

SADC

Hashim Mbita Project

**Southern African
Liberation Struggles**

Contemporaneous Documents

1960–1994

edited by

Arnold J. Temu and Joel das N. Tembe

7

**Frontline States
(continued) & Extension
Countries**



MKUKI NA NYOTA
DAR - ES - SALAAM

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Zambia

Independent on 24 October 1964

7.1

Zambia's Contribution to the Liberation of Southern Africa, 1960 to 2001

By Mutumba Mainga Bull and Lee Habasonda

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Introduction: 1

This chapter provides an overview of the role played by Zambia in the liberation struggle for southern Africa during the period 1960 – 2001. It is based primarily on a synthesis of oral sources, supplemented by archival and contemporary sources.

The oral interviews were conducted in the six provinces in which the country is divided and the interviewees were willing to sit down for hours and share their memories with us. Unfortunately, a large number of the first hand actors have died, while some among the living were reluctant to participate in the project for various reasons.

The Government of the Republic of Zambia through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs facilitated our tours by providing a vehicle and a driver. The office of the first Republican President was always open for interviews and guidance. The research team is also grateful to the retired and serving men in the military, who walked us back into the sixties, seventies, and eighties as the wars of liberation raged on. Finally, mention should be made of the unique early records in the United National Independence Party (UNIP) Archives.

Background:

Zambia is a landlocked country located in south, central Africa. It shares borders with Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, and Mozambique. It has a total area of 752,972 square kilometres (290,586 square miles). The country's population in 1964 was estimated at fewer than three (3) million. By 1991, Zambia's population had risen to over eight million people, while currently it is estimated at over 11 million.

Like the rest of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa which attained independence in the 1960s, Zambia's independence was followed by nationalist struggles for freedom from Britain, the colonizing power. Although this is not the place to discuss in detail the rise of nationalist movements in Zambia, our interest being the contribution of independent Zambia to the liberation struggles of its neighbours, suffice it to briefly mention the political contours of the nationalist struggle whose success paved the way for Zambia to champion the cause of its neighbours.

Fully fledged nationalist movements in Zambia emerged after World War II. In 1948 the Northern Rhodesia African Congress was formed as a political party. This was subsequently reconstituted into the African National Congress (ANC) under Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula. In 1958 the ANC split between reformists and militants. The reformists chose to follow gradual steps towards independence by working through the established legal institutions, namely the Legislative Council, and remained in the party. The militants followed Kaunda and formed the Zambia

(1) The Zambian Research Team included Mutumba M. Bull, as National Focal Point and Principal Researcher, Lee M. Habasonda, as Associate Researcher, and Walima T. Kalusa, General Joseph Chitomfwa, and Col Best K. Makumba, as Researchers. The research team worked with a team of research assistants, and a cameraman in Lusaka only.

African National Congress (ZANC). Realizing the futility of working through the legal channels to obtain independence, they decided to adopt other conspicuous means, among which was the boycott of the Legislative Council. The declaration of a boycott of the constitution by ZANC in the following year landed its leaders into restriction in remote rural areas. After the banning of the Party by the colonial government, Kaunda was charged with holding a meeting without a permit and sent to prison for nine months. When they were released in the same year they formed the United National Independence Party (UNIP), and invited Kaunda to lead the party after his release from prison in January 1960.

The immediate goal of UNIP, as for the ANC before it, was the dismantling of the Central African Federation, for it stood in their way of achieving independence as an African country. A Federation was imposed by the British on the colonial territories of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Southern Rhodesia under a Federal Government in 1953. The Federal Government was dominated by the reactionary white minority settlers in Southern Rhodesia, the only self-governing settler dominated territory in the Federation; Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were denominated a Colonial Office Protectorate and a Foreign Office Protectorate, respectively, and both had fewer European resident populations.

The Federal Government took exclusive control over the affairs of the three territories leaving the respective territorial colonial governments of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland responsibility for African education, African health, African agriculture, African land and settlement, and native administration. The control of the economy by the Federal Government based in Salisbury (now Harare) relegated the other two partners to secondary positions that turned them into suppliers of labour to the Southern Rhodesian, industrial and farming, white owned and controlled complexes. Equally, it made nonsense of the economic argument for the Federation, and destroyed any hope that the Federation was a combination of equal partners. The racist policies of the white minority settlers in Southern Rhodesia were at variance with the colonial policies in the two territories, albeit Africans in the two territories were also subject to some degree of racial segregation. African fears in the three territories were more and more heightened as white settler politics consolidated and swung to the right in Southern Rhodesia, from 1956. Inevitably, the African majorities in Zambia and Malawi were pitched against the Federation, as they quite rightly feared that the more oppressive native policies in Southern Rhodesia would be extended to them. Little wonder then that the nationalists in the Federation fought for its dismantling; Zambia nationalists turned their full force to achieving this objective from the inception of the ANC.

The party opposed the Review Conference called in London on 5 December 1960 to review the Constitution of the Federation promised in the Constitution after seven years. The Conference was preceded by the report of the Monckton Commission, which was set up by the British government in the previous year to consult the people in the Federation directly on their views concerning the Federation. Released

in October 1960, the report stated that opposition to Federation was “widespread, sincere, of longstanding, and almost pathological.”² It concluded that the Federation in its present form could only be maintained by force, and recommended that the British government should retain full power to “make provision for the future of the Federation in any manner they might find fit, including secession.”

These developments forced the British government in 1962 to revise the new constitution so as to clear the way for majority rule. In the election of October 1962, UNIP and the ANC secured over two-thirds of the total vote, hence taking over a number of government departments. The Federation was then doomed and it was finally broken up at the end of 1963. In a peaceful evolution, Northern Rhodesia became Zambia in 1964, and UNIP formed its first cabinet under Kaunda as the president of the country. Zambia’s southern neighbours, namely, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), South West Africa (Namibia), Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa, were still struggling to throw off the colonial yoke: a white minority ruled South Africa and South West Africa through the apartheid system, and a white settler minority ruled in Southern Rhodesia, while Portuguese colonialism ruled in Angola and Mozambique.



Map of Zambia³

(2) Mockton Report. London: 1960.

(3) <http://un.org/>

Zambia's Policy towards Southern Africa

Zambia saw itself as part of southern Africa, deeply involved in the unfolding crisis within the region. The Zambian nationalist leadership of Kenneth David Kaunda, the first Republican President (1964 – 1991), held that by virtue of Zambia's strategic geo-political position, the country had special responsibilities in ending the crisis through the total liberation of the entire region as a basis for building peace in place of armed conflict and oppression.

Furthermore, Zambia was committed to the total liberation of Africa which was enshrined in the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), formed in May 1963 at a meeting of independent Africa states in Addis Ababa. Liberation was a major theme at the first and second meetings of Independent African States, which were held in Accra and Addis Ababa in 1958 and 1960 respectively. Article II of the OAU Charter included the purpose to eradicate all forms of colonialism from Africa. The founding session of the OAU in May 1963 established the African Liberation Committee. In 1963 Zambia was still a colony of Britain and yet the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was one of the twenty one national liberation movements which signed the 1963 Joint Memorandum to the first summit.⁴ Zambia became a member of the Organization of African Unity after attaining independence in 1964, and became a member of the OAU Liberation Committee in 1965.

Zambia, as was the case during its own struggle for independence from Britain, remained committed to the principles of majority rule.⁵ Kaunda saw the principles of majority rule as the only basis for a durable peace which was rooted in freedom and justice. He called on South Africa to withdraw from both Rhodesia and Namibia in order to open the way for acceptable and lasting solutions to these problems.

On Rhodesia, Zambia maintained that Rhodesia was a colony of Britain. President Kaunda urged the British government to remove the reactionary, illegal regime of Ian Douglas Smith and prepare the country for majority rule and eventual independence. When it became clear that Britain was not willing to use the necessary force to remove the rebellious regime, Zambia fully backed the Zimbabwean nationalists waging guerrilla warfare to topple the illegal racist regime in their country. At the same time, however, Kaunda preferred a peaceful negotiated settlement through a Constitutional Conference to be attended by all parties. The Zambian leader advocated for the release from detention of all Zimbabwean nationalist leaders so that they and their parties could participate in the Constitutional Conference to solve the Rhodesian crisis, thereby leading to majority rule and independence.⁶

In the case of Namibia, the apartheid South African administration had to be removed from the country. Zambia saw Namibia as one of the greatest challenges to the UN and stated that neither the UN General Assembly nor the UN Security

(4) Wolfers, Michael. *Politics in the Organization of African Unity*. London: Methuen, 1976. See p.187.

(5) Interviews with President K.D. Kaunda, (Lusaka) 28 December 2006 and 10 May 2007.

(6) *Zambia Daily Mail*. 22 October 1965.

Council should sit by idly while their decisions were being flouted by South Africa. Zambia called for full and comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa to force it to comply with the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council Resolutions. To this end, Zambia fully supported the Namibian peoples when they took up arms to remove the ruthless, racist, minority government.

In relation to South Africa, Zambia advocated for the abolition of apartheid and saw majority rule as the only solution to the crisis in that country. Zambia called on the majority of Western European powers, which, due to heavy investment in South Africa, were supporting the apartheid regime, to desist from doing so. Zambia acted as a rear base to the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) liberation movements of South Africa, both of which opened representative offices in Lusaka as early as 1965.

To the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique, Zambia pointed out that the answer to their colonial problems lay in the granting of freedom and independence to the peoples of Angola and Mozambique. Zambia acted as a rear base to liberation movements of both Angola and Mozambique, while at the same time provided refugee status to hundreds of thousands of refugees from these two countries.

Zambia, together with other newly independent African states, resolved to unite their efforts and resources through the Organisation of African Unity in the fight against imperialism, colonialism, and under development. It was this resolve which in April 1969 formed the basis for the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa. The Manifesto provided a definition of the objectives of the liberation struggle in southern Africa and articulated the principles upon which the liberation process was based. The Manifesto, originating in Zambia, was adopted by the fourteen nation Heads of State from eastern and central Africa at their Fifth Summit Conference held in Lusaka, 14-17 April 1969. While pledging total support for the armed liberation struggle in southern Africa should the white, racist regimes remain intransigent, the leaders of the fourteen nations proclaimed that they abhorred violence and urged freedom fighters to use peaceful methods “even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change” if peaceful progress to full emancipation were possible in southern Africa.⁷ They stated that if the minority racist regimes were to change their policies and accept the principle of self-determination for the un-liberated territories, they would urge the liberation movements to desist from their armed struggle and to cooperate in the mechanics of a peaceful transfer of power.⁸

The Lusaka Manifesto was subsequently endorsed by the Organization of African Unity Heads of State and Government at its Sixth Ordinary Session, from 6-10 1969 September. The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government mandated the then OAU Chair, President Amado Ahidjo, to present the Manifesto at the 24th Session of

(7) *Zambia Daily Mail*. 18 April 1969.

(8) *Zambia Daily Mail*. 18 April 1969.

the UN General Assembly. The Manifesto was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and was circulated as a UN document.⁹

Progressive nations in the international community rallied to assist Zambia to overcome challenges that arose from its geopolitical situation, particularly in the transport and communication sectors. Similarly, progressive nations in the international community rallied to support liberation movements in their struggle for human rights and self-determination.

Indeed, Zambia's involvement and dealings with regional political movements and emerging parties in the region predate its independence.¹⁰ Among the objectives of the ZANC, the predecessor to UNIP, were "To cooperate with all nationalist movements in the entire continent," and "To act as mouthpiece for Africans." Moreover, it is not without significance that during the struggle for independence UNIP found a supportive rear base in independent Tanganyika, and had offices in Cairo and Accra. Kaunda, who was elected Secretary General of the African National Congress of Northern Rhodesia in July 1953, revealed that the Secretary General of the South African ANC tried to come to Northern Rhodesia in 1954, but was deported by Governor Arthur Benson.¹¹ The main objective of the Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA) was to draw together independent African states and to promote and support liberation movements in those African states, which were then not liberated (PAFMECSA was subsequently dissolved when the OAU was established in 1963.). In 1962, at a meeting of PAFMECSA Conference in Addis Ababa, Nelson Mandela had separate discussions with Kaunda and Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe both of UNIP.¹² Kaunda was Chair of PAFMECSA from January 1962 to 1963. Referring to that period Kaunda said: "When I was privileged to become Chairman of the Pan African Freedom Movement for Central and Southern Africa, I had to learn to think about more peoples, more nations...."¹³ In his first address in the Legislative Council in January 1963, Kaunda stated that the disturbed situation around Northern Rhodesia would affect the country unless steps were taken to help to solve these problems.¹⁴ Speaking on 2 September 1963 to a symposium arranged by the Roan Selection Trust (RST), Kaunda stated that to the African people, Pan-Africanism was a constructive force which was throwing all its resources into the fight for the political emancipation of its peoples. He went on to state that, at that particular time, all Pan-Africanists condemn Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and the Republic of South Africa without reservation.¹⁵

(9) Elijay, Mudenda. *Zambia: A Generation of Struggle*. Harare: SAPES Books, 1999: See p.110.

(10) Interviews with K.D. Kaunda, (Lusaka) 28 December 2006 and 10 May 2007.

(11) Kaunda, 28 December 2006.

(12) Mandela, Nelson. *Long Walk to Freedom. The Autobiography of Nelson Mandela*. London: Little Brown and Co., 2006: See p.342.

(13) Legume, Colin, Ed. *Zambia Independence and Beyond: The Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda*. London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1966: See p.193.

(14) *Ibid.* p.5.

(15) *Ibid.* p.4.

Upon its formation in 1959, UNIP assumed a leadership role in the region when Kaunda, its president, was also Chair of PAFMECSA. In January 1964, UNIP won a landslide victory in the territorial elections which were based on universal adult suffrage and which ushered in self-government for Northern Rhodesia. Kaunda became the Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia until its independence on 24 October 1964, when Northern Rhodesia became the Republic of Zambia and he became its President.

In the period of 1960 to 1964, UNIP opened the office for Pan-African Affairs, headed by an under secretary, at its headquarters in Lusaka. UNIP records have revealed correspondence with liberation movements in the region which go back to 1960. On 9 December 1960, the Secretary General of the Swaziland Progressive Party, Dr A.P. Zwane wrote to Kaunda and UNIP, requesting assistance and guidance; he was particularly interested in getting copies of the Constitution of Northern Rhodesia and that of UNIP.¹⁶ On 9 January 1961, Dr Zwane wrote to Solomon Kalulu, the then UNIP Chair, whom he had met in Basutoland. Dr Zwane wanted to know what constitutional changes UNIP envisaged in view of the impending talks on the Northern Rhodesian Constitution.¹⁷ The Swaziland Progressive Party also raised the question of a person trying to go to Accra, Ghana from Swaziland. Dr Zwane inquired from UNIP how the person would pass through Rhodesia. The National Secretary General of UNIP, M. Sipalo, replied on 26 January 1961 that “our comrade who intends to pass through here en route to Accra may do so if you give him proper credentials in written form with his membership card of your Party.”¹⁸ It is said that long before independence, UNIP used to smuggle freedom fighters proceeding to Accra, Cairo, and later Dar es Salaam across the country.¹⁹ On 3 August 1963, Lawrence C. Mulenga, the UNIP Administrative Secretary, wrote a letter introducing three Mozambican freedom fighters, in route to Dar es Salaam, to UNIP cadres and other sympathizers, with instructions to the militants to facilitate safe passage to their destination.²⁰ Similarly on 9 September 1963, Hlomulo J.C. Gwambe, National President of the Mozambique National Democratic Union (UDENAMO) wrote to

A. Milner, the then Deputy National Secretary for UNIP, requesting UNIP’s support for UDENAMO’s militants on their way from Mozambique to Tanzania and from Tanzania to Mozambique. The support requested involved offering protection, money, and accommodation to the militants and securing their release when or if they were arrested while in Zambia.²¹ Similar requests were received at this same time from the ANC and PAC of South Africa. In many cases, UNIP made transit arrangements for party cadres proceeding to Tanganyika (Tanzania) which was then the rear base for

(16) UNIP. 6/7/20.

(17) UNIP. 6/7/20.

(18) UNIP. 6/7/20.

(19) Interviews with K.D. Kaunda, (Lusaka) 29 December 2006 and 10 May 2007; A.G. Zulu, (Makeni Farm, Lusaka) 16 June 2007; Maxon Gaura, (Kazungula) 30 April 2007.

(20) UNIP. 6/5/3.

(21) UNIP. 6/5/3.

virtually all liberation movements in southern Africa. Before the end of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 31 December 1963, it was, however, difficult for UNIP since the Immigration Portfolio was under the Federal Government. As soon as the UNIP regime assumed control of immigration matters in 1964, it was swamped with endless requests for entry permits for liberation movement representatives and militants.²²

On 23 April 1963, founders of the Caprivi African People's Union (CAPU) wrote to UNIP headquarters in Lusaka to report the formation of CAPU and to request UNIP's assistance on "political subjects."²³ Similarly, the founders of the CAPRIVI African National Union (CANU) wrote to the Pan-African Affairs Desk at UNIP headquarters on 6 November 1963, notifying UNIP of the formation of CANU. They also appealed for financial help from UNIP to get the party registered. Furthermore they requested UNIP to forward their petition against South Africa's continued occupation of their territory to the United Nations. On 26 November 1963, CANU submitted notes on the proposed constitution for their party for UNIP's perusal and assistance to have them typed and bound into booklets. The notes were sent to UNIP headquarters through the Sesheke UNIP office.²⁴ M. Sipalo, the then Under Secretary for Pan-African Affairs at UNIP headquarters, responded on 5 December 1963, advising CANU to hold on to their petition to the UN Special Committee in New York until after the January 1964 elections in Northern Rhodesia.

When security and immigration forces in Namibia made it impossible for South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) militants to pass through Rhodesia on their way to Tanzania, E.P. Nanyembe, the Chief Representative of SWAPO in the Bechuanaland Protectorate wrote to UNIP on 15 February 1963, requesting UNIP to send a Land Rover to Freetown so that SWAPO could use it and continue sending its militants into Tanzania through Kazungula. UNIP was unable to provide a Land Rover, especially since it was preparing for elections to gain internal self-government.²⁵

On 5 November 1964, the merger between SWAPO and CANU was brokered by UNIP²⁶ through the Vice President of UNIP, then Reuben Chitandika Kamanga, among others. Later, when Mishake Muyongo decided that CANU should withdraw from the merger, he sent a memorandum to the UNIP Vice President who was also then the Republic's Vice President, R.C. Kamanga. It was, however, the UNIP Under Secretary for International and Pan-African Affairs, then A.J.K. Kangwa, who on 20 July 1965 sent a strong letter to Muyongo criticizing CANU for taking a splinter stance from SWAPO.²⁷

(22) Kaunda, 29 December 2006.

(23) UNIP. 6/7/23.

(24) UNIP. 6/7/23.

(25) UNIP. 6/5/9.

(26) UNIP. 6/7/29.

(27) UNIP. 6/7/29.

On 16 February 1963, Oliver Tambo wrote to Kaunda: “You and UNIP are a source of constant inspiration to millions of struggling peoples and hundreds of African leaders, not least of them being those battling south of Zambia, south of the Zambezi and south of the Limpopo. I know this inspiration will survive the fight for freedom and the fight will not continue for long if we truly close ranks and move into action as a solid mass.”²⁸ In May 1963, Walter Sisulu wrote to the UNIP President to call on UNIP to intensify its cooperation with the ANC as white supremacists in South Africa passed more and more oppressive legislation.²⁹

On 26 November 1963, Duma Nokwe, ANC (South Africa) Secretary-General wrote to the UNIP Secretary General, urging UNIP to take a firm stand against the arrest and pending trial of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and others. Responding to Nokwe’s letter, Aaron Milner, UNIP Secretary General, informed the ANC official that Kaunda had sent a very strong warning to the South African government that if Mandela and others were sentenced to death, “the whole Africa would hit back at those who (come) not from Africa.” Milner went on to reveal that this serious warning was repeated over the BBC and the South African Broadcasting Corporation. He pointed out that this was an indication that Zambians were prepared to go the whole way to help their brothers in South Africa to free themselves.³⁰

According to UNIP sources, the first authorized consignment of arms for a liberation movement to enter Northern Rhodesia was for the African National Congress of South Africa, during the period of Self-Government, in 1964. The arms came from Tanzania and Aaron Milner, UNIP National Secretary and Parliamentary Secretary to the Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, went to the border to receive the consignment. Milner narrated that in route, around Mpika, in the middle of the night, he was signalled to stop by flash lights. There in the forest was the ANC President Oliver Tambo and the Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia, Kenneth David Kaunda! The arms were handed over to ANC freedom fighters there and then.³¹ Meanwhile the Southern Rhodesian nationalists started using Northern Rhodesia

as a base for their struggle during the period of the UNIP/ANC Coalition 1962-1963. The Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) was formed in December 1961 and was banned in September 1962, while the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was formed in August 1963 and was banned in August 1964. Both parties went underground. The banning of African nationalist parties, contrary to expectations, increased the nationalist agitation for freedom. The minority settler politics swung to the right with the Rhodesian Front Party (RFP) coming to power through the December 1962 elections in Rhodesia; the more right wing Ian Smith became Prime Minister of Rhodesia in 1964.

(28) UNIP. 6/5/8.

(29) UNIP. 6/5/8.

(30) UNIP. 6/65/8.

(31) Conversation with Mr Aaron Milner, (President K.D. Kaunda’s Office, Kabulonga) 29 January 2008.

In August 1964, the Smith government declared a state of emergency in the Salisbury African townships. By December 1964, nearly 2000 Africans were in detention or restriction without trial.³² Nationalist leaders Joshua Nkomo of ZAPU was held at Gonakudzingwa and Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole of ZANU at the Salisbury Maximum Security Prison. Both ZAPU and ZANU exiles were operating in Northern Rhodesia, building their membership from nationals of Zimbabwe who were either working or who had settled in the country.³³

Furthermore it is said that the friendship between Kaunda and Joshua Nkomo went back to the period before the Coalition Government in Northern Rhodesia. Mark Chuunyu Chona³⁴ revealed that when he was a student at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1960, news was received that Kaunda was at the airport in Salisbury. He had come from London and was on his way to Northern Rhodesia. He was not allowed to come into town to meet Nkomo, so Nkomo went to the airport to meet with Kaunda. Both men had just come out of prison.

Mark Chona and a good number of fellow students rode in buses to go and see Kaunda at the Salisbury airport. The students were already at the airport when Nkomo arrived. Chona recalls that Nkomo and Kaunda went into a very intensive discussion, while the students were watching. The students could see that racist security personnel were really worried. In a very short time an announcement came, "Kenneth Kaunda, Kenneth Kaunda, telephone call, go into the booth." He went into the booth and was holding the receiver for a long time. Mark Chona walked over to the telephone booth and offered to help. He said: "Sir, can I hold for you." There was no call. They just wanted Nkomo and Kaunda to be separated.³⁵

On 22 June 1964, the Under Secretary, Pan-African Affairs at UNIP headquarters wrote to all the representatives of liberation movements in Northern Rhodesia to inform them that:³⁶

1. No party officials would open offices in the country unless they were invited officially by both UNIP and the government.
2. UNIP would not take responsibility for accommodation and food.
3. Pan-African Affairs Office would make arrangements for obtaining all necessary permits for officials seeking to stay or transit through Northern Rhodesia.

Liberation movement representatives were required to state the number of their officials, names, and positions held. Furthermore, representatives were urged to ensure that their officials had the papers necessary for them to stay in the country. In response to the circular above, on 10 July 1964, the ANC wrote to notify the UNIP Pan-African Affairs office that their Resident Representative, Thomas T. Nkobi, and

(32) Theodore, Bull. Ed. *Rhodesian Perspective*. London: Michael Joseph, 1967: See p.126.

(33) Interview with early Zimbabwe settlers, (Mumbwa) July 2007. See also Elijah Mudenda. *Zambia: A Generation of Struggle*. Harare: SAPES Books, 1999: See p.22.

(34) Interview with Mr Mark Chuunyu Chona, (Dar es Salaam) 30 May 2007.

(35) Chona, 30 May 2007.

(36) UNIP. 9/1/97.

the Assistant Representative, Memory Miya, had temporary residence papers, valid for only six months, and sought assistance to secure renewals from the UNIP office.³⁷ UNIP had representatives in the region and abroad, in capitals such as London, Stockholm, Cairo, and Accra, who looked after both the Party and Northern Rhodesia people's interests. At independence, the government of the Republic of Zambia established diplomatic missions in friendly countries. UNIP was the ruling party in Zambia from 1964 to 1991, and President Kaunda remained the Republic's President during that period, which also included the period that Zambia was under a one party system between 1973 and 1991. Therefore, UNIP continued to influence government policies in relation to the liberation process in southern Africa for the entire period.

Office of the President: The Political Dimension

On 28 November 1964, a month after attaining its independence, the new Zambian nationalist government set out policies regarding foreign nationalist parties in Zambia. The Office of the President took charge of all matters relating to liberation movements, and set out the following new regulations:³⁸

1. Those organizations wishing to establish themselves in Zambia would open offices only in Lusaka and not at any other place in the country.
2. Office bearers and members of these organizations were not allowed to operate outside a radius of 10 miles from Lusaka, without special permission from the Office of the President.
3. Permanent staff at the Lusaka offices of the organizations were limited to a maximum number of six (6).
4. The headquarters of foreign nationalist organizations located in Lusaka were required to render to the Office of the President details of itineraries and programmes of their officials operating from their offices.

Furthermore, all foreign nationalist organizations were to:

5. Render to the Office of the President addresses and telephone numbers of their permanent office or home from which they were operating in Lusaka.
6. Submit to the Office of the President a list of the permanent staff at the Lusaka office, titles of individuals, and confirmation that these individuals had complied with the Republic's immigration laws.
7. Branches or offices outside Lusaka: Organizations were to inform the Office of the President of their immediate plans for the cessation of activities outside Lusaka and for the dissolution of all branches in the provinces and districts.

(37) UNIP. 9/1/97.

(38) National Archives Zambia. FA/1/22

Finally, the Ministry of Home Affairs was made responsible for coordinating all arrangements regarding refugees with foreign nationalist organizations. It meant that all inquiries concerning refugees had to be referred to the Ministry of Home Affairs and not the Office of the President.

The Liberation Centre in Lusaka

In January 1965, concern was expressed by both the Central Committee of UNIP and the Cabinet that most liberation movements were operating under difficulties due to lack of funds with which to acquire and maintain suitable offices and living accommodation. Ways and means of assisting such organizations were discussed. It was, however, concluded that the Zambian government would only purchase a block of offices for use by the liberation movements as office accommodation. The Minister of Local Government and Housing, in consultation with the Commissioner of Lands, was to negotiate and purchase the specific building which was to be partitioned to provide offices. After a building was identified and purchased by the government, His Excellency the President took over the responsibility for allocating offices to the various foreign parties. It was further decided that there was to be a representative of the Zambian government who would be accommodated in the office building, which was later known as Liberation Centre. His duty was to liaise between the Zambian government and the various foreign nationalist parties, and take general responsibility for the offices.

In March 1965, the President appointed Mukuka F. Nkoloso, a veteran soldier of World War II, to be responsible for the foreign nationalist office building. Nkoloso was to be paid £60 per month. He was directly responsible to His Excellency the President.³⁹

The Zambian government decided that, at that stage, direct government assistance to liberation movements would be limited to the provision of office accommodation, while additional financial contributions were to be channelled through the OAU's Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam, which had a central fund for the purpose.⁴⁰ By 1965, foreign nationalist organizations operating in Lusaka included:⁴¹ the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the African National Congress of South Africa (ANC), the Pan African Congress of South Africa (PAC), the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the Caprivi African National Union (CANU), the Caprivi African People's Union (CAPU), the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), the Mozambique National Democratic Union (UDENAMO), the Mozambique African National Congress (ANC Mozambique), the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), the Union of Populations of Angola (UPA), National Front for the

(39) Interview with K.D. Kaunda, (Lusaka) 10 May 2007.

(40) N.A. Zambia FA/1/22 LOC495, MFA 344/163/01Conf.

(41) Ibid.

Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and the All African Convention and Unity Movement (South Africa) (AAC).

Given the proliferation of exiled nationalist parties from individual un-liberated territories, Zambia was soon faced with the question of which organizations to recognize and which ones not to recognize. A decision was made to seek the views of the OAU and the OAU Liberation Committee before granting recognition. It followed therefore that some organizations were subsequently not approved in Lusaka due to non recognition by the OAU. The OAU and the Liberation Committee were sometimes known to change their decisions and grant recognition to parties they had initially rejected.

A number of movements sent in applications to establish offices in Lusaka. In May 1965, the United National Democratic Party of Angola (UNDDPA) applied for recognition by the Zambian government, but was not approved due to non recognition by the OAU and the OAU Liberation Committee; the Organisation was ordered to disband or else be liable to prosecution. The National Unity Democratic Organization of South West Africa (NUDO) applied to establish an office in Lusaka, but was similarly not approved; the party chair, Dr Mburuma Karina, was declared a prohibited immigrant in both Zambia and Botswana. In 1966, Dr Karina unsuccessfully tried to deal with the Zambian government once again, claiming to be the representative of the SWA National Unity Front (SWANUF).⁴² The Comité Revolucionario de Mocambique (COREMO) was formed in May 1965 as a result of the meeting between Portuguese nationalist parties which took place at ZAPU offices in Lusaka.⁴³ COREMO was subsequently recognized by the Zambian government. The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) of Dr Jonas Savimbi had not been recognized by the OAU and the OAU Liberation Committee, and so it had opened an office in Lusaka under Matense Katalayo as its representative; UNITA was in November 1966 denied recognition.

Zambia's Mediatory and Conciliatory Role

Zambia allowed liberation movements and freedom fighters to establish bases and transit camps in the country from which they launched attacks into the territories still under colonial rule and racist minority regimes. Liberation movements were also given land for production units, logistic camps, and training camps for youths, while some of the militants and fighters settled in compounds and townships in cities and urban centres. Some of the high ranking officials of liberation movements with professional qualifications secured jobs in the country as teachers, doctors, and nurses. While in Zambia, the Zambian government protected liberation movements and freedom fighters from attacks by the enemy as much as was possible and facilitated travel by providing necessary travel documents. Each liberation movement, on the

(42) NAZ-MHA. 1/6/24 LOC2427.

(43) MFA. 334/163/01Conf. NAZ FA/1/22.

other hand, was left free to run its own internal matters as long as they did not break the law of the land.

In dealing with liberation movements, President Kaunda and the Zambian government played a mediatory and conciliatory role within and between liberation movements. This was due to the realization that without unity their efforts would have limited impact on the struggle. It was for this reason that throughout the liberation struggle, for Zimbabwe for instance, Zambia tried to reconcile ZAPU and ZANU. Similarly, in relation to Namibia, Zambia supported the merger between SWAPO and CANU in 1964, and suppressed efforts by Mishake Muyongo to repudiate the agreement. In relation to Angola, Kaunda, as already seen in 1966, tried to reconcile Dr Jonas Savimbi of UNITA and Holden Roberto of the FNLA without any success. Later in 1974, Zambia tried to convince the three major Angolan liberation movements to form a government of national unity. President Kaunda believes to this day that had such a government been established, Angola would have avoided the tragic and costly 27 year civil war the country went through.⁴⁴

Zambia Intelligence Service

The Office of the President was restructured and expanded to facilitate operations relating to liberation movements which were now added to its portfolio. In 1965, an Act was passed to establish the Zambia Intelligence Service under the Office of the President. The same Act abolished the Special Branch which was under the Police and headed by Michael Mataka, the first indigenous Commissioner of Police, appointed ten days before the UDI in Rhodesia.⁴⁵ Officials of the Zambia Intelligence Service were mandated to work with liberation movements. They checked on counter intelligence activities of other countries, especially the racist minority regimes in southern Africa, and employed informers, both inside and outside liberation movements.⁴⁶ In working with liberation movements, intelligence officers assisted to bring in arms and guns and other weapons from Tanzania for freedom fighters in Zambia. They stored the arms in safe houses and distributed them to intended freedom fighters within the country. Furthermore, intelligence officers identified safe crossing points for freedom fighters along the Zambian border, into and out of the countries of combat. The intelligence budget allocation and expenditure were not debated in the National Assembly. The Intelligence Service bought safe houses, paid rent, and even built houses for freedom fighters and liberation movements where it was deemed necessary.

There was close coordination between the Zambian Intelligence Service and their counterparts in Tanzania. On 21 April 1967, a meeting with all representatives of nationalist parties in Lusaka was called by the Permanent Secretary, Presidential

(44) Interviews with K.D. Kaunda, (Lusaka) 29 December 2006; General Malimba Masheke, (Lusaka) 27 February 2007.

(45) Hall, Richard. *The High Principles: Kaunda and the White South*. London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1969: See p.123.

(46) Interview with Mr Vernon J. Mwaanga, (Lusaka) 25 February 2008.

Affairs, to explain resolutions made by the Liaison Meeting of Heads of the Special Branch Service of Zambia and Tanzania which was held at Mbeya, on 28 February 1967.⁴⁷ However, there was a complication. Although the majority of white colonial civil servants had taken their pensions and left in 1964, the new Zambia Intelligence Service comprised both Zambian and senior expatriate white officers. On several occasions, senior expatriate intelligence officers had their Zambian counterparts arrested when they found them in the process of transporting arms for liberation movements.

In May 1966, Vernon Johnson Mwaanga was appointed the first Director General of the Zambia Intelligence Service and Elisha Banda, his deputy. The fact that Zambian intelligence officers were being arrested by white expatriate officers from the same service irked Director General Mwaanga.⁴⁸ He went to see President Kaunda pointing out that their mandate to work with liberation movements was being frustrated by white expatriate officers from the same service. He revealed that whenever there were arrests, indigenous Zambian officers would find petty criminals and exchange them in cells at night with arrested officers. A directive was given to the Public Service Commission Chairman, then Henry Makulu and his Vice Chairman Josephat Siyomunji to terminate the contracts of the 37 expatriate officers in the Zambia Intelligence Service. The Public Service Commission sat in an emergency session and wrote letters terminating the appointments. The letters were delivered simultaneously to stations in Kabwe, Livingstone, Ndola, and Luanshya.⁴⁹

Mwaanga recalled that as Director General of the Zambia Intelligence Service he was responsible for looking after Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC. He allocated safe houses and provided security to Oliver Tambo and other senior leaders of the ANC. Mwaanga dealt with Thabo Mbeki first when he was the Director of the Information Department of the ANC, and later, after he was appointed Director for Foreign Affairs, following the death through natural causes, of his predecessor John Makatini. Mbeki lived in different townships which included Lilanda, Kabwata, Mtendere, and Martin Luther King Road in Kabulonga.⁵⁰ Mwaanga also worked closely with Alfred Nzo, the then Secretary General of the ANC who lived in Lilanda. Apart from the ANC of South Africa, Mwaanga worked closely with leaders of other liberation movements. Dr Augustino Neto of the MPLA and Dr Jonas Savimbi of UNITA used to discuss their needs with the Director General of the Zambia Intelligence Service. Later, following the three way split of the MPLA in 1972, V.J. Mwaanga was appointed to negotiate for a reconciliation of the three factions with Dr Augustino Neto. Mwaanga flew to Brazzaville with General Hashim Mbita, Executive

(47) NAZ MFA/344/5/02 Conf., NAZ FA/1/162.

(48) Mwaanga, 25 February 2008.

(49) Mwaanga, 25 February 2008; Hall. *Principles*: See p.125.

(50) Mwaanga. 25 February 2008.

Secretary of the OAU Liberation Committee, a number of times to negotiate with Dr Neto.⁵¹

Mwaanga recalled that when the eastern front was opened in 1967/1968, Zimbabwean ZANU freedom fighters and Mozambican FRELIMO freedom fighters used the Eastern Province of Zambia to enter Tete Province in Mozambique and the Zambezi Valley of Zimbabwe. He recalls that Malawi under Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda obstructed the efforts of liberation movements by denying them transit rights,⁵² and that, even at the UN, Malawi abstained from voting or simply left the Assembly when it was time to vote. This account concerning Malawi was similar to that given by General Thomas Michael Fara. General Fara revealed that the official policy of Malawi was that the country would allow food and medicines for liberation movements to pass through Malawi. He recalled that, when he was stationed in the Eastern Province of Zambia, he and some other Zambian army personnel were detained in Malawi for three days while trying to take fuel to FRELIMO in Mozambique. The Zambian government had to intervene before General Fara and his military men were released. Both General Fara and Mwaanga, however, revealed that Malawian territory was violated several times by freedom fighters and Zambian intelligence officers in search for safe crossings for freedom fighters.⁵³ Mwaanga went on to state that Botswana, which gained independence in 1966 was not like Malawi, despite its difficult geopolitical situation. The Botswana government used to notify and coordinate with Zambia on the movements of liberation movement cadres and freedom fighters, into and out of South Africa, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.⁵⁴

Zambian Defence Forces: The Military Dimension

Following the Zambianization of the Zambian Army and Air Force in 1970/1971, the Zambian Defence Forces came to play a pivotal role in the liberation struggle. The military dimension of the liberation struggle was introduced to run parallel with both the political and diplomatic dimensions.⁵⁵

Before 1970, the Zambian Army was not given any special duties to do with liberation movements and freedom fighters.⁵⁶ According to General Mibenge, the Army was not given any brief at all by the Government concerning liberation movements and freedom fighters. Yet President Kaunda had allowed ZAPU to organize in Zambia and ZAPU had formed camps in the Southern Province. In 1968, the 1st Battalion

(51) Ibid.

(52) Also interviews with General Thomas Fara, (Lusaka) 12 September 2007 and 15 January 2008; Chona, 30 May 2007.

(53) Mwaanga. 25 February 2008.

(54) Mwaanga. 25 February 2008.

(55) Interviews with K.D. Kaunda, (Lusaka) 5 October 2007; General Malimba Masheke, General T. M. Fara, and General Benjamin Mibenge, (Lusaka) 2 February 2008.

(56) Mibenge. 2 February 2008.

(1ZR) moved into the Southern Province to arrest ZAPU freedom fighters. This was called *Operation Sledge Hammer*. ZAPU freedom fighters were rounded up and handed over to the Zambian government. Similarly in the Eastern Province, President Kaunda had allowed FRELIMO to route through Zambia to fight the Portuguese in Mozambique without full briefing of the military. The situation was the same in the Western and North Western Provinces, where the President had allowed UNITA and MPLA to operate; yet the instructions of the Army to their officers were to arrest freedom fighters if they find them on Zambian soil.

It is necessary at this juncture to point out that before independence in 1964, the Zambian Army was part of the British Army and there was no African above the rank of Captain. Indigenous Zambians could only rise to the rank of Warrant Officer Class I, while all those above this level were either white Britons or Rhodesians and South Africans. The first effort to train Zambians to higher ranks was in August 1963 when the British Royal Military Academy Sandhurst allocated three places each to Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia. While Southern Rhodesia sent three white trainees, Northern Rhodesia sent three indigenous trainees, namely Kingsley Chinkuli, Dustan Kasote, and Benjamin Mibenge. The three Northern Rhodesia African recruits were taken on after Form VI as British cadets.⁵⁷ General Mibenge narrated that they flew to London from Salisbury in Southern Rhodesia in September 1963. They trained at Sandhurst until 1965. On graduation they were given three options: (i) Join the British Army; (ii) Go back to Northern Rhodesia; (iii) Join any other Army in the Commonwealth.⁵⁸ All three opted to return home to the then Republic of Zambia and joined the Zambian Army. Two of the three Southern Rhodesia trainees returned to Rhodesia and one of them was in 1969 killed by ZAPU fighters in the Zambezi valley.

Mibenge recalled that as a Platoon Officer under the first battalion (1ZR), in October 1968 while on patrol in the Eastern Province, he was called to see a vehicle full of Russian weapons. The men in the vehicle said they were FRELIMO from Tanzania proceeding to Katete, and on to fight the Portuguese in Mozambique. The FRELIMO freedom fighters were accompanied by Zambian intelligence officers. Mibenge revealed that although this was his first encounter, he identified himself with the freedom fighters very easily and instead of arresting them, he wished them good luck. As more Zambian officers were appointed, army units began collaboration with freedom fighters without the knowledge of their white officers. Moreover, as the Portuguese and other racist forces became more aggressive, quite inevitably there were clashes with the Zambian Defence Forces deployed around the country. General Thomas Michael Fara recalled that, on his return from training at Mons near Belgium in 1965, he was put in charge of a Platoon. On 29 December 1965, his platoon landed in Kalabo in the Western Province and they were shot at by Portuguese soldiers.

(57) Mibenge. 2 February 2008.

(58) Mibenge. 2 February 2008.

The Zambian soldiers retaliated and the Portuguese soldiers moved two miles inside Angola at Sikongo. Platoon Commander Fara then moved his platoon to Sikongo and while on patrol they encountered eight Portuguese soldiers in a boat on Luanginga River. In the shoot out that followed, all eight Portuguese soldiers were killed.⁵⁹ Similarly in 1968, the Zambian IZR was compelled to fight the Portuguese on Zambian soil near Katete in the Eastern Province of Zambia.⁶⁰

In 1970, indigenous Zambians were for the first time appointed to Policy and Command in the Defence Forces. Kingsley Chinkuli, then a Brigadier General, was in 1970 appointed the first Zambian Army Commander, while in 1971 Benjamin Mibenge was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army. Lt. Col. Peter Zuze took over in 1972 the command of the Air Force. By 1972 all British commanders had left the Army and Air Force. In 1973, Brigadier General Chinkuli was promoted to full General and was appointed Zambian National Defence Force Commander of the combined Zambia Defence Forces. Following the Zambianization of the Defence Forces, the President could then come to the Army and propound government policy as it related to freedom fighters in Zambia and the liberation process in general.⁶¹ This was particularly true since significant changes and reorganization were also made at the political level. In January 1970, the Office of the Ministry of Defence was for the first time assigned to a Cabinet Minister. On 8 January 1970, Alexander Grey Zulu was appointed Minister of Defence.⁶² The office of the Ministry of Defence had since independence in 1964 been held by the President himself. The duties and responsibilities of the Minister of Defence included liberation movements and the activities of freedom fighters. The Army from then on worked directly with leaders of the liberation struggle.

General Mibenge recalled that, in 1973/1974 as Chief of Staff of the Army, he took charge of *Operation Witch Hunt* to clear the very porous Zambian border from Feira (Luangwa District) to Sinjembela in Senanga (Western Province) of informers and enemy agents. Sealing off twenty kilometres per day, non Zambian nationals and those without national registration cards were rounded up and deported or sent to refugee camps.⁶³ General Mibenge narrated that he stayed in Sinjembela for three months. There were a lot of Angolans in Sinjembela and the majority of these were airlifted by Buffalo military aircraft to Maheba Refugee Camp in the North Western Province.

The Zambian Army took charge of movements of liberation armaments, weapons, ammunition, and explosives. These came mainly from China and Russia to Tanzania where they were put on trucks or TAZARA trains to Zambia. Army engineers would go to Dar es Salaam to bring in explosives to Zambia and then distribute them to

(59) Fara, 12 September 2007.

(60) Mibenge, 2 February 2008.

(61) Mibenge, 2 February 2008.

(62) Zulu, 16 June 2007.

(63) Mibenge, 2 February 2008.

liberation movements. The Zambian Army participated in the coordination of fighting plans. General Mibenge revealed, for instance, that Cubans, Russians, Zambian army commander and deputy commander, Air Force commander, and ZAPU operations and intelligence met every Thursday to review what had happened and what next. The Zambia Army also began to train liberation movement fighters. General Mibenge revealed that, between 1971 and 1975, a battalion of FRELIMO fighters was trained at Chindwin Barracks in Kabwe. Similarly after UNITA was recognized by the OAU, a class of UNITA officers was trained at Chindwin Barracks.⁶⁴ The Army, through the Chief of Logistics for the Armed Forces of Zambia, also sometimes provided logistics support and gave weaponry and ammunition to liberation movements when they ran out of supplies.⁶⁵ The role of the Army became much more formalized with the establishment of the Army Special Duties Unit.

The Army Special Duties Unit

General Thomas Michael Fara⁶⁶ narrated that in 1971/1972 he went to China to train in guerrilla tactics for nine months together with twenty other Zambian soldiers. After their return from China, the Ministry of Defence, in March 1972, established the *Army Special Duties Unit*, a military logistics cell, to handle the armies of liberation movements. General T.M. Fara dealt with the Army Special Duties Unit from 1972 to 1976. He was called the Projects Officer and was the contact man between the Zambian government and freedom fighter liberation armies.

Officers of the Army Special Duties Unit were at the Kamwala Liberation Centre where liberation movements had office accommodation provided by the Zambian government. According to General Benjamin Mibenge, who became the second Zambian Defence Force Commander after General Kingsley Chinkuli, ZAPU had a military command centre in Zambia, as did SWAPO; FRELIMO and the MPLA, on the other hand, had military transit and logistics centres in Zambia. General Mibenge revealed that, in the period up to 1980, the ANC of South Africa had a political and administrative coordinating cell in Zambia, while their operational base and logistical bases were outside Zambia, first in Tanzania and after 1975 in Angola, which has a very long border with Namibia.⁶⁷ He revealed further that the fighting units for the ANC were mainly trained in Russia.

The roles and responsibilities of the Zambian Army Special Duties Unit at the Zambian Liberation Centre at Kamwala included:

1. Coordinating and running the day to day welfare of freedom fighters in the country.
2. Taking head count of all freedom fighters entering and leaving Zambia.

(64) Mibenge. 2 February 2008.

(65) Fara. 12 September 2007; Mibenge. 2 February 2008.

(66) Fara. 12 September 2007.

(67) Mibenge. 2 February 2008.

3. Take stock/record of all arms, ammunition, houses, farms, and other properties belonging/owned by the freedom fighters.
4. Organizing, servicing, and supervising movements and escorts to and from crossing points along the border as freedom fighters go to fight.
5. Organizing and supervising the movements and escorts to and from other countries as freedom fighters go/return for training.
6. Transportation of arms, ammunition, and other defence stores to crossing points and friendly neighbouring countries.
7. Clearing of freedom fighter goods from outside Zambia (Goods destined for freedom fighters in Zambia were duty free).
8. Attending to disciplinary cases of freedom fighters, including coordination of court cases.
9. Organizing and coordinating meetings between senior government officials and top freedom fighter leaders.
10. Representing both the Zambian government and freedom fighter organizations during the (OAU) Liberation Committee meetings outside the country.
11. Command and control of troops and accountable stores in direct support to liberation movements in the country.

The office of Chief of Military Intelligence was created in the Defence Forces in 1970 to report directly to the President, who was also the Commander-in-Chief. General Malimba Masheke was appointed the first Chief of Military Intelligence.⁶⁸ In 1979, General Joseph Chitomfwa (at full Colonel rank) took over from General Malimba Masheke as Chief of Military Intelligence when General Masheke became Deputy Army Commander.⁶⁹ The duties of the Chief of Military Intelligence were to:

1. Coordinate intelligence networks with commanders of liberation armies: i.e. Modise and his deputy Chris Hani of Umkhoto we Sizwe of the ANC of South Africa; Tongogara and his deputy Rex Nongo Mujuru of ZANLA of ZANU; Nikita and his deputy Lookout Mafera of ZIPRA of ZAPU,
2. To oversee the movement of weapons for freedom fighters,
3. To coordinate the work of the liberation movements, and
4. To seek assistance for Zambia and liberation movements.

The National Defence Council was headed by the President of the Republic of Zambia. Its members included the Minister of Defence, Service and Security Chiefs, and selected co-opted members. This organ assisted the Head of State to strategically plan and mobilize resources for assistance to freedom fighters and the Zambian Defence and Security networks.

(68) K.D. Kaunda. 10 May 2007; Zulu. 16 June 2007; Masheke, 27 February 2007.

(69) Interview with General Joseph Chitomfwa, 20 April 2007.

The Central Joint Operations Committee was comprised of Service Chiefs and other Security and senior government officials, whose tasks were to advise the president on day to day operations of the defence and security wings, including the daily activities of the freedom fighters in the country.

Joint Provincial and District Operations Committees were established throughout the country with Regional Army Units at provincial headquarters. These committees were directly involved in the monitoring of the daily operations of freedom fighters in their respective areas. Similarly, they were constantly on the look out for enemy infiltration into their respective areas. When security operations were launched, Provincial and District Operations Committees provided information as to the exact location and strength of the enemy. They also monitored border crossings and arrivals of both refugees and freedom fighters through alert village communities.

During the late 1960s up to 1974, the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola, in a bid to stop freedom fighter infiltration from Zambia, began to violate Zambian territory, raiding villages in the North-western, Western, and Eastern Provinces of Zambia and destroying costly infrastructure. Luangwa Bridge was, for example, bombed in June 1968 in a move intended to stop the infiltration of COREMO and FRELIMO freedom fighters crossing into Mozambique from the Eastern Province of Zambia. South Africa built a big military airbase in the Caprivi Strip in 1965 in a bid to thwart both SWAPO freedom fighters infiltrating into Namibia and ANC fighters, who had forged an alliance with the ZAPU freedom fighters of Zimbabwe. The South African military operating from the Caprivi Airbase sent high flying surveillance aircraft over Zambia and carried out air raids deep into Zambia, in the Western and Southern Provinces, on the pretext of pursuing freedom fighters. The Rhodesian forces, beefed up by South African troops, fought freedom fighters of ZAPU in the Zambezi valley and ZANU on the Rhodesia Mozambican border. As Zimbabwean freedom fighters intensified the struggle, particularly in the period 1977 to 1979, fighters were infiltrated in large numbers into Rhodesia along the Zambian border, stretching from Feira in Luangwa to Kazungula in the south, while Zambian soldiers were in the trenches, eyeball to eyeball with the combined racist troops of Rhodesia and South Africa along the Zambezi River. In 1979, the main fuel depot in Salisbury was hit by freedom fighters and Rhodesia had to seek assistance from the UK and Australia to put out the fire. The Gwelo fuel depot hit, on the other hand, failed and the liberation task force was captured.⁷⁰

According to Zambian military sources, ZAPU, in collaboration with the Zambian defence forces, began to train freedom fighters in conventional fighting in preparation for the invasion of Rhodesia in order to engage rebel forces. Military tanks and artillery for ZAPU were brought into Zambia through TAZARA and were held for the imminent invasion at the Ndola Barracks.⁷¹ Units trained in conventional

(70) Masheke. 27 February 2007.

(71) Mibenge. 2 February 2008.

fighting were in Kabwe and at Chakwenga on the Great East Road, while Zambia moved ZAPU fighters from Kabwe to Chirundu in convoy as Zambian soldiers. One night Zambia planned to move 1,000 fighters to Chirundu when Rhodesian racist forces attacked Chirundu and a battle, which lasted for three days, followed. It seemed the enemy was well informed about the heavy presence of freedom fighters in the area.

In response to the challenge, the Rhodesian troops, during the period 1977 to 1979, intensified patrols along their border and on the Zambezi River. Rhodesian helicopter gunships and jet fighters from Kanyemba Camp opposite Luangwa Boma carried out raids and destroyed Zambia's infrastructure in Lusaka, the Central, and the Southern Provinces. Rail and road bridges along TAZARA and the Great North Road such as the Chambeshi Bridge and Mkushi rail and road bridges were bombed and destroyed with the objective of disrupting the flow of exports and imports through Dar es Salaam. On the eastern front, the Luangwa Bridge was bombed several times together with other road bridges along the Great East Road in order to disrupt imports and exports through Malawi and the port of Nacala. In the south along the Lusaka- Livingstone Road and Kafue-Chirundu road, bridges were similarly destroyed in order to disrupt Zambia's connection with South African and Mozambican seaports. Freedom fighter camps and bases in Zambia were targeted and heavy casualties occurred at Kavalamanja in Luangwa⁷² and the Chikumbi ZAPU Camp near Lusaka. In October 1979, a force of more than 1000 South African troops invaded the Western Province of Zambia.

At a news conference on 20 November 1979,⁷³ President Kaunda put the country on full scale war alert. He called for general mobilization of able bodied Zambians and announced a five point plan of action to counter further attacks from rebel Rhodesian forces:

- All leave in the security forces was cancelled and those on leave were recalled.
- All those who resigned or retired as regular officers and all other ranks in the Army, Air Force, Zambia National Service were recalled.
- Form V Zambia National Service graduates, with the exception of girls, were to be mobilized.
- The Party and its Government would take necessary measures to mobilize all other resources in the country for war.
- Finally the Government reserved the right to call upon Zambia's friends to help defend the country.

The Zambian Defence Forces, assisted by alert and patriotic Zambian communities, rose to the challenge by repulsing the enemy, defending Zambian skies and territorial integrity and sovereignty. Furthermore, the aggression of minority racist regimes

(72) Interviews with Lawrence Henry Tapisein, 29 November 2007; William Antonio Mumba, (Luangwa Boma) 29 November 2007.

(73) *Zambia Daily Mail*. 21 November 1979.

was condemned by all progressive peoples around the world. In 1980, Zimbabwe attained majority rule and independence.

When Rhodesia attained majority rule and independence in 1980 as Zimbabwe, President Robert Mugabe appeared reluctant to receive tanks, artillery, and ammunitions belonging to the opposition, ZAPU. Unfortunately, neither was Zambia willing to keep the weaponry. In the end, tanks, artillery, and ammunitions belonging to ZAPU were put on trains and taken across the Zambia/Rhodesia border to a small station next to the Victoria Falls.⁷⁴

In South Africa and Namibia, the wars of liberation were to last another ten years. Apartheid South Africa continued its attacks and war of destabilization against Zambia and other neighbouring independent African states. In 1986, from March to August, Zambian air space was violated several times by South African military aircraft, jet fighters, spotter planes, and helicopters. In April 1987, the South African Defence Forces launched four commando raids into Sesheke and Livingstone, leaving behind several casualties, dead or wounded. Throughout 1987 and 1988, there were bomb explosions in various parts of Lusaka which left several Zambians killed or wounded. Similar bomb explosions occurred in Livingstone in December 1988 and early 1989. ANC cadres were particularly targeted through bomb explosions, assassination by shooting, hijacking, and kidnapping.⁷⁵ All this, however, did not stop the intensification of the liberation war.

Zambia Foreign and Diplomatic Service: The Diplomatic Dimension

Presidential Diplomatic Initiatives

In all the efforts Zambia made to try and solve the crises in southern Africa through diplomatic means and negotiations, the Zambia Head of State and the Commander in Chief of the Zambia Defence Forces and the National Defence Council remained the principal actor. This stemmed partly from President Kaunda's preference for a solution through peaceful means. In the case of Zimbabwe, the President believed that, although Britain had *de jure* responsibility for Rhodesia, South Africa had the *de facto* responsibility and dictated the course of events in that country.⁷⁶ It was for these reasons that President Kaunda had meetings and negotiations with Portugal and three successive leaders of the apartheid Republic of South Africa, as well as with Ian Smith of Rhodesia.⁷⁷

(74) Mibenge, 2 February 2008.

(75) See Appendix I.

(76) Chona, 30 May 2007; Mwaanga, Vernon J. *Looking Back: An Extraordinary Life*. Lusaka: Fleetfoot Publishing, 2000: See p.196.

(77) Kaunda. 10 May 2007 and 29 December 2006; Chona. 30 May 2007; Masheke. 27 February 2007; Mwaanga. *Looking Back*. See p.204.

In January 1969, President Kaunda contacted Dr Marcelo Caetano in Lisbon, Portugal, through his Special Assistant, Political Affairs and International Security, Mark Chuunyu Chona, to ask him to stop bombings and raids by Portuguese troops along the Zambian border with Angola and Mozambique, without success.⁷⁸ When the new rulers made it clear that they were ready to stop colonial wars and to grant independence to Portugal's so called overseas provinces, following the *coup d'état* in Portugal on 25 April 1974, President Kaunda sent Chona and Peter Kasanda to Lisbon. They were to meet with General Antonio de Spínola, the head of the new government and ask him to start negotiations for the independence of Mozambique with FRELIMO which, unlike the MPLA, was ready.⁷⁹ In August 1974, Mario Soares, the new Portuguese Foreign Minister, came to Zambia. An agreement was signed with Mozambique, and in September 1974 Prime Minister Joachim Chissano moved to Maputo.

At this juncture, a Portuguese agent reported to Zambia that mercenaries were gathering in South Africa ready to stop the installation of indigenous Africans in the government in Mozambique.⁸⁰ In September 1974, Mark Chona went to Cape Town, conveying Zambia's request to John Vorster, the President of the Republic of South Africa, not to interfere with the transfer of power in Mozambique. Secondly, Zambia requested the South African President to put pressure on the Rhodesian rebel leader, Ian Smith, to release the detained Zimbabwean nationalists and start negotiations for a constitutional settlement of the Rhodesian crisis. Furthermore, Zambia requested South Africa to withdraw its fourteen helicopter gunships she had loaned to Rhodesia, which were wreaking havoc in confrontation with freedom fighters. While the South African President said he had no objection to the points raised by Zambia, he stated that he could not abolish apartheid because it was their culture.

In August 1975, Mark Chona went to Pretoria to meet with President Vorster again. In his interview, Chona revealed that he found Ian Smith with President Vorster in Pretoria. Smith agreed to hold negotiations with Zimbabwean nationalists who had been released from detention in December 1974. The location where to hold the negotiations remained a problem. President Vorster offered his train, which was to be stationed at Victoria Falls; and in 1975 both Presidents Kaunda and Vorster held a meeting for three nights, in the train, at Victoria Falls Bridge Station. The meeting was also attended by the Zimbabwean nationalists and the Rhodesian rebel leader, Ian Smith.⁸¹

The second South African leader President Kaunda met with was President P.W. Botha in 1987. Both met in Botha's train on the border between Botswana and South Africa. President Kaunda revealed that this was an important meeting in diplomatic terms, but, in contrast with the earlier meeting, not much resulted. In 1990, Kaunda

(78) Chona. 30 May 2007.

(79) Chona. 30 May 2007.

(80) Chona, 30 May 2007.

(81) Chona, 30 May 2007; Kaunda, 10 May 2007 and 29 December 2007; Masheke, 27 February 2007.

met with the reformist South African President, F.W. de Klerk, in the Mosi wa Tunya Hotel in Livingstone. President Kaunda stated that de Klerk revealed his plans to end apartheid to him, and on his return from the meeting he made a public statement that de Klerk was a man he could work with.⁸²

In relation to Rhodesia, in January 1973 when Ian Smith closed the Zimbabwe-Zambia border for the second time, Zambia also closed its border. Subsequently, the British government forced Ian Smith to re-open the border, but Zambia refused to open its side of the border. President Kaunda declared that Zambia would not open its border with Rhodesia until majority rule was realized in that country.⁸³ The economic consequences for Zambia were very serious. Goods destined for Zambia had to be flown in from Botswana and fuel had to be flown in from Dar es Salaam.

A UN Security Council Mission visited Zambia and pledged to support Zambia. At the same time, President Kaunda sent Mark Chona and Lishomwa Lishomwa, Special Assistant for Economic Affairs, on a worldwide tour covering the USA, Canada, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, China, and Australia, to lobby for support for Zambia and the liberation movements.⁸⁴ In 1974, President Kaunda undertook secret negotiations with the Smith regime in Rhodesia, through Mark Chona, which saw Ian Smith fly to Lusaka to hold talks with President Kaunda in State House, and the temporary release of Zimbabwean nationalists to enable them to fly to Lusaka for consultations. General Malimba Masheke, then the Chief of Military Intelligence, and Brigadier General Enos Mulambo Haimbe of the Zambia Air force flew to Rhodesia to pick up the detained Zimbabwean nationalists from Gonakuzingwa and flew them to Lusaka by a Zambia Air Force Buffalo plane. The Zimbabwean nationalists were put up at Mulungushi Village for five days. Detainees were briefed on the negotiations with Ian Smith and after consultations, they were flown back into detention in Rhodesia.⁸⁵ Subsequent talks with the minority leader Ian Smith led to the release of Zimbabwean nationalist leaders in December 1974. General Masheke pointed out that when Zimbabwean nationalists were released, the Zambian government insisted that the Rhodesian Air Force and not the Zambia Air Force should bring the released detainees to Lusaka. He revealed that Zambian authorities suspected that if the Zambian Air Force was used, Rhodesia might shoot down the plane to eliminate the nationalists.⁸⁶

At this juncture, it should be pointed out that President Kaunda's diplomatic initiatives in talking to the racist minority regimes were viewed by some with suspicion. There was fear that Zambia was perhaps proposing some form of compromise with colonialism and apartheid. History has, however, proved without

(82) Kaunda, 10 May 2007.

(83) Zambia only opened its border five years later in 1978, in order for the country to access the southern route.

(84) Chona, 30 May 2007.

(85) Masheke, 27 February 2007.

(86) Masheke, 27 February 2007.

any doubt that a preference to see a negotiated settlement was no betrayal of the African cause.⁸⁷

As President of the Republic of Zambia, Kaunda, through the OAU, the Commonwealth, the Non Alignment Movement, and indeed the United Nations, championed the cause of liberation of southern Africa in particular and of Africa in general.

At the Special Commonwealth Conference in Lagos, in January 1966, to discuss the Rhodesian crisis, President Kaunda called on Britain to use force to bring down the rebel regime of Ian Smith in Rhodesia. He offered Zambia as a base for British troops. Furthermore Zambia took a leading part in urging the British government to refuse to grant independence to the colony of Rhodesia before majority rule (NIBMAR). At the Singapore Commonwealth Conference in 1971, President Kaunda presented a set of Commonwealth principles which was adopted unanimously – No Independence Before Majority Rule (NIBMAR) in Rhodesia.⁸⁸

At the 1970 OAU Summit Conference in Addis Ababa, President Kaunda was elected OAU Chair for a period of one year. The Zambian President subsequently led an OAU delegation to Italy, Germany, Britain, France, and America to argue the African case against supplying arms to South Africa.⁸⁹

In September 1970, the Third Non Aligned Nations Summit Conference was held in Lusaka, Zambia, and President Kaunda was elected Chair. Liberation movements attended the Third Non Aligned Movement Summit as observers. This Conference, which was being held in one of the frontline states, passed resolutions in support of the struggle, and pledged more moral and material support. The Summit helped to focus the attention of the world leaders on problems in southern Africa.⁹⁰

In the case of Zimbabwe, the Conference called on member states to provide increased moral and material assistance in order to render the Zimbabwean armed struggle more effective. The Conference condemned the failure and refusal of the British government, as the administering power, to take effective measures, including the use of force, to bring down the illegal racist minority regime. Furthermore the Conference condemned Britain's connivance at South Africa's armed intervention in Zimbabwe.⁹¹

In relation to the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau, the Conference noted with deep concern that Portugal was waging a colonial war of suppression with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) arms. The Conference called upon Portugal's military allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to desist from giving the Portuguese government any assistance that would enable

Portugal to continue its repression. NATO countries were urged further to prevent any sale or supply of weapons and military equipment to the Portuguese government.

(87) Mwaanga. *Looking Back*: See p.200.

(88) Hall. *Principles*. See p.239.

(89) *Zambia News Brief 2*.

(90) Mudenda. *A Generation of Struggle*: See p.108.

(91) Zambia Government of the Republic. "Resolutions." 8-10 September 1970, *Third Non-Aligned Nations Summit Conference*. Lusaka: Falcon Press Ltd Ndola & Government Printer, 1970.

As in the case of Zimbabwe, the Conference called on Non-Aligned member states to give increased moral and material assistance to the struggling people of Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau in order to render their struggle more effective.⁹² On apartheid and racial discrimination, the Conference, among other factors, noted with profound concern that South Africa arrogantly continued to pursue its policy of racial discrimination and apartheid in flagrant violation of various UN resolutions on Human Rights and fundamental freedoms. The meeting particularly condemned the United States of America, France, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Japan, which, by their political, economic, and military collaboration with the government of South Africa, encouraged and incited that government to persist in its policy. The Conference stressed the need for effective international action to bring an end to apartheid.

Foreign and Diplomatic Service

Zambia's foreign and diplomatic service was another wing of the government that was used to rally support for the liberation struggle in southern Africa. Diplomatic efforts at the United Nations and other international fora served generally to mobilize international opinion and to focus world attention on the crisis in southern Africa. After Northern Rhodesia attained self-government status in January 1964, the UNIP government, in consultation with Chief Secretary, Sir Richard Luyt and Governor Sir Evelyn Hone, began to groom Zambians for the Foreign Service. In May 1964, for instance, three young candidates, Vernon J. Mwaanga, Moto Nkama, and Ali Sumbule were selected by the President to undertake a course in Diplomacy and International Relations at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at Oxford University in England. The course was sponsored by the Ariel and Atlas Foundation with the support of the British Labour Party and the British Trade Union Congress (TUC). At the end of the course in Oxford, the British government sent the three Northern Rhodesian candidates on attachment to British embassies in Europe. Ali Simbule was sent to the British Embassy in Oslo, Moto Nkama went to the British Embassy in Paris, while V.J. Mwaanga was sent to the British Embassy in Rome.⁹³ The attachments lasted until September 1964.

In September 1964, a Special Seminar for diplomats was mounted at the National Institute of Public Administration (NIPA) and was conducted by political science professors from the London School of Economics under the sponsorship of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation in Sweden.⁹⁴ The seminar was attended by students from Uganda, Kenya, Zanzibar, Tanzania, Malawi, Nigeria, Ghana, as well as Zambia. Zambia made its first ambassadorial appointments from the participants in the course at NIPA. Kaunda, then the Prime Minister, went to NIPA and called Zambian participants individually to give them their assignments in the Foreign Service:

(92) Ibid.

(93) Mwaanga, 25 February 2008.

(94) Mwaanga, 25 February 2008.

Rupiah Banda as Ambassador to Cairo, Hosea Soko as Ambassador to Washington, Ali Simbule as High Commissioner to Tanzania, Simon Katilungu as High Commissioner to London, V.J. Mwaanga as Deputy High Commissioner to London (leaving Lusaka for London in October 1964, after independence celebrations), Fwanyanga Mulikita as Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York, and Timothy Kankasa as Ambassador in Kinshasa.

Mwaanga revealed that in the official brief to the new diplomats at NIPA, Kaunda stressed that their main role was to promote the liberation struggle in southern Africa. He urged them to keep their doors open to receive freedom fighters and to give them all assistance possible. In London, Mwaanga recalls that the Zambian High Commissioner used to talk to the British Members of Parliament and government about the situation in Rhodesia, apartheid South Africa, Namibia, and the Portuguese territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Equatorial Guinea, as well as Sao Tome and Principe. He revealed that the embassy gave information to members of the British Parliament, especially the Labour Party and Liberal Party, to enable them to make statements concerning the liberation struggle in southern Africa. Copies of speeches by President Kaunda were circulated to Members of Parliament and interested NGOs in Britain.⁹⁵ In an earlier interview, President Kaunda revealed that left wing British Labour Party MPs and British churches had been very supportive of Zambia's struggle for independence.⁹⁶

After London, Mwaanga was in May 1965 appointed Ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in Moscow. While in Moscow, Mwaanga had close contact with Andrei Gromyko, Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union for 32 years. He also had a close working relationship with Yakob Malik, Deputy Foreign Minister then in charge of Africa. Malik dealt with liberation movements. Mwaanga came to discover that Russia was training guerrillas and supporting the freedom fighters of ZAPU, the MPLA, FRELIMO, and PAIGC. Moscow provided scholarships, financial resources, and logistical support in the form of weapons to freedom fighters.

Rhodesia made its Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) on 11 November 1965 while Mwaanga was still in Moscow. Mwaanga narrated that he had continuous meetings with Yakob Malek concerning the struggle in Zimbabwe. A delegation from Zambia led by Arthur Wina, then Finance Minister, and Elijah Mudenda, then Minister of Agriculture, arrived in Moscow to hold meetings with Nikolai Podgorny, the President of the Soviet Union, and Leonid Brezhnev, then first Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as well as Alexei Kosygin, then Prime Minister. The Soviet Union assured Zambia that they would fight the UDI and support the struggle for the independence of Africa on all platforms; at the UN, for example, the Soviet Union would use its powers of veto. Contrary to rumours

(95) Mwaanga, 25 February 2008.

(96) Kaunda, 28 December 2006.

that the Zambian delegation to the Soviet Union had gone for military assistance to overthrow the Smith Regime,⁹⁷ the delegation actually asked for assistance to overcome the adverse economic effects of the UDI and UN economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, e.g. petrol rationing and airlifting of fuel through the Congo-Lubumbashi and Dar es Salaam using American and Canadian planes at great cost. Russians offered tankers for transporting oil and promised further support. They also acknowledged that Zambia could not comply with all sanctions due to its geo-historical position.⁹⁸

After Moscow, Mwaanga was appointed Permanent Secretary/Director General of the Intelligence Service in the Office of the President, a post he held from May 1966 until February 1968, when he was appointed Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the United Nations. Rhodesia was to be one of Mwaanga's major preoccupations at the United Nations in New York. Harold Wilson, the Prime Minister of Britain, had stated in Lagos, in January 1966, at a Special Commonwealth Summit to discuss the Rhodesian crisis, that the Rhodesian problem would be solved in a matter of weeks rather than months. This resolution, of course, did not happen and Zambia underwent severe economic dislocation as a result of observing first the British and then the UN sanctions against the rebel colony. Transport links were severely disrupted and fuel was rationed. The British were not prepared to use force against the rebel regime of Ian Smith; neither were they ready to support more punitive sanctions against Rhodesia, which would only be effective if they included total and comprehensive sanctions against South Africa, which provided Rhodesia's main means of survival.

Mwaanga was keen that the UN and the Security Council should recognize the difficulties and special position of Zambia given its geographical position, and that the country should be exempted from observing some of the proposed sanctions. On 29 May 1968, the programme of mandatory sanctions was debated in the Security Council under the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, including a provision for Zambia's exemption from some of the clauses, were adopted under Resolution 253. Zambia was forced to import maize using this exemption in 1971, when the country was facing a devastating drought.⁹⁹

The UN General Assembly terminated South Africa's mandate over Namibia in 1966, and, in 1967, assumed direct responsibility through the UN Council for Namibia. Zambia served on the Council for Namibia from the time it was formed and was subsequently elected President of the Council. Unfortunately, South Africa persistently refused to comply with General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions. In 1971, the International Court of Justice resolved the impasse by declaring that the continued occupation of Namibia by South Africa was illegal and

(97) Hall. *Principles*: See p.132.

(98) Mwaanga, 25 February 2008.

(99) Mwaanga. *Looking Back*: See p.94.

that it was the duty of the UN to assume direct responsibility for the territory. This paved the way for UN Security Council Resolution 435, which eventually led to the independence of Namibia on 21 March 1990.¹⁰⁰

On 15 July 1969, Mwaanga submitted a letter to the President of the Security Council, complaining that between 30 June and 3 July 1969 the Portuguese in Angola had raided and carried out armed attacks on Zambian villages in the Balovale (now Zambezi) District in North Western Province. Four members of the UN Security Council (Algeria, Nepal, Pakistan, and Senegal) formally proposed that the world body strongly censure Portugal for violating Zambian territory and stop the country from making further raids. There was a demand for “the immediate release and repatriation of all civilians from Zambia kidnapped by Portuguese military forces operating in the colonial territories of Angola and Mozambique.” The Security Council debated Zambia’s charge of aggression by Portugal for five days. Portugal rejected the allegation, arguing that Zambia had supported African nationalist guerrillas fighting against Lisbon’s administration in Angola and Mozambique. The Security Council ignored the counter-charges, condemned Portugal, and called upon the country to desist from carrying out unprovoked raids against Zambia and violating its territorial integrity.¹⁰¹

Mwaanga spent four years in New York. Then, early in January 1972, he was posted to the *Times of Zambia* as Editor in Chief (Government took over *Times of Lonhro Zambia Ltd*). The struggle for the liberation of southern Africa through the United Nations continued. Paul Lusaka, Zambia’s Representative at the United Nations, was the Chair of the UN Council for Namibia from 1981 to 1986. The Council recommended the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa as was provided for under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter in order to ensure South Africa’s immediate compliance with the resolutions and decisions relating to Namibia.¹⁰² Unfortunately, no progress was made.

The Regional Dimension: The Frontline States

The Frontline States group evolved out of the Mulungushi Club. President Kaunda narrated how he had for the first time invited President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and President Milton Obote of Uganda to the 14-20 August 1967 UNIP Annual General Conference at the Mulungushi Rock outside Kabwe. Under Resolution Two, the Conference “saluted Presidents Nyerere and Obote for not only the spiritual unity which they had forged with our beloved leader, but even more important for their physical presence at this historic Conference which was a clear demonstration of their unswerving loyalty to the ideals and principles of Pan-Africanism.”¹⁰³

(100) Mwaanga. *Looking Back*: See p.112.

(101) *Zambia Daily Mail*. I.11 (26 July 1969).

(102) Mudenda. *A Generation of Struggle*: See p.157.

(103) UNIP. “Proceedings of the Annual General Conference of the United National Independence Party, Mulungushi, 14-20 August 1967.” Lusaka: ZIS, printed by the Government Printer, 1967.

The three leaders were so impressed by the manner in which UNIP leaders from various regions discussed their problems that they too decided to form their own Club, through which they could share and discuss their own peculiar problems. The club came to be known as the Mulungushi Club. Sir Seretse Khama of Botswana, who had sent his Vice President Q.K.T. Masire to the Conference, was the fourth leader to join the Mulungushi Club. Unfortunately in 1971, President Milton Obote was overthrown by General Idi Amin in Uganda, while attending the Commonwealth Meeting in Singapore. The Mulungushi Club lost Uganda.¹⁰⁴

The Mulungushi Club had quite naturally come to focus more and more on the crisis in southern Africa. The name was changed from the Mulungushi Club to the Frontline States in 1976 when Angola and Mozambique joined the group.

At the regional level was the Frontline States group, of which Zambia and Tanzania were founder members. The Frontline States were collectively and individually the rear bases for those countries struggling for independence. The Frontline States addressed, organized, coordinated, and led the liberation struggle in southern Africa. They, as individual states and collectively, spent money, provided arms and bases; provided travel documents and facilitated freedom fighter movements to get wherever they wanted to go for training and back.¹⁰⁵ President Nyerere was the first Chair of the Frontline States. President Kaunda was elected the second Chair of the Frontline States in 1985, following President Nyerere's retirement.¹⁰⁶

The Frontline States group was a 'War Council' comprised of independent African states, nearest the liberation war frontline and overseeing the liberation struggle in southern Africa. Freedom fighter representatives from various liberation movement armies were admitted to Frontline States' meetings to submit reports and to sit as observers.¹⁰⁷ Sitting with leaders of the liberation movements, the Frontline States advised on strategies and tactics to be employed at various stages in the liberation effort.¹⁰⁸

Thus, for instance, the five nation Frontline Summit which met in Dar es Salaam on 6 and 7 September 1976¹⁰⁹ was attended by the Presidents of Mozambique, Zambia, Angola, Botswana, and Tanzania. Nationalist leaders Oliver Tambo (South Africa), Joshua Nkomo, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole, James Chikerema, Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), and Sam Nujoma of SWAPO (Namibia) also attended the meeting. Representatives of the High Command of the nationalist guerrillas fighting in Rhodesia were also at the meeting led by Rex Nhongo.

The Summit was called to review the latest developments in the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa. The Frontline leaders received briefs from the African

(104) Kaunda, 10 May 2007; Chona, 30 May 2007.

(105) Kaunda, 10 May 2007.

(106) Kaunda, 10 May 2007.

(107) Interview with General Malimba Masheke, (Lusaka) 1 March 2007.

(108) Sithole, Masipula. *Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle, 1957-1980*. Harare: Rujeko Publishers, 1999: See p.187.

(109) *Zambia Daily Mail*. 6 and 7 September 1976.

National Congress and the Pan African Congress on the unrest and rioting in South Africa, particularly the June riots in Soweto Township. The meeting also considered the diplomatic initiative by the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, who attempted to mediate between black African countries and the white minority governments in the south. The question was whether Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy could bring change inside South Africa, and majority rule in Namibia and Zimbabwe. The other issue before the Summit concerned efforts to unite the feuding Zimbabwean nationalists who had split into four groups.

- The Presidents of Frontline States met again in Lusaka on 26 September 1976 to review developments in Zimbabwe concerning the Anglo-American proposals, which were announced and accepted by Ian Smith. The Frontline leaders met to counter the Anglo American package, which to them would have legalised colonialist and racist structures of power.¹¹⁰ They called on Britain to immediately convene a Conference outside Zimbabwe with the authentic and legitimate representatives of the people to map out the future of Zimbabwe as follows: To discuss modalities for convening a full constitutional conference,
- To discuss the structure and functions of the transitional government,
- To work out the Independence Constitution, and
- To establish the basis upon which peace and normalcy could be restored.

The Frontline States reaffirmed commitment to the cause of the liberation of Zimbabwe by armed struggle and declared that the war of liberation would continue. On 17 October 1979, while the Lancaster House Talks on Zimbabwe were going on in London, the Frontline Heads of State met in Dar es Salaam.¹¹¹ The Summit was attended by Presidents Kaunda, Machel, Khama, and Nyerere. President Eduardo Dos Santos of Angola had just taken over after Augustino Neto's death; therefore Angola was represented by the Minister of Education, Ambrosio Lukoki. The Frontline leaders were briefed on the progress of the Lancaster House Conference by Josiah Chinamano, the Vice President of ZAPU Patriotic Front, and Simon Mzenda, the Vice President of ZANU Patriotic Front. Special mention was made concerning the hitch over the land issue. The nationalists argued that independent Zimbabwe should not be compelled to bear the burden of buying back land through compensation. They proposed that Britain should give assurances that funds for compensation would be made available, as was the case when Kenya became independent in 1963.

The leaders of the Frontline States came out in full support of the stance taken by the Patriotic Front on the land issue. Furthermore, the Frontline leaders declared that they were pleased with the way the Patriotic Front carried out its negotiations at the talks and reaffirmed their solidarity with them. The decisions of the Dar es Salaam Summit were communicated to the British government and other Western countries.

(110) *Zambia Daily Mail*. 27 September 1976.

(111) *Zambia Daily Mail*. 18 October 1979.

Nigeria used to attend some of the Frontline Heads of State meetings due to its exceptional commitment to the liberation war effort in southern Africa.¹¹² In October 1978, a Nigerian military mission came to Zambia to explore the possibility of Nigeria taking part in the southern war front between Livingstone and Kazungula. The Nigerians promised to send a battalion (1,000). The Zambia Army advised the Zambian government to ask for a division or two divisions (10,000), as well as arms.¹¹³ On 19 October 1978, while the Nigerian mission was being briefed at the Zambian Army Headquarters in Arrakan Barracks, Lusaka, rebel Rhodesian forces bombed Chikumbi ZAPU training camp, twenty kilometres north of the capital city Lusaka. The delegation went to Chikumbi and witnessed the carnage firsthand.¹¹⁴ General Joseph Chitomfwa took the Nigerian delegation to Chikumbi. Unfortunately, Nigeria's plans were never implemented as the country's leaders were overthrown in a coup *d'état* and in fact the leader of the delegation to Zambia was one of those killed.

The 1974 *coup d'état* in Lisbon, Portugal, changed the course of history in southern Africa. The new rulers in Portugal brought in changes which resulted in the independence of Angola and Mozambique, in 1975. The independence of Angola and Mozambique was of great significance to the wars in southern Africa. The frontline of the liberation war was suddenly extended from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean.¹¹⁵ SWAPO of Namibia moved its headquarters from Zambia to Angola, which has a long border with Namibia. ZANU of Zimbabwe moved its headquarters to Mozambique, in the aftermath of Herbert Chitepo's assassination on 18 March 1975. ZANU had in 1972 opened a permanent guerrilla front in the north east of Zimbabwe.¹¹⁶ Similarly, the ANC of South Africa mounted infiltrations into South Africa, using routes across southern Mozambique, from their base in Tanzania; the ANC also opened military bases in Angola.

In April 1980, Zimbabwe gained independence and joined the Frontline States. The war of liberation now came to be focused on South Africa and its occupation of Namibia. In relation to Namibia, both SWAPO and the Frontline States called for the implementation of the UN plan for the independence of Namibia. In 1978, the UN Security Council had approved Resolution 435 outlining a plan for Namibia's transition to independence under the UN Transitory Assistance Group (UNTAG). The plan provided for the independence of Namibia, after free and fair elections supervised by the UN. The resolution was initially approved by both South Africa and SWAPO, but subsequently South Africa kept raising new conditions.

During the same period, in 1981, SWAPO and the Frontline States were reacting to new initiatives by the Reagan administration, to put negotiations for a Namibian

(112) Kaunda, 10 May 2007.

(113) Interview with General Benjamin Mibenge, 2 February 2008.

(114) Interview with General Joseph Chitomfwa, 27 October 2007.

(115) Masheke, March 2007.

(116) Sithole. *Zimbabwe: Struggles within the Struggle*: See p.189.

settlement in motion. The US Secretary of State for Africa, Dr Chester Crocker, was on an eleven African nation fact-finding tour, which included the Frontline States. At the same time, the United States declared its desire to strengthen relations with racist South Africa, “a traditional ally and reliable friend.” It was also suspected that the USA intended to use South Africa as a military base. Furthermore the US government made clear its intentions to support anti-government groups in Angola through the Reagan administration’s attempts to get Congress to repeal the law that forbade the USA to grant aid to UNITA rebels in Angola.¹¹⁷ In fact, Dr Jonas Savimbi of UNITA revealed in an interview to a western magazine that he was going to get support from the USA.¹¹⁸ This was seen by the Frontline leaders as a clear affront to independent Africa and interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Similarly, the Frontline leaders observed that South Africa had resorted to training and equipping rebel groups from Frontline States with a view to destabilizing their governments: Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) in Mozambique, Mushala in Zambia, and UNITA in Angola.

The Frontline States, comprising Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, which was represented by that country’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Witness Mangwende, met in Luanda, the capital of Angola on 16 April 1981 to deliberate and map out strategies on the latest developments in the liberation struggle.¹¹⁹

The Summit of the Frontline States condemned South Africa for its continued refusal to implement the UN Security Council Resolution 435 on Namibia. The Summit put the onus to persuade South Africa to agree to hold free UN supervised independence elections on the CONTACT GROUP of five western nations, comprising of the USA, Britain, West Germany, France, and Canada. Furthermore, the leaders of the Frontline States reaffirmed their support to SWAPO and called on the international community to redouble efforts in rendering effective assistance to SWAPO, so that it could carry out the struggle more effectively, on all fronts. President Kaunda pledged that he would continue to offer a reliable rear base for the Namibian freedom fighters.

Zambia’s support for the liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa exposed Zambia to raids by the South African defence forces and infiltrations by agents of the apartheid regime.¹²⁰ The Frontline States were highly suspicious of the intentions of apartheid South Africa. It was not until December 1988 that UN Resolution 435 on Namibia was implemented in the context of a US brokered, multinational agreement, linking the departure of Cuban soldiers from Angola to the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia and the independence of Namibia. In November 1989, the UN supervised elections took place in Namibia. General Benjamin Mibenge of Zambia, then Zambia’s Ambassador to Ethiopia,

(117) *Zambia Daily Mail*. 28 April 1981.

(118) *Zambia Daily Mail*. 17 April 1981.

(119) *Zambia Daily Mail*. 17 April 1981.

(120) See Annex I.

served as Chair of the Frontline Observer Mission to oversee the elections.¹²¹ He became Chair on the basis that President Kaunda was the Chair of the Frontline States. The Frontline Observer Mission was formed in 1989, and it was comprised of ambassadors from the Frontline States of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe.

The Frontline Observer Mission's overall responsibility was to monitor the process of change in Namibia and to ensure that the process should not prejudice SWAPO. When SWAPO in exile returned to Namibia, the Frontline Observer Mission was there to receive them. The group met with Sam Nujoma, the SWAPO leader, on a weekly basis to review areas of concern and the intentions of South Africa. Areas of concern included disarmament and the withdrawal of South African troops. The Frontline Observer Mission visited garrisons and barracks to ascertain that all South African troops had been withdrawn. This inspection was carried out because there was suspicion that South African military units were still in Namibia and were being paid by the South African government. The Frontline group held regular meetings with the ambassadors of Western countries, who in turn put pressure on South Africa to honour the UN resolutions. Similar consultative meetings were held with the ambassadors of Eastern countries. The Frontline group of ambassadors communicated concerns to their own heads of state. General Benjamin Mibenge had a direct line to President Kaunda and could even fly to Zambia to talk to the President if it was deemed necessary. Furthermore, General Mibenge could communicate directly with General Peter Zuze, Zambia's Permanent Representative at the United Nations in New York, who raised pertinent issues at the UN.

The Frontline Observer Mission closely monitored all aspects that had a bearing on the elections, including the return and settlement of refugees, and the situation as related to political parties and how the elections were to be conducted. The group also toured election posts. All in all, ten political parties participated in the UN supervised elections, and SWAPO won 41 of the 72 seats and 57% of the vote. The Frontline Observer Mission observed that the elections were free and fair despite lapses here and there.¹²² In March 1990, Namibia gained independence and joined the Frontline States.

In South Africa, the apartheid regime became isolated and overstretched as the so called buffer states were liberated one by one. The struggle was intensifying just as the racist Defence Forces got brutal. President Nelson Mandela¹²³ has recorded that in 1981 the South African Defence Forces launched a raid on ANC offices in Maputo, Mozambique, killing thirteen people. In December 1982, the *Umkhonto we Sizwe* set off explosions at the unfinished Koeberg nuclear power plant outside Cape Town and placed bombs at many military and other targets around the country.

During the same month, the racist military forces attacked an ANC outpost in

(121) Mibenge, 12 August 2008.

(122) Interview with General Benjamin Mibenge, 20 August 2008.

(123) Mandela. *Long Walk to Freedom*: See p.67.

Maseru, Lesotho, killing forty-two people. In May 1983, the *Umkhonto we Sizwe* carried out its first car bomb attack in the heart of Pretoria. In response, the apartheid regime intensified attacks on South African freedom fighters and neighbouring independent African states throughout the 1980s.

In Zambia, President Kaunda accommodated Oliver Tambo, President of the ANC, in the second residence within the State House grounds for ultimate protection. South African freedom fighters were airlifted by the Angolan government to Lusaka, and the Zambian government airlifted them on Zambia Airways in small numbers to Maputo in Mozambique, Mbabane in Swaziland, and Maseru in Lesotho, from where they infiltrated into South Africa.¹²⁴ Weapons to South Africa went through Angola, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique.¹²⁵ The Zambian military refuse to talk about operations, but they say on a soldier to soldier basis that they did things which even their Commander-in-Chief knows nothing about.

There were, however, other factors and forces that augmented the liberation process in South Africa. These included:

- The development of a strong internal opposition movement through the United Democratic Front (UDF) formed in 1983 and comprising of churches, students, and the trade union movement, as well as community groups. The UDF was disbanded in 1991.
- The influence and effectiveness of the anti-apartheid movements abroad, which extended to the media, churches, trade unions, political parties, among others. There was growing international condemnation of apartheid and the apartheid government's brutality.
- International sanctions were impacting negatively on South Africa's economy and isolating the South African regime.
- The escalating costs of maintaining the apartheid regime's war machinery functional. By 1985, South Africa had a foreign debt burden of US\$22 billion and could not meet its commitments and was therefore compelled to announce a freeze on repayments.
- Due to the deteriorating economy, differences began to develop between the government and business over the economic cost of maintaining apartheid.

President P.W. Botha had succeeded John Vorster and was in charge of the Nationalist Party and the government in South Africa from 1978 to 1989, and he was succeeded by the reformist President F.W. de Klerk. In February 1990, de Klerk, after holding consultations with Britain and Germany, as well as with Joachim Chissano of Mozambique and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia on reform, unbanned the African National Congress and all other national liberation movements. Furthermore, he announced the release of political prisoners, and his government's intention to

(124) Interviews with Col Best Kapanga Makumba, Rtd Mongu, 21 July 2007; General Malimba Masheke, Rtd.. (Lusaka) 3 April 2007 and 2 August 2007; Mr Timothy Mwene Lipoba, (Kaoma Boma) 15 July 2007.

(125) Interview with General Malimba Masheke, (Lusaka) 3 April 2007.

repeal apartheid legislation. In May 1990, the ANC leadership and the de Klerk government met at Groote Schuur and agreed on a peaceful process of negotiations. In August 1990, the ANC suspended the armed struggle. In 1994, South Africa attained majority rule.

The Zambian People

The liberation struggle was borne by every Zambian. Through political education and propaganda, the majority of the Zambian people understood and supported government policies towards the liberation of southern Africa; after all, they themselves won their independence as late as October 1964.

During the first Republic, 1964 to 1973, however, the opposition African National Congress under Harry M. Nkumbula had opposed Zambia's involvement in the costly liberation wars, preferring that the un-liberated countries fight their own wars. Similarly in 1973, Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe, the former leader of the opposition United Party for Progress (UPP), had opposed Zambia's refusal to open the border with Rhodesia.¹²⁶ The One Party System of Government from 1973 to 1991 meant that only the policies of the ruling party, UNIP, were publicly propagated throughout the country. UNIP, through its members, was totally committed to the liberation of southern Africa.

When freedom fighters and refugees and all those running away from oppression crossed into Zambia, their first point of call was the people in the villages, in areas along the borders. The villagers provided shelter and food to the refugees and freedom fighters, as they crossed and passed through the villages. Furthermore, villagers provided security for freedom fighters and refugees by denying the enemy information, preventing them from easily finding their hiding places or operations bases. In many cases, border crossings were arranged by villagers on both sides of the border. For instance, some of the freedom fighters used canoes belonging to the local villagers in crossing the Zambezi River. Many citizens of the countries fighting for freedom crossed into Zambia for safety, training abroad, or to get re-supplied with weapons.

Freedom trails and border crossings by freedom fighters were facilitated as the Zambian government gave unlimited access to freedom fighters along its international borders with the countries to be liberated. International boundaries in Africa quite often cut across communities of common ethnic linkage; these communities often speak the same language and have family members on both sides of the border. This geography literally made the struggle of the un-liberated territories Zambia's own. In the Eastern Province of Zambia, Nyimba, Petauke, Katete, and Chadiza Districts extend to the border with Mozambique. FRELIMO of Mozambique launched operations from these districts, particularly Nyimba, Petauke, and Katete. These districts are inhabited by the same ethnic groups; the Nsenga

(126) See Zambia's survival strategies above; see also Masheke, 3 April 2007.

people and the Kunda inhabit both sides of the Mozambique-Zambia border. Katete District is the home to the Chewa of Gawa Undi who are found in both Malawi and Mozambique. The freedom trails of FRELIMO have been traced to several crossing points on the Zambian eastern front, which include Kameta and Mwanjabantu in Katete District, Tafelansoni, Chibalawa, Vubwi, and Luangwa Bridge.

Similarly, in the Feira/Luangwa District of the Lusaka Province, the Nsenga and Kunda people are found on both sides of the Mozambique and Zimbabwean border. The Chiawa border area of Kafue District is inhabited by the Goba people, who speak a language very close to Shona of Zimbabwe. Interviewees in the study disclosed how easily Zimbabwe freedom fighters fit into local communities because they spoke the same language. Zimbabwe freedom trails led to border crossings at Feira, Luangwa Bridge, and Chirundu, among others.

The Southern Province of Zambia, along the Zambezi River, which carries the boundary between Zambia and Zimbabwe, is home to the Tonga people. The same Tonga ethnic groups inhabit the Zimbabwe side of the Zambezi River and the two groups have close cultural and family ties. The construction of the Kariba Dam on the other hand forced the local inhabitants to settle on either side of the lake in Zambia and Zimbabwe. In this province, Zimbabwe freedom fighter border crossings were at Sinazongwe, Kalomo, Livingstone, Kazungula, etc.

The Caprivi Strip of Namibia is home to Lozi speaking peoples, Subiya, Yeyi, and Mbukushu ethnic groups, the majority of whom are linked to the Lozi/Luyana Kingdom of the Western Province of Zambia in the pre-colonial period.¹²⁷ SWAPO freedom trails led to border crossings at Imusho, Singalume, Katima Mulilo, Ngweze, Mambova, Kazungula etc.

The Angola-Zambia border was the result of arbitration in 1905 by the King of Italy, following a dispute between the Portuguese in Angola and the British in Northern Rhodesia.¹²⁸ The King of Italy simply split the disputed territory in the middle without taking ethnic divisions into consideration. Thus from Imusho in Shangombo District of the Western Province to Kaunga Mashi through Senanga District to Kalabo District, the boundary cut through and divided ethnic groups who spoke the same languages and shared Chieftaincies. UNITA freedom trails led to crossings at Imusho, Shangombo, Sinjembela, Kaunga Mashi, etc in Senanga District, and Sikongo, Kacamisa, and Muweshi in Kalabo District.

In the North Western Province of Zambia, the Luvale peoples of the Zambezi District have their paramount Chief in Angola. In early colonial days, it was reported that the Luvale used to evade tax collectors by crossing over into Angola only to return after the tax collection exercise was over. Similarly, in Mwinilunga District, the Lunda speaking people inhabit both sides of the border. The MPLA freedom trails crisscrossed the border in Zambezi, Chavuma, and Mwinilunga Districts of the

(127) Mainga, Mutumba. *Bulozi under the Luyana Kings*. London: Longmans, 1973.

(128) Ibid.

North Western Province at Chinyama Litapi and Nyatanda in the Western Zambezi District, Nyakulenga in Chief Nyakulenga's area in Western Chavuma, and at Jimbe in Chief Kanongesha's area in the Mwinilunga District.

Unfortunately, porous international borders also meant that the enemy spies and informers were also able to penetrate into the country and carry out operations. The crisis in southern Africa, particularly the Rhodesian border closure at the time of the UDI in November 1965 and on 9 January 1973, highlighted Zambia's vulnerability. Zambia had little choice but to come up with survival strategies, some of which appeared to limit the country's role in the liberation struggle.

President Kaunda, at the opening of the proceedings of the UN Special Committee on Colonialism in May 1965, said, "Zambia's geographical position and the development of its communication and economy in the past have left us in an awkward, indeed, well-nigh impossible situation. But this does not deter us in condemning those who carry out imperialistic, racial and colonialist policies."¹²⁹

Inside the country, refugees and freedom fighters were treated differently. By definition, refugees were those people who left their respective home countries to flee from colonialism, racist oppression, occupation, repression, and the destabilization of liberation wars. Refugees were not fighters per se, although liberation movements could recruit refugees as fighters. The refugees, who settled in Zambia or transited across Zambia, came from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Some refugees settled spontaneously in villages and townships where they were absorbed into local communities and needed very limited direct assistance from the Zambian government. The refugees who needed direct official assistance, on the other hand, were the responsibility of the Commissioner for Refugees of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Zambian government coordinated all matters relating to the protection and assistance of refugees in Zambia, through the Ministry of Home Affairs. Refugees were settled in special reception areas, which were gazetted. Each arriving refugee was registered. In 1966, the Mayukwayukwa Refugee Settlement in Kaoma District of the Western Province was established. Similarly, in 1971, the Maheba Refugee Settlement was opened near Solwezi in the North Western Province, and the Ukwimi Refugee Settlement was opened in Petauke District of the Eastern Province to cope with refugees from Mozambique.

The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in Zambia in 1967, as the refugee influx problems unfolded in the country with the intensification of the liberation struggle in the region. Subsequently, several international Non-Governmental Organizations such as the Red Cross Society, the Lutheran World Federation, and the Jesuit Refugee Service, as well as local NGOs, participated in the UNHCR programmes in Zambia.

Zambia is a signatory to both the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects

(129) *Times*, 25 May 1965.

of Refugee Problems in Africa. In 1970, the government of the Republic of Zambia passed the Refugee Control Act.

Freedom fighters were quite different from refugees, although a refugee could become a freedom fighter and vice versa. Freedom fighters belonged to military wings of liberation movements. Within Zambia, traditional leaders, with the approval of the Central Government, allocated land to liberation movements in specific areas, after taking into consideration security concerns of both the local people and the liberation movements.¹³⁰ The land was used for camps and bases of various types such as military units, logistic camps, production units, tailoring units, and children's camps. Freedom fighters in Zambia were in camps and bases under the control of their liberation movements and high command. Most military camps were transitory, in that groups of fighters were not in permanent settlement. While bases were highly mobile for security reasons, whenever and wherever they moved to, a unit of Zambia's defence forces was always in the vicinity to provide support and cover. Officers of the Zambia Army Special Duties Unit were in direct contact with liberation movement high command and freedom fighters. Thus the MPLA had a big transitory camp in Lusaka West, Victory Camp, and transit bases in Mwinilunga, Chavuma, and Chinyama Litapi in the North Western Province. SWAPO had a big transitory camp at Nyango in Kaoma and transit bases in Kalabo at Lukena, Sikongo, and in Senanga at Shangombo, Imusho, and Sinjembela, and Kaunga Mashi. ZAPU had big transitory camps at Ngwerere and Chikumbi near Lusaka among others, and transit bases all along the Zambezi River border areas of Luangwa, Chiawa, Siavonga, down to Kazungula. In addition to bases, freedom fighters were scattered and hiding in the hills and forests before crossing into and out of Zambia. All liberation movements had personnel who lived in urban townships, mainly for administrative and logistic purposes. Some of the urban houses were provided by the Zambian government, while some were bought or rented by the liberation movements themselves.

In militarized border areas such as Imusho, Kaunga Mashi, and Sinjembela in Senanga West, some areas were mined and government institutions were deserted. The villagers could not produce food due to frequent enemy attacks and landmines, while at the same time large numbers of refugees from Namibia and Angola were spontaneously settling in villages. Zambian soldiers patrolled the general areas to protect both the local people and refugees. In addition, the Zambia Army distributed medicines, food, and clothing, and even ran schools to provide basic education to a mixture of children residing in the areas.¹³¹ The Zambian government and missionaries, particularly Catholics at Sioma provided the necessary basics both directly and through the army.¹³²

(130) Interviews with Mweene Mutondo Edward Mooyo Mbombola, Mutondo Royal Establishment, (Kaoma) 14 July 2007; Induna Imandi Kandala Muteto, Barotse Royal Establishment, (Limulunga) 19 July 2007; Mulena Mukwae Makwibi, Nalolo Barotse Royal Establishment, (Muoyo) 18 July 2007.

(131) Interview with Col. Godfrey Lubasi Shebo, (Livingstone) 1 May 2007.

(132) Interview with Lt. Col. Adam Jansen Mwandila, (Livingstone) 27 April 2007.

In Kaoma, where a large SWAPO military camp was located in Nyango forest by the Nyango stream in Mweene Mutondo's area, the situation was quite different from the border areas analysed above. The camp, which was built in 1975, stands intact to this day in tall elephant grass. It was deliberately sited in a place far from villages so that if SWAPO were attacked, locals would be little affected and the forest was thick enough for the protection of the freedom fighters. The local Chief Mweene Mutondo allocated enough land for SWAPO freedom fighters to cultivate maize and keep goats and chickens for their own consumption. The research team was informed that, at its height, Nyango Camp had 4,000 children. Boys and girls lived in hostels within the camp where education was provided from kindergarten to junior secondary (Form II). There was a large hospital staffed by Namibian doctors, where war casualties were brought for treatment. There were even underground chambers and tunnels, which came to be known only after the freedom fighters had left. These might have been armouries or hiding places in the event of attack. Members of the local Zambian community were not allowed to enter the camp. The Nyango stream separated the Zambian civilian population and the camp.

SWAPO built two small clinics outside the camp, which attended to local people. However, sometimes very serious cases among the local people were admitted into the hospital within the camp. Every Tuesday, Thursday, and Sunday morning till noon, SWAPO personnel would come out of the camp and cross the stream and open a market. SWAPO sold second-hand clothes, and people came from far and wide to buy them. There was also barter trade, and SWAPO exchanged cooking oil, soap, and sugar, for cassava leaves, groundnuts, vegetables, and fruit. Furthermore, the local people brought cattle, which they slaughtered and sold as beef carcasses to SWAPO. Zambian women built houses along their side of Nyango stream brewing

'seven days' *mbote*, *kachasu*, and *waine*, which were consumed by the Namibians.¹³³ SWAPO freedom fighters entered villages freely, and had children with local women, which they left behind in Kaoma.

Nyango camp was used as a transit camp for freedom fighters returning from training abroad and from fighting in Namibia. Reports of arrivals of groups who were in the camp only for some days, were given to the research team. SWAPO had a large fleet of trucks running between the camp, the Kaoma Boma, and some unknown destinations. Local people revealed with appreciation how they used to be given free rides to Kaoma Boma.

It was revealed to the research team that SWAPO combatants in Kaoma used to go to Senanga to cross into Namibia. They used to cross at Kalongola Pontoon on the Zambezi River into Senanga West.¹³⁴ It was indeed established in Senanga that SWAPO had transit bases near Litambya Hospital, as well as at Nande near Itufa and at

(133) Mutondo. 14 July 2007.

(134) Interview with Headman Lazarous Mwiya, 14 July 2007.

Liangati.¹³⁵ In Senanga West, SWAPO had several crossing points, sometimes through Eastern Angola, into Namibia.

The threat of attack by the Boer racist forces was ever present, although Nyango camp was never actually attacked. At one stage, the Zambian Air Force intercepted an enemy plane heading for Nyango. The plane was forced to land at Kaoma airstrip and it is still there as a museum piece. Captured enemy soldiers were taken to Lusaka.¹³⁶ At Mwene Mutondo's palace, it was revealed that in 1978 Boer planes flew over Nyango forest. During the same year, two Boer soldiers on foot were caught, one at Mukunkike and another at Mangango. They were arrested by alert local communities and taken to Kaoma Boma.

In the border district of Luangwa (previously Feira), Chief Jolon Giri Mpuka, who has been chief of the Chikunda since 1971, revealed that he was never requested to give land or transit rights to freedom fighters.¹³⁷ Freedom fighters who wore khaki and spoke Ndebele and Shona were of Joshua Nkomo's party ZAPU. ZAPU had a big camp at Chakwenga in the neighbouring chiefdom of Chief Mbuluma, along the Great East Road. Freedom fighters started entering Chief Mpuka's area along the Zambezi River in 1971. Initially they were few, but more and more came. The freedom fighters were brought in vehicles at night. They lived in small individual tents and did not stay long in one place, for fear of exposure. They explained that their presence in Luangwa was known to and sanctioned by President Kaunda and his government. Their main objective was to cross the Zambezi River into Zimbabwe, to fight the racist minority regime of Ian Smith.

Freedom fighters used canoes loaned to them by locals, floating baobab tree trunks, inflatable dingies, 'life jackets' which they came with, and anything else that could float and take them across the Zambezi into the combat country, Rhodesia. Their crossings were near the Kavalamanja, Amoro, and Kanyenze villages.¹³⁸

Initially, freedom fighters were in the forest in the hills such as Chilombwe Hill, Kansuku Hill, opposite Kavalamanja. Then freedom fighters started coming to the villages. Although food used to be delivered to them by trucks, they used to go into the villages to buy beer, chicken, and goats. They bartered or paid for what they needed from the villagers with second-hand clothing and blankets. They also helped the villagers by providing medication to the sick.¹³⁹ Soon freedom fighters began to mix with the villagers freely. Zambian villagers provided freedom fighters with food, and told them where the rebel racist soldiers were. The villagers guided freedom fighters through safe passages for crossing. Comeless Watch Tembo, Headman of Kadembwere, told the research team that they helped the freedom fighters at the border because they wanted the fighters to win freedom for their country. Moreover,

(135) Makumba, 21 July 2007.

(136) Lipoba, 15 July 2007.

(137) Interview with Chief Jolon Giri Mpuka, (Luangwa Palace) 1 December 2007.

(138) Interview with Mr John Njovu Shitima, (Chiendeende Village, Luangwa) 1 December 2007.

(139) Interview with Mr Francis Tembo, Headman Kavalamanja, (Kavalamanja, Luangwa) 30 November 2007.

villagers on the Zambian side had family members across the border in Zimbabwe. It followed, therefore, that if the freedom fighters won the war, relatives on both sides of the river would be free to visit one another.¹⁴⁰

The minority racist regime established a military camp at Kanyemba, on the south bank, almost opposite Luangwa Boma to control the growing infiltration of freedom fighters. Zambian and Rhodesian security forces patrolled their respective sides of the Zambezi waters, from Luangwa to Chirundu, at regular intervals.

The local people in Luangwa gave accounts of instances when returning freedom fighters were caught by pursuing Rhodesian white soldiers on the south bank of the Zambezi. The desperate fighters would call out for help to cross over to the Zambian side. In full view of the Zambians at the Luangwa Boma, the freedom fighters would be executed by the pursuing racist troops. On one occasion, William Antonio Mumba, a police officer at Luangwa Boma, after watching three returning freedom fighters shot on the southern bank by Rhodesian forces, went to rescue one freedom fighter who called out for help to cross the river while racist soldiers were hot on his heels. Mumba got in a canoe and paddled across the Zambezi to the Rhodesian side. He picked up the freedom fighter in the canoe and brought him safely to the Zambian side. The freedom fighter had no boots and his feet had thorns imbedded in them; at the Boma in Luangwa the thorns were removed from his feet and he was given food.¹⁴¹

In addition to patrols, racist agents and spies of all types used to cross into Luangwa to plant landmines and to try to locate the positions of freedom fighters. On one occasion, Boer soldiers came to Kavalamanja Basic School and took down the Zambian flag, and sat on it to have a picnic!¹⁴²

As was Zambia's policy, the Zambian Army had deployed soldiers from the second battalion (2ZR) in Luangwa and they were camped at Luangwa Secondary School to give cover to both the freedom fighters and the local people should the need arise. Furthermore, army personnel used to go to the villages to take men and women for training as Home Guards. The Home Guards were taught how to handle guns at the firing range at Kakalwe Village near Luangwa Boma, but they did not keep guns in their homes. Weapons were to be given to the Home Guards when the need arose. They were also taught how to dig trenches in which to shelter in the event of attack.¹⁴³

On 6 March 1978, the racist forces operating from Kanyemba carried out an early morning surprise commando attack on Kavalamanja, Tinkalo, and Kandembwere villages cradled deep in between steep rocky hills. The enemy also bombed the surrounding hills, home to freedom fighters waiting to cross and returning fighters waiting to return to the safety of camps further inland. Zambian army personnel

(140) Interview with Mr Comeless Watch Tembo, Headman Kadembwere, (Kandembwere Village, Luangwa) 30 November 2007.

(141) Mumba, 29 November 2007.

(142) Francis Tembo, 30 November 2007.

(143) Interviews with Mr Comeless Watch Tembo, Headman Kadembwere, 30 November 2007; Mrs Juliana Phiri, (Kavalamanja Basic School, Luangwa) 30 November 2007.

at Luangwa Secondary School were bombed by Rhodesian jet fighters in their trucks as they tried to reach Kavalamanja. There was carnage. After jet fighters bombed the villages and surrounding hills, there came helicopter gunships, which, in addition to their fire power, dropped paratroopers who killed and finished off anything on the ground that had survived the bombing. One woman survived, only because she had gone to the fields very early that morning.¹⁴⁴ Others survived because they were away from the village visiting elsewhere. Chief Mpuka knew of the slaughter when some of his subjects, fleeing from neighbouring villages and neighbourhoods, arrived at his palace to seek refuge. Many had serious injuries.¹⁴⁵

Two days after the attack, on 8 March 1978, soldiers of the 4th Battalion (4ZR) arrived from Chipata to help bury the dead. The research team was told that many of the dead bodies in the hills were devoured by wild animals. The burial site at Kavalamanja is comprised of two large graves sealed with concrete. One of the two graves has a copper symbol of the Zimbabwe bird.

Traditional leaders, chiefs, and headmen led and guided their subjects in remote rural villages through thick and thin when hostile forces attacked.¹⁴⁶ Furthermore, alert and patriotic villagers monitored enemy infiltration and border violations by racist soldiers in their localities. Through the network of security committees they were able to report to the national security system. One interviewee summed up the situation when he stated that villagers believed in security measures like religion.

Joint Provincial and District Operations Committees were established throughout the country and in war zone areas, in particular. At the provincial level, the Regional Army Units linked ordinary villagers and communities to the national security networks and systems. At the district and local levels, the committees were directly involved in the monitoring of the daily operations of freedom fighters in their respective areas. When security operations were launched, Provincial and District Committees provided information as to the exact location and strength of the enemy. The Committees also monitored border crossings and arrivals of both refugees and freedom fighters through alert village communities.

Men and women in the areas which were militarized were given military training to guard their own homes and families, the Home Guards.¹⁴⁷ They were also taught how to recognize the enemy and to watch out for enemy infiltration. A Home Guard could make an arrest, but was warned not to confront armed persons. Similarly they were discouraged from accommodating freedom fighter combatants with arms in their homes. Home Guards could identify a bomb. Training was carried out in their own localities through the Regional Army Units and Joint District Operations

(144) Phiri, 30 November 2007.

(145) Mpuka, 1 December 2007.

(146) Interviews with Chief Inyambo Yeta, Mwandu Barotse Royal Establishment, (Mwandu Palace, Sesheke) 30 April 2007; Mpuka, 1 December 2007.

(147) Interviews with Mr Ngabwe Martin Masiye, (Sesheke) 28 April 2007; Mr Lackson Simon Kabona, (Chiawa Local Court) 4 December 2007; Induna Iluya, Mwandu Kuta, (Sesheke) 30 April 2007; Miss Noria Lubinda, (Katoya Village, Kazungula) 30 April 2007.

Committees. Zambian security forces have actually acknowledged the role played by the Home Guards and Zambian communities in providing information concerning enemy movements in their respective areas.¹⁴⁸

The price of liberating southern Africa was very high for all concerned. In Zambia, the lives of both freedom fighters and ordinary Zambians were lost. The blood of Zambians mingled with the blood of freedom fighters to pay the ultimate price. Expensive developmental infrastructure was destroyed through targeted bombings; costly re-routing projects to Dar es Salaam, Malawi, and Kenya, were undertaken as a matter of urgency while the cost of hosting freedom fighters and refugees, as well as keeping the defence machinery running was immense. These factors, combined with the hike of oil prices in the early 1970s, the prolonged slump in copper prices throughout the seventies and eighties, saw a sharp decline in the standard of living of the Zambian people. However, the majority of those Zambians interviewed have said that sacrifices made to liberate southern Africa were worth it, because this was the only way to guarantee Zambia's own freedom and independence. Moreover there was no way Zambia could enjoy freedom while their brothers and sisters in southern Africa remained in the bondage of white settler and apartheid domination.

(148) Masheke, 1 March 2007; Mwandila, 27 April 2007; Shebo, 1 May 2007.

Abbreviations:

ANC:	African National Congress of South Africa, Mozambique, Zambia, AAC: All-African Convention and Unity Movement (South Africa)
CANU:	Caprivi African National Union
CAPU:	Caprivi African People's Union
COREMO:	Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique
FNLA:	National Front for the Liberation of Angola (Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola)
FRELIMO:	Mozambique Liberation Front
MPLA:	Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NIBMAR:	No Independence Before Majority Rule
NIPA:	National Institute of Public Administration
NUDO:	National Unity Democratic Organization of South West Africa
OAU:	Organisation of African Unity
PAC:	Pan African Congress of South Africa
PAFMECSA:	Pan-African Freedom Movement of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa
PAIGC:	African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde
RENAMO:	Mozambique National Resistance
RFP:	Rhodesian Front Party
RST:	Roan Selection Trust
SWANUF:	SWA National Unity Front
SWAPO:	South West African People's Organization TUC: British Trade Union Congress
UDENAMO:	Mozambique National Democratic Union
UNDPA:	United National Democratic Party of Angola
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNIP:	United National Independence Party (Zambia)
UNITA:	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNTAG:	United Nations Transitory Assistance Group
UPA:	Union of Populations of Angola
UPP:	United Party for Progress (Zambia)
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ZANC: Zambia African National Congress ZANU: Zimbabwe African National Union ZAPU: Zimbabwe African People's Union

Appendix I

Between 1965 and 1972, Zambia experienced about 444 border violations as detailed below:

Table 1: Number of Zambian Border Violations by Year 149

Year	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	TOTAL
Times	1	20	32	85	57	82	58	82	444

Table 2: Means of Zambian Border Violations in 1971

Year	Country	Helicopter	Aeroplane	Boat	Foot	Total
1971	Angola (Portugal)	2	8		3	13
	Mozambique (Portugal)	3	17	2	2	24
	Rhodesia	5	7	27		39
	South Africa	3	3	3		9

Table 3: Zambian Border Violations by Type for 1971 150

Year	Country	District Entered	Border Crossed (No action)	Border Crossed (Action)	Total
1971	Angola (Portugal)	5	9	4	13
	Mozambique (Portugal)	4	22	2	24
	Rhodesia	4	39		39
	South Africa	1	6		6

(149) Zulu, Grey. *Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu*. Ndola: Times Print Park Ltd., 2007: See p.367. (Source: Ministry of Defence).

(150) Zulu, Grey. *Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu*. Ndola: Times Print Park Ltd., 2007: See pp.368-69.

Table 4: Zambian Border Violations by Country and Year¹⁵¹

Country	Year	Zambian District	Times		Year	Zambian District	Times	
Angola (Portugal)	1972	Chavuma	4		1973			
		Kalabo	5					
		Mwinilunga	1				Mwinilungu	1
		Senanga	2					
		Sesheke	1					
		TOTAL:	13				Zambezi	1
				TOTAL:	2			
Mozambique (Portugal)	1972	Feira	6		1973	Feira	1	
		Katete	6				Katete	1
		Chadiza	9				Chadiza	1
		Petauke	1					
		TOTAL:	22				TOTAL:	3
Rhodesia	1972	Feira	24		1973	Feira	5	
		Lusaka (Chiawa)	11				Lusaka	2
		Gwembe	3				Gwembe	3
		Livingstone	1				Livingstone	1
							Kalabo	3
		TOTAL:	39				TOTAL:	14
South Africa	1972	Sesheke	6		1973	Sesheke	2	

(151) Zulu, Grey. *Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu*. Ndola: Times Print Park Ltd., 2007: See pp.370-71 and 405-06. (Source; Ministry of Defence).

Table 5: Rebel Rhodesian Raids into Zambia, 1977 to 1979¹⁵²

Date	Place	Deaths	Casualties
21 August 1977	Luangwa	5	Several
1 September 1977	Luangwa	NIL	Several
18 September 1977	Luangwa	NIL	Several
31 October 1977	Katombora	NIL	Several
2 November 1977	Katombora	NIL	Several
2 February 1978	Rhodesian Border	8	Several
2 March 1978	Livingstone	2	Several
6 March 1978	Luangwa	22	Several
23 August 1978	Sesheke	12	6
19 October 1978	Chikumbi (Lusaka)	226	629
19 October 1978	Old Mkushi	107	92
2 November 1978	ZAPU Camp (Lusaka)	6	90 Missing
22 December 1978	Mboroma (Re-Education Centre)	4	32 Kidnapped
23 March 1979	Farm House (Lusaka)	6	Several
16 March 1979	Sinjembela	4	5
10 April 1979	16 km west of Lusaka	1	7

Table 6: Destruction of Rail and Road Infrastructure in Zambia by Rhodesian rebels, 1979¹⁵³

Date	Place	Infrastructure Destroyed
12 October 1979	Northern Province	Rail Bridge, 1 Road Bridge, 1 Chambeshi
20 November 1979	Rufunsa	Road Bridge, 1 Road Bridge, 1 Chimyangulo, Rufunsa Nchonco
20 November 1979	Mazabuka	Rail Bridge, 1 Road Bridge, 1 Kaleya
20 November 1979	Mkushi	Rail Bridge, 1 Road Bridge, 1 Lunsemfwa
20 November 1979	Lusaka Province	Road Bridge, 1 Chongwe
20 November 1979	Southern Province	Road Bridge, 2 Road Bridges, 1 Chirundu
20 November 1979	Kafue Gorge	Road Bridge, 1 Chirundu

(152) Zulu, Grey. *Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu*. Ndola: Times Print Park Ltd., 2007: See p.465.

(153) Zulu, Grey. *Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu*. Ndola: Times Print Park Ltd., 2007: See pp.377-78.

Table 7: Apartheid South Africa's Covert War of Destabilization, Zambia, 1986-1989¹⁵⁴

Date	Place	Means/ Forms of Destabilization	Results
December 1985	Livingstone	Letter bomb explosion	1 ANC member injured
December 1986	Livingstone	2 bomb explosions (Sub-station and Railway Office)	Electricity sub-station destroyed; 1 person injured
February 1987	Lusaka (Suburban post office)	Bomb explosion	Building extensively damaged
September 1987	Lusaka (Township)	Bomb explosion	4 injured
September 1987	Lusaka (Libala)	Bomb explosion	No injuries
September 1987	Lusaka	Bomb explosion	2 postal workers killed and 6 wounded
June 1988	Lusaka (Olympia Park)	Bomb explosion	5 persons injured; 3 houses damaged
24 November 1988	Lusaka (outside a hotel)	Bomb explosion	
2 December 1988	Livingstone (North Western Hotel)	Car bomb explosion	2 Zambians killed; 13 Zambians injured; 2 dead in other incidents in the same town.
24 January 1989	Livingstone (Windsor Hotel)	Bomb explosion	1 dead; 1 injured
29 January 1989	Livingstone (Bush Baby Bar)	Bomb explosion	1 Zambian woman killed

(154) Zulu, Grey. *Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu*. Ndola: Times Print Park, 2007: See pp.344-45.

Table 8: South African Direct Attacks on Zambian Territory¹⁵⁵

Date	Place	Means/ Destabilization	Results
24 March 1986	Sinjembela	Military aircraft	Air space violation
5 April 1986	Kazungula	Jet fighter	“”
10 April 1986	Sesheke	Jet fighter	“”
29 April 1986	Katima Mulilo	Helicopter	“”
15 May 1986	Katima Mulilo	Jet fighter	“”
24 May 1986	Senanga	Spotter plane	“”
20 July 1986	Sesheke	Jet fighter	“”
25 July 1986	Sesheke	Jet fighter	“”
13 August 1986	Sinjembela	Jet fighter	“”
25 August 1986	Sesheke	Jet fighter	“”
30 August 1986	Mwandi	Helicopter	“”
1 April 1987	Sesheke	Commando raid	4 civilians dead; 4 wounded; 1 abducted.
1 April 1987	Sesheke (Central PO) and Dambwa	Commando raid	4 dead; 1 wounded
11 April 1987	Livingstone	Commando raid	4 dead
20 June 1987	Sesheke (Kazuni village)	Speed boat	2 dead; 1 wounded
25 June 1987	Livingstone	Commando raid	4 dead
12 June 1988	Opposite Mwandi Hospital (Sesheke)	Speed boat armed with motor	Violation of land and water space.

(155) Zulu, A.G. *Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu*. Ndola: Times Print Park, 2007: See p.342.

Table 9: MNR (RENAMO) Raids and Atrocities into Zambia¹⁵⁶

Date	Means	Target	Result
20 December 1987	MNR attacked a border immigration post and cooperative store in Chadiza. Armed with machine guns, rocket launchers, and axes.	Zambians	Looted homes, abducted eight people, set alight a Land Rover, stole money, left 1000 homeless, 300 cattle stolen. Left an open letter to Zambian Government to stop supporting FRELIMO and a poster of RENAMO. Leader was Dhlakama.
1 March 1988	Two MNR bandits cut ears off Sasonvis Mbewe.	Zambia	Sent him to report the Zambian authorities.
18 May 1988	Seven MNR bandits armed with sub-machine guns and axes.	Zambia	13 civilians were killed.
18 August 1988	MNR raid on foot.	Zambia	Five people killed in three villages and 12 people killed in neighbouring villages.
27 May 1989	Kwenani near Vubwi. Raided on foot with machine guns.	Zambia	Six people killed.
2 May 1989	Chilawe village (Katete) armed with AK-47s and grenades.	Zambia	Burnt 39 villages, burnt 24 granaries; exchanged fire with Zambian security forces.
16 May 1989	Kafumbwe village, Katete. On foot raid.	Zambia	Looted health centre and shops; attacked Zambian military post; exchanged fire with Zambian security forces.
13 February 1989	Chikalawa Primary School; Armed with rifles, motors, and rocket launchers.	Zambia	Three people killed (one of them a school headmistress); Five Zambians disappeared; Exchanged fire with Zambian security forces.

(156) Zulu, A.G. *Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu*. Ndola: Times Print Park, 2007: pp.339-40.

Table 10: MNR (RENAMO) Incidents of Cross-border Raids and Atrocities in Zambia from 1987 to 1989¹⁵⁷

Year	Incidents	Dead	Abducted	Huts Burnt	Cattle Rustled	Shops Looted
1987	24	1	122		419	7
1988	88	30	36	9	298	12
1989	21	44	13	152	121	9
Total:	133	75	171	161	838	28

Table 11: South Africa Terrorist Attacks on ANC in Zambia¹⁵⁸

Date	Place	Means / Forms of Destabilisation	Results
	Lusaka (Farm)	Target assassination by shooting ANC	Two ANC members and a farmer died; perpetrators charged with murder.
April 1989	Lusaka	Assassination by poisoning ANC	Two ANC members died; perpetrators charged with causing death by poisoning.
April 1989	Southern Zambia	Landmine explosion ANC	Two ANC members killed.
May 1989	Lusaka	Disinformation leaflets ANC	Calling ANC members to create "Assembly point" to facilitate their return to South Africa.
May 1989	Zambian Airspace	Attempted hijacking of plane carrying ANC cadres from Angola to Dar.	ANC white hijackers arrested and sentenced to 15 years jail.
June 1989	Lusaka	Boob-trap bombs ANC	Office of ANC damaged; no casualty.

(157) Zulu, A.G. *Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu*. Ndola: Times Print Park, 2007: p.338.

(158) Zulu, A.G. *Memoirs of Alexander Grey Zulu*. Ndola: Times Print Park, 2007: pp.345-46.

Appendix II

Table 1: Number of Refugees Hosted by the Republic of Zambia from 1967 to 2008

Year	Namibia	Angola	Z a i r e - DRC	Mozam bique	Malawi	South Afric a	Zim babw e	Burundi	Somalia	Uganda	Others	Total
1967		11,000										11,000
1968		12,800										12,800
1969												
1970	850	9,000		4,750							1,400	16,000
1971	900	11,200		4,600		300						17,000
1972		17,200		6,400							1,400	25,000
1973	3,000	22,000		10,000		500					1,500	37,000
1974	3,300	25,000		10,000		600					1,100	40,000
1975	3,400	30,000		450		500					1,650	36,000
1976	3,350	28,000		360							1,890	33,600
1977	2,700	29,700					30,000				1,600	64,000
1978	5,500	26,000					45,300				3,200	80,000
1979											57,000	57,000
1980	5,500	22,000	5,000			3,500						36,000
1981	4,300	29,100	4,700			2,200					200	40,500

Year	Namibia	Angola	Z a i r e - DRC	Mozam bique	Malawi	South Afric a	Zim babw e	Burundi	Somalia	Uganda	Others	Total
1982											58,000	58,000
1995											31,347	31,347
1996											31,685	31,685
1997											32,549	32,549
1998											34,983	34,983
1999											177,490	177,490
2000											233,006	233,006
2001											259,588	259,588
2002		209,050	49,071				1,828	5,506	937	227	401	267,020
2003		193,056	57,354				2,071	5,779	1,006	232	324	259,822
2004		120,492	72,535				2,239	6,250	1,711	736	8,768	212,731
2005		75,450	59,376				2,152	5,674	1,693	744	8,828	153,917
2006		42,350	61,065				1,374	3,988	1,695	764	8,797	120,033
2007		40,757	55,434				1,417	4,045	1,725	778	8,775	112,931
2008		27,343	51,070				1,850	4,817	1,762	131	213	87,186

Note: The Office of the Commissioner for Refugees stated that there are several blanks on the chart because they are still compiling data, especially in relation to the early period.

Table 2: National Statistical Overview 159

Zambia Refugee Population as of 31st April 2008								
Location	Angola	Burundi	Zaire (DRC)	Rwanda	Somalia	Uganda	Others	Grand Total
Meheba	8,936	351	2,560	2,628	59	16	1	14,567
Mayukwayukwa	9,854	62	263	88	-	1	-	10,268
Kala	-	-	17,120	-	-	-	-	17,120
Mwange	-	-	18,320	-	-	-	-	18,320
Total Camps	18,790	413	38,263	2,716	59	17	17	60,275
Total Urban	21	832	1,593	935	806	152	96	4,435
Self Settled	8,262	400	15,000	900	700	-	71	25,333
Grand Total	27,073	1,645	54,856	4,551	1,565	169	184	90,043

Table 3: Angolan Refugees Born in Zambia as of 31 April 2008 160

Site	View	0-16 Years Old		17-21 Years Old		Older than 22 Years		TOTAL	
		Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female
Mayukwayukwa settlement	Not willing to return	1,370	1,428	68	85	138	186	1,576	1,699
Meheba Settlement	Not willing to return	1,725	1,740	184	235	413	471	2,322	2,446
Self Settled Angolan Refugees	Not willing to return	468	455	58	52	446	401	972	908
	TOTAL	3,563	3,623	310	372	997	1,058	4,870	5,053
GRAND TOTAL		7,186		682		2,055		9,923	

(159) Republic of Zambia, Ministry of Home Affairs, Office of the Commissioner for Refugees .

(160) Office of the Commissioner for Refugees, Ministry of Home Affairs, Republic of Zambia.

7.2

Zambia

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Akapelwa, Simaata

[2 July 2008]

Ambassador Simaata Akapelwa was a senior civil servant and diplomat who served the government of the Republic of Zambia in various capacities. Here below we chronicle his experiences and the roles that he played in aiding the liberation process, not only for the country Zambia, but also for the neighbouring countries in the SADC region. He was the Under Secretary in Cabinet Office at some point and was responsible for administration and finance, coordinating some of the activities of the Liberation movements and disbursing some of the material and financial assistance to freedom fighters. He was involved in the hosting of meetings with freedom fighters under the Front Line states.

Thank you very much for according me this opportunity to share the information of great importance. I am ambassador, retired, Simaata Akapelwa. I was born in the year 1939 on 4th December in a place called Litokela in Sesheke district. I went to school, finished Cambridge. I graduated from the University of Zambia with Bachelor of Arts degree and specialized in administration and political sciences and proceeded to get a master's degree at the University of Columbia in the United States of America.

I have a Post Graduate Degree in Administration from Manchester University and I have a Diploma in Education from the University of Perth in Western Australia. I did diplomatic training at the London School of Economics and western Berlin too. I joined the Government many years ago in 1960. Initially, I trained as a teacher and worked in Livingstone, in Monze, Malcolm Moffat and joined the civil service as an education officer, Deputy Education Officer and rose through ranks to the position of Deputy Permanent Secretary, where I was appointed ambassador in the year 1982 at Ministry of Foreign Affairs and it was through that appointment that I got exposed to the liberation of neighbouring countries because in Foreign Affairs, I was meeting distinguished persons who were engaged in the liberation struggle for South Africa, that was African National Congress and the Pan African Congress, Azania, South Africa, Namibia. We got in touch with people like the former President of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma and all his collaborators; and I got in touch with the people who were engaged in the liberation of Angola and Mozambique, amongst others.

There from, I was appointed as High Commissioner of Zambia from 1986 to 1991 to Tanzania where the Liberation Committee, of the Organization of the African Unity was located; and I was working very closely with people like General Hashim Mbita and who was the Executive Secretary, and two of his assistants, a Nigerian and a Zambian national. The Liberation Committee used to have two meetings in a year, one in February, a budgeting session and one in July, which reviewed the operations of the organization in Adis Ababa.

So we worked very closely with Hashim especially when the first President of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda became Chairman of the Front Line States. This is a grouping that mapped up the regional strategy for the liberation movements. The

liberation movements used to report to this committee and that is where we discussed the budgets for their arsenals, military and logistic and their cadres they had to send abroad for training purposes so I became chairman of the Liberation Committee three times when I was there. This exposed me to their operations. We visited some of the areas. We went to Tunisia, Egypt and Bulgaria and we came back to report to the Liberation Committee. We were also mandated to report to the ministerial meeting in Adis Ababa twice in a year, so we worked with their military commanders. I can recall people like Sam Nujoma, and Hidipo Hamutenya. We worked very closely with the current speaker of Namibia. The current speaker who is now the Prime Minister, the name is just gone.

For the ANC, I could recall the one who was the President of the ANC Oliver Tambo. I knew him personally, yes. I knew Alfred Nzo, yes, we interacted, I know President Thabo Mbeki, when he was Publicity Secretary and he became secretary of the youth wing. I knew people like the one who was commander of the Umukontho we Sizwe in Mongu and he became the first Minister of Defence of South Africa. So I knew those as chairman, and Zambia had defence advisors like the one who is in the current Ministry of Home Affairs of Zambia in the name of Lieutenant General Shikapwasha. We worked very well with them and we interacted with them and facilitated the movements of their cadres from Zambia either by vehicles or by train into Zimbabwe and cross over to Botswana using outlets. So this is the contribution that I am aware of and really it was a proud moment. For me and my colleagues who served with me in Tanzania, from 1986, May up to July 1991 in Dar-es-Salam. I have fond memories of the prosecution of the struggle both in South Africa and in Namibia. That is not all, when I got posted to Adis Ababa in 1992, I was the ambassador of the Republic of Zambia, we also worked closely with the Liberation Committee, headed by General Mbita, attending all successive meetings of the Liberation Committee, Council of Ministers and Summits of Heads of States. I attended all the summits from 1986 until 2003, so I am associated to the decisions which were reached. I can go up to the period when the OAU Liberation Committee was dissolved; that was in 1995 in Arusha, Tanzania and Brigadier General Mbita was the last Executive secretary. So we have fond memories.

We collaborated with countries in the front line states like Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Angola, Botswana and Mozambique. These were really the front line states who helped in the prosecution of the liberation of South Africa and Namibia. Zambia too served on the committee on South West Africa and Zambia was chairperson of that committee in New York. Yes it was being discussed in the Committee Four of which I was there which was dealing with decolonisation and I participated almost annually from 1986 to 1991. I was attending all meetings in New-York to discuss the activities and to help Liberation movements to work in unison because at times they wanted to differ because of style of leadership, but we were telling them that our interest was to maximise the prosecution of the liberation struggle. Zambia as you know had a Liberation Centre where we had people like Simumba who were a Colonel there and

many others who followed after him. That was the training centre which liaised with the Liberation movements which were hosted by Zambia. We had here ANC, SWAPO and many others so the Liberation Centre here was coordinating their activities. They have now transformed it into the Army Training Institute near Kamwala. That was a liberation centre which was assisting the Liberation movements with logistics.

I was aware that Rhodesia was one of those countries that Zambia took up so much effort and risks to help the country gain its liberation. By then, I was not serving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I was Under Secretary in Cabinet Office, working under the Secretary to the cabinet and I was responsible for administration and finance, coordinating some of the activities of the Liberation movements, that is, disbursing some of the material and financial assistance that was being accorded to them in camps. They had camps in Chikumbi, west of Lusaka; they had camps in Makeni and many others, so all of these needed facilitation. As you know ZAPU under Joshua Nkhomo was hosted here and so was ZANU, until they differed. When Mozambique got its independence then ZANU moved to Mozambique but originally they were operating in this country and I was aware of their activities and so was FRELIMO, although it started operating from here in Zambia but later on went to Nachingwea in Tanzania because of proximity of the Front Line against the Portuguese in Laurencu Marques. So that one too; we worked with them and we visited them together with the then Special Assistant to the President, Mark Chona.

We travelled in special helicopters to Nachingwea. We hosted meetings with them which were convened by the Chairman of the Front Line, KK. When Mario Soares, the Foreign Minister of Portugal came to a meeting we held culminated into the Portuguese giving up power in 1975. I am aware of all that, because in 1975, I was a Deputy Permanent Secretary, an equivalent of Under Secretary in the Cabinet Office. The countries which played prominent roles were Tanzania which worked with Zambia; Botswana, yes, it assisted because the freedom fighters were fleeing from South Africa via Francistown on the border with Botswana and Botswana kept them as they came to Zambia. We kept some, and then others found their way to Tanzania and they went to foreign lands. So, that is the role we played.

I indicated the roles were vast for AFLICO. The Executive Committee was responsible for budgeting. It was the one which was responsible for keeping finances which came from all African states which were free then because they had a budget which they were remitting to the Organization of African Unity and OAU in turn reposed this responsibility to AFLICO whose HQ was in Dar-es-Salam to keep this money and the Liberation movements would in turn go to AFLICO when they needed assistance in money terms either to procure some equipment, for their travels and for scholarships to various countries. It was the one which was responsible to source for scholarships from various countries and they would bring them into the committee and then we would sit and decide how many scholarships we would give to South Africa, to Namibia, to Zimbabwe, to Mozambique and to Angola in that

order and what their needs were; and to appeal for assistance from other countries of the world and well wishers.

Countries like Arab Jamahiriya played a major role. Countries in Africa like Egypt and Nigeria assisted with some finance and countries like Ethiopia they even arranged for some training outside Addis Ababa and we appealed to the then Socialist countries of Europe including the Soviet Union then to lend assistance to them in monetary terms and they would channel that assistance through AFLICO and the Committee would decide. In South Africa there were two liberation movements; ANC and PAC. They would tell us what their needs were in the area of equipment, logistics and funds. If that was available, assistance was allocated in prorata terms depending on the strength and attitudes of the Liberation Movement. For Namibia, it was one, SWAPO. So we would give them their subventions and then they would go and procure that and then if they needed military, because this is a specialised area, we had a committee of defence experts.

AFLICO was actually a big body. But they didn't have defence personnel, as such they relied on personnel which was based in Addis Ababa, personnel which were attached to embassies, of defence personnel who were well versed with their training but when we called a meeting for defence experts, they would be drawn from all African countries but under the umbrella of the Front Line States because AFLICO had given the responsibility to the Front Line States because they were the ones who felt the heat of the liberation struggle, to advise them.

Indeed there were differences of opinions, differences of perceptions and differences of assumptions. Then, when they came to us, some of them would exaggerate the roles they played in the liberation struggle and then that was where the Front Line States, using the expertise of military personnel, would go with them and ascertain that they did what they claimed to do and then in the case of Namibia, it was apparent that SWAPO was indeed prosecuting the struggle much more effectively than CANU for example was claiming. They didn't bring anything to either Africa or OAU to show what they have actually done on the ground to prosecute the struggle; similarly even in South Africa, ANC and PAC. There was a rift because PAC would claim that they were there in South Africa. They would claim that they had done this and that but when the military experts went on the ground, the information was proved to the contrary. That is why more weight was given to ANC because evidence showed that ANC was prosecuting the struggle more vigorously than the other parties.

Then weighing was 80% to 20%, I think, if it came to who was at the front to prosecute the struggle. There were quarrels between Mbeki who was spokesman for ANC and the spokesman for PAC. I think we were more convinced with the submissions of the ANC, and I think they granted them about 80% and the other party 20%. I think they were very good at giving some statements which were not backed with facts. Gora Abraham was the spokesman for PAC but evidence proved to the contrary. I think SWAPO from Namibia was getting 100% because there was not any evidence of another party doing anything visible on the ground.

In terms of the training systems that were available or scholarships and just general funding, we had a special subcommittee of military experts who examined the offers from China, from communist socialist Europe,. African countries such as Libya and Egypt would provide. So the experts would leave this as a responsibility to the committee of military experts. The committee of military experts would advise and when they gave that advice we went along with it.

In terms of issues of women participation, I think women were very active but not in the leadership or management level, so to say or in the command positions and were relatively insignificant but in the rank and file especially in Tanzania where I was based, if you visited camps like Kongwa and Morogoro, there were more of women in the rank and file and participants in education as well. It is not only military but we provided secondary schools, primary schools, and teachers and all these were there in Morogoro and Kongwa; and we built clinics then and social welfare for them and then they went to higher grades or tertiary education. When it came to assistance which was not only military either giving them software or hardware was the responsibility of the military experts to provide but we also gave them social amenities; education, clinics and I can recall that in Tanzania, if you went there and you asked the current President Jakaya Kikwete and you can ask the former President of Tanzania Benjamin Mkapa who was then Foreign Minister, yes, they could show you were Kongwa is and Morogoro. We had schools there primary schools, secondary schools and when they finished, scholarships were gotten for them. Even the countries in the front line, Zambia, Tanzania and Botswana, there were schools and they were all accommodated within the same schools, primary and secondary schools. That is the contribution these countries made including medical facilities.

There were many, many risks that those countries went through. Talking of Zambia, it suffered a lot of risks. One, our economy was affected because the routes for our imports and exports were tied to Rhodesia and South Africa through the Beit Bridge up to Durban. So when Smith declared UDI in 1963, then these countries had to air lift imports and exports at great expense. That was a cost and there was a physical cost because the Selous scouts came into Zambia bombing the perceived areas where they alleged that freedom fighters were staying. They destroyed bridges; they destroyed farms in Lusaka West here and, in fact, near where I was living some families lost their lives. Chikumbi camps were bombed along the Great North Road. People were killed in numbers. There are a lot of unmarked graves around Zambia, you can go even to Luangwa, the bridges were bombed and the so called routes which were allegedly used by the Liberation movements were bombed and as a result innocent lives were lost.

Yes, indeed and I think if the clock was being reset and rewound Zambia would still give and render the same assistance to the liberation struggle except one sometimes gets disappointed when you see that the people who were assisted in the cause of the liberation tend scorn and ridicule Zambia. They tend to think the economy of Zambia is in shambles without realising that the state of Zambia's economy is in the manner it

is today because of the principled stance that Zambia took to assist these countries in the liberation struggle; and when Zambians go to visit these countries, they just laugh and say you are coming from a poor country. The element of xenophobia takes place, which is regrettable, but we are happy that Zambia played a role in the liberation struggle and we never regretted.

Well, all I would say is that the term terrorist is used sometimes by some hard line states to describe a group of people or individuals who are opposed to it, even if that cause may be justified because they want to remain in power at infinitum or for a long time. Anyone who questions that, they would term him/her a deviant when there are no acts of terror. So really I am sure now the so called terrorists are viewed as gentlemen and women; as people who meant well and contributed to the liberation struggle.

Banda, Benjamin

Benjamin Banda, veteran in the liberation struggle of Zambia's independence, was born on January 1, 1927 in Chipata at Chalungwa, in Chief Nzamane's area in the Eastern Province of Zambia. He went to Chakozi Primary School up to standard four in 1952, before going to Zimbabwe in 1956. He returned to Zambia in 1959 and took part in the liberation struggle for Zambia's independence up to 1964.

Thank you. The truth is, Zambia got independence in 1964 and all our friends got liberated because KK was a real man. He is the one who helped our friends who were suffering.

I am Benjamin Banda; I was born on 5th January, 1927 in Chipata, Chalungwa village, in Chief Nzamane's area. Since it was in the old days, when I reached standard four at Chakozi Primary School in 1952, I stopped school and started searching for jobs.

I used to be a foreman within Lusaka town before I went to Zimbabwe. I came back in 1959 and worked in the Lusaka City Council. That was when the Boers and Ian Smith and Ian Smith started troubling us a lot. By then we were with Roy Welensky. This country was Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was Malawi. Both these places were under Welensky by that time.

Things in Zimbabwe started to get worse and that is why I ran back home. I thought it was better to die at home. That is also the time when Kaunda started the struggle in 1960, and in 1961 he was jailed up to 1962. When he came out of prison, he came to address a meeting in Kamwala where there was an old station. He addressed the meeting when he came from Zimbabwe with Joshua Nkomo in 1962. They had their campaign here and we voted very well and before long Nkomo had also started his liberation struggle here, but when he went back home he was jailed. From that time the battle became intense.

Again, Kaunda was also jailed this side and we used to call our battle under KK, "ZA." Because of these slogans, the Boers under Welensky became vigorous but the UNIP Party became stronger and stronger. Nkhumbula's party was a weaker party. When KK was jailed, there remained Chona Mainza, Mudenda, Sipalo, Kamanga, Kapwepwe, Changulu, Chitambala and Kalulu. All these remained here; while KK was jailed these people carried on with the party.

That is when those who remained did away with the name ZA and changed ZA into UNIP. These men also had great strength and they were doing the campaigns, struggling with the whites. UNIP and Nkhumbula were also fighting, destroying each other, and a lot of people died in what was known as Chachacha. From there we voted. The Boers got some seats. At this point, KK came back from prison. When we voted the Boers got 15 seats, UNIP got 14 seats and Congress got 7 seats. Before long UNIP and Congress merged to form a Coalition Government and the Boers noticed that things were becoming bad for them since we now had 21 seats. The Boers started running from Parliament one by one until we remained with this doctor. I have just forgotten his name. Welensky ran away to Zimbabwe. That Boer doctor took up the place from Welensky.

Although I have forgotten his name now, I do remember him occasionally and he also saw that things were becoming worse; he did not also take long but ran away. Within the Coalition Government, UNIP had power and Kaunda was given a seat as Local Government Minister and Nkhumbula was Minister of Education at

that time. The struggle continued until we had general elections. People who stood were only two; Nkhumbula and Kenneth Kaunda. The Boers also tried to stand in the elections but they had nothing to offer and as UNIP we won the elections while Nkhumbula failed and he was like the opposition party behind UNIP. Thereafter, in 1963, KK went to London and when he came back, we had both the Republic and Independence. We went on ruling until October 1964. That is when we got our Independence. We got both Republic and Independence status on the 24th of October, 1964. On that date we were at Independence Stadium, Lusaka. At midnight, the British switched off power and their plane got away and our plane landed. That is how we got our independence. After that, the Angolan freedom fighters also started fighting for their independence after seeing the benefits of independence in our country. They needed KK to help them. Savimbi did his campaign and when he went to Angola he lost to Dos Santos. War continued because their land is rich in minerals. Refugees started flocking to Zambia and we were keeping them.

There was a big problem also in Zimbabwe since Nkomo was in jail. KK fought so much with the Boers. KK met the Boers at Mosi-oa-tunya in Livingstone and they started talking. KK told them that we did not want to fight with guns but with our mouths. That is how we sung the song “TIYENDE PAMODZI NDI MUTIMA UMO” (let us walk together with one heart). KK was never scared of them because he was telling them the truth. Guerrillas from Zimbabwe came here. Others were in Lusaka West and some were in Chikumbi. These guerrillas were for Nkomo while Mugabe’s were in Mozambique.

We fought with these Boers a lot. We helped our friends a lot with food; and I thank Kaunda for the job he did to help liberate his friends including the freedom fighters who were here. We had freedom fighters from Namibia and from Zimbabwe right here in Zambia. I am not sure if they were SWAPO or SWANU but they all came here. We even kept the freedom fighters from Mozambique in Luangwa. Botswana by then had obtained her independence. Even as I am talking now we still have some of these freedom fighters, here in Zambia. Some used to complain that they lacked soap and food, but KK made it available to them so that they could also fight and get their independence. No wonder even up to now, all the places that KK goes to, he gets so much respect.

Some ZAPU people used to run away and were not coming here but others we used to help. The government, through the Minister used to give them salaula, blankets, foods and a lot of other things. They were here in our community and we used to help them when they asked. If we had, even a 50 ngwee coin, we would give them. There were some who used to stay in other compounds and they ran away from there. When they needed help to feed their children we would help with food and money as long as they had a place to live.

The freedom fighters always ran together with their relatives. We never left them alone hungry especially government. They used to help them despite the stories you hear such as there was a shortage of food or soap. We used to be on queues to buy cooking oil and so on, but KK did a lot of work to help these freedom fighters with food, soap, cooking oil. He used to distribute these things in the camps everywhere. Of course we did not have enough, but we used to help our friends so that in future when things went well with them they could also help us.

Other groups of freedom fighters were here such as ZAPU, Savimbi’s UNITA,

FRELIMO and some were from Namibia. If you start off from here going to Nyimba, FRELIMO built a very big village in Ntabankunwi. They are still here and refuse to go back home. Most of the strong young men and the elderly had jobs around here. This is what we used see.

Ian Smith used to bomb our place a lot because of chasing the ZAPU freedom fighters that were here in Zambia. That person was very bad. He came to Chikumbi and many people died. Some had their hands cut off and others their legs cut off from there. He went to Namalombwe where there was a camp for ZAPU and they bombed it. They came back and bombed a camp in Chongwe.

At Chikumbi and Namalombwe it was ZAPU's camp. Smith left lots of damage to Zambians and there were innocent people, including our relatives, who died. But these people who were running from the bombings had a lot of their Ndebele relatives here. Some used to arrive at this house belonging to Mr Moyo, a Ndebele. They even used to hold some meetings, since Mr Moyo was the Secretary for ZAPU party, and his elder brother who died was a Chairman. Many Ndebele people who used to run away from Zimbabwe found their relatives here and they lived with them. Even those who were coming from Zimbabwe were kept by their relatives, especially in Marapodi compound where there were a lot of them.

Some of us were here and we used to see with our own eyes, but many of our friends have died. We saw the power and strength of K.K when UNIP was the ruling party. When the Cabinet met, they made sure that Zimbabwe got independent.

Mandela was jailed for a long time. He was chained on his legs and he had a hammer to crush stones; he suffered for 27 years until K.K came up. Then KK met Voster and they started having dialogue at Victoria Falls. KK refused to fight with guns but with the mouth; K.K stood his ground until South Africa became liberated through the strength of KK. Mandela came out of prison because of KK. He could go to Britain and no one refused him. They used to listen to whatever KK was saying because he was a strong man; and even now he is a strong man and whatever he is saying we should listen to him, because he speaks the truth. He does not lie. He fought the liberation war using his mouth and not guns. Even when fighting for Zambia's independence, he used the mouth and not guns; but those who used guns are still fighting. Zambia helped countries like Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique to get independence.

When these guerrillas came, we were living with them freely. All the Ministers used to know how these people were coming to Zambia. We used to have meetings and they used to tell us that when we saw such people, we were to receive them, for they were our brothers and sisters whom we had to help so that their countries got independence as well. So we were not scared, but when we saw a white person, we would report quickly because there were whites who would disguise themselves as black men but we used to recognise that and they would be caught. They gave us a way to handle this, they told us to rush to the police whenever we saw such a person and the police used to lock up such people.

These freedom fighters were not giving us problems despite the fact that they used to be found with guns. It was different with those who used to paint themselves so as to look like they were blacks. These were the ones who used to find out where the freedom fighters were; but we used to call the police. These were pure whites who used to paint their whole bodies so that when we saw them we would think they were blacks. When asked about the whereabouts of freedom

fighters, we used to know that they were just spies who wanted to know where they were living so that they could come to kill them.

Those freedom fighters never brought their wives. Whenever they visited any community, they would have female friends, and when the time came for them to leave, many of them left their children with their mothers.

Here in Matero there were many ANC members from South Africa. When these people came, the big people in leadership used to announce to us after they had their own meetings in their offices that these were our visitors coming from such and such a place. It was not for everyone to know, it was just a few people who knew. It was a secret because if such information was revealed to the wrong people, it meant exposing them to danger.

To help other countries get their independence was worth it. Only those who do not have good intentions cannot appreciate and oppose such action. When a foreigner runs away from his country you cannot just leave him without aid, but you should help him because he is your brother. We should not discriminate him just because he is from a different tribe. Here in our country, it is One Zambia, One Nation, meaning that all people, regardless of where they are coming from are one.

ZAPU came here in 1962 when Nkomo came together with KK at Kamwala and they had their meeting. Even ZAPU helped in the independence of Zambia, because this is also their nation. When Welensky was around, Nkomo also came to attend a meeting and he was known here, but when he went back he was jailed.

Bhebhe, Jabulani

Jabulani Bhebhe was born in 1958 in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. He is one of the Early Zimbabwe Settlers in Zambia. He has lived in Zambia since 1962. He shares his experiences with the liberation struggle in Rhodesia.

I am Bhebhe Jabulani. I was born in 1958 in Zimbabwe or Rhodesia by then. I went to school here in Mumbwa, in Zambia, I would say. I was born in Southern Rhodesia and then I came to Zambia in 1959. I was brought by my two parents. My father's name is Mr Mateo Bhejani Bhebhe that is the late. They told me they wanted land for farming because in Zimbabwe, there was not enough land for them or good land for them, I would say. During our stay here with my parents, my father was so involved in the liberation struggle. He was the Provincial Chairman helping the struggled; the struggle for ZAPU. He was organizing members to help in the struggle. Meetings were held at our home, sometimes I attended the meetings at the Provincial level. The meetings were held in ZAPU offices, in Lusaka. They collected food and other things, and they were put together and taken to places where it was needed. Sometimes the Party official transport was used to collect and transport the food and other stuff from here.

There were some students who were recommended by the Party to go for studies abroad; particularly in Cuba and Germany. I remember one of them. After the studies, they went to Zimbabwe. By the time they came back the fighting was really over. These students went for studies during the liberation struggle, but by the time they were coming back the war was over, the country had attained independence or majority rule, and they just went to work.

My parents were supporting ZAPU. Our relationship with the ZANU people only came under the Patriotic Front arrangements. Thank you.

Chidata, John

John Chidata, was a political activist between 1960 and 2001, and shares some of the living memories of the liberation struggle in Mwinilunga District. He is currently the District Commissioner for Mwinilunga District, an office he has been holding since 2001.

Thank you very much. My name is John Chidata. I am a Mwinilunga resident born at Nagandu village, Chief Kelenge east of Mwinilunga and I am 56 years old. I am a District Commissioner in Mwinilunga District. I am glad to have you in this district, although I did not expect you to come to for this purpose.

I enjoyed politics in the 1960s during the UNIP regime. I was active in politics from 1960 up to 2001, when I was appointed District Commissioner. During the struggle between UNIP and the colonial regime, we had a loud partisan in the country. We had UNIP, ANC, and the Luchelo Party, which I have just forgotten. The political struggle was first started by the ANC. We had leaders like the late Chindefu, late Ntemba, Samundengu and other veterans. During our struggle we had a peaceful campaign, although a few lives were lost between ANC and UNIP.

After we attained independence in 1964, we were actually free from the colonial regime. Whilst we had liberated ourselves, the same struggle was mounted in Angola and Congo. Most of the Congolese residents ran away to seek refuge in Zambia. In 1960 the Congolese government attained Independence. Actually the Congolese government did not have much problems except that, most of our brothers from Congo ran to Zambia in order to seek for asylum. These refugees were taken to Luatembo refugee camp in the Zambezi district. Later on Congo was peaceful, but the only problem we experienced as a district, was the struggle in Angola. Most of our brothers who came here had ran away from Angola. Some used to enter through Shimbe, Kamampanda and Shalusinda, in Mwinilunga District; all these border points are in Mwinilunga. Upon arrival here the Zambia government took these people to Luatembo because we did not have any camps in Mwinilunga. This one was just a transit.

As the struggle was intensified in Angola, the Zambian government decided to move the refugee camp in Luatembo to Maheba Refugee Camp. Well, the reason was it that is located in Zambezi, nearer to the border. Some of the refugees were basically kept by the residents in the villages and they were being fed by the residents of this district; that resulted into the district not having enough food to feed the refugees. There was not enough space to accommodate both the Zambians and Angolans. If I remember well in 1960, Mwinilunga suffered few attacks by, both Congolese and Angolan soldiers. Kaleni hospital was bombed in 1960 by the Congolese government. Maybe they thought we were harbouring the Katangese, or maybe they made a mistake and thought this area was within their country. Kaleni hospital was bombed by the Congolese.

Again in 1971 the Angolan government attacked our soldiers in Kampananda in chief Chibwika and Kanongesha area, where some of our soldiers died, and residents were affected, because they stole nearly every thing, goats, silver and other things. The Zambian government was supporting UNITA, so the Angolan government was not happy with our government as a result most of our people along the border were affected. The government was quite supportive, and our men also came in to seek money for the Bundus so that the soldiers from other countries could be cut out. Mwinilunga residents have been peaceful people because we as Lundas always regard people from Congo and Angola as brothers. As a result people from Congo and Angola were well treated and given shelters, before they were transferred to Luatemo.

What I can remember clearly is what transpired after independence when we kept the UNITA soldier here; that was when people from Angola attacked us. We were not interested, as Zambian government, because Congo was suspecting Zambian government to be trying to assist the people attacking their government. Zambia did a tremendous work, because usually the Zambian government had already signed the so called United Nation Declaration. So when those people were coming here, the Zambian government could not refuse them entry. Although as a country Zambia was going through a difficult period, we could not try to send these people back. We had to accept them as brothers or people who were running away from war zones.

According to the UN declaration on refugees, what I know is when a refugee runs away from a war zone and enters a different country he is considered like any other resident in that country. So, whichever country accepts a refugee they give them treatment like the nationals. So the relationship, actually I can't say it was bad, even now we still have some refugees. The government has not repatriated all of them; but registration has been done and those people have their identities. Those who feel they are unable to go to Angola while Zambian government repatriate them through the ministry of home affairs, they maybe considered as established residents.

Mwinilunga did not experience such things but maybe other districts like Zambezi, experienced that. Nothing happened in Mwinilunga, but as a government we assisted the freedom fighters. We gave them shelter, and we allowed them to use our country as part of their struggle. There was no way the Zambian government could avoid these people. We knew exactly that we were facing a lot of problems, but we could not avoid receiving refugees. It had an impact on the Zambian government..

Now these African countries are free, and it is good they got their freedom because we contributed to them being free; we do not really expect them to give us anything. That is why we still maintain the good relationship. Maybe if Zambia had a neighbouring country which was still at war, we would not have been peaceful.

In Mwinilunga after independence some people or some young men were hijacked by the people who were in Nkumbula's party because they expected to be voted in power, but after they had lost some of our boys were taken to Angola to be trained, then later on they could come and attack Zambia, but that did not work out. They were taken by ANC members who wanted to revenge on UNIP. This is all I know

about the struggle between UNIP and ANC. I cannot report on what happened from 1990 – 1992 because I have been a politician through and through.

We have an area, which is Kamampanda. That is now an official point, but before that Kamampanda was not the official point. It is a crossing point on the road from here to Kazombo, in Angola. People never used to use the main road but they preferred to use the small paths in the bush. Here we are saying Kamampanda entry point because this is an area where most of the Angolan refugees were entering though; it could be in the bush, but it was called Kamampanda entry point. We also had Shimbe entry point which was an official entry point.

Angolan soldiers came into Zambia and planted landmines. We actually had one at Munkangala, Chief Munkangala, but he was deprived of the chieftainship and now he is just a village headman. That is area between Kenya and Munkangala. That was in 1960 when the Angolan soldiers came to attack Mashata Village; but unfortunately the man they were targeting was not found in his house, so they attacked his village. When they realized the man was not there, they came and planted landmines on Likelenge, on Mwinilunga road which resulted into a bus being blown up. Some of our pupils who had closed school at Kalene, and traveling back to the Copperbelt were actually involved; some of them lost their legs. It was UBZ being driven by driver Kakeya. The bus was actually split in the middle when the landmines exploded; the driver was safe and those pupils who were at the back were not affected. Only those sitting in the middle were hurt. I cannot remember the date but the year was 1960.

This was a complicated lesson. Our new generation should actually learn from what our people went through. They will learn because what you are getting today will not just end up being recorded. These things will be published and the new generation will know exactly what happened and learn from what you are gathering now. Thank you very much.

Chintomfwa, Joseph

[April 20, 2007 and 27 October 2007]

Brigadier General Joseph Chintomfwa has been an ardent supporter of the liberation struggle. He was born in Kabwe in 1945 and after leaving school in 1968 he served in the Civil Aviation at Ndola Airport as an Assistant Air Traffic Controller. In 1971 he served in the Department of Military Intelligence, and was subsequently sent to Yugoslavia for military intelligence training until 1973. He came back with others in 1973, after spending almost two years in Yugoslavia. He also served as Assistant Director of Military Security in the Ministry of Defence and became Chief of Military Intelligence in 1979. He was a member of the Zambia Foreign Service personnel, initially as Deputy High Commissioner in Canada from 1991 to 1992. As Chief of Defence Intelligence, he worked closely with African liberation movements, including the African National Congress (ANC) military wing, the Umkonto Wesizwe, headed by Joe Modise.

Thank you very much indeed; I am Brigadier General Joseph Chintomfwa. I was born in Kabwe in 1945 and after leaving school in 1968. I briefly served in the

Civil Aviation at Ndola Airport as an assistant air traffic controller and then left to go and join Old Mutual Fund General Insurance Company in Ndola East, and that is where I spent most of my growing period. I came to Lusaka in 1970 and joined the Zambia Defence Force, the Air Force in particular. Initially, I underwent military training at Kalewa Barracks.

I initially joined Zambia Air Force as an officer cadet and after about two months at Kalewa Barracks, which was the school of military training, I was sent to UK, where I trained with the Royal Airforce as an officer cadet and then I got commissioned there. After getting my commission, I was sent to the Royal Air force to finish my course in Administration.

I came back to Zambia in November, 1970 and on coming back I was posted to Zambia Airforce, Lusaka. I held various positions there, at the same time I was an Accounts Officer, then station duty's officer and Adjutant, the one who really assist the commander in carrying out certain orders, arrange programs for a commander and commanders of particular units to give various duties. I served in that capacity at Zambia Airforce Lusaka up to 1971. At the end of 1971, I was asked to join the Department of Military Intelligence as it was known. Subsequently, I was sent to Yugoslavia where I did my initial military intelligence training.

I came back with others in 1973, after spending almost two years in Yugoslavia. When I came back, I thought I would find an organized military intelligence service. Only to be told that, you are the first ones to formally train as intelligence officers and we were to start acting like an organization. And my first posting in the rank of Lieutenant, was at air force headquarters, as one in charge of military intelligence at headquarters. And that' was how I rose up in the ranks; and at the rank of captain, I was moved from air force headquarters in Arakan Barracks, to join the departmental

headquarters which was, then based at the Ministry of Defence. I think it is still based there and I was an assistant director of military security at the rank of captain.

Our boss was General Malimba Masheke, he was the lieutenant colonel and I directly worked under General Mweene. That was how I worked in intelligence, for all my life until I became the Chief of Military Intelligence at the rank of lieutenant colonel. On being appointed as Chief of Military Intelligence, I got my promotion to full colonel from the President.

It was during the period when I was chief of military intelligence when I was so much involved with the liberation struggle, mainly it was the ANC. My involvement started with ANC because they were the only liberation movement that was still fighting for their independence at that time; the last areas having been Zimbabwe. This is how my association with the liberation movement started.

My work as chief of military intelligence was to provide all the security intelligence, security military intelligence, and intelligence of the armed forces, by the security military intelligence. Because the enemy was always working against us, in particular against the Defence Force, recruiting various officers could cause damage to the military. My role was to ensure that, that did not happen or where it was happening we managed to get hold of those that were being recruited. We were also handling almost all the affairs dealing with security of the defence force and in the proper nature. We call it counter intelligence so you fight against those that are trying to recruit your officers and then in our current set up which it had being for a long time, you are at the same time providing intelligence from other forces that you are fighting against, so that the commanders and whoever is involved can plan properly.

For instance, you should be able to know, if the enemy, when the enemy is going to attack by the happenings on the border areas; and even if nothing is happening in the border areas. You are supposed to be the trained person, whose purpose is to provide that kind of intelligence and probably even advice on how that can be counteracted. I was appointed as a chief of military intelligence in 1979, I took over from General Masheke who was just being appointed as Deputy Army Commander and I stayed as chief of Defence Intelligence until 1990. After 1990, I saved for a little while at the Ministry of Defence.

I was just changed; I became defence secretary at the Ministry of Defence. That involved literally writing regulations and amending them and liaising between the Ministry of Defence and the various sections such as the Army, the Airforce and National Service. I stayed in that appointment for one year and then I was posted to the Foreign Service. My initial posting to the Foreign Service was to serve as Deputy High Commissioner in Canada. That is where I served from 1991 to 1992. By the time that the political change in Zambia came, I came back to Zambia in 1992 and, on my arrival I was retired to civilian life. Basically and briefly this is my military career.

In my duty as chief of defence intelligence, we dealt with African liberation movements in our own role. Not handling them but because they were fighting from our soil, it was of interest for us to know what they were doing and also what services

were going in and out of the country. They were a source of information and we also had a duty to inform them when the threat was around so that they would be aware and prepared. So in that way, by the time I became chief, I was dealing very closely with the ANC.

The ANC had a military wing and the commander of that party of the struggle in the ANC was Joe Modise. He was the commander, and together with colleagues in a special division, we held periodic interviews just to exchange information, informally; and we normally did these. We would book a room at Hotel Intercontinental and just to talk generally, no specific agenda just start chatting and in the process, a few things would come up, we would give them what we knew and they would give us what they knew. That was basically my involvement with the liberation movements. But during my career as a military intelligence officer, we dealt with various liberation movements, starting from ZAPU. The people that really dealt with liberation movements in details were members of Liberation Committee and (SDU) special division unit. But this exchanging of intelligence and so we dealt with ZAPU.

We had some days with SWAPO, but not so much because the government view at that time was the independence for Namibia was going to come, but that independence really depended on Zimbabwe and South Africa. So although Sam Nujoma with his SWAPO members were here, we had very little to do with them in terms of rehearsals, but we had a lots of rehearsals with ZAPU and ZIPLA the ANC and Umkonto Wesizwe. Tuhisani was the chief and the head of the ANC, South Africa section, because the ANC was made of two parties, South African Communist Party and the National African Congress. So Chris Hani was apart from being the Deputy to Joe Modise, the head of the Communist Party after Josi notion had passed away.

We handled these things, for instance ZAPU came to Zambia, and started the liberation struggle before independence, and this caused a large concentration mainly on ZAPU. Since we got our independence, others came only as early as 1973, and at that time it was mainly ZAPU and ZIPLA, who we were dealing with, but later on we started dealing with SWAPO; SWAPO was South West African People's Organization based in Angola. There was also FRELIMO from Mozambique, and FRELIMO was mainly based in Tanzania, but after the death of Mondlane, when Samora Marcel took over, he used to come to Zambia and he literally carried on the liberation of Tete Province from Zambian soil because that is the province that is next to Katete District here in Zambia.

But there was very little that you could do at military level to come between liberation movements, because almost all the times they were operating at different duties. For instant, some of the camps that used to exist here in Zambia or that existed at the time, where liberation movements used to be, were started by ZAPU and ZIPLA and when they got their independence, some of them were taken over by SWAPO and other liberation movements here. Eventually, the ANC took some of them up. These camps used to close down as liberation movements went away but those that

were close to some of the borders were taken by other people who were still in the liberation struggle, such as ANC.

The example I can give you, is the camp in Lusaka West where we have the Zambia Airforce now, the unit that is dealing with air defence. Initially, it was the Angolans that were there. Then after that, it was ZIPLA. After ZIPLA, it was the ANC and they were the last people. Well, they were here for a while, and when Mozambique became independent they decide to leave Zambia and went to Mozambique. So they carried out most of their struggle from Mozambique. Personally did not have a chance to deal with them. But I recall that they were with ZIPLA at Mboloma in Mkushi; it must have been in the 1970s when there was a fight between ZIPLA and ZANLA and we lost one Lieutenant Ngweshu in that fight.

They speared him through one ear to the other one. Well, ZIPLA and ZANLA were not the best of friends; they were in one camp, but not exactly. Maybe when we get to this camp at Mboloma, you will be able to see how they were located. But although they were located in separate camping areas, but the general area where they were located is one, Mboloma; and that was near enough for them to plan to fight each other and this lieutenant belonged to the Special Duty Unit (SDU), which was looking after the affairs of the liberation struggle. He was trying to find out what was wrong and to separate them from fighting each other and in the process they speared him from ear to ear.

In certain cases, like in the case of this camp at Mboloma, we had a (NCO), NCO means Non-Commissioned Officer. We were part of network because as a department of military security, we were supposed to know what was happening within liberation camps purely from security point of view. But the actual conduct of the freedom fighters that were against the enemy countries was the responsibility of the Special Duties Unit. At the OAU level we had an officer of Brigadier General Rank just like me.

Most of these liberation movements brought their operations from Tanzania to Zambia. It was found that we needed an officer of very senior rank to oversee their operations and liaise directly with OAU Liberation Committee in Tanzania. So we had an officer of the Brigadier General rank in charge of OAU Liberation Committee in Lusaka. In Tanzania we had The OAU Liberation Committee, then under the African Liberation Centre, you had this unit now which was handling freedom fighters special duties unit under the Zambian government. In special duties unit, we had officers there who were based actually at the African Liberation Committee itself, in what is now Kamwala and day to day we handled the affairs of these freedom fighters.

The special unit sent officers to various camps, where we had freedom fighters, they were ones who knew the weapons were been kept. They were the ones who assisted these liberation movements to the where they could cross into their country to go and conduct their operation. We never worked with them operationally, as the Department of Military Intelligence, but when we did, it was mainly for liaison purposes to ask the various leaders of the liberation movements at the Ministry of

Defence, while we were preparing to move them. It is quite interesting in the sense that, as Zambia, we all supported their liberation struggle. And the main guiding force came from the leadership. Not all but the majority of the people appreciated the reasons why we had to keep freedom fighters.

There was no public debate about that, but of course, there were always some individuals who felt that these people were just wasting our time. That was the perception but freedom fighters were normally accepted and welcomed except in certain cases, where there was indiscipline. But in general terms, Zambians did not complain about the presence of the leadership of freedom fighters, except those who had reasons to complain. There were various reasons that people gave for complaining. We would get the information and report to the authorities, but the actual handling of such issues was left to the special duties unit and in the units.

What happened was that these people would be reported to their command. For instance, if it was somebody from ZIPLA, the ZIPLA command was called in, and they [were] given the report and they dealt with him. But there were certain cases, which were beyond ZIPLA or any other liberation movement to deal with, and in a few of those cases we had the police taking action. I recall very well in the case of ZANU, the armed wing of the ZAP when they started conducting atrocities, and killing some of their people secretly. When this came to our attention, and I think we were the first people to know about it, because one of the wives of these people came to complain, investigation were initiated and all the people involved were arrested. I cannot recall their names now but a very big trial was conducted in the High Court at that time. How it was disposed of, they must have been sent to prison for a little while and then they were released and sent to Mozambique were they continued with their struggle. The indiscipline cases of minor nature were given to the freedom fighters to deal with them. But where major crime like open murder was involved, they were brought to the attention of the police who took normal legal action; that would be taken against anybody, living on Zambian soil.

I was returning from a function of the Minister of Health; I got off my car in the car park. the Muzungu came standing from just outside from the darkness, rushed through my area and came and said contact Dr Kaunda at State House, they want to kill Chitepo, I looked at him, I knew when it was a white force. Later those involved were committed to the High Court and that was quite a lengthy trial, but after the trial, I think it was decided that ZANLA and ZANU were to shift officially from Zambia to Mozambique. Those people were released; if I am correct these records can be found in the Ministry of Justice.

Maybe as I talk about the little that I know and the little that I was involved in, concerning this liberation movement, it is much clearer; I can now recall what I did, where I were, and I think my involvement in the department of military intelligence. We were involved in almost everything but not in the actual running of the liberation movements. But as the matter of interest, we were interested in everything that was going on. I can remember when the Portuguese changed their policy suddenly as a

result of the coup, When it came about FRELIMO, and MPLA became very crucial; they were the most important fighters at that time, and I recall very clearly that there was a conference in Makeni at Mr Aron Millners Farm, Where all the parties not only the MPLA or indeed FRELIMO but I think let me not confuse with FLELIMO; but all the parties in Angola, where there were various parties, they were MPLA. I can't exactly recall all the others, but of course there was Savimbi's party UNITA. It was a very difficult time because what Zambia wanted to do through President Kaunda was to unite these factions, so that they could go into Angola as one force and maybe form a united army; that was the approach. I think we spent three days continuously, trying to bring these various parties together and if I recall correctly, President Kaunda himself was doing that. I could not sleep in those three days. This was after the Portuguese had declared that Angola and Mozambique were to be free. It was very difficult to unite the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA in Angola. They all held different positions and did not want to compromise. They had the capacity to fight against each other and conquer one another in order to control Angola. That was how they left Millner's Farm in Makeni and went to continue with their fighting.

I also recall, I think it was in 1974 or early 1975 when I accompanied the first MPLA delegation led by Lucio Lala into Angola. We went through Congo Brazzaville by Zambia Airways and from Congo Brazzaville straight to Lusaka. That was actually the official start of the civil war in Angola. We stayed there for two weeks, there was myself and later Colonel Mpelama, heading the special duties unit, and we were both captains. Mpelama was a captain and I was a captain, we were the only two military officers in that delegation but one political leader was a governor but he is late now. He was governor for Lusaka Province. Then we also had this man, Frank Mutubila, from former ZNBC,. We were all very young, Frank Mutubila with his crew from the Zambia National Broadcasting Services. We were there with cameras and everything, we stayed for about two or three days in Luanda, the capital of Angola with Lucio Lalo, and he was going round to address various sections of people in Luanda. But on this particular day he was addressing a very major meeting. We were very prominent, being the only Zambian members of the defence force from here, so we were always been introduced that this is our rally, my colleague Mpelama has just finished being introduced and the strong slogan ambush the Portuguese and so on, and it was now my turn to do the same, when suddenly somebody opened fire, he must have been have a member Portuguese military forces. It was the first time, I was directly fired at, and I didn't know how to react, and I was trying to find where fire was coming from. But my colleague Mpelama was very good and just pulled me down under the platform. And we stayed there until it was quiet, but in the process I had lost my watch, I held on into the camera until the situation was calm, that was the end of the meeting, that was the end of the rally and we were taken back to our hotel. One or two people died those that were caught in the firing.

I think we were the only two who were able to pick their cameras and got into a small minibus that had been prepared by MPLA to take us back to our hotel, the hotel

we were in was Domidi Yohowo Chikundu in Portuguese; Prince Jeod the Second, in English. That part of liberation war I can remember quite clearly because, in fact when the news of the fighting came to Zambia, the two of us were literally written off, that “These are dead people, they will never come back.” So it was quite surprising when Zambia Airways came. Zambia Airways had to come back as per schedule, they were told to come and pick us up in two weeks time, and after two weeks time they came back and that time...everybody was so surprised.

It was very dangerous to fly with Zambia Air Force as the result of that closeness with the ANC liberation movements, even in my cases as a chief of military intelligence. I was in almost all the delegations of the people going to Angola Military; I was a member of institutions such as Zambia, Angola Military Commission, just like I was a member of so many other military commissions that existed at a time. So that's the aspect I can give you about the Angolan struggle and the MPLA, then as a party were very well-known. In Luanda. At least the party that we were in, I can say that, MPLA was the most popular liberation movement, but we doubted how popular they could have been in other areas. The MPLA were positioned towards, Zambia and towards the Southern part of Angola. The rehearsal that was there was between our SDU here, that's why I am mentioning Colonel Mpelama, late Colonel Mpelama, for he was then the captain and he was in-charge of SDU at that time.

Chona, Mark Chunyu

[30 May 2007]

Mr Mark C. Chona was born in June 1934 in Chief Chona Village, Monze District. He was one of the first 100 graduates Zambia had at independence in 1964. He served as Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and then moved to State House in March 1968 to become Special Assistant to the President for Political Affairs and International Security, a post he held until the end of July 1980. Mr Chona retired to the private sector as a farmer and consultant.

I do hope that I can do justice to the challenge you have given me to talk about

experiences of the liberation process in Southern Africa 1960 to 2001. My full name is Mark Chunyu Chona. Born in June 1934, in Chief Chona's village in what was then Mazabuka District but now Monze District. I was educated in my village school, for primary and at Chikuni Mission and St. Canicius College up to Form II and I was at Munali from Form III to Form VI and from 1954 to 1958. I was at the University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which was a campus of the University of London from March 1959 to December 1961. I was in Choma as a District Officer and immediately after that, in December 1961 to end of August 1962, I had to go to Cambridge University for a year to study Public Administration. I came back in June and was posted to Katete, in the Eastern Province, as a District Officer but stayed for only 3 months because I was withdrawn to go to the American University to study International Relations and Diplomacy. I came back and worked in the Ministry of Native Affairs in the Prime Minister's office and that was shortly before independence. After 24th October I remained in what was then the President's Office until April 1st 1965, when I became the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs under President Kaunda's Zambianisation programme. I remained in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Permanent Secretary up to 1st March 1968 when I moved to State House to become Special Assistant to the President for Political Affairs and International Security. I remained there until 31st July 1980. After Zimbabwe's independence I felt I was really tired. I needed a rest. So I retired to the private sector as a farmer and a consultant for many companies. So that is what I was doing and I still am a consultant, and I am still a farmer. But my interest now is in fighting poverty, particularly in the rural areas using the traditional structures. That is what I am doing.

I came into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at a very critical time. President Kaunda had been trying to find a way of assisting the Rhodesian regime just before independence, to try and see whether or not there could be a way in which peaceful change could be brought about. But as you will yourself confess that this effort was spurned immediately by the Rhodesian leaders, the racist leaders, and that meant immediately that there was a problem facing Zambia because the intelligence from Rhodesia was indicating that Ian Smith, who had taken over as leader of that country, was determined to declare unilateral independence, against the will of

the African people and therefore formulating Zambia's Foreign Policy was centred around Zambia's response to this crisis which was unfolding. It was not only about Rhodesia, it was really about Southern Africa because Rhodesia could not declare unilateral independence without the support and even the approval of South Africa and Portugal. So it was clear that the chapter which Zambia had entered was to be extremely tough because it was fighting Portugal, fighting Rhodesia, and fighting South Africa. That was the reality which we faced in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in looking at where we would get the support from, because already we had become a Frontline State by the nature of our geographical location, landlocked, facing Angola over 1000 kilometres, Namibia over 200 km; Zimbabwe Over 700 km, Mozambique over 400 km, unstable Congo but not hostile, over 2,000km; and Malawi on which we should have been counting on over 800km.

We feared that we would not be able to play the kind of role that the challenge in Southern Africa was presenting us as Zambia. So we had basically only one country which we could count on for purposes of security and stability in facing the crisis which Zambia had entered. We, in the Ministry fortunately, had a small core of officers and they happened to initially been British colonial civil servants but they did play a role which was helpful as we were building a cadre of officers, some of whom I sent to London School of Economics, Oxford University, American University, Columbia University, and we just sent out as many as we could so that they could come back to man a very difficult Ministry facing such a big crisis. By July, Tanzania was the only country which we could count on. We also counted, of course and fortunately, on very committed Departments like Home Affairs and Defence, the Ministries of Defence and Home Affairs. Those are the people who were really now on the ground to ensure that if anything happened Zambia could face up to the reality of a possible outbreak of war.

Ian Smith's Government confiscated chunk load of arms, an indication that something serious was brewing. And Mr Wilson's attempt, who was then Prime Minister of the Labour Government in Britain, tried to fend off Ian Smith's efforts to declare UDI. But he didn't have the will power to stop UDI by necessary force. Because it was obvious that without credible threat from Britain to use force to stop the rebellion, Ian Smith would go ahead and declare UDI with the support of the South Africans and the Portuguese, which he did on November 11, 1965.

I talked about Ian Smith confiscating a chunk load of arms. These were Zambian arms in transit for the Zambian Army and Ian Smith confiscated those arms, which was really the first serious indication that he meant to declare UDI and he did not want Zambia to use those arms against him. So, immediately there was a crisis OAU Summit, and by that time Rhodesian nationalists had already been arrested. They were already in detention, which cleared the way for him to do whatever he wanted because the nationalist movement within Zimbabwe was without the leadership that was necessary. So we had meetings, one meeting after another, condemning the UDI

and calling upon the British to stop the oppression of the African people and to end the UDI regime.

These calls were being made by the OAU Summit, the Commonwealth Summit and the UN Security Council where we found all the time that the British were always pouring cold water on every single resolution. First they opposed sanctions against Ian Smith. They went for voluntary sanctions which were more honoured in breach than in observance. The British companies themselves were in the lead in breaking sanctions. Zambia and other African countries fought very hard for mandatory sanctions. The British were reluctant all the time arguing that as long as south Africa was there no mandatory sanctions would actually succeed because South Africa would always supply Rhodesian needs.

By 1966 the armed struggle had actually started and the first burst of fire was a combination of groups of freedom fighters, Zimbabwean freedom fighters and South African's ANC. They all basically acted together and it was a very, very powerful push which became a wake-up call for both Rhodesians and South Africans. That drew the South Africans into Rhodesia to fight a war on the Zambezi front. That changed the history of the struggle significantly because South Africa and Rhodesia became essentially one force to try and prevent the nationalists from crossing forcefully into Zimbabwe and marching on into South Africa. So, that was the Rhodesian and South African response.

The British response was basically to talk to Ian Smith. Mr Wilson, who had said that UDI would end not in months but weeks, was essentially, I think, history would be fair to say, beating the retreat on every word that he had pronounced. Now, he was actually talking to Ian Smith. It was talks on battleships – the Fearless, the Tiger. Envoys were sent into Rhodesia and yet Ian Smith had decided that he would never basically give up his illegal independence. The Commonwealth Conference in 1966 proved to be very difficult but at the same time it showed that Britain was going to do nothing about Rhodesia. Essentially they were playing a lot of games, procrastinating, frustrating the African countries, essentially giving more time to the Rhodesians to entrench their power and allowing South Africa to play an even greater role with Portugal in coordinating their efforts to organize what became hot pursuits of freedom fighters into Zambia and Tanzania as well. By 1968 the Portuguese had started bombing the Zambian villages in Western Province and later on in North Western Province. Incursions across the Zambezi by the Rhodesians were also being launched.

The connection between Portugal and Britain was basically through British companies. British companies that controlled, for example, Benguela Railway, Tanganyika Concessions, and on the eastern side the Beira Corridor. Basically again, you had British interests entrenched because Rhodesia was really very strong with British in terms of economic interests. And so even was South Africa. So the speed at which the British could bring down the Rhodesia regime was really a function of what they thought could bring minimum damage to their economic interests. And

that is why they were not keen on mandatory sanctions. And because of course we knew that the success of mandatory sanctions in Rhodesia could probably be a very good test for our efforts later on mandatory sanctions against South Africa. So there was reluctance on using Rhodesia as a good example for the African effort to impose mandatory sanctions against racist regimes in general in Southern Africa. And so the major economic interests, Western interests particularly British, became a real obstacle to the efforts to bring down the Rhodesia regime. Clearly if the Western interests were not so much entrenched in South Africa, the Smith Regime would have been brought down much earlier. Majority rule would not have cost so much, not only for the Rhodesians but for Zambia in particular.

So let me look at the response of Zambia just before 1969, which is a very significant year for Zambia. Southern African in general. The immediate response to the challenge of combined forces of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia was Zambia to begin to make preparations.....It was clear that there would be a freedom struggle. It would be an armed struggle basically forced on the people of Southern Africa. Consequently refugees were allowed to come through. So Zambia had to make preparation for transit camps and transit bases for freedom fighters. Government had to make preparations.....

Transit camps and transit bases. There were transit camps merely for refugees going to some other places, and transit camps for training of freedom fighters; because it became very clear that a liberation war was necessary in order to dislodge the racist regimes which were consolidating in the region. There were also transit bases for freedom fighters who were coming back from training not only in Zambia but beyond Zambia, in Tanzania and other countries which eventually included eastern block countries.

Then of course there was Zambia's own military preparedness because for every attack by freedom fighters there would be a response from the Rhodesians and South Africans and the Portuguese. So a lot of effort was made. Actually we had a very strong team of the army and police, and the national service was being built to supplement the efforts of the army. The Zambian response also included mobilization of international opinion. So political, diplomatic and military action was necessary to win over the international community and access some of the resources which were necessary because, in a way, Zambia was already under sanction. Ian Smith was turning the sanctions against him to be sanctions against Zambia. This is because of the transit route. There was only one route for Zambian exports and imports and that was through rebel territory in Rhodesia. So in many ways, Zambia was in prison of its own landlockedness and strategies had to be developed to block Ian Smith's efforts to impose effective sanctions against Zambia and to make it yield in its support for freedom fighters. But thankfully the resolve of the government made that impossible and so Zambia continued its support. Countries like China and Soviet Union then came in handy in their readiness to assist the freedom fighters with the necessary arms to wage the struggle. But those arms had to pass through Tanzania and Zambia

in order to reach the freedom fighters that were in the battlefield. And there was a price for Zambia to do that because not all freedom fighters actually crossed the border. Some of them decided to sell these arms for use against innocent Zambians in their syndicates in crime. So again Zambia suffered but did not yield, did not succumb. So that was the period when training of freedom fighters was taking place. The racist regimes knew that the exodus of refugees, particularly from South Africa, meant that there would be freedom fighters training and they would be coming back. So it looked like they infiltrated some of their agents into liberation movements. It was apparent that by 1969 the liberation struggle was really intensifying, so the racist regimes turned their agents into saboteurs. If you look at the history of that particular year there is not one national movement which did not suffer some kind of split. FRELIMO had a problem, TANU had a problem, ANC had a problem, ZANU, ZAPU had problems, and even UNIP had problems. MPLA had problems. So 1969 it looked like a coordinated attempt.

In 1966 that's when the first burst of fire and it was a combination of freedom fighters. I mean it was Zimbabwe and African National Congress. That's why and that was the time when Bechuanaland...there was a huge exodus of South Africans and South Africa allowed them to leave. But that is when they were infiltrating the other people. So I think thankfully all the political parties which suffered an assault by the racist regimes survived and became even stronger and that is how the liberation struggle continued with a greater degree of awareness that there were agents within the liberation movements that had been infiltrated; and you know you infiltrate the best. And indeed they rose very high some of them...so that is what essentially was happening during that period and then, of course, having failed the next stage, if you recall 1971, after a very successful Commonwealth meeting in Singapore when, through President Nyerere's action and President Kaunda and unfortunately President Obote was won over to attend the Conference in Singapore even when it was clear that there was a problem in Uganda. Because there was something called Mulungushi Club and it consisted of basically of President Nyerere, President Obote, and President Kaunda. The idea had been to apportion responsibility because Zambia was carrying too heavy a load. So Tanzania would look after the Mozambican issue, the front. And Uganda would try and help with the Angolan front because of the FNLA which was in the Congo while Zambia could manage Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa front. It was really to try and see how best to relieve pressure on Zambia. Zambia managed part of Angola and Zimbabwe and Namibia and part of Mozambique because of this very long frontage.

The British and others did actually engineer the coup in Uganda while the Commonwealth Conference was taking place in Singapore. The positive aspect of that meeting was that the three Presidents Obote, Nyerere and Kaunda won over Jonathan, Leabua Jonathan the Prime Minister of Lesotho who was very much a South African man. And he had really been put there by the Boss of Bureau of State Security. He was their man. But in Singapore he essentially was won over. The only

one who was not won over was Kamuzu Banda who was not even invited for the lunch because we knew what he wanted. He was very much a British Government man and by that time it was very clear that he was a client of the South Africa regime. The two Presidents, President Nyerere and President Kaunda, regretted having persuaded President Obote to leave Uganda to go and attend the meeting. Because by bringing Amin into power the Mulungushi Club was one less. It weakened what was developing into a kind of Frontline States.

By 1973 Ian Smith was feeling the pinch. And in January he closed the border with Zambia. Zambia in return closed its side of the border. I think the British in that case the conservatives, blamed Ian Smith for starting the closure of the border because they were against sanctions and yet Ian Smith had started the sanctions so quickly. We had information that they had told him to reopen the border. So he reopened his side of the border but KK declared that the border will not be reopened until majority rule. That immediately created a new crisis of diverting Zambian import and export traffic from the south to other routes. There was only one free route Dar-es-Salaam. But even with TAZARA, you could not handle copper and other exports and imports. So other ports had to be used but those ports were actually in Mozambique. Nacala was in Mozambique and the deep seaport in South Tanzania was not easily accessible because of the road infrastructure. So there was a crisis and the sanctions Committee was called and a UN Security Council Team visited Zambia in January 1973 immediately after the border closure and concluded that Zambia needed to be supported.

The Security Council met and pledged to support Zambia but the implementation required action. And Lishonwa Lishonwa and I went begging throughout, first North America, (US, Canada), Western Europe, through Eastern Europe, China, Japan and Australia and New Zealand and came through. And we got very good support. Small countries like Finland, provided aircraft to fly goods from Botswana to Zambia. Oil had to be flown from Tanzania to Lusaka via Ndola. It was a very hard time for Zambia, extremely hard. You did not have a choice in certain areas in order to increase the amount that was coming in. The Oil Pipeline was working, but there were certain products which were necessary. So we managed to survive that. Then on St. Mark's Day, April 25th 1974, the Portuguese coup came and it was a loom! That changed the course of history in Southern Africa. What was impossible apparently became a probability, namely that Mozambique and Angola would be independent. So the new Regime in Portugal made contacts. President Kaunda sent us to Lisbon to meet the new leaders.

I went to Portugal with Ambassador Peter Kasanda. We met the new President of the Republic, General Spínola. Immediately after that the process of negotiations started, which led to starting negotiations with FRELIMO, which was ready; and to see what negotiations could be initiated with MPLA, which was in disarray at that time. So immediately after that Mario Soares the new Foreign Minister came for negotiations at State House. There was an initial team, Major Antones and another

official, just to test the ground, then after that, that was when Mario Soares came. This was in August 1974; I think it was August because by September Chissano had moved to Maputo. Yes, the Agreement was signed and Prime Minister Chissano moved in.

Zambia had trained a battalion of Mozambican troops in the hills. It was fantastic experience the day they were passing out. It is hard to believe how beautiful it was. And then immediately after that there was a problem. We had a Portuguese agent who was working with us. He said that there were mercenaries in South Africa who were ready to move into Maputo to destabilize and to stop the installation of an African Government. By coincidence also South African messages were arriving saying that they wanted to talk. They never expected the Portuguese in Mozambique and Angola to collapse just like that after claiming they had been there for 250 years. But that was the end. So they wanted to speak. That was when I was then sanctioned to taste the waters and that is when I went to South Africa. What am I going to write for my memoirs if I tell you all this? I went to South Africa in September 1974. And I met Prime Minister Vorster with my agenda to release the African nationalists in Zimbabwe Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole, Mugabe, and others. Vorster agreed to bring Ian Smith to the negotiation table.

I met Vorster in Cape Town, where he was having his Parliament. So I think that we hit it off. He felt that Rhodesia was really an unnecessary appendage. I went with three items:

1. Rhodesia: freeing the nationalists and bringing Ian Smith to the negotiation table.
2. Non-interference in Mozambique because of the mercenaries whom we heard were in South Africa and an undertaking from them that they would not interfere to stop the independence of Mozambique.
3. That they would allow the independence of Namibia to proceed.

These were the areas which we discussed, but of course he had problems. He had no problem over Mozambique with an undertaking not to interfere². He had no problem on the nationalists, Zimbabwe as he proved later, namely because for them they said that Rhodesians made a mistake in 1923. During the Referendum for Union with South Africa, they voted against Union with South Africa. Their Constitution had a built in majority rule, so it was tied for them, they would not pay much more than they had paid for Ian Smith friendship. So that was what happened in 1974. So, the movement towards the release of nationalists really started. By November 1974, we had the nationalists here, very quietly on a secret visit from their prison. Unfortunately we had to send them back to prison again. Then the second time we succeeded to have them released by December.

So the rest really became an internal problem now within the nationalist movement. It is really a bad story what happened, the amount of almost fratricidal strife within ZANU and almost what happened in 1969 was happening again. But this time we lost a lot of lives unfortunately. Some said that is what war is all about, but we didn't necessarily think that strife within the nationalist movement should actually lead

to loss on life on that scale. Then of course now came what Vorster wanted. That is to bring Ian Smith to the negotiation table. After the release of the nationalists we really thought that's it. That agenda was gone. They had coup d'état, but frankly speaking, we never said it was. It was actually a security operation to achieve a political diplomatic end. It was not to reach an understanding so that we could actually live as good neighbours. It was not about good neighbourliness, this was really to solve the problem. As President Nyerere said of Rhodesia once, you know that if we could solve Mozambican problem, solve Angolan problem, solve the Rhodesian problem - then he said - Ken we may not have to fire a shot in South Africa. I think that we didn't. The thing just crumbled from within the moment that Rhodesia went, the moment that Angola went, Mozambique went, Namibia was going. Within South Africa there was a collapse. So I think that is what happened.

Then Vorster for some reason contacted me, I was in Mozambique when a call came. President Samora Machel said – you are wanted in Lusaka. So I said why? He said Vorster wants you. He had a nickname, so he said this “thing” wants you. So I said but I have no agenda, I had finished. So he said what do you think? He said go and listen. So I came through and straight into Johannesburg, only to meet Ian Smith the following day in Pretoria. That was 1975 and that is the meeting which led Vorster to tell Ian Smith that gentlemen if you don't accept my proposal then count me out. Now I happen to have been present during that meeting and really as a witness, because I had no mandate to meet Ian Smith. It was a meeting between the two of them. This was in August 1975. And this is when in this case Ian Smith had reluctantly agreed to meet the nationalists. The question was where? Vorster said the nationalists should not come to Rhodesia because you would arrest them. Smith did not want to succumb his sovereignty and go to another country. So that became a problem. And eventually Vorster offered his train to meet at Victoria Falls. So immediately after that of course the talks failed. Ian Smith was not ready and the nationalists were not ready. But the most important thing there was Vorster, immediately after that, he did remove some of his forces from Rhodesia and just left the equipment.

The parties which met at the Victoria Falls bridge in 1975 included ZANU, ZAPU, FROLIZI and ANC; the African National Council, Bishop Muzorewa's ANC. Following that failure, that is when the movement towards now Geneva came. I think that Henry Kissinger understood that a lot of effort had been made to try and reach an amicable settlement in Zimbabwe. He was now worried that Vorster having done as much as he did the next was certainly more intensification of the armed struggle. So, he did step in and by early 1976, he was visiting this region and managed to convince Vorster and therefore Ian Smith, because it was always South Africans who had real influence on Ian Smith. Because FRELIMO by that time was controlling in Mozambique and so he had only that particular border, which the South Africans called strategically irrelevant to them. So you could feel that if only the United States had come in earlier, the way Kissinger came, we would have actually moved the Rhodesians.

He convinced them to actually meet the nationalists, negotiate with the nationalists and for South Africa to put pressure on Ian Smith which is what led to the Geneva Conference on Zimbabwe's independence, from September to December 1976. It flopped mainly because the British Government was not ready for those kinds of negotiations. They sent their leader of negotiations, who was their UN Permanent Representative, Ivor Richards. A very nice man, but you know you do not pass a chemistry exam by a smile. So the Geneva Conference failed because the British Government was not ready for those kinds of negotiations. Ian Smith was on top. You don't put a Prime Minister even if he is illegal to negotiate under the leadership of an ambassador. It was clear that they were not ready.

Ivor Richards became the Chairman. He presided over the Geneva Conference, Zimbabwe Independence negotiations. And we, as observers from Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique and Botswana, understood that the British were not quite ready for a successful Conference. So the Geneva Conference failed and I think that Henry Kissinger was right in saying that if only Gerald Ford had not lost the elections to bring in Jimmy Carter he would have managed to seal the deal. So then after that we moved on with Carter; a very nice man of course. It became more difficult, and the armed struggle shot up, and the attacks on Zambia from Zimbabwe became even more vicious. The Rhodesian attacks on us, all those bombings started in 1978 and 1979 before the Commonwealth Summit Conference. Very severe destabilization continued even after that.

It was a difficult period then because there was a new man in the United States, Jimmy Carter, and the new team had to understand the Rhodesian situation and the Namibian situation, and they were carrying on two things at the same time. So that allowed the Rhodesians really to go to town, because there was nothing after the failure of the Geneva Conference – only war. And of course they finally found Muzorewa as a solution. So the country was then called Rhodesia – Zimbabwe or was it Zimbabwe – Rhodesia. Muzorewa took over. The bombings intensified under an African Prime Minister, and this was the time when Margaret Thatcher was also coming into power and Margaret Thatcher was a Muzorewa person, because he was not a nationalist and Ian Smith had accepted him. So Margaret Thatcher was really forgiven for recognizing Zimbabwe under Muzorewa. But fortunately that is when the Commonwealth Conference was being planned for Lusaka. And it was fortuitous that very strong men were heading a very influential move in the Commonwealth, President Nyerere of course, Forbes Burnham of Guyana, Michael Manley appeared to have come, but also Michael Fraser, the Prime Minister of Australia.

The Commonwealth Conference in Zambia was held in 1979, and that assisted a lot by getting Mrs Thatcher convinced. Fortunately there was Lord Carrington whom we feared very much at the beginning, but like the other Conservatives, when they are convinced they act; and that was really what happened during the Commonwealth Summit in State House. During a weekend retreat, Margaret Thatcher was nicely cornered by very influential people who showed her that in fact there was nothing

but goodwill for her, if she did the right thing. Once Lord Carrington was convinced, and Margaret Thatcher was convinced, a communiqué on Rhodesia was easier to draft, and it was done. That led to Lancaster House immediately after that. Again it lasted from September to December but by December the deal was sealed and signed; with that all the difficult terms relating to Zimbabwe's independence was done. There were difficulties, but I think that the beauty about the Conservative Government then, was that when once they committed themselves to a solution they remained tied to it and felt they were bound by it and they discharged their obligation. So Zimbabwe's independence was achieved, at great expense. But without, you know, President Kaunda's firm stand this would have been impossible. Dr Kaunda could have been a Kamuzu Banda, very easily, and would have had the international airport built by South Africa as Lilongwe was. That was the present for cooperation. But KK said 'No' and we said 'No.'

You asked about the meeting President Kaunda had with Botha. First of all you know I have to confess that I wasn't there, because Botha was in the 1980s. But I met Botha during the meeting with Ian Smith in 1975. He is a man I did not like, and even shaking his hand was a huge problem for me. But I understood because there came a point when a very close friend of mine a journalist whom I knew from the very early days, an Afrikaner, said Botha was looking to be a kind of General De Gaulle on Algeria, and it looked like to him he could actually achieve that status. How to do it was a problem. Therefore the outward looking policy which Vorster had pursued as his foreign policy was embraced hesitatingly.

I think that what Botha was trying to do after Nkomati with the Mozambicans, was to talk about the meeting which ended into Nkomati Agreement; which people again you know unfairly criticized Samora for. It was really a security problem. Each one of us when we were approaching that problem we were keeping our cards up the sleeve. Samora was, I am sure, looking for an elbow room. As I will say in my memoirs, even a strategic retreat is not surrender. I think it is in St Luke where Jesus actually says so though not exactly in the same terms. When you are not ready you cannot sue for peace, but show the possibilities and if somebody swallows the bait, fine. In our case we didn't swallow the bait of détente. We were trying to solve, seeking an elbow room, and I think Mozambique was really under pressure, because of RENAMO, which the South Africans were supporting. RENAMO was a product of Rhodesian intelligence, which was passed on to the South Africans after Zimbabwe's independence. So RENAMO was really a product of the Rhodesians. Just like, the truth when it is written, Mushala was a product of the South Africans in order to respond, retaliate; it was an instrument for retaliation. And when Zimbabwe became independent, the Rhodesians handed over RENAMO to the South Africans. And the South Africans managed those; some of them became their vigilantes; the infamous vigilantes. So that is really what I think after meeting Samora Machel, Botha was encouraged to see if he could meet KK as well. That was the context.

South Africa interested was in Mushala in Zambia. There being no other alternative he was of a nuisance value. It was testing the waters. There is a lot more which will come out in future. All that they wanted was somebody who could be an instrument for destabilization in Zambia; preoccupy Zambia with internal problems and therefore weaken the power of supporting the liberation movements. But you know when you are in a war, you always find solutions to things like that, and I think that the Government found some solution. History has shown that we did not completely get tied down to that. We still managed to support the liberation movements.

Did KK talk about his meeting South African white businessmen at Mfuwe who declared apartheid 'dead'? You say he did not. You say he did not! Of course that is for his memoirs I am sure. It's very good. I think it was about 1986. Because I had 20 South African black business people here during about the same period KK was meeting the whites at Mfuwe. I was hosting the Africans the black people.

The businessman who used to talk to RENAMO was Jardin. That is how we knew that there was going to be a coup in Portugal. The business of liberation movements did not lie with me. It lay more with Home Affairs because it became an internal issue within Zambia, and the managers of the liberation movements like Mr Simumba who was really at the Liberation Committee and the others.

We had no problems with FRELIMO. We had a small organization called COREMO. You see like PAC, when they were in Livingstone, we had very big problems. That is why we had to move them from the frontline. There were divisions and we had to move them from the frontline into Tanzania. And that is why ZANU also when they had those very difficult problems in Katete, some people were buried in shallow graves and things like that, again they had to be moved into Tanzania, at least slightly at the back. Then even if they went via Mozambique after Mozambique's independence, that is fine.

The independence of Mozambique was of real strategic value because then Ian Smith's forces were overstretched. The withdrawal of the South African forces meant that Ian Smith's forces had to police the entire Mozambican border, the entire Zambian border over 700 kilometres, the entire Botswana border. So they were pretty thin on the ground, and the eastern border became porous, so it was easier for the ZANU and ZAPU. Instead of crossing the Zambezi under risky circumstances they had this very big border to use, and that is how the Rhodesians became extremely vicious. That was genocide which Ian Smith committed on that side of the border; it was really honestly genocide. It became so vicious on the villages along the border. So that is the way I would look at that.

In terms of general political situation, yes there was the policy to actually guide the establishment of Refugee Camps, rear bases and all this liberation; the Refugee Camps were not necessarily freedom fighter camps. Like we had here, SWAPO West of Lusaka, was really freedom fighters training, and they were trained ready for transiting into war zones. The Maheba and the other camp in Western Province, and the other in North Western Province, those were proper refugee camps. Maheba

and Mayukwayukwa were proper refugee camps. But of course freedom fighters were free to recruit there if they wanted, which was possible, and they actually did. But refugee camps became proper structures, like Ukwimi in the Petauke area. Ukwimi was a refugee camp. Reports that Samora Machel and his fighters used to stay at Ukwimi could be true because those were allowed some free range. You had to turn a blind eye. We would deny vehemently that we are keeping freedom fighters. We had only refugees. Now I said that we did not have problems with FRELIMO. We had problems with MPLA. Huge problems. They had different styles. When FRELIMO found agents in the group they did not kill them, they retrained them. They won them over. They rehabilitated them, but not the MPLA. And that was sometimes the difference between Chinese and Soviet Union style training.

The differences between ZANU and ZAPU were very old dating back to the late 1950s and early 1960s, when ZANU broke off from ZAPU. And they remained basically different organizations until the Patriotic Front was formed. It was really about challenging Nkomo's leadership, that he was weak. Like our Harry Nkumbula had been labelled as weak for genuine reasons. Even for Joshua there was some kind of weakness sometimes. But he was tougher, and when the Patriotic Front was eventually formed, as one of the nationalists said to us after Lancaster House Talks, he said do you know who really negotiated? It was the old man (Nkomo); he saw the finer points. The other man (Mugabe) articulated them. So they became a very good complementary team.

The Lusaka Manifesto was a product of Kaunda – Nyerere vision. It was really to define what the future of Southern Africa should actually be. It was a persuasive articulation of the principles upon which the Liberation Movement was established and what its goals actually were. Defining what Portuguese territories were – namely colonial; what Rhodesia was – it was colonial. South Africa was not issue of independence but actually end of apartheid and the achievement of majority rule. It defined basically South Africa as not a colony; and that was in our attempt to persuade the South African Vorster regime in that case. If you read the manifesto on Southern Africa you will find that we were not saying that South Africa was a colony and that whites were going to be thrown into the sea. But that it was the end of apartheid which was really the issue. So it tried to define the issues in order to isolate the enemy and divide them. I think that in a way as a negotiating instrument Vorster somewhat bought it. His problem was as he said, he did not want to be a Prime Minister who would lead his people into a future he did not know. So he was to that extent cowardly; and we thought that he was behind public opinion, public opinion was ahead of him. That was what we thought, but that he assisted us in removing South African forces, not all the equipment but at least it weakened Smith's frontline, and the defence lines. He took back his helicopters. You know until BBC showed the film in which they interviewed me, I hadn't known the impact. We saw on television the equipment actually leaving, which is what Vorster said he would do! He made sure that the spare parts were not delivered; the suppliers were made more difficult. I think he sent a

very strong message to Smith before the Victoria Falls Conference. This is what you normally do if you want to screw the guy, to get him down to where you want him to go.

The rumours of Zambia favouring ZAPU instead of ZANU; favouring Tambo even living at State House. I think it is right that these questions be asked and answers be given. First of all the friendship between KK and Nkomo goes very far back, even before ZANU broke away from ZAPU. Mutumba, I don't know whether we went together, maybe only men went, in 1960 from the University. We heard that KK was at the airport, he was not allowed to come into town to meet Joshua Nkomo. We caught buses to go and see KK at the airport and while we were there, Nkomo arrived and the security was very, very tight. Yes, Nkomo had come out of prison. KK had also come out of prison. He had come from London on his way to Zambia, and he was not allowed to go to town to see Joshua Nkomo. So Joshua came to the airport instead. So we went there and while we were watching Joshua Nkomo came into a very intensive discussion with KK. You could see the security really worried. In a very short time an announcement came. "Kenneth Kaunda, Kenneth Kaunda, telephone call go into the booth." He went there, and he was holding for a long time. Then eventually I said, 'No let me go and help. I said Sir, can I hold for you?' So he left, there was no call! They just wanted them to be separated. So that is how far back they go.

There was no favouritism between ZAPU and ZANU. ZAPU were here; ZANU were here. That is how Chitepo came to State House once and said – 'This is my problem.' He reported to KK the security problem he was facing. ZANU had offices here in Lusaka only when there was that problem in 1974, when the killings took place, that is when like PAC, we said, they should not be in the frontline. And that is when the government felt Tanzania should hold them while they were sorting out their problems. In Geneva KK paid accommodation for ZANU. He never paid one cent for Nkomo in 1976. In London, Lancaster House Talks we did the same, when ZANU said that they did not have enough money for accommodation, we paid. We did not give any money to Nkomo, because he was looked after.

Daka, George

Mr George Daka was born on 22nd August 1959 in Matero, Lusaka. After completing Form V, he trained as primary school teacher and proceeded to teach at various schools in Lusaka, Central and Eastern Province where he eventually settled and is now heading a school. Daka could vividly recall the fighting between Frelimo soldiers and Portuguese forces, the support that local Zambians provided to the latter and the danger that, by so doing, they exposed themselves to, including the killings and other forms of destruction that Zambians and Zambia underwent during the liberation struggle in Mozambique.

My names are George Daka. I was born in Lusaka, Matero, on 22nd August, 1959....

I went to school in Lusaka's Matero Compound at Tanda Primary School. I started sub-A in 1966. About the same time, my parents divorced. Then my uncle took me in and brought me to Eastern Province. In the same year, 1966, I started sub-A again at Mintose Primary School in Petauke district. I continued, and in 1969, they introduced the Grades system. So instead of going to Standard I, I went into Grade III. From there, I went to Chizongwe Secondary School in 1974, where I did up to Form V. After completing school, I looked for a job in a private company, where I worked for a while. But there was no success. Then I trained as a primary school teacher, worked for one year [and] then went to Nkrumah [Teachers Training College] to train as a secondary school teacher. After graduating there, I went to teach at Matero Boys in Lusaka. I also taught at Kabwe Secondary School, Petauke Boarding, Katete Boarding and Petauke Day Secondary School. I am now heading a basic school called Ludwazi here in Petauke district.

My understanding on the subject of discussion i.e. Zambia's decision to commit itself to liberating our neighbours in Southern Africa is that even if we got our own independence in 1964, we were not completely independent as long as our friends, our neighbours were not independent. This was so because whatever problems they had in their respective countries due to lack of independence would still spill [on] to us, landlocked country Independence in those countries meant peace for us. So we engaged ourselves in helping those countries becoming independent. War in any of our neighbouring countries meant problems here in our own country. It was either war would [spread] here or we would have refugees coming into our country. This is why our Zambian government went into the struggle to assist those countries to get liberated so that there was peace in the region.

I have a feeling that to some extent there must have been a[nother] motive [behind Zambia's involvement in the liberation of our neighbours] because, you see, this liberation struggle was done on a concession basis [?]. Moreover, politicians in government usually used to differ with the citizens in those countries. For example, [some] politicians supported UNITA in Angola but UNITA did not win elections there. In Zimbabwe, likewise, [some] politicians supported Joshua Nkomo when it is actually Robert Mugabe who won the [independence] elections. So it shows that

politicians had a certain motive other than what we Zambians perceived as a motive of helping to liberate our friends.

[In fact, I think ordinary Zambians were literally compelled to render support to FRELIMO, ANC and other liberation movements] because [they] were not consulted...[What] people saw was that the Zambian government was involved. The majority of the citizens were not literate that time, so all they saw was our involvement. Then they would cry here and there because of the repercussions that [Zambia's] involvement [in the liberation wars brought] into the country.

If we talk of Mozambique, RENAMO came into our country on several occasions to terrorize us because of our government's support to...FRELIMO. The Zambian government was genuinely supporting Frelimo but those who were fighting them in their own country were not happy with our government's support. So they came to attack us. At one time, I was teaching at a border school...when they came to attack. That was in 1980-89. We had several attacks. What used to happen [is this]: We teachers in the border area, used to have our supper by 16.00 hours and head towards Petauke to sleep somewhere in the bush, where it was safer. Then early in the morning we could get back to our respective schools.

To a very large extent, life was lost. I remember my village, somewhere in Sinda, the village called Mastala where I used to stay. There was an influx of refugees who came to settle there. A refugee camp was established nearby at Nyimba. Zambians lost property in attacks by those people who came...the RENAMO and Portuguese soldiers. They could come and attack us.

At the same time, people in the border areas suffered a lot because of poverty and ignorance. For instance, you could find a radio dumped in the bush, not knowing the device inside. [A]nd you call friends; you touch it and it explodes. Several people died in the process. At that time, I was still at primary school. Property was lost as fighters... came to steal our animals because they wanted to eat the [m] in the bush, [and] so that they had enough food. There were also crooked Zambians who were running businesses and owned farms along the border area. RENAMO fighters could come with precious stones and ask the Zambian businessmen... to sell [the stones] for them here in Zambia so that they raised money to buy food. When these people went for good, those fighters could come and attack heavily in pursuance for them. [As a result], innocent people suffered a lot. For instance, we had two prominent businessmen in Mwanjabantu area who were constantly attacked. When investigations were conducted, it was discovered that they never fulfilled the promises they made to the [Mozambican fighters]. At the same time, a lot of marriages were broken because some Zambian soldiers who were camped [in Eastern Province] to patrol the area started flirting with [other] people's wives. Due to poverty in the area, women used to be enticed with tinned beef and beans which used to be supplied to the soldiers by the government.

When you talk of compensation, I would say, yes, [Zambia and its people must be compensated for such losses] and no at the same time. Firstly, in my view, I felt the

vision was good although the politicians ignored the people who elected them.... They should have been more informative as to what they wanted to do and to consult as to how to go about doing it. I can give an example [of] where at a place called Zumaile, a certain farmer called Mr Bembele Tembo and his family had hammer mills planted in the villages. One day, a group of people came to one of the hammer mills, locked the workers in a thatched house, set it ablaze and waited until the [victims] were all burnt to ashes.

I feel, [on the other hand] that it is not necessary [to compensate the families of those who were killed by RENAMO and Portuguese fighters before and after 1975 for the deaths of their relatives] because... wherever there is a struggle [and sacrifice], there must be loss of life. The peace we are enjoying now [exists] because of the sacrifices made that time. In short, [those who were killed] are like Jesus who died for us to be saved. Those people sacrificed their lives so that their children and grandchildren [could later] live happily. Moreover, now we are able to move in these countries freely. We go to Mozambique to order fish. We [freely] go to Angola and many other countries. It is, however, not very safe to go in the bush where landmines were once planted since those who planted them are now dead. [A]nd the living don't know exactly where the [landmines] were planted.

There are...inter-marriages across national borders. If you go to the border areas after Mwanjabantu['s] villages, a lot of Zambians have settled in villages like Simbuza [in Mozambique] in search of fertile soils. The headmen of such villages like Simbuza and Goma once came to Zambia to seek refuge here; so they are very welcoming [to Zambians who wish to settle in Mozambique]. They even came to Zambia to say "Please, if your soil is poor you can come and join us," and there are [now] a lot of Zambians there. This simply shows that we are now one.

For example, when I was teaching at Kamunioka along the border area, people like Headman Goma, [whom] I talked about earlier, was the chairman for FRELIMO. When the RENAMO fighters came, they killed his wife and children. So he took refuge in Zambia. We kept him at a village very close to the school, [where] I was teaching. He stayed happily. We gave him a farm and he had everything he wanted. The same was the case with Simbuza. When the war was over, they went back to their villages. The same Zambians they stayed with here have followed [them live in their villages in Mozambique]. Right now, if you go to Mozambique, you will find a lot of Zambians living [there] happily, growing plenty of maize.... You hear that Petauke has produced [a lot of maize]. [This] is not correct. Most of this maize is bought [in] Mozambique. So it looks like it was grown by locally-based Zambians. Zambians go there to buy maize cheaply and sell it here cheaply. So there is harmony.

We assisted them and they are able to show appreciation. We also have a lot of things in common because whenever we have Kulamba ceremony in [Zambia's Eastern Province], they are always here. This is why they have agreed that [the ceremony] has to be rotational so that if this year it is observed in Zambia, the following year, [it should be held] in Mozambique and then in Malawi. It is the new arrangement

we have made. You see, it is not good that people should always come here. Those who are not able to travel from Mozambique or Malawi always miss out but when it is brought closer... home they will also know what it is. So partly the liberation and partly the cultural similarities have led to this harmony between us.

You see, at the very beginning when we were in the village, we did not understand exactly what it was [liberation movements began to attack white forces in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and elsewhere] because there was no civic education. All we saw was that there was war. We used to see people coming. For instance, my mother used to run a poultry farm and the people who used to work there were Mozambicans. They were those who ran away from war there. They came in but nobody in the village circle could understand why there was war. Those with a sound knowledge would accuse Kaunda as causing the war. They were alleging that he was letting them to be killed...because they saw the way others were suffering. So they said, "Why should we suffer for other people?" They did not know what it meant. Worse still, we joined in the sanctions against South Africa when we had a shortage of commodities--when we were queuing for commodities outside CBC and Mwaiseni shops with vigilantes whipping us. It was bad; you [would] find a learned person being beaten. People did not understand what it was.

You see, at th[at] time was a bit cumbersome because politics was for the educated and those in town. At the village level, it was very difficult because you find even people contesting for elections would come all the way from the Copperbelt and Lusaka. We did not have our own people around here contesting [for parliamentary seats]. I don't know whether they knew the importance [of this] or not. People could come all the way from Lusaka and we were there following behind. All they could do was buy Kachasu for those who drink, maybe even...a goat or chicken for people to eat [so that they could] vote for them. Indeed, that time politics was not [as] expensive as it is now.

I would not know specifically [entry routes that FRELIMO soldiers used when crossing from Zambia into Mozambique to attack Portuguese forces] but there are certain areas in Chadiza, somewhere in Vubwi. We used to hear about soldiers coming in or going out of Zambia. Then, here in Petauke, we had places...somewhere in Chipembi. This area used to be under Petauke district but due to the demarcation that was drawn just recently, it now falls under Nyimba district. Then [there was another entry point], somewhere in Feira; that is [in the] Luangwa area. Even after getting independence, the RENAMO fighters were using these same entry points to come and attack us. In Chadiza, Taferasoni and Vubwi, as mentioned earlier, [there] were common entry points. Then coming to Zumaile here, it was also a popular entry point. In fact, RENAMO fighters never used to hide when coming into Zambia. They never used to fear the Zambian soldiers but the commandos. They even used to write letters informing soldiers in Zambia that they were coming to attack. [Here in Petauke] we had two camps for soldiers: one at Zumaile and the other one at Manyane. So they would ask [a] farmer to take a letter to [Zambia] soldiers [at the] camp, stating that

“ We are coming [to attack] on Saturday around 24.00 hours,” and they would keep their word.

They would even come drumming and they would even see the Zambian soldiers. That is how we even lost a female teacher at Zumaile. They were running away upon hearing the drums but she remembered that she had forgotten something. When she went back to get it that is how she met her fate.

I would speak much about [the role that the OAU, the Commonwealth, the UNO and Non-Aligned movements played in relation to the liberation of Southern Africa] because [when we were in school... we [studied these organisations] in social studies....I remember some international organizations would... bring in some relief food. I remember when soldiers were camping at Manyane, a certain Mr Nkhata was working for the P[resident] C[itizenship] C[ollege]. I think he was at the President’s College in Kabwe but he [may have also been] a member of the Red Cross. So they used to send him there [i.e. refugee camps] to oversee the distribution of food which they used to bring whenever Mozambican refugees ran away from war. They could bring in beans, cooking oil and other food stuffs. [However,] I would not talk much [about the Non-Aligned Movement] because I did not study it much.

[Today], I would [still render support to the Zambian government if it was necessary to give assistance to the liberation movements as it did in the 50s and 60s], because we have to make sure that there is peace and harmony. If the liberation struggle is justified, people are fighting a just cause, then we [should come to their] help. No... group of people [should] team up and fight [a] government. We don’t support rebel groups in any country because if we do, we destabilize that country and their problems spill over [on] to us. [So I would still welcome the enormous sacrifices that go with supporting liberation movements if need arose even today and I would not ask for anything in return.]

Dube, Elias Saulos Muxlanga

Elias Saulos Muxlanga Dube was born in 1928 and is one of the eye-witnesses of the liberation struggle, having lived in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia at a prime-age in the liberation years. He shares his experience in the liberation struggle in this interview.

My name is Elias Saulos Muxlanga Dube. I only know that, I was born in 1928. I was born in Zimbabwe. In 1947, I went to South Africa. I went there for work; then I came back to Zimbabwe in 1955. After six months I went back to South Africa.

That was during the liberation struggle. Mandela was jailed and I came here in 1962, and I found that here there was a coalition government of ANC and UNIP. That time there were three parties; the Federal Party, ANC and UNIP. The Federal Party which was for the whites won 16 seats, UNIP won 14 seats and ANC won 7. The two leaders, Nkhumbula and Kaunda, had to sit and combine their votes which gave them 21 seats; so they formed the coalition government. Kaunda became the Minister of Local Government, Nkumbula became Minister of Education and Kapwepwe became Minister of Foreign Affairs. They formed the government in 1963.

In 1963, there were other elections, UNIP won and Kaunda became Prime Minister and Kapwepwe Minister of Foreign Affairs. Then the government continued with Kaunda as the Prime Minister, and again in 1964 there was another general election. The ANC and Federal Party lost and UNIP won and Kaunda became President. By that time there was a strike by buses going to the Eastern Province, but I came with my friend, Stephen Mtonga, from Eastern Province,. I stayed in Eastern Province for eight years, from 1962 December to 1969.

In 1970 I arrived in Lusaka. At that time freedom fighters were staying with us but I did not participate when the Zimbabwean people got independence. They were repatriated and I stayed here from 1963. I did not marry for several years. I wanted not to marry here because if I married here, there would be problems. When Zimbabwe got independence that was when I married so that when I went back to Zimbabwe I would not leave my wife suffering the way I left another wife in South Africa.

I stayed until the South Africans were going back and I registered myself to go back. I wanted to go, but because of the children I did not. So when it was my turn to go back, and my flight was ready I found out that there was no food to feed the family at my house, and no money for rent. So I started thinking that if I went what would happen to my family, because I had three children here. This made me not to go. I didn't go and they finished the repatriation exercise in December so. I always still think about the children I left in South Africa.

During the struggle when they were fighting for independence, the freedom fighters were very cooperative. We lived with them here and sometimes worked together very well. They got assistance from Tanzania where they went for training. Here it was like their headquarters, so we stayed with them well.

I was here in Lusaka when the South Africans bombed Lusaka West. There was a camp for freedom fighters in that farm where they bombed. Even Nkhomo's people were there. Thank you very much!

Fara, Thomas Michael

[Lusaka; 12 September 2007]

General Thomas Michael Fara was a senior army officer who participated in the liberation struggle of Zambia. He joined the army straight after school and was trained in England. He helped to establish the SDU Unit which facilitated freedom fighters to cross from Zambia into the unliberated territories to carry out the incursions. He rose through the ranks and became a commandant in the Zambia National Service. He gives a detailed account of what happened during the time.

My name is Thomas Michael Fara. In the army we like calling each other first

names, so really people think my name is Tom. Tom is the short form of Thomas. Then there is the middle name, Mike. Mike is actually Michael but again because we like to shorten names, calling each other by first names I am Mike and I am also Thomas Michael Fara. I always tell people that I have never lived peacefully in my life. I was born during the war in 1942, 8th May 1942 I remember my mother telling me how she used to run with me at her back because of the Germans where they were crossing from Namibia going to Tanganyika. Namibia then was German colony just like Tanganyika, now Tanzania was a German country. So my mother had lots of things to say about how she used to run with me at the back. I am very grateful for that poor woman. May her soul rest in peace.

I was born in Luangwa. Then my parents crossed into Zimbabwe and my father was working at a mine we call Company Motors. I don't know the proper name, near Gweru, near Gatoma. Later on we came to Lusaka. And then we went back to Feira and I started school in Feira. After that I came to Lusaka to stay with relatives of my father. I went to school in Matero and from there I went to Canisius, I am catholic. So I went to St Canisius Secondary. That time, if you are a Catholic, you go to Canisius. If you are other people, you go to Munali. During my young days, I was very fond of boy scouting. I have a lot of boys scout pictures at home. I went to do Form One in 1960. I was there until Form Five. I didn't do form 6 because they stopped us. They said go and open the university. Then I didn't go to the university. I thought it would be too long so I went to the army, because the army gave me two years. I joined the army in 1964. We were the boys at the independence parade in 1964. We didn't have a training school here. I was trained in England at a place known as Mons. It is a training place. Mons is a battle ground between, as you are approaching Belgium from France. There is a place known as Mons on the left and there is a place known as Waterloo on the right. So in honour of those battle grounds, that's how they established this school and called it Mons. I trained in England, but Mons is a place battle for the Second World War. The allied forces fought there with Hitler people near Belgium as you enter Belgium.

So I came back and in the army you come back as a junior officer and you took command duties with soldiers. They give you 30 soldiers to start what is called a

platoon. You start with that, and as you are making progress.... When I returned, I found a muzungu there. I came back in 1965. Then I took over the platoon and I was a commander, first black commander. That was my first appointment as an army officer, very exciting. I worked on and I did those duties up to 1972 and then...

As commander of the platoon, we did a lot of...if you remember in the 60's a lot of skirmishes with Ian Smith people and the Portuguese territories. On the 29th December 1965 I went with my platoon to Kalabo. I landed in Kalabo with my platoon. And in the evening they shot at us. They injured Corporal Zalila. We took him to the clinic and then I sent a patrol, and discovered where the Portuguese were and we watched them from about 15hrs and when it was 23hrs at night they attacked that place and brought me a radio and the things they collected from the Portuguese. My platoon attacked and after that the Portuguese moved out of that place. They now went to Sikongo. It is 42 miles from Kalabo. They established camp 2 miles inside Angola. And I shifted from Kalabo and I went to Sikongo following them. I set camp there and they called for re-enforcements and they brought young chaps from the university. You know, you have seen our school boys here wearing army uniforms. We call them cadet corps, combined cadet corps. So they have a system like that. When the university is closed, the Portuguese in the Portugal they sent the students overseas to relieve soldiers because they were getting paid and I had eight Portuguese soldiers in a boat on a river. But the patrol was not exactly where we were. They had gone to the river towards coming back to Kalabo because they heard some people saying we have seen some bazungu this side. All those eight were shot down. I felt very bad.

They were in a boat. These small military patrol boats. Oh but they are very many of those things on the boats. Some of them you report, some of them because we had white people as our leaders. The instructions were that don't do anything there, you must stop MPLA from coming inside the country. They must go back to their country. This is the instruction we had at the same time you our leaders were saying the Portuguese should not enter our country so when you are in there you just make decisions on your own which is the best to do.

Later on during life, you remember the Draeiber? Those girls at the Victoria Falls? Those two? That was my company, this time I had become a company commander. That was my company. Draeiber, what is the name? Those two Canadian girls? Their father even came to check. We shot them at Victoria Falls. Sikota Wina was Minister of Broadcasting and like they do now, spokesman. So he is the one who held the press conference. This was 1969. By this time, I was called a company commandant and I had three platoons.

Luanginga River is in Zambia going towards Angola. It is actually in Kalabo. It is very fast flowing and deep as well as a lot of fish, big fish.

Those were Portuguese boats, you know. The boats we get, we take with us to the bush. But when you finish what you are doing, you deflate it and put it at the back and you go. So the Portuguese solders were demobilised, eight, all of them. They died, they were white boys and when we searched their pockets we found university cards

and identity cards. Very, very bad. Even Smith was doing the same, he was sending secondary school boys who were being shot by our people at the borders.

At Victoria Falls in 1969, it was my soldiers operating as platoons. Now you are not with them all the time. I was myself in Livingstone. But you see, the girls were coming towards the ZESCO power station in Livingstone down there. That is where they were shot. They were on the water. They were swimming. But to us, they appeared like commandoes and we were thinking that they were probably coming to attack ZESCO. To blow up ZESCO. That is how we shot them. Even during the press conference, because it was an international press conference held by Sikota Wina, there were a lot of countries who came there, they sent journalists and we were being asked didn't you see that they were women. We said how you see she is a woman she is swimming. The front part of the woman is in water. You can't see the shape of the chest and you cannot say the hair because the hip is now men have longer hair than women. So these are the sort of questions, we were being asked, very interesting

Well they were, they must have been commandoes. But Mr Brider came to see where his daughter was shot and he said to me because I was the one taking him round. He said this girl was very daring. The father's name was Mr Draeiber or something like that from Canada.

After this, I went to do some course overseas. I went to China from 1971 to 1972. Because I think the government was preparing me to come and work with freedom fighters, so I had to do guerrilla tactics and at that time it was felt that the best country in guerrilla tactics was in China. So I went to spend 9 months in China and I went with 20 soldiers and two lieutenants. When I came back, I was using those soldiers and those two lieutenants. I started what we called SDU, meaning Special Duties Unit. That's when I was posted to the Ministry of Defence. At special duties, we were handling liberation movements and nationalist movements. You know, people like that, I was based at Ministry of Defence and for a lack of name, I was known as projects officer because these were top secrets those days. I operated as if I was liberation committee because I was like the front line. Because we were fearing the Americans. Because all the western world at that time were against freedom fighters, they were calling them terrorists, they were calling them all sorts of names, bandits and so on, and yet they were decent men who merely wanted to have a say in their own countries.

I was the contact man between freedom fighters and my government. The prominent nationalist movements we had at that time were FRELIMO, SWAPO, ZANU and ZAPU. This was from 1970. When I came back from China in 1972. The SDU was established in March 1972. I was the contact man between freedom fighters and freedom fighters organisations under the Defence ministry and government. We were handling, freedom fighters at that time. We were not too open or as to what we were doing. We had meetings like clandestine movement. The leaders of freedom fighters were advising them to stay in Tanzania. But their men were staying here in camps in various camps in the country. And when you were ready to despatch men

into battle to cross the Zambezi in the end, we found it necessary that we had to go with them up to the crossing point. They must cross you prepare them to cross and you see that they have crossed and then you give the chap a program. On such such a day, we shall listen to Rhodesia broadcasting corporation, because if something was done, we would hear from Rhodesia we had a radio in Livingstone. If it didn't work, we did not go to any station except on the Rhodesia. We had a radio on South Africa, the radio on Namibia - South West Africa. If you crossed a chap and gave him a program, you are going to take two days to get there, but we will give you one day to rest then after that you should attack such and such a place. When you finished you think that Rhodesia by such and such a day will report on their radio. That corporal so and so is missing or something like that and then we will know that you have done our task. If we do not hear anything in two to five days after this day, then it means you have been killed.

Leaders determined to say here is the money, here is the food and then in the end we had to take over that responsibility because we found that if you are not there to say cross now sometimes they didn't cross. They will just come back with the money. They will drink beer, they will give the people the food and they will get married in the villages. But if you are there supervising, he crosses, you are gone and if you are two or three of you, you can even sleep there along the Zambezi then after two days you come back, then you know he is gone. Then you go and start listening to the radio whether there has been any attack, because there they used to say terrorists have done this at the farm then you know those are our boys.

Have you been on the road to Chipata? There is a place there that used to be Tsetse control. Now there, when you just pass about a quarter a mile something like that you turn to the right nine miles there I had a camp. I was training ZAPU in 1974. I had a training camp there. That place, is it Sinjela? You know, when you are going to Chipata, that place where there used to be tsetse control long time ago. Now it is broken down. There is nothing there. There used to be tsetse control there then. When you just pass, you turn to the right on the road. Francis Kaunda put a big thing. He cut the grass to stop tsetse flies. So there, you go nine miles. There was a camp on the mountain there. Sinjela is about 64, 65 miles before Rufunsa or further. It's near, half way. These were ZANU. Not ZAPU. ZAPU I was with them in Livingstone. You know that's where we had them, just before Livingstone on the left at the dam. There was a dam there. Later on, I put up a national service thing there. In Livingstone, on the left. There is a dam there. That is where I had ZAPU. That side I had ZANU. You know, they can't operate together. ZAPU had to go to Ndebele land. ZANU had to go Mashonaland.....

The place where we had PAC was just after Senkobo, that is now you go near Livingstone on the left. There is a dam there. So we were keeping them and mind you, we were not really keeping them in one place for a very long time for fear that they would come to drop things on them. Because once you have crossed a number of people, you change here, you change accommodation, you change where they

stay because when they are arrested there they start coming back showing where they have been. There were frequent movements so that when they come they find something else and so on.

SDU was composed of Zambian troops-those twenty. The job was to deliver food, the job was to give protection if their leaders have come and so on, and that was SDU, so our troops... Deliver food to the freedom fighters in the camps. The food

and money came from the OAU. Sometimes it came straight from Dar es Salaam. Like for SWAPO, it came from Bagamoyo through the road to Dar es Salaam after Iringa. The freedom fighters had a lot of well wishers giving them money. If there are certain things they can't find themselves we bought for them but mostly we were transporting it so that it is used for what it has been brought here for. If you just leave it on their own, they are troops they are trained as troops just like our troops here, you have to control to make sure that they are doing the correct things. So when the food came you hope to take it to the camps. If they have got trucks, their vehicle comes; you take them petrol and so on. We were a logistic cell for them.

We gave protection to their leaders. If, for instance, Machel is coming to Zambia, he will come, we will not be worried about him, he will go to state house, he will see his friend and will go back to Tanzania that's alright. But if he wants to see troops in the bush then we take over. If there are just in town here, they come from the airport to state house the military intelligence take charge of that. Each liberation movement has its own code of discipline. They punished each other but we had a mandate to intervene if they started murdering each other for instance if they are fighting on a tribal thing and so on. Then we intervene, we report to their leaders, their leaders come and decide what to do with them. But if it is just indiscipline, he is drunk, he has missed from the camp for one day and he comes back, they know what to do to each other in accordance with their regulations.

As regards to traitors or betrayers, they knew each other. The leaders in the camps will know each other. Because they recruit each other from say from Zimbabwe, from Rhodesia, recruit each other, they assemble and if we recruit, they are given to us, we take them to a certain point and we take them to a certain training camp in Tanzania and they will know each other. When they go whether is to Algeria or to Russia or somewhere they go and train and they will come back. When they come here they will be together, so if there is a new person there, he must have credentials from where he was recruited inside the country. It was a difficult thing but we were doing it and I think it didn't lapse much. Towards the end we had programmes. I find that there is question there on front line states. In the end we had to narrow it up so that fewer countries are involved and then that way the control was tight.

I was doing these jobs at the SDU until 1976. I went Livingstone. I was becoming senior and so I was combining with other duties at the ministry there. I started to run a department. When I went to Livingstone in 1976, to open a regional command of the Southern province. I was the regional commander there. And then that's when we opened the third front. You remember the famous third front. Even the way people

came to visit the third front. And unfortunately there was problem inside there, inside Zimbabwe. You remember when the government there were using, what is that? When they were using the Koreans to quell the insurrection which was in there and I was in Livingstone and I think that we helped quite a bit because we were going to have a problem there.

The third front which was opened, crossing soldiers into there which was not happening before. It started in 1976. You remember when that, what, is it 5th brigade that Korean brigade which quelled down that insurrection in Zimbabwe when they had already become independent? Do you remember? Yes the Gukurahundi when the matebeles were murdered. In this other area, we had already done. I had already even myself I had crossed already at that time. But it is just in Livingstone because of the way the place is and when you cross Livingstone, you go in Matebeleland, the reception from Matebeland and the reception from Mashonaland was different. At that time, ZANU had taken over. ZANU had become more popular than ZAPU. I did not cross in that area. But I understand if in your group you have some Shonas, there may be a problem because you know guerrillas rely on the people they find and if you are going to talk to them in Shona it's not very nice.

I am calling it a 3rd front because these were two. There was 1st and second front. The 1st front was in Feira area. The ones who were crossing at the 1st front were all my boys, ZANU 1st and second front were ZAPU. The 2nd front was in Chirundu area in Chiawa. And after that it was difficult because there is a big water stretch. This Kariba dam, the next one. ZANU and even ZAPU were crossing at Chiawa. Like a chap known as Nikita. He was killed in Chiawa area but he was ZAPU. So there was a ZAPU unit we sent to go and cross there. Nikita the chap known as Nikita you should have known him. He was based in Lusaka. He was a leader. He was commander of ZAPU. ZAPU troops. He was killed by a landmine. He was shot; yes he was shot just after the palace as you are coming this way.

They infiltrated ZANU. Then we had ZANU and FROLIZI -James Chikerema. They were at Kavalamanja. FROLIZI was at Kavalamanja. When we removed them, we put back ZANU. The original camp was ZANU. When they started fighting and so on, we told ZANU to get out. Then we left Frolizi there and ZANU went to a place known as Jeki coming towards Chiawa and when Chikerema became discredited, and the leadership here said we don't want FROLIZI so we went and removed Frolizi and took back some elements of ZANU. Remember? But you know Chikerema James a friend of Silundika George, Muzi and so on. When the massacre took place, it was ZANU who were killed that time when they said they came with gunships?

In Zimbabwe the first liberation movement registered and recognized by OAU was ZAPU. The leader was Nkhomo. Now Nkhomo is from near Beit Bridge there. He is a Ndebele and as ZAPU was gaining momentum, the Shonas who are the most populace tribe in Zimbabwe couldn't accept to be led by a non-Shona so there was a split in ZAPU. So they ended up with ZAPU and ZANU. In ZANU, there were Shonas, the way Nyanja is here, where you have Nsenga, you call them Nyanja, you

have Chewa, you call them Nyanja, and so on. And the Shona is a group made of the tribe like Bemba here, they start from Serenje all the way up to where they are called Bemba. But they are not. So certain elements in the ZANU was infiltrated and so a group broke away and formed FROLIZI. Even with that, even when we stopped, we said Frolizi is done and should not come to Zambia. OAU stopped FROLIZI. Inside there, they started having those funny things, Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole. A groupment of the Shonas but breaking away from the main Shonas.

FROLIZI broke off from ZANU. We caught a chap at the railway station in Livingstone known as Hendrix. This chap, they recruited him, the Zimbabwe Intelligence and told him we are going to give your family 5,000 dollars every 6 months and they will stay in New York. When this nonsense is over you will go to stay with them in New York. We will be looking after you, but we want to cut your leg. So he agreed they cut his leg and put an artificial limb. And he is the one who was delivering letters to ZANU. They would stick letters in his artificial limb and then put him on the train. He would sit in the corner there looking very poor with plastic. You can even get money and give him. But he is loaded with money in this artificial limb. We caught him at Livingstone Railway station. What we discovered there was that serials in Zambia used to produce clothes. Very good suits. So these boys used to have blue trousers white shirts and green rings. When drinking beer, you must use your left hand so that that the ring shows. If you find another person dressed like that, you go and dance near him. The person will also stand and dance near you and bottles will go to each other ko-ko comrade-comrade. And then you follow them outside, you go and discuss and say am so and so. We discovered it was a successful tour there and very nice.

Hendrix was half cast, coloured. Wezi Kaunda wanted to shoot him. He was in Choma with soldiers because there in Livingstone. I didn't want soldiers nearby. I said I will call for soldiers when I want them as long as they behave. So they used to stay in Choma, Njase Secondary School. There is a dam like this.....

Hendrix was a transporter of information, letters and so on and recruiting people for destabilization of You know, they are no freedom fighters who have been disturbed so much like those ones in Rhodesia.

Hendrix would stuff these letters and pictures and so on in the artificial limb. This was in 1976, going into 1977 because mid 1977 I left and came back here. I got an upgrade. This is when I was regional commander. But with this special assignment from OAU they said make sure they cross. Please make sure they cross. Because the Ndebele were a bit difficult. They liked playing. But you know they were crossing. They fused very well with the people at Mwandu. You would go to mwandu that's where we used to cross. And we would land into Kasane and start the journey to Zimbabwe.

We got this request from OAU to actually assist these people to cross. They visited that place and said, please we want, you know, intensification now. And ..I don't know what he was doing there. He had gone to Geneva. He stayed a long time. Even there, meetings with Mark Chona, he used to go to Geneva where they became

ZANU Patriotic front because of that misunderstanding with that small group of Ndabaningi Sithole.

Chipepo was killed in 1974, that was early but I was at the Ministry. I had just come from the bush to collect something and go back. Because if you don't do that, they don't cross. You give him 5000 dollars tell him-You better cross and here food for the next two days before you get to this town. When you get to this town, then you can buy. You know these crossings are dependent on the level of water at that particular time, on what time of the day and whether it's visible from this way and so on. So even Livingstone area, but the best was Mwandi and Kazungula. The Kazungula border post became very popular. In Kazungula, we were using boats and canoes. You know, you give them a net, they are looking as though they are fishing. That was wonderful. But, Feira No. There was crossing even during the day at Feira and Kazungula. It depends on what you got to go there and spend one hour with your binoculars, and see what is going on across. Sometimes just to cross 20 people - 3 days. We used to take few people at a time. If it is a big group, you are spotted by an air craft, because they have got these spotter planes they go very far and they have strong glasses that look dark. But sometimes you cannot spot them because, by the time you hear the sound, it is going back. It is rounding.

The Chief at Mwandi was harassed by the Freedom Fighters. The boys were misbehaving. Even our troops were harassing some chiefs in Senanga. They sent a friend of mine, Mwaanga, to go and open a camp in Senanga. When I went, I had to remove it to take it to that airport because they were harassing people at the nearby school near Harrington mission school. The mistresses there stopped going to work because they were being harassed by soldiers. So I said, Mwaanga how can you put a camp like this? So we had to shift to go to another place. So really, it depends on your leader of the group. In February 1966. We had the Zambian army. These skirmishes against Zimbabwe. You know what we are discussing with freedom fighters, but we ourselves were also there. We also were there. But this I am saying because a friend of mine who had gone with troops there was getting married. So they sent me there and I had to change troops because they were young boys. You, you are like teacher. If you don't do certain things, some things will not go well.

This was the first time we took troops to Senanga in 1967. But I had been all over before. I have even been to Eastern province where I took over from Mibenge and the radio operator of Mibenge the leg was blown you see. So I left Livingstone in 1977. I came to take over the Mechanical Services Department. I was in charge of government transport. Whatever disasters happened to the country, whatever large scale movement, even when soldiers are moving, you are part of it because you have to beef up with transport and soldiers. When there is a disaster, you have to provide transport to deliver things from the office of the vice president and so on. So I spent three years at MSD. Then I became Chief of logistics in 1979. Chief of Logistics of the armed forces. I was the superintendent. I boss, I was director. They seconded me there because there was too much pilfering, too much this, too many complaints. You

ministers were complaining and so on. I went there, in fact, I remember the first day I reported, Rajah Kunda, was Minister for Eastern Province. He was there shouting and I asked what was going on. I can't work like this it is now three days I said no, no it won't be three days anymore I have just come, look, this is my bag. So any way I was there for three years, from there, I became the Chief of Logistics.

The MSD played the role of providing transportation in the liberation struggle. MSD was in every province. If there was a dire need to help especially, I remember, we directed, what is the name of that? Mwinilunga, we directed them to offer their truck up to Luso inside Angola and they carried the soldiers who would carry these chaps. It was part of their crossing exercise so they went to Liso inside. Liso is that place after Mwinilunga inside Angola. I think it is Liso. It is inside Angola after Jimbe. At Jimbe there are actually three countries there. Zaire is also nearby. That thing actually starts in Zaire. This Zambezi starts in Zambia; it goes a little into Zaire to Angola and goes back to Zambia. That is where it starts from.

We transported MPLA Angolan freedom fighters from Zambia into Angola. There was a chap. They were using these pseudo names, Kamalata. Do you remember him? He was always there because these leaders of liberation movements were being treated as Diplomats. They were always with higher ranking people. And you, you come and stand at the back and the chap comes and is talking with Bulawayo and call each other by first names. It is like you are seeing a train on the advert of Victoria Falls and you see Kaunda is in there and the man from South Africa he is there -Vorster. They are drinking wine and you, you are pointing guns at each other-the soldiers. It was at Jimbe where we transported troops. I am just giving an example. We did that in many places.

Using GRZ vehicles is not good because if you start doing that, you put GRZ transport at risk. But there comes a time when you have to make a decision. Do you want to risk or not? There were GRZ vehicles in Mwinilunga district. So I said let them go. So they gave him a lift and went inside. Just to transport them. Its better we take them home and pray that nothing happens. They come back, just hang around in Mwinilunga, causing havoc because freedom fighters could be a nuisance sometimes. We did this as MSD in several places. There is a camp in a place known as Kameta in the Eastern Province. We transported them from Chipata. They had come from Tanzania up to Isoka. We met them there put them on GRZ Lorries. All the way up to Kameta in the Eastern Province. Kameta is somewhere after Katete, on the border. There was a big damp of ammunition like a magazine. We were assisting freedom fighters -FRELIMO who had come for training from Tanzania. They got to Isoka with assistance from the SDU of Tanzania, special duties unit of Tanzania. They brought them up to Isoka, then they had no fuel. They couldn't continue and we met there and we passed through Chama. Then we transferred from there. Our SDU trucks, we didn't have enough, so I authorised that they get the truck from Chipata to go and meet them there and take them that side. They took the SDU trucks to transport them

all the way to Kameta. They came with SDU truck of Tanzania. The trucks had private numbers, but they were government.

Then I became chief of logistics of armed forces of Zambia. That masterminded logistics operation and troop movement of the three services at the peak of the skirmishes with Rhodesia. You know logistics is a wide word. I became Chief of logistics of the armed forces of Zambia, army, ZAF, ZNS and Police. Me I am army.

Logistically for the ZAF, Army and ZNS. Yes, you remember we had a lot of the United Nations coming to visit. Not Police. Police, we would work with them but they would have their own command. But we would plan. I was Chief of Logistics from 1979 to 1980. I was there for one year. We provided food, petrol, water and so on. That is logistics. And then movements, I had to know each movement so that I calculated how much food I should give them, for transportation whilst they are on the way, how much petrol they need for moving, and how many miles. So you need to know every movement so that you can provide those things. You remember there were a lot of people who were coming with the United Nations when we had bridges blown in Chambishi along the Great North Road. Now I was the logistics chief. I'm the one who was planning, even helicopters.

The Chambishi Bridge near Kasama was blown up in 1979 or 1980. That is the new one which is there.

If the army wants to send two companies to Livingstone, maybe they would need 10 vehicles, maybe 15 vehicles to carry soldiers, equipment and things and so on. They must say that, and how many soldiers, so that we calculate how much food we think they need, how much petrol they will need, just to move to Livingstone and so on. Then some other separate logistics movements to take now supplies there and reposition our own staff. We actually knew the numbers of people. They would be drinking water and eating. You need to know so that you can calculate, and they were a lot. Chief of logistics is the senior quartermaster or the quartermaster report to them. If they ran out of supplies and government has sanctioned that certain assistance must be rendered to them, then the chief of logistics should procure that assistance. Ideally they are supposed to be self-supporting. But us the SDU is supposed to control the usage of these supplies which come to them. But if they have run out and government has sanctioned then chief of logistics must. There was a time in Lusaka west when they attacked that place where the air force is. We call it victory camp now where Daniel Lisulo'sor was it his children or something were killed there in Lusaka west, you remember eeh. Now that place, we had to supply a number of times because there was a school there, so we were not supplying freedom fighters, fighters, the combatants because people hate combatants. We were supplying the children they were keeping there and whoever else was making that place work so like government was very kind and even OAU and outside assistance used to come because those were not considered to be people who are armed who can kill people. But you see, chaps like in Kavalamanja and so on, eeh nobody wants to give them anything.

The OAU went to children's camp to see them. Those were the Zimbabwean ZAPU children. And I think we had some Namibian children there because I remember when I was running a special course for Namibian children in Kitwe we got them from there and took them to ZNS camp in Kabwe by then there were two Swedish girls who were teaching at Nkrumah College. They used to come and teach them special English every four o'clock in the afternoon for two hours. From there we shifted to Kitwe where the equipment is to go and learn how to make shoes.

We were you training them skills in tailoring, shoemaking- what you call cobblers. We moved them from the camp and took them to Kitwe camp. The reason why we went to Kitwe camp is because there were equipment on which they will learn how to make these things. However, in Kabwe I had a school for ZNS. We gave them a classroom. In the morning they would work and wait and in the afternoon at 16 hours the Swedish teachers would come and teach them special English.

I became commander in 1980. I only had one year as logistics chief because there was independence coming in Zimbabwe, so there was no point wasting time either. So they gave me now the national service to reconstruct the country. I went to National Service. Freedom fighters were given mealie-meal coupons by government because there were very awkward issues, if you don't really watch them, they sell the food and buy beer. If they have a bad leader That problem it doesn't matter how you supply, they will sell that stuff and buy beer. Most of the time. It is not strange, even our own soldiers- if the sergeants, the officers are dull they will have a problem like that. At Kaoma, where Sikota Wina has a quarry. You leave Kaoma 21 miles and you go another 20 miles, there is a quarry there, I think it is for Sikota Wina. We had a refugee camp there- that is a problem we had. And I was looking after them because I had a national service camp nearby. At Mayukwayukwa refugee camp, the problem is too much!

I was deployed to national service as Commander in 1980. Now it is difficult to say what sort of things that we did there. Here I have said service chief and commander of Zambia national service was assigned the training of youths, construction and developmental tasks and large scale farming. I have not mentioned cultural activities, sporting activities and political mobilisation that we were doing at national services. We made roads, bridges, what they are still doing it, they are now making a road from Sinazongwe going to near Chirundu, Siavonga.

National Service started in 1971. The National Service, really it was like a resettlement programme. The independence struggle had finished and you have got these children you were sending to throw stones, to steal and to burn schools and so on and so forth, they are there, they are not educated because they were dismissed you can't do anything. So the government says Minister Dingiswayo you are going to be in charge of cooperatives. These children are yours, use them into agricultural production. They stayed at cooperatives for some time and there the minister couldn't fuse them to do agricultural activities because they were unruly, they were party youths. In the party the children must be unruly, so that they don't fear and smoke

a bit. So the minister couldn't. Then they said right, let's send them to home affairs maybe they can become policemen. So they go to home affairs under Minister Grey Zulu now. Again it was impossible and the Bazungu who were in home affairs said we cannot mix with this.

We were called home affairs, they were still youth. Then they said no..... They were just youth service. Then, in 1971 they said no, let's train them militarily like Tanzania has done and then send them to ministry of defence. In 1971, that's when it was done properly, there was act of parliament and so on, there were debates, we travelled the whole country and leaders went to speak to Israel and Israel came and established a camp in every province including Lukalanya. You know it? It's near Mongu. But I closed that thing when I went to national service and I opened this thing at Mangago near that quarry in Kaoma.

So Israel came and put up camps for ZNS in every province and loaned us some equipment for schools for training and so on. Then Israel became the bad boy of the world. So Kaunda says we shall have nothing to do with Israel. So they packed up bags and went. But they left everything they brought which was a very nice thing. Even the rifles, the guns, we had were from Israel.

The National Service played a lot of roles in the liberation struggle. Because, you know deception, there are times when you don't want the enemy to know what you are doing. There are times you would get freedom fighters- give them national service uniforms and you pass through a road block and nobody knows -they are just national service and yet they are freedom fighters. They are going to cross. When you go at a crossing point, you have to supervise because they change clothes. The national services clothes are put back on the truck and they wear their kit and they cross. So, all the arms of the defence forces helped liberation. The Air force helped to uplift freedom fighters.

Samora, people say he walked from Dar es salaam to Lusaka. No. He would be lifted by a helicopter put at some place, he does a meeting there, and he walks to somewhere and so on. He did part of the coming home on foot. You remember the way Samora came when he was going to receive his country. He moved from Dares salaam going through all the camps along the way saying bye, bye and thank you to people. The Air force lifted him from place to place here in Zambia. From here to Mozambique, you remember the guards of honour at the airport in Mozambique they were done in English, we trained them at Chindwin. We trained the band; we trained the soldiers, who were freedom fighters. Now this time we had to train them and give them a complete six months training. But mind you dealing with freedom fighters for a long time, we were hiding, because the colonial masters did not want them. Britain did not want the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe and that's why they arranged the killing of Chitepo. Those were the people who were doing it. Mondlane, the super powers, because when you have established a liberation movement you have to say what ideology you have and then you align yourself if you think you want to be socialist then you align yourself to Russia or china. If you are going to be hard

core capitalist, then you to go the US and the moment you start going to the US, these people become you enemy, if you change your view and go east the people on the west are you enemies. And now the thing is whatever you do, you have to have this in mind, otherwise you will be jeopardising your thing.

When I was at Sinjela there, I had boys from national service to do the education, to sensitise, to align the mentality and then we had boys from the army to teach the drill and weapon handling, so you need to know all this. The teachers and instructors at the National Service teachers did political sensitisation. Political Education is a technique of sensitizing people it is a misnomer to say political education because I saw when MMD used to insult us saying that this army is useless, they have been learning politics. This is because there was a department at ministry of defence in later days which I headed. It was known as political education and I was known as political education secretary. You are like chief ideological mobilizer of the armed forces. You are in charge of political mobilisation. You have to do a lot of training, a lot of seminars and so on. And seminars we were doing here exactly like the Americans. They have got seminars but we differ in naming. We name them political education, they name it senior officer's convention, and the British say tutorial discussions. But it is the same- you go to the bank of Zambia and get the governor to come and explain why the economy is collapsing. Another time, you go to the water board to come and explain why there is no water in prospect. But there is nothing socialist about it or there nothing capitalist about it but you see we were insulted because we were using political education. And political education is a term Russians use. So when you say this political education you are perceived as completely indoctrinated by Russia.

Political education was given to the youths, other people say is like current affairs. People should know some things which affect them which they don't normally deal with in their day to day lives. The national service youths used to man some very central infrastructure. Even you used to see the posts they were guarding, bridges were guarded. They were an army. You don't know that trouble took place in Chongwe. I had five boys guarding that bridge and the Rhodesians came and attacked and killed four instantly. One went and died further where we used to do that youth meeting with Kaunda there. Where we build that Kaunda's house -that's where that boy died so we just built that thing there and said Kaunda takes this house, one boy died there and we will put your house and you will be sleeping here. So, they hit this helicopter and it went and fell somewhere in the bush there. By the time we had the information here; three more helicopters from Rhodesia had landed. They were tying up this thing and lifting it up. They took it away. And then, here we just managed to bring uniforms. There was a belt with blood and some shoes and so on. He (KK) held a press conference and showed people that this is what has happened. You remember? At Milner's farm it was ZNS which queried those people who were trying to do a coup. We were farms and as farms you produce your food and then it must be documented. So we would sell to government through NAMBOARD. Hence government and NAMBOARD can do what they like. We had to sell to Namboard. We used to borrow money and use

it at the farm sell these things and pay the labourers and pay back the money. This is what we did with mangago. We borrowed some money from Friday Njovu (managing director of Zambia national commercial bank then). I went with him there.

But I know from that book am talking about there was a roadblock by Zimbabweans (Rhodesians) or racist South Africans I don't know who it was. You know where there is Munali statute, now you go a little bit like that in front and then you leave the hill and then you can see kwa kamunga, you can see the flat area there and then the road goes like that. Now there according to that book they had a road block for one week and they were not allowed to cook. And they must have been eating fresh food. Somebody must have been cooking somewhere and delivering there. Those Mazabuka farmers were supplying the Rhodesian soldiers. There was a farmer who had an aircraft who used to buy their food in Salisbury. They fly and go to Salisbury and fly back. That's why it took long to gain independence-the liberation struggle was prolonged because of insincere people. It is very difficult; it is something you can't be taught. Guerrilla warfare is-you fight a common enemy. But you see in the case of Zimbabwe because some whites were on the side of ZANU. So it is not every white who was an enemy. Same thing with South Africa, there were whites there who were on the side of ANC. There were whites who had positions in the ANC. They were whites here, the Indians- you remember the whole treasury of ANC was controlled by Indians. So you can't say every Indian South African is an enemy.

Kamanga, Edina Mwansa Kabungo

[28 May, 2008]

Mrs Edna Mwansa Kabungo Kamanga is the widow of the first Vice President of the Republic of Zambia Mr Reuben Chitandika Kamanga. It is from her role as wife of the Vice President, that she gave some insights into the role of her husband and indeed the role she played herself as the second Lady of the Republic and the role of women in the struggle.

Mrs Kamanga got married to Mr Kamanga in September 1963. Mr Kamanga was then Minister of Labour in the Coalition Government of UNIP and ANC. At the attainment of independence in October 1964, Mr Kamanga was appointed Vice President of the Republic of Zambia.

You are most welcome. I am Edina Mwansa Kamanga or rather Edina Mwansa Kabungo Kamanga or rather Edina Mwansa Kabungo Kamanga. I was born many moons ago, around 1946 on the 17th March in Kitwe and it was at Nkana hospital. I started school at the age of six in Ndola. I think it should have been 1952 somewhere around there. Then African Township. I started my school there and I did my Sub A, sub B, standard one, standard two and standard three. Then my father left Northern Rhodesia (Zambia) and went to America. And I must mention here also that as he did his studies in the States he also got busy in the Watch Tower Church. They are known as the Jehovah's Witnesses. Actually he brought that church to Northern Rhodesia. Yes and in 1954 he came back and we moved from Twapya Township to Chifubu Township. Chifubu had just been built it was a brand new township. We were the first occupants of that township and my father decided to send me to Chimpepe Mission School in Luapula Province. Chimpepe Mission School is a mission that belongs to the S.D.A Church. His sister was the headmistress there. So I did my standard three, four and then in standard five I came back to Lusaka Province of course that time it was not known as Lusaka province, I went to Kembe. I did my standard five and six there. And then I didn't do well in standard six so I had to repeat. I was then sent to Fiwela Mission School. I must confess I was a very playful girl so that somehow I delayed my education. I went to Fiwela in 1962. At Fiwela I did standard six, I was repeating. Actually that was 1961. Then 1963 I got married. I didn't have the chance of going to secondary, after I got married.

I got married to Mr Reuben Kamanga who was then Minister of Labour and Mines. This was in the Coalition Government haa.... It was quite interesting in the sense that I was pretty young, this was 1963, 7th September. And a year later we gained our independence and I became the second lady, young as I was. It really was not easy. My husband became the vice President of the Republic. He was the first vice president of Zambia there were a lot of functions to go to and I must confess I am an introvert I don't really like going out but I had no choice in the matter. I had to accompany my husband to the many functions that he went toAnd at such an early age.

I remember my mother giving me some words of advice. The one I remember most is when she said to me “You know you are now in this position, you are a mother to everybody, young as you are. And people will be coming smiling at you. Now you must be very careful. It’s not all those teeth that you see that will smile at you that will be genuine.” So that frightened me. So when I saw people greeting me, smiling at me, I remembered what my mother had said. So I was now busy gauging is this one friendly! You know I was so young really it was quite difficult. But I thank God, my mother had good friends in the name of Mrs Milcent Wolfson. Mr and Mrs Wolfson owned then what was known as Shapiro Milling Company now National Milling Company. Mrs Wolfson came in and really took over. She was now my mentor and she did so much for me I learnt so much from her.

Mrs Wolfson talked to me about a number of things: about how to entertain people, how to receive visitors. And in this case am talking about dignitaries, and how to carry myself, what to say and what not to say, and so on. Because when these dignitaries came, whether they came to our house or they went to State House, I had to be there. So she really drilled me and grilled me and am so grateful. May her soul rest in peace. She left us last year. She passed on. So she taught me quite a lot. She taught me how to entertain, what to call a full menu, what drinks to serve and so on. After a while I decided to go back to school. I went to then the College of Further Education, now Evelyn Hone College. There I went and did my junior secondary school and I did....I enjoyed my school and I made good friends with some of the teachers in the name of Dr Inonge Lewanika today our Ambassador in the States. She made a very good teacher you know, and she taught me Home Economics. She was pretty young. I finished my school there. My course, it was a combination of secondary school and Home Economics. So I did my three year course there and graduated, very happy with myself I learnt so much from my course. There was also another teacher Mrs Johnson an American lady, who taught us about etiquette, elocution and so on. My training was such that I could teach, you know in a school or anywhere else. So that helped me and from there I gained a lot of confidence, and there was no looking back.

Now you ask whether I played any role in the political field relating to Zambia hosting liberation movements and freedom fighters who were fighting to liberate Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, Namibia and Angola. The answer is ‘Yes’, I was because freedom fighters I think I played a role used to come here. Some would spend the night here. We would cook for them and so on. I had people like Mr Oliver Tambo. Of course he spoke my mother’s language, so when he came I was quite comfortable with him, you know. My late mother was from South Africa. She was Nthosa by tribe. She came from the Transkei. I have never been there, I am sorry to say. But anyway we used to receive these people, you know, these great sons of Africa.

Mr Oliver Tambo he was very friendly, very fatherly and whenever we sat, if my husband was not around, he was nothing but a teacher, you know. Telling me about this and that, I remember him teaching my children how to because he suffered

from asthma and two of my first children are asthmatic. So he would teach them how to breath whenever they had an attack of asthma. You know you breathe like this and so on. It releases the tension. So you know we got on well.

That's very interesting because, you know, he was such a freedom fighter and commander of the.....Umkhoto we sizwee and you are talking about his human side and his fatherly side.

Yes. Well that's wonderful. But I remember one time, then he was not staying with us, he was in town. He was living somewhere else in town. Then I met him and I slowed down. I was driving myself and I was trying to greet him. It was around eight hours in the morning. He didn't answer me he was just walking. I think it was along Roan Road in Kabulonga, I stopped and I was greeting him in Xosa because he spoke the language. He was just walking on. So I thought oh what has happened. And the security men around him were also just walking on. And some were doing this to me like (signalling 'stop talking').

Yes so I just went 'oh sorry' and I drove off. So when I got home I got worried. I searched myself. I wanted to see what I had done wrong. It really puzzled me. I was so uncomfortable the whole day. Then in the evening he came home and you know, he was his usual self, jovial. And he was saying, sister, don't worry, you know when I am in public like that, we don't want to be known, for security reasons. I was having my early walk, and you know, with the security there, we try to walk, and you know, in camouflage. I said oh, sorry I didn't know. Please forgive me, (laughs together) I didn't know about that, please. So this is all about Mr Oliver Tambo.

I met and lived with Mr Joshua Nkomo. Who was a lovely man, also very fatherly. Of course I was much younger than all these people I am talking about. This was again in the sixties?

We kept Mr Nkomo. I think he was coming from Bulawayo on his way to Tanzania. So he came and stayed with us for a few days, and then in the middle of the night, I don't know what happened, they just moved camp. They went and lived somewhere in Emmasdale. I think they were tipped off to say things were not right, move. You know, the enemies know where you are or something like that. So they moved away. And then after a week or so again we received them. They came back. And of course they came in, in such a way that people didn't realize who was coming in or out. And after about ten days he left for Tanzania. And he had just escaped arrest. Here in Zambia, I think the I think the Smith Authorities had snacked in. It was more or less a kidnapping exercise so to speak. So anyway he left.

And we made friends with the ANC ladies. I remember one by the name of Agness Msimang. She was the leader of the ANC ladies in Zambia. I remember also when Mrs Sisulu came. We had a party for her here. You know the Zambian leaders' wives and the ANC ladies, we all gathered here. It was lovely. Mrs Sisulu coming from South Africa. Yes, she lived in South Africa. This was in the late eighties, now things were just beginning to open up. I think it was in connection with their political activities. Yes. We had a party for her here and we invited the ANC ladies themselves, and some

Zambian ladies, ministers' wives, yes and other ordinary people. It was a combination of, you know, the party cadres and the senior freedom fighters yes. And like I said, my mother comes from South Africa, so you had people like Thabo Mbeki, now the President, who would be with my mother at her little farm, Eureka, somewhere in Makeni here, Thabo Mbeki used to stay with my mother once in a while, and the late Chris Hani. Chris Hani spent many moments with us. He would come and stay with us. Go to Moscow come back. Stay with my mother. I was not very close with them because I had my family here, but my young sister and my mother looked after them. Yes they would go and stay with my mother and sometime they would move camp, they would go and stay in Mtendere, they would move and go and stay in Lilanda. You know, they were men and women of no fixed abode so to speak. They were moving from place to place. They had to, for security reasons. I cannot say much about Chris Hani but for Thabo Mbeki he was jovial. He was jovial, like I said, they were much closer to my mother and my young sister yes. And then the great moment came when our great man, Mr Mandela, got released. They came to Zambia with Winnie Mandela. It was a wonderful moment. That was 1990 or 91 around there. I'm glad to say that my role was nice and I enjoyed every moment of it. I was told that they would be kept at the Government house then, which is now the Vice President's residence. So I was asked to go and pep up the gardens and re-decorate the house with the assistance of ZCCM. So we did the decorations. Then Mr Hazel Mwale was the Minister of Works and Supply and I remember him coming to inspect, to see if all was in place. So we did the decorations, but Mr Mandela didn't stay there. He was kept at the State House. It was the junior people who came and stayed there. But it was lovely.

I used to meet women freedom fighters, but really we would just talk about women matters. Politically we never went into details. And I must confess they were quite secretive. So when we talked, we discussed irrelevant matters, so to speak. But they had confidence in me and whenever they wanted something in my small way I would assist.

When Zimbabwe got its Independence ... it so happened that one weekend I was driving to Harare. And I don't know perhaps my late husband must have told President Kaunda that I was going to Harare. So I was given this letter to take to Mr Nkomo. This letter was in a big envelope of course haa... I took it to Mr Nkomo. I found Mr Milner already in Zimbabwe and he took me to Mr Nkomo's residence who was very happy to see me and I remember him opening this letter, reading, and then he just went (Au Bantu!) What's wrong with Kenneth! Apparently President Kaunda here was pleading with him to accept the position of Vice President which he did not like or had rejected to start with. But eventually he accepted.

I met Samora Marcel when they had already attained their Independence after 1975 each time he came to Lusaka. We were such good friends, very jovial. And the last time I saw him was I think a month before he died. He had come to Lusaka, they had their usual regional meetings. And we met, and he was so jovial and he was saying thank you for looking after my brother so well. Please continue to look after

him. And I said thank you your Excellency. And I said thank you. And it did not take long he was no more. I think it was 21 days later, he was no more. He had come to Mbala where they had meetings and so on. But he was very friendly very active. Yes so, this is what we saw, and this is what happened.

My husband retired in 1990 with other leaders, he came home and said well this is what I have done. I have come to the end of my political career, I said well-done congratulations but.....He retired in 1990 with you know with the other colleagues Mr Mudenda, Mr Grey Zulu and so on. So we welcomed him home. And I told him that..... because he said that it appeared that there were no benefits... I said well don't worry I have been a defiant wife in the sense that according to the Leadership Code we were not supposed to do any business, but I don't know, perhaps I saw this coming. We had our poultry, I am sure whatever will be realized from the poultry unit we shall share. So that kept us going. Yes it helped us so much. But that was 1990 and in 1996 he fell ill and left us. This was the moment when I felt I will never smile in my life again. But the good Lord has his own way of doing things. I felt lonely and I decided well I think the best I can do now is going back to school. So in 2005 I decided to go to the University and take up a Diploma in Social Work. And I finished successfully so I am a social worker by profession. I did in a University Diploma in Social Work yes. And after completing that, I felt well since I have tested the waters let me now plunge. So now I am doing a degree. This is my first year. I am doing Developmental Studies. It's tough but it is good. It keeps me busy I am enjoying it. I think I am the oldest in school, everybody calls me auntie Kamanga and I love it. I must also thank the Lord that he has given me lovely supportive children, I have four boys and two girls. The two girls have two degrees each. The boys are lazy, they are just into business. I think they are happy that way. I thought when I went back to school they would emulate me. Instead they said, no, we shall pay for your school fees it's ok (laughs). And back here at home I have little ones, my grandchildren who keep me busy.

Kampamba, Rabby Kangwa

[5 August, 2008]

Mr Kampamba was born in Broken Hill, now Kabwe in 1947. He grew up on the Copperbelt. In the interview Mr Kampamba focuses on the early settlers and professionals from Zimbabwe and South Africa as opposed to freedom fighters who came a little later. He also reveals how at independence Zambia embraced all those who were settled in the country offering them citizenship, free education and free medical care. To Mr Kampamba Zambia's role in the liberation struggle for Southern Africa was a continuation of the role the country began to perform soon after attaining independence.

My full names are Robby Kangwa Kampamba. R. K. Kampamba. Where I used to

work they used to call me R. K. I came from a family of eleven and I am the first born. I was born in Broken Hill that is Kabwe, even my national registration card is still written Broken Hill I haven't changed it. Yes, I was born in 1947, April. A few years after, my father trekked to Kalulushi. They were just opening a mine in Chililabombwe mine, and that was where the entire family, I would say was brought up. I went to Kalulushi Upper Primary School. That time there was Mr Isaiah Kanyense, he was the headmaster he is now the late. This same headmaster at one time had taken a trip with the late Simon Mwansa Kapwepwe to India to study. Yes, that was our headmaster then. So I was there from Sub-A in 1955 to Standard 6. After Standard 6 I qualified to or was selected to secondary school which later turned out to be Chiwala Secondary School. So that was in 1963. Yes, at independence time I witnessed at Chiwala Secondary School when we were laying down Union Jack at midnight and then hosting our Zambian flag. There were celebrations there. I was at Chiwala from 1963 to 1967 when I completed Form Five. Then I was taken by the Manpower Board. That time, Manpower Board allocated us some jobs before we even left school. So my first job was at Kitwe Central Hospital I worked in the pharmacy department. Immediately after writing my last paper I went straight into employment. It was nice in those days. So I worked there briefly and then I went to Mufulira and worked as a pupil teacher, untrained teacher for months. Then I applied for a job in Barclays Bank and there I went, sat for test and interviews, and then I was taken on, that is 1969. Three years after, 1972 I got married to my dear Jacqueline and we raised our family of seven, the family that I have just been talking to you about. I retired in 1997 again in the same month that I joined Barclays Bank in June so basically this isuhm, what I am.

Yes, yeah much as you have already said that you did not know that these people (freedom fighters) in fact helped us before we even helped them. At independence and after and thereafter, yes, before our independence mainly the ANC were in my area Kalulushi. They were actively involved in our liberation struggle although they took the back role they were not in front, they were just supporting us and also assisting us to carry out certain activities that would make the powers, the colonial masters at that

time jump around. So when our leaders used to come to Kalulushi they used to find a situation whereby the leadership of the youths were being harassed by the police. The police at that time, were very clever because we had these police officers from South Africa and the sub-region, the whites, so they knew the activities of these the liberation movement from South Africa, Mozambique, Namibia and Angola. So they knew the tactics of the liberation movements in those days. In Kalulushi in particular they realized there were some activities that were aimed at weakening and causing panic in the minds of the whites and the colonial masters and they knew that the only people who could cause these problems were the youths so they brought the ruling that all youths leadership must be registered with the police, their particulars with house numbers must be registered. So this is what they did and that slowed down the impact of the activities that are being done by our people, more especially United National Independence Party. The thought was that they would perhaps now slow down or at least eliminate all these activities but that was not the case because UNIP devised a system where they had to employ the young ones. So, they brought in what they called the 'underground youth movement' to involve the school children in the plan so that when these children would cause havoc in the community in the compounds the police will rush to the houses of the youth leaders because they had addresses with them. So when they rushed there at night or in the early morning hours they found them still fast asleep.... They were in their houses...but something has happened somewhere so they didn't know what was hitting them and yet it was these underground movements that used young children, very young ones to carry out certain activities even in the absence of youth leaders themselves. And those were not registered with the police and that caused the colonial masters to start wondering what was happening and this when you find UNIP guys at rallies saying, 'the shadow of UNIP at work' (laughs)... But I just wanted to let you know that the people who were teaching us some of these activities that I am talking to you about, these were the ANC chaps they came from South Africa. They were working for the mines on the Copperbelt but they took a low profile, they taught us how to make petrol bombs and how to carry out all those activities using some materials that were supplied by some of the UNIP veterans working in the mines which were used for blasting the underground mine to extract copper from there. So we could do that. Yes, I was very young at the time I must have been in Standard 4, yes Standard 4, Standard 5 somewhere there. So I was quite young but we even knew how to make petrol bombs taught by these South Africans.

But moving on to Chiwala 1964 we hoisted our Zambian flag as a newly independent and free Zambia. I was there witnessing it. It was a beautiful sight yes, a sight of freedom at dawn for Zambia and we were eating and drinking with the white masters there and the black masters alright? At independence time I am saying black masters, yes, yes we had black masters and the majority of them were coming from South Africa. They were educationists like Mr Bob Lishiwai....ah from South Africa, we had Mr Mapindisa he used to take us in history, then later after, the one that we

found as the head of the school Mr Peter Widwith had left, Mr Wesley Masiye took over as the school head. So as I said we started looking after them much earlier (the South Africans and other freedom fighters). Different professionals who came into the country, we started looking after them offering them jobs. As long as they were carrying the right profession and the right documents, we gave them the job. They got a salary like that of a white man. We had many of our learned African masters in our newly born free Zambia: South Africans were there, Zimbabweans were there, for example, we had Mr Robert Mugabe himself. He was here in Zambia as a teacher here. He taught at Chalimbana here, yes. So we started looking after them. At independence time the government of the day had to make sure that they provided jobs for these people. As they did that they were also creating ways of supporting the liberation struggle for our neighbouring countries. I am trying to show you that from the time I was at school, I saw South Africans helping us and then we started helping them to attain their independence.

I said where there is no vision people perish. Our leaders had a vision because even at independence time they realized and put in place a law that whoever at the time of independence was in Zambia became a Zambian. Now we had so many, from Malawi, from Tanzania, from Namibia, there were many on the Copperbelt, from Congo now DRC, they were working in the mines and were people that became Zambians at the time. More especially those that were born here even if they had their parents coming out but they came here and then they were born here at independence time and now they were Zambians. So this in itself helped in a way when it came to general elections because you can see the numbers increased and those people would not work against the Zambian government, the new republic. They made sure that they supported and voted because they realized this government has given them jobs on the copper mines and so on and so forth and some of them started inter-marriages marrying Zambians and thus becoming part of the free Zambia.

At school we had friends that came from Zimbabwe, that came from Angola that came from South Africa, that came from Mozambique, Namibia. At Chiwala Secondary School we had these. The deputy head boy at Chiwala Secondary School at one time was a chap from Angola, ah...from UNITA, Savimbi's organization that time. We could not tell these things till later that's when we came to know that that chap was under Savimbi. Just when they were about to declare their independence. When he was at Chiwala Secondary School there we could not tell that he was even involved in these liberation struggles, or liberation movements. The policies of the government before independence when it came to education were not good. The national allocation for a school going child at that time before independence it was segregative against Africans. You find that the school allocation in term of money to educate an African child per year was little, when compared to a white or European child. So this is where they had very good education these the whites compared to Africans because the funding of an African child was very little. But at independence

time it was standardized, everybody should get equal opportunity and equal funding to get a child into school in whatever grade, they had to give some allocations.

Now this attracted a lot of neighbours, and children from Malawi, children from Mozambique, from Zimbabwe, Southern Rhodesia, they flocked into Zambia. More especially those that had relatives on the copper mines, they started coming in because there was now freedom. That's when we called it free education. When I went in Form One in 1963 we started in Form Two there were no, in 1964 no school fees. No boarding fees to pay and as a result we started having an in-flux from neighbouring countries because there was free education and free medical services. In their countries these things were not there so they started coming in, more especially those that had relatives on the Copperbelt started flocking, flocking, some of them changing names to suit Zambian names.

And because we had a shortage of man power at that time, the whites at independence time were running away so there was a strong big vacuum created in getting the right professionals. So Zambia was in a hurry to train and to capitalize on those that had the brains to take engineering, to take medicine or other various fields. In fact I am talking about foreigners that capitalized on this. There were so many of them that really capitalized on this and now are big – big – big business men. They were in liberation movement or they were coming from Rhodesia or South Africa. Some of them came from Namibia or Angola. Not because they wanted to capitalize on the independence, but they wanted to get educated since only Zambia offered free education to Zambians or perceived Zambians. If you were a Zambian then you get free education, so there were so many friends that capitalized on that.

I am looking at how we assisted these people and how we looked after them, so they were brought in they came to see their relatives some of them, they pushed into schools to get free education from secondary school up to University level. The Zambian Government was paying even for these foreigners, paying for them at the University of Zambia, paying for them sending them out of Africa to go and train, the Zambian Government paid for them. Then they would come back and start working for the Zambian Government. We had critical shortage of trained man power and professionals because the whites that were manning these positions had left. Zambia was in a hurry to develop hence you trained anybody including foreigners as long as but they were fellow Africans. According to Dr Kaunda that time, he stood for the interests of Zambia and Africa as a whole. This is when the philosophy of humanism came. Dr Kaunda started pro-pounding on that when it became challenging to hold these many Zambian tribes that were almost on each other's neck. But he used that philosophy of humanism which had the term of biblical teachings to hold the nation together. That was very good in critical moments of our nation more even during those times of the liberation wars. And we were well taught about humanism at school. When I joined Barclays Bank, a lot of these people from Zimbabwe, lots of them from South Africa were here in Lilanda, even the late brother to Anderson Mnangagwa the boss in Zimbabwean Parliament. I think you heard of Anderson Mnangagwa,

Lameck Mwangwa we were with him together in Barclays Bank. I worked for Barclays I told you for 28 years and there were so many of them (foreigners) we had many of them but at independence time of their countries all of them just went. They resigned from Barclays. Some of them we didn't know they were Zimbabweans but immediately there was this Lancaster Peace Agreement in Zimbabwe, and Mugabe calling to Lancaster parties to discuss that's when these guys came out. So you can see how we looked after these people, in South Africa these were black-listed there by the colonial government. When they came here, they had their names, photos and other personal details changed. When some of them were being used in this liberation and they were moving out they made sure they had documents, Zambia document. So they were going out under different names, Zambian names. So we looked after them such that they could use Zambian names as if one is coming from North-Western or Western Province, Eastern Province or some other province, and yet they are foreigners because they were involved in the liberation struggle. They were using these Zambian names to cover up. I believe, there are some people who will tell more on this especially from the intelligence side like General Malimba Masheke at the time he was the Chief of Intelligence, and there was General Chintofwa also under intelligence in the Kaunda's time. All these know what used to happen because we had, they admitted one of the best intelligence systems in Africa. Freedom fighters used our names, when they were carrying out or making some incursions in South Africa. They were being provided with these Zambian names as they were going to Lesotho or Swaziland with a Zambian name. They could fly in and out Swaziland created a habit of using its geographical location to cause havoc in South Africa were they would fly into South Africa using Zambian names and passports after causing havoc, fly back to Swaziland and back to Zambia using Zambian names.

They had their real names, but you could not tell, because with the passage of time their faces changed. They were holding those photos but, you know, these things were happening as we were saying because we had some friends that were in these things from South Africa. Some of them were in the intelligence, some of them were guards to big, big short within the ANC and we used to mix with them here so well a lot of them were coming during that time. We could see the material assistance, yes clothing as well as money. They could go to the black market and buy, because they could have some forex and they used to be given food donations from all over the world, cooking oil and whatever they needed they used to get these things for free. They were just given and some of them could not use all, they used to sale. They could sell at a reasonable price to some of us I have some of the clothing I used to buy from those from South Africa. When it was too cold you could buy those things very cheaply. I was trying to say we looked after them in quite a number of ways.

I have said it how we looked after them as a government, and how they benefited from the system. Some of them are Engineers, Doctors, Professors and so on from our free education they benefited from the moment they got here through to their independence. They were employed because the thought was that they were

Zambians and yet they were foreigners. So even in the system of employment they could rise because they were perceived as Zambians even when they were foreigners. When they were getting independent that's when we would go like... ah, so he is not a Zambian. Even their language changed, and we could say to some of our colleagues, 'but I thought you were from Eastern Province, no!', they were too happy to leave... (laughs)!

Yes ... I can say that they were really taken care of. When you look at this compound called Mandevu especially these Zimbabweans ZANU PF they used to camp there. They used to stay there, they used to have houses there. Now because these Zimbabweans used to shave their hair and keep their beards, they were referred to by Zambians as mandevu ('ndevu' meaning for beards in local language). As a result of this term the place where they used to stay later got the name Mandevu compound. So even now when you go you find so many Zimbabweans there, they are still there in Mandevu compound. This is because of these Zimbabweans and their ndevu (beards) it is called Mandevu compound. I just want you to realize it when we say we really kept them. But they were not loafers they showed us how to survive. They had survival skills, making this making that, making mirigoma and coming up with all sorts of trades just to earn an income. This way while we looked after them, they too contributed to our development, human development and that was good.

I am saying we really looked after these people. You take a trip to Mumbwa and you will see how many farms these people own. Even when they were leaving going to Zimbabwe they left quite large tracks of farms. Now some of them were married to Zambians, Zambian women and farms this side you find a lot of Zimbabweans when they came in, because they were not idle, they wanted to do something. Zambians that time were not very keen to work on the land so Zimbabweans got large tracks of land and most of them were doing very well. You find that at the time they were leaving they left some goods and some of them sold their, the farms. They contributed to the agriculture side of this country, as small scale farmers, peasant farmers and its not only here even Southern province we had these Zimbabweans that capitalized on the Zambians that wanted always white collar jobs while the Zimbabweans took the land. I am sure our leadership can say how well they looked after these people. Dr Kaunda himself by nature of his position, I don't know how many years perhaps can pass before he can divulge this information by law. The majority of us know that even the survival of Joshua Nkomo when they came to bomb his house there it was because of the security network of our country otherwise Joshua Nkomo wouldn't have survived. So we looked after them very well.

I am not so qualified to talk about these big chaps, but even if I am not qualified, as a layman I know that something happened. In the day time you could see leaders they were staying in these houses but at night you would not know where they go. They had to be protected somehow. We were just seeing that a leader goes in that house but very late at night he is not there. The intelligence had taken him somewhere else. Sometimes we used to have critical shortages of essential commodities but those that

were involved in the liberation struggle they had a good share from the Zambian Government as well as from well-wishers from abroad.

Kaunda, Kenneth David

[Lusaka; 28 December 2006]

Dr Kenneth David Kaunda was born at Lubwa Mission, Chinsali District in the Northern Province of Zambia, on 28th April 1924. He worked as a school teacher among other things before joining the struggle to liberate Northern Rhodesia from colonial rule. In 1949 he was elected Branch Secretary of the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress in Chinsali. He was subsequently elected District Organising Secretary, and then in 1951 he was appointed Provincial Organising Secretary for the present Northern and Luapula provinces. In 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was imposed against the wishes of the African majority. That same year, Kenneth Kaunda was elected Secretary General of the African National Congress. In January 1955 Kaunda and Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, President of the African National Congress, were imprisoned for two months each for being in possession of prohibited literature. The literature had come from a Member of Parliament of the British Labour Party in Britain! In October 1958 the Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) split from Mr Nkumbula's African National Congress. Kaunda was elected President of ZANC. ZANC was banned in March 1959. Kaunda and several ZANC leaders, were arrested and detained. Kaunda was detained in Kabompo, North Western Province, for 3 months and then he was brought back to Lusaka where he was charged again and sentenced to one year imprisonment. He was posted to Salisbury prison in Zimbabwe, then Southern Rhodesia. While Kaunda was in prison, the leaders of the banned ZANC regrouped in 1959 and formed the United National Interdependence Party (UNIP). When Kaunda came out of prison in January 1960, he was offered the presidency of UNIP. In December 1962 to December 1963, UNIP and the ANC of Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula formed the Coalition Government. The first African led government in Northern Rhodesia. The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was dissolved at the end of December 1963. In January 1964 Northern Rhodesia attained Self-Government rule. Kenneth David Kaunda became the Prime Minister of Northern Rhodesia. On 24th October 1964 Northern Rhodesia attained independence status from Britain. Kenneth David Kaunda became the first Republican President of Zambia, a post

he won in successive Presidential elections until 1991.

Welcome young people. The struggle, not for Zambia alone, but for Southern Africa as a whole, needs recording; and as such I stand ready to answer the questions being raised. But don't expect me to answer all your questions because I don't know what you want to ask, if it will be within the limits of my historical knowledge. All the same, I have agreed, I will handle whatever I can.

The struggle here in Zambia hangs on a number of things. We had here a number of old people who were running Welfare Associations. We had Nabulyato who ended growing up into politics as the General Secretary of the African National Congress. It was at that time called Northern Rhodesia Congress. It was indeed Northern Rhodesia African Congress. And late Mbikusita was President of that organization. He later became our ruler in the Western Province. The official title was Litunga, and people like the late Sokota and Yamba those were our leaders then. I have forgotten anybody else. In 1957, first of all, we had a Conference of this Northern Rhodesia African

Congress under late Mbikusita and with old Nabulyato as General Secretary. We met in Kabwata Hall in July 1951. In my opinion that was a good turning point of Zambia National Congress. At that meeting, old Nabulyato did not attend, his vice secretary, I don't remember the name, ran the show. Also there came to that conference new blood; a young man called Harry Mwaanga Nkhumbula. He addressed us, and I think he changed the feelings of the young generation at that time. And he proposed that we should not continue calling it Northern Rhodesia African Congress. We should call it African National Congress in Northern Rhodesia. He inspired us all and without any money at all, we elected him President of the African National Congress. And he appointed a number of us as Provincial organizing secretaries. I was sent back home to Northern Province. Northern Province at that time was today's Northern Province and today's Luapula combined. By that time, I had been on Copperbelt, I had left the school where I was headmaster and I had gone to Tanzania, Tanganyika then, with two of my colleagues, late Mwansa Kapwepwe and John Malama. We didn't like what we found there. We came back, and went to the Copperbelt to teach.

Now you are forcing me to put in some of my own history. From there, I was Assistant Welfare Officer to the poor there in Chingola. And I didn't like it very much there. And after 9 (nine) months, I left and went back to teaching. I was posted to Mufulira. There I joined John Malama and we taught together. We bought bicycles. This is why I am bringing the story here, to go and organize for the presidency at home and we succeeded.

I don't know, I can't remember.....I think my colleague is gone, you see, who can help me to remember how much we paid for those bicycles. All I remember is that they were green in colour and Hercules, I think. I went back home. And that was in 1949 and I was elected branch secretary of the African National Congress. At home, I was elected branch secretary of the African National Congress for the whole of Northern Province up to Chinsali. Chinsali was where there were those Associations, where late Yamba and late Sokota were and I became branch secretary of the African National Congress in Northern Rhodesia. And I organized personally with my colleague in Mutambe area and Chibesakunda area of Chinsali. And then later, of course, I was elected District Organising Secretary of the African National Congress. And then comrade Makasa, Superior Makasa had come back, teaching at Kula and he was elected Chairman; my Chairman Makasa was in-charge of the district, and I was the secretary of this organization.

When both of us went back in 1951, I was appointed organizing secretary of the Northern Province. And as I told you, it was a combination of the current Northern Province and current Luapula Province. In 1951 I mobilized the whole province as provincial organizing secretary, and my colleague Robert Steven Makasa was Chairman of the province. So we worked together. We mobilized the province. He was then stationed in Kasama.

And then in 1953, the old man, Harry NKumbula, organized a full Conference of the Congress; so we came back to Lusaka to report in July 1953. We came to report, yes

at the Conference first. Because of the work I had done in Northern province, I was elected Secretary General of the African National Congress in Northern Rhodesia, to take over from the late Nabulyato and old Harry was elected President of course again in 1953. So we had to mobilize the whole country. I visited Lusaka, Copper belt, Kabwe, Eastern Province, Southern Province, Northern Province and North Western province. We had support from our Asian businessmen. They were led by a man called Rambai Patel.

He had a few shops here in Lusaka and we had also shops bought for us in Livingstone, Choma, and Kabwe and of course our own supporters, poverty stricken as they were. And this man Rambai Patel, his son is still around here, running the same shops in town. He sent to India people like, friends now most of them are late, late Kapwepwe, late Munukayumbwa Sipalo, late Mundia, and late Daniel Lisulo. A good number of young people were sent to India. He was using his Asian organization, and of course the Indian Government itself was helping us.

The Indians also helped us by writing smaller versions of the history of Zambia's struggle in India,. Mr Patel and others, they wrote about the struggle in smaller versions, and they also translated them into our languages. They really were a source of great inspiration to our people. They were involved in the struggle. They played a very important role. In the 50s, I became involved very much in trying to use Mahatma Gandhi's methods. I borrowed that approach to be used by us, to give us a sound base. A number of those young men had come back from India and they all joined us.

In 1953 I believed in Mahatma's theme. I decided that I loved tea and coffee so much, but if I went to prison following a non-violent approach in fighting the British colonial rule by disobeying the laws, loving my tea and coffee so much would dilute and affect determination to the struggle for our independence. It was better for me to give up tea and coffee before I went to prison. That is how, young people, I stopped taking tea.

Then our meat was called boy's meat. Not how old you were when you were buying meat. They called it boys' meat. Yes, and we were all boys. At that time, I was 29 years. There were very big boys and girls, but me, I was still called a boy, so we tried to fight hard. And the meat we were buying, we were buying through the pigeon holes. And whites came and entered through doors to buy their own meat. But we had to line up; come rains, come heat, hot sunshine, come blowing winds, whichever elements, we were required to line up in long lines to buy boys' meat in the pigeon holes. So we tried to fight that under our leadership. We were very strong in the Copperbelt. We were strong here in Lusaka, and in provincial towns. They were arresting our people, beating them up; we had very cruel police forces beating people who were picketing peacefully according to Mahatma Ghandi's approach. These people were arrested, sent to prison for two, three, four years. Ah! Colonial! But thank God by December 1953, we won. They sealed pigeon holes, and we began to buy meat through the doors. And that's how I thought about protesting saying these people were doing wrong.

They were selling us boy's meat through pigeon holes and that was when I stopped taking meat. After winning, I stopped eating boys' meat as well as chicken and eggs. My colleagues said, "Secretary, we are going around the country to help those poor people who wanted to be assisted by buying some meat. They were providing us with village chicken or fish and you stopped eating everything! It was for punishment." So I was stuck on to fish, eggs, and chicken, but I stopped red meat.

The struggle continued. One January morning in 1955, old Harry and myself were arrested and sent to prison for two months each. We had prohibited literature, so we went to prison for two months and they thought that we would be discouraged. The literature was from left wing, from London, a Member of Parliament, British Parliament, for that matter, a very famous man. Labour, of all parties, it was supporting us.

I was saying that I stopped taking coffee and tea thinking that when I went to prison, it would not be there and this would weaken my resolve. But when we went to prison this time, they put us in the so called white section here at Lusaka Central, to stop us from being with black prisoners and influencing them with wrong things. So we were there and I was made chief cook for the white prisoners. So there was plenty of tea and coffee!

I have been very lucky I have been a very good cook from the onset. In prison, I was the only cook for the white prisoners. I did the cooking myself although both Harry and I were supposed to be cooking for the white prisoners. I had to allow my old man to rest. So that is what happened. After two months we got out. January and February 1955. In 1953 they imposed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on us. The whole idea was to build another South Africa in the heart of Africa. From the beginning we began fighting it. So we struggled on and on.

We had a very strong contact with the (British) Labour Party. They were in opposition of course, but we still had a very strong contact with them. And there were socialist parties in Scandinavian countries, very supportive; Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Finland.

In education, Alexander Chikwanda, Rupiah Banda and others like that. Churches were very supportive. British Churches supported us. They raised these issues about us in Parliament, pushing bills concerning these issues in Parliament and again they supported us mainly through education. I do not remember at all that the Zambia liberation struggle, at any point used firearms. We never used guns but Mahatma Gandhi's non-violence struggle. I was very angry when I threatened them with Mau Mau. Our struggle was peaceful.

When this thing was coming up, the liberation struggle for Southern Africa was non-violent; so was it in other neighbouring countries. But our brothers could see no hope in non-violent struggles. From the beginning, you remember Mahatma Gandhi went to South Africa. I brought this up in one of my articles in the Post. I had mentioned the situation that Mahatma Gandhi's statements were real, because he came out to preach to South Africa as a lawyer, to defend Indians who were treated

as slaves. And he started in South Africa and from there he moved back to India to start there also. His commitment to this was real; and South Africa was non-violent to begin with, but when the people saw that it wasn't helping them at all, they had to change. ANC had to change and that is how they begun to send young people for (military) training. Mozambique under the Portuguese had no choice but to send their young men for training. Angola, the same thing, Namibia, South West Africa in those days, the same thing. Some were going to countries outside Africa. Zimbabwe going to China, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa were trained in the Soviet Union.

UNIP had first an office in Cairo. Oh! About 1961. In Cairo because the man who was in charge there was our friend. That is the late Nasser. We knew him because of what he was saying to the rest of the world. And he provided accommodation for our representatives there. And there were also others. And when Tanganyika was reborn, Mwalimu shielded our representatives and they all established themselves also in Dar- es-Salaam. Some of our senior boys were there. And that was the case in Accra, also after their independence in 1957. We also had an office in London. When late Mainza Chona ended his University education he stayed on to open the UNIP office. I had not visited London until in 1957, the first time, when Labour Party invited both my President and me to go and attend their conference to talk about Rhodesia problems. When I went there, two young men called on me by the name of Mainza Chona, and late Patrick Chuula. They said, "Secretary General, we are proposing that you take over the leadership of ANC from the old man." I told them that I was a very loyal supporter of this old man. They said that he was delaying to bring about our independence; and that was 1957. In 1958, I was invited by the department organized by the Asian community in Zambia to visit the place which Mahatma Ghandi established in India when he was engaged in the struggle. So I went there for two months, July and August 1958. I visited many places but when I came back home here in 1958, our African National Congress in Northern Rhodesia was in disarray. Almost all the youngsters in Congress rose against the old man. They accused him of favouring to work with Harry Franklin So I tried to patch up but I couldn't.

Harry Franklin was the Member of Parliament and Minister of Information in the Northern Rhodesian Government appointed by the Governor. So one day still in 1958 we had a meeting as a National Executive Council Committee. Now something broke up and the old man said something that showed that he no longer had any confidence in me. So I said, "Old man, since you no longer have any confidence in me, I must go. And the old man called, "Ken, come back." I said, "Old man, I am going." Still full of respect for him. And after I left, those young people whom I was talking about stood up and followed. That was the beginning of UNIP. We formed Zambia National Congress which gave the future name of the country. And I suggested that we meet in my room in 257 Chilenje and discuss this. And we decided to meet on 24th October 1958. So that these young men and women can understand why we were doing that on United Nations Day, we thought we should launch it on 24th October 1958. That is how UNIP was born. Later, Zambia's Independence Day and also United

Nations day but by that time, we were not independent yet, so I was thinking in terms of United Nations.

It is true Mainza Chona was not in the country by that time. He was still representing us in London by that time as a student when they arrested us as Zambia National Congress. They arrested us on a very hot year under Governor Benson. They arrested us on 11th March 1959. They picked us up at 01:00 hours in the morning. We were arrested, picked and dropped to an area outside Lusaka where there was a big pit which they dug and dumped us there. By 05 hours, they came to collect us and we were taken to the Airport and flown to various parts of the country in two threes, I landed in Zambezi. It was called Balovale. I was then driven to Kabompo where I stayed for 3 months. Then I was re-arrested and taken this time to Lusaka and sentenced to one year term of imprisonment, not allowed to stay here and I was posted to Salisbury prison.

I was privileged to have been the First President of the independent State of Zambia. Our policy towards the liberation of Southern Africa was really guided by the 2nd Commandment of the two main commandments of the Lord God Almighty – Love God your Creator with all your heart, with all your soul, with your entire mind, with all your strength. Here we are being taught how to relate to our Creator. We believed that, the 2nd Commandment says Love your neighbour as you love yourself, and do unto others as you would have others do unto you. It's very powerful, the most powerful in terms of our human relations. Within Zambia itself, you may recall, we were guided by the same policy. The 73 ethnic tribes, we worked on the basis of One Zambia One Nation. The idea was to bring us all 73 tribes into one Nation. Others came in, the English tribe, the Indian tribe, the Pakistan tribe, the Portuguese tribe, Scottish tribe and many others all different on the same basis of love your neighbour as yourself, and we accepted them.

Locally here, in view of the situation, we were the frontline country, leading in terms of geography. Fortunately behind us we had Tanzania, a very powerful ally in this field. They displayed very much the same approach internationally as we did ourselves. So we had Mozambique under the Portuguese, Angola under the Portuguese, Zimbabwe under British settlers, Namibia under Boers, South Africa itself under the Boers, Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland. Our responsibility was to accept, first of all to understand, and also accept that those who were fighting for their own independence could only be received here under the basis that these are our brothers and sisters, these are our neighbours and we love them as we love ourselves. We had therefore to handle their problems, in the same way as we handled our own problems within Zambia, within our tribes; this time, between this future nation of Zambia, and future nations of Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa. And what did that mean? It meant one thing, that whatever they decide to do by way of fighting for their independence, we had to support that. What do I mean here? I am talking about us in Zambia; we were guided by the method that Mahatma Gandhi used, first of all to fight against apartheid in South Africa, and then the Satyagra method he used to

fight for the independence of India itself. But we knew that this was only realistic when you were in a British colony, as Mahatma Gandhi himself pointed out. So, we chose therefore to support our brothers and sisters in these countries I have referred to already, according to the decision of the liberation movement in each country. What do I mean here? If in the neighbouring country the leading liberation movement decided to fight it out against the oppressor by taking to armed struggle methods, we had no right to say no to that. We would support that. If they chose as we did under the British to use Satyagraha methods we would be very happy to support them similarly. So that was our stance as time went on.

We ourselves struggled for our independence until 1964, as you know, we got our independence. But even before we got our independence we were helping these liberation movements of these countries by helping them to get their fighters across Northern Rhodesia through to Tanzania. They came from Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia. They would come through here, escaping Northern Rhodesia colonial policy and we took them through to Tanzania where Mwalimu Nyerere and his government and people were ready for them.

After independence it became easier then, because now the police were in our hands, the soldiers were our own and we were the ones who were now handling the passage of freedom fighters from the liberation movements in neighbouring states. Before independence we had limited resources of course, but we used, party cadres, I think, quite effectively. We drilled our party cadres to be of assistance to our brothers and sisters, who had to pass through our country. It was not easy. No, it was very difficult, but we managed to do that.

Let me now come to the period after independence and what happened. After independence the situation naturally became better for the freedom fighters and indeed for us. What do I mean here? Our own soldiers, our own police were now involved. There was a very important security wing; a defence and security wing in the army which was under one General. We had a former Lt. Colonel in the army Mukuka Nkoloso who was in charge of an office at Party Headquarters in charge of this wing, and he coordinated this work. On the other hand the army was very active. The General who later became Prime Minister was in charge.

But while we were quite effective in our work, it must be said it cost us quite a lot in terms of life and property. The Portuguese were not very strong they could only attack us on the border, both borders with Angola and Mozambique; but the Boers in South Africa and settlers in Zimbabwe were very ugly. They had commando programmes against us. They bombed a number of places. They destroyed railways including Tazara; I suppose it was to make us have no freedom of transporting what goods we needed for the development of our country freely. So they bombed Tazara Railways. They bombed places which they came to know as places where we looked after our freedom fighters in various places, to try and destroy the strength of those freedom fighters in various neighbouring countries where colonial rule was still prevailing. There was destruction and a lot of killing of our people as well as our

freedom fighters in some of these places. It was a high price but we were committed – love thy neighbour as thyself, do unto others as you would have them do unto you – was guiding us. We felt it was a God given responsibility, tough as it was. In terms of loss of property, more importantly loss of human life, we were given the responsibility, and we saw it as God given responsibility, and we responded to it accordingly.

We were poverty stricken it is true. We were just coming out of the liberation struggle. So it wasn't easy at all. And yet driven by the desire to get our neighbours free, we sacrificed quite a lot, I must say. It is not something we are proud of, but something we thank God for. We provided for freedom fighters. But also the freedom fighters themselves had supporters like the Chinese and the Soviet Union in those days. They got support from organizations like that, governments like that. It was not easy at all but we had to do it. It is something we had to do.

The Lusaka Manifesto was a document we prepared to guide not only us in Zambia but the Frontline countries as a whole. It was an important document; it was leading us in our thoughts, in our words and deeds in that struggle.

The main points or main guiding principles in that document were the desire to fight and conquer, and the desire to get determined; and also the ability to get assistance from those who were ready to support us. It was an open voice for the liberation of Africa. We do not take pride in ourselves that it was Zambian originated. It was something that was accepted by Frontline countries, and therefore, it was a Frontline document. The only opposing voice to our stand on the liberation of Southern Africa, one could refer to within Zambia, really, is when the economy was becoming affected by the struggle here; and then copper prices went down, the OPEC pushed oil prices up to very high levels; and that began to affect our cost of living in the country. Then the Chiluba Government, Trade Unionists, began to organize people within the country against the Government stance on these issues. That is how the struggle affected us. We couldn't say no, we can't handle this. I remember late Mwalimu Nyerere in his book, or introduction to a book written by the late Rev Dr Fergus McPherson, Mwalimu wrote: 'If Ken could have said 'No' to Zambia participating in the struggle by supporting liberation movements, we all in Africa could have understood.' That is the voice Africa must listen to. When he said that, it was heartening for us, but still we were suffering as a country.

The birth of the Frontline States is a very interesting episode. We, as United National Independence Party, the party that led us into the struggle for independence and began to rebuild Zambia, had a habit of calling a General Conference of the Party at a place called Mulungushi. This is a small place outside Kabwe Town the provincial capital of Central Province of Zambia. I had called this Conference as President to discuss very important matters pertaining to the development of the country. Members came from all corners of the Republic, party cadres. At this conference I invited my close friends then, who were also; independent. These were Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere of Tanzania and Milton Obote of Uganda. They were very happy and perhaps I should say inspired by what they found at this Conference; they

proposed and we all agreed that we should be having a summit of our own and we called it MULUNGUSHI CLUB, named after this place of great importance to Zambia. I should have said that this is the place where we used to meet before independence and after, as a Party. Now after independence we invited our other two leaders I have mentioned already. So that is how Mulungushi Club was born. Soon after the Club was formed at Mulungushi, we brought in late President Sir Seretse Khama. So there were four of us now. As more countries were becoming independent, we invited them to join the Club. When Angola and Mozambique became independent, I think that was 1975, we also invited them. Then President Neto and Samora Machel joined after that.

The Frontline States took upon themselves an extremely important role. We changed the name from Mulungushi Club. It was now becoming more than just the interest of these countries as guided by the three leaders. It was now involving the struggle led by and organized by all those Frontline States. I am sure listeners will know that South Africans invaded Angola and attacked Mozambique trying to stop the support we were all giving to the freedom fighters. What they were doing to us in Zambia, bombing us, destroying our facilities they were doing now by actually invading our sister Republics of Angola and Mozambique. And of course as Zimbabwe became independent in 1980 they were also involved and they were also being attacked by South Africa. Yes, definitely as soon as Zimbabwe became independent they became a Frontline State. So the work on this was very serious indeed.

We met in Mozambique one day as Frontline States. Mwalimu was attending that Frontline States Summit for the last time because he was leaving the Presidency of Tanzania. At that meeting Mwalimu bade us farewell and my colleagues elected me to take over from him as Chairman of the Frontline States Summit. In my short message of thanks I said to the Summit: 'Thank you for the honour you accorded me as well as my country Zambia. But please remember there can only be one Julius Nyerere.' The work that man had done for the Frontline States so effectively, my colleagues in the Frontline Summit, should not think I would be able to do as effectively as he did it, as effectively as he had performed. As far as I had stopped thinking that way, the late Samora Machel raised his hand. He thanked me for accepting, but before he could welcome me to this he said, yes President Kaunda has said there can only be one Julius Nyerere, and we also know that there can only be one Kenneth Kaunda. And he stopped there. We understood what he meant. I understood that in terms of the work that was to be done, my colleagues were confident I would do that effectively. That is how the Summit came and ended. I think Mwalimu left in 1985.

Nigeria was a very active supporter of the struggle for African independence in Southern Africa; very active indeed. They were supporting the liberation movements by giving them different wares. I can't tell you what they actually got because we were not inspecting what they were getting. Again it was entirely left to individual countries what liberation movement they supported and how. Well ours was really a question, not only of principle, but also a question of geography. We were surrounded by these

countries. So geographically there was nothing we could do, even if we wanted. I am not saying that we would have said 'No' to some of these countries, but as we were, we had to receive everybody and support everybody.

Well, as I said earlier, we had to support them. Physically that meant we spent some money on them. We supported them with arms and we supported them in buying them. We got them across the country to where they wanted to go for training, and from there they got more support of weapons from the Soviet Union and from China as I said earlier. Of course the Frontline was spread now, Angola was there Mozambique was there, and later on Zimbabwe. The Frontline was really spread. More states were now independent. Furthermore, countries such as the Soviet Union and China were supporting what the Frontline States were doing and also as I said earlier, the training of various liberation movement fighters and providing guns or should I say weapons.

It would very difficult for me to distinguish between the support given by Russia and by China because I thought that, for example at one time China gave us a squadron of 18 war planes. So you have got to be very careful how you write and say that there was assistance from these two great nations in our struggle for Africa's independence when it became necessary for the liberation movements to fight it out with colonialist powers.

As when I was meeting the Boer leaders, for example, I met John Vorster at the Bridge for three nights, I also met his successor. Yes, I met John Vorster at the Victoria Bridge in his train for three nights. And then I met his successor Botha in his train also at the border of Botswana and South Africa. Then I met the last one, what is his name, the last Boer Prime Minister of South Africa, de Klerk, in Livingstone. I met him at the Airport and we met at the hotel. I think it was the hotel which was destroyed. And I was very happy with the outcome. I said, "Well I have met many of these people, but I think this one we can do a lot of business together." That was what I said at the Press Conference; and it was true.

I think the first meeting and the last one were very successful. At the meeting with John Vorster, I was talking about releasing Mugabe, and Nkomo from prison by Ian Smith; I was talking about ending apartheid, and then withdrawing 14 military choppers that South Africa had lent to Southern Rhodesia and which Ian Douglas Smith was using to slaughter freedom fighters.

Remember after we destroyed the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, we became Zambia, Nyasaland became Malawi but Ian Douglas Smith snatched independence from freedom fighters. Now I was demanding, 10 years later....from South Africa do away with apartheid, Zimbabwe - release of Joshua Nkomo, Mugabe and others, and withdrawal of 14 choppers which South Africa had lent to Ian Douglas Smith Regime. Now on apartheid he was saying it was sort of a racial thing, it was culture. So I argued and said that what do you mean by culture? Are you telling me that your culture and that between the English and the Portuguese, the French isn't the same culture? It didn't make sense. In terms of Zimbabwe or Rhodesia in

those days, it led to the release of the leaders; Vorster forced Ian Smith. He withdrew 14 choppers. Yes! That is how that happened. After the Zimbabwean nationalists were released they came here straight to State House. More about the Frontline States.

The meeting with Botha, I will present to you a short note, because I cannot remember the points we made there. It was an important meeting but diplomatic things. In diplomatic ways it was alright. I am glad I did that but there isn't much that came out.

Then came the meeting in Livingstone with de Klerk. I think it was very useful. I was talking about ending apartheid. The reaction I think was very good; very good indeed. I made a public statement, as I said earlier, to the effect that I had met many Boer leaders, but there was no doubt at all that that one had been extremely successful and that was a man that I could do business with. That was what I said and it was true there; we continued to work together until the end of the whole apartheid thing. It was a very good meeting. I must say the one with Vorster was also successful because of the release of Mugabe and Nkomo and other leaders. Many of them had been locked up for 10 years from 1965 when they were arrested and detained or imprisoned, to the point which led to their release by going through Vorster. Who imagined that Vorster should prevail over Smith and get my colleagues released! So, that one also very successful; from there they came out and they continued the struggle from here. Of course the withdrawal of the 14 choppers was also very, very important. The meeting with Smith was also very successful. I will revert to Botha a little later.

I think these are the major steps that I can refer to in terms of the Frontline States. We continued to meet. The role of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire in the Frontline States! I am sorry I don't remember any! Was he a member? It is true that Mobutu was at the meeting in Mbala following which Samora Machel died in a plane crash. I don't think that was a Frontline State meeting. When was that now? There was a certain thing we wanted him to work on but I do not think it was a Frontline States meeting. It is true that he was there. That was the last meeting I embraced my brother Comrade Samora Machel. It is true he was there. There was something he wanted to clear but I cannot remember unless I look at my records.

Botswana was a Frontline quite early and quite active. They were being attacked by South Africa, having their place bombed. Freedom fighters had to pass through Botswana to come to Zambia. These were freedom fighters from South Africa. Botswana had economic links to South Africa, but we were all linked up to South Africa economically, in one way or another. Why should they be a special case, we were all the same. Will it ever be possible to assess the full economic impact of all these liberation wars and struggles on the development of Zambia? I am not sure that is possible. In any case, it will mean we need a detailed study to come to the correct conclusion of the damaging effect it had on our development, because it was real. When they damaged our railways, our bridges including this one east of Lusaka, in Chongwe. You can imagine Chinese railway and not Chinese railway only, but also Mkushi bridges there, both the railway bridge and the road bridge were damaged.

They were not only damaged, the right word is, they were destroyed completely. What it meant, all these places, including fuel, one or two tanks. When you look at all these you can imagine how long it took for us to repair the bridges and get the railways running and to get the lorries running; it wasn't an easy thing at all. But above all, it was very difficult when you look at our repairing of these things. Then we began bringing in fuel by air. Thanks to some nations which helped us, but the expenses were terrifying. The cost of the oil bought by industrialists at home was very high. You can imagine the cost to the economy and things like that happening. But as I said, the things which were happening those days needs a special study. It had to be that way because otherwise the enemy would know what we were planning and doing in terms of defending ourselves and what we were buying. So we had to actually put that behind doors. It was war time, in other words at war time you do not show the enemy how much you were spending on this and that.

I do not know whether the budget and how much was spent on the liberation struggle should be released now. It is a thought that would need reflecting on for some time before we say 'Yes' or 'No!' It might happen in future but I am not sure that we should do it this way.

Part 3

The privilege to be the first President of the Republic of Zambia, came out of the decision from the people of Zambia so that I could be President in 1964. From the beginning I think, I was fortunate that my father was a reverend and my mother was a teacher. And the lessons I have not forgotten in my life, are the two commandments in the Bible: Love God the Lord Almighty with all your heart, with all your soul, with your entire mind and with all your strength. That is how to relate to our Creator. And then as to how to relate to each other. Love your neighbour as you love yourself. Do unto others therefore as you would have them do unto you This is what helped me to set my pace with my colleagues and my colleagues were ready to agree to go in for a leader's shouts of "One Zambia" and they would respond "One Nation".

With the seventy-three (73) different ethnic groups and tribes in Zambia, plus of course new ones like English, Scottish and French and the Portuguese, the Indians, Pakistanis and many others. Those were the new tribes and so we were about seventy

(70) to eighty (80) different tribes. And I thought if we did this, we could be cutting across what was there, what we were fighting within Zambia and in the region of Angola, Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia and South-West Africa and South Africa itself as you know, in the east was Mozambique with the Portuguese and in the west was Angola, again with the Portuguese. South of us settlers, British settlers in Zimbabwe lived happily, South-east Africa Boers in Namibia today, lived happily and South Africa itself. Now, if we didn't have this idea of how to relate to God our creator, through that first commandment, and how to relate to each other through the second commandment, where would we be in helping our colleagues or comrades in our common struggle in Angola, in Mozambique against the Portuguese, in both

countries; against settlers in Zimbabwe today, and against the settlers, the Boers in Southwest Africa, Namibia today and in South Africa itself.

In Botswana, there were colonialists, in Swaziland colonialists, in Lesotho, colonialists. This is not to say we are confirming this with these Christian Nations alone. I have referred to Mahatma Ghandi; he was not a Christian but he was a believer. In the message that Christ left for us. He was a great Hindu, a great Hindu man and he was guided by those principles of Hinduism. So this is not that what I am talking about is even in terms of faith, it cuts across that whether you are Jews, Muslims, Christians. Those three as you know, came and spread out from the Middle East. This also applies to all the others, the Hindus and other people living with Hindus. So this was therefore an extremely important message, it was something which at least has helped me to know that all of us, who are to point fingers at each other, that you are this, you are that, that when at the level of this religion or the level of tribes, level of colour, level of countries, and nations, we are all human beings. That is what it teaches us.

Therefore young people, I feel very much at home. Even when we were fighting here we were being bombed, our bridges were being destroyed by South African planes because of our support for those people. I did not think that we should stop that fight because our lives were being destroyed and so on. We had to go on because it was a question of loving our neighbours as we love ourselves; doing unto others as we would love them to do unto us. It is a most powerful message ever, anywhere, wherever you go. If you want genuine peace on earth you must believe in this without castigating anyone of us, for any reason at all. That is my first contribution this morning.

My names are not all English. No, I have beautiful, beautiful African names. It is Buchizya Mutepa Kaunda. Buchizya meaning "the unexpected one" and that's the meaning of Buchizya that's first one. Buchizya is from my mother's side. Mutepa is from my father's side. Buchizya Mutepa Kaunda. There they are.

I can't remember, as to which Angolan liberation movement operated in Chavuma area, really, that is an important question but, I don't really remember. I think however, that in Chavuma area, it must have been Savimbi's supporters, I think I suspect that. There was support for both MPLA and Savimbi's, UNITA in Zambia before 1974.

UNITA, in 1974 itself, I remember that when we were preparing to go to the OAU summit of all places in Uganda under Amin, and I will show you why I am saying of all places that time under Amin, we had to go. Earlier I had gone to see Julius and we decided to meet at his place on the Lake Victoria side. Amin heard that we were at that place in Mwanza. Amin was uninvited, because we thought he was brutal; but he came and we had to greet him. We had to receive him greet him and there we said, oh sorry we are having a quiet meeting here. So he left and that is when we talked.

Now this time it was in the parliament and I was saying we must get our people, all people in all parties, in all these countries where they were fighting for independence

to come together. They must come together. So I organized, I told both of them, President Neto of MPLA and Savimbi and Savimbi's party, I said... by that time we were keeping their parents also, those who brought their parents here. We looked after them. And I told them you must all come together when we go to the OAU in Uganda I am going to make this recommendation. All of you, you must come together because if you don't, civil war will start. I went and they all agreed. I went there and I made this recommendation. Unfortunately it was my own closest friends who were doubtful about this, Julius and Samora Machel. At that time Samora Machel had just got independence. We had a meeting here probably; you would recall a meeting here under the chairmanship. But at that OAU Summit, this motion was defeated. I felt very sad, so when I came back I said I am sorry then I think all those who have got parents here have got to leave because I still believe that we should be fighting as one. The OAU rejected my recommendations. It wasn't accepted. And I could see that behind this was going to be a terrible thing for Angola and Mozambique, Zimbabwe in future and South Africa in future. So when they came back here I said to Savimbi and others please take your parents away from here because my policy has been defeated at the OAU. And that's how Africans failed to see my problem and my programme and my approach. I did the same thing for Zimbabwe when time came because I meant my colleagues to keep together, fight together and work together; especially when independence was attained. Fortunately Zimbabwe accepted that, and came together, worked together and saved the institution. Otherwise with bitterness between the Shona big group and the Ndebele, a smaller group there would have been gun galagata solving.

The origins and objectives of having the Kamwala Liberation Centre in Lusaka. It was liberation and that was going to be shaped by how the freedom fighters responded to our challenge. That's how I saw it. But in the end what I was thinking of did not come, but neither was the thought destroyed as it was at OAU in Uganda that year. So I think just what we thought it was going to be doing was done, because it was a coordinating centre and people understood as such, while of course they had their own centres, their own groups grouping offices that were the major place where coordination was done. I think it helped.

From the beginning, the liberation organizations were in Dar-es-Salaam. And when we became independent they moved from there to here. And as soon as they moved we knew that liberation movements would be here and that was why the enemy knew it, and they were bombing us, Ian Smith and his fellow criminals were bombing us because they knew indeed they were here; the Nkomos and Mugabes. South Africans were bombing us because they knew ANC, PAC and other smaller parties were here. The Portuguese on the border did not have power to bomb many places, but they were bombing us in the villages on the border side. That was how this came about and that's how it went. But I think it was quite a useful approach to the liberation struggle.

We had nothing apart from what was happening. In Tanzania we had nothing to go by except to understand that these people will begin fighting from here and they will organize themselves from here. Once they get organised, they will cross over to whichever country they were required to go and fight. We would fight but we would have loved them to be in one central place but suppose they had their own secrets to keep and they had therefore to keep their secrets in their own offices. You probably remember that Oliver Tambo was at State House in one of those homes outside State House itself He was there all the time. His colleagues were coming each time they were in Lusaka; they stayed with us at State House. They stayed with us at State House but their offices were not in State House. Their offices were all around Lusaka. That was how it was.

The issue of compensation to Zambia for the contribution to the liberation struggle! This is a fact that never crossed mind personally, and I don't think it would be right for us to go to neighbouring countries and say we are workers; we have been bombed, our bridges were destroyed, so please compensate us, it would not be a pleasant approach at all. We were fighting this as a matter of principle. And you cannot say now we are independent, we sacrificed so much please pay us something. What do we get better than free education that we got?

At independence we only had 100 university graduates; after seventy years of British rule, a 100 university graduates. Of these only 3 were medical doctors. We opened gates wide, free education. We did not stop there, we built schools, primary schools in every province in every district. We built secondary schools all over. We built technical colleges all over up to university, and free education across. Health services, dispensaries, clinics; we built everywhere in the country and built district hospitals everywhere in the country. We built provincial hospitals which are called general hospitals in every province ending up with the University Teaching Hospital. We began to build roads, tarmac roads in provinces, gravel roads from provinces to the districts and indeed add little development roads from the districts centres to various centres on development, mainly according to chiefdoms. We searched to start on a big journey. If some other people have not followed that don't blame us. But we opened the country to everyone and nothing could be more beneficial than free education and free health services. That was what we did at that time. So young people that is how I see it. To go to our friends now and say look we suffered for you, we died for you, and so we want you to pay us back something. No that would not be right.

The report that at one stage UNITA donated maize to Zambia! Young lady, this is the first time in my life that I am hearing about this. First time I am hearing about this UNITA giving food! The fact is, they might have brought some maize, yes. And they might have perhaps helped some villagers where they were. I don't know and I haven't heard of this. But if they did that it was a good thing but I have no records of that. Do you remember if was it in Senanga? This is the first time I am hearing about it.

The question of how Zambia used media and its propaganda against the South African and Rhodesian regime is important. Yes of course we did. You know what was broadcast was not about individual liberation movement; it was about the whole struggle and why we had liberation movements here. It was to tell not only South Africa but the entire world, those who could listen to what we were doing here. It was important we did that. But it is true; some liberation movements had their own small radios donated by China, Russia and other socialist countries like that. East Germany helped a lot. But it wasn't that we ourselves did that with them or for them at all, they were doing that on their own, with our permission of course.

I must say that there was a lot of co-operation with our press men and women; they were also nationalists. They knew what they were doing. So they could write anything really, not much in terms of quarrels between the government with the press, I don't remember much in that field at all unfortunately. At that time too we had a very heavy presence and at senior level of Western Press for example in Lusaka. Yes, they were here that time they were out to action what they liked. But sensitive information was not leaked out.

I think this was due to just oneness or should I say the nationalism in the hearts of your colleagues who were in charge of these things in the government, who knew so much; they knew so much themselves and yet they still kept it to ourselves, I must say it was a job well-done.

The proposal to set up a Centre for Liberation Studies for SADC is that, I think we need to ensure that the period of struggle for Africa by Africans against outside forces must be recorded. It is important to add also that I hope and pray that people who will be doing that job will be honest with themselves, will be honest to Africa. Nothing should go wrong in terms of our records. I would urge all of you involved in this to start moving quickly but please remember those principles.

In certain records of what transpired during those difficult days we were doing that which involved so many countries in that struggle at different times. And therefore, people who do that; firstly should have or must have been there when these things were happening. If they were not there, they should be keen to record these activities, these happenings, and these events, very honestly indeed. In other words there should be no fairy telling, they should only be telling the truth. That's what I'm saying. Good or bad. They should be recorded as they happened. Everything must be recorded, so that the human race comes to know exactly what transpired; it's for the future.

I think geography will demand that the Centre for Liberation Studies should be in Lusaka, Zambia. The reason is that we are very grateful to Tanzania and Mwalimu that great son of Africa, for what they did to look after us all, including those who were fighting liberation wars and those who were fighting for independence using Mahatma Gandhi's methods. All of us were in Dar-es-Salaam. As soon as Zambia became independent, the freedom fighters moved to Zambia. They were here until the last to be liberated, South Africa, left. First, when Nelson Mandela was released, he

came here to come and say thank you to the people of Zambia. We were still in power. So it must have been in 1991.

By 1994, everybody had left from Zambia, but remember the geography. There is Angola on our right when we are facing south. Angola on our right, Mozambique on our left, Zimbabwe, Botswana in front of us and South Africa. This is the whole geography indeed. It is the history of what happened which I think would call for that Research Centre to be on Zambian soil. Everything came here from Dar-es-Salaam, here from different directions. That's just a question of what happened. How events came about. Let us just call the Centre here and keep it here. And people can come here from different parts of the continent and different parts of the world.

Thank you. (Laughs) That is my stance on that issue, extremely important issue. Thank you for thinking of coming to discuss that with me.

Kazembe, Timothy Jim

[7 September 2007]

General Timothy Jim Kazembe is a retired army officer cum diplomat. He retired as the defence secretary in the Ministry of Defence. He served as the Joint Military Commission Chairman for the Congo. He is associated with the liberation struggle having been attacks across the Zambezi into Southern Rhodesia and was involved at the level of planning and execution of military plans.

I am Brigadier General Timothy Jim Kazembe, I joined the defence force in 1970 and I retired in 2003 after serving for 33 years. I was born in 1947 in Serenje Zambia, in Chief Serenje's area, Chaibila Village.

I attended primary school and secondary school in Ndola from 1957 to 1970. After I finished Form 5, I joined the army as an officer cadet at Kalewa Military training. I later shifted to miltez, Kabwe, Kohima barracks. In December 1970, I was sent to Tanzania for military training and I was commissioned in December 1971. I came back to Zambia. I was commissioned Second Lieutenant in December 1971 as a signals officer. Thereafter I did a lot of military courses in communications, tactics, administration, management and intelligence up to the time I rose to the rank of Brigadier General. Just as a second lieutenant I was already a leader of leading others but suffice to say that apart from leading the military I also led civilian institutions like mechanical services branch in 1974. I was made chief mechanical engineer at public institutions which was marine at MSD. I was also appointed a diplomat in the republic of Congo

I retired as Brigadier General in the army serving at the ministry of defence. I was a secretary to the defence. Let me say that after serving as mechanical engineer and a diplomatic, I was also chief instructor and commandant of the defence school in Lusaka which also trains defence attaches. Thereafter I became assistant military secretary at the ministry of defence and eventually I became a military secretary or defence secretary at ministry of defence. I was defence secretary from 1996 to 2003. I was assistant military secretary from 1991 to 1996 and was Commandant from 1989 to 1991. Let me add on that during my service at the ministry of defence I was associated with the peace process in Angola, in fact it was through my office that a peace process that was started by the U.N in Zambia passed through, I was also associated with the peace process in Congo from 1997 to 2003. I was associated with Angola from 1994 to 1996. I was chair of the committee of officials that drafted the cease fire agreement in Congo from 1998 or 1999. That was after Kabila took over. And that committee of officials comprised of diplomats, ambassadors, permanent secretaries, chiefs of defence forces, chiefs of security services and intelligent services. That is the one I headed as chair and I headed a group of my seniors as chair on that capacity then that cease fire was successful and there on I became chairman of Joint military commission in the Congo to implement the cease fire.

The committee of officials was responsible for mediation and for coming up with a cease fire agreement document which the ministers approved (foreign affairs, defence and security) and the presidents approved to end the hostility. The role of the JMC was to implement the cease fire provisions. And I chaired this and we were successful, we disengaged all the forces and peace returned to Congo.

Well, there were many challenges. It is difficult to mention the big challenges but the biggest is to chair warring parties because they don't trust each other and then you have to build this trust in these parties so that work could move that was a very big challenge.

Let me say that as a senior officer in the military you have to know the politics of the world, the politics of the region and the politics of the country for you to be a good leader you must understand this. So let me say that at independence Zambia as a member of the Organisation for African Unity, it was incumbent upon it to complete the liberation of other countries that were under colonization. From that angle first of belonging to OAU, then OAU firstly had to recognize what liberation movements were in Africa and as Zambia we also recognized the movements that were recognized by the OAU. So the Zambian government decided that the policies guiding the establishment of offices by liberation movements in Lusaka was to be based in on a number of conditions. Number one condition was that they would only be allowed to operate only in the capital Lusaka as offices. They would operate under the office of the president defence division to which my department belonged. This was the special division, the office of the president special division this was manned by the defence. The office of the defence secretary was under office of the president defence division. Then it operates only within 15km radius of Lusaka, this was for control purposes. Unless on special permission from the office of the president defence division.

The other condition was that the details of the itineraries and programmes of official operating in Zambia were to be furnished to the office of the president special division. Then an office had to be established which was the liberation centre to coordinate movements of the freedom fighters movements. Let me now say that by 1965 a number of nationalist organizations had been recognized by OAU especially those that had established offices and military bases in Zambia. Some of the parties or political movements that I know were by 1961; let's take Zimbabwe now, by 1961 there was a formerly known organization as National Democratic Party headed by Robert Mugabe which later in 1962 became Zimbabwe Africa National Union-ZANU. Also in 1961 Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) under the leadership of Joshua Nkomo was established. I started with NDP led by Mugabe and the same year this same NDP changed its name to ZANU also in 1961 Zimbabwe Africa peoples union was formed under Joshua Nkomo. The other organization that operated from here was African national congress ANC of South Africa under Oliver Tambo. We also gave transit facilities to pan Africa congress of South Africa -PAC. Then South West Africa, which is Namibia now. In 1960, SWAPO of Namibia under

Samuel Daniel Nujoma. At the time, they were coming during independence those parties were already formed, and then we had also at that time Mozambique Africa national Congress formed and then FRELIMO. On Angolan side we had movement for the popular liberation of Angola MPLA under Augustino Neto. We also had some movement which was called something like union of population of Angola but this fizzled out and later on we had UNITA. Now let me say that after establishing the liberation centre in Kamwala now which is called Defence College?

The liberation centre was established early enough but I can't remember, maybe 1967 or so, somewhere there. We had now a lot of movements for freedom fighters but even before being established, in 1965, we had the first deployment of Zambian troops along the Angolan border particularly in north western province. You may remember that at this time UNITA was very active on that border and the Portuguese were also very active on that border. So the Zambian troops went to deployed there not to allow any incursion on Zambia. By 1967 South African forces and Rhodesian forces that time they were cooperating together. The Rhodesian of Smith had already started operating together in the lower Zambezi; they were violating our water space. Let me say that having mentioned all those political parties, liberation movements from all these countries, we deployed on Mozambican border, Luangwa, Katete going that side and other small towns in border areas.

MPLA were in Kivu. UNITA were along that border. I think UNITA was not here but there were very close to the border. What I know is that when we sent our troops they did not allow people to come in. We were fighting the Portuguese when they were trying to come in.

Any liberation movement that was recognized by OAU, Zambia recognized them too. We deployed on the Zimbabwe border starting from Luangwa itself Kavalamanja and some small towns I may not remember maybe afterwards going through Chiawa, Chirundu, Siavonga, Siampondo, Sinazezepto Livingstone. Siampondo, kalomoth then you go to Kazungula and Livingstone including Sesheke. Sesheke was the Namibian border so now Namibian and Angolan border were on Sesheke, Sinjembela, Imusho, Kaunga Mashi, Sikongo, and Lukulu along the border at Siangoni.

So we deployed, this is Namibia, Angola, then Zimbabwe. South Africa partnered with rebels in Rhodesia. I just said deployment but there are certain operations according to the deployment it was called another name and another name and all these deployments had their own names of operations.

There are not secrets. For instance in Mozambique area the name was different so that we can distinguish to say this operation is talking about Mozambican border this is talking about Zimbabwean border, this is Namibian border or this is Angolan border. Let me say that we had incidents and attacks especially from rebel Rhodesia and South Africa forces. Camps at Kavalamanja in eastern Chikumbi. We had about three camps for the freedom fighters at Kavalamanja from ZANU.

The Rhodesia and South African rebels were operating together in lower Zambezi but attacks were done by Rhodesian rebels. The freedom fighters in those 3 camps

were from Zimbabwe. I am sure because of betrayal there were some infiltrations into the freedom fighter camps, Rhodesia had the information about location of these camps. These camps were infiltrating the freedom fighters to go and do the fighting into Zimbabwe. So what happened was there was aerial bombing, they came by air, using helicopters and even jets. Suffice to say the other Rhodesian forces were dropped in the rear of the camps. So these are the ones who combed the area and pushed them towards the river, you know the border there in the river. There was a protection company our Zambian troops deployed at Kavalamanja and we lost a Zambian company commander captain Kalima. He was hit by shrapnel from the bomb that had been dropped on his headquarters. This company was a protection company, so they did not choose where to drop. So it affected them. This happened in 1978, either 6th March, some where there, it was a rainy season.

Infrastructure and property were damaged during this time. Vehicles, mostly it was vehicles which were bombed. I think one Landover and two carriers for the army. There was a truck for the milling company or ZESCO. There was no displacement of Zambians from those camps, they were not too close to the villagers or displacing anybody. These were just like transit camps; they were not even established camps. These areas, we are talking about tactics and strategies here, that is the area which was open, which was safer for the freedom fighters to cross and go and do their business, you don't just put camps there just anyhow so that was the area that was safer that time and the Rhodesian had to know about it later.

Zambia National Service was guarding installations in the rear either of the bridges. Chikumbi was a freedom fighter camp, Chikumbi, Mulungushi, Mboroma. Mulungushi is in Kabwe. Mulungushi authority is different. This is ZANU. There are two things here. You will remember we had Nkomo's house bombed here and Makeni. There at Saint Eugenia there were Angolans first then ZAPU. Mboroma was a girl's camp. I think Mulungushi was for boys. So I said there were incidents and attacks I am talking about camps which were attacked. It was also aerial bombing. These camps at Kavalamanja were transit camps for infiltration. I wouldn't know which year but it was before 1978.

There are many things that involve sitting of a camp, firstly the acceptance of liberation movements is political, and the sitting of these military camps is military. It was Chikumbi and Mboroma. We have also mass graves there. Even at Kavalamanja we have mass graves. At Chikumbi even the buildings that were there were bombed, vehicles that were there and the store rooms and so forth were bombed. Some people survived.

Laugery, Kufekisa Sifuniso

[18 July 2007]

Mrs Kufekisa Sifuniso Laugery a resident and owner of Farm No. 3/B of 19A Farm, Lusaka West has lived in Lusaka West since February 1971. Lusaka West, because of the MPLA and SWAPO bases in the area and some Zimbabwe nationalists who lived on farms there, was a target of bombs and road raids from the South African and Rhodesian racist forces south of the Zambezi river. Mrs Laugery gives first hand accounts of what actually occurred and how Zambian residents were sometimes caught between freedom fighter suspicion as well as white racist fury.

My name is Kufekisa Sifuniso Laugery, I was born on the 7th January in 1942, and I have been living on this farm since February 1971. I moved here with my late husband. During the liberation struggle for Southern Africa we have witnessed some of the attacks that Zambia suffered from the racists south of river. Lusaka West was a target of bombs and road patrols from the Boers.

Almost on a weekly basis we used to see planes flying over the area. We would start by seeing one plane which will be flying very high. As soon as we saw that we knew that the bombers would be coming. My goodness my memory of the years is a bit down! But definitely this was around 1977. I remember the incident when my little son was standing on a sand heap and the planes were going by and he was just paralyzed, petrified on top of this sand heap. He was just two years old. This must have been around 1978. Yes, the planes would be coming, I remember that in fact it was on Thursdays, that we used to have the bombings. And surely enough you would see the planes flying, go past here, zooming past here. Once when this place just around the corner from us was bombed a friend of mine and I, actually went there. It was quite dangerous because the electric cables were all over the road. At one stage we even picked some very large shells which we kept for sometimes as candle holders. This was very, very frightening, because we knew definitely that they were going to come. Sometimes we would hear that, they have stuck some camps far from here. But twice it was actually here. And a friends' farm was shelled. There were two teachers on holiday who were living there, German teachers, and were killed. They were sitting on the veranda apparently and they were killed. A land rover was also demolished. And this is not far from here. Sometimes we got stories of people who were in the neighbourhood, people whom we did not know where they had come from, and we would be very worried because as you can appreciate it in a situation like that, people tend to be suspicious of any stranger that they see. We personally experienced an incident when we were taking a nephew back to boarding school. We were stopped just a kilometre from our turn off and we were told that, we had to come back so that our place could be searched. This was a group of plain clothes men and a few who were in uniform and whom we were told were Zambian Army officers. We came back. First of all I was told that I wasn't required to come back, they were only

going to get my husband. So I protested about this but they said, there was nothing I could do. They left me and a friend on the road, but I decided to come back because they picked up my husband. So I got into our car and drove back home only to find that our place was surrounded by army type vehicles and some armed men. They were in plain clothes but they were armed. And when I got near the house I was told that I wasn't allowed to go in. So I explained that this was my place and I had the right to be here. I joined the search party and they went all over the place. They went into the chicken house. We had layer cages where we kept the egg layers. And these cages were put in pits so that we didn't have to clean up the manure on a daily basis, we only cleaned out the manure after the chickens were removed. So these pits were slightly over a metre deep. They even looked into those pits. They went all over the place but nothing was found, and they went away. It was said that they were looking for arms and ammunition. They were foreigners, but there were Zambian army officers with them, Zambian army officers, I remember one of them came to me and said to me, don't worry about anything. Everything is alright, I must say, the Zambian army officers were extremely polite. The foreigners were not polite. Every time, I looked at one of them, he would push his jacket aside to show me the pistol on his belt. Several days after this, we were told by the workers that these foreign people were actually camped in a stream. There's a river bed here, it is a seasonal stream. That they were actually living there and we were under surveillance.

I think they wanted to search this place but probably they did not have the authority to search. And Zambian officers maybe were asked to be with them so that they saw what was happening. Because really if the Zambian offices had not been around it would have been very unpleasant for us. They went away, after driving over some plants and all that. They went away without a word of apology or explanation. But one of them said to us that they were looking for arms and ammunition. That they had been informed that we were hiding arms for the white regime in Zimbabwe, Rhodesia then. Yes! These were black men, you see this happened to us because my husband was white. So they were suspicious. The freedom fighters were very jittery, and they were very suspicious of anyone who looked foreign. These other people were not Zambians definitely. We could also tell from the accent, yes. The Zambian officers were in uniform alright, and I believe that they were Zambian army officers. Their behavior was very polite, yes, and apologetic.

My husband was from Switzerland. They suspected that because my husband was white, he must have been working for the white regime in Zimbabwe. Now after this my husband went to a local drinking place here, called the Rocky Gardens and one of the freedom fighters came over to him and said he wanted to know what he was doing there. He said he wanted to have a drink. So he wanted to know his details. So my husband wanted to know why this man wanted to know his details and could he identify himself. And then he said we are suspicious of all strangers in this area. So my husband explained to him that he was not a stranger. That he belonged in this area, and the man was a stranger. So if anyone needed to explain his presence in this area

it was him. But it meant we had to be very, very careful. It was quite dangerous to go out in the evening. And what happened to us, happened to another friend of ours. His place was also searched and so on. And again Zambian army officers were present and they were very, very polite. They explained that they had to be present to make sure that things were done properly. Apart from unpleasantness of being harassed by armed people, nothing came out of it. The other couple whose house was searched were also mixed race. I can give their names. It was the late Timothy Holmes and his wife Nadia. Nadia is from Sierra Leone.

I remember, sometimes we would be at this local place here, and we would be having a drink, and suddenly someone would give a word and we would all scatter. You know ran around and try to take cover because the planes were coming over. You never knew where they were going to drop their bombs. But we understand that, there used to be a house that was occupied by some freedom fighters from Zimbabwe, so it would appear that that was a target. This house at the corner not far from here. These were Mr Nkhomo's men, they were ZAPU. Before the ZAPU came in this neighbourhood, we had Mr Savimbi's people. What was the party again? I think we had, MPLA here yes. No, no we had MPLA not Savimbi's people. And the MPLA people we had here were mainly professionals like journalist and teachers, a lot of camera men and that kind of person. You were hardly aware of their presence. They were very quiet, very discreet, I remember that time when they had to leave, they came to say goodbye to us and they needed some transport. We even offered them transport to the airport. Yes they were very nice people indeed. They had to leave due to the local politics. I don't know, I think our support the Zambian support moved to the other side. It looked like there was some disagreement, with the government and they had to leave. But they were very discreet, very, quiet, and very pleasant. Then there was ZAPU. Let me see, what, happened! I cannot remember how they left. Because I think again ZAPU were....what happened! I do not know what happened between ZAPU and ZANU. It was some internal politics of theirs. And suddenly there was peace and quiet around there. I did know how they left, but we were certainly very glad that they left. So we were harassed not only by the Boers who were dropping the bombs in Lusaka West but we were also harassed by the black freedom fighters. They were very, very suspicious. They suspected everyone of spying on them. They were very, very nervous and very unfriendly and extremely hostile. And most of the times we really felt as if we were the outsiders and they were the ones that belonged here. Because we curtailed our movements whereas they didn't.

The Mbayimbayi family are further along this road, and his house was actually bombed. And it was a very funny incident. Not funny, but very silly, I think. A day or two after bombing the house, these Rhodesians, white Rhodesians, went over to Mr Mbayi, Mbayi and they found Mr Mbayi, Mbayi himself. They just landed by helicopter and went up to him and apologized. They said it was a mistake and they wanted to offer some sweets to the children. He was very angry and told them to get out. They said that they would have compensated him for what they had done

but they couldn't do it. Much of the bombing from Zimbabwe actually took place when there was this black president. What was his name? They had a puppet black leader I would say. Muzorewa. It must be Muzorewa, because Banana was just before Mugabe.

After all Zambia went through, the sacrifice was worth it. Yes in a way it was. Now I can say that. But at the time I think it was a bit too much. I think the Zambian, ordinary Zambian people like myself, were not protected enough. I feel that maybe at government level everything was alright because things were being organized at a high level, the likes of me wouldn't know about. But to the ordinary people like myself, people who lived in terror, it was terrible. Although it was a good thing that the other people got independence, I often ask myself whether they wouldn't have got independence without this suffering by the Zambian people. I know of families who lost members of their families. People who were killed by the bombings. I really feel, that the Zambians were asked to sacrifice far too much, especially since we, were not in the know. If you know what you are sacrificing for maybe you wouldn't mind but we were completely ignorant. This was all being organized from a high level and the likes of us were not being put in the picture although we, were the one who had to put up with this sort of thing. Perhaps more could have been done to bring the Zambians into the picture. To explain to them that it was necessary to go through a bit of suffering. Because of this and that. Explain and sensitize the people, so that they are part of it and they understand what is going on. I feel that maybe the independence of neighbouring countries could have been obtained in a less hazardous way for the local people. I hope we do not have to live through another experience like that. With sister countries liberated we should enjoy peace.

Libeleki, Richard Mwangala

[29 April 2007]

Mr Richard Mwangala Libeleki was a school teacher who was posted to Katima Mulilo School on the border with the Caprivi Strip in Namibia in 1975. Mr Libeleki narrated in detail incidents and raids that took place in Katima Mulilo and Sesheke in 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1979. Furthermore Mr Libeleki witnessed the migration of not only freedom fighters to Zambia but whole schools, pupils and teachers who crossed from the Caprivi into Zambia at Katima Mulilo.

Mr Libeleki paints a very clear picture of the impact and extent of destabilisation South African racist troops had on Zambian local communities.

My names are Mr Richard Mwangala Libeleki. Currently I am residing in Sesheke, I am a retiree who retired in 2004 from the Ministry of Education. I have dwelt in this place for quite some time and I am one person who can boast to have known Sesheke district much better than any other district in Western Province. I am 57 years old, and I will be 58 on the 5th of June this year.

I think I will restrict myself to Sesheke in as far as Namibia is concerned and perhaps a bit of Angola because of Imusho area. I was posted here in 1975. I didn't like the idea of being posted to Katima because I knew Sesheke was, sort of, a boiling point because of the liberation struggle. And so I wanted to be a bit far away from the border. But there was nothing I could do. I was posted to Katima and I stayed there. It was in Katima, in 1975, when all of the sudden I could see some paramilitary officers visiting the township of Katima. Yes, with their weapons of course. Zambian paramilitary, yes please. Then that was enough to trigger the sense, the same sense that really the struggle is here. Ah... consequently, we heard that a landmine had, exploded and some paramilitary somewhere in the Imusho area got killed. That was one thing that was sinister and rather frightening. And then, life went on. In 1976, we had some skirmishes but before that, ah... while we were in Katima, we started seeing a lot of influx of people coming from Namibia and they would descend at Katima Basic School. And we normally had to go and report to the Immigration on what is there and to the police. So, it happened as if it was a habit, they would keep on coming and coming and we would keep on giving them assistance in terms of food and in terms of shelter because the school had classrooms where they could sleep until such a time when they would be collected by whoever collected them and took them to wherever they were taken to but, we had that role to play.

Then in 1976, we had a skirmish of some kind. Yes, from nowhere at night, we heard some firing. Bang bang! Boom, boom, boom, boom! Those things happened. Yes, the following morning we found out that a section of Katima residents were not there. The residents had run away. It's only us who were close to the border to immigration who were still within. When they ask, they said no, normally this is the trend, people run away from bullets and other things for safety. That was in 1976, in September, if I

remember correctly. Then in 1977, there was something even worse than that. More serious than the 76 one, where, ah... some Namibian soldiers, some South African soldiers rather, were seen to have crossed into Zambia and they were spotted and the information was conveyed to our security officers who were here. And then, shall I call it "a section of soldiers" crossed. Just as they were crossing, the spotter plane, yes, that was the spotter plane, also hovered into Zambia Katima Mulilo. Yes, then there was some kind of shootings and accidentally one of our soldiers hit the other, I don't know maybe when you... whatever, whether it was when coking, or whatever, so he was injured but then that didn't last long until again at night. The South African soldiers started shelling the Zambian side. The following morning, we were forced to run away from Katima. Yes, we vacated. We were forced by the South African soldiers who were shelling. There were no announcements. So because of the intensity of the firing, people decided to vacate, to see if things were going to settle. Then some of us run as far as Sibobo where we stayed for two days. Some went as far as Senanga just along the riverside, the others crossed. For two days, there were no people in Katima Mulilo and that was around August in 1977, August 1977. Then things came back to normal. We came back to Katima. We went on with our work, with our life, yes.

Then, you know, in Katima Mulilo, like here in Sesheke there was this issue of Home Guards and we had some teachers from Katima Primary school who were members of the Home Guard. I remember madam Masepe, she was a teacher, a female teacher, she was a member of the Home Guard. I remember the son of Mr Mwanaunshi, he was also a Home Guard member, Mr Imbwayi has been mentioned, Mr Mwalao, Mr Mashebo was also a member of the Home Guard. So these people, they were trained so that they could protect the citizens, at the same time be cautious of what is taking place from the side and alert others especially the security officers who should know what to do, who could plan and do all the likes. So, there was such kind of alertness that could always come to our attention. Furthermore I personally came into contact with a good number of military officers, from the security wing, the intelligence wing, if I can put it that way. So, we used to work hand in hand. They could ask me to keep an eye and an ear to the ground. Yes, that's what I did. In most cases they would come and consult me, I would give this report and that, and so on.

Life continued but then there was this fateful day of 1978, yes, this particular day when unfortunately I differed with the other person. I will give my own version as I know it. Yes, 23rd August, I remember it so because that was the day when I was supposed to go to National Resources Development College (NRDC) for Mathematics Association Conference. I did not go to the Zambia Association for Mathematics Conference which was held at N.R.D.C I did not go because of what happened on the night of 23rd, the advent of the 24th when I was supposed to leave. So, from nowhere at night it was around 01:00 or 02:00, then terrible bombings started, shootings started. To be specific shooting did not start from the South-West Africa Namibia. The shooting started from the Zambian side, Katima side. Yes, and this is so because of the freedom fighters. These are the ones who started the whole show, alright. Then

eventually the other side also started firing back and then even Sesheke was also engulfed in the same situation. That went on for some hours until up to around 04:00 hours. When all this was happening I was in Katima, I was in the house at home with my family. Although, my elder brothers had run away to the riverside. I didn't know only to be told the following morning. Yes, so that was the situation. Then in the morning we thought all was well and we even went round now the school picking the fragments, trying to identify what damage had been caused. In fact when we were in our house, I never imagined that there was any other house in Katima which was standing except for ours which was blessed by God. That is what I believed and my family believed. Then in the morning we found out that all the houses were intact except for a few at the Immigration and MSD which would..., had some..., which were terribly affected with shrapnel and bullets. So, much of the damage was done in the morning when the South African soldiers now were crossing into Zambia through Katima trying to chase the SWAPO guys. That's when maybe for military strategy to draw attention, that's when they had to fire to the Zambian side where they did a lot of damage. Some 12 people, were caught in a trench and died there. They were all Zambian civilians at Microbe, here, in Sesheke.

There were no casualties in Katima except for the Bishop. That man who was known as Bishop Mutasha. Yes, that is the one who was killed. We don't know who killed him, it could have been some shrapnel from Namibia. It could have been the SWAPO freedom fighters. It could have been anybody because he was a nuisance. So, I cannot tell who exactly killed him. He was a nuisance because he was even eating food stuffs which even the workers could not afford when he was as old as he was. He could freely walk into Caprivi, any time. So, he was sort of self-sufficient. He was suspected of being a spy for the Boers. And it was a lot to alarm someone to say this one is supposed to be what he is. (a spy). So, everybody had vacated this place, everybody had vacated Katima to be specific. We crossed, we went, we went and settled at Mabumbu for some time. We went and did our Grade 9 teaching there, I mean Grade 7 teaching, up to the end of the examination period. We moved with all the pupils that were here. The pupils at Katima, they were taken to Mabumbu School. Sesheke Primary was taken to Mwandu. Sesheke Secondary School students were spread throughout the country. Examination classes - girls were taken to Holy Cross in Mongu, boys were taken to Hillcrest in Livingstone. Other classes that were not examination classes, they were taken to Sefula and Senanga Secondary Schools. Yes, so we did our teaching of the Grade 7 classes and normally the examinations ended in November. After the examinations we had no purpose of being at Mabumbu so we had to go back. The families were left behind. So myself, Mr Imwaka, the late Mr Bernard Litambi Mwiiba and Mr Imbwaii we settled at Katima up to the time when the group that visited the school went there from Lusaka to assess the damage. By then there were no soldiers.

Then later on towards the end of November, that's when we started seeing soldiers coming. In November 1978, President Kaunda had announced to say I am sending

my soldiers there! So, they started coming. The first group that I believe to have come is that one from Mufulira, the Engineering, yes. That went and assembled a platoon at Lusu that was being used to cross the Zambezi river. So they were there and then there were those that came through, was it through Kalongola? I don't know who came and settled at Lusu. The place was now with security officers in the name of military personnel. So, we were there now living with them. And then there were some who settled at Likanda, just some two kilometres from Katima Police. Yes, there was a camp there. Then we also had some soldiers, military personnel at Nakatindi and some even at the airport, here. I think those were their strategic positions in order to guard the country. Yes, So that even the Boers could not just walk in anyhow as they feel like, as they used to do. Yes, it was for security purposes. Yes, that was 1978, life went on in Katima and in Sesheke. People who had run away now started coming back bit by bit especially when they heard that soldiers were there. They felt now they were secure. Yes, so life went on.

Then came 1979, again it was in August. The same situation again repeated itself but not as harsh as the 1978 one. In 1979, that was when Senior Chief Inyambo of Mwandi was visiting Sesheke, I mean Katima, also to access the situation, that's when he was confronted by some convoy of (white racist) Namibian soldiers who came here and had to be stopped. Yes, so there was that incident where it was difficult to contain the situation, to control the situation because the senior chief was there and then the South African soldiers were in. The immigration officers and the police were a bit lost sort of, until at last the Boers were forced to find their way out to give room to the chief. But by then there was a jet, some kind of a military aircraft that was hovering around. Yes, so there was sort of alertness. It was an aircraft from Namibia. Zambia at that time, we didn't have any military aircraft in the area. We started seeing some military aircrafts in 1980. Ah, I mean to Sesheke, if I remember correctly. Yes, maybe that was for security reasons. So, the aircraft was coming from South-West Africa. At will, at their own free will, they would just come in, start hammering you in the northern part of Katima Mulilo. We heard that they were trying to pursue some freedom fighters that were seen up there. They say, they saw them because they had spotter planes that could move around or sometimes it could be pretence for the sake of destabilisation.

Yes, so again from that time we started seeing other people now again whether we call them refugees, but I don't want to call them refugees. I want to call them young men and women who were recruited by SWAPO. They went to schools and rounded them up and brought them to Zambia. Those we saw were brought and somehow again we fed them at Katima and then they found their way to wherever they were taken to. They were in large numbers because sometimes it would be the whole school, boys and girls including their teachers. I... I remember two schools with their head teachers coming. The first school was Mafuta. It is just in Fatika, Caprivi, where the head teacher, the teachers and the children, the pupils came and then the other one is Simataa. According to what I believe and what the rest of us in Katima

believed I don't think they ran away I think they were recruited. Because shortly after that, we started seeing freedom fighters also coming down. So that movement I think it was deliberate so that they should not be seen with the actual freedom fighters because they would be attacked. So if it were only pupils coming through the other way then would be understood that perhaps they are running away as refugees. That's what I believe and think.

Yes, So, then the other incidence again which I remember too well is about Mr Mwanang'ombe Siluzingila. Oh, sorry I was mentioning about Mr Sankwansa, here. Mr Sankwansa. Yes, I have forgotten the other name but I have his number in my phone. Mr Sankwansa, currently he is working with Namibian Police. He is at the Swapokumondi. He is in Namibia, at Swapokumondi. He is the one who identified me when he came here to visit some relatives. He said are you Mr Libeleki, we met in Katima Mulilo when you were with the group of children. So he went also, he was taken to Tanzania where he trained. Then he came back and fought. Now because he appeared to be one of the heroes, he was given a very big responsibility in Namibia. He is some police chief in Namibia. So I was trying to crown the idea of pupils coming from there in company of their teachers as people who were recruited sort of.

Then I do remember the Mwanang'ombe's issue. He was tied by the hands to the vehicle of the Boer soldiers. Mwanang'ombe Siluzungila, he happened to have been Swapo and I think he was Swapo inside Namibia. So it's like he was rounded up, he was identified by the Boers, so he was chained to the Boer vehicle and was made to trot behind here and there until when he managed to escape. Mr Imbwai and I found him hiding at MSD area. We helped him to escape. He was taken to Kaoma, I mean he found his way to Kaoma after we rescued him from the hands of the white Namibian soldiers. Then, you see I must say here that with the advent of soldiers, military personnel, life changed. We went back to the normal life. The Boers also could not start, could not continue playing games they used to play. I remember some officers who came here like Captain Kampumpa! Yes, Captain Kampumpa, I remember Captain Hamboote, I remember Captain Meleki, I remember captain..., was he captain or major, I can't remember, Kachepele, who should be in Botswana by now because I met him when I went there. Aha I remember Captain Mwiinga, Captain Lungu, what was the other name? Yes, Captain Miyanda, and many others. Many, many others. We knew them because we had to. They came to stay with us. We had to rub shoulders, yes. And they had set up a football team and we used to play football with them. In fact, we used to hire them to train us whenever there was any other team that would come from either Mongu or Kaoma and so on. So there was this, you know, mutual type of relationship.

So life went on but I must also mention here that I was in 1979... I forgot, when one is ageing there is always lapses of memory. In 1979, from 1978 we only had two vehicles which were very effective, civilian vehicles, for Immigration and for MSD. Then the 128 Land rover for MSD struck a landmine just on the hill as you leave the branch that goes to Makai area there. Even the body, what we call the chassis is still

there, even that number is still there, 128M for MSD. This was the work of spies now. In fact the vehicle that should have been struck by the landmine, was supposed to be a military vehicle. But it so happened that the MSD vehicle left earlier than the military one, so it is the one which became the victim and so people were injured there. I think one person died in that accident. That was the end of the vehicle. Yes, I know of incidences where a herd of cattle, north of Likanda village, that was far back in 1977, a herd, some of the animals were killed because they stepped on a landmine. When it exploded, some animals were killed. Yes, to me this shows that in a community you have those who are negative and those who are positive. For example, in the case of Bishop having been identified as the spy! There were those, people also who were planting landmines, not only for the soldiers, but even for themselves. There was also another incident at Silolo, the same year, where one, no no..., that was 1979, where one was given a landmine to... to set just around the Silolo area, in Sitwatwa village, yes, Sitwatwa village Silolo area. And, Induna Sitwatwa was taken to task by military personnel. So, I think that man is still alive. Yes you can see the face is transformed. He set the landmine, now after putting the landmine, he wanted to see whether he had put it, properly, ha! ha! ha! So he went back and tempered with it. Then...heh... heh, off it went. Fortunately, he was served by a big 109 which was somewhere nearby, which blocked the majority of what should have hammered him. So that is how he was found. You know doing all that work. He was taken to the hospital. That is one incidence.

When I asked for a transfer to move, the District Education Officer (DEO) told me, we cannot transfer you for fearing to be killed. Now, you go elsewhere in Zambia, find someone who will not die from bullets, so that this someone comes here. Then you go where this somebody is coming from. Then I knew, I will not find such a person so I must stay and continue with what was happening. So I knew I was sent there to help in the liberation struggle and if I died it was fine! I should have died perhaps for the cause of liberating our colleagues. My house was one of the victim houses because you know I am a historian. I kept a lot of pictures, apartheid pictures, SWAPO, ANC, all these Nkomo's, Mugabe's, you know. So when the Boers entered my house, when we had run away, all these things that were there, were really damaged. Even mattresses you could see them ripped off.

The local people didn't organise themselves in so many ways except when we come to the political wing where people were given some sort of civil education. And that type of civil education was that we must help our colleagues to attain self-rule. From the UNIP wing in Sesheke district, we had Ms. Alikokoto here, who was the youth chairman. EH, we had the same lady who was mentioned he, Bo Ma Mwilima who was the mama region here, those are the people, the Chishikos who were the political secretary at the district level. So, those would go and mobilise branches. Otherwise, organisations were coming from the... the security wing, especially where we went to build trenches. Even at the house where I am staying, there is a trench there, it's there, it's still there, eh...eh. This was done by, who was that captain? I have forgotten

the name, who used to take us to Silolo to cut logs and where we built those trenches. And we learnt a lot! In 1978 that is when we were taught how to build trenches using mupani tree. The intention was that every family was supposed to have a trench. Every household needed to have a trench. We didn't have one communal big thing, but every household needed to have one. And it should have been built under a tree or something better, even better than a free. So that it could not be seen, or the other reason, if shell or whatever came, definitely it must hit the branches first and it will explode from there, it won't affect the people below. We were building trenches ourselves, but soldiers were there, guiding, supervising us. I remember, finishing ours in three days time. Then we went on to help others, especially female teachers who could not do much, yes. Who could only cook for us while we were building the trenches. They wouldn't go to cut those big logs. When the Boer soldiers were heard counting, 1,2 we would know that they were going to fire. So with the alertness, we would rush into the trenches and keep ourselves there. Or sometimes when we just saw a jet fighter passing, we would think that something is going to happen, so we would go into the trenches. But we used to keep our trenches safe in case a snake went inside.

Civilians had no other form of protection. Even those who were training as Home Guards, they did not come with weapons. No, the only time I remember them having come out with weapons, was in 1979, when there was this incident of Senior Chief Inyambo. That is when I saw Mr Malwalo and Mr Mwanashisali carrying some weapons. But he was in the company of what, they were in the company of soldiers, so they wouldn't just, on their own move like that carrying weapons. In terms of freedom fighters crossing in and out of Zambia, these things happened but they... they were not taken across by the Zambians themselves. What the Zambians would do was just to leave a boat for them so that they find their way out or in. Yes, so that they themselves (Zambians) don't fall victims of whatever is going to happen. So they left the freedom fighters to ferry themselves across. In Katima, there is no river to cross, there is just the land, so they would have to find their way in or out on land. Basically humanitarian humanism was at its peak during that time. We had to extend, and we also followed Christian values, we had to extend assistance to our brothers and sisters in trouble. So we had to get our bags here and there and small relish that was there. We cook food for them, they eat, we sympathise with, with them and their situation. We... we always thought suppose it is us in such a situation, what would it be like? Coming hungry, tired, dirty and so on.

The UN relief, I think it came with the UNTAG. This was... a UN mission in Namibia which came to prepare for the independence of Namibia. So, instead of South-West African soldiers now being at the border and other places, it was United Nation troops that were there. So that is the time when I started seeing all this relief. Furthermore this area was infested by tsetse flies. So most of the animals (cattle) had died and people were starving. Furthermore people couldn't do much of farming for fear of fields being infested by landmines and some of these shells which didn't explode.

Lipoba, Timothy Mweene

[Kaoma Boma; 5 July 2007]

Mr Timothy Mweene Lipoba is a retired Senior Officer from the Office of the President. He lived during the liberation struggle and recalls that during the Cha Cha Cha after independence, Zambia had people from Zimbabwe and Namibia who were accommodated as freedom fighters. He recalls that they were fighting from Zambia and going to their countries.

Mr Lipoba was a police man and though his job did not involve dealing with freedom fighters, the situation was such that every citizen knew what was going on. He recalls assisting freedom fighters cross the Zambezi river into their countries.

My name is Timothy Mweene Lipoba. I was born in Lipoba's village, chief Mayankwa, district Kaoma in 1932. The highest level of education I obtained was standard six (6). I did my form two and G.C.E through correspondence. I finished my form two (2) in 1976. I started school at Lwampa Mission, Kaoma district, in 1944. I went to Mutanda School, Solwezi, in 1950. I got my Standard Six in 1953. I trained as a police officer in Livingstone in 1954. The college was then called Northern Rhodesia Police Depot. The college was later moved to Lilayi.

My first station was Mufulira. I went to Mansa. From Mansa, I went to Kawambwa. I was transferred back to Copperbelt to Chingola, Kitwe and Ndola. I was also sent to Kasama. From Ndola, I was transferred to Livingstone on a higher position as a Provincial Head of Police in the office of the president, special division.

Well, during the Cha Cha Cha after we got independent, we had people from Zimbabwe, Namibia who were accommodated in Zambia as freedom fighters. They were in fact fighting from this country going to their countries, especially Namibia and Southern Rhodesia now Zimbabwe.

My job did not involve dealing with these freedom fighters. But as far as politics were concerned at that time, we knew what was going on. These freedom fighters used to come here and go to Tanzania. They were living here in the camp you saw, people from Namibia. They camped at Nyango, there were so many Namibians. Not that they were very close but we knew what they were doing. They were camped here in Zambia and they were going across to their country. They contacted me and when they arrived, we would welcome them at the border. When they were crossing over to their countries sometimes, we would hear bombs. We used to take them to the border in small groups because if you take them in large numbers, they would be wiped before they enter. So we took them in the night, not day time. The groups were sometimes 20 or 15. Sometimes we used to take them in vehicles, sometimes we would just show them the way to go to the Livingstone border. We used to take them with vehicles especially to Kazungula border because it is a bit too far. We did this once in a while.

They used canoes to cross the Zambezi River. They got canoes from local people found around the Mambova area. Sometimes they used to swim across. Some parts

of the Zambezi are narrow so they would cross secretly. They found the canoes by the river side packed by the villagers. After crossing with them, the freedom fighters used to bring the canoes back after the war in the evening or sometimes one would bring them back and swim back. It was dangerous and the game was not easy.

Several points of the river were used to cross. Mambova is one of them, Kazungula as well, while some would even go via Sesheke and Katima Mulilo. Those are the only ones I can remember and also down in Kalomo where there was a good place for crossing. The place was just called Kalomo area. It was on the Zambezi River. This is where they used to fight even very hard because they used to follow them here, sometimes you would find that the soldiers from there used to come here to fight them.

But all points were used for fighting. Once they got information of their whereabouts, they would follow them. You remember that time when they came and bombed in Lusaka? I can't remember too well the year. They came to bomb Lusaka where we were keeping ZAPU. They killed so many people with their bombs from Zimbabwe then called Southern Rhodesia.

Apart from Livingstone and Kalomo in Southern Province, Kariba was also used to cross into Rhodesia. The lake is very far. They were crossing near towns, at Victoria Falls and at the bridge during the night. It was dangerous for us people living in Livingstone and Kalomo.

In Livingstone, we were not keeping the freedom fighters in one place. We divided them. We didn't want people to know that we were keeping freedom fighters. We used to do it secretly. We kept them briefly in different places. We would keep them for about an hour or two hours then they crossed. They came in the night. They came from Tanzania where they were being trained. They used to come to Zambia. I thought people knew about this. One time Rhodesians came and bombed all the bridges in Southern province. The bridges that were bombed were the one from Livingstone and three other bridges were bombed. This was on the Livingstone – Lusaka road. The soldiers used to come to Livingstone from Zimbabwe during the night to look for the freedom fighters. They couldn't find them because they were not permanently in one place. They stayed a short time in one place so it was difficult to find them.

It was difficult to tell how the soldiers from Zimbabwe were coming to Zambia. You know these are soldiers. Sometimes when they knew that there were freedom fighters in Livingstone, it was bad. Those who were caught were tied to the helicopters and we saw them flying them around Livingstone.

We said that is the end now, they were going to be killed or they were going to be interrogated so that they tell them where the other friends are. It was bad. Have you seen that plane there? That was the one they wanted to bomb that Nyango camp. It was intercepted by our government just here in Kaoma. As it was going, ZAF saw it. They had to make it land down. The people who were there were arrested and taken into Lusaka. Those were spies now who were looking for freedom fighters. They were soldiers. People who were fighting were soldiers not freedom fighters.

That is why Zambia is poor because of the people we helped. They damaged a lot of our property here in Zambia.

The plane landed here when it was intercepted, just there where it is. Our ZAF forced it to land. So they landed because it was on its way to where they wanted to go and bomb that camp where you have been. I got this information when I came. I was not here when it happened. The people who were in the plane were taken to Lusaka. I don't know what happened to them. Whether they were deported or they were taken to court, I don't know. They did not bomb the camp but they were also equipped with weapons which they used to carry to go and fight across.

They were not going there unarmed. No they were going well equipped. They were being trained somewhere this side where we didn't know which countries. Am not sure which countries were giving them these weapons. I think it was these communist countries.

That place there, if you had come here before going there, we would have gone together. That place is a military camp. Down there is where they were keeping their weapons and hiding. Any time they heard any noise you would not find people there. They would go, just like in the camp, in the military camps you dig you hide under. Even in Sesheke when there was this time when people were fighting. Even our people in the villages, we used to tell them to dig and they would hide.

People used to dig but when people were killed in one of the trenches, they no longer wanted to stay in trenches. Because they were not trained, they were not soldiers, they were villagers. If we went together you would have seen a lot. It's a big camp and from there where you, somewhere down there again there was another small village that is where they were hiding weapons. They were also rearing chickens and so on because they were living on their own. We really helped our brothers. It is a pity if they have forgotten.

Liswaniso, Alice

[27 April 2007]

Ms Alice Liswaniso, a young mother with a three months old baby was transferred to Sesheke to work for Sesheke Council in August 1977. Ms Liswaniso describes the attacks of South African troops based across the Zambezi river in the Caprivi Strip on Sesheke. She gives a clear narrative of the impact this had on her and her family as well as the communities in the Sesheke area.

I am Ms. Alice Liswaniso. I work for Sesheke District Council. Before I came here on transfer from Mazabuka, I heard that there was war even when I was coming here. I asked myself a lot of questions. I came here in August 1977. Yes though I hesitated to come.

In 1978 I witnessed one incident happening, with my three months baby. We were sleeping and I just heard as though my bed was shaking. I did not know what was going on because it was my first time. I just heard the dogs barking and chickens making noise outside. I asked what was happening outside, and someone came knocking on our door telling us to go out or else we will die. I just got up in my night dress with my baby on my back and we run away with my young sisters following where the others were running too. When we reached there we just threw ourselves in the trench. I even hurt myself because the trees in the trench were not properly arranged. We stayed there while the guns were being shot. Looking outside it was all light due to the shooting of the guns. We were shaking while in the trench with my three months baby and my two sisters. We stayed in the trench from 24:00 hrs while the guns were shooting. At 06:00hrs a soldier with a gun came and told us not to go anywhere or try to run away. He told us that he would come back after the situation had cooled down to say whether we could get out of the trench. The trench had a machine gun and would bring out a lot of dust. When getting into the trench I started coughing with my baby, we were in problems. While we were seated in the trench the soldier came to tell us to go somewhere else, not where we lived, but to another place. When we came out of the trench we went home and packed the blankets on the bed and packed them in a bag and then we ran away. I didn't even remember to carry water for the baby during the journey. I didn't even think about taking money or food. We went to Mahondo on foot with my baby on my back. I was dressed in a night dress. I thought of going back to Monze where my parents lived. When we reached Mahondo we found a truck coming here (to Sesheke) with wood on them. They were taking the wood to Simioti. We told them about the problems of where they were going. They decided to go back and we got into the vehicle. The vehicle was so high to climb. We don't even know how we managed to get in the vehicle. At Mahondo we drank dirty green water. We all drunk the water and never got sick. We went to Livingstone with the vehicle. At the Livingstone railway station waited for a train to take us to Monze. While we were seated with others we heard like a gun shot in our

ears. We asked ourselves why others did not fear the shot. We were very frightened where we sat and we asked ourselves questions about what was happening. Finally when the train came we got inside and went to Monze.

We stayed in Monze for three months before we decided to go back to Sesheke. I was staying in Monze with my father, Mr Liswaniso Lubinda who worked for railways. Then they called us to say the shooting of guns had stopped and that's how we went back. When we reached Sesheke It was deserted. There were no people except for a few workers. Even when we were working I wanted to stop work because I didn't understand why I had gone back. Some of the people stopped work, while others went in transfers. We decided to stay. At one time at work we heard the gun shots again. By then I had taken my baby to my parents in Monze and remained with my sister who was in school. I can't remember the month, but by then my baby had stopped breast feeding and was with my parents in Monze. I can't seem to remember, though I think it was in 1979. At that time one of my sisters found a job as a soldier and married in Kaoma. She is now late. My other sister came to visit me when the funeral happened. One of the Zambian soldiers had shot one of the Boers from Namibia in a speed boat. The Boer soldiers became angry and told the civilians to move out of Sesheke town. They gave us time and started counting from 10 to 0 in which time we must move out. The announcement was made at the river. They asked us to reveal who the soldier who shot their colleague was. We were at work. We had a neighbour with a vehicle. I ran wanting to go home when I found a vehicle parked. It was a Landover. We all managed to get in the vehicle. We ran into the bush where I don't know very well. We reached there in the night. We reached there and found houses with people living in them. The vehicle we went with was white in colour. We covered the vehicle with leaves because of the jet that was flying in the air in order for them not to see us. The owners of the villages told us to face down while in the vehicle for the jet not to see us and maybe shoot us. They told us we were seen very much by the people flying in the jet. The man who carried us in his vehicle lived here in the 1970's. He went back to Sesheke to check what was happening. When he came back he told us that it was now getting better such that we could go back. At that time Shebo and Hamboti were there. He was a Captain by then. He offered to take us back home. The following day we went to Mwandu. When going back it was quiet. We travelled in the vehicle of the same man who had brought us. He made about three trips instead of one that he made at first. While we were asleep we were shaking. The following day we went to Mwandu. We only spent a night in Sesheke and went to Mwandu. When we reached Mwandu we spent three days. While we were seated the soldiers came and asked us to move from the house we had occupied because it belonged to a soldier. They wanted to vacate civilians and separate them from soldiers. A Zambian soldier had shot at the Namibian soldier. They were asking us the civilians to move away from the soldiers. They gave us time before they started cocking the guns while counting with a loud speaker from 10.

We went on foot to Simungoma. I was with my three siblings. The journey was very long and as we were proceeding we got on a vehicle from Zambezi Sawmills to go to Mwandu. As we travelled to Mwandu we heard outbursts of gunfire. The Boers demolished a house where the soldier who shot at their colleague was believed to be hiding. Unfortunately while in Mwandu one of my brothers was caught by a crocodile and died. He was a pupil in Kafue. He was just there for a holiday. We decided to come back after that incident. This is what I experienced here in Sesheke. What used to happen is that we would pack our things in advance in case we hear a gun shot from Namibia, we could just pick up a bag and run. We could run and go to the hospital or to the Sawmills on foot. We were on the road all the time. We never had time to relax. Even when we are seated immediately we hear gunfire that was to alert us and go. That is how we used to live. A lot is going to be told by the experienced one like Mr Nakatindi Ngawe and also Mr Hamukena on how people died. There were a lot of skirmishes here in Sesheke and also in Katima. At one time we were sleeping and we heard people asking us why we were still sleeping when the freedom fighters were in Katima. They used to call them f/f. The Freedom Fighters had gone to Katima to drink water and picked a fight. Upon hearing that, we picked our bags and started off on foot.

We never used to see freedom fighters. We just used to hear that the Freedom fighters were in Katima (Zambia). Reportedly they used to carry their guns when seen. Whenever we heard that we could start off in the night. The road really suffered. We used to be many on the road. At one time we all stayed at Sawmills and it was during the cold season. Houses and schools were destroyed. Others were saying at Nakatindi one household had fallen down killing people. The house I saw belonged to the council at ZRT. It fell down and got damaged. At the Secondary High School the dining hall and assembly hall were badly damaged. People also died. People died in a trench during the first fight I witnessed when a soldier came to tell us that we can now leave and we went home.

At our place it was quiet but at the secondary school the soldiers used the upper rooms. When people heard that gun had started, they run to the trench and meanwhile children used to fall down. Some people died in the trenches at the secondary school. A shell fell on the trench and people died. We were not happy. Even us who used to work it's just that it was work, we were not supposed to live here. We were not happy at all. We used to suffer a lot. The soldiers were there to protect us. The soldiers did not want us to be killed- they used to protect us, though when something had gone wrong there is nothing we could do. They used to protect us and the buildings of the government. It was not their wish for us to suffer. As to who provoked skirmishes, I don't know whether they were our soldiers or not. For instance, the soldier who told us not to go out of our trench until he had come back again, he was offering protection. But the trenches were just covered with small sticks that were supposed to protect us when they started shooting. They used to be like openings of the mice holes, one could enter from one end and another in the other direction. Trenches had

trees with sand on top. The People used to make the trenches for themselves after being told to do so by the soldiers. There was no other way of helping the army except to run away the moment you hear gunfire. I don't know what elderly men could say about this. Our job was to run away and protect our families even though I lost my brother. If a shell fell on the trench no one can survive. It was just by the grace of God because when the thorns of the trees fall, it can injure you. Sand is so soft and very easy to break. Some trenches I saw were like cement, more like a house, not the ones with sand. They were not strong. It was only by the grace God.

We did not have chance to plough at that time. In the bush where they used to take their guns, it was very dangerous to walk. It was dangerous to go in the bush. Some of us were still working and could buy food, but I don't know what people in the village used to eat. We did not receive any food from the Government. I didn't see any food for people who were running away during the war. War is bad it is retrogressive you will find that people's mealie-meal is destroyed. You will find that you are never at peace with the heart. There was no development in Sesheke, Development only started now in Sesheke. War does not bring any development at all. Peace is good. When I look at countries like Mogadishu, Somalia, Sudan, it reminds me of how we used to run and makes me a very sad person. Most of the time I don't even watch such films. Zambia helped those countries that needed to be liberated because by then we had already gained our independence. They got something from us, like the Namibians, though we suffered for them. It is a good thing on the other side that we helped while on the other hand it is bad because a gun kills. It does not choose.

Makumba, Best

[Mongu; 21 July 2007]

Col. Makumba was born on 12th May 1943 at Mwelo Village, Chief Namakaya in Nyengo area, Kalabo District. He joined the Army in 1968 after Grade 12. He was trained at Delado Academy in northern India. He returned to Zambia in 1970. He rose through the ranks to become Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion from 1982 to 1985.

In 1986 Makumba was appointed Commanding Officer of the Liberation Centre at Kamwala where he dealt with all the liberation movements in Zambia for two years to the end of 1987.

My names are Colonel Best Kapanga Makumba. I was born on 12th May, 1943 at Muwelo village, Chief Namakaya in Nyengo area of Kalabo district. I started my school in 1956 at Sikongo primary school. This is in Kalabo district. I obtained a school certificate, Cambridge School Certificate that is, at Kambule Technical High School. After my Grade Twelve I immediately joined the army that was in 1968 December. I didn't stay long I proceeded to go abroad. I was sent abroad to India to a military academy known as Delado in Northern part of India where I completed two years of military training. After my training I returned in 1970, the end of 1970 and I was posted to the 3rd Battalion of Zambia Regiment, that was in Kabwe, Chindwin Barracks. That is where I served as a Platoon Commander. And through my hard work I commanded a company, as company commander. And then from there I went to the military training in Kabwe that is in Khohima Barracks. That was in 1975. From 1975..... I was an Instructor in Khohima.

First I was given to command the recruit training centre and then I was later promoted to go and train officer cadets at the Officer Cadet Wing. In 1979 I was appointed to be second in command at Gondar barracks in the Eastern part of Zambia. That is in Chipata. I served there until 1981 when I was seconded to Zambia National Service as Camp Commander in Kafue National Service Camp. It's just about five kilometres after Kafue, from Kafue. I didn't stay long there, in 1981, I was transferred back to the Army and I was appointed General Staff Officer dealing with training at Army Headquarters. Yes, General Staff Officer, Grade two, dealing with training. Again I didn't stay long I was appointed Personal Assistant to the Army Commander, then General Masheke in the same year 1981. I was posted to Turgagan Barracks as commanding officer in 1982. I served there as Commanding Officer of the 1st Battalion for three years up to 1985. Then I was transferred back to the school, the Military Establishment of Zambia (MILTEZ) that is in Kabwe military training as Commanding Officer dealing with other ranks training.

Then in 1986 I was transferred and appointed Commanding Officer African Liberation Centre at Kamwala. The Liberation Centre at Kamwala dealt with combatants that is, the freedom fighters. The OAU centre in Lusaka was just a secretarial co-ordination office that was run by only one senior officer, who coordinated activities from Dar-es-Salaam to the Zambian Government, through

that office. The Liberation Centre at Kamwala on the other hand dealt with day to day administration of freedom fighters. It was the Zambian one. Then we operated with freedom fighters a record of which I have profiled in detail in the catalogue document I have given to you. I stayed at the Liberation Centre from 1986 to end of 1987, two years. At the end of 1987, I went back to the school in Kabwe. Yes, Miltez, and became deputy commandant of the whole school this time. Yes, I became deputy commandant up to 2001. When I was, I beg your pardon - not 2001 it was 1995. Then thereafter I was appointed regional Commander for Western Region in 1996. That is Mongu. Then eventually when I attained the age of 55, I retired in 1998. I retired, that is after having served for almost 30 years.

Firstly, immediately I came back from military training in 1970, we operated along the border with Angola. That was when freedom fighters in Angola were fighting for their independence. Immediately when I came back from training in 1970, I reported to my unit. I was sent to the North Western province to that area called Jimbe that is Kanogasha in Mwinilunga District. There our task was to guard the border against any possible crossing of Portuguese soldiers, that were always following freedom fighters who were crossing into Angola to go and fight. These were MPLA. Yes they were MPLA. At that time UNITA and the other one I have forgotten, (FNLA), they were all fighting for independence. The differences among them came after independence, after 1974, 1975 but they were not operating in one area but in separate areas. For example, FNLA were more active in that area Jimbe. MPLA were more active in Chavuma. Chavuma by then was in Zambezi district but now it's a separate district. UNITA were mostly in Western Province. In Western Province they were operating in Sikongo area. That was covering, Kacamisa to be specific close to the border, all in Kalabo district. So let me take you back to the areas of operation. In terms of the areas we have started with Mwinilunga District and we have gone to Zambezi district and now it is Chavuma district. In Chavuma we were covering Chavuma itself. We were facing the Portuguese troops that were at Kalipande Camp in Angola opposite the same area. We were covering Zambezi district. Kalipande Camp was one of the biggest Portuguese camps and extremely active there.

Other centres where we were operating from included Chinyama Litapi and Nyatanta. These centres were in the Western part of Zambezi district just along the border with Angola. Then we were also covering chief Nyakulenga area again in the Western part of Zambezi. Yes, Western part of Chavuma. That time it was Zambezi district but this time it has been renamed Chavuma district. That was the end of North Western front as far as we were concerned at that time. Freedom fighters were crossing at all these centres. That is at Jimbe, Chinyama Litapi, Nyatanta and Nyakulenga and in fact at many other areas. Those were the routes used by freedom fighters, and so we had to man the possible routes. The Zambia Army manned the possible routes where we were suspecting that Portuguese soldiers could follow up freedom fighters who were crossing in and out of Angola. Along the North Western Front, it was only the two districts of Mwinilunga and Zambezi, at that time, which were very

active. Kalipande was a Portuguese Camp which was very actively following up the activities of the freedom fighters. It was opposite Chavuma in Moxico Province of Angola. At that time we were being given 3 months per posting at a time but we could stay longer. To be specific in North Western, I mean in Mwinilunga and Chavuma, if I added the number of months, I stayed there it could be a year or more. The two districts Mwinilunga and Chavuma and part of Western province were opposite Moxico Province in Angola. Further along the border with Angola, Western Province was opposite Kwando Kubangu Province in Angola.

Then in 1972 to 75, the struggle in Namibia was hotting up and the activities increased, so the Government of Zambia decided to deploy troops in Senanga from Shangombo to Shantonto and Imusho. That is bordering Kwandu Kubangu province in Angola. The main reason for this focus of deployment was that SWAPO had a lot of field camps in Senanga West. And therefore troops had to be deployed in order to deter the Selous Scouts, of the South African troops from entering Zambia. Yes, that was the time South Africa was occupying South West Africa, now Namibia. The Selous Scouts were South African, part a force that was known as Battalion 101 of South Africa that were deployed in the Caprivi Strip. The reason for their deployment was because of the freedom fighters from SWAPO that occupied most part of Senanga west. Yes, freedom trails were at Imusho. Let me start from Imusho, Imusho School or Chief Imusho's palace in Zambia. Freedom fighters crossed to both east and west of a small town called Singalamwe in Namibia, just directly opposite. The other crossing points were in between Katima Mulilo and Singalamwe. You know it's a thick forest there. It is a forest reserve there, our Zambian forest reserve. In fact it is a Game Management Area (GMA). It is the Sioma Ngwezi GMA area. Yes, that is what they were using. The other routes were immediately after the palace of Chief Inyambo in Mwandi. Immediately after Mwandi we have got an area called Ngwezi There is a stream which is situated between Southern and Western provinces. Ngwezi area maybe, we should generalize it. The other route was Mambova, Mambova was another route. They crossed into Caprivi but you must say Namibia. Namibians don't like you people specifying that area. They become very hostile with you. Yes, Mambova was another route into Namibia. That was the last for the Namibian crossing points. But there were numerous crossings. It depended on the loads the people were carrying, the number of people, so that they could not be detected. Kazungula was another crossing. I call it a major place because during one time even when I was at the Liberation Centre, there were more activity there. Because we were able to manoeuvre in there without the Boers detecting freedom fighters. Since they were going into (Botswana) an area in which the Boers were not very active in.

While at Liberation Centre we dealt with PAC. We also dealt with the Communist Party that merged with ANC. PAC was on its own. The Communist party merged with ANC. You can write ANC/ Communist Party. The Communist party, Chris Hani, was mainly in Tanzania, the few people that we dealt with here at the Liberation Centre they were on transit only. These were South Africans. In Zimbabwe we dealt

with the Nkomo school. The others for the current president now (Mugabe) they shifted to Tanzania the Mozambican Front. You remember the story of that killing of Chitepo and others. That was when they moved. I don't know if it was a government policy or what. The other group decided to shift to Mozambique, here we remained in the main with Nkomo's people.

Well I was asking that we didn't document anything in regards to the bases for SWAPO inside Zambia from which we were administering. First of all we had Nyango Camp. Nyango Camp was in the Western part of Zambia in Kaoma to be specific. In this camp we had over four thousand children that were orphaned children. Over four thousand! But data can be obtained from the Liberation Centre records. These children were being collected from the front, the front line. SWAPO would go and attack maybe Boers then in the process people in the areas would scamper leaving children. Then SWAPO would take those children into their care and keep them at Nyango. At this same Nyango camp children were being looked after, there were schools there. At this same camp Nyango that's where we were selecting boys and girls that were becoming strong to go for training in other countries. Not only to go and train in military manoeuvre but even in civil work civic work education boys and girls. There were also freedom fighters, it was a mixture. Those freedom fighters most of them were protecting those boys and girls because we were aware that the enemy were aware of that camp.

Then around Lusaka we had quite a number of farms which we used to call "safe farms." Among them was Namayani farm which was donated to UNIP. Namayani farm is just at the satellite dish there. Mwembeshi satellite dish. We also had farms scattered around Lusaka West, and even in Lusaka itself along, Shake Shake road we had offices there. Initially they were SWAPO. When SWAPO was going they handed over to their colleagues (ANC). They gave them free of charge.

Other camps were in Western Province. In that area we had one of the biggest SWAPO camps. It was Liangati. There was Liangati and then there was Nande. They were separate. Then even at the Boma (Senanga Boma) itself, we had a transit camp. Senanga boma, around, the old hospital, Litambya area there, in those small houses there, that was a transit camp. There were other small camps. We used to call them transit camps. You bring the boys along the border to cross. They are reminded of what they have been taught then they cross. Yes, before the crossing point, there is a camp, then the crossing point. Then they are ferried across or taken across by the guides. I think for SWAPO that is enough! You may recall that SWAPO shifted its headquarters into Angola, and even the president, that is president Muyoma was based in Angola later. The move was prompted by the fact that Nkomo was almost killed just close to the State House. So, since the main force for SWAPO was in Angola, the leadership decided to shift their big bwanas, the senior leadership... to Angola, on the basis that there was no security in Lusaka after Nkomo was attacked, you remember. This was the historical background in terms of the leadership, how it was shifted up and down.

But as for ANC, the ANC remained intact in Lusaka. Both Oliver Tambo and the other man I cannot remember who were number one and two acting on behalf of Mandela they were all based in Lusaka. The Liberation Centre was doing the screening, the following up of training. Chris Hani was a roving ambassador, we lived with Chris Hani in Lusaka, people just didn't know. ANC remained in Zambia and all the leadership was based in Lusaka. But now the main training for ANC was actually also in Angola. And we were now transferring ANC cadres from Angola to Lusaka by air. I have no idea, where in Angola they were being trained we just knew it was Angola. Then they were transferred from Angola to Lusaka or let us generalize it, to Zambia in transit to South Africa. We had contacts in Zimbabwe and we had some contacts in Botswana, and we were driving, driving them through Botswana up to the border with South Africa. It was one of the most complicated exercises and very expensive. The others we were driving them into Mozambique and there they were taken over by our colleagues in Mozambique and taken to the border with South Africa. To get to Mozambique were driving via Eastern province to Katete and into Tete Province in Mozambique. Freedom trails were from Lusaka by road, in some cases, few cases by air into Maputo, and there the cadres were received by officers there from both the ANC and the Government and they transited to the border. Other trails were from Botswana to the border of South Africa. Some would go into Lesotho, fly there and have them damped there and they were received by commanders on the ground. Others went to Swaziland. ANC had offices in all those countries. And even inside South Africa itself, we had very, very strong supporters of ANC, where cadres were springing from when coming and they were going back the same way to selected areas.

Inside Zambia, they had their camps in towns. We had offices two separate entities, office of the chief representative, ANC chief representative had its own office. Then we had the main stream of the ANC that is the headquarters which was also splitting into groupings. It was the office of the chief representative that was directly dealing with the Liberation Centre and from the Liberation Centre through the government machinery, for any assistance or any help or for any information. Then we had the Office of the President itself, which was dealing with the government at hand. The Acting ANC president Oliver Tambo. His offices were scattered. We had offices at,... as you go to Matero, after Matero, there is that stream, then immediately after that stream just a road or two on your right, there were officers there of the ANC Acting President. There were ANC offices near Kamwala Secondary School. There were also other offices that were scattered around the light industrial area. Along Shake Shake road we also had some offices there. And several others, in fact safe houses, they used to call them, where the president used to shift to. Two days later we shift him to some other place and so on. It was team work. The chief representative also had his own. And then the main stream of ANC.

Next we maybe look outside Lusaka where we had other camps, among them was Chongela. Chongela is located along Great North road. Remember where a lot of

Zimbabweans were bombed. Chikumbi, yes. Yes around that area we had the biggest camp for ANC. Around Chikumbi area, the name of the camp was Chongela. That was the biggest ANC camp. Then in Livingstone we had the crossing point for ANC into Zimbabwe. They were crossing around this village, Nakatindi village. Nakatindi village there. Yes, right on the river bank as you go to Sesheke. Just in the outskirts of Livingstone as you go along the road towards Sesheke. Along that same road we had also another crossing point along the road before Mambova. It's very near to Livingstone, we had another crossing point there.

After the independence of Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, this time around now we were using independent states (in Southern Africa) also to undertake tasks because we were working in liaison with them. Lesotho and Swaziland were also involved. They received freedom fighters even by road they would receive them, even by air they would receive them. But not on large scale like ourselves. But actually they were providing some help because there were also ANC offices in Lesotho and Swaziland. We were handing over to each other from here to the Mozambican border we hand over, and from Lusaka to the border with Zimbabwe we hand over. In some cases there were ANC officers or officials who were based in those countries. They were able to receive those cadres and take them to the next crossing point. We did not use trucks as such, small vehicles and small buses. Small vehicles and small buses. That is how the ammunition went and the guns also went. When we took them by air from Angola to Zambia it was Zambia Airways or Tag Airways the Angolan airline. That's how even the ammunition were taken from Lusaka to Maputo. Was that not our airline Zambia Airways! Zambia Airways, if you check the money that Zambia Airways made on the route from Luanda to Lusaka and to these places I have mentioned! Huge sums of money, part of which were being paid by the state in support of the freedom fighters.

Eastern Zambia for FRELIMO. We had Kameta. Kameta was a camp for both, us Zambian troops guarding FRELIMO operators that were operational in the area, and that was one of their crossing points. This is in Katete District, Eastern Province. Then we had Mwanja Bantu. This was a camp, I think in Katete also. It was both a crossing point and also our area of operation to cover the movement of the freedom fighters. Then there was Tafelansoni, a crossing area and we also had troops there. Tafelansoni is in the Eastern Province. What I am not sure is whether it is Katete district or Petauke. It's along the border, along the border with Mozambique. So those were the major camps in that area. Which one have I left out? There is Chikalawa, it was also a crossing point and Zambia army camp and crossing point for FRELIMO. Chikalawa is in the Eastern Province, again I am not sure whether its Chadiza or Katete, one of the two districts. Those were the major camps for FRELIMO. But what you may need to note is that unlike the other colleagues, maybe like MPLA and others, who were close to Zambian population, they operated very far away from populated areas. This is a very important major point to note. They were highly disciplined, well trained and even the leadership was field orientated. Field oriented

means it was really hard to know military commanders in the field. It was not easy to tell a political leader or a military leader in the FRELIMO line up. They were all the same. I am sure General Masheke should have covered that because he was very close to them he used to travel with Samora inside Mozambique. Look at the ANC. ANC had two parallel structures whereas for FRELIMO it was all military structures. That is why you find that in Mozambique three quarters of the leadership are Generals, Brigadiers, Colonels, and so on, including the country's president. He was a very senior FRELIMO cadre. And the other camp that we handled was at the bridge itself. At Luangwa bridge . The Luangwa Camp That was a very important camp for us although, despite what you know, the Government realized late after the enemy had destroyed the bridge, that`s when they decided to put troops there, previously they didn`t although FRELIMO was there.

Mandanji, John K.

John K. Mandanji, was born 1932 in Mwinilunga District, North-Western Province of Zambia, and has been an active supporter of the liberation struggle at Kaleni, where they started it. As a teacher in the 1940s, he worked with other teachers in North-Western Province, where he worked closely with liberation leaders such as Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula, Kenneth Kaunda and Elijah Mudenda who visited them.

Thank you very much. My name is John Mandanji; I was born here in Mwinilunga. I

am a Lunda by tribe and I grew up in Mwinilunga. My village is in chief Mwinilamba near Kaleni Hills, village Nyakamweyi. I started my primary school at Mwinilamba; by then it was called sub-standard A up to Standard 4.

I was born in 1932 and started my school at Mwinilamba village in the 1940s, then finished substandard 2 and then went to Kaleni for standard 3 and 4. Then I went to Mutamba Upper School a place near Solwezi from 1952 to 1957. I did my standard 5, upper 6 and lower 6. After standard I went to Chitokoloki mission, in Zambezi district for my teacher training for four years. Then I finished in 1957 and went back to Kaleni where I started teaching.

I went to college in 1955 to 1957. Then I went back to Kaleni and started teaching. I have been to several schools in this district. My village chiefs were Mulamba, Kanyama, Kakoma, senior chief Kanongesha, and Shanukunda. Then at Kakoma I was appointed to go to the curriculum development centre in Lusaka in 1973. I only taught in this district. After working for 9 months with CDC I was sent to London in Britain, where I did my curriculum course for a year in 1974 to 1975.

When I completed I worked at curriculum development centre as a mentor and wrote some books. We had books for the Tongas and the Lundas. Then the liberation struggle started between the Kaundas and the Nkumbulas. I went to Singapore in 1981 to study Religious Education. I have also been to Malawi to study Religious Education but I was still working for CDC. In 1987 I retired and came back and settled here.

When I was at Kaleni, we started the struggle of liberating ourselves, coming out of criminal bondage. We saw people like late Harry Mwaanga Nkumbula and Kenneth Kaunda at Kaleni. In 1949 we were visited by Kenneth Kaunda now called Dr Kaunda. Others were late Nkumbula and Elijah Mudenda. They introduced the topic that we wanted. At that time I was a teacher. We got involved with other teachers because we had seen how the white people were treating us. Although they did not beat us but we had seen their negative attitude towards us. We are all human beings and we wanted to be free.

I remember at one time when we went to the village of chief Nakaseba, the chief who had died. We were brutally beaten up by the people there because they interrogated us, wanting us to get involved in their politics and one of our fellow teachers was beaten almost to death, so we ran away. So it is from there that we started UNIP, and later on UNIP split. Nkumbula started his party which we used to call the Nkumbula

one and later on we came to the elections and there was the white people's party. I remember voting for the late Mr Nkaza here and it was the first time that we were involved in voting in general elections.

I cannot remember the year I voted for the first time but it was in the 60's and there was only Mr Nkaza from Chitokoloki, Zambezi District whom we voted for, to go the National Council in Lusaka. I was also involved with some white people voting for the right party. We had only one man from Western Province, Mr William Nkaza. He is a Lunda man of senior Chief Nshimbi. The others came in later like the late William Mwembela. Then we had a government, a coalition government, Nkumbula did not go through so they thought of amendment, joining having a coalition government where we had Dr Kaunda as Prime Minister and Harry Mwanga Nkumbula also joined in and the others. Mudenda and Simon Kapwepwe also joined in. After that they went again to elections where UNIP won. Nkumbula and Kapwepwe became Prime Ministers. So the two parties were running the government and later on these two parties joined together because Dr Kaunda had said if we had two parties, we would hinder development, because we would be pulling each other, so they came together and formed a one party state.

By then we were not consulted as we did not know much about politics and we did not know what the big politicians were thinking about. We just came in because we wanted to liberate ourselves, to be free from the colonial rule. So what other people were thinking about the economy of this country could not even get much involved, so Kaunda thought of joining UNIP and Congress together so that we could have one party state. So the result was that Nkumbula died, Kapwepwe died, only Kaunda remained with others. We went on like that with one participatory democracy.

That's how we got liberated. We could see some of these things coming up like in Mwinilunga when we got independence we had no big offices like the ones you are seeing now in the Boma. We had no police offices like the ones you are seeing now. Those were built when we got independence. From what I see now, Dr Frederick Chiluba has not built anything in Mwinilunga here. Even the present Government has not built anything here.

Masheke, Malimba

[Lusaka; 27 February 2007]

General Malimba Masheke was born on 17th June 1941. He was one of the first few Zambian Officers in the Zambian Defence forces after independence. In 1970 he was appointed Chief of Military Intelligence. His formal duties then included to coordinate the work of Liberation Movements; to coordinate movement of weapons; and to coordinate intelligence networks in each of the unliberated territories with the freedom fighters commanders of individual countries. General Masheke rose to the top rank of Zambia Army Commander in 1980. Subsequently he was appointed Prime Minister of the Republic of Zambia by President Kenneth David Kaunda. In this interview General Malimba Masheke gives a short autobiographical narrative leading to Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in Britain. He returned to Zambia in 1967. He rose through the ranks and in 1970 he was appointed the first Chief of Military Intelligence (new post) as part of the Zambianization of the Defence Force in 1970. The full responsibility of managing and administering the freedom struggle in Southern Africa began to fall on the Defence Forces. General Masheke as Chief of Military Intelligence was given the task of coordinating infiltration of freedom fighters into neighbouring countries which were yet to be liberated.

This interview gives firsthand insights into the reorganization of Defence and Security as well as management of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.

My name is General Malimba Masheke born on 17th June 1941. I hail from the Western Province in Nanjuca, Longe Village. I went to school at Mulobezi Primary School, then I went to Musokotwane Lower Primary School, then to Sekute Lower Middle Primary School and then Nandu Upper Primary School in Musokotwane. I went for my Standard VI at Sioma Mission, that time in Senanga District now Shangombo District. That was in 1959/1960. I moved to Mongu Secondary School and did my junior secondary up to Cambridge School Certificate, which I sat in 1964.

I joined the Army in 1964. In May when I went for the selection board, I was successful but I wanted to write my exams at Cambridge before I went to military training school. When I left school in December, I left almost immediately for Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, where I started military training. Sandhurst is in Britain. It is one of the highest schools in Britain which train officers of the Officer Core. I was there for two years. I did other courses at Hythe School of Military Tactics in Salisbury and also at Warminster.

I joined 2ZR where I worked from Platoon to Company Commander. 2ZR was in Lusaka, Arrakan Barracks. Then I moved to Army Headquarters as Deputy Assistant Adjutant General for only a few months. The Headquarters of Zambia Army is also located in Arrakan Barracks. From there I was posted to the Ministry of Defence where I became Military Secretary. That was in 1970. At the end of 1970 I was also given added responsibility. By that time Zambia Army was Zambianized and we had General Chinkuli taking over command of the Army. He was the first indigenous Army Commander at Zambianization. He took over from a white Briton, General

Reads. That time the full responsibility of managing and administering the freedom struggle in the Southern Region started to fall on to the Defence Force. Before that it was difficult to trust the white commanders to allow freedom fighters to transit, to go across to fight. You will recall that at one stage Mr James Skinner who was the Chief Justice, when there was a captured Portuguese soldier in the Chavuma area and when he came to the High Court, the High Court freed him. That troubled a lot of Zambian people. And in Zambia the Zambia Youth Service (predecessor to Zambia National Service (ZNS) at Kafue demonstrated and came to upset chairs in the High Court and marched to State House to protest against the judgment. Subsequently Mr Skinner left the country. I think Mr Skinner was able to know that even when there is passion of Zambia, at the time when the 'Kith and Kin' is involved you have difficulties in trying to straighten yourself. So it had to wait until time came when there were all Zambian people in command. So I was given added responsibility. I was given the portfolio of Chief of Military Intelligence which wasn't there before. At the same time, I was given the task of coordinating infiltration of freedom fighters into our neighbouring countries where there was still white rule.

Yes, I was the first Chief of Military Intelligence. The first letter on each of the files was made by me. I was starting something new. I think now it is working well when other people came to put their hands on it. The coordination of activities of freedom fighters entailed making sure that when freedom fighters.....initially they were trained outside, abroad in countries that were helping the freedom struggle in the country. Such countries like the Eastern countries, China, the Soviet Union and allied countries to those countries where the weaponry and training was coming from. When they came here to make sure that the security of the armament was proper, that the passage of the freedom fighters was secure and that the areas where they were crossing from Zambia to the countries of their operations where they came from was also secure so that there was no danger to their lives. Although often the turn of this danger could not be averted, this was one of the tasks.

There was the Liberation Centre established. Until 1970 we did not have a military officer there. We had civil officers, who were only doing administration and crossing by freedom fighters was very limited. In 1970 we were able to put military officers there. We had Brigadier General Mulopa who was one of the senior officers put at the Liberation Centre. He worked very closely with our famous Mukuka Nkoloso who assumed leadership there on his own. We had other officers like Colonel Noah Lungu, Colonel Pilama and officers like Colonel Augustine Mutale. I cannot remember the turns when they were going in command but I used to pass through there. And they were dealing with operational and administrative requirements. They were managing all the liberation forces that were here from Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa.

We had other bodies which dealt with liberation struggle and different security matters. The first one was National Defence and Security Committee which was chaired by the President of the country himself plus his commanders of Army-Air

force and also Inspector General of Police, officer in charge of Police, Director General of Special Division, as well as Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs. And also other trusted leaders in the country who the President was able to use, they were also made members of the National Defence and Security Committee. That was the highest committee, it dealt with policy and this was chaired by the President for operations and decentralization.

Under the National Defence and Security Committee was Defence and Security Consultative Committee. It was also chaired by the President, but at the same time it had political leaders from the Provinces. At the first stage we had Ministers in charge of the Provinces. It moved to Central Committee Members. And down below that we had Central Joint Operations Committee. This was an operational body. This had commanders and other security and defence officers dealing with specific matters, like if there was a question of discussing a certain border area, then an officer dealing with that border area was incorporated in the meeting to deal with that aspect of it. It dealt with actual military operations; dealing with the logistical involvement of the defence force in passing through either equipment or the freedom fighters themselves to the country where they were going to be used.

The Central Joint Operations Committee went down to provinces. These were called Provincial Joint Operations Committee and District Joint Operations Committee.

We also had the Defence Council. The Defence Council was mainly military. It dealt also with policy but this was an advisory committee, advising only the President. It was a task force to advise the President on military defence matters, defence policy, conduct of any defence policy. We also had the policy which we think should manage the liberation movements. Membership was privileged in that the President hand-picked the members of the Defence Council and appointed one of them to be its Chairman. He could chair it himself but he delegated to a trusted member of his government at Central Committee or Cabinet to chair it. And it has of necessity to include the commanders of the Army, Air force, National Service as well as the Inspector General of Police and the Director General of Special Division. It also had some Ministers or Members of the Central Committee who gained the trust of the President. And Chief of Military Intelligence was among them as well.

The prosecution of the struggle was a highly coordinated affair because whatever happened had consequences on the country, the country's economy, the country's security and people in the rural areas had this coming to them on a daily basis. In fact most of the people who prosecuted it were our people on the borders because you know in the liberation struggle, in warfare which is guerrilla warfare, we consider the people as everything; because the people are the food store. The people who are crossing, they cannot carry their food. They depend on the people on the borders. And the government will not give them extra food. So they were just giving away food. They would also give information to the enemy if we were not coordinating them well. So people are the information officers, office. People are the food store. People are everything to the freedom fighter. Therefore even the behaviour of freedom

fighters was such that they were well behaved except in a few cases. And if there were cases like that their commanders would deal with them. Because if they did not behave very well, and their behaviour affected the lives of the people in the area, they risked the danger that they would report them to hostile forces across where they were going.

The OAU Liberation Committee (Dar-es-Salaam) had an office here in Lusaka. I mentioned already earlier in this interview that in 1970 we had introduced military personnel at the Liberation Centre. Before that we had Mr Lungu and Mr Simumba. Mr Simumba was dealing with coordination. It was an OAU Liberation Committee office. As the name implies it was an office of the OAU. Its officers were supposedly paid from an OAU fund but this fund was not there, so its officers were receiving government pay from Zambia. They were operating under OAU Charter. The office coordinated the activities of OAU through the Liberation Committee Headquarters. Earlier on in Dar-es-Salaam, later on in Addis Ababa we had Hashim Mbita; he was coordinating operations from OAU Headquarters. When he came here he dealt with officers from this office. This was the Sub-Office of his OAU Liberation Committee office.

The Kamwala Liberation Centre was both national and OAU office. When the OAU came to Zambia it had to operate under the national organization. That is why even the operations of the OAU here (office) did not have foreign officers who came from other countries. They were all Zambian nationals. As I said Mr Simumba, Mr Lungu, then Brigadier General Mulopa, they were also OAU officers here. The Zambian Government paid their salaries because OAU failed to meet the obligation to do so. The Zambian Government had to pay for many things.

When we had refugees coming and money for them required us to go to the OAU, having a committee to meet, so forth, asking countries to contribute money, etc. People are hungry when they cross, and like our stomachs are shaped in a question mark way, when they enter the country the stomachs are asking what are you putting in today? It will not wait for OAU to resolve how much money. It is not the question of whether there is money or not, they must eat. And they were fed. In some cases there might have been some refunds that came, but I can tell you that if you went to our account to see how this was paid, you will find that maybe 50% of it was never recovered. This was the price we paid.

Part 2

Thank you very much indeed. This is a very gigantic tour, going back to when the struggle for Africa started then we should go back and remind ourselves of the initial feeling of an African. Of the beginning when they were itching of independence. We remember people like Dr Aggrey, remember people like Nkwame Nkrumah, Janial Nasser, Sékou Touré of Guinea, Emperor Haile Selassie. He was a tool with founder members of the Organisation of African Unity. They were embracing a road of struggle to free Africa entirely, from Cairo to Cape if we can put it in reverse.

Normally it is from Cape to Cairo but Cairo to Cape because the Cape was the last to be free.

During that time the big names we have now like the Mandelas, the Kaundas and so forth. Mandela was running a small youth movement in South Africa. I think Dr Kaunda, Nyerere, Kenyatta, Lumuba all these people, I think until the 1960s they met the founders before they themselves were free. That was the very first step that brought leaders of Africa together. Then a policy emerged from there and the desire to get Africa free developed in the minds of all. You remember in 1957 Ghana was the first to get independence and that ignited the bush fire in Africa every country wanted to be free. As time went all African countries may be to bring everything to a good start – Kenya was free, Tanzania was free, Zambia became free. We had here the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Malawi was free a few months before us. There were countries in the Southern Hemisphere, South of Zambia, apart from Botswana which had gained independence, of course Swaziland is just a small spot within South Africa. We had on the east Mozambique which was regarded as a province of Portugal, on the West also we had Angola was also a province of Portugal. Then we had Namibia former South West Africa African state, she was, if I am not wrong, mandated to be run by south Africa by the League of Nations after the First World War. We had Southern Rhodesia which was part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland only to remain unfree after Malawi and Zambia were freed. The people that were fighting, the politicians, the nationalists of the same age and time as the Kaundas, Nyereres, we had Nkomo, Ndabaning, Sithole, Robert Mugabe only to mention some in Southern Rhodesia. They were agitating for independence and they received a lock up call. They were all detained without trial, but their followers went on to carry on the struggle. And the OAU had sanctioned the struggle to start using force of arms where necessary to receive this freedom in countries which were still.....

In Angola we had President Neto, MPLA. We had also Holden Roberts... Later on we had UNITA under Savimbi. In Mozambique we had a party which was led by Mr Simango but it was really a breakaway from the main party FRELIMO which was led by Mondlane. Mondlane was the first President of FRELIMO. When he was killed in a letter bomb accident, Samora Machel took over the leadership, to take the struggle further.

In Southern Rhodesia, of course you know, we had ZAPU, then there was a breakaway by Ndabamingi Sithole of ZANU which was later on taken over by Mr Robert Mugabe. These were the main fighters really nationalists that were of substance, there were others.....

Ndabaningi Sithole was Secretary General of Mr Nkomo in ZAPU. Then he broke away from ZAPU to form what he called a more militant organization. ZANU, Zimbabwe National Union, from ZAPU Zimbabwe Peoples' Union. That also went through reformation when Robert Mugabe also who was Secretary General of Ndabaningi Sithole also took over the reins. My elder sister (Dr Bull) was student

in that area, she may be able to correct wrong facts. Now the stage was set and the freedom struggle had started. In South Africa, the African National Congress was the main fighting group. But we had PAC also coming in. They also came to Zambia. They were given areas to operate from although later on they were becoming a nuisance. We discovered that they were cooperating with the regime in the South. So we outlawed them here. And we embraced ANC under Oliver Tambo as leader. Mandela as you know, was in prison on Robbin Island. Now so you see the major highlights was that, the elimination of leaders by colonial forces, like Mondlane who was murdered, I cannot remember the year, but it was a scheme to eliminate the leadership. They also wanted to cause factions within nationalist political parties so that as they split they would not be able to fight in unison.

We had problems of supply of weapons and the passage of such weapons here. And the Eastern Europe must take the first centre stage in the struggle for Africa. Struggle for the liberation of Africa. This is the Soviet Union and its satellite allies of the countries in the Iron Curtain. This is Yugoslavia, Czech Rumania, Caecescu, Tito in Yugoslavia – these played a big role of course they supplied military hardware for the freedom fighters. Alongside Soviet Union was China. China became very handy and equally supplied arms through the two countries. Tanzania which only bordered Mozambique. The blunt of the rest of the struggle was born by Zambia because Zambia had Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique on its border. And this means we received very serious retribution from the Southern African racist regimes of Ian Smith Caetano from Portugal Mozambique and Angola, the regime of Vorster in the South Africa. They were very brutal. We were under instruction to free Africa. The training was done mostly in Tanzania because it was far from the place of action, mainly in the Songea area of Southern Tanzania and Iringa area of Tanzania. We had some bases here doing light training later on we were also involved in heavy training of the cadres so that they could go back to fight in their countries. The struggle became so intensive in all the five countries - Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Rhodesia and Mozambique. But the heaviest as we were coordinating, we worked very closely with these forces, that were for liberation, MPLA and FRELIMO. We knew that if we were to press hard the Portuguese then if they were free these two countries would give us support on the wings in the East and on the South. This actually paid dividends when the casualties of the Portuguese white fighters in Mozambique and Angola became so heavy that their officers who were being prepared to be sent to the frontline staged a coup d'état in Portugal to topple the Caetano regime. This was a major turning point, because the coup d'état decided to appoint Mario Soares as its Prime Minister. And then they dictated that they should do away with the two provinces of Angola and Mozambique in Southern Africa which meant that they would receive their independence. Now the talks for the independence of Mozambique and Angola were held in State House in Lusaka under the leadership of Dr Kaunda who provided to host these meetings. They went very well and dates for Freedom Day were set in Angola and Mozambique.

In Angola there were factions. We had Daniel Chipenda who was the Treasurer of MPLA breaking away from main MPLA group to form his own party. Holden Roberts also pressing demands that he had more right to be the leader. UNITA under Savimbi.....

In Angola, MPLA. Daniel Chipenda broke away from MPLA, he did accept the leadership of Dr Augustine Neto. In fact Chipenda was Treasurer General of MPLA, and when it wasn't possible he broke away. These were factions which always are caused by the colonialists who want to divide the people who are involved in the struggle. So we had, I remember that we had about one week of negotiating to unite the MPLA factions. Angola was more divided than Mozambique. Mozambique.... COREMO was a smaller party, they were just a party in newspapers and radio but there was nothing on the ground. But they received more from broadcast because the physiological warfare which was waged by the colonizers controlled the radios and the air time, newspapers, etc. So normally they put more to put the stature of the surrogate parties higher.

COREMO had been in existence almost as long as FRELIMO but they were really not of any consequence. I had the opportunity myself to get into Mozambique to fight, to check....Normally you give assistance to fighting groups but you have got to anyway that you give you must also be able to supervise otherwise you receive stories of successes where there are none. Because of this, I think in 1973, Dr Kaunda commissioned me to go to Mozambique with some troops, there was Major Zulu who came with me, there were a few officers from the Army and soldiers from 4ZR in the Eastern province who I took with me. We visited the combat zone, to confirm on the ground what was claimed to be liberated zones. And hosting us was President Machel. In fact President Machel was there, President Chissano as Secretary for Foreign Affairs and the present President he was in charge of Commerce and Communication, Mr Armado E. Guebuza.

Yes we were with him. He was a freedom fighter. There were several times when we got attacked by the combined forces of Rhodesia, south Africa and the Portuguese. We were altogether. We went there for a period of time and when the struggle was heavy, in fact they surrounded us we had to come out and we had to bring the leadership of FRELIMO safe to Zambia. We cut the hole that brought us to Katete, a place called Kaswende where we brought President Machel, Chissano and the present President Guebuza and many of his members of government now back to Zambia. But we had confirmed on the ground that most of in fact larger than we learned was actually no go area for Portuguese forces. The Portuguese forces were timid. They made sporadic air strikes in areas suspected that freedom fighters were there, also maybe to show their government that they were fighting. I think that they had already lost the war. By the time the coup took place Mozambique was virtually free, except for certain areas which were also heavily surrounded. We toured Tete Province, Nyasa Province; going back to the other side of Tanzania, we went to Cape Delgado and Cape Nyasa and Inyebmani. We found that the support for freedom fighters was very very strong.

And that the forces that were fighting, the African forces in the Portuguese forces of Mozambique, I think they had already given up the fight. Similarly in Angola, it was the same....

We measure that support because they gave us information of patrols that were going out areas. And we confirmed on the ground that such information was true because except in a few cases where changes were made because of logistics or because they got information about the freedom struggle, in all cases the information became true. Even the Portuguese, white some of them were supportive. We had contacts that we cannot name for obvious reasons who were giving us information.

Next Zimbabwe, Rhodesia. Most of the strikes that we had here we knew in advance that they were coming. The fact that we were not able to respond positively was due to the fact that military in weapons we were inferior. We did not have sophisticated air support. We bought some air missiles from the British but it was the prototype. They real were not honesty and gave us what wasn't working. Eventually we only got help from the Soviet. They gave us weapons which were able to sustain some of the air strikes. So the support for the freedom fighters was not only from the people at grassroots but from the high level of command in these areas particularly if I move to Zimbabwe now.

During the time of Smith we had people who were operating within Smith's forces who would give us accurate information at the time and place of attack. We took certain precautions, we were successful in a few cases, but we were not able to down their aircraft. It was air attacks on groups of freedom fighters, like in Mkushi, like in Ngwerere here, like in Solwezi, where they were using sophisticated weapons with South Africans. Where they using aircraft that would go very long range and refuel air bone. So they were able to hit any part of Zambia and being able to fly back. Their air strikes were done in most cases at very high level so our ground air weapons were not able to be effective to down them. But all the same the battle was on the ground in the countries where they were fighting. In Zimbabwe I remember one of the highlights was when we were able to penetrate a task force which hit a fuel depot in Salisbury then. And it burned for over one week. They had to get support from Europe and Australia to come and put the fire out. The aim here was to ground them to a halt, but we only managed to get one task force through to the target. The other was targeted to get to Gwelo where there was another facility for fuel was captured by the Smith regime before it got there. If that had succeeded, Zimbabwe would have surrendered because they were not able to move after that. But even that one had given them sufficient notice that the struggle for independence in Southern Rhodesia....

This was 1979. I will check my memoirs. I had carried one of my memoirs and I have lost it. I lost it in the attack in South Africa when I was robbed last week not at the airport. We had already arrived at the lodge where we were going to stay. We were going to stay at the Airport Game Lodge which was 10 minutes drive from the Airport. I lost some of my materials but I think I still have some of the drafts which I

can retrieve, except I have to do the work twice. In Angola, yes. We had negotiations to unite factions.

This was very very difficult negotiations we held in what was the name of that place, in Lusaka West. They would not agree to come together and no progress was made after a long time of negotiations. We wanted to form a Government of National Unity in Angola. But this is where we had some problems, Zambia had support. Tanzania did not want Savimbi and others to interfere in the Government that was to be formed in Angola. They wanted MPLA alone. Zambia had a different approach because were able to see the efforts of UNITA and the efforts of MPLA. If we did not unite them there was going to be trouble in future because MPLA would not find it easy to go into areas liberated by UNITA. We foresaw this. And in Zambia we had given both MPLA and UNITA grounds to operate from. Literally from Kalabo down to the border with Namibia UNITA was more effective than MPLA. MPLA was not there. And from Kalabo area up to Mwinilunga.

The Southern Angola was controlled by UNITA, the Northern Angola was controlled by MPLA. So we foresaw that there would be trouble if we did not allow them to come together. We had problems here in Zambia even from our own students. There were some demonstrations here. That we were become divisionists and that we were siding with forces that would weaken the struggle, that it was paid a very high price. We knew that there was going to be very big trouble if we didn't do this.

I think at OAU both those who were supporting Angola under MPLA and Angola under Government of National Unity had a 50-50. There was not winner no loser. Here the Government resolved that we should have a Government of National Unity (in Angola). In the end I think the MPLA which controlled Luanda succeeded. The handover of government in Luanda when independence came was not smooth. The flag was just thrown by the officiating person, a Portuguese man who was handing over, from the ship and he left.

And Independence Day, I didn't travel there. But from the stadium where it was held, that is where the first shot was fired and people took cover/when they were celebrating independence. On the first day of independence that is when the struggle came. MPLA this way. Holden Roberto FNLA was supported by Mobutu in Zaire then, MPLA I was supported by Zambia and Tanzania. UNITA had also support from Zambia. FNLA under Holden Roberts. Was operating in the Cabinda area. Southern tip of the oil rich area. Surely one can see where the eyes were set. They were set on oil. Zambia was for Government of National Unity. We were operating them here and we knew that MPLA was not operating in the South of Angola because they were not passing through the Southern tip of Angola. We also knew that UNITA was not operating in the northern part of Angola. Because they were passing through here. So we knew that each time one of them only controlled a portion. It doesn't matter the size of a portion. It wasn't the whole of Angola. The best thing is if we had a Government of National Unity one of the Parties should have agreed to become junior party and take the position of Deputy and vice versa. And then later on, when

they were settled, an election would resolve their leadership. After they had united their forces. Because we knew each group had weapons and heavy weapons and left on their own they would fight. And we were not proved right! Sixteen years the war was ragging in Angola between MPLA and UNITA. If the Government of National Unity effort had been supported, such useless carnage of life would have been saved in Angola.

The factions were three, MPLA, UNITA and FNLA. Possibly Chipenda's group in MPLA could have joined in the fracas. But actually the first Civil War shot was fired there on the first day of independence.

After MPLA succeeded in Angola the relationship between Zambia and Angola would have been much smoother but there was some quietness to say the truth. But all the same we hosted Augustino Neto here, we still supported him, he knew that even in the unity fight, we still wanted him to be on top. And we were neighbours, therefore I would say it was lukewarm. It wasn't hostile at all, because we still had most of the cadres who had been fighting and the people of Angola MPLA here, with their properties. As I said earlier, the focus of our struggle was that the two wings of Mozambique and Angola if they were free, the Government of Mozambique and the government of Angola would also feel obligated to support freedom fighters. And SWAPO of Namibia and the African National Congress of South Africa moved from here (Zambia) to Angola. In fact late Chris Hani operated from Angola after Angola was hid liberated. The other one, Modise operated. Despite the Civil War. Actually the goodness was that although there was a Civil War, UNITA did not really oppose SWAPO. They were still comrades in Arms. The facts at hand were that UNITA was also fighting the same enemy which MPLA was fighting. MPLA did not have to come and fight in the South because UNITA was fighting them. Both MPLA and UNITA knew that the struggle they were waging in their own areas, were also being waged by their opposite numbers. MPLA were fighting from Central to North and from Central to South, UNITA fighting there. Both of them were receiving arms from the same sponsors. China, Soviet Union. And the fact that there was 16 years of war in Angola should have given even those opponents of Government of National Unity in Angola a thought. Because when MPLA was in control, from day of independence we stopped supporting any other party, even UNITA leader left Zambia. We could not host him. He had lost because we were supporting both MPLA and UNITA before there was a government. But when one of them became government, we had no choice but to support the Party which formed government, which we were supporting before any way. I will tell you the whole fact. The Soviet Union did not want UNITA. In fact I made an error. Soviet Union did not support UNITA. But China supported UNITA and MPLA. Soviet Union supported MPLA and did not want UNITA to come in. Because if UNITA came in then influence of China would also creep into Angola which would affect the influence of...this is high level politics I think which they were playing. China was for UNITA and to a certain extent Holden Roberto. But

Holden Roberto like COREMO in Mozambique were parties on radio and TV with a lot of propaganda but no fighting on the ground.

In Zimbabwe we had a serious problem also. We had ZAPU and ZANU, we had even FROLIZI under Chikerema and Nyandoro; you remember those names. They were also factions created by mainly the West. When Mozambique got independence we had a little fracas with ZANU because within ZANU there a struggle. We had Mr Chitepo who was National Chairman of ZANU. He differed with his own... there were some other factions who did not want...I think there are various ethnic groupings that want to gain upper hand of the governance. Herbet Chipepo was murdered in Chilenje (Lusaka) where they were staying in internal squabble: trying to size themselves up, who crosses the tape to win the race be the leader. I do not know what politics they were fighting but there were people who were disappearing in ZANU. We had some lecturers at the University who I cannot remember the name. I will remember. You see they were murdered. They were burned alive. There were some people in ZANU in the Eastern Province who were buried alive. I think out government, the Zambian government came out strong that we did not want the parties that were fighting for independence of their countries to settle their scores on Zambian soil. And that when they are in Zambia they must obey Zambian laws, and whoever commits offences on the Zambian soil they must get retribution. There was an international enquiry which was led by the late Reuben Kamanga to investigate this squabble. I think the results were not liked by the leadership of ZANU. So there was some little discomfort on the part of ZANU. Most of the leadership they moved their headquarters from here to Maputo. But they were still operating from here. We gave them our support.

ZAPU was operating mainly from Kariba going South. From Kariba going North up to Luangwa, Feira, ZANU was operating.

Yes, by population ZAPU strongholds were ethnical. They were mainly Ndebeles and Manazwa and opposite on the other side the Kalangas and Zezulus mostly favoured ZANU under Mugabe. At the time when the question of Southern Rhodesia was coming up the British were now trying to find a person who could lead Southern Rhodesia. They were not in favour of Nkomo or Mugabe. They wanted a neutral person to emerge. They created Abel Muzorewa. They took him from the Anglican Church and tried to groom him for leadership. And they - arranged with Smith - when Smith was withdrawing from leadership, they put Muzorewa to take over from not to takeover, he was handing over to Muzorewa.

Now Muzorewa, even when they were doing so, funny enough they were not calling him Prime Minister initially. They wanted him to be first Minister then they would appoint other Ministers, whether they would be second Ministers we do not know. That was the only time when...They wanted to form a country with two names - Zimbabwe Rhodesia. I remember we used to joke around that it was the only country that had a Christian name. The local name is Zimbabwe. Muzorewa was later to be Prime Minister of Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

But the intensity of the struggle went further. That the regime in the South decided that they have got to talk to the freedom fighters proper. That is Mugabe and Nkomo, Smith and they were brining on board Muzorewa. So they were four. Before the talks took place, they had some shuttle diplomacy between Zambia, Rhodesia and South Africa, because South Africa was the Godfather for Zimbabwe. South Africa was giving all the arms to Zimbabwe because that was a buffer state for them. If Zimbabwe was there wouldn't bother about it because Botswana would not risk freedom fighters there. And since they were holding Namibia also as another buffer state, they were quite free except for a small portion of the Limpopo from Mozambique, they were able to contain it very well.

So this diplomacy negotiated the release of Mr Mugabe and Mr Nkomo from prison. Actually I do not know whether Dr Kaunda said this or not, but Smith flew here (Lusaka) for negotiations unannounced. He flew here and we had discussions at State House and we agreed that he should also free the people he was holding ZAPU officials led by Nkomo and ZANU officials led by their President Mugabe.

This was arranged. Mark Chona was actually more involved in this. You might wish to visit him now that he is also in good books with KK. He might reveal some of the information first hand.

General Zuze told you that he spent sleepless nights guarding Ian Smith! was saying how he spent sleepless nights guarding Smith. Yes! Yes we guarded him and he took off unannounced. Not even a little incident that he came here! The media was not able to.... We also went to pick up Nkomo, Mugabe in our plane. I happen to have travelled on that plane myself to the detention camp in Gonakuzungwa. We had to branch off from the airport. Yes they were Zimbabwean detainees. Smith released them to come and have initial discussions in Zambia following the discussions that Mr Smith had. Yeah! The Zambian plane picked up the ZAPU and ZANU officials. Late General Haimbe and myself actually went and we landed at out ZAF Base. We brought them, and quietly we put them up at Mulungushi Village. We stayed with them for 4/5 days here. Nothing leaked out even to the BBC which is usually sniffing around. The security was really good. We discussed with them and we flew them back to detention. The agreement was that we would bring them back. They came and Smith had his own meeting. He was on his own negotiating with our Government. He was a guest of Dr Kaunda. That is when he said I can only release them on the understanding you that bring them back.

The negotiations started when the detainees were released the second time. When they were released the first time it was to agree on how, to brief them on the programme, that you go back but you will soon be released. But at the moment you know what you are looking for. Even their colleagues who were here we only allowed four to come and meet them. We told them that we were going to take them to another country. They came to and hugged him. From that time they did not go back to their homes, we took them also to be our guests at Mulungushi Village. They stayed here. Luckily enough there were no cell phones then and no telephones could go out.

When we finished we drove them back to their place and they went back. I am sure those who were worried that we were going to send them away. But so we came back and said you have returned from the country you went to visit, you can go to your families. So the four officials went. We told them that this not for broadcast because you will jeopardize future efforts.

I was appointed Chief of Military Intelligence in 1970. My main task was to get the struggle going. We had late Brigadier General Mulopa who became in charge of the Liberation Centre. He is the one who was seen. In Government operations the man you see in front is not the man doing things. The one who is doing things is the unseen hand. He is only talked 'to what' he has need to know so that he can carry on with the information. What he has no need to know he doesn't get it.

In the struggle I worked with liberation Movements, ZAPU, ZANU, liberation movements from Zimbabwe, from Angola, from Mozambique from Namibia and from South Africa I wasn't in charge....I was making arrangements to tell the Army Commander what is going to happen in certain areas the Air force Commander what is going to happen in certain areas just for their information not everything. My formal duties as in charge of Military Intelligence in charge of the Liberation Struggle were:

1. To coordinate the work of the Liberation Movements.
2. Coordinate particularly movement of weapons and ask for assistance here and there how they should move from one place to another.
3. Coordinate intelligence network in each of the countries with the commanders of individual countries.

In South Africa we had late Modise, he was the first Minister of Defence of South Africa. He deputy was Chris Hani. In Zimbabwe we had Tongogara for ZANU. His deputy was Rex Nongo alias Mujuru the Dept? Of the Vice President now. Tongogara was Commander, Rex Nongo, that was his Chimurenga name, was his deputy. Mujuru is his real name. We had Nibita in ZAPU, and his deputy was Lookout Mafera. Mafera later died in detention under the Mugabe government. He was deputy commander of the Zimbabwe forces when they combined them. Nikita had died in the Southern Province under a landmine. Tongogara also died under circumstances that are better left un-discussed in Mozambique. Before even the elections, I think he was driving from one point to another. If you switch off this thing I will explain. If I died in that struggle my blood would have been fuel for further struggle for freedom of Africa. And if I died in the struggle of Africa, I will be the happiest. I was regretting last week when we were being robbed and I thought that well if they kill me this is a cowardly way of dying. I should have died in real fighting against colonies not these sponsored fights that are sponsored by either international cartels to make Africa look they could not manage things for themselves or those that are fighting because they want to move the World Cup out of South Africa, so cause more trouble there, so

eventually Africa cannot host because they are not ready. So there are so many things at play.

Zambian military personnel were sent across to unliberated areas because we are prosecuting the struggle. When you are supervising I will tell you that I was very happy to go there. We were not intervening because the freedom fighters did not own any ground. It was under Portuguese rule. We were just supporting the struggle. We were stealing ourselves in. We did not announce that we were there. It was a quiet operation. I crossed the border into Mozambique Machel, Chissano, this one Gubuzo, we were in the same group. I am much better looked after when I am in Mozambique, in Angola, in Namibia than here.

We sent Zambian Army personnel to other unliberated areas in small groups. You see we were charged by Africa to prosecute the freedom struggle and some of the people would come and take two hours explaining how they fought a struggle which they made up in the air. So you have got to get there to see where they are saying that this area is a liberated zone. You should be able to go there. It is a risk because sometimes they will get you into an ambush. But that is part of the risk.

The Portuguese Government, the Rhodesian Government then South Africa had learned that we were in Nacala? About three weeks. Because when Machel was there even his fighters got motivated that our own Commander in Chief is here with us. he is fighting with us. So it was more fierce. We were having real battles every day. They were poisoning any ponds of water. We were not drinking water from the ponds or from running streams. If a stream is running we would go thirty metres to dig on the ground so that you drink water from the well. Then we knew that they drank from poisoned ponds. So all these are some of the things we went through or freedom fighters went through. It was really very solidly done.

Things which Zambia did for freedom fighters included raising funds and weapons. Because for example all these countries would not send weapons to the freedom fighters, they would send them to Zambia. So we receive the weapons but we know that.....It is like if you are going to Monze you come with a carcass. They say here is an animal...the chest is for you. When you come if they arrest you, it is you who is caught with an animal but you know that most of the parts are going to different people. So the Soviet Union would send weapons to Zambia, the Chinese would send weapons, other countries, the Chinese would send weapons, other countries, others allow help to come to us. When they arrive what goes to the defence force goes. This is where I also was part of my duty to make sure that certain weapons when they come to the Liberation Movements are kept separate till they are handed over. And when we hand them over is when they are about to cross the border. Apart from weapons for their personal security they are not given more weapons than they require except to defend themselves around where they are. We hosted every Liberation. We gave to each as many bases and camps as they required. In every province we had some but you see we didn't make them official, except for places like Nyango, Mayukwayukwa, Maheba. The camps where they trained people were in the hills, away from the camps

but within the vicinity. In Lusaka here we had Chikumbi, we had Westwood, in Mkushi, Mboloma in Luangwa in various positions, Nyimba District., Mwinilunga, Chavuma, Chinyama Litapi area. In Kalabo we had various camps Lukena, Sikongo area, Mapuwa, Mambolomoka, Shangombo, Imusho, Sinjembela itself, various areas. The first mine which killed people in Zambia was planted for me and Mr Mbala, now our High Commissioner to South Africa. He is still here if you want to talk to him he will tell you. We left her and we went to Trusho through Sinjembela. The two of us it was part of looking after the freedom fighters, these were the routes which they used. And I think one of the weapons was carelessly put in the vehicle and one of the game guards manning the area was already recruited by the Boers in Namibia. So when we passed through the Ngwezi Game Reserve when he was checking us and when he was spraying for tsetse fly, I say the way he took note of the weapon which he saw. Eventually when we left, he was jotting down and I could see in the rear view mirror what he was doing. So I reversed and asked him as if I was going to ask something. So when he came near I grabbed where he was writing saying why are you writing this? I gave him a pep talk. Mr Mbala also did.

Don't be used so forth. So we drove off. I think nearby there must have been some scouts from South Africa. So they must have come to him and he narrated everything. And we were to come back through that route so they planted a mine for our coming back. Now as fate would have it, when we got to Sinjembela, something I do not know how, but we said well let us pass through the Sioma Mission, and then maybe since it's late spend the night. We shall go back tomorrow, because we left certain information to pick on our way. We arrived about sunset at Sioma. And when we got to Sioma we found my elder brother's children, both of them very ill. They were suffering from measles they were not able to eat. The sister said these case are touch and go. So I was overwhelmed by responsibility. So I said well I think let us save life. This is not only life but my own life.

So at 3 a.m. we left for Sesheke and got them into the hospital. When we were at the hospital another requirement needed me in Lusaka with Mr Mfula. Mr Mfula was Assistant Secretary at the Ministry of Defence. We worked only two of us. Normally this thing we operate one or two, normally two so that someone else can take over like a co-driver or copilot. So we gave instructions to the command on the border, police and army, to go and pick the information for us and send it. So when we left, they also left and they hit that landmine. Two policemen and two soldiers died on the spot from that mine. If we had come back that way....

It was between Kalobolelwa and Imusho in Sioma Gwezo Game Reserve. From Sesehke you turn off at Kalobolelwa to Imusho. Imusho is where the border between Namibia, Zambia and Angola meets on the Kwando River. In fact we were reliving this incident with Mr Mbula at the airport when I met him. He was arriving and I was leaving for the Far East last week. He still has very very touching feeling for this incident, because when you see someone in the coffin what has died in your place, it's not very nice.

Mompati, Ruth Segomotsi

[3 November 2007]

Dr Ruth Segomotsi Mompati was a senior female freedom fighter of the African National Congress. After her military training she served in both Tanzania and Zambia. In Zambia she was a member of the Internal Political Committee whose role was to infiltrate cadres into South Africa.

Through Dr Mompati the study has been able to get valuable insights into the operations of female freedom fighters, structures of the ANC in Zambia, and the relationships between ANC and the host country Zambia.

My name is Ruth Segomotsi Mompati. I was born in the district of Fradeck in Kanyesa North Western Province. I come from a family of peasants. My father worked the land; my mother was an ordinary housewife. I lived in a very small village, even when we went to school everybody knew that when schools closed we had to go to the fields to go and work in the fields. My father never went to school, he taught himself to read and write. My mother went I think up to standard three. So I come from a family that was not educated. But whatever we did going to school was because my father was very interested in education. Somehow my father although he had never been to school himself, he believed that education frees. That, if you are educated you are a freer man than a person who doesn't have it. I went to school in Fradeck the Primary school. The reason why we went to school in Fradeck and not in the village was because at the village the nearest school was 10km away. So if we went to school there, we would have to walk 10km in the morning and 10km back home. Very long distance. So my father decided that he would go and work in a small town called Fradeck not far from our village. And this is how we came to live in Fradeck and attend school there. My highest level of education that I attained was to become a primary school teacher. I am a teacher by profession. I studied at Tigerkloof a school that was started by and set up by missionaries. And a school that was in the years when apartheid was very strong, it was one of the schools that was closed and part of it almost destroyed. It was the London Missionary Society which opened it. Actually it was the school where people from Botswana, even from here (Zambia), and the then Southern Rhodesia, attended school there because it was the area of London Missionary Society. People like Princess Nakatindi attended school at Tigerkloof, and Seretse Khama, he attended at Tigerkloof. It was quite a good school too. I taught for 8 years, and then at the end of the 8 years I got married and then moved to Johannesburg. That's when now I fully joined the liberation movement and became a full member of the African National Congress (ANC). That was in 1952. I was married in 1952.

My husband was a politician but he was not as mad maybe as I was. He believed in the struggle and I joined the African National Congress because he himself was a member of the African National Congress. I have a family and two children. Unfortunately my youngest son died from a tumour of the brain. But they were very

close with his brother and four months after he died his brother went to bed and didn't get up the following morning. But I have five grandchildren from both my sons who live with me now.

Being a freedom fighter was a very difficult job. Not difficult in what you had to do but difficult because you had to work under very difficult conditions. You had to work under conditions You had to work in other countries and you had to work at least

where the ANC was present. We worked under Comrade Oliver Tambo. One of the things that was emphasised is that we must not create problems for our host countries. It didn't matter which one it was and therefore everything that we did had to be done in a way that it would not create problems for the people who were helping us. People who were doing everything to assist us to move on with our struggle. We worked in these countries but were also helped by organisations and other countries outside Zambia. Some of our people worked from Tanzania. I worked from Tanzania myself at one time. Others worked from Zambia, others worked from Algeria, others worked from Egypt and others from London. So we worked at different places but those of us who worked in Tanzania and Zambia were very fortunate because the governments of these countries understood the work that we were doing and they supported us. Although their support was really not in the interest of their own country because they didn't have much they had very little resources and for them to share what they had with us was difficult.

Well the most important help that they gave us was that they allowed us to live in this country, they allowed us to work from this country, they gave us assistance and they gave us political support and also they gave us material support in that we were given houses. Some of us lived in houses which belonged to the government, we lived in houses which belonged to some of the people here, we had water and some of our people could work here. Actually a number of men and women who came from South Africa were teachers in Zambia for instance which was very good because it then meant that some of our people were actually employed here and they could support us also. Well not only did they make contributions to the liberation movement, but they also were able to form a sort of background for these young people because they were like homes to which our freedom fighters could go to visit. It was something that was very good, support that was very welcome to our freedom fighters. We also got support from the political parties of the various countries of Tanzania for instance, and political party of Zambia for instance. We worked with UNIP in particular, and we worked with the women's organisations. In most cases when we were invited to go to other countries UNIP'S women's organisation was also invited and in most cases it was very good to discuss some of the problems with them and to work together with UNIP's women organisation.

We did not go to Conferences as part of UNIP Women delegations. Usually they went as a delegation and we went as a delegation from the liberation movement. Because we came from their country, they knew what our problems are and usually it was to them that we first spoke about the political needs of our movement. To Mama

Kankasa for instance and two other ladies, just can't remember their names. We used to go to them to discuss the problems we wanted to put through particularly if we were at conferences in other countries. So that when they raise issues they should also raise our own issues. And it used to be really a great support to our struggle if they did that because then it meant that we didn't have to push alone all the time. We pushed and were pushed by them.

In fact one of the leaders of this women's movement as I said was Mama Kankasa and she was a very interesting woman. She was not highly educated but she was a very intelligent woman. She knew what she wanted and she was brave. She would come to us to discuss what we wanted so that when we raised these problems or requirements of our struggle of our liberation movement they could also raise them and give us support. It was always amazing that she was so calm and that she was able to put these our requirements into very good perspective. So, most of us had a very great admiration for her. And she stood firm when she felt we were right as liberation movement in asking for certain things she stood firm. She would not allow us to be made to change our minds because it was not in the interest of some countries. She was very firm. She felt if that was what our programme is what they could do is only to support our programme but not to tell us what our program should be.

Well, you know, women always had to fight for their place in any liberation movement. In any movement, in fact sometimes in any position in society. So we had begun to fight for the place of women even before we got home. So when we were now in the liberation movement, one of the issues we had to put before our organisation was the place of a woman in the liberation struggle. Where should it be? Should we really be left to cook when in camps or should we be part of the people who were trained? And one of the achievements that we made was that in our camps where training was done we were not treated as women; we were treated as cadres of the movement. We cooked as everybody did. We practised as every person did. We were not segregated when we went for shooting. They didn't say to us we are shooting today so you don't do anything, we'll take men. And when it meant baking bread it didn't mean that the women should go and bake. Our best cooks and our best bakers were our men cadres. They did very well and so this was through the work of women. The women made sure that they pushed for their place in the struggle.

There were women combatants. We made sure that there were a lot of women that came particularly to come and join the army. And we made sure that we were allowed into our army. And this we felt was the best way that we could encourage even our men. Because there was now healthy competition between the men combatants and women combatants. There were also those women who really were good to be soldiers. They were allowed to go into the army and fight. The army was open to anybody who wanted to go there.

We trained in the same places. Many trained in Cuba. They also trained in the German Democratic Republic. Some of our cadres were trained in the old Soviet Union. They also trained in the old Czechoslovakia, Cuba and the old German

Democratic Republic. And also trained in Africa. We trained in Angola, we trained in Zambia and trained together with our men. The commander was not a man or a woman, the commander was the best soldier. We had some female commanders although. I can't give you any names. Yes they were there.

Women after training crossed to go and fight in South Africa. Actually a lot of our women were killed. You know there was a time when nine women were killed who had been crossed into the country in Piet Retief in Natal. And there were some of our women who were mixed and were killed in the Lesotho. They had crossed and there in Lesotho they were killed by the South African Police. The South African Police were to know that they were there. So they went and killed them.

Women fought side by side with men. Actually we always felt that our women did more because our women were the mothers, they looked after the children. Because even when we were outside there were children born. They gave birth to children, looked after the children and they looked after the men who were their husbands. They cooked for them and kept the house for them and cleaned for them. And on top of that they themselves were soldiers. They fought side by side with the soldiers. The overall structure of the ANC in Zambia is that we had the liberation officer at the liberation centre, and then we had the representative of the ANC here. But apart from this we also had members of the ANC and the leadership of the ANC who were in the national executive committee of the ANC. And then we had these structures like in Zambia we had the structure in Zambia, Tanzania, London and all the areas where we had offices. So we had the usual political structure of the ANC. Furthermore, we had. We had the offices that belonged to the army, the Political

Military Committee and then we also had the office of the Committee that fell under that Internal Political Committee and I was head of that committee. Then we had other smaller committees to do various things. Then we had the army structures. We also had the political structures.

The Internal Political Committee's role was to infiltrate cadres into South Africa. I don't know how many cadres we managed to infiltrate into South Africa but we did it. People went in. They crossed the Zambezi. They crossed into South Africa. We know the routes our cadres took to go into South Africa, but the trails of that time ! Yes, I think we do know but I don't know whether I can say these were our trails.

For example we were told that the so called second front which was from Livingstone to Kazungula, was opened mainly with the support of the OAU coming in to say let's intensify the war. And we are trying to identify which liberation movements were crossing at that point.

You know there were these fronts, but it was very difficult because the first front was the front when we went through Zimbabwe when there was engagement with then Rhodesia, when our people crossed through Zimbabwe and engaged the then Rhodesian army. That front fought until the end. And the second front was then opened. For us we had the second front even before the OAU structures came in. We went to that side to see if our people could go through there. The second front, you

know these are some of the things you don't think of. We just took them on. In fact it was called the Eastern Front. It wasn't through Mozambique. It was to go through Zimbabwe into South Africa, sometimes through Botswana.

The second front was through Botswana. Mozambique was at war also so it was not a front until after 1974, 75. We worked together with ZAPU. Yes and then there was a relationship between the ANC and Chitepo ZANU. Before Chitepo was killed. Although we worked more with ZAPU at least the leadership of ZANU at the time, in fact our President Comrade Oliver Tambo had a good relationship with Chitepo. Because he was a very good political man and he made alliances that were in the interest of the struggle. But then when the ZAPU and ZANU came together then we also worked with them in that way. We worked with the Patriotic Front.

We were working together with the Zimbabweans. We were together with ZAPU, so we were crossing together. This was the excuse South Africa used for bringing in soldiers into Zimbabwe. I think in the beginning South Africa thought they could come in and out of Zimbabwe as they liked. They would just kill just out there and go away. But they in fact realised very early that that would not happen. In fact they themselves were killed.

Well some of our women cadres were arrested in Botswana but they were later released after some time. Even some of our men cadres went to prison in Botswana for a bit and later released. They were crossing to South Africa as ANC cadres. I went to Botswana to see them and give them some necessities particularly the women. While they were serving prison sentences in Botswana. They were arrested because they had entered Botswana without passports and some of them were caught with firearms used in fighting. Yes Tongogara was also arrested for making himself too visible in Botswana.

When I visited them while in prison, I took for the women sanitary towels, creams and things like that just the necessities and then you smuggle in even sweets. We were such smugglers. At one time our fighters had camps in Zambia. One of them was very near the road that goes to the Airport, the Great East Road. I don't know how far away from the turn off, you then turn left. And then we also had camps far from Lusaka. Although those were closed. We were asked to and moved far from the city. The ones near the city were closed.

We moved quite far. It was near the Zambezi River. I said you go up the Great East Road, and I don't know how far from here, you turn right. And near the river you have a tent. I know I was there a number of times.

In the beginning we were assisted by the socialist countries, particularly the Soviet Union. And then afterwards we were assisted by the Liberation Committee of the OAU, and of course the various countries. Then after some time we were able to get farms here in Zambia where we used to plough, grew our own food. And we also through assistance from Socialist countries opened a carpentry factory in Lusaka where we made house furniture which we sold.

Here in Zambia we managed to have farms. Well the land we got from people who owned it. We bought it. We were given by some people. Because they felt rather than give us money it was better to buy land and then we would be able to grow our own food. So we do not go every day to beg. As a result we were able to sustain ourselves as far as food was concerned. As for clothing we would get old clothing from Sweden and from various countries. We got material support and other support from the socialist countries and the anti-apartheid movement in various countries of the world. They contributed sometimes in kind. Sometimes Sweden gave us food, they gave us clothes and they gave us money. There are many countries that supported us that way.

We maintained links with people inside South Africa but communicating with people inside the country was a very confidential thing because if you communicate with people you get them into prison. So it was something that was not done by every member but by the internal organ of the movement the one that dealt with internal work. And that was headed by our President Comrade Tambo. It was at the highest level because it was the lives of the people you were communicating with that were at stake. And also it meant we would be destroying the communications that would help us get information from inside and give information also. We had some cells inside. So when we sent people inside they got to know about it and it sustained them and helped them. But sometimes people had to find a way of sustaining themselves. You just had to find a way. Because it was your life or finding a way of how to live in that hostile society. By becoming anything even a labourer on a farm. Or just manage to move around without getting into trouble. It was very difficult.

We were working with the people inside when deciding which targets to attack. So the people who were on the spot decided because we couldn't decide outside. They had to attack the kind of target which would really hurt the government. You know the government was shooting our people, killing them, and that is why they had to know what it is to be killed like that for nothing. Like bombing the place where the army gathers. It felt like our people were bad, but they were worse killers than we were. It was very difficult to fight in South Africa particularly because we were so far from our bases and we could never be sure that the person we thought was our contact was genuine. Sometimes we worked with a person for years and after some years he just decided that he was tired and sold to an agent. Sometimes the person you worked with for years is arrested. We had women freedom fighters, but when people were sent inside they did not decide that they were sending women or men. They sent the best cadres. And if among these cadres were women then those women went in. They were received by women who were in the structures that received people inside the country but not as women's movement.

We had internal structures that could receive or that would work with freedom fighters. These were ANC members. We had people in various countries such as Swaziland working for us. People went from Swaziland to South Africa all the time and from Lesotho to South Africa. That's where some of our young people who went in as cadres to carry out operations inside the county were killed in Lesotho. So we had

people everywhere, even in Botswana we had people fighting there. They were South Africans. One thing one needs to say is that countries like Zambia and Tanzania were very good to us because we were supported by the Heads of State in these countries. And because we were supported by the Heads of State our most senior leaders were able to work Tanzania and from Zambia. We had a lot of our freedom fighters living in townships such as in Matero, Lilanda, actually more in Lilanda, and also in Libala and in a number of places. I lived in Libala township. A number of us lived in Libala. We had houses there which we were given by government officials. I lived in one of the four roomed houses. We paid the rent. But you know although we paid rent, we were not really entitled to houses. Just where I lived there were about my neighbour, myself, the next street, one house and the neighbour were all South Africans, and then further on it was the same. And in Tanzania it was the same. In fact in Tanzania in Morogoro they gave us a place to build a school, to build a hospital and then we ploughed. In Zambia we didn't build schools. We just had farms where we ploughed. We didn't build schools and hospitals. Our children went to the local schools and local hospital. Even in Tanzania our children went to local schools but when they gave us the land, about 3000 acres, we built a school and built a whole settlement in Morogoro. Well we worked very closely with UNIP. We met at meetings and we met at conferences. And in most cases we worked together because they were supporting us. They were our supporters. So we had in most cases to inform them of what we wanted and to help us with what we would like to happen. Well I think that some of the things that we did together with the UNIP women involved the question of development of women. It was a subject we discussed because UNIP women were very keen and interested in developing their women. Giving them the opportunity to be part of the overall development of the country. But they were busy with their programs and we were busy with development because at the time Zambia was not a very developed country. We were the people who learnt with them and coordinated with them particularly when we went to other people. And in most cases they were the people who represented us and they made sure our voices were heard in some of these women's conferences.

The most outstanding land mark achievements of our involvement in the struggle were many. The first one was the young people who came from home. What was interesting was that all these young people were not interested in going to school. They wanted to go and train so that they can free their country. When you tried to convince them that this will be done by older people they don't have to participate in that part. They were very angry with you. They were determined they wanted to be free. So it was something that was very remarkable. The other thing is that it was not something that was done by the educated or the uneducated. It was done by all people of all levels of education. In this they were united to bring an end to oppression in South Africa. The other land mark that was very remarkable was when our people the Luthuli detachment went to South Africa because at that time it was difficult. They had gone to Rhodesia on the way to South Africa through Rhodesia but they

did not find the way they thought they would find. So they engaged the Rhodesian forces and the fight was very fierce. But what was interesting was that the Rhodesian army was well armed, very well trained being in a British army of course. But they could not even in the newspapers but praise our young people, that they were really freedom fighters. The next landmark was of course when we reached the stage when we were able to find ways of going into the country, to infiltrate our army into South Africa. That was about the best. With the independence of Angola, Mozambique and also the independence of Zimbabwe things became easier. Although even after independence of Botswana it was difficult with Botswana. But after the independence of Angola, Mozambique this was now the next when now we could go into South Africa through Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana and through Angola. And so it became easier to find our way into our country and come to drop things on them. We did not fight so much in the rural areas. The places where we had to engage the enemy was in the urban areas. And that is why we were referred to as urban guerrillas because we did our guerrilla work in the urban areas. We fought in the towns, in the cities, in the townships. There was very little fight in the rural areas because actually there the people were on our side. So we didn't have to fight them. They joined us to fight the urban dwellers. The greatest targets of course was the South African army. The police and those people who supported them amongst our people, who worked with them and were used to kill our people. Usually targets which were chosen... we didn't like targeting people, but we did particularly target the army if we could. And some installations, particularly the type of installations that assisted the South African regime to oppress us. The training of our fighters entailed the use of arms, firearms; it entailed tactics of war; it entailed physical training so that you are fit. It also entailed ordinary training of people when they are not fighting, you know, book training. There were a number of young people who had never been to school when they came out but went to school in the ANC camps.

When I came back from training I was in Tanzania. Our camps in Zambia were closed after some time. The usual training was firearms, tactics, a number of other things like the history of the struggle. Because people had to know why they had to fight. Also you were to be able to maintain yourself. To produce food where they were staying.

Our camps throughout the country were closed in Zambia. I cannot remember exactly when they were closed. We then trained in Tanzania and in Angola. Almost all our people were in Angola. But Chris Hani was also here at the time when we had camps here. Chris Hani was here. South Africa did not attack Angola just because we were there. But because South Africa did not want Angola as a free country. They wanted the diamonds in Angola. They wanted the oil in Angola. They wanted the coffee in Angola. They wanted everything that was in Angola. I think after the war frontline was broadened was the final landmark, if I am not making a mistake. Because after that then it became easy to do things. It was difficult but then there were several ways of going into the country and engaging the enemy in the country.

After the war of liberation the freedom fighters went to their various areas where they came from. The younger ones went to school. The others became part of their various areas, got jobs. Others went into Parliament, others went into various sectors of Government, and various sectors. A good number joined the army. This is a very difficult problem. For one thing it depends on the various areas. Because people don't all come from the same area. But the Government had resources for the various freedom fighters. But if there are people who missed out, it is not because Government did not make the necessary arrangements. It is only that sometimes human beings are human beings. All efforts were made. But it is possible that some did not, particularly those whose level of education was low and they get back and they did not want to go back to school.

Well, one thing that I would add is this one that sometimes there are people who miss out, and the sad thing is that these people who miss out had contributed. For one reason when you settle down on new ground you find that you are not part of anything. You cannot explain to yourself why you are just there. But Government has set pensions which go to people. And Government is trying to correct some of the problems where you find people who were in the army are not doing anything. Government is going out of its way to try and make sure that these people are employed and that they are assisted. The other thing is that of course we as freedom fighters will always be very grateful to Governments. the Government of Zambia,

Tanzania. First and foremost because they were the first two governments to give us a lot of assistance. And then of course the others after that which assisted us.

Moosa, Osman Ahmed

[15 September 2007]

Mr Osman Ahmed Moosa was born on 18 December 1949 to an Indian father and a Zambian mother at Chikabala village in Zambia's Petauke district. He obtained a Form V certificate in 1971. He thereafter attended the Zambia Institute of Technology [ZIT] in Kitwe on the Zambian Copperbelt, from which he graduated with a higher diploma in water engineering. Osman Moosa then joined the Department of Water Affairs for which he worked for thirty-three years, retiring in 2003. For most of his working, the informant lived in the Eastern province. He thus witnessed first-hand the atrocities Portuguese soldiers and later RENAMO renegades inflicted upon Zambian villages during and after the struggle for independence in neighbouring Mozambique.

My full name is Osman Ahmed Moosa. I was born in Chikalaba village, Chief Nyanje, in Petauke district on 18 December 1949. I completed my Form V education

in 1971. And I then went to NRDC for my water engineering course, and furthered it with a higher diploma at Zambia Institute of Technology in Kitwe, and then [I] continued working with the Department of Water Affairs, for which I worked for thirty-three years before retirement in 2003.

When we became independent in 1964, we were sympathetic with the harsh conditions of our Africans still under colonial rule in neighbouring colonies. That's why I think our government decided to render assistance to liberation movements. The leaders were thinking that liberating territories under colonial rule, would be an easy affair. Thus Zambian leaders committed themselves to freeing the other countries surrounding Zambia.

Among the nationalist leaders Zambia recognized were people like Robert Mugabe, who was once a teacher at Chizongwe Secondary School in Eastern province. Other freedom fighters who were friends to Kaunda and received Zambia's support included Joshua Nkomo and Samora] Machel.

I think that Zambia's geopolitical position, especially its landlocked nature, influenced our leaders support the liberation movements. They wanted to have an easy access to the ocean after freedom fighters in southern Africa liberated their countries from white minority regimes. In this way it was going to be easier for Zambia to export its copper to the outside world.

Unfortunately, the infrastructure in countries like Mozambique at that time was not conducive, particularly the roads. They were not strong enough to enable our heavy trucks needed for that type of trade. But the white man to the south had already a good infrastructure through Livingstone to the ocean. So we looked at the southern route via Zimbabwe as the best route through which Zambia could import and export goods. But I think that the conditions white minority regimes imposed on Zambia in order for the country to use such routes were very unfavourable. This included taxes that were so hefty that we were not getting almost anything from the copper trade.

In Mozambique, we had actually mainly two political parties. There was FRELIMO and then there was a breakaway [party] from FRELIMO, which became a rival to FRELIMO. This was RENAMO. So, when they won their independence and RENAMO thought the elections were not free and fair, they started waging war against the FRELIMO regime in Mozambique. But they had no base to wage war from within that country. Instead, they moved to the frontier between Zambia and Mozambique. In the process, we had a lot of problems.

One aspect that led to this unfortunate situation is that RENAMO renegades were constantly were running out of food. So they were going into our maize storages to steal food at night. After stealing, they would leave... but sometimes they would steal even our cattle to make relish for their food, break into the shops to steal salt. All such things. It was not actually a war as such. At the beginning of the Mozambican civil war, it was a like game of raiding for food.

Given this situation, the Zambian government deployed some military men along the Zambia-Mozambique border to assist indigenous Mozambicans. And these Zambian soldiers were also running out of food. So, the villagers in such areas as Ofumaile in Nyimba, Chikalaba in Petauke and somewhere in Nyanje in Petauke district were actually feeding our own soldiers so that they could effectively fight the Portuguese in Mozambique. We, in the Eastern province, gave humanitarian support particularly to the Mozambican soldiers and to our own Zambian soldiers. But before Mozambican independence, Petauke district particularly suffered no armed Portuguese incursions and no Zambian in the district was killed. However, Portuguese forces regularly raided villages in Katete, where some Zambian lives were lost, particularly in Chief Katumba's area.

This was because most of the Mozambican refugees and freedom fighters lived in Katete. Their main camp was in Katete district itself, somewhere before Chadiza, on the western side, as you drive towards Chadiza. That is where the camp was. I think at that time there was an incidence involving a man who was leading FRELIMO who was killed in a letter bomb. I think it was Eduardo Mondlane. The letter came to the camp on the Zambian soil and it was delivered to him in Mozambique.

There was a military base in Katete, and an entry point in the area from which FRELIMO fighters crossed into Mozambique. Other entry points were somewhere in Chadiza, in Tefelasoni and the Hofmerr route off the Petauke-Nyimba road. Another entry point was on the Lufingwe route in Chikalaba area, Petauke district.

Regarding relations between Zambia and Mozambican freedom fighters and refugees who fled to Zambia, the fortunate part was that most of the people in Petauke district originated from Mozambique. And most of the people that ran into Zambia from Mozambique during the liberation war in that country actually had relatives already living in Zambia. So, we did not have much problem at that time. The relationship was very good, very sound.

We expected that after Mozambique attained independence we would treat our common frontier as an open area, as if there was no boundary. After our relatives

shifted back to their villages, we thought that all would be well, but it was the opposite. RENAMO teamed up with villagers and looked at us as if we were enemies because we supported FRELIMO during the liberation struggle in Mozambique. I don't know whether they thought that we should have even gone over there to vote for them. They looked at Zambians in the border areas as their enemies.

Nonetheless, I think the relationship between Mozambicans and Zambians in our border districts today is generally quite good, except the relationship between some communities. After looking after refugees from Mozambique, we thought they can also keep us there, but the situation is not the same. Even when you enter Mozambique today, you are not well received. You see, they will pretend they don't know your language. They will use their language, the Portuguese language...

I think that Mozambicans' indifference toward Zambians stems from their low standard of education. The standard is still very low. They cannot read between the line, and religion in that country is still skin-deep. You know the vast land of Mozambique is still undeveloped, and some of the areas there have never been reached by a white man because of poor or the absence of roads in those areas.

During the struggle for freedom in Mozambique, some Zambian teachers were killed and nurses abducted, especially after 1975. You know, when we say we lost lives, for the people that were not here, it doesn't carry much weight. But for some of us who actually lost our uncles who were supporting us in school and other learning institutions, we really felt the impact and...have been struggling to survive since then. You know, the tradition here is: if a family owns cattle, that family is considered rich. But all our cattle is gone because of livestock thefts by RENAMO rebels. So, when we hear of the government restocking [cattle] because of the East Coast Fever in Southern Province, we ask ourselves: "Why can't it also restock animals in these districts where livestock was stolen because of the liberation struggle?" Cattle rustling is also a disease, you know.

We need to get back ...our wealth. I think there is need in the border areas, where we had these conflicts, for government intervention to bring the areas back to their normal lives. I can assure you, people there are struggling because the animals, which are the main source of draught power are no longer there, not because of disease, but because our colleagues stole them.

Cattle is very critical. Similarly, the government should rebuild the infrastructure which was damaged during the liberation war in Mozambique. Most of the infrastructure has not been repaired. We also lost teachers, you know, like at our school, Chikalaba. The teacher there was shot right in his house, and we don't know what agony of his spouse and the children are experiencing today, you know. So all those issues, I think there is need to take stock of them because...people...suffered innocently. Such victims should be compensated by anyone sympathizes with their plight, including the international community, obviously. They may come to their aid because we did not have a written agreement to compensate victims of the war of

liberation in Mozambique, you know. But I think the international community may come in and help the situation.

In a way it would be right to ask the countries we helped during their wars of liberation to compensate Zambia. But in another way it would be wrong because, you see, when you say, "I want to help you", at the end of it you don't expect me to get something from you. But, you see, we can always explain to them how much damage we experienced because of the assistance we rendered to them. And then it will be up to them to say "No, I think I can meet 1% of the damage that was created due to my situation." Maybe you leave it open ended to them but they must have facts.

Regarding whether Zambia's assistance to liberation movements was a sheer waste of resources, my reaction would be: "That is not correct; it was not a waste of money." When you hear a fight in your neighbour's house, you wake up and rush there even if the warring parties will tear off your shirt. As long as you have served the situation, you will be contented. I think Zambia did something quite great. You know, it's better as neighbours we move together, and not leaving each other a hundred kilometres away. That is a bit exploitative. We don't have to do that. So the situation as it is now, we are all independent, fine. But we must be moving together as independent states. I know our economies are at different levels of development, but we must sit down and ask ourselves the fundamental question: "Why are our economies at different levels?" You know, like the system we have started, the COMESA thing-you call it the... [Free Trade Area Agreement- is how we should be moving. For me, I strongly appreciate what the first independent government did to our southern African neighbouring territories which were still under colonial domination, which it helped to be independent. It was not a sheer waste of time, believe me.

Politically, we are now free and no one would dispute the fact that Zambia helped all these countries we are talking about to become free. Unfortunately, we are not moving together because of the differences in the visions, or constitutions. I think of three or four constitutions that are very different. You know, we were a British colony, and our constitution, like of Zimbabwe, is British-oriented. Mozambique has a Portuguese-oriented constitution. So their constitution as well is different from ours. So we manage our economies, differently from Mozambique but in a manner that resembles how Zimbabwe manages her economy. You know, the other time I visited Zimbabweans in 1995, I told them, "You were living Zambia in the 1970s." They didn't believe me. I told them that this situation of having midnight shows, we had it in Zambia in the 1970s. In Zambia now, we are too advanced, we don't have them. They thought I was joking, and they still have midnight shows now. No! So you see, they are actually trailing our footsteps. We want them to get closer so that we may move together.

I think the levels at which we are with our education and the system of government-multi-partism- I don't see any possibility of unity because even uniting the nine provinces in Zambia alone is not easy because each province has got its own culture. For example, in those days, soon after independence, an Easterner could not marry a

Westerner, as they had their own reservations, and we accepted them. So, I don't know whether a Ndebele would accommodate an Easterner or a Bemba. You see, if in our own small [way], we can still identify who is who, I don't know whether....

It's tough to unite African countries because, you know, as, I am saying, in each country there are different cultures, and culture is what shapes a country's vision. So even at government level, the community plays a very important role. Looking at the poverty levels at which we are, other African nations will be saying: "But they are too poor. Why should we unite with them? They will milk our economy!" So, I think it will take a bit of time. Maybe our grand-children may reach that level of unity. But, you see, where we are, we can only strive to unite. I don't see [much] hope because there is so much greed in each and every one of us. To have that type of situation [i.e. regional unity], you need people who are open and not greedy.

The steps we should take to achieve unity include creating a corruption-free environment. In this way, we can accommodate our friends. For example...in Botswana, no one can steal government property; no one can damage anything. If we can also reach a level where we have no corruption, definitely other countries will accommodate us. But what we have written and reported about ourselves is so bad that no one can take us seriously.

I think it was at governmental level at which the OAU assisted African governments to serve as mediators in the conflicts associated with the struggle for freedom in southern Africa. I think that is where I saw the significance of the OAU. I never heard of the OAU giving out material assistance to movements of liberation. Neither did I hear of the United Nations Organization doing the same. It is the Red Cross is the one we used to see, [helping] casualties. What we saw even after independence in Mozambique is the Red Cross. We used to see their vehicles. The UN came in very, very recently, particularly when the civil war in that country became very critical. When it became very critical, that is when we heard of the United Nations. The UN then opened a resettlement centre in Petauke district at Ukwemi refugee camp. That is where they settled refugees. Even the refugees from Rwanda and those from the present-day Democratic Republic of Congo were settled there. So the role that the UN played was to look after the vulnerable [during] the Mozambican civil war.

At grassroots level the Commonwealth played no major role in the liberation of Mozambique. Maybe it did so through the central government. The same may be said of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Before the civil war commenced in Mozambique, we did not lose any lives in Petauke. No, during that time we did not. We were well protected by the Zambian soldiers who had a military base at Chikalaba. The Zambian soldiers there reinforced FRELIMO combatants, you know. In the night, they used to reinforce the liberation groups in Mozambique....I would say they played a duo role: protecting FRELIMO fighters as well as the villagers against the Portuguese.

I remember that there was once a major confrontation between the Zambia army and Portuguese forces at Mfingwe. One night, they fought very, very heavily. On our

side, I think we lost about two soldiers because of the fighting. We saw two dead bodies flown off from the Chikalaba Primary School airstrip the following morning. The Zambian soldiers sometimes used to share food with FRELIMO combatants.

When the Zambian government supplied food to its soldiers, they share[d] it with the FRELIMO soldiers. Even the medicine, they used to share with them.

If we were to support liberation movements against we would still do it today. We are used. We would do it again. It's in our blood, especially that Zambia is now a Christian nation. So, we wouldn't let down our colleagues. We would]still stand up and help our colleagues. But his time we would be clever. This time we would say, "Oh, we have the muscle, you want the assistance? We can reinforce you, but what do we get at the end of the day?"

As to what we would ask for in return, the situation would dictate. If bridges are damaged in the course of assisting freedom fighters, like the way we lost the Luangwa bridge, they should come and repair the bridges. The school is blown off, they must repair the school; lives have been lost, there must be an agreement about compensation....

When we helped our neighbours to become free and they became free, we should have realized what the intentions of their white adversaries were. The same colonizers we helped freedom fighter to chase, the people who buy our copper, have started manipulating the prices of copper to make sure that our economy goes down so that we pay a price for having chased their relatives.

Because of this, I can tell you we are in a total mess. You know, we are not [economically] independent. As we are saying, we are still dependent on foreign aid. Most of the things we [possess] in this country, we don't manufacture them. They... come from outside. So, they have played a lot of gimmicks on the value or the strength of [the] Zambia Kwacha. They have already [negatively] rated our strength against the dollar. We know how bad the situation is...

I am not...very much aware of what was happening between FRELIMO and RENAMO, and what role Zambia played in harmonizing their relations.

Mukuni, Samuel

[10 June 2008]

Mr Mukuni has been a resident of Lilanda Township in Lusaka since 1969. He lived in the Township with SWAPO freedom fighters and ANC freedom fighters. He was a firsthand witness to the struggle and reveals how much Zambia had to sacrifice in order to assist the neighbouring countries to liberate themselves. Mr Mukuni concludes that the sacrifice was necessary and worth it.

My name is Samuel Mukwani Mukuni. I was born in July 1933 in Sefula Mission in Mongu. I came to Lusaka about 1936 accompanying my mother who was re-marrying having lost my father. My stepfather worked for the Government Printers at the time. We stayed in Kamwala, at that time called Ma'round compound. I started school in Lusaka in fact at Methodist School in Chibolya. I later transferred to Munali Training Centre which is now called David Kaunda. Yes, later on what you call the lower Munali Training Centre middle of the school was transferred from Munali to Chilenje because we had...we had to move to the Chilenje suburbs. So a new school was constructed there and the lower middle that is from Sub A to Standard 4 was transferred to the Chilenje new school. So we went there. Fortunately upper middle was started at the same school at Chilenje and were the first people to go in Standard 5 there and it went up to Standard 6 upper. So after my Standard 6 upper in 1951, I started work at a butchery called Lusaka Meat Market as a clerk. In fact I was an Accounts Clerk. I worked there while I continued doing some private studies. I did my Form II about 1960 or so.

I left Lusaka Meat Supplies in 1963 and joined Keys Limited which later became CBC. I worked there only for three years. My former employer at Lusaka Meat Supplies wanted me back so I moved and continued my work there. I was made Manager for the Lusaka Meat Supplies butchery and I worked there up to 1977. The firm was wound up and my employers left. They were of Polish origin. So they went back home. I remained with their son, temporarily, whom they left on their farm. In fact I only stayed there for 2 years, then I left and started my own business, transport business. I bought myself a truck, a Mercedes Benz truck, which I used to ferry cattle for the butcheries from Namwala, Western Province, Mongu to Lusaka. Yes, in 1992 I found it difficult to carry on with business so I sold the truck and retired.

Yes...I have lived at this place since 1969 and in Lilanda house number 669. Lilanda was established by a Doctor Alexander Scott who was for sometime Member of the Legislative Council. And he was also owner of the First Permanent Building Society which was nationalized and renamed Zambia National Building Society. Yes, this is the firm that used to give mortgages to people who bought or purchased houses in Lilanda. This scheme was brought about by the same Doctor Alexander Scott. This area was his farm and he started this as the African Home Ownership Scheme. And I benefited in that I got a mortgage from the same firm first Permanent Building

Society. I have since bought this house completely. I have paid off my mortgage. Yes, I think this is all about myself.

The dates, I am sorry I can't remember, but I know that here in Lilanda we had Namibians first, the South Africans came a little later. They were given certain houses amongst us. Yes, and we lived very very peacefully with them. They were just like ordinary citizens. I remember that one woman was in fact studying at the University of Zambia. She was taking a law degree at the same time as my daughter. So they used to come here and study almost all night. We regarded them just like own fellow citizens. There was no quarrel at all, it was quite peaceful. In fact other people made very very great relationships with these people that when they went back some were very very sad and others still come back to see their colleagues whom they left back here. I know other people who have been to Namibia to see their old colleagues. Unfortunately I had not much contact with the freedom fighters proper. I haven't even seen a gun (laughs), from a freedom fighter, the ones that we used to stay with. They were peaceful. From our leaders we heard that these people in fact were all the same, even those who were in the camps, in the refugee camps, because here I am talking about the people we lived with in the community. Yes, but our leaders assured us even those who were in the camps and in refugee camps where they were pursued by South Africans were also peaceful or rather they were just camps and not military camps as they were called by the Rhodesians and the South Africans. Yeah, if there were any arms in those places some of us didn't know. The only incident probably where I saw firsthand was when the bombs were thrown at Chikumbi. Yes, then we could see vehicles carrying people, injured people, in fact even dead, people driven to the UTH. I think that is the closest I came to these skirmishes....yes.

Yes, freedom fighter is a term for everyone, but we had our own freedom fighters in Zambia, the Kaundas, the Kapwepwes, even me I was a freedom fighter but I never carried a gun,...(laughs) I don't even know how to shoot. So there are many types of freedom fighters. You can fight for freedom peacefully and you can fight with arms. Fortunately, for us in Zambia our extent of using arms was very very limited probably one or two shots were fired by freedom fighters. This was different for our friends, say Southern Rhodesia, Zimbabwe now, and South Africa. And you can't blame them if they used guns they were pursued by war-planes and they were bombing those areas which we called refugee camps.

In fact the motto by Rhodesia and South Africans the notorious Selous Scouts, when following freedom fighters, their motto was 'search and destroy.' Wherever you find a camp, 'search it and destroy it,' 'put it on fire and let go.' And so they (freedom fighters) were forced also to return fire either when the South Africans came or before they came, they would go now into South Africa and fight.

The freedom fighters we lived with in the compounds, they were very, very peaceful people. In fact I would say they were also refugees. They just left South Africa for fear of being pursued. There was a bit of fear. Smith was Cavendish and if there was any

plane that comes up there, you would hear shouts of fear from the young ones who even shouted Smith uyo.....Smith uyo.....!

Yes, it was exactly like that, because then after that we experienced a lot of bombs, bombing. We could hear the sound ‘boomm bomm!’, They were so loud, I don’t even know what to say. When they travelled in their helicopters they even sat on the helicopter doors! They were flying very low. They knew no one would attack them. Probably the only complaint we would have against our government is that they didn’t shoot these fellows down. But our President was a very peaceful man. He said we don’t want to fight because it’s our people who are going to get killed. And ah, on our part we used peaceful means.

I remember we had labour migration, I mean labour recruitment from Western Province for people to go and work in the gold mines in South Africa which was called WENELA that’s right. You would work on the mines in South Africa. And this system was also in Malawi. Malawi had a greater part of it than Zambia. And I remember the then President of Malawi, Dr Kamuzu Banda refusing to join the rest of the world in putting sanctions on the Zimbabwe and South Africa. Kamuzu said no ‘me I am not entering this fight. Let my people go and work. But here in Zambia it was stopped because we were peaceful fighters.

Kamuzu went on the air where he even emphasized saying, “if the interests of the Malawian is at stake then my Governments will take no action but if it is for the benefit of the Malawians, the whole world must know I am telling Africa as well as the region. No matter what these fake friends are saying about South Africa I will still have contact with the Boers.” He was a very good friend to the Boers, and it was only by doing this that he demonstrated that.

So Zambia did take part really in a very.....in a very, very peaceful way, we fought for our independence very peacefully and won. In fact we got our independence faster than those who were using arms, yes.... I remember that song by this man, “Kalipinde”kulibe muntu wina okosa ngati Kaunda, kulibe muntu wina okosa Kaunda ahaah ahaah ahaah amenya nkhondo nama namau.... o’ oka ... singing..... and laughs together.....!! That was Kalipinde!

So when we talk about Kaunda, we should be able to recognize what good Kaunda brought. Well somethings went wrong and up to now I still find articles written by our first President explaining how we got involved. Some of our colleagues who opposed Kaunda, yes they opposed him because opposition for the sake of it. But I don’t know what they would have done if they were in the same situation. What would they have done if they were in the same situation? What would they have done differently? Smith blocks the railway this side. So Kaunda frantically searches for way out to the sea. He brings in Chinese to build the Tazara railways. And the Oil Pipeline. The pipeline, the oil pipeline, all these were frantic, they were not things that were planned at independence, they were just unforeseen circumstances. So that meant more money being diverted from development, although even that was development, but development was needed at a certain area, we wouldn’t have needed a pipeline

immediately. No, we have even, even Tazara itself, so these are some of the ...issues during this difficult time. Then there was Hell-Run road. Hell-Run road was bad. It was called hell-run because it was very muddy. It was terrible. There was a lot of tankers, the Somalis and I don't know I cannot tell you how the Somalis got in, but we had a lot of them on the hell-run. It was called Hell-Run because it was hell, trucks would overturn. But this was done to maintain Zambia bringing fuel. And then when you ran short of sugar you say no because Kaunda made us line up! I think we were going through very difficult times. Because of them (neighbouring countries) they are now shouting at us, even these guys here (South Africa) troubling our people yet we sacrificed, we sacrificed for them, that's why I definitely I can't understand especially the South Africans. I think we helped the South Africans more than probably the Zimbabweans in my own opinion. So when I find them doing that, I really don't know. Maybe they have better reasons I don't know....(laughing)

What could have brought the disturbance of peace (xenophobia)? Is it an internal part of ANC, or some other factors? It won't be long before they are in the same trouble like Zimbabweans because their land problem is bigger than Zimbabwe. They soon will be going back on it. Somebody said, my son always goes to South Africa, he came here recently saying when you are there at the bus stop or on the bus the South Africans say, "the day Mandela will die that's when things will change because then, we shall take the law into our hands. We are only respecting the old, how can all these foreigners come?" These foreigners have been going to South Africa to work in the mines from the time when I was still a baby! I remember that in Western Province they were in fact transported by plane. Planes used to take them there to work in the gold mines. I remember there was a joke (laughs) these artists said or rather it was a saying, anyway, that I am not stupid like a wenela man who puts 'mamina' in the pocket.' Because you know, people were just developing, the country was still very low down, so to see someone take out a hanky cleans his nose, in fact blows his nose, and then puts the handkerchief in the pocket, they laughed at him. They said, 'me I am not stupid as that man from Johannesburg who put mamina in the pockets.' Because they (the WENELA recruits) were the first gentlemen we had. Where were the owners of the land? Why couldn't they do those jobs without needing foreigners. So foreign labour is not a new thing to South Africa, it's something they have lived with and if they want to end it let's suggest they end it peacefully. (discussing xenophobic attacks). Let them talk and say no more people from outside and give us time to vacate our nationals. Otherwise they will be finished and production will go down, then they will be economically poorer while we are jumping.

Otherwise to get back to the subject of the matter on the liberation, a lot can be shared because Zambia as a country played a very critical role in the independence of these countries like Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Angola and Mozambique. Zambia lost a lot economically and in terms of life. So many Zambians were caught up in this web of the liberation struggle for these other countries. Our country

sacrificed for these countries. We gave what we had to live on ourselves to support our colleagues.

Zambia today would have been somewhere higher in terms of economic standards. You see, at one point in the history of this country, we were the richest country in Africa and our economy was better than most developed countries in the world. The Kwacha was very strong in the 1960s and 70s after independence. We had so much copper compared to the other countries in the world, and this copper sold very well on the international market. Zambia had the potential of becoming most successful industrial and economically advanced country today. But as you may know, the truth of the matter is that the country gave a lot of its resources for the freedom of the other countries in the region, and probably other parts of Africa. We had the spirit to give and support unsparingly. We kept a lot of our brothers and sisters who suffered atrocities in their liberation struggles. We had supported South Africans so much and so many of them unsparingly. We supported a lot of our Zimbabwean colleagues through and through to the attainment of their independence. Because we knew deep down our hearts as Kaunda used to say that their sorrows are ours, their victories are ours too. All in all it was a fight for African freedom. Unfortunately these are critical facts of our history that may not be appreciated today, but yet very important. We are enjoying from what others had sowed in terms of their own lives.

The sacrifice by Zambia however was without any doubt worth it. I think I have already indicated that their (freedom fighters) sorrows were our sorrows, their victories were our victories. It was worth a prize.

Mulafulafu, Samuel

[23 June 2008]

Mr Mulafulafu spent part of his childhood years in Senanga West. SWAPO freedom fighters had their freedom trails and crossing points along the Senanga west border with Namibia and Angola. Mr Mulafulafu narrates how groups of freedom fighters would be seen disappearing into a thicket. He also recalls being hospitalised at the same district hospital with SWAPO combatants wounded in battles with racist troops.

Later, after secondary school, Mulafulafu went for National Service. National Service cadets were used to guard key national installations such as bridges, post offices, etc. His group intake in 1981 was however the last since with Zimbabwe's independence the pressure on Zambia's defence forces was much reduced.

My name is Samuel Mulafulafu. I was born in 1961 in Kaoma district in 1961 but I come from Mongu. My parents were teaching in Kaoma. On 23rd August, 1970, I was in grade four and we moved to Senanga district, we were transferred from Kaoma. I did my grade one to four in Luampa Mission in Kaoma. I continued my Grade four in Senanga at a school called Lilyachi in Senanga. No. In fact we were transferred to Lilyachi when I was in grade 3. I continued my grade three in Lilyachi. In the middle of grade 4, I was transferred to another school in Senanga West called Silowana. It is now called Nakatwelenge. Thereafter I completed my grade 7 and in 1976 I went to St. Johns Secondary School in Mongu and from there I went to the university.

In 1980, after completing secondary education I went for military training as it was compulsory that time. Every school leaver had to undergo military training. I did my military training in 1981 because in 1980 I was completing school. I went to Kabwe for military. After finishing the military part of national service in 1981, I just did a bit of production unit and went to the university and that was in September and October.

We were opening at the university, so we had to be cleared after we did 6 months military training. It was about 2 months of production. I was at UNZA from 1981 up to 1985. Then I went to Senanga to teach at the secondary school from 1985 up to 1988. It was about two or two and half years and then I came back to university for post graduate studies in 1989. Then I went back to teaching at St Mary's, here in Lusaka. That was in 1991. I taught there for about 8 months, and then I resigned to join the Catholic Bishops Conference. I am still working up there to date.

Yes we heard in 1972 of liberation struggles when we moved from Lilyachi to Silowana especially between SWAPO and South Africa which was occupying Namibia that time. Silowana is in Senanga West and in an area which is bordering Angola and also quite close to Namibia, but not too close as Sesheke. The experiences that we had were that, at that time, Zambia was hosting a lot of camps for SWAPO. Senanga had several camps far from the border. Not permanent camps, we used to have temporary ones in the area. The SWAPO cadres would camp in the thicket for

short periods. Somehow people knew that these people were fighting for some just cause for independence. People had some political sensitisation. I remember on many occasions in the morning, I would wake up and hear huge exchange of gun fire between the SWAPO and the Boers. And this may be for an hour or two. The gunfire noise could be heard maybe from 05:00 hours up to 07:00 hours, and then around 16 hours, we would see groups of SWAPO fighters come through, some were injured and after that they would disappear in the thicket.

The injured fighters were being treated in our own hospitals, I remember in 1975 when I was in grade 7, I was hospitalised because I contracted hookworm, it was about August to October and there were many SWAPO cadres who were in the hospital, sharing the facilities together with the locals. They were injured coming from the frontline. That was the district hospital in Senanga. That time it was called Litambya hospital.

The war caused quite a lot of damage. Our roads were heavily landmined in Senanga west. In fact up to now, there are still areas which are still known to have the possibility of landmines. I am aware of people that were killed because of their vehicle running over these landmines. I remember there was a government vehicle, a Land Rover, which was coming from Sesheke, I can't remember the department it belonged to, it ran over a land mine and a lot of people were killed in that land rover. The Boers used to come inside Zambia moving from Sesheke to Angola. And sometimes they could mount road blocks on the Zambian roads. They searched villages and intimidated people so that they could reveal the whereabouts of freedom fighters. It was quite hectic. The other experience was, when I was in Form 3 at Saint Johns in Mongu, Sesheke secondary school was bombed. That was in 1978. Sesheke was bombed, so pupils from the school were sent away. I remember by that time I was writing my exams which are done in Form 3. So two Form 3 classes from Sesheke were brought to Saint Johns to finish their term and write their exams. I remember people like Mpundu Mwape. Other classes were sent to other schools but we had two classes at our school. I don't think the infrastructure in Sesheke has ever recovered since that time. A lot of property was destroyed and students were really behind except for those who were in examination classes. Similarly places like Shangombo which was also bombed, was completely abandoned. That is why up to now, even setting up Shangombo district is problematic because a lot of infrastructure in that area was destroyed.

Relations between the freedom fighters and the local community were good. Some SWAPO cadres had some relationships with Zambian women and vice versa some Zambian men had relationships with SWAPO women. I remember in March 1995 or 1996 when I was out of Western Province and working here in Lusaka, the gentleman who came from Namibia working for Justice and Peace Commission came with some letters looking for children of his brother who were born with a Zambian mother. That was unsuccessful. Life was however not easy for local communities. It was not possible to farm because of landmines. So it was an area which was prone to relief

food. It is very difficult to say who is responsible for the small arms that are currently being used in the Western Province for cattle rustling and so forth. The story is that these arms were bought from Dr Savimbi's UNITA fighters. It is however possible that they were left by SWAPO.

National Service played an important role in the liberation struggle in that they were guarding bridges and some security places and some were even attacked and killed. But the 1981 intake was the last group to go for national service. By the time we served in national service in 1981, the most notorious group of Ian Smith which used to raid Zambia had stopped when Zimbabwe got its independence. So there wasn't much pressure on the national service.

Zambia paid heavily in terms of money, infrastructure and human lives but I think that we would do it again given the same situation. That was really good solidarity with our neighbours to ensure that they got free from the colonial bondage. In Senanga, Zambia provided camps for SWAPO freedom fighters such as the camps around Likamba and Boma area. There were also camps in Lui for SWAPO freedom fighters. Camps for refugees were in Mayukwayukwa, in Kaoma.

The question of compensation for communities and those who lost family members in the struggle is very difficult. The first question is who will compensate them? But the issue is that if there are any who are living, who were injured, I think they should be looked after by the state of Zambia. I am however not sure about this because we were not assisting freedom fighters for any personal gain. Moreover we knew that if we support people in liberation who were fighting one could get injured, so it is a very difficult question.

It depends on what expectations we had. If the expectations from my point of view was to have those neighbouring countries free, self governed and manage their economy, for me that is good enough. And if that in itself it helps to promote good neighbourliness in issues of trade, political relationships, this is even better. I do not support a situation to expect those to repay us for having supported them during the liberation struggle. It was a priceless effort. I don't think there is anything unusual in the way free Namibians, South Africans, Zimbabweans, Angolans and Mozambicans are treating Zambians. In general terms the relationship with all these countries is okay.

The local communities sacrificed a lot for the liberation process and they could not ensure their own safety in any organized manner but many people were security conscious and they knew who was a stranger in the community and who wasn't. Furthermore that time the Zambian military presence was quite available to deal with the issue of security. People were living their lives in the normal way. Freedom fighters did not discuss freely matters of their engagement with the Boers and neither did they operate within communities. Apart from those social engagements when the fighters used to stray in drinking places and so on. They really kept to themselves in the camps because they were fully aware of how much they were risking the lives of

the locals by their presence among them. The fighters used to pass, get help that they needed, but not really give intelligence information to the locals.

Naturally, the sharing of space was itself a challenge. Like I told you that the whole of Senanga west had agriculture on a stand still. People could not farm. A lot of people died from starvation and it was known as a chronic famine area, not because of drought, but because of the liberation wars going on there. People could not grow crops for fear of the landmines. So that was a big challenge. But if you look at camps like where the refugees were staying, like in Mayukwayukwa, these camps were well-known and there were quite some visits to this area. In fact, I even worked there as a volunteer. The refugees are settled with a lot of indulgence from the international community, with good schools, good clinics as compared to our Government funded dilapidated schools and clinics. The community had a bit of resentment that they were not accessing those facilities. That is why, in later years, there was a change of policy and the locals were also allowed to access the schools and where refugees were attending. Some of the refugees were quite industrious in agriculture, in business and so on. The conflict was there, but generally on balance there was more of good will in the area of co-operation between refugees and the local people. The liberation struggle is a revolution; it is a process of change. Your satisfaction should be in the fact that change was achieved. If we are looking for rewards from the neighbouring countries, I think we are not a people who are ready to do that.

Mulenga, Doris

Doris Mulenga, Journalist and Broadcaster, has been an active follower of the liberation struggle first as a school girl at The Kamwala High School and then when she started work at Zambia Broadcasting Services (ZBS). She served as Controller of Radio in the Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation (ZNBC) formerly ZBS from 2004 to 2007.

In 1981 and 1982 I was passing my time at ZBS (Zambia Broadcasting Services).

By then I was doing educational programmes, but all my life I have been involved in what today I would call an announcer. I was a controller of radio from 2004 to 2007. I belonged to radio broadcasting and I think what gives us that drive with the audience is that people cannot see the person who is behind them. It is a mystery.

About the liberation struggle, I know it is a period when there were quite a number of curfews. From time to time, you would hear bomb sounds but in essence, at the end of the day you would discover that what was being dropped were fliers. I don't think they were dropped by the Government of Zambia. If it was Zambia, I am sure they would have distributed them to us. There were quite a number of parcel bombs. It was a time when there was a lot of information by, I suppose, the Ministry of National Guidance if I can recall properly. We were given this piece of information that people were not just to open letters. We were supposed to be very sure of parcels from abroad, otherwise we were advised to refer them to security officers. Such was the situation until that day when we were running over each other trying to jump out of windows. It is many years back, I can't remember. Give or take but I know in 1979 there was curfew some time in April because it had something to do with somebody passing away. That day, from the time I woke up it was a normal day. I was a student by that time at The Kamwala Secondary School in form five. Grades, as we know them today came much later. It was a normal day and my father dropped me at school. That day we heard sounds of jets or airplanes. It was not very comfortable and some of our friends took refuge in trees as we looked out of the windows. Planes were flying very low and we were scared and wondered what was happening. We became more worried with the knowledge that the ANC (Africa National Congress) had their offices just where the Military Training School is today (Kamwala Defence College). We were a bit worried because they had their headquarters here and the planes were flying pretty low. What we got to learn later was that the bang we heard was a mixture of just fliers being dropped and that some actual bombings had taken place somewhere in Lusaka and at that particular time we did not know where this had taken place. So those noises set the whole school scampering in all directions. In my class I recall that we were having Religious Knowledge class with a Catholic Father, and we started jumping over each other to get out. The Father was trying to go under the table while trying to tell us to remain calm. It was not a nice day and the school was closed at around 10:00 hours. We all left in different directions and as we were going outside we were hearing all sorts of stories.

The Town was very close, so we decided to go to town and see what we could do, because most of the time we could not go into town. We found ourselves in town and I personally witnessed a lot of violence in part of the Cairo Road, as we moved towards the Post Office. I thought of the bangs we had heard earlier and we saw some vehicles that had bodies of people. We were curious and interested to know what was happening and where these people had come from. We heard people talking about Chikumbi but I did not really know where it was. All we knew was that Chikumbi was a place for refugees from Zimbabwe and freedom fighters. That time we took it as freedom fighters fighting for freedom but didn't really know what experiences these people went through as they were fighting for freedom. I don't know. Even in town that day there was a lot of noise so we decided to move away and we left.

At another point in time I had an experience in town at the main Post Office. I saw two light skinned people who were definitely from South Africa. They were also freedom fighters living in Zambia and we met by the stairs. They were going down as we were going up. Just as we passed them, we heard a bang and naturally, we went to see what had happened. The other man had just opened a small parcel which contained a bomb. The palm of his hand was cut off and there was blood dripping where his hand had just been cut off. This is when I recalled the warning of not opening any parcel if there was anything suspicious about it. What was interesting was that we were even beginning to talk about it. I didn't even imagine myself that I would be able to talk about it today. I felt sorry because we had just passed these people; they were very easy to notice as freedom fighters, maybe because they moved around freely and we could mix with them easily.

I was not comfortable with the curfews, not that we were allowed to be outside that long, but you know the problem was that you had to make sure that there was no light filtering to the outside, as these people went around patrolling. Suppose you want to watch television and people from the police or defence forces, were patrolling to make sure there was no light? Curfew was like total darkness, it was late around 21 hours. They were just too strict in the area I lived because we were just off the road near Independence Avenue which is close to the State House. It was making sure that there was no light or else security would be so particular about you. I can remember about those who opened a box, but anything beyond that I can't remember. I know that in border areas they used to have bunkers which they used to hide their families in. I don't even know what those would have meant and done where we were living.

I may have been too young to comprehend but just looking at the situation now, if we had so much to give out to help the others that at time, do we have that much today? There is some kind of development, having grown up to where I am today, that I would have loved to see be given the opportunity that I have been given in my work to travel around the region and see the kind of infrastructure that is in some countries that we don't have. So I don't know whether most of it was constructed before these countries were liberated or some of it has been constructed after they were liberated. If we had that much at that time to help our friends, where is it now

for us? Because I think Zambia as a country, we are really lagging behind in terms of infrastructure development. For me to claim compensation is like asking me to ask somebody to pay somebody for raising a child because I think to raise a child, nobody can ever qualify in terms of money but if it is a token of appreciation, maybe. It is difficult to put a figure in compensation.

Gender! On that one I cannot make any informed comment. I think what came out to me was Chikumbi which I heard of. I cannot put to mind through this discussion. Maybe those that stayed in areas where they were residing would know. For sure I know most of them and places like Libala, Kabwata, and Chilenge South of which to me those areas by that time were like very new and unvisited areas so to speak. You will be surprised that the reason why I went to Kamwala was I heard of George. My parents actually wanted me to go to Roma Girls but I went and changed without the knowledge of my parents at Kamwala Secondary School and when the results came out I was at my elder cousin's place for a holiday. He made sure he bought for me all the uniforms and everything and the day he took me back home. I think the only thing my father showed me that day was, besides him trying to really get upset but he did not because my elder cousin bought all the uniforms and everything and he was promoted highly. Like today some of my folks can't really tie their neck ties properly. In 1982 I was around working, but when South Africa was liberated for me, a lot was already here when I started working. I think I already found what was called External Service of Radio Zambia. Actually there was an office which these people used. There was a group from SWAPO Namibia, from the ANC, and within ANC itself they had different groups dealing with different programs. We were quite a number together with them but of course the transmission was handled by the Zambian personnel. With programming, they mixed together with local production by the Zambians. The programs were by SWAPO and by ANC and, there were men and women, and all those different groups; and sometimes it was so interesting to see that. I think they had different views because at times they argued so much.

If we got into talking most of them would just shun you because you had to know when to chat with them. For me, at that time, I don't think I could say I really had a friend who was that close, but there were friends. When they wanted something we could help them and they could go on and do their programs.

The external service was a facility extended to them to give a voice to talk to the people in their own countries because it could be heard in Namibia. I don't know how far in South Africa it could be heard, but definitely in Namibia it was really good. You know when these countries were liberated the station was closed down, unfortunately. I say unfortunately because I don't know who the decision makers were. We may say it was the Government but then who is the Government? Government is us, again at different levels. For me as a broadcaster the external service is still important for us even today. It would do well because sometimes when we switch on the radio we listen to BBC and we listen to the external service of BBC. But with the coming of Radio 4, the external service was phased out. I do need a diary because these are

things we want to talk about. I was a junior at that time and to me those things never mattered.

Munalula, Bornface M.

[2 June 2008]

Mr Munalula was a freedom fighter as a youth in Zambia's own liberation struggle. He was a resident of Lilanda township where a large number of ANC cadres of South Africa lived. It is a well-known fact that the ANC of South Africa had cadres and offices in various townships such as Matero, Kamwala and Lilanda. Racist troops of South Africa used to target residences which they believed were occupied by freedom fighters. As a result ordinary Zambian residents were sometimes caught in crossfire or were mistaken for South African freedom fighters.

My names are Bornface Munalula, I was born in 1941 in a village called Lishiwe in Kalabo District of Western Province. I came to Lusaka in 1960. After completing my senior secondary education I joined the Government Printers and I was accommodated in Matero by the City Council. That time UNIP activities had gathered momentum and it happened that I found myself as a Branch Secretary for UNIP for Mulongoti area. We worked very well except that we had a problem with our own African National Congress, where we had some differences. But we were being guided by our senior politicians like Mainza Chona who was in Matero, Changufu and others. We kept on with our struggle until we got independence, in 1964. We were actually encouraged by our leaders especially Dr Kaunda, Kenneth Kaunda who was the President who used to talk about the liberation struggle. He kept on reminding us that Zambia being independent is not enough we have to help our friends in the bordering countries so that they also get their independence. After all we were also greatly helped by Tanzania during the time of Cha Cha Cha.

Yes after our independence we had a lot of problems from the racist white rulers of Mozambique, Angola, Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia. They were not nice periods for us because of the acts of brutality which were perpetuated by these regimes which were ruling our neighbouring, our neighboring countries. Something I can vividly remember is when we were harbouring them, the African National Congress people.....

In fact before I come to that, let's talk about Southern Rhodesia, when Smith declared UDI we had a problem. We had an influx of Southern Rhodesians who ran away from that country coming into Zambia, Northern Rhodesia became Zambia after independence. They were seeking refugee status and some of them got employed here but others chose to fight for freedom for their countries. It was a very traumatizing time because Ian Smith wanted to connect us so heavily to the liberation struggle of Southern Rhodesia; yes, because many of the freedom fighters as we knew them, but known to Smith as Golilazi, were being kept here. We had camps, like Chikumbi which had mostly females, the ladies, it was bombed. It was a really terrible thing when we heard about it that so many were killed during lunch hour. The Boer soldiers who painted themselves with black paint knew the time for lunch so one of them went to ring the bell and they came out from wherever they were. Then the jet fighters just

came and started dropping the bombs. It was a really terrifying thing to hear and to know. Yes, for us here in Lilanda, in Lusaka West we had a family which was destroyed, a family which was mistaken to be freedom fighters but they were actually a Zambian family and lives were lost there. Yes, I remembered one time we were seated here and wherever the bullets came from, they were flying and went over us here into the next area, just nearby here, entered into the next house, a man was seated there, it went through the leg just like that. So you see we were really frightened, but because we understood what our senior leaders used to tell us to say freedom for Zambia is not enough if our neighbours, African neighbours are still under the yoke of colonialism. So that gave us a lot of encouragement to the extent where we accommodated these people. We accepted them to say they are our brothers and sisters who were desperate, who wanted to go back to their country with independence, but now they were here fighting for that independence.

Yes, ...aah there came also a time for the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa. Yes, there were so many, they were so many in Lusaka even here we used to meet them in the pubs, in bars, they were quite a friendly lot, very very friendly. I remember sometimes in bars we could sing 'Nkosi-sekelele' because that tune you know, we know it whilst we were at home, 'Mulena Buluka Sichaba Saluna,' but they were engaged...okay if there were cases of robbery and whatever they must have been very isolated, very isolated cases. Normally they knew what they were doing and that was to fight for the freedom of their country. Yes, Lilanda, in Lilanda itself here we had a lot of the ANC people. Here opposite the Happy Groceries that's what was known as their headquarters,Bakulu Bakulu bena Oliver Thambo and others used to come there. We had also other houses which were occupied by the freedom fighters of course with their families. They were armed but we never saw them walking with guns especially during the day no no! Some of us, in fact could have thought they didn't have guns except at maybe night when, if there were anything suspicious they would open-fire with their guns and we would all go undercoveryou know under the beds because they were really loud explosions, heavy gunshots. So what the Smith chaps used to do according to what we used to hear was, they could come to Zambia use the helicopters just flying on top of the tree leaves. Unfortunately our radars, the airport radars, couldn't pick them up until when they were here and when they occupied our airspace they would say, 'we have occupied the airspace for Zambia, if your airforce tries to fly out we are going to bomb.' And Smith used to boast saying, 'within 2 hours we can flatten Lusaka if we want but what we want are the freedom fighters that they are keeping.'

Now we had a very wise leader Dr Kaunda who despite the provocation he didn't allow our army to hit back. Because if that had been done, I don't know what, or where we would have been. Because they were going to attack us directly. So most of them (freedom fighters) were found in the compounds,yes and by so doing it was not an easy thing for the Boers to identify them. It was it was, we were at great risk anything could have happened to anyone of us but then we were being encouraged by

our leaders especially Dr Kaunda who said look we have to support this cause because it is a good cause not only for themselves but for us as well. Because we cannot live surrounded by enemies. Once these people get their independence we shall really be free. We will have nothing to worry about because they will become our own brothers and sisters. Yes, yes....so it was some sort of relief to us actually because we knew at one time, these people at one time or another, these people will be independent and then this burden will be off our shoulders.

SWAPO of Namibia were also here. I think they had a camp somewhere also in Lusaka West and when they left that became the Zambian Army Camp. It was the same for SWAPO, ANC, ZAPU. It was the same. You see the good thing was we Zambians didn't show any hatred that maybe we didn't want these people to be here,

....We wholly accepted them because we understood their cause, that's why maybe they responded by being polite to us because we had accepted them. We didn't show any atmosphere of hate or whatever, no. We really accepted them because we understood their goal. Well, you see, with the ANC because of the experience of Southern Rhodesia now Zimbabwe, ANC didn't want to live in the camps for fear of being bombed. And they understood the war is not here, the war is in their country. They would go through Mozambique or Southern Rhodesia, they would go through there to South Africa and then start making attacks. Because of the experiences of the Southern Rhodesia freedom fighters who were in camps, so they feared to go in the camps where they could be bombed. ANC cadres were living amongst the people in townships but information concerning their operations, that was their total secret. Yes, for fear that if it was something made public they would be a target, because the Boers would have known and they would attack them before they even reach South Africa.

In the case of ZAPU especially, we heard something to the effect that, I don't know how these people did in terms of recruitment, there were certain instances of abduction. Young men, who even maybe, came as refugees, young men, able bodied would be abducted and be taken to the camps so that they go and fight for the liberation of their country. It was known that that could have been one of the ways of trying to recruit personnel for their operations. And as I said, they were given a lot of freedom actually while here because from the top, from most of our leadership up to the bottom we understood that they were here for a purpose and the purpose was to win independence for their countries. In terms of marriages, we heard about freedom fighters marrying Zambian women. For instance in our home here the second family who came to me here by the name of Mopani, Mapene, something like that, was married to a Zambian and they had two children. After their independence he went with his wife and family, but the wife was a Zambian actually.... I don't know how they arranged it amongst themselves. Liberation movements were given a lot of freedom in this country. Towards the end, ...yes towards the end I think things became better and better as I have said. We had a big house there, where their senior man was living with his family, but we guess he had some armed people who were protecting him

like what we used to do during our independence struggle protecting our leaders. So some of their senior leaders were being guarded at night, and at the instant you look suspicious they would open up fire. Yes, especially shooting into the air trying to scare off the would be enemies.

We didn't know much as to how freedom fighters got their rations and food supplies. But as I said, you see we've got their groceries as you go south on your left which we used to call Happy Groceries. Just opposite that is where they were keeping materials, rations and they were getting it from there. It was very interesting how the South African colonialists didn't get hold of that information because I tell you the whole of Lilanda would have been bombed. Yes, yes, we would have died. They were getting their rations there yes. It was a well-known thing that this is African National Congress headquarters, but thank God, we thank God, for that actually (that the South African racists knew nothing). Because we were really endangered.

There were however some serious instances. The person we used to go to church with who was in charge of the youth at church, was living in Roma and when we went to his home, just near, opposite his home, there was an incident where the helicopter came and landed there. There were freedom fighters in that house opposite and it was bombed. According to him when he showed us, he said there was hell there, ... there was hell that they couldn't peep through the windows instead all they did was just go under the beds. Yes! In the Roma township they bombed ...the helicopter came to land and the Boers came out and started shooting here and there. We were not there when it happened, but after a week we went to our friend's house for church business. Yes we heard about a known thing again in Longacres where Mr Nkomo's home was bombed. We woke up one morning and news was that Mr Nkomo's home has been bombed, "is he alive?" news was that he was not there." Then we heard about the bridge which was destroyed. It was a known thing. It was also very frightening in Chongwe where we lost a few of our people. These Boers just came with a helicopter, they landed there to destroy the bridges. So many other things happened during this period...so many things were destroyed and so many lives were lost.

Musambachime, Mwelwa

Mwelwa Musambachime is a professor at the University of Zambia. He was born in 1931. He shares his experiences in the liberation struggle in Zambia and the southern African region as a whole.

My full name is Mwelwa Musambachime. I was born in Mansa village, chief Chimese, in Mansa. The year is in dispute because my father was not around. My mother did not know, and the grandmother did not know. The only thing which she could remember is that I was born after the rain. So the date did not materialize. Somehow I just picked the year randomly; I don't know if 1931 was the year that I was actually born.

I grew up in the village but from 1951 I came to Luanshya. Actually, my father had found a job with Antelope Mines in 1947, so in 1948 my mother joined him, I remained with my grandmother from 1957 and the reason for the move is that in 1950, I had started school. I made a mistake of attending one of the traditional ceremonies and I was reported to the school authorities. That school was a Roman Catholic school, and so I was expelled. I was in sub A when I was expelled, and my father did not want me to repeat at the same school, so he called me to Luanshya where I started sub A again at Roan Antelope Primary School, where I remained up to standard two. After that I was transferred to Luanshya Central School for Standard Three and I was there up to Standard Four. Of course when I say transferred; I mean it was done through selection examinations. We had to write the selection examination to Luanshya Secondary School – Standard Three and Standard Four. We had to write another selection examination to Standard Five and Standard Six.

The Anglican Church gave me a scholarship to go to Uganda, so I was at a private school Mutosane College east of Kampala where I did Form One up to Form Four. I passed to go to Form Six back to Luanshya. I briefly worked as a reporter. But my heart was burnt on teaching so with my 'O' Levels I went to Kitwe Teachers Training College. I was the first to have that qualification to be admitted at KTC. I found out after three years that was a mistake; I was far ahead of the others, so I spent the last year teaching.

I taught at Chimwemwe, under Mr Chippongome and the following year I had a quarrel with the inspectors and I requested a provincial transfer to be sent to Luapula; the intention was to send me to Kawambwa, but the managers in Kawambwa did not want me to be sent to the rural schools in Kawambwa, so they sent me to Mununga. This was because they received a message was that I was a very troublesome person and they should find a place where I could be taught a lesson. Mununga which was popular for witchcraft was the ideal place. I got there and I fitted well in the society, and taught there at the primary school until 1970. I felt I needed more education. The government was looking for people with qualification I had done my A Level in Mununga, so I was given a scholarship do Bachelor of Art with Education degree and Mrs Bull was one of my teachers from 1970 to 1973.

Then she joined politics, but each time she met me, she asked me to remain at campus. I told her that I did not want to remain at the campus, I wanted to be a permanent secretary, but she always said I should continue teaching. So I am here because of Dr Bull, and of course the other people in the department; those that UNZA had produced; I am one of the first staff development fellows in the department, together with Chapasha Luchembe who is in the USA now. So that was 1973 to 1974, I was with the late Mwanawasa at the National Service. We were in the same entry with the late Mwanawasa. I was in another class in the same year; we were in the same grade.

Then in 1975 I went to the University of Murrison for further studies, where I did my MA and PHD. Then I came back to teaching. In 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, I was teaching in the United States. When I came back I became Dean in the School of Education from 1985-88. And then I did not want to contest for a second appointment, because I needed to have time. So in 1990, I was appointed the Director of Human Relation Institute and in 1994 the institute was phased out. I went to Sweden and I spent 1995 in Malawi, before I came back. In 1997, I retired from the University after serving for 22 years.

After that I went to Namibia where I was appointed Professor of History. In June 2002, I received a call from President Chiluba that I had been appointed Ambassador to the United Nations, and in August 2002 I took up that position, and I was there up to March 2005. I rested for some time and I then came back. But in the meantime, I taught at other Universities apart from the USA, and again I went back under the Fellowship of Mankosa Fellow, to the North Western. I also had a chance of teaching at the University of Cape Town in South Africa., I went to the University of Cape Town when the country was facing sanctions by that time blacks were accounted as students at Cape University. I taught there for a month, and then came back in 1993, I taught at Natal Emerisburg for a term, then 1994 I went to Hawksell to do my post graduate.

Earlier in 1992, I spent some time in Madagascar teaching at Antanarivo and in 1999 I spent some time in a French speaking country that is Burundi, where I taught for some time. Apart from that I was an external examiner in Malawi and in Ethiopia. I had very good relations with some universities in Switzerland, and also in Finland under the University of Stockholm, until I became a diplomat. Since coming back I have published two books in which related to my work at the UN, because of the questions which we were receiving on Zambia, I thought the best way to handle that was to publish a book, which came out in December.

I revised the history of Mansa and I had also come out with few copies, so I am working at Meteorology. I am leaving to Cambridge after next month to try to finish it and also I am trying to work on Congo to look at conflict resolution. So those are the two projects I am working on. I am releasing my PHD publication on Fisheries; and I also hope I can find time to finalise my book on the Congo from 1959 to 1964. So those are the few things I have done.

The Government decision may not be known because it is those who took part in the liberation who can give a decision, but looking at the position I am not sure if there was much debate about what the President decided. The President decided we will follow Nkrumah; Nkrumah got independence on 6th March 1957. Ghana made a very interesting statement on independence, and Nkrumah became the role model that most African leaders wanted to emulate. One of them was our President, he had broken from the ANC at that to form ZANC. He was militant and tried to emulate Malawi; but Malawi was under a leader who has spent 40 years away from Malawi, so he did not know most of the liberation movement leaders.

Kaunda on the other hand was a member of the Africanist Movement which grouped left, or maybe say, forward looking parties. In Zambia the most forward looking party was UNIP at that time, so it was unfitting for him at independence to be surrounded by countries like Zimbabwe and Namibia under colonial rule; Angola, Mozambique which were under Portuguese colonial rule; and South Africa under apartheid, and even Lesotho at that time was not independent. So as he looked around him he believed that the independence of Zambia was meaningless until the other countries were liberalized.

It was not the empty platitude, he had to put it into action by offering Zambia as a background for liberation movements to operate; to plan, train and take refuge in this particular country. This pronouncement was made and of course it scared the neighbours. It fortified the so called liberation movements and from 1965, we began to receive Joshua Nkomo here. ZAPU, and ZANU were all here, Savimbi was here, FRELIMO and a number of other parties were all here in Zambia. They were located here in Kamwala Secondary School where right now there is a military school, where officers go for further training. It is just near the college for the handicapped, along Chilumbulu Road, after the market, before Kamwala Secondary School on the right-hand side. That is where the centre for the liberation movements was; where all the liberation movements had offices from 1960. They operated from there until they started being infiltrated.

In 1965 Rhodesian soldiers started infiltrating the freedom fighters. They were not around so soldiers were sent to come and bomb the place. there was a lot of speculation around Lusaka and then all was quiet until after 1975. In 1978, there was an intensification of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, because Mozambique had become independent and then the terrain did not have a river as border, and so it was easy for ZANU freedom fighters to move into eastern Zimbabwe. They spoke the same language on both sides of the border; anyway they were all Shona and they were somehow related in one way or another, so it was easy to penetrate. It was very difficult for ZAPU because ZAPU operated on the western side of Zimbabwe which required crossing the Zambezi River, and the Zambezi was being monitored at all points all the time. Let me say everywhere, even Kaongola in Namibia was being monitored for SWAPO, and the security system also was very good.

Rhodesian soldiers could come in private plane and land in the farms in Lusaka, using the small planes. It took off either from an international airport or a city airport okay, and they would land at the farms on the north road on the way to Mumbwa. There is a big farm in Mazabuka which had a runway, so they could come, land and locate where the ZIPLA or ZANU were and shoot them and disappear. Sometimes they brought in vehicles that were painted in military colours of that particular country and they would drive at night to locate the identified places. The planes were flying but they were not attacking anybody until one day in September. I used to stay in Romo along Kazungula Road, so very early in the morning they passed our house and before they could get to Roma Girls we heard a huge bomb that was Chikumbi being bombed. And the plane circled and flew back.

Sometimes the helicopters came down to shoot and then took off and flew away the same way they came, but our Zambian Air Force were nowhere to be seen. A few days earlier in our area, my neighbour on the right was ZANU, he taught Chemistry; on the back of my house was Mr Moyo, married to a Canadian, but he was ZIPLA; so I thought he was out of Sandnitche. Two days later the plane flew the location where they were but there was no shooting, We were just looking at them; so the plane, which was painted in Zambian colours flew down Mutande Road. There was a house which was an intelligence office for ZIPLA and there was a fight there, later they took off back to Harare.

The Zambian Air Force was nowhere to be seen. Even the police were not seen. There is a shopping centre in Roma, so they flew off and there were bombs. Chikumbi was bombed and the camp in Serenje was bombed, so was this place in Chongwe. They always targeted the infrastructure; Kaleya Bridge and Chongwe Bridge were bombed. So there was intensification of security along the border area and there were a lot of landmines which were planted to stop ZAPLA and ZANU from crossing into Zambia and into Zimbabwe.

Now that went on until independence when these things ended. During the struggle the university students were mobilized, trained and some of them deployed in border areas to fight against the Rhodesians, because most of the bombing were done by the Rhodesian forces and most of the damage were done by the Rhodesian forces. During the same year I am talking about, Nkomo escaped, now we understand because of the tenants. There is a house, near the Celtel building, that was Nkomo's house. They had come from wherever they had come from, entered the house at around 10:00 hrs, and a few minutes later there was fighting and shooting between the Rhodesian forces that were waiting for him, and the guards who were at the house.

The guards were shot to the ground, but Nkomo's body was not found. I think he had gone into some tunnels. Now we understand okay. So 1978 especially when you look at Rhodesia crisis, 1975 was a very critical year when they wanted to break down the window of the freedom fighters who were meeting here on their way to Zimbabwe. They didn't meet. If you are looking at SWAPO, at that particular time SWAPO had a camp in Mayukwayukwa in Mumbwa and Lusaka West. But at that particular time

there were also the forces from Angola. They had to cross the Kunene into Northern Namibia, but it was much easier rather than to pass through the Kaprivi where there was a Game Park and things like that, so they found it to be very difficult.

So much of the fighting for Mozambique was done from Tanzania, a little from Chadiza but not much. I think especially after the FRELIMO had taken over the northern part of Mozambique especially from the Lwavuma coming south, it was easy for them to establish the liberated zone, if we put it that way. Only very few that went through Katete into that particular province. You find that the liberation struggle was hottest in 1978 to 1980, because I think in April also 1980 Zimbabwe became independent and that followed that of Mozambique and that of Angola.

Due to what Dr Kaunda had been saying regarding the liberation of neighbouring states, we only remained with South Africa. At that particular time, although South Africa was doing subversion against ANC, it was not as serious as Rhodesia because Rhodesia would come by air following the Luangwa, so that they could not be picked by the rudder, and around the bridge just by the bridge there by three minutes they would be in Lusaka from that particular point. Three minutes they would be in Lusaka, so it was very difficult for Zambia which did not have a very good Air Force, although it had a very good commander at that particular time General Zuze. All the defence forces had been put under one command and General Zuze was the commander. He would actually fly into Zimbabwe but not to do any damage but to pick intelligence which could be used by our forces here.

There were people like Malimba Masheke, whom when we were fighting against the Portuguese was known to be operating deep into Mozambique with the FRELIMO soldiers, gathering intelligence and also giving advice on this and that about security. Let me say after 1980 quite a few things and much more diplomacy was undertaken at the UN, under the leadership of Ambassador Paul Lusaka, who was the Chair of the Namibian Committee at the United Nations. Paul Lusaka although we have not given him much credit, was very much instrumental in moving forward the diplomatic initiative at the United Nations.

Although that was not enough war on the ground in Angola, with the participation of the Cubans who were able to defeat the South Africans who were supporting the UNITA. Also sometime they had tried to wipe out the ANC and SWAPO, but they were defeated by the Cubans. They combined Cuba and SWAPO forces and that changed the dynamics because the South Africans knew that they could not defeat the Angolan forces who had the help of the Cubans. So negotiating speeded up from 1995 resulting in the independence of Namibia in 1995. Once Namibia was taken off, the focus was now on South Africa, and South Africa as you know at that particular time had released Mandela.

Negotiation was going on between De-Clerk and others; there were also other negotiations between the freedom fighters taking place in various places in Lusaka. I also participated in trying to resolve the conflict between ANC and Nkhata in 1994 just before the independence or the change of government. I was in South Africa with

President Obasanjo and the team from OAU. We joined the negotiation between the ANC and Nkhata, when we were in Johannesburg, if you can remember, there was a note by the Zulus and Johannesburg was quiet by then and we participated to try to resolve. That was in April, I think there was the change of government, Mandela became the President of South Africa and they started quietly. Just as Kaunda had predicted that without independence in this particular region, Zambia would never be free. I think from 1994 things were quiet.

There were no more liberation movements; one would say the determination by the President to keep the liberation movements here went against some of the things that Zambians wanted to see. They were raided at night and you know the Nationalist liberation movements had a lot of people within Lusaka. And number of them assumed Zambians names like Banda and so forth and so on. And there were attacks at night by the people who could not be seen during the day. It was quite unsafe in certain places; people complained, and the President heard those complaints, but the greater obligation was to see the liberation of other countries that was under colonial rule. Sometimes he did something but sometimes he did not. A lot of people understood why the President was doing that; and you know the goodness of Zambians is that they understand, and are not easily swerved against what they believe, and that was what happened.

President Kaunda tried through meetings, through district commissioners, through party structures; UNIP at that time was very strong and explained why he took that particular position. He explained what the benefits of taking that particular situation were. So in a nutshell, one could say that the period between 1975 and 1980 was very critical to Zambia. I mentioned in 1975 that was the year Chitepo died and Chitepo died in Kabwata where bombs were placed under his car, the VW he was driving to organize a party, Chitepo was not like Mugabe. If Chitepo was alive, Mugabe would not be in the place he is. After Chitepo was eliminated, it was easy for Mugabe and the other people like Zulu and Manika amongst others, who were grouping around ethnic identities within ZANU. That promoted a lot of fight and it had to end.

The beauty of Zambians is that they are very cosmopolitan. They don't look at ethnicity or origin of the person. If you went to Soweto you will find exactly what I am saying. There are people who come by bus from Tanzania and as soon as they arrive even if they do not a permit to trade in Soweto, they are assisted by Zambians, but that does not happen in the other countries. If you went to Namibia, you cannot do any business there unless you get a permit. Another thing which is very critical is that Zambia being a landlocked country, has people with relatives across the borders, you see. If you are a Chewa from Katete from Chadiza, if you are Ngoni from Ngubulu, if you are from Isoka, if you are from Chama, if you are from Luapula, there are always relative on the other sides of the borders. Maybe you know that the President was very sick, I think it was when I was twenty; he survived because he was taken to the hospital in Congo. You can take the breath of the Congo to Kaunda, they are relatives and therefore we don't look at nationality of an individual, you don't look at ethnicity

and the kingship of that particular person. Sometimes we don't look at that at all, we look at the friendship we have with that particular person and that is the basis we operate on. When it came to the liberation struggle, there was a bit that was known about some people, and a little was known about certain people.

For example, President Mbeki. You know that Woodlands Shopping Centre? There is that road going to the police station. There is a space in between. That was the bar where Mbeki used to drink. That bar was run by the SWAPO. Angola was not sleeping at all, they were observers. It has been suggested by the history of strategic studies, that the Angolans came up and bombed the Indeni.

We have not confirmed that but this is coming to my good source that Indeni was bombed and probably it was when it was set on fire. But who else was involved on that? Kavindele came here looking for diamonds to make him rich. Who else? The MP for Nchelenge Mr Mwila was formally the Minister of Defence here. Other people did not know what was happening, but other people fully knew. I can only say you know the death of Mr Penza was not fully explained, but if you follow the story carefully, it was connected to the diamond case in Angola. If you have been to Penza's place, how they were able to get into the bedroom and where was the wife? I don't know, that would raise many questions. There must be a link somewhere; they were Zambian anyway.

But if that area was attacked, I don't know if we could survive because we had the house at the right and the house at the back. We couldn't have survived because the bullet did not know the direction it took. Zambians are very good and you know that. If you look at Zambia with other countries, they are very commendable and using Chimbuyaship also that was where Mbeki was drinking, a very popular bar. But Zambians wouldn't care who runs the bar as long as there was cold beer. So if I haven't travelled I am trying to find out something, you find that Mbeki was there at a certain time, and so was Mr Phiri. That is how people knew him and they did not care what he did. So there were complaints when there was a tragedy when Zambians got killed, like in the murder of Chitepo there was also a small child, one of his neighbours who was innocently playing, and he was killed.

Zambians complain but they quickly forget and move on. The important part among the Zambians is that they believe in their leadership and once the leader is open and frank and they see the reasons why they had to commit their lives. Mind you, these things were not in many places in Lusaka. It was only in Lusaka west where there were farms and there were camps. Kaoma, part of Western Province, Shayumbo was, where UNITA entered in to that particular area; also Kalabo areas and Zambezi West. It did not affect many people. Other people did not know you can take it up to 2002, Zambians were being a threat to Angola, not that they knew what had been in Zambezi where it is a very sleepy place. Nobody had helped to diffuse certain problems because a person from Zimbabwe is a Sibanda and he just takes out the SI and becomes a Mr Banda.

They will always joke with him and yet he is a foreigner. What I am saying is something I have experienced myself; a person I had known for many years, the Deputy Headmaster for Mwense Secondary School, the Headmaster Nchelenge Secondary School, Headmaster for Naboye here, Mr Banda came during independence and he was a SIBANDA. To the surprise of everybody when asked if he was Sibanda and he said yes! How did he become Mr Banda? He went back to Zimbabwe as Mr Sibanda, but all those years he was Mr Banda, although he could not tell you which village he came from, but who cares about that, that is the nature of the Zambians.

The observation by Nkrumah, and Kaunda that Zambia will not be free unless other countries were free was taken very seriously. I used the word it was not a platitude, but something which was firmly believed by the President Kenneth Kaunda, because if he did not have that belief, he wouldn't have taken that big risk of committing Zambia to support the liberation struggle in southern Africa.

The risks were many, because we did not have a strong Air Force in Zambia. If they had decided they could have flattened Lusaka within one hour; they could have bombed the mines. They could have actually strangled us, transport wise, but they only damaged one bridge at Kaleya, after Mazabuka. That bridge was bombed and no trains could reach Lusaka. They did not want to bomb Kafue Bridge; they bombed that very small bridge at Kaleya. Those trains were paralyzed. They bombed that bridge in Luangwa, the bridge which was there is not the original bridge, the original bridge was much bigger and could handle two vehicles one way and two the other way.

After the bombing we had one which allows one vehicle to cross; that was paralyzed and therefore, eastern province was cut off. They bombed Chamgeshi Bridge and that paralyzed all the traffic from Lusaka going to Kasama. That was paralyzed and the alternative was to pass through Mansa, Luwingu - Mansa into the Copperbelt. So if the Rhodesians wanted those bridges they could have destroyed them because they were not guarded. They could have come and bombed something like the Kafue Bridge to cut off Lusaka from southern province completely. They could have bombed the bridge in Mumbwa to cut off western province completely and things like that. However, they did that selectively but it was not a strategy which was repeated over and over. So, the risk was that we had to pay heavily in terms of transit fee through Zimbabwe because we did not have Tazara at that time; we had Benguela Railway which was totally unreliable. The only reliable route was through Zimbabwe to South Africa and to Mozambique, but then they bombed the Kaleya Bridge.

Sowerestruggled; and a bridge cannot be built in a day. You know to get the materials and things like that took two to three months. We could not get the experts we needed and that strangled the economy. Fortunately the population of Zambia was smaller at that particular time, but the impact was felt everywhere because certain items could not be accessed. When certain items could not be accessed, you are actually creating a situation in which your people can rise up and disturb the sitting government. The risks were there; because they were bombing Chikumbi. There was a plane flying over state house communicating with President Kaunda, that they had not come to harm

the Zambians, but they had come for the rebels. That was the ZIPLA element that was causing a lot of problems for us, they too lost the grip on their security.

ZIPLA was moving from Bulawayo to other places ZAPU was moving from Mozambique killing farmers, livestock, and burning whatever they could burn. The country was losing the important foreign exchange earning crops, especially tobacco. So no government could just sit. If somebody can put right the country was at war, and what remained was to declare the war against each other; they were shooting at each other. As you know up to now the landmines used then are still being de-mined with in certain areas because there are still many people being injured or killed by them. Twenty years, thirty years on, and people are still struggling with those landmines. Some are still there. So effectively we were at war.

Mwanawasa and I were trained by Peter Machungwa the farmer and Florence Mumba for National Service. We opened Ndola Mushili camp. That was my group of 1974, not knowing that amongst us one would be a President. Way back in Luanshya, his father was selling fresh fish, so he brought his fish within Roan Antelope market. He was very kind to certain mothers, and mine included.

So it was a war, yes, it was a war and in those days when the planes were flying around Lusaka, Lusaka was quiet around 18:00hrs and everybody would be at home. So bars did not do good business; war is bad. It happened like a mile from my house; the house was bombed during the day and left burning. They came in and they collected all the intelligence material put them on the helicopter and flew out. They did not care whether somebody was wounded. They were not Zambian but who knows if some of the maids that they employed survived? People did not talk about that because they were not important. Those who swept, those who could not run lost their families. I would say they were important because a human being is a human being.

There were students who were deployed in the Southern province from Siavonga to Livingstone. The UNITA students were deployed there. This is what I am talking about, it is a fact that they were deployed. Fortunately, no war occurred because they were quietly given training for three months.

Mutekenya, John Chomba

John Chomba Mutekenya was born in 1977 in Lusaka. He was a refugee officer at Maheba Refugee Camp in the North-Western Province from 2005 to 2007. In this text he shares some of the roles that Zambia played in the liberation struggle, particularly the issue of hosting refugees from other countries in the region.

My name is John Chomba Mutekenya and I was born in 1977 in Lusaka. I am Bamba. I became a Refugee Officer here some two years ago when I was deployed to come and set up a data base for Refugee Data in this camp. The Maheba Refugee Camp was officially opened in 1971. I am a refugee officer and I did studied electronic data processing at the CBU.

The refugees that were accommodated here included the Angolans that were involved in the liberation struggle in their country. Initially, they were accommodated at Luatambo in Zambezi District, and eventually, in 1971 they were transferred to this settlement, when the country opened doors to refugees. There was repatriation in 1975, but again there was an outbreak of war between UNITA and MPLA. We received another set of refugees that we again accommodated in Maheba, but the reasons were different because it was not liberation struggle; now it was politics and the two parties could not agree on who should rule the country.

Since then, we had been receiving pockets of refugees. There were a number of them staying at Zone H, who were received in the settlement in the year 2000; when there was an emergency over 10,000 refugees were received. Maheba is in a forest area and the solution for the Angolans was not forthcoming because theirs was long term conflict. The authorities thought it was wise that a place like this one should be established so that the refugees could be self-reliant.

I may not have been there that time but these are things that you find when you live in these camps. Of course when you have two groups of people mainly coming from opposing parties, who are fighting, there is bound to be very careful plans in terms of where to place these particular groups. Maheba does not host Tutsi refugees but we host Hutus. Tutsis are in Mayukwayukwa; this is just to avoid continuation of the conflicts that were existing in their countries to spill over to Zambia. It is a precautionary measure that we do not mix these people; it is strategic, and for different reasons.

They Refugees entered Zambia through Mwinilunga in Zambezi District. In Mwinilunga, they entered through Shamapanga and in Zambezi through Luatambo camp. In Zambezi they came through Chavuma which is very close to Zambia, through the Angolan border. When they arrived there, because the government works with UNHCR, which is an agency that takes care of the affairs of the refugees in terms of logistical support. But for issues of identifying these people, we have what we call DGCs or District Gents Committees which are government committees that identify these people and screen them for onward transfer to the camps. We screen

them because people can come with guns, or with whatsoever. So these committees ensure that people that have such things remain in safe hands with the security wings. Environmentally, it could be said that it has been negative because when you visit the chiefs they complain about the fishing that has been done by refugees; They also rampantly cut down trees; and now there is need for reforestation. But, agriculture wise we must appreciate that they contributed quite a lot. If you go to the DACO agriculture offices you find that at one point this place was the bread basket for this place Solwezi. That was the positive impact of the refugees. Politically I am not in the position to say anything.

The refugees that we keep here are interacting very well with the local people because right now, apart from the Angolans, we have Rwandans that are teaching in our colleges about rice farming. They had these rice fields which were uncultivated but now these Rwandans went there and taught them farming. So now farmers are producing many bags of rice from Chief Mumena's area. That is the positive impact. Sometimes the locals may not like the Refugees because they perceive them to be favoured individuals, but thank God we have this programme called Zambia Institute which is meant to bridge the gap between the local and refugees' welfare. It is a government initiative which was meant to mitigate the negative effects of refugees' presence in the host community areas, in the sense that where you find that there are ten boreholes in a refugee camp; you find the locals have one borehole for the same population. This initiative was created to ensure that there is a balance between the refugees and the host communities in order to reduce xenophobic tendencies from the locals to the refugees.

If you have a school in your plan for 500 pupils then you have 1000 unexpected pupils because of the refugees and without support, it becomes a problem. But the government has not been sorting out things there. All these initiatives are coming up like Zambian initiative. Right now if you pass through Maheba High School, which is for refugees, is well rehabilitated and is still on going. These are humanitarian actions. Zambia being the way it is, we have helped people and even the ones we are hosting now because we are the centre of the liberation in the southern region; and being party to so many international conventions, I think we are obliged to establish such institutions and places for safety measures.

Some have appreciated. You know that one is a bigger picture of the whole thing. You know that we helped South Africa to get rid of apartheid; we helped Namibia; we helped all these other countries. But we have not received anything to say this is a 'thank you'. We have not seen that. I think Zambia being the way it is, we will continue assisting them and hopefully people will come to realize that what we did was a very good thing. Refugees came from Namibia, Rwanda, Angola, DRC, Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Algeria, Sudan, Uganda, and from Zimbabwe. We have recent ones from Zimbabwe because of what is going on between Mugabe and Tshangirai. However, I am more interested in the SADC ones anyway Namibia, Angola and Zimbabwe

Intermarriages are there. Right now Zambians are married to Congolese and Angolans are married to Zambians; and when you look at people of north western province, particularly the ones just across the border, you find there is Senior Chief Kanongesha on the Zambian side, and there is also Senior Chief Kanongesha on the other side. So you find it is very difficult to distinguish them when you go there. The chiefs will tell you that this is from Zambia this one is not. If you and I go there to try to identify that it will be very difficult. So that is how closely related these cultural aspects are in various countries, and in this region. The Congolese and the people in Luapula are difficult for you to distinguish; and across Jimbe, the languages they speak on one side is the language they speak on the other side.

Muteto, Kandala, Induna Imandi, Barotse Royal Establishment

[Limulunga, Mongu, Western Province; 19 July 2007]

Induna Imandi Kandala Muteto was selected by the Kuta at Limulunga to speak on behalf of the Barotse Royal Establishment. The Barotse Royal Establishment headed by the Litunga (King) has a long history of receiving and accommodating refugees from Angola. The early Mbunda groups arrived in the Western Province of Zambia in the early 1800s.

During the liberation struggle for Southern Africa (1960 - 2001) Western Province hosted liberation movements from Angola (MPLA and UNITA) as well as liberation movements from Namibia (SWAPO and CANU).

My names are Kandala Muteto, that is my maiden name. I am Induna Imandi here at Barotse Royal Establishment. I became an Induna in 2001. Professionally I am an accountant. I am an accountant by profession I hold MBA in Budgeting and Finance which I obtained at Henry Management College in UK. Before that I also studied in UK doing SEIs Scarce Is, majoring in accountancy. So before becoming an Induna I was working in East Africa, Nairobi. I was there for about eleven years, working for a UN sponsored organization dealing with original surveying and marking projects. I came back from Nairobi in 1995 and I have been settling here back home. I have come to deal with tradition and cultural issues of my home place.

Well probably a preamble to the issue of the Liberation Struggle for Southern Africa is to indicate that people of Western Province, better known as Barotseland, have been dealing with foreign situation for a long time, long before the liberation struggle in Southern Africa and as such over a period of time we developed some standard performance in terms of how to deal first with the refugees from Angola. So the people of Barotseland are well vest in protocol issues of how to handle the people from other countries.

Now specifically, now coming to the question of freedom struggle in Southern Africa one would say that Barotseland and the Barotse people had been very active especially in dealing with refugees. Secondly as an integral part of Zambia we joined the nation as a whole receiving refugees and offering bases where to operate from. The freedom fighters were well accommodated in Western Province and the Barotse Royal Establishment through their network right from the village up to the headquarters. They were involved in securing the safety and freedom of the freedom fighters. The first point of call were the people in the villages and in the Silalos who were receiving these people. Their specific requests and specific needs for land were forwarded through one channel from the silalos to the district. Kuta. At the same time the Barotse Royal Establishment was working very closely with the security system in the country. They had to agree and once the agreement has been reached a suitable area was identified. The area was suitable in sense of security consideration, so that the people we are keeping are not exposed. That was done but it's also important to

indicate that no piece of Barotseland could ever be occupied by anybody without specific sanction of the Barotse Royal Establishment. So we were actively involved in locating these camps. As I said for security reasons we had to liaise with the national security system to make sure that the security interest of the country were taken care of. I cannot identify any specific bases which were given to freedom fighters, on that one, I don't think I have got the liberty to give you that information. As you know, you can't release security information unless necessary clearance is sort. The policy guidance given to the villages and village headmen in dealing with freedom fighters and refugees were are follows: With refugees almost all along the border, especially with the Angolans, the village headmen were given the leeway to welcome the people as they were coming in. But they had the obligation to report whoever was getting into the country to the traditional district headquarters as well as to Namuso, that is Lealui. In terms of freedom fighters, the system was the same only that they were working under a general security cover provided by the national security, as well as the traditional security arrangements. They were told firstly to take care of the refugees, in terms of welcoming them. Secondly as for freedom fighters they were told specifically that they should take into account security requirements of the villages so that the villages and villagers are not exposed to danger. They were not, for instance, to operate from the villages but away from the villages so that the villages were not at risk in terms of fighting from their (racist) opponents. Depending on who and how they were coming into the country, for instance, if some refugees were chiefs in their country of origin there was an obligation for such chiefs to be reported to Namuso (Lealui) through the district authorities in our traditional set up. That was a requirement and I should have mentioned this earlier in relation to refugees. Refugees were given shelter as they were passing through the villages. They were also fed. In more specific situations they were, given some sort of counselling so that they felt welcome. It was really a very major humiliation to be a refugee and that is why when they were here they really needed to feel at home through the type of reception they were given by the respective people in our system.

You had also asked about the reactions to the Boer occupation and particularly in Senanga district. It was serious. It was a serious experience and we lost a lot of our people. It was condemned by all peace caring people. But as you would appreciate the traditional law, authority, we did what we could firstly by denying them (the Boers) information so that they wouldn't easily know where some of the freedom fighters were hiding. We believe that was an honourable part to play. Secondly we were able to report their whereabouts to the national security system, so that when appropriate action was considered, they knew exactly where the enemy was. But over and above this, we were completely helpless. But our national security system took care of the situation, and eventually the Boers were booted out of our place. Our army came in. It is only that that time, South Africa was a major security force in terms of manpower and in terms of equipment. But still we were able as a nation to account for ourselves

very adequately. It was not easy even for them (Boers). They were aware that anything could happen as we put up some resistance.

Because of the serious security threat, as Barotse Royal Establishment and people at grass root level, we used to accompany government security forces, we worked with them, we fought with them. In one small way we contributed to the whole struggle. We had to calm down the people, assuring them that you know, appropriate authority will take suitable action under the circumstance to protect them. And that way, from our point of view, there was no massive movement of people from our areas. They kept themselves together.

Seriously speaking, as I said for us the Barotse Royal Establishment, we had this long history of looking after displaced people, especially people from Angola. And to this moment we are still hosting these people. We believe that for that humanitarian gesture we haven't lost anything. It was a genuine effort that we put to mankind. As a matter of fact some of them have started appreciating our long history of friendship, of accommodating these people. For example, the Embassy of Angola here in Zambia through their Consul General here in Mongu, has been assisting Barotse Royal Establishment in developing architectural designs of a sitting arrangement at Nayuma. So that those who come to attend and watch Kuomboka Ceremony can have the comfort of watching on a well-structured situation. So that they can now enjoy the Kuomboka Ceremony. They are not putting up structures, they have only assisted in developing the architectural designs for the stadium at Nayuma at Limulunga. I think it is quite an important contribution, and also an expression of gratitude for what the people of Barotseland have done for the people of Angola. Similarly, the United Nations, they have also tried to assist through their project called Zambia Initiative. To assist those people who live around refugee settlements so that they cushion them for whatever they have suffered all along in accommodating these refugees and freedom fighters. They are building schools. I am aware of a school at Kamunale near Mayukwayukwa (in Kaoma). They had a similar project at Nagweshi in Shangombo district. Anyway it's not significant, but it is at least an intimation of their appreciation of what the people around these refugees have contributed to the well-being of refugees, both civil as well as military refugees.

While it is known that environmentally refugees have caused a lot of environmental destruction to our place, this is what I would call the cost of accommodating the refugees. It is not without suffering. It is not without loss of certain facilities. That is why one could say that the United Nation should do more for places or regions that have been hosting refugees, both military and civil refugees. I think it is something that needs to be looked at again and again, so that adequate compensation would be paid. It's not that we are charging for our humanitarian contribution to mankind but just an appreciation that a lot of damage, especially to the environmental has been done. People through education, through project activities, must find a way of bringing back the lost forests, the lost grasslands. Not only that, even some cultural problems have arisen. You know that some of the best lands were given refugees, and

the locals were displaced. These are the things that need to be looked at an appropriate time. But I must emphasize, it's not that we are charging refugees, but just to restore some of our degraded areas. Whatever we have done for refugees we should not ask them to pay back in whatever form. That is why we are leaving it to them to examine what contribution specific areas have made to their liberation, to their well-being. For instance, Namibia invited the Litunga in 2003 to visit Namibia. That tour took place and I believe that was an indication that the people of Namibia are appreciating our contribution to their liberation struggle, and that we are one and the same people. I believe as I was saying it's an indication that people are beginning to realise what other regions have contributed to their freedom.

While thanks very much for the interview, I wish to only say that if you had given us sufficient time or notice, we could have been probably more articulate in answering your questions. You should come again. Yeah, actually yeah, I will welcome that opportunity because we will expand on what we have already said. For instance one issue which I omitted in putting across to you is the effect these wars here had on us. For instance Western Province is known to have been a home of so many animals, cattle, you know, but because of disease arising from certain areas, most of our animal population has completely gone. So that is again another cost of supporting the liberation struggle. That is why we are praying very hard that these other countries surrounding us get more and more organized in terms of bringing stability in the way they go about their business.

Mwaanga, Vernon J.

[Lusaka; 25 February 2008]

Vernon Mwaanga, fondly referred to as VJ, is a veteran Zambian politician who lived through the struggle and is a first hand actor in the liberation struggle. He served in various capacities in government including being the Director General of the Intelligence Services in Zambia as well as being foreign Minister. He is currently the parliamentary chief whip in the National Assembly of Zambia.

Mr Mwaanga joined the liberation struggle in 1961 after completing his school. He served as Provincial Youth Secretary for UNIP for Southern Province up to 1962 and later as Regional Secretary for UNIP in charge of Choma and Namwala Districts. He attended several international conferences where the liberation struggle was discussed at length and the most notable of these was the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Algeria on 19th March 1964 and He, together with several youths were considered the young radicals. He was among the youths that were advocating that the party should not only be concerned about the liberation struggle in Zambia but also in the whole of Africa, particularly in the Southern region.

While serving in the Zambian embassy in London, Mr Mwaanga was among those that continuously appealed to the ministers in the British Government and members of parliament to support the liberation struggle of Rhodesia, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola and the apartheid South Africa.

During the struggle, Mr Mwaanga met several important people including Che Guevara, Andrei Gromyko, Yakub Malik, Oliver Tambo, Thabo Mbeki and John Makatini, among others.

Thank you very much and you are very welcome. My name is Vernon Mwaanga. I was born on the 25th of June 1944 at Macha Mission in Choma District of the Southern Province of Zambia. I went to school at Nansenga Primary school in Namwala, where my father was teaching from 1947 up to 1950. I went up to Standard Two at Nansenga Primary School. Thereafter my father was transferred to Livingstone and he became Headmaster at Shungu Upper Primary School. I was at Shungu Upper Primary School where I did my Standard Three and Standard Four. Later my father was transferred to Kanundwa Primary School in Monze District, West of Monze. Since there was no upper primary school at Kanundwa, I went to Keemba Upper Primary School west of Monze again where I did my Standard Five, Standard Six Lower and Standard Six Upper. I completed my Standard Six Upper in 1958. In the same year 1958, I went to Livingstone Technical School and I did carpentry at secondary school level.

After completing in 1961, I then joined the liberation struggle in 1961. I became a Provincial Youth Secretary for UNIP for Southern Province up to 1962. And when the party structures were re-organised in UNIP 1962, after the Magoye National Conference, I became Regional Secretary for UNIP in charge of Choma and Namwala Districts. I was the first youth to be transferred from the youth wing of the party to the main wing of the party. During this period, I attended a number of international conferences where the liberation struggle was discussed at length. The most notable

of these was the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Algeria on 19th March 1964. I attended this conference with Mr Wilted Phiri, who was the UNIP representative at the time in Cairo, Egypt. He was running a liberation programme on Radio Cairo International in Cairo.

Before I went to the conference in Algeria, I had been selected by UNIP to go for a leadership course in the United States of America in January 1963 and I linked up with other liberation leaders from Zimbabwe. We were invited and financed by the United States Youth Council, which was being funded by the African American Institute. The African American Institute based in New York. There was a man who was an expert in African affairs by the name of Frank Ferari. Frank Ferari was a senior Vice President of the African American Institute at the time. So I visited 20 states in the United States. I spent six months in the United States. I linked up with two freedom fighters from Zimbabwe. Joseph Msika, who is now one of the Vice Presidents of Zimbabwe, and Jane Ngwenya, who was Head of the Women's League of ZAPU at the time. Joseph Msika was also from ZAPU. Jane Ngwenya was head of Women's League of ZAPU. ZAPU was led by Mr Joshua Nkomo. So we toured together with these colleagues. I went with another colleague from UNIP, Abel Makumba. Abel Makumba was a Youth Secretary in Northern Province at the time.

After that tour, I travelled with Abel Makumba to London for a constitutional conference about Northern Rhodesia around June or July 1963. We stayed in London for a few days as guests of... When we went to London from America, Dr Kaunda had suggested that we stay for a while to observe the constitutional conference on Northern Rhodesia which was going on at the time. This constitutional conference was all part of the build up to the 1964 constitution. I remember meeting Mr Aaron Milner, Mr Elijah Mudenda, Mr Simon Kapwepwe, Mr Nalumino Mundia and Mr Munukayumbwa Sipalo. They were all in London for the constitutional talks. Mr Solomon Kalulu and Dr Kaunda were in charge at the time. I met Mr Harry Nkumbula as well. He was there with Mr Mungoni Liso and other leaders from the African National Congress at the time. There was also a delegation from United Federal Party in Northern Rhodesia which was led by John Roberts and other leaders such as Robin Malcomson. The United Federal Party was then in the Northern Rhodesia Legislative Assembly. Our legislative council, I can't remember exactly what it was called at the time.

In 1964, I went to represent UNIP at a conference after attending the Algiers conference. In May, I went to Sweden to represent UNIP at a conference of the Swedish Socialist Union, which was taking place. I spoke at that conference about the Liberation struggle in Zambia and also in the region. The conference was held in Stockholm. It was in the City Hall in Stockholm. That is where I first met Vice President Rupiah Banda who was a student at the University of Lund. I also met Alex Chikwanda, who was also a student at the University of Lund. UNIP at that time was represented in Sweden by Emmanuel Chalabesa, who was at the University of Stockholm. Emmanuel Chalabesa is the one who became the principal of the

Citizenship College. He was the representative of UNIP in the Stockholm. He was the one who received me and he was my host.

Alex Chikwanda, of course, I knew from here because in 1961 we had attended a UNIP conference at Mulungushi together and we were also delegates to many of the UNIP National Council meetings. We were considered the young radicals. They used to call us the angry young men. It was Alex Chikwanda, myself, late Justin Kabwe, Sefelino Mulenga and Zeniah Ndhlovu. If you recall at the time, Africa was split into two groups. There was the Monrovia group, which was considered more radical, and then there was the Casablanca group, which was considered more moderate. We were in charge of the more militant side of UNIP at that time. The late Ali Simbule, the late Zeniah Ndhlovu, the late Sefelino Mulenga and myself. We were the ones who were advocating that the party should not only be concerned about the liberation struggle in Zambia but should be concerned about the liberation struggle in the whole of Africa, particularly in the Southern region where we were residing. I think that we did influence the party leadership to some extent to adopt a more Pan African view in terms of the liberation struggle at the time.

So I was then selected to go to Oxford University Institute for International Relations in March 1964. I did a 3 months course there. After that course, I was sent to the British Embassy in Rome on attachment. I was a second secretary trainee in the Embassy from July up to the end of September 1964. During my attachment, I was in the Political Affairs Department, which was headed by Douglas Hurd who later became Foreign Secretary, British Foreign Secretary. He was my immediate supervisor. I was attached for about two weeks to the British Consul General's office in Genoa in Italy up north and dealt with consular affairs.

I should have mentioned, in the group of the radicals at the time, the late Motto Nkhama was also in the group. We went to Oxford together with Ali Simbule and Motto Nkhama. All three of us. Motto Nkhama was attached to the British embassy at the same time as I was in Paris. Ali Simbule was attached to the British Embassy in Oslo, Norway. We returned together to go back to Zambia at the end of September in 1964.

So we got back in September, end of September 1964 and went to attend a course which had been arranged by the Chief Secretary's office, International Affairs at NIPA from end of September up to about 17th of October. The course was run by the London School of Economics and funded by the Dag Hammarskjöld foundation in Sweden. It was also attended by participants from Malawi, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. Malawi had just become independent in July 1964. Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were already independent. This was while we were waiting for our independence. Dr Kaunda came to NIPA and he called each of us, one by one. He was Prime Minister at the time. He gave us our respective assignments in the Foreign Service. By the time we went to NIPA, we had been joined by others, who were being recruited into the Foreign Service like the late Joseph Mweemba, Fwanyanga Mulikita, Dr Paul Lusaka, Gwendolyn Konie, Simon Katilungu, Timothy Kankasa, Hosea Soko and Mr Emmanuel Mwamba, who

had come to attend this course. So KK started calling us one by one and telling us which missions we were going to. We were also being handed letters which had been done by him in consultation with the Chief Secretary, Sir Richard Luyt, who later on went to Guyana as Governor General.

The British were still active at the time, right up to independence and right up to after independence. The Governor was also being consulted at the time because the Governor at the time, Sir Evelyn Hone, was still very much here and he was considered quite sympathetic to the liberation struggle compared to his predecessor, Sir Arthur Benson, who was not considered sympathetic. Sir Evelyn Hone was considered a lot more sympathetic and I believe that he did offer some advice to UNIP and to Dr Kaunda in particular at that time.

I was told that I would be going to London as Deputy High Commissioner and we were told to leave almost immediately for our respective posts. Hosea Soko went to Washington as Ambassador, Mulikita went to New York as Permanent Representative and Simon Katilungu was my High Commissioner in London. Timothy Kankasa was posted to Kinshasa as Ambassador to the Congo. Congo only changed the names in 1965 when it became Zaire after Mobutu came to power.

That was in 1964 when I first met you, Dr Bull when you were at Cambridge. It was to celebrate the opening of the mission in London on 7th Cavendish place at the time. We hadn't moved to where the mission is at the moment. The mission was later moved to the Carlington Garden where the mission is at the moment. But the awkward part was that parking was a problem. You probably noticed because we were just on the main road on Cavendish Street. This was the main road. So parking was a problem. We had to go and negotiate to park our cars somewhere else. It was only High Commissioner's car which sometimes parked in front of the Zambia High Commission. It was called Zambia One, being the Zambia High Commissioner's car. I worked with Simon Katilungu and the Zambia High Commission was a very big mission at the time because we had attachés, defence attachés, assistant attachés, a recruitment section, an immigration section and information section. Dunstan Kamana was the information attaché at that time. We also had the trade department. The trade commissioner at the time was a man called Sikalumbi, Wittington Sikalumbi. Colonel Slatter, an Englishman, was a Defence attaché. We had a lot of students who were at Sand Hurst and at Mons, who were doing Defence training. The Chinkulis, Zuzes, the Mibenges and others who were training. And there was Mataa Joshua who became the first Pilot. Joshua Mataa, the former broadcaster turned an airman. The recruitment section was headed by a man called Edward Nicholson, an Englishman. Then we had a political section, which was headed by Paul Lusaka. The education section was headed by a man called Bob Vale, another Englishman. So in total, I think we had 17 members of diplomatic staff, excluding the locally engaged staff.

Before we left NIPA, we were told specifically that part of our role was going to be to promote the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. So you see that for us, the commitment in the liberation struggle started right from day one of our independence.

We were told in the official brief. KK told us that we had to be prepared to promote the liberation struggle. Although our independence was just around the corner, we could not feel free for as long as any inch of Africa remained under colonial rule. And that we must leave our doors open for freedom fighters when they come to visit our mission. We must receive them and we must give them whatever assistance was possible at the time. So our brief was very clear about this matter of liberation. We must keep our doors open, we must receive freedom fighters and we must give them whatever assistance was necessary and possible to ensure that we played a helpful role to them.

We spent our time with Simon Katilungu at the Zambia Mission in London, the High Commission. We spoke continuously with the members of parliament, the ministers in the British Government and members of parliament about the liberation struggle of Rhodesia, which was the main pre-occupation at the time. But apartheid South Africa was also a major concern, so was Namibia and the Portuguese colonies mainly Mozambique and Angola. But we also broadened this to cover Guinea Bissau, Principe, Sao Tome and countries like Equatorial Guinea which were not yet independent at the time. So our mandate was a lot broader than that. We were told to ensure that we gave these people, the members of Parliament in Britain, and we were also accredited to others. We gave to the Irish and the Vatican whatever information we were able to obtain so that they could make a contribution to the struggle and give information to members of Parliament so that they could make statements in the British House of Commons about the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. And I think that we did this quite well. The parties that supported us were the Labour party mainly and the Liberal Party. At that time it was called the Liberal Party. It was a small party and I think when I was deputy High Commissioner, the Liberal Party was led by David Steel and had seven members of parliament in the House of Commons. Now of course, the Liberal Democratic Party is a bigger Party even in Parliament. It has a lot more representation. Our support was mainly from the Labour Party and also from the Liberal Democratic Party although there were individual members of parliament from the Conservative Party, who supported the struggle. There were individual Labour members of Parliament who supported what we were doing and whom we could visit from time to time in the House of Commons and who also came to the Zambian High Commission to get whatever information was available. Dr Kaunda's speeches at the time and the speeches of the Foreign Minister at the time, Simon Kapwepwe, were also very useful information because we circulated these speeches to many members of Parliament as well as to some of the NGOs in the United Kingdom, which had an interest in African issues.

On 14th November 1964, after independence, I went with Dr Kaunda and Mr Kapwepwe to New York to witness Zambia's admission as a member of the United Nations. We went to New York, myself and Rupiah Banda, who was our ambassador in Cairo at the time. We went to New York and witnessed Zambia's admission to the UN heads as the 114th member of the UN. So we were admitted to the UN and Dr

Kaunda made a speech on behalf of Zambia, in the General Assembly of the United Nations. He made it clear that one of Zambia's foreign policy priority would be the liberation of Africa. The speech was very well received and I think people realised that we would focus our activities at the United Nations on the Liberation Struggle. The speech was drafted in Lusaka. It was given to Fwanyanga Mulikita, who was our Ambassador, Puteho Ngonda, myself and Rupiah Banda to look at it afresh and make it current and we made sure that in that speech the slant from the brief we had been given was on the liberation struggle. Fortunately that struck a very good cord in the United Nations. So the stage was set in terms of policy that would be our policy and fortunately that remained our policy throughout the liberation era.

While at the United Nations, of course, we met other revolutionaries like Che Guevara. Che Guevara had led the Cuban delegation. He was Minister of Industry at the time and led the Cuban delegation to the General Assembly. I had the opportunity, with Motto Nkhama, of calling on Che Guevara and he explained to us that he felt that his mission in Cuba had been achieved and that he wanted, as a revolutionary (the duty of a revolutionary was to be revolutionary all the time) to go to Africa and help in the liberation struggle. As you probably remember, he ended up in Africa. I read his memoirs not very long ago where he ended up in Angola and then from Angola he went to Congo. Mobutu's regime at the time was not considered progressive. It was considered retrogressive and Mobutu was a puppet of the United States government. He got involved with the late Kabila, for example, the old man, linked up with him in Angola to plot for the removal of Mobutu from power. In the diaries, which Guevara produced, he records that he was very disappointed with Kabila because he thought he was meeting a revolutionary but he found that there was no revolutionary spirit in Kabila whatsoever. And that his major pre-occupation was song, dance and women. That is what he said in the published memoirs of Che Guevara. Song, dance and women. So he said he got very discouraged because he found that they were not ready and that the crisis he heard in Angola was that first of all there was a problem with language. He didn't speak French which Che spoke. He didn't speak Portuguese which most of these Portuguese fighters spoke and he had problems in communicating. He was a bit disillusioned about the split between Roberto and Augustino Neto where he found that he did not know who to support and we were all saying that they wanted to get rid of the Portuguese and so on and later on when the African continent, through the OAU, recognised the GRAE, (the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile). Roberto was the President and Savimbi was the Foreign Minister in GRAE. So it became very complicated. He went back a very disillusioned person and that is how he ended up going back to South America which is where he came from originally. So these meetings, of course, with Che Guevara were very inspiring because he spoke of nothing but the liberation and he was very optimistic that Africa would be liberated one day. His optimism was later to be justified.

So we went back after KK addressed the General Assembly. We continued the lobbying aspect with the British members of Parliament and ministers and with other

British NGOs which had an interest in the liberation struggle. Mainly there was an organization called Atlas Foundation. The Atlas Foundation was headed by a group of Quakers. There was a man called Dennis Grennan, who was the contact point and the head of the African section of the foundation. The Atlas Foundation was very instrumental in the fighting for the liberation of the African continent. Dennis Grennan later on came to Zambia and he was employed as an Advisor to Kenneth Kaunda. The Atlas Foundation had people like John Papworth. John Papworth came from the quacker movement and he was associated with the Atlas Foundation. Dennis Grennan and John Papworth ended up here as advisors and they linked up with some of the local Quakers like Rev. Mervin Temple who was also a Quaker. Rev. Mervin Temple was a Methodist but the Quakers are in different professions. There was also Rev. Collin Morris, who was also a Methodist minister. He was based in Chingola. Mervin Temple was based in Livingstone. He was a principal at David Livingstone Teacher Training College. He even stood as an M.P at one time. At that time the constituencies were ridiculously big. One constituency could take two provinces or so. Southern province and western province were one big constituency. Temple was removed and replaced by a muzungu from this trading group, who were based mainly in Western Province. The Wilson brothers, if you remember them. And the district commissioners, the district officers let this entire thing pass.

When I was secretary for UNIP in Choma in 1962, Mark Chona came to Choma as District Officer when he left the University of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in Salisbury. He became a very useful source of information in terms of what was happening in the colonial administration of Northern Rhodesia. The fanciest job at the time by the graduates who were coming was to become District officers. There was also a District Commissioner in Choma by the name of Vernon White. A district officer, who worked with Mark and he was transferred from Choma because at night he used to invite me to go to his house to go and talk to him about the liberation struggle. Then he was transferred to Kalomo and he continued meeting the freedom fighters. After some time they said 'NO'. They sent him back to the colonial office in London. No, but these guys, him and another young man called James Lavender. James Lavender was actually in the Chief Secretary's office at the time and he later on went to become a Lecturer at the University of West Indies based in Barbados. It gave me great pleasure when I was sent by Kaunda to go and recruit him and come back to Zambia. He was an Economist. We had a type of colonial Administrators who were so different from the settlers. So Mark Chona came and joined the Administration and he was a District Officer in Choma. He was placed under a lot of surveillance because his brother Mainza Chona was Secretary General of UNIP and because Mainza Chona would come to Choma. You know Mark Chona was Secretary General at that time. Mark Chona would ask his brother to go and visit him. So Mainza Chona would ask his brother Mark Chona and say look if I come are you not going to be in trouble with your employer? Mark Chona would say "listen I can't change the fact that you are my brother". And why shouldn't you visit me? It will look more suspicious if you

don't visit me because they will think that we are meeting elsewhere. So I used to go with Mainza to Mark Chona's house to go and see Mark Chona. And Mark could not be accommodated in the white area. He was accommodated at a very lonely house by the main road going to Livingstone. One house, which had been built, I think, for a road foreman where Mark Chona was accommodated, near the compound, near the African compound. The white duo was in the white area.

I joined the diplomatic service and served in London up to 1965 and then I was sent and promoted to Ambassador. I went to Moscow to open our Embassy there. It was the only embassy we had in the whole of Eastern Europe. But it was also a very critical embassy because of the support which the Soviet Union used to give to the liberation movements by way of training, weapons and even financial resources. They were providing training in guerrilla warfare. They also offered freedom fighters scholarships for some of their students to study for academic studies. They gave them financial resources. They also gave them financial resources and also provided logistical support to the liberation movements, where this was possible. They gave them weapons and they also trained not just those who were going to be involved in actual fighting, but those who were going to train in guerrilla warfare.

It was at the time I was in Moscow, that Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) was declared in Zimbabwe. It was declared on 11th November 1965. We were angered at the time by the inability of Harold Wilson, who was British Prime Minister at the time, to state categorically that if the UDI was declared in Zimbabwe, the British Government, which had duly authority in Southern Rhodesia, would actually use force to put it down. I think that after Harold Wilson had said in Parliament that the British Government would not use force against UDI, Smith and his colleagues got very encouraged.

The movements that were getting support from Russia in 1965 were ZAPU, MPLA, FRELIMO and Admiral Cabral's movement, PIGC. ZANU was being supported by Chinese. The Chinese were very strong in supporting ZANU which was led by Ndabaningi Sithole at the time. The split of the liberation movements was a major concern to us because it meant that the efforts which they were making... It forced countries to begin taking sides. With regards to Southern Rhodesia situation, UNIP was very close to ZAPU. Kaunda had a very close relationship with Nkhomo. This more or less went into the way Zambia conducted herself in terms of the amount of support that it had to give to the liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia. Later on, there was a change in policy because then Zambia started supporting both sides, ZANU and ZAPU. ZANU was headed by Ndabaningi Sithole at the time. There were instances when, before UDI, we used to invite representatives of ZAPU to address UNIP meetings here in Zambia. UNIP leaders were invited to address meetings in Southern Rhodesia before UDI. But after UDI, that was no longer possible. Smith would not have allowed that. On the contrary, the coming of Smith did see an escalation of violence involving Rhodesian soldiers coming into Zambia.

South Africans also started incursions into Zambia. The Portuguese also started incursions into Zambia because they claimed that we were harbouring and training terrorists. Which is true, although we never categorically said so, as a matter of policy. The truth of the matter was that we were training, we were harbouring, and we were financing and giving military support to freedom fighters. But officially each time we were asked, we denied because we realised that we were vulnerable and at the time we were like in an enclave here surrounded on the western side by Angola, eastern side by Mozambique, on the southern side by South West Africa, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. So we were an enclave right inside and you had to understand at the time. Countries like Botswana were not in a position to render support to liberation movement in Southern Africa because they were dependent on South Africa. It would have been risky for them. Each time we met, we discussed a number of things and we were assured of their support to the liberation struggle but because of their geo political position, they could not come out in the open and we did not demand that they come out in the open because we appreciated the predicament in which they were. One of the first freedom fighters to trek down to Zambia was Emmerson Mnangagwa, who was from ZANU. Others were from South Africa.

First of all, while in Moscow I had very close contacts with Andrei Gromyko, who was foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, and also with Mr Yakub Malik who was the Deputy Foreign Minister and in charge of African affairs. Andrei Gromyko served as Foreign Minister for 32 years in total. One of the longest serving ministers on record. Before that he was Ambassador at the United Nations during the time when the UN was formed. He was also ambassador in Washington and then the United Nations. Yakub Malik was Foreign Minister in charge of African Affairs. He is the one who had very close dealings with liberation movements in Africa in terms of organizing logistics and finances and so on. So I had a lot of discussions with Gromyko and also with Malik to constantly review how the liberation struggle was going in Southern Rhodesia, in South Africa, South West Africa, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe and Equatorial Guinea. And in the smaller countries like Seychelles at the time, they had not yet become independent. Seychelles became independent much later on. They made it very clear that they would continue to support the liberation struggle until Africa was free. Yakub Malik and Gromyko made it very clear to me and I remember receiving a delegation from Zambia in 1965, which was led by Arthur Wina, who was the Finance Minister at the time and it comprised of Elijah Mudenda and some officials. We went to have a meeting with the President of the Soviet Union at the time. It was Nikolai Podigovny. He was the President of the Soviet Union at the time. After Krushnev had been removed, the triangles of three leaders, Podigovny was the President, Brezhnev was the Secretary General. At that time, he was called the first Secretary of the communist Party and had not changed the title, and then Kosygin, Alexei Kosygin, he was Prime Minister. Leonid Brezhnev was the first Secretary of the communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The delegation comprised of Arthur Wina and Mudenda and there were other officials. I took them for a meeting with Podigovny and he made it clear to us that the Soviet Union would fight against the UDI, and that they would support Zambia in the struggle to liberate parts of Africa. That the liberation movements would be supported and that they would use their influence in the UN including the veto power in the Security Council to veto any resolutions which were tilted against the freedom fighters. And that any language in the UN resolutions which related to calling freedom fighters terrorists would be vetoed by them in the Security Council and for sure they stuck to that position. There was speculation at the time Arthur Wina and Elijah Mudenda and myself went to meet the Russian leadership that we had gone to discuss military support for Zambia against Southern Rhodesia.

They were very jittery in Rhodesia at the time because Smith had announced that Zambia was preparing to attack Southern Rhodesia militarily and that the delegation which had gone to Soviet Union had gone there to discuss the Soviet military assistance to Zambia in her fight against Smith. We didn't discuss the military assistance, but we also made no serious effort to deny the story which was on the BBC. That for us, we had gone to ask for military assistance to overthrow Smith. So it was a big story all over the world and of course the iron of it is that because of the fact that this was at the height of the cold war. They came there to find out what the Soviet Union could do to assist Zambia overcome the adverse effect of UDI. For example, at the time, we were transporting oil through Elizabethville, using Canadian planes, which were ferrying oil, petrol and diesel into Zambia. Petrol rationing was very much in effect here at home. Motorists were restricted to 4 gallons per week.

We entered into an agreement with the Congolese Government. So they were ferrying fuel from Lubumbashi to here and also from Dar es Salaam to here. That is before we built the pipeline and that was one of the reasons why the pipeline was built because of the difficulties which Zambia had experienced after UDI. Although I must confess that in the UN Security Council resolutions, we had put a rider that Zambia should not be expected to comply fully with all Security Council sanctions against Rhodesia because of the geo political position. So were given the exemption but principally on the part of our leaders, Kenneth Kaunda, the government and the cabinet, they felt that we had to make an effort to lessen our dependence on Rhodesia. That's how projects such as the pipeline and also TAZARA were first conceived because of the hardships that we had first experienced at that time. The Russians did offer that they would give us some tankers to help transport oil and to help Zambia beat the sanctions and that they would press very hard in the UN Security Council to make sure that Zambia got this exemption which we were fighting for because as a permanent member of the Security Council, they enjoyed the powers of veto. We felt that even if the Russians did not object to this special clause, exempting Zambia from observing these sanctions in full, the western countries would go along with that exemption. That is why Washington and Moscow, and these leaders were the leaders of the two worlds as it were. The Eastern block, the communist block as it were, as well

as the Western world, United States and Britain. We were at loggerheads with Britain at the time because of the Rhodesian crisis and Dr Kaunda was on record as having been involved in so many quarrels with Harold Wilson and James Callaghan, who was Foreign Secretary....

We were involved with Rhodesian issue and it was virtual war and meetings had taken place here and in Lagos. You will recall the Lagos meeting, Commonwealth meeting, which was held in Lagos in January 1965 when Nigeria experienced its first coup d'état. Even before the conference had actually ended some of the leaders were still at the airport. There was a coup in Nigeria after the Commonwealth conference, which was very acrimonious.

Nyerere and Kaunda were at war with Harold Wilson at the conference. It became obvious that now the African countries would rally behind Kaunda and Nyerere to fight Britain over the Rhodesian issue because we felt that the British Government was not taking a strong stand to say to Smith "if you declare independence unilaterally, we will come and put down the rebellion. It would be an act of rebellion against the queen". They would have said that and KK offered the British Government Zambian territory to use for the invasion of Southern Rhodesia but of course they declined the offer. The British government said under no circumstances will they use force against Smith. Because of that, Smith and his colleagues got the encouragement to go ahead with UDI and also there were very strong links with some of the members of the British royal family, the British government and some members of Parliament had interests in Southern Rhodesia through their families and through companies that were owned by family members. So that really complicated the personal family

aspect complicated the whole struggle because members of the British government, members of the House of Lords, House of Commons and other interest groups. There were people lobbying against the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia. That is when the kith and kin argument came into being. They couldn't possibly be involved in that kind of struggle.

So when I came back from Moscow in 1965, I was appointed as Director General of the Zambia Intelligence Services. My mandate was to take the then special branch away from the police and to establish an independent civilian intelligence services. My deputy was a man called Elisha Banda who had come from Police. He was involved in a car accident. And he died in a car accident. Elisha Banda was a very energetic person and he strongly supported the liberation struggle. We had to introduce a new law, a new act, establishing the Intelligence Services. Peter Siwo was an Assistant Secretary in my office. He worked very closely with late Fitzpatrick Chuula to draft the legislation creating the Zambia Intelligence Service. And you will be interested to know that one of the persons who was involved in this legislation and who later became the legal counsel for the Intelligence Service was Edward Shamwana.

So after we set up the Service, we then had to get the Police on board and the Commissioner of Police at the time, because we didn't have the title of the Inspector General at that time, was Mr Michael Mataka. Michael Mataka was Commissioner of

Police. We had to convince him that we were going to remove officers who were in the old special branch to come into the Intelligence Service. But that we were going to leave some officers because we wanted to recruit some young graduates and the people who had better academic education.

Before the new act the officers were called Special Branch officers. Initially they were under Police. They were police officers. Some of them were recruited from uniform while some of them were recruited from the criminal investigations department.

Kaoma was a Police Officer. He was one of the people I selected to come into the Intelligence Service. We didn't take all of them. Some of them were not really suitable to be in the Intelligence Service. There was no Special Branch. Special Branch was abolished. They ended up going into either the criminal investigations department or into uniform. They had to go back to uniform. Now the problem we had with the Intelligence Service was that, we still had British officers in the Intelligence Service and because of the additional mandate we were given by KK to work with the liberation movements, including helping them to smuggle guns into Zambia, and we set up safe houses which belonged to the Intelligence Services here.

The Intelligence Service was given mandate to work with the liberation movements including overseeing their training, bringing in guns into the country and distributing the guns, and identifying crossing points for them, particularly the ones from Rhodesia. We identified points which, according to our information, were safe for them to cross using canoes to go into Zambia.

We identified crossing points and even the times for them to cross. The guns and other forms of support were coming from Tanzania. We had, maybe, three or four incidences, I remember, where the intelligence officers who were involved in smuggling these weapons were actually caught by white officers from the service, the same service. And they came rushing to me to come to tell me that we had just arrested some terrorists. The white officers were still using the word terrorists when I became Director General. They would be put into cells and using the generally held view that all blacks look alike. We, as a Service, would find petty criminals who were sentenced maybe for three months or six months. We would go to the cells at night and exchange them. We would go and have them exchanged.

It was a major dilemma because we had to do everything away from the white officers. Which was not always possible because some of them were in very influential positions but after it happened a fourth time, then I thought this is enough now. I went to see KK and we agreed that all the serving British officers in the Intelligence Service had to have their employment terminated. This was in 1966. What we did is, we had to get the Public Service Commission. At that time, it was chaired by Henry Makulu. And the Administrative Head was Mr Josphat Siyomunji and was assisted by Mr Ariel Phiri?

They met at night. We agreed to terminate employment and to get their letters written over night which were then handed over to me and Elisha Banda identified officers who would wait outside their offices to hand them letters.

The lodge in Ndola is named after Henry Makulu. Henry Makulu and that night the Police Service Commission met the whole night. The letters were done. KK approved. We were awake until 7 in the morning. By 7:30, the officers were positioned outside the offices of all these officers. The first letters to be done and signed were for stations in Kabwe, Mazabuka and Livingstone. People had to go by government flights to Ndola Livingstone, Chingola and Luanshya. By the time they wanted to report for work, they were handed their dismissal letters. All of them were dismissed. They were

37. And when I tuned to BBC news that day, the main heading was “so many British officers had been dismissed from the Zambian Government Service” and they kept repeating that the whole day. That they were dismissed by the new Director General of the Service. They mentioned my name.

It had to be a very ruthless act. There was no other way of doing it. You couldn't leave any of them in those positions otherwise the security was going to remain compromised. The liberation would have been very difficult. There were too many leaks coming from our operations. The military, the British commander and there was an Intelligence wing in the army we used to work with. The officers in the Intelligence are in service in the army who used to report to me and also to the boss, the commander. He was a white officer. So I mean they were everywhere. The British High Commission was informed about what we were doing in the Service. It just became unattainable. So we had to get rid of them at one goal.

There were white people in Public Service. They were very few at the time and it was mainly the people who were very sympathetic to us. And people were brought back from the UK, those who had been taken away by the colonial Government.

Siyomunji was in Public Service that time. I found him there. Even at independence, we found him. He was already in the service. He was one of the most experienced public servants we had.

Our role in the liberation struggle was to play a supportive role to the liberation movements. This was in addition to maintaining national security, and also checking on counter intelligence operations by other countries, especially Britain. It was during my time when I said to the various governments that we know you have intelligence officers in your missions, why don't they just register with the Intelligence Service so that we can work with them. We can work together, we can even hold meetings and give them briefs from time to time. That's when they started coming out in the open, although we knew who the intelligence officers were. The British came out in the open; Americans came out in the open, and the Germans did the same; the Russians did the same; the Chinese did the same. All the other countries that had Intelligence Officers registered with our services. So we started working. We knew we would have meetings with them and have discussions with them. They would come and say, for example, we understand that the Service was involved in ferrying freedom fighters across the Zambezi into Rhodesia. If they were the western intelligence officers the answer was NO, that's not true. Our service was never involved in that but if it was the Russians and the Chinese, we told them yes we did. We had two answers.

Before the Intelligence Officers became involved in the transportation of arms and freedom fighters, it was done by the politicians. The politicians, who were involved in the operations before the Intelligence Service, were Mr Milner and Mr Lewis Changufu. They were already in the Government so I don't know whether it is possible to draw a distinction between their personal capacities. Obviously they had been instructed to do that by the President's. Milner was in the President's office. Changufu was in the President's office before going to Home Affairs. Those were involved and Mainza Chona was also involved, I remember. Mr Milner was involved and actually went driving to the border to collect arms. The vehicles collided and the ammunition exploded. It was very bad. So it's during that time when we got involved. We bought safe houses on farms outside Lusaka. The operations became more methodical when we got involved. When the politicians were being involved, they used to meet freedom fighters in some bush somewhere and they were allocating and counting the guns and how many you take. It was a little clumsier during that time before the Service. The system was refined later when the services got involved.

Government bought safe houses. The Intelligence Service bought the houses. The gazetted time, you see, the budget which I controlled, the Intelligence Service budget I controlled, was neither subject to parliament nor subject to audit by the Auditor General. It was outside Parliament and outside the Auditor General. The expenditure had to be authorised by myself because it involved having to pay agents, people who were acting as informers for example for the Government. We had to employ informers for example for the Government. We also had to employ informers even in the liberation movements themselves to make sure that they were not doing something unusual which would compromise our own strategies. We had to operate this fund from which the liberation movements were funded, including funding buildings for them. We bought buildings for them here. Those who lived in rented houses, we paid the rent. We organised the crossing points for them on the border, not just Southern Rhodesia, but also Angola and Mozambique. The Eastern Front involved opening the front on the East. That is, the border between Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. We had to do this in conjunction with FRELIMO. They were active in those areas. We had to get their cooperation. They also assisted in helping freedom fighters in Zimbabwe. In particular, ZANU was the one operating using the Eastern Front. That is between Southern Rhodesia and Mozambique. The Eastern Front became an important front in terms of the liberation of Southern Rhodesia. The freedom fighters got to the Eastern Front by working with FRELIMO. They were given safe passage through Zambia in Eastern Province into Mozambique where FRELIMO were operating and using FRELIMO, they set up bases on the Eastern Front. They went from Eastern Province to Tete into Zimbabwe. That is the most talked about Eastern front, when the Eastern front was open in 1967 or 1968. It became very operational and active from 1968. But we had to do the same for Mozambique and for FRELIMO as well. They used the same route but the Tanzanian route was also very fertile for FRELIMO. Because from southern Tanzania, they used to infiltrate Northern Mozambique.

So they had to build these bridges. The military used to call them logistic bridges. Malawi was refusing FRELIMO entry but we used Malawian territory without their knowledge several times. We violated Malawian territory because they didn't want to be involved in the liberation struggle. We cut our own routes via Malawi without the support or knowledge of Dr Banda. Although later on, when I met Dr Banda, he told me that they were aware of some of the incursions that we had made but they looked the other way. There were a number of people detained in the process. In the case of Botswana, they even used to facilitate, for example, people like, some of the people who were running away like from the communist Party of South Africa for example. Dr Limbando was from the communist party in South Africa. The whole Limbando family came from South Africa after they fled from arrest and we helped them. The Intelligence Service helped them to come. They ended up in Botswana and Botswana told us in confidence that there were these people who needed to be assisted, could we please work out something? Botswana used to pass a lot of information so they never obstructed the struggle. Unlike the Malawians, who were very difficult because even at the United Nations if they didn't vote against a resolution they abstained or when it was time to vote they left the voting chamber and went outside. So the roll call, each time they called Malawi, Malawi was absent, if not, they voted against or abstained. So Malawi was very obviously in the whole of this scenario. But Botswana were not obstructing. They passed information to us and a number of people who escaped from there ended up in Botswana and the Botswana government notified us and we arranged rescuing these people to come here. They didn't always stay here. Some of them just transited through to go to Tanzania either for training in Bulgaria or East Germany or Cuba. These were the major training grounds. The Cubans played a very major role in the training of freedom fighters.

Apart from the Eastern front, there was one across the Zambezi. That was always there. The one from Zambia into Southern Rhodesia. And then we had the South African one where people had to go into South Africa using all sorts of ways either through Mozambique, Swaziland, Botswana or through South West Africa in areas where SWAPO was active. So the river crossing was always there and always taking place. A few people got caught but compared to the number of people who went in, it was negligible.

I did have individual links with the ANC, Oliver Tambo for example. I had the responsibility of looking after Oliver Tambo. When we suspected that there were going to be raids against Zambia by racist regimes from South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, I was responsible for allocating safe houses to Tambo and Mbeki, and there was a man called John Makatini, who used to be Head of the ANC department of Foreign Affairs before Mbeki took over. Mbeki was in the department of information. Only after John Makatini died from natural causes, did Oliver Tambo decide that Mbeki should go to the department of Foreign Affairs. If you know the ANC constitution, it's not like ours. It's not like MMD for example where a person is elected directly into a position. In the constitution of ANC, only 6 people are elected directly

to the portfolio. The President, the Vice President, National Chairman, General Secretary, the Deputy Secretary General and the Treasurer. The others are elected to the National Executive Committee and the President allocates the duties. They are elected to the National Executive committee after that the President allocates the duties as foreign affairs and so on. After John Makatini died that is when Mbeki was made Head of the department of Foreign Affairs. He was commissioner before. The vice president, the Chairman, they actually don't call him vice President they call him Deputy President. Then, the Chairman of the party. Then Secretary General of the Party, deputy secretary general and the treasurer. Then the others are elected to the National Executive committee without any specific portfolio. The President then allocates duties and the advantage there is that the President can make changes among the duties he has allocated whereas here once you are elected to a specific post you cannot be removed.

Mbeki was in foreign affairs as the Director. He was the Head of Foreign Affairs, Director for foreign affairs just like Trevor Manuel as Finance Minister, he was Director of Finance. Mbeki, here was Head of Information department. It is the same as chairman for international relations. Up to the time he returned to South Africa, you will probably recall that he married his wife here. They married here because Zanele was working for UNHCR. And she was brought up by an aunt of hers who was working as a Nurse in Chingola. So she was brought up here. She worked here and she was living on Martin Luther King close when they got married. We used to play Tennis together at Kabulonga Girls Secondary School. She was living with an aunt of hers who was married to a miner on the Copperbelt in Chingola. So I had a lot of dealings with the ANC. I also had a lot of dealings with ZANU and ZAPU.

Mbeki's predecessor in foreign affairs was John Makatini. He became Director of foreign affairs after Makatini died. I personally knew Alfred Nzo. He used to visit my house quite regularly and I interacted with him very closely. He was the Secretary General of the ANC. He used to live in Lilanda. They moved to here although they used to come in and out of Zambia quite often because they felt very much at home here because of the support we gave them. They used to go to Tanzania first and then they came here.

Mbeki lived in Lilanda first and then he lived in Kabwata then moved to Martin Luther King close where Zanele was staying. He lived in Mtendere for some time. But eventually we had to find housing in areas where we thought they would be safe because in addition to just giving them accommodation, we had to buy houses or rent houses for them. We also had to provide them with security to make sure they are safe. The army and the security services and the Police had to give them security. The freedom fighters from South Africa had most of their cantonments in Tanzania but later they did have cantonments here. For example they had military support in Mkushi area and in Western Province. The ANC had cantonments in Kalabo for example. You remember there was some man who got killed there on a farm when they raided the farm? They did say that they thought that the farm was used for

training by ANC freedom fighters. His children are still alive. One of the girls does come here with her husband from time to time to visit me. The father was killed in that raid. The man was the farm manager.

They were side by side with MPLA and UNITA except they did not live in the same camps. We always separated them. But they were in the sort of general areas with MPLA and ZAPU and then subsequently with ZANU as well. ZAPU had their headquarters in Tanzania. Then they ZANU moved here. They realised that it was pointless to have the headquarters in Tanzania. They needed to be nearby.

Chitepo was based here. The day before Chitepo was killed, I was Foreign Minister at the time, he came to my office at the ministry and said that he felt that his life was in danger so I said we can give him protection if he wanted. I said, look we can give you Police protection right away if your life is in danger. So he said no. He came with Maurice Nyagumbo but I realised that Maurice Nyagumbo belonged to the faction that wanted to kill him.

So when I met him I did not want to meet him in the presence of Nyagumbo. So we left Nyagumbo in the ministers' waiting room. I called Chitepo alone. I asked what was happening and he said his life was in danger. He said, I think there is a faction of people in the party that want to kill me. So I said, we can give you Police protection immediately. We can have your house guarded. He was living in Libala. He said, let me come back to you tomorrow. I said, ok you let me know what the position is. The following day was a Friday, I was at Parliament, this is the day when Parliament meets in the morning. I was called out by the Inspector General of Police to tell me that Chitepo had been blown up in the drive way of his house in Libala.

I was in Parliament myself and the Inspector General of Police called me outside of Parliament to tell me that Chitepo had been killed and there was a bomb blast in his drive way. I said to myself oh my God why did he not tell me. I wish I had given him Police protection yesterday.

I had direct connections with Dr Neto, the MPLA, and also with UNITA. I used to meet with them. They used to come to my house and we would discuss their needs which we would pass on to President Kaunda. They came to me either just to visit me as Director of Intelligence or just as a friend. Even when I was Foreign Minister they used to visit me. So I had a lot of dealings with Neto and there was growing disenchantment within MPLA about Neto's leadership. Some of his colleagues felt he was autocratic and because of that there was a split as you know within MPLA, into 3. All this happened in 1972. There was a group, which was based in Zambia, which was led by Chipinde. This group which was based here was called the Eastern Revolt.

It was the Brazzaville group which was led by Dr.....that one was called the active and actual revolt against absolute Presidentialism in MPLA.

Revolts against active Presidentialism in MPLA and then Neto's group, which was the larger group, was called the actual direction of MPLA. I got even more involved as I was appointed by the Frontline States to mediate between Brazzaville group and Neto. The actual direction and the group which was against absolute Presidentialism.

So I travelled to Brazzaville on Government flights from here, direct flights into Brazzaville with the General Hashim Mbita, a number of times to go and meet with these people. These contacts became more urgent after the coup in Portugal against Salazar. They were not ready because they had split. So even when Mario Soares, the Foreign Minister came here on behalf of the armed forces movement in Portugal, which had overthrown the government of Salazar, the Mozambicans were quick off the blocks because then we had to arrange a meeting between them here. The constitutional conference was held here and I was hosting Mario Soares and hosting, as Foreign Minister, and FRELIMO. Machel came here, Chissanno and Maselino dos Santos, the vice president of FRELIMO, we had our meetings here. And the meetings did not last that long. One night, I remember, when there was a deadlock in the meeting, a colonel who was the head of the armed movements in Portugal, he said to me, you know, I know these FRELIMO, I was originally born in Mozambique, you take me to where they are staying. So I had to drive him at night to take him where FRELIMO were at State house. By sitting down with him, we went through the areas of disagreement and there was agreement. So he said now you can take me to the hotel tomorrow when we meet I would have discussed with the ministers because there was Mario Soares and Major Antonis, who had come with Soares. The armed forces movement decided that the disagreement/deadlock should be broken and that they were prepared to accept what FRELIMO were demanding. And when I took him to meet the FRELIMO delegation, you should have seen the hugging. They were all hugging each other. They had gone to school together. I was amazed.

The meeting in Lusaka was April 1974. We were able to conclude the Mozambican part of the process very quickly. But then while we were trying to mend fences among the Angolans, the three who had split and then there was FNLA which was led by Roberto and then there was UNITA led by Savimbi. It became very complicated. That is why right up to the time when it was agreed that the Portuguese to hand over independence, I remember General Grespal, who was High Commissioner of Portugal to Angola. When they went to the stadium to say they were handing over independence, they didn't know who to hand over to. They just said they were handing over the independence to the people of Angola. And he went from the stadium to the Airport and boarded a plane back to Portugal. That is how these factions started fighting. MPLA grabbed the capital, UNITA also grabbed the southern part, Jamba. Then Dr De-Andrade, their group became irrelevant because their group was mainly the intellectual group and was associated with the coloureds. Some of the people went and joined hands with Neto. In accordance with the OAU policy at the time, to recognise the faction, that controls the capital. That is how the recognition was given to MPLA. And by that time, Zambia had started supporting a government of national unity. There was an OAU meeting in Addis before that. And KK addressed the meeting where he was booed. For the first time KK was booed at the OAU meeting.

KK said we must support the government of national unity and he was booed in the Africa Hall. And you know that Zambia was one of the last countries to recognise

the MPLA government? We were among the last. Even after Malawi had done so. We had riots at UNZA because the UNZA students wanted us to support the MPLA government. And you remember that journalist who used to do special articles from time to time? He was used to be attached from time to time to MPLA forces in Angola? You remember Robbie Makayi? Even when I was his editor in Chief at the Times, we used to send him on assignments/attachment to MPLA fighters in Angola. So if you can find him, he has very interesting episodes because he went in and was attached to MPLA forces in Angola. And I paid for his trips as Editor in Chief.

He really spent a lot of time with the MPLA forces on attachment. Nyerere got so fed up with Neto when these negotiations failed between him and others. He said to Dr Neto, it may save us better if we can give you a 2 or 3 million dollars to go and setup a medical practice in Ghana. I was at that meeting where Nyerere told Neto you should just go to Canada. Get out of the way so that people interested in it can get on with it. That is how bad the situation had become. The OAU recognised Neto because he controlled the capital. That was before that stage was reached. Do you remember that the OAU had recognised GRAE at first? Then they de-recognised GRAE. They said this was problematic because the OAU had to give budgetary support to GRAE since it didn't have any other source of income. They had to get money from OAU to recognise GRAE and UNITA as heads of state. And we said no, this can't be and they were de-recognised. It was very complicated. Each time Roberto came here, he had to be received as a head of state at Intercontinental Hotel. We had to clear all the people on the top floor to accommodate President Roberto. And you know that he was the brother in law of Mobutu. So after he was de-recognised, he went to Zaire. And his brother in law looked after him. He gave him bungalows; he gave him whatever he wanted. Because he considered Zambia, initially, as hostile. So he was not even sure how he was going to be received. Neto declined and Savimbi declined. It was very complicated issue and unfortunately, those complications are still there.

But you used to act as Minister of Foreign Affairs for me when I travelled? I remember one day we hired aone-eleven. I remember that but we didn't tell you who else was going to be on board. You remember I saw you off at the airport with Alex Chikwanda. And I told you the destination at the airport. The bulk of the plane....it is 122 passengers. You were in first class. The others this side were freedom fighters. The factions who were quarrelling on the plane were Neto's and De-Andrade's factions. They were Angolans. They had failed to reconcile here. We were just sending them back. That is what KK told us to do. What we did here was part of what we used to do. Some of the things we had to do involved the international scene like at the UN. Putting pressure and getting the whole world to put pressure now on the colonialists. You were given the declaration of Southern Africa, I am sure? I have a copy somewhere but I have to look for it. We also had another declaration in Dar-es- Salaam on our re-commitment on the liberation struggle during the OAU Liberation Meeting in Dar-es- Salaam. The Liberation Committee played a very major role and then our involvement with the UN....As Ambassador to the UN.

Have you managed to talk to Mark? Mark played a very major role. Even when we had reached an agreement with the South Africans, to release Nkomo and Sithole at the time, when we found out that Sithole had been overthrown in Prison, and that Mugabe had taken over, Mark Chona is the one we went to the prison. And we sent a Zambia Air force Plane with an all black crew to Salisbury...

Nkhomo came from Gonakuzingwa and Mugabe from Gweru Prison. Then we were told while there that Sithole had been overthrown. So now, Nyerere, the Chairperson of the Frontline States, was saying to me how can they overthrow Sithole from prison, which means the plot which was engineered by the Then it turned out that it was consensus decision among the ZAPU leaders to remove him. And to have Mugabe become leader.

The Chikumbi bombing, I don't know. It was more than a thousand dead. In the foreign ministry we recorded more than a thousand. The ambulances were screaming. That was bad. Do you remember the interview Nkomo gave? He escaped through the back door. And you when you look at Nkhomo, he was so huge to go through the back door.

Thank you for coming.

Mwale, Siteke

[13 June 2008]

Dr Ambassador Siteke Mwale is the Special Presidential Envoy and National Co-ordinator for the Great Lakes Region. He is veteran politician and diplomat who served as Zambia's Foreign Minister between 1976 and 1979 at the height of the liberation struggle. He was instrumental in many decisions that affected the Liberation movements.

Dr Ambassador Mwale represented UNIP when he was a student in the United States. At independence, he was not in Zambia but assisted in organizing receptions in the USA. He was there when discussions about power sharing between ANC and UNIP were taking place. He was part of government when Dr Kaunda endeavoured to unite various liberation movements. These included ZANU and ZAPU from Zimbabwe, UNITA and MPLA from Angola. He highlights his involvement in the liberation struggle.

My name is Siteke Gibson Mwale. I was born in Nyimba when my father was working there as a stock taker. That was on 22nd October 1929. I did my elementary education at Lakwenga Mine School in Eastern Province near Luangwa. I started my school there in 1936. I moved on when my parents moved to Ndola in 1938. I continued with my elementary education until 1944 when I went to Munali training centre. On the Copperbelt, I went to Ndola Main School. I later went to Munali Training Centre which is now known as David Kaunda High School in 1947 and I was just about to go to South Africa, my father had arranged for me to go to South Africa to do my...? You go there before you get into college. In South Africa, they had something like standard 8 and from there you go into junior secondary school. And then you went ahead until you were able to enter junior college. I didn't go because my family experienced death. My mother died before I could go and when that took place, my father found himself in an awkward position. So in 1948, I was forced to start work and help my father look after four siblings who were left by my mother. I started as a Ledger Clerk at the Ndola Municipal Council location office. Now, because I was not satisfied with the education that I had taken, I registered with South Africa's correspondence colleges to do secondary school education. When I was satisfied with the South Africa's Correspondence Colleges, I registered with the Rapid Results College in London. I was still working. In 1953, I was able to qualify to be appointed to be accepted as one of the five students to do the first course ever in the country in social welfare at Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation while still doing my private studies in constitution I and constitution II. Then I was able to be admitted through based in Ndola to go to England to do the development work, probation work and social case work. I studied at London School then I moved to Exeter and did my practical work there in probation work then I moved to university. I came out after four months with what was considered as a diploma. Then I went back to Ndola and continued to work as Senior Social Welfare Officer. Then on the basis of the studies I had taken, I was chosen by the African American Institute to do a Bachelor of Arts

degree for three years at Tempo University. I was doing a Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology from 1960 to 1963. Then I completed my degree. I was one of the 13 outstanding students out of a group of 2000 students who graduated and I was the first African ever at Tempo University.

Because of that they decided that I should stay on and become part of the staff there. I wanted to do other things, I was offered a teaching position in Research Assistantship at the University of Chicago, and again I turned it down. Then I was accepted at the University of California at UCLA and I became a Teaching and Research Assistant. This was 1964 to 1965. The training I was doing at UCLA was a combination of Master's Degree and PHD. While at UCLA, UNIP appointed me as a UNIP-USA representative and United Nations representative. I was a representative to the United States of America as a party. I took over from the late Arthur Wina. He was the first one and he was also at UCLA. But when Arthur Wina came back in 1963 in preparation for the independence, he had already done his work there and now I was still completing my post graduate. So because I was a UNIP man from here

I was a student and a teacher. Because we were not yet in government UNIP had representatives in several parts of the world during those days. We had this very strong arrangement which covered the whole of the United States of America to try and raise scholarships in preparations for the independence of Zambia. The centre became a rallying point by many students who were in the United States of America. In fact when independence took place I was not in Zambia, I was still in USA. As a representative there, they sent us money for us to spend on receptions to my office which I re-distributed to students who were based in New York and Washington DC to organise receptions and they did that. We had a major reception for the USA in Los Angeles. After I completed my studies I came back to Zambia on 1st January 1965. I had never been back home since 1960. I was joined by my wife briefly but I had left four children who were in schools already. The youngest didn't even know how daddy looked like, she was too young to remember. When I came back to Zambia, it was an independent country. It was multi-party and not yet one party state. When we started, it was multi-party. If you recall before independence just as we were preparing we had to do a number of things which I believe today has a lot to do with the political tolerance that our country has managed to maintain. Because as far back as 1962 when UNIP and ANC were like the two African competing parties, apart from the parties that the whites had formed. We were at one stage compelled to come up with a coalition government, in which both the ANC and UNIP were the major parties. We sat down and discussed the possibility of sharing power as we were getting into our first period of self-government. It took place in 1962, 1963 and by the time we were getting independence, we still had a number of African parties sharing power. This was a challenge in the history of African politics not only in Zambia but also in the sub region. A challenge, because there was need for tolerance and acceptance by parties that were not able to come out with outright wins at the polls. It is an important point for Zambia, just say yes we did this kind of thing that people are

talking about in Zimbabwe, in Kenya. We did it here. When I came back, I had all my education but we were in new era were not everybody was educated as some of us were more educated. There were only 105 graduates at independence. And yet we were challenged to come up with the government that knew what independence was all about. We were in problems. The number one problem which I think should feature very prominently because it is my conviction that out of many reasons why Africa has continued to be torn apart by divergent groups and thoughts, is because we have not understood what the initial problem has been. The initial problem I think and, I stand to be corrected, is that the struggle, as it was at the beginning of gaining independence and now, is of Africans, more especially those who have taken over power, to understand that the struggle has been one of correcting the ills and inadequacies of the colonial past coupled by the similar challenging aspects of meeting the demands of the new independent country. As you go right through you will find that this is a challenge which keeps coming. Whatever we talk about, the constitution this and the constitution that. It goes back to the fact that, at independence, none of the African newly independent countries had the capacity to just take over and run their governments in the manner that the Europeans were running the governments. The Europeans themselves made sure that we were not trained enough. They denied us from the word go.

They didn't train us. This is the problem from the word go. They talked so much about democracy this, democracy that, the Greek and British democracy but never allowed us to be part of that to practise. Yes we were willing to say let us try to do things according to the democracy you are talking about. They never let us. I can give you a typical example of the times we are talking about. At that time of independence, we had to fight to wrestle power from the people who told us about power. It is the white man who told us about power and yet he did not share. He knew that if the population was 50,000, they needed so many representatives. Do you know how many representatives we had in 1962 or 1963? Well by 1963, we were already in what was known as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Federation came into being in 1953. Now, 10 years old, the whites were still talking about so many representatives of whites in the three parliaments which they gave themselves, not because of the numbers which is what democracy is. It is obvious that the people who have more representation will be the 3 million and not 250,000. Anyway in our country in Zambia in the 50's before the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland had been pushed down our throats, no African was a member of a city council. In Ndola, I became one of the councillors, not as a city councillor but as an advisor to the situation in the area I stayed which was a predominant black area. We never shared housing areas in Ndola, for instance. The blacks lived in horrible areas that had not enough water and no electricity in the houses, no water run toilets. We dug out latrines. Schools were not adequate and everything else, we did not manage to get it according to the numbers of people who lived there. So we had little or nothing to do with the city because we lived in locations and so they had advisory representatives. I was a member of

the Ndola Advisory Council. Now according to them, any advisory council in the city, was given a chance to nominate two people to serve on the Provincial Advisory Council, which in turn nominated two representatives to serve on the African Representative Council, which in turn recommended two Africans to be considered as members of the Legislative Council by the government. Now, a Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia, before independence and even before the Federation, had two representatives to represent the whole country. At that time, we had a population of 2 million people. So we had two people representing 2 million people in the legislative council, which is now the house of chiefs behind the cabinet office.

The whites, whose population was estimated between 60,000 and 70,000 in the whole country of Northern Rhodesia, had 14 representatives. We never even knew what a minister was. We only had two people for the whole country. And we had no votes at all. We were just there as representatives and not members of the Legislative Council. But they had people coming from England. I remember we had a late member of parliament who later became a prime minister. He was visiting one of the colonies and one of the places they used to meet this person was Ndola because Ndola was the headquarters of the Copperbelt. So we were there meeting this man. He was telling us how England is and its king George the VI, I lived during his time until he died and when I was working in 1948. So this man came and he was talking about his majesty the king prefers this and that. I had people whom I served and some of them are still alive, Mr Thomas Mtine used to be a member and others like the father of Doreen Mukanzo was there. He was a very able man, Mr Kazunga and a number of others who have passed on and he were there and we was telling us how Britain in England felt strongly about us Africans getting more responsibilities in running the country. They had it in their hearts but the whites who came here, most of them were brought up here and with the influence of South Africa then, which was already toiling with the idea of Apartheid, they had discrimination. There was apartheid in South Africa, discrimination in Southern Rhodesia and colour bar in Northern Rhodesia. Now apartheid in South Africa was legislated, they were by law. In Rhodesia, it was also by law but to a certain extent a little more relaxed except when it came to a certain specific things like hospitals, schools. In my time, there was only one secondary school that we went to, Munali for boys and Chipembi for girls, the whole country. Munali is now David Kaunda School. This one was built in 1952 by that time some of us had already left. The apartheid is something that came in to strengthen the kind of system that the whites had in South Africa. It became a legislated system in 1948. Smarts died and then Vorster took over. The number one thing he did was to come up with Apartheid. Apartheid meant separate but equal development. The equality part was just a mockery and it was a part of the law. At one stage, it was so embarrassing even to the Whites themselves because Apartheid came out with a vicious system of separating the whites from the blacks even to the extent of making sure that blacks who looked like coloureds had to go through a system where they had to take their blood samples and made sure they had no black cells in them

and when this happened, there was confusion in South Africa because some families that had thought themselves to be white found that some of them had a little bit of the black that went way back. And before he knew what was happening, some families were just torn apart because half of them were considered as non-whites because they had a small drop of black blood or cells. So apartheid separate. Discrimination was another lighter form which came into South Africa. South Africa had a legislation which separated the blacks from the Whites because the coloureds were off shoots of the whites. So they had their own schools. In here, some of the things were not legislated or specifically on the statute books to say black man can't stay. It was by system, and most of the people who came to Northern Rhodesia to work on the Mines came from South Africa and brought with them the system. That is why, until independence came to Zambia, a boss boy was a white man who had ten blacks. He was a captain of ten blacks and it was part of their trade union rules. Interesting enough, the African Trade Union was trained by a Mr Comry who came from England. He brought Trade unionism here and mine workers took advantage of this and with the likes of late Katilungu made the African mine workers trade union a formidable trade union. The trade union got involved in the struggle for independence when with the parties like ANC that was before the birth of UNIP. Katilungu, in 1952, joined hands and finally agreed to work hand in hand with the African National Congress. That broke the camel's back. That was when you could see independence, especially the mine workers trade unions, which was the largest in the country. When they joined hands with us, that is when we could see the struggle now taking its meaningful direction. It was first to destroy the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland which was imposed on us. You hear groups like the one Zukas led. Zukas was a senior Jew who had British Citizenship. He came to Northern Rhodesia then during the Federation, just as the Federation was about to be launched. He worked with my father in Ndola. He was an architect in Engineering and they gave him a small motor cycle. He got in touch with a group of us in Ndola. That group included people like the late Chikunga, Chimba, and Reuben Kamanga, who was the secretary of the anti Federation campaign. Some of us were members and then the anti-Federation campaign was led by Zukas. Then one day, because the whites were watching, you know we never had communication between whites and blacks but Zukas somehow got free to mix with us and we used to go to his small flat sit there and talk about how to make sure that the federation should not come about. They had papers that they were circulating and that was in 1951. The ANC was launched in 1948 from Munali which is David Kaunda now. The first leader/president was the Litunga, the late Mbikusita Lewanika, and his general secretary was the late Nabulyato. After that, a new leadership came in 1957 and 1958. It brought in people like Harry Mwangi Nkumbula, a dynamic man, who studied at the London Schools of Economics and Political Science, he didn't finish but he came back fiery and we were part of that. That is where he stopped chain smoking. He was a friend of mine. Mwangi came and became president of the ANC and Kaunda was elected as general secretary and a number of other young people started joining

in. When ANC started, people were not paid for the offices that they held. It was a voluntary thing and because the Government of the whites of England insisted that Civil servants were not to be involved in politics, a number of educated Africans shunned becoming members because most of them were clerks after their secondary education or teachers and they had this thing of civil servants not participating in the politics. Then something happened.

The current apathy of educated people to politics goes back way back. But then they were forced into it because the ANC were talking sense. They were telling you that this, you can't have this because the whites could not allow you to do this. So they never joined and most of the people who were trained at Munali and elsewhere ended up as clerks and they were few. We had no woman typists working in offices. Do you know that I had to take a course in short hand? I did book keeping but most of the times I typed things for a muzungu?

First of all, to become a book keeper was something that came in later because we started co-operatives. The co-operatives are the ones that needed book keepers and it was like a new thing but most of us had to be teachers. But even that didn't provide us with many things. As a civil servant, you were not allowed to participate in this, and the colonial government had a very strong police service. They knew what you were doing. So when the whites had brought in a paper in 1951 that had come up with these ideas about the Federation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, they did a lot of work in England. So we never knew although we had sympathisers there, some organisations sympathised with us there but contacts and telephones were not there. So they put the police force. They even came up on the Copperbelt because the Copperbelt was the hot bed of all politics and all economic struggles in the country because of the mining industries.

The policemen, were blacks of course, a white man would be the boss. This has happened in many countries. Pursuing your own people. Any African who was working as a clerk and was known to be digging was followed and all they did was to issue instructions to his muzungu and chase him out or terminate his service and it happened too many of us, I was one of the victims. So they knew that I was part of the struggle. I started with ANC. Then after ANC split into ZANC and the old ZANC was with Harry Nkumbula and ZANC was with Kenneth Kaunda. When this happened, I had gone to England and when I came back I found K.K was out in Kabompo. A group of militants met in Kabwe and the organisation formed was African National Independence Party (ANIP) then it was changed to UNIP. Kaunda and many other leaders were still restricted.

Konkola was there but they finally elected Mainza Chona to be the interim president of UNIP with the understanding that when K.K was out of prison or restriction, then he became president. This is what happened. So when he came back, he became president and after that the situation changed. Whites could not stop it by imprisoning people and UNIP started being heard internationally.

We were giving the people the message of independence during the federation. Freedom! Freedom! Africa National Congress was doing the same. But somehow eventually they had lost their strong following. Then the struggle spread out. It was not only Northern Rhodesia then, Malawi was also very strong against the Federation. Now in Southern Rhodesia, the situation was slightly different. Although we had strong people like Joshua Nkomo, who was a father of the struggles in Southern Rhodesia, whether they like it or not. He started with the Dominican Party then after that he had his own African National Congress, and right here I can read to you. In 1958, Nkomo came...from Northern Rhodesia they were three, K.K. John... It talks about the formation of Comesa, PTA and so on but the introduction itself talks about how we started as Africans.

Going back to myself, when I came back from studies, because I was a UNIP man who had built that representative job in USA, I was in touch with K.K. Kapwepwe and they had already known what I had done before. So when I came here, I came into a new system. I had never been a civil servant before, I refused. There were two things I didn't want, I hated to join the mines and I hated the Government civil service. So I was with the Local Government, the Municipal council. I am talking about the 50's, the 60's before I went to the USA because I left here in 1960 to USA. I came back on 1/01/1965 and I found that they were waiting for me. K.K. had his own ideas because we were a new government. I was in Ndola but he called me here. Kapwepwe wanted me to straight away go into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs because of my representation. I was there at United Nations when K.K. was making his speech in 1962. We prepared the speech that he made. So I was already out there with the United Nations long before you guys knew.

I was there when they were forming the OAU; I was there when Daghammerskjold was launching the UNECA in 1958. I was already a man who was already exposed to a lot of things. So when I came back from USA, I was one of the people he wanted immediately to get into the Foreign Service because of the knowledge I had. But the real situation was that this was a country which was just beginning to get the feel of running its own affairs. We had people who came in. I was not in the country when the politics were being organised so there were already people who were lined up because of the knowledge of the situation at home. So the only people who knew the things I had done between 60 and 65 were people who used to be in touch with me like K.K. Kapwepwe, Wina. Those I was with at Munali in the 40's. But the new image, the new group which was coming in enthusiastically to take over was already there. So I had to fight. When I got back, I found they had set up a Public Service Commission, the Cabinet and Secretary to the Cabinet Musakanya was already there. Now Zambia did not have simple personnel like secretaries. We had to recruit secretaries from England, the Caribbean, we didn't have. My secretary was an English girl from London because we didn't have our own people. Again I came in at a time when there was super numeral thing when the people who were known as permanent secretaries, all whites, had to prepare to leave. Which meant that they were training

other people, who had been chosen by the new Public Service Commission with K.K, who had so many things to deal with already. So when I came in, these people knew and Kapwepwe wanted me in the Foreign Service. K.K wanted me to deal with the statistics because of the knowledge that I had. He wanted me to be the first man to run the Central Statistics. Now there was a delay and then they decided that I should get into the Ministry of Labour and Local Government. They changed the Ministry to Labour and Social Development. Because of my background in sociology, they thought I was a suitable person to run the department of labour and social development. I got in but there were so many idiosyncrasies.

I was given the job as Under Secretary. But the people who had done nothing were already Permanent Secretaries and there were a lot of jealousies. So I was responsible for social development. I wanted to prove myself. I did my job but somehow some people had seen that the Public Service Commission had sent a paper to the Ministry of Labour and Social Development to say that I was going to be promoted to become a Permanent Secretary. Somewhere along the line some people just looked at it and said ‘, what is this? They felt bad but someone encouraged me to say I was already that. I waited for two to three weeks and nobody was coming and I was told that some people objected to that and they just ignored. To cut a long story, I ended up with Kapwepwe winning. I got into Foreign Affairs, which was then divided into two; we had administration and political affairs. I was responsible for the whole political section. Everything you talked about people before being in Foreign Service. It was my area and Paul Banda had his area of administration. We were going through a very difficult time because already Malawi and Zambia were independent but Southern Rhodesia was not and our colleagues were fighting. At first it was not Smith but there was another one. He was quite good but the whites didn't like him because he was soft on the African issue. So Smith emerged later on, and we were in trouble. He just hated this whole idea of independence for Rhodesia and he had as it's called South Africa, the South African whites were already in the apartheid and for them to think of newly independent Zambia and Malawi and the next thing they could see on the map was that very soon it could be Angola, Mozambique and then Rhodesia then South Africa would be exposed. So they put everything they had, they worked with the Portuguese, who were still holding onto Angola and Mozambique until 1974. From the time I started up to 1974, there were problems.

I was still in Foreign Service. I never left the ministry. I was there from 1966 up to 1968. In 1968, the OAU secretary General Diallo Telli pleaded with K.K that he needed someone like me to go and re-organise the administrative part of the OAU. This is when I met your man, Mbita. He was just a military man. It was George Magombe who was in charge of the executive secretariat for liberation based in Dar es Salaam. I was then appointed as head of the administration of the OAU from 1968 to 1970. I was on secondment but during that period, it was a period of activities for the liberation front and I was involved in that. In 1970, I was appointed as Ambassador to West Africa based in Abidjan. But before going to the job of the Ambassador and

because of the experience I gained at OAU, they insisted that I should be involved in preparations for the Non Allied Summit that took place in 1970. We had a meeting in Dar-es-salaam where India just decided not to host the Non Allied Summit and they thought of Zambia which was upfront because of the liberation and the courage that we had here to host the freedom fighters while we were being bombarded by the racist regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia and South Africa.

The liberation set up in Dar-es-salaam was under my jurisdiction as the Head of Administration. The Tanzanian one covered the whole area but it was under the control of OAU. Head of Administration was a senior international civil servant at the OAU. That is why they called him Head of Administration. The other people were called Director of this, director of liberation, of politics and so on. But in terms of payments next to the secretary general, I was at P5 in 1968. I changed and completely gave them a new administration. I even put up new structures there. Have you been to the OAU?

You see the old blocks? And that tall one? That was the original one and the new one is the one that they have put in that big hall. Now, that is how I was involved in the liberation. I will tell you later the most significant thing that happened in the liberation struggle. We had a liberation meeting in Lusaka in 1970. The meeting was to decide the question of the unity between ZAPU and ZANU and the other smaller organisations that were fighting Ian Smith.

There was a splinter group. I was Foreign Minister then. The meeting was opened by the Prime Minister around 15 hours and we had a break and restarted our meeting at 17 hours. I was in the chair. Your man, Mbita, was also part of this. I have pictures. If you came on Monday I will give you the pictures. When I was Foreign Minister he was in charge because he took over from Magombe. We sat there with all the liberation representatives of ANC of South Africa, PAC of South Africa, representatives of people in Namibia. Those people used to be in my charge. People like Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, Nujoma, all those who were in my charge as Foreign Minister. I used to take them in an aeroplane, all these people. We used to have travels with Joshua Nkomo but very, very brilliant and brave people.

I know Mugabe very much. Just as I knew the old man. He used to call me Mukwenyani. We started that meeting around 17 hours. We had dinner which was brought there in Mulungushi because we never broke up. We had people who were already committed to support Muzorewa, others supported Joshua Nkomo and Sithole. The whole thing we wanted to do was to get these people together to agree to have one front in order to defeat Smith. Now by this time, Zambia had managed to get Mugabe and a number of people who were incarcerated in different jails, even Joshua Nkomo, we managed to make arrangements and have them picked up. It was an arrangement that we had made with Smith. Those are things that can only be revealed by big people.

They talked and they sent somebody who went up to pick these people up. They came here and I was Foreign Minister then. When they came to State House, we

didn't know that, while in prison, Ndabaningi had lost his presidency to Mugabe. So when they came to State House, somebody whispered to us that Sithole had lost his presidency. They all came out. Mugabe was voted as the president. So it was really like the group of freedom fighters who decided while in prison that change had to be made. We didn't know about it until they came here to Lusaka and what we did was to ask Mugabe very politely to go upstairs in state house while Mwalimu Nyerere, K.K and the others were deciding on how to handle the change situation. So after a while the leaders were convinced and they brought Mugabe from the room and recognised him as the leader. So we talked with Muzorewa, who had taken the initiative to continue the struggle by forming an extended... Mugabe took over from Ndabaningi Sithole in prison. Muzorewa was not in prison. He was outside and he tried to continue with the struggle but not the kind of struggle that these two had in mind. So somehow Smith tolerated him knowing that he was not very useful but he was at this meeting and the Chikeremas were also there and all those who had claimed to be part of the struggle in Rhodesia then. They were at state house and the idea was for us to try and get them to put their efforts together and to see that they would be effective or to negotiate. But negotiation was not the issue there, they were legitimate owners of the country and if anything the only person who could negotiate was Smith. This meeting was long before the meeting we had in Mulungushi and in fact it had already passed time when the front line states had managed to try and get these two people together, Joshua Nkomo and the old man, to try and see if they could have one front. They refused we had a meeting at state lodge. We took the whole day and the following day these people refused to work together and they ended up with the famous Patriotic Front two of them were co-chairs of the Patriotic Front. This continued until the Chimurenga itself came when Smith was overrun. They agreed that they should be Patriotic Front and they refused to work together. Which would have meant that one of them be appointed as the leader. It's a history. The situation in Zimbabwe, if you go back to history, you will find that it comes from struggles that were there long before the Muzungus came in, between the Shonas and the Ndebeles. Up to now, the Ndebeles are still considered as foreigners. They are in the minority but very effective minority. In fact they are the only ones who fought the British South African company. The fight which led to the Africans being declared as losers because the British, the Lord's team which was led by Jameson had guns and so on and they overrun the Africans. But the people who fought by that time without bringing conflicts between any Shonas and Ndebeles, were the Ndebeles or the Ngulas. They were fighters they fought and they lost, the casualties were many. So it goes back to that time, more especially the Shonas. There are many factions within the Shonas, the Kalangas etc but when it came to dealing with the situation in Zimbabwe, all these people who spoke almost the same language, ganged together and left the Ndebeles on their own and that is why when our leaders here wanted Joshua Nkomo and Mugabe to come up with one party, it just could not work out because of these deep differences which were deep rooted in the tribal situation.

The Patriotic Front was called the ZANU-PF. But we had other groups, the Chikerema factions, there were also other people, about 5 groups. It was just going to be Patriotic Front which meant that there were all patriots to fight for their rights in Zimbabwe. So instead of saying one group under one leader, they just failed to agree because Joshua Nkomo, regardless of what they said, was a father of the liberation movement in Zimbabwe. He was the first man to come out, the president of the Dominant party, he became the president of the first liberation movement. ZAPU, Zimbabwe African People's Union, and quite a number of people who later on moved out were part of that because he was really the father of liberation movement. That is how they came up to form ZANU which was led by Ndabaningi Sithole who was the lieutenant of Joshua Nkomo. Let me go back to the ship as they say. This meeting, I chaired from 17 hours, no break, until 0700 hours the following morning. At that point in time, Nigeria came in and served the day and we agreed on something although some people opposed it and the funny thing was that was the day when Mengistu Haile Marriam took over in Addis Ababa the following day when he engineered the slaughtering of eight of his colleagues and took over power. The man who had been very strong against the whole idea of unity and so on, the Minister of Foreign affairs of Ethiopia. He was here and in the morning. He heard that there was a coup and killings and he didn't know what to do. We were leaving that same morning going to Zanzibar to go and witness the joining together of Afro-Shirazi party and TANU which then got out as Chama Cha Mapinduzi. We had to leave this man and told him that we would come back the following day to sort out your stay here if you don't want to go back to your country. But he decided to go during the meeting with the views of another friend from Liberia, Sisu Dennis because Sisu Dennis and his president were close to Muzorewa, having been church people. They were both members of the world council of churches and at one stage Muzorewa became president.

First Mobutu Seseseko was not in agreement with us so he didn't go, he sent his Foreign Minister Ngunza Karibond and we were like Zaire here and Zambia last before Zimbabwe. In the strategies that we had mapped out in Lusaka, certain countries were going to propose these things not Zambia because we were the host only to find that at the last minute, the countries that were supposed to propose were not there and at the last minute Obasanjo and Khaba, a brilliant young man, he was Foreign Minister. We had agreed that Obasanjo was going to propose and I think it was to be Gambia to second it and this would have sorted out things with Zimbabwe, we were going to agree that there should be the Patriotic Front. As far as we were concerned, there were only two serious parties that were fighting, they were even losing people, The other parties were not doing anything, so we thought of recognising the P.F as the leaders in this struggle. We had agreed in Lusaka, but when we went to Gabon a number of countries at the last minute, we had come now to the Agenda. For us it was crucial. It was saying that, can we now do it and constitute the Patriotic Front? It was quiet.

It was quiet and I wondered what was going on. I have never seen a thing like this happening I saw President Tobert raising his hand and K.K was looking at me and

saying, “what is happening here?” I said I don’t know. Bongo recognised this and he says,” I think we want to support what our friends of the front-line states have done. They have done a wonderful job. The Foreign Minister who put his hand up was from Togo. Liberia seconded it but we had hoped that Nigeria would have been the ones to raise that hand. Anyway, when they raised their hand, we were not sure of what they were going to say. They said, “We wish to support very much and commend the work that the Zambian government had done and the meeting of foreign ministers that took place in Lusaka. We want to support that resolution. Because ZAPU and ZANU has been in the forefront fighting compared to others who just sit in the Hotels of Ridgeway eating chicken in the basket. They were talking about Chikerema and company. “These people have been fighting and they have lost a lot of people, we want to recognise them as the Patriotic Front”. I looked at K.K and he looked at me and said,” A miracle has happened my colleagues.” Instead of Nigeria seconding this, Liberia did. I was narrating the story of what happened when we went to OAU summit in Gabon over the leadership in the struggle by cadres in Southern Rhodesia. The decision has already been made by the ministers that had met in Lusaka about a month before the Summit and when our leaders at the summit were discussing this issue, we had hoped that countries that met in Lusaka at the ministerial level would have also taken lead in the decision that had been made by ministers of Foreign Affairs. But to our surprise, many progressive leaders, as we may call them particularly from central and Southern Africa, did not attend. So what we had was, for instance, leadership from Zambia president Kaunda who was always at these meetings for obvious reasons because we were right in the times of the struggles. Nyerere didn’t go, Mobutu didn’t go he sent Karibondi with specific instructions not to support the idea because they were already supporting other people. To cut the long story short, when discussion on this issue came we were hoping that our colleagues would come out like Nigeria, Obasanjo was there and representatives from Liberia, Gambia were there, Mauritania didn’t come, Shaka Stevens was there from Sierra Leone and a number of other leaders were there and we thought that this issue was going to be dealt with effectively and efficiently. But sadly when the issue was debated we could see that some leaders had chosen not to speak and when it came to someone to move the item, because Zambia could not move the item because we are the people who hosted the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and there were other people who had hosted the Heads of States government on the question of the PF and also the meeting that took place in Lusaka. We were hoping that Nigeria would come out, but to our surprise Togo out of nowhere just raised their hand and president Kaunda looked at me and we both shook our heads, we didn’t know what to expect because they were not a country you could count on. But when the Togo President talked it surprised us and a number of colleagues because they said they wanted to salute Zambia and the Patriotic Front and the Frontline States for the job well-done and they agreed with the decision that was made by ministers of foreign affairs and recommended to the summit that the two parties that were fighting should be given

an opportunity to serve as Patriotic Front. So they were silent. We had decided that Zambia should not take a lead for obvious reasons and we were hoping that some other countries would come in from the team that was very, very progressive and we were looking at Nigeria as the Foreign Minister was constantly in touch with my colleague Kabha. Kabha beckoned me and went on to say that his head of state cannot second it though he can support it. Then I went back and whispered to Dr Kaunda that we were in a very difficult situation. Nigeria just decided not to second this and just as I was whispering, the president of Liberia raised their hand and we did not expect them to speak because of the relationship with Tobert and Muzorewa. It had been made clear to us during the foreign ministers meeting in Lusaka. But Tobert took the floor and gave a lot of praise to K.K and the Front Line States for the brave move and also for assisting the liberation movement even at the expense of the lives of their own nationals. The man ended up by saying they felt that they should support this decision by the Foreign Ministers that only ZANU and ZAPU cadres who had come together as the Patriotic Front should be given moral and monetary support in order for them to be effective. After that, all the leaders just acclaimed. It was a good decision. These are some of the high lights of some of the work that I did as Foreign Minister. There are quite a number of these things. I can go on and on but this one was important because it relates to what we were doing in terms of the liberation movement.

It was agreed that they become P.F from that day on and the rest of the OAU respected that. Of course there was confusion because some of the liberation movements in Rhodesia who had already made promises started going back to the supporters and so on but the P.F had already made their mark. Wherever we went for meetings, we airlifted them from Zambia and went with them and that was during my most active period in politics as Foreign Minister. I was Foreign Minister during a very crucial moment, 1976 up to 1979. Then the president decided that I should....

Before 1976, I was the Ambassador to Washington DC and also to Latin America. Before that I was Ambassador to West Africa from 1970 to 1973 and before that I was head of administration in the OAU. So these were run into very meaningful sequences as far as I am concerned. My career was very meaningful. When president Kaunda insisted in 1979 that I should continue as state house special assistant to organise.... It was like I stop being a Minister now and the following day I move somewhere as Special Assistant to the president. I was responsible for administration, regional and economic co-operation. In addition to that, I was in charge of the organisation of Commonwealth meetings of Heads; they used to call it CHOGM. It was also crucial because that meeting brought together people who were bent on resolving the Zimbabwe issue. This is how we had Margaret Thatcher coming in with the enormous help from the former Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Frazer and this is the time that brought in another influential force, the former Secretary General of the Commonwealth. He was from Trinidad and Tobago. He really worked so hard on the Rhodesian issue with Malcolm Frazer and K.K. Interesting enough we had met when

I was still foreign minister. Margaret Thatcher was just a shadow, just warming up to become the next prime minister. She insisted that she should see K.K in London. We were on our way to USA and she saw us. She came as shadow of Prime Minister with Lord Carrington also as shadow Secretary and we had lunch, the four of us and that is where she was saying, "Mr president, in Britain, we are want to continue Smith because we think that Smith will bring about a peaceful solution in Rhodesian and I could see President Kaunda that he was really cross he said, "Margret, can I call you Margret?" she says "yes". He continued, "you are making a big mistake in supporting Ian Smith because the freedom movement is something you can't stop now. Ian Smith is killing blacks in my country and in Rhodesia; very soon it will be the other way round. It will be the whites dying. Do you want to see that kind of thing?" Margaret Thatcher couldn't say anything. The next thing, she was Prime Minister and she came to Lusaka for the meeting and what happened in Lusaka was revolutionary. From Lusaka the next thing was at Lancaster House for the meeting which brought Zimbabwe independence. But there at Lancaster House a lot of things were said which appeared as if there was going to be promises if fulfilled that were going to bring about the peaceful solution to the situation in Rhodesia. But no, the British were asked how they were going to resolve the land situation and Britain promised that they would find money so that the black Zimbabweans would buy back their land but you know in very small letters there was something like they would give them the money on the basis of owner and buyer agreement, that kind of thing. In other words, the owner, the people who were sitting on the land would say I am selling this land at so much, if you like it, fine if you don't like it, vamoose. That was the whole idea. It also depended on how much money and the British government was going to dish out this money to enable the local Zimbabweans who were squatting in their own land. They were considered as foreigners because the land owners had bought 73% of arable land and some of them were absent landlords. Most of these people were in the House of Lords. They owned property in Zimbabwe. So, that again was a mess. It is something that you should write about because it is connected to part of the freedom of Central Africa. We are still suffering as a result of what the British did during that period in 1980 when Zimbabwe became independent. The arrangement was not fulfilled up to now, it took them 20 years and Zimbabweans were calm enough.

In regards to assertions that we were meeting Smith and asking for trade and supply at night and during the day we condemned them, we were not asking for anything. They were the ones who wanted to discuss these issues and we didn't promise anything. If you really search the heart of the people who went to talk with the enemy this is what we did. If we didn't talk with the enemy, we would not have been where we are now. If you go back you will find that in 1969, Zambia was the most threatened with these solutions, we were surrounded by the enemy. Don't forget that by that time Angola and Mozambique were still under Portuguese. Don't forget that Namibia which was Southwest Africa was still under South Africa and all these people in Europe were supporting the status quo and the British were right in front of

this. So there were times when we had to talk to our enemies because they came to us with suggestions and you remember we tried the train on Victoria Falls with all these people locked up there. Yes we tried even to speak to the devil himself Vorster who was to try and bring about negotiated statement or peace, not necessarily in favour of the whites but peace that would bring participation of the majority.

We consulted. Whatever we did was not done in privacy with the devils. We were very good at consulting the liberation movements and we made them feel that whatever we were doing was in their interest. They had to say yes, you go ahead, we know that it is dangerous to talk to Vorster but if the idea here is to fulfil the Lusaka Manifesto which was accepted by the OAU, the UN. In the Manifesto, we said that the whites who were born here, with family going back centuries, were Africans. The British made a mistake because they promised what they were not going to deliver and the thought that this will just pass on like that having given Zimbabwe independence without dealing with land issue effectively. They thought they would sort it out by themselves. Now you and I know that it has been sorted out and because it has taken so long it has given Mugabe a bad name when in fact it should be the other way round, it should be the British who should be getting the bad name over the land situation. It is not Mugabe or the Zimbabweans, Zimbabweans suffered so much. 73% of arable land was in the hands of the whites, just a few whites. Some of them were absent landlords, Lords in the House of Lords who were given this land on a silver platter because they had served in the Second World War and the Rhodesian whites were encouraging it because they wanted a number of whites to increase in Zimbabwe. But they never lived to the arrangement and now, I am not saying I am supporting what is going on in Zimbabwe but on the issue of land I don't see the excuse that the British would give because they promised the Zimbabweans in London. Now they didn't deliver but anyway it is just the point I wanted to make that we in Zambia suffered because we wanted to be fair in a situation which was very difficult. The 1969 Lusaka Manifesto itself, if it was understood in its true perspective we wouldn't have been looked down upon by some people. It did go a long way in resolving the situation in Southern Africa. This is how we managed to get Mandela out, we had to deal with the devil at times but we were not swallowed up by the devil. What would be greater than people dying for the cause of other people's freedom?

You can't pay or consider it in terms of money people were massacred at Chikumbi. They were our black people. They used what is now known as cluster munitions, bombs that would bounce up and explode so that the damage was greater. I owned that farm for a while. I bought it because I was so touched. I was Foreign Minister when bombing took place. The people who were staying there were people who were refugees from Zimbabwe. We had so many camps here. We had camps for ZAPU, for ZANU, we had a Victory camp in Lusaka West. I went there with the Prime Minister from Europe and just as we were talking to the kids and so on a plane zoomed by and before we knew what was happening, kids just died on their bankers. We have been through this my friend. There is nothing greater than blood that was lost by

Zambians. It was sacrifice of the highest order. We are talking about the Alick Nkhatas of yesterday, who were just brutally killed, we sacrificed so much but we never lost our principles. That is one thing you can say about Zambians. If we were selfish like some countries who decided not to be involved in the struggle of their own black people, and had chosen that, perhaps, it wouldn't have been possible because the people we were keeping here would have turned against us. Our choices were limited in this. We kept people who became heads of state at our own risk at state house. We were keeping these people at State House. People like O.R Tambo. He was at state house. Like the head of state of Angola, Neto. He was at state house. The head of state of Namibia was kept there. It is quite a number of them. ANC of South Africa, the base was here and Mbeki was here for 9 years.

The differences that existed between UNITA and MPLA were major differences. SWAPO wasn't a big problem for us because SWAPO and SWANU swallowed each other. UNITA, MPLA, there was also a party that was known as Government in Exile which was based in Kinshasa. The problem was that at first they worked together but they split and the stronger of these in terms of being outside was UNITA. UNITA was inside the country, they were in a place which has a lot of diamonds. FNLA was operating from Kinshasa. Roberto's wife was Mobutu's sister. At one stage the OAU somehow, I think the liberation movement was behind this also. They gave FNLA the title of being `government in exile`. They asked for it because they didn't do anything. I was at this meeting in Kinshasa which stripped him of this FNLA right. It was not effective, only the other two parties, more especially MPLA. After 29 years, they decided to go back to Portugal and immediately they got there on the 13/04/1974, the man caused a commotion there by declaring a coup d'état. It didn't last long but within the short period that the coup d'état existed, Spínola influenced others to release all the colonies and that was done. This is how April 13 becomes an important day because it was declared that all the African colonies of Portugal should be free. Now that brought in a big problem because the liberation movements did not expect those things to come, they were fighting so suddenly the enemy they were fighting said "no, I am no longer fighting you take what you want" now the three of them started vying for power. At first they decided that it should be a government of National Unity which would also include the Whites. Then something came in which Zambian didn't like and unfortunately it started with Neto here in Lusaka. Neto was planning to bring in the Soviet Union and he did do that and do you know what led to that? What happened? For the first time, we had thousands and thousands of people dying. He asked the Soviet Union to help them with guns against the other movements so that he could take over and so that his party could rule. We didn't like this because we were very much concerned that a situation like that would bring chaos that would last for many years and we were right because we told our friends that this thing was not going to be the answer but the answer was in government of National Unity. Neto was a great friend of us; he is still a friend even in his death. We remember him as a great friend and Kaunda spent, I think 16 hours discussing

with Neto about this move that it was not the best move but Neto went ahead and you know what happened? After that when the Soviet Union moved in with tanks and thousands of people died in the fight. The USA brought in South Africa because Russia brought in the Cubans. Do you remember that?

The Americans used South Africa and Soviet Union because of their closeness with Cuba who wanted to show their power also. They came in and what we had was destruction, after destruction and these three groups never reconciled at all. At one stage Savimbi tried to come in with Neto. In fact Neto died. It was the president, Dos Santos. Dos Santos was my colleague. When Dos Santos was a Foreign Minister, I was a Foreign Minister. In fact the two of us signed an agreement that Zambia recognized the MPLA government. We signed it in Colombo in 1978. Zambia did not support UNITA against MPLA. Zambia did not support UNITA at all. Anybody who says that are not correct. Zambia's concern was that they wanted this issue to be sorted out according to the OAU, which was already discussing this issue. I remember both Kaunda and Julius Nyerere were involved in this and they wanted things to end peacefully. Kaunda was against blood shed which we thought was not really necessary. There was so much of it, more than 20 to 30 years that the Africans in both Angola and Mozambique had fought against the colonial Portuguese. Thousands of people died within few months because they brought in the Soviet Union and Cubans. It was not necessary and up to now, later on Kaunda was proved correct when he insisted on a government of national unity. They had tried to do it, but it was too late. Remember one day Savimbi, decided to join Dos Santos to compete for who should become the president and when he lost he went back to the bush, that was an attempt to have a government of national unity but it was too late. Damage had been done, people had already been dead. The country had been wasted and people died, others ran away and we were with them here in Zambia as refugees. So the students here were reacting to something that I thought was too much. I went to address the students and I had just taken over as Foreign Minister. I asked them to stand up and sing the national anthem but they refused. I thought I was only going to speak to them for only 45 minutes that was the longest I spoke to any group of students. I took them slowly through the whole thing, explaining to them why government took that stance, delayed; it is not that we were opposed to Neto. He was here for many years, he was a friend and died as a friend of Kaunda and of mine. But we were talking to him as a friend who was wrong because we could see that bringing the Russians at that point in time would have meant giving him powers to kill his own people, the Angolans. We were not in support but the students took it differently and they could not listen to any of our leaders but when I went there I spoke for three hours instead of 45 minutes. There was free exchange of discussion. They liked that kind of exchange and I was frank with them. In the end, after three hours, everybody sang the national anthem. I was so happy that at least there was an understanding but it doesn't change the fact that what we advised Neto was not wrong because we were proved right, later on, after thousands of people were killed. We went back and said this is what we were

avoiding. If he could have sat down, discussed this issue, give in and take something then he would have avoided all these things and he would have avoided bringing in outside forces to come and kill his own people in order to prove a point.

Mwenda, Levison Amos

[14 September 2007]

Mr Levison Amos Mwenda, now a businessman in was born in Zambia's Eastern province on January 1, 1954 at Njanje hospital in Petauke district. He attended Maambo, Matonje, Ndake and Moombe primary schools, where his sister and brother-in-law taught as schoolmistress and head teacher, respectively. He then obtained his secondary education at Chassa secondary school, where he completed Form V. Mr Mwenda grew up in Eastern province, and he thus witnessed the trauma that Zambia experienced at the hands of the racist regime in nearby Mozambique.

My name is Levison Amos Mwenda. I was born in 1956, on 1st January [at] Nyanje

Hospital. By then we were [living] in Nkwaze Village, [in] Chief Mwanjabantu's [area], in Eastern Province. I started my education [in] Sub-A, B. That was [at] Mambo Primary School in Nyimba. My sister was a [school] mistress [and at] that time married to a teacher who was the Headmaster, Mr Mumba. Then we moved to Matonje in 1965.... My mulamu [i.e. brother in-law] could not allow me [to enrol in school] because I was very young, I was short, not that I was very young.... He said that if you went ahead it is a problem; you will meet mockery. That time, there was mockery in schools. So he was against the idea of me advancing]. Then I did my Sub-B again.... until the year of independence.

Thereafter, you know, at the hoisting festival of the independence flag, I was there as a child from the [Head] teacher's house. I was the one carrying the flag.... [At] midnight, just after hosting the flag, we broke off. The following day was a day of dancing, and we were told now we have taken independence. Now, we did not even know what independence was.

I went to Ndake Primary School, [where] I did my Standard I, ...and, in our class [i.e. in our final year at school year] they changed to [the] Grade[...] [system]. So, instead of going to Standard II, [I] went into Grade IV. Then, [as] you know, [at] that time we had to pass. We wrote an exam, and I came [out] number one.... I came from a background where my parents were a bit poor, [especially] after the death of my grandmother.... That was a disaster. Luckily enough—these we have changed the language, we say Ba-aunt. Ba-aunt called me and we went to Mombe Primary School, [where] I did my Grades V [and] VI. [In the} second term, I went to Katete. Then I wrote my Grade VII exam[s] [at] Katete Mission School. Then I went to Chasa Secondary School.

At Chasa, I [went] up to Form V. From there, [I] went for National Service... You know, I was a bit disappointed because I had applied to Kabwe Trades. After my completion of National Service, there was that period of [military] mobilization due to liberation wars. [As you may] know, there were bombings all over. The Zambian soldiers at the time I would say [were] not enough; they were in the bush.... Kaunda... was a clever man. He excluded his own children and daughters [from the mobilization

process]. Do you know the way he did it? Those in the 1976-77 intake [who were cadets] were excluded [from mobilization] because one of his sons was a cadet that year. So tactfully, he excluded his children [from mobilization].

I started my career as a Card Expert. [Card experts] were people who received invoices and deducted from the stock cards after the salesman had sold [goods]. Within six months, I was promoted to become a Supervisor. I rose again and became a Stock Controller. Then, finally, I became a Stock Auditor. Then there were interviews at Zambia Breweries. Looking at the money they were offering, I moved to Breweries as a Stock Controller. I only worked for about six months [when] I was promoted to become a Supervisor. In fact, I was the longest serving supervisor at Zambia Breweries. That was in Livingstone. From there, I was transferred to Chipata, where I was promoted to become the Manager of Western Province. This title was changed to Depot Controller, and I served there for four years. There then came a time when they wanted to privatize public companies. The new owners said they wanted to empower ex-employees so that they became businessmen. I applied and I was asked why I wanted to leave the vehicle and a big house.... I said these things do not belong to me. I wanted to go and work [for myself]. The major reason I wanted to leave was that I wanted to show them that we were able. If others were going to fail, I was going to succeed.

In your own home when you see that neighbours are sleeping hungry and, you are a farmer and, they come begging, don't you share part of your own farm produce with them so that they are also [fed]? When we were still very young it was very embarrassing that when a white [man] came and entered the toilet, we would rush to see what he [had] left in the toilet. So we did not want our brothers and sisters of this southern region to behave in the same way. We felt it was better that they made their own decisions [as how they would rule themselves. The wealth that they produced must go back to them, not being [appropriated by whites]. I think that was the main reason why we thought it wise to help our brothers.

It is not good to see your friends suffering and... not help when you are in a position to. In fact, it is now good that the second Republican president came out in the open to declare Zambia a Christian nation. That time when we were doing it, we did not know that [we did so because] of Christianity, Jesus told us to help those in need. Our friends were in need and we helped them. It was just a fulfilment of what Jesus encouraged us to do: "Love our neighbour as you love yourself." It was going to be unfair and inhuman to see our friends being beaten up every day when we were free and in the position to help.

It's not that we [hoped to gain anything from liberating our African neighbours], and I don't think it is a right thought all together. All we wanted was to see our friends being liberated. If our president, ministers, leaders and our elders in general had the thought of getting some money at the end, I think it was a wrong thought. [Such] help should have been out of a good and sincere heart.

When there is a war a bullet does not choose so the major sacrifice [Zambia made towards the liberation of southern Africa] was ourselves. Human being[s] were sacrificed at that time because the bullet could not choose. Two, [we also lost] infrastructure. When [Zambia's enemies] came to bomb they didn't choose.... [O]ur [enemies] were more disciplined. When they were bombing, they went for [specific] targets but those who were found nearby [were killed], [as] the bullet could not choose [who to hit]. So, I think was a big sacrifice.

[Zambia also sacrificed] infrastructure [and] money. You know, we were funding the refugees. We were funding the fighters themselves. We were funding our own soldiers. Assisting them, you know. We lost money that way.... The money was going out, you know. There was the UDI in Southern Rhodesia where they said we could not buy things from. Now our money was just going, even our copper....They [also] reduced the price of copper to make sure that we suffered. You know, as long as Kaunda remained President they maintained... that copper prices should be down until they tactfully helped Chiluba get into office and promised to help him. Although they promised, they did not fulfil the promise. You know, they continued changing goal posts until... the end. After that you could see that our buildings such as bridges were being bombed.... As I said in the beginning, the Zambian soldiers were not enough [when] Kaunda called...for mobilization.

When students went to State Souse, Kaunda changed from being called His Excellency to Comrade. I still remember very well because I heard [that] when he was addressing students, he said, "I am telling you from today, do not call me His Excellency anymore but you have to call me Comrade Kaunda, because this war will be fought by sons, me and you, my friends. So when you are comrades, you have a common purpose....Your purpose is to fight Smith. So because of that we are comrades, everybody, whether young or old."

Just as I said when your neighbour is hungry you will have sleepless nights because every day at any time he/she will come to say he/she doesn't have food. So it was with our neighbours. As long as they were not liberated and they were oppressed, we could not sleep.

You know, Zambia's development [is retarded because] when you look at ourselves you find that those people with money do not pump [it] back into the economy. How do you expect the economy to pick up when we, ourselves, are not pumping back the money? We have instead decided to go abroad.

Those [critics] who say that we wasted money when we helped [liberation movements] are wrong. It is a wrong concept. We should ask ourselves, what we have done so far after that? Yes, you talk of the roads, every infrastructure which the white man left in the economy; they are all gone. Really, even if we had that money could we have continued developing? No!

We are poor because the economy favours those with money who are investing [their money] abroad. You can look at our education. When I was at school those from the ministers' families and those who were rich [sent their children] somewhere

in Botswana or Britain but I, a poor Zambian, was made to go to Chasa Secondary School. When it came to tertiary education, we were made to go into these colleges around, while their children we[nt]... abroad. That is how it is. Now, when education standards are lower, those who are rich sen[d] their children abroad. You know, the idea...is that the rich continue ruling the poor. That is what is [happens], especially now. In orphanages, you find that even the orphans are more oppressed than other children.

A Christian talks of love. When you give [something to someone], you don't expect to receive from the person you have given. In fact, we are being compensated indirectly by the donors who finance say 90% of our national budget yearly. When the minister of finance is planning, he is not even sure whether he is going to receive the money or not.

The Bible says that when you give you should not count....Someday God is going to reward you. So [since] we were giving those freedom fighters [assistance], we are [now] receiving [aid] indirectly from donors. So, we can't say that we lost money.... We are getting more money, maybe more than we lost.

It is the United Nations (UN) that should think of [compensating families that were killed during liberation wars in southern Africa] not the Zambian government and I will tell you why. Just as I said, the UN should come in because we were spending money. Although these donors were giving us money, it [was] not enough. Those families who lost relatives lost breadwinners; so the UN should come in to compensate those families.

I would not recommend money [as compensation], but they should take their children to school. They should educate them. They should train them so that once they are empowered, they will [make] money for as long as they live. I will tell you... although the government is still rewarding freedom fighters, I, for one, was involved in a road accident at Luangwa Bridge, but I was not given anything. I missed going to college because they said I did not [meet] the required arrangements. They wanted me to leave Feira border and... pay K2,000 at Kabwe Trades. Here I am [today] because at that time I missed the opportunity of going to college; so I have not been to college.

In fact, I had a friend who was a refugee, Julius Mwanza. When they came, here—I think in 1965–66— they built Nyimba refugee camp which has now been misused by a lot of ... guys [with] selfish interest[s]. You know those refugees. We can't cry much that we spent a lot of money to feed them because [of] the policy [at] that time. The government had a very good policy [out of which emerged] one of the most successful farms handled by the refugees. In the morning they w[ere] going for cultivation to [grow food to] feed them[selves].... So as far as mealie-meal was concerned they were okay; they were feeding themselves. My friend Mwanza could invite me to his mother's house every Monday. They could give me a bit of Kapenta [sardines] and cooking oil which they received. Unfortunately, I have lost him. We are not in touch, and I do not even know where he is. If he is still alive and we meet

[again], I think [there would] would be a very big celebration. We were like brothers and sisters. We never quarrelled.

Inter-marriages between refugees and Zambians were [common] and you [can still] find a lot of [such couples] along the border areas.... Some Zambians [married] wives and husbands from the refugee camps.

There was also Ukwimi refugee camp. In fact, most of them [i.e. refugees] refused to go back. Since most of [their] schools were very far, most people there were learning Portuguese [when they were in Zambia's Eastern Province]. When they went [back to Mozambique and found] no relatives [there] they decided to come back because they had registered as refugees. They wanted to benefit from [their refugee status]. They went there but upon arrival they found that they had no relatives so they decided to come back.

Frelimo fighters [camped] along the borders. In fact, we did not even know where they were [camp]ing. But I know of the Zimbabweans because [at] one time I was in Chongwe. That is when I knew where they were [camp]ing [there].

Those people [who blame Kaunda for helping freedom fighters in southern Africa] are not sincere.... Resources were not wasted...on refugees. [It is poor] government policies [that led to the waste] of money.... The problems we face today are not because the presidents who [ruled earlier] wanted those problems.... For example, there was a nine hundred billion Kwacha agrarian revolution project. Kaunda said that every province should have a state farm. He [spent] nine hundred billion Kwacha... to open farms. In Eastern Province, the farm which he opened is... near [the] Gonda Barracks which is now abandoned. Though the intention was good, it was [a] disastrous [project] and money [was lost] because there was no accountability. Instead of training agricultural officers, he [employed] councillors who had no interest in farming. When they came back they did not do anything so money was just going like that. There were also the Thomas Alexandria Wood and Tito Iron Kaunda Industry projects where a lot of money was wasted. While iron was in Eastern Province, the plant was put in Kasama, Northern Province. I do not understand why; maybe because the Bembas come from there [laughter]. It never worked. That is how resources were wasted.

When we started [helping freedom fighters] in Zimbabwe, we were supporting ZAP. But after the death of Chitepo, [there was] confusion. So when confusion arose, we had two presidents: our own President Kaunda and his friend Dr Nyerere. So Kaunda was [influenced] by the decisions of Nyerere because he was older and his closest friend and also because he believed in do[ing] what your neighbour is doing. [Kaunda believed in the adage]: love your neighbour as you love yourself. So he didn't want to [help freedom fighters] alone. we decided to liberate [them] because we didn't want divisions. That is why the old man accepted to be [influenced] by a friend.

Nkomo and Kaunda were much closer; they were jailed almost the same year. They suffered together. Now, because of that they developed a relationship which was stronger than with others....Our own president didn't want to divide [freedom

movements but to help them achieve their] goal... Our way of winning was to liberate our friends. [But] when Nyerere said no, when Nyerere was supporting this other liberation movement, our... president easily changed and supported and stood by Nyerere so that he could not bring divisions. So together they worked and achieved the goal they wanted.

Let me explain about ZAP and ZANU because these are the ones I saw as I was growing up. I had held a gun; I was in the National Service so I know very well. Those people were disciplined. I would assure you they were. However, problems could be there amongst themselves, especially towards the end of the war. The tribal differences brought about infighting amongst themselves. They wanted to split so that each one...became president. That is where you find that there was a problem.

In fact, I remember very well when the differences became tenser. Mugabe decided to move to Mozambique. When Mugabe moved to Mozambique, he was with ZANU while Nkomo remained in Zambia with ZAP.... [I]nfighting divided them; they were only coordinating when attacking. Though the infighting was still there, they concentrated on fighting the settlers although the problem came towards the end of the war, especially when they got independence.

When you fight yourselves you can't achieve anything. The way we have failed to achieve anything! I can tell you, for example, [in] the first five years of Chiluba, he was fighting Kaunda so that [the former president did] not come back. He was fighting against [Kaunda's] citizenship.... Then, five years went without development. In the second term of Chiluba, we Zambians were fighting him alleging that he was not a Zambian. Another five years went without development. During Mwanawasa's first term, he also [told] by Zambians... that he was not legally elected. So far we have lost 15 solid years.

[Today Zambians are] the best mediators. If people wanted to choose, they [would] cho[o]se Zambians because they understand the problems of others better. To me, the best person to choose is a Zambian because he has seen people suffer and he is able to mediate. You know a good mediator does not take sides; [if] you do that, you are wrong.

The OAU's main role was to train soldiers. After the formation of the OAU, its member countries were ready to bring [freedom] fighters to be trained in their own countries. I think that is the major role the OAU played. [The] OAU opened member countries [to freedom fighters and refugees]....They were not sure where they were going. They were not sure whether where they were going... to face the enemy or not. Zambia, Tanzania,[and] Libya played a part; I think Egypt played a part [in hoisting freedom fighters and refugees]. These are [the] few I can remember.

[Because of our role in the liberation of southern Africa], we have been recognized as good mediators and peace-lovers. That is the most important thing we have gained. We don't need money or vehicles to be brought to us, no. That is why when Zambia is in problems, other countries come in automatically. For example, that time when

there was a drought you saw how UN vehicles were drifting [into Zambia to bring relief food]. Who can help you when you do not help others?

[There is now] unity [between Zambia and the countries she helped to free from colonialism]. I will tell you, Zambia trades with these countries although you know what [is wrong in this trade] is using different currencies. Our currency has gone down. [Our economy in Zambia] has gone down; so when we go out [to trade in other countries], we need to go with huge sums of money. I think that... is not fair. If we had a common currency it would do us very well.

You know, due to our failing economy, our personnel have gone to work in Zimbabwe, Botswana and South Africa. What should happen when you fall sick and you are flown to South Africa is that they should not charge us. They must say these people helped us get our independence so we should help them when they are sick. You need to [assist] the person that helped you so that next time you have a problem he will be in a position to help [you again].... [If he dies, where are you going to get help or wise advice from?

[Our] human resource has migrated in those countries to teach them.... [Now that] education standards [in Zambia] are getting lower and lower, there should be interaction at all levels so that we [may] benefit from their improved education.

The UN? Those are double-tongued. You know, [the UN is] controlled by Britain and America. They are not fighters. [The UN] only supplies weapons but Russia and China are fighters. The [UN] train[s] people to go and monitor. You see what happened in Angola... Those people were like [our] brothers. They didn't want the oppression to continue because Americans wanted to establish another colony, just the way they are doing now. Every country that says no to them is considered an enemy.

[The frontline states] were the planning grounds. Whenever there was a problem or war, refugees were kept in frontline states and most of these were in Zambia. [The frontline states helped refugees] in terms of education. Most of them started their education [there]. Some became teachers, doctors and so forth and practiced their professions in those states up to the time the war was over. They went back home with qualifications.

Wherever there is war you should give assistance. First of all we should mediate the peace because without peace we can't do anything. Peace is a very cardinal thing. Where there are conflicts we should not send guns. We should instead send people who are neutral and understand the problems of the fighting [factions]. When the problem is identified, then sit down and talk.

Ndlovu, Greyford

[15 September 2007]

Born on 30 January 1957 in Chipata, Eastern Province, Mr Greyford Ndlovu completed Form V at Petauke Secondary School (where he teaches today) in 1981. He then trained as teacher and began his career at the height of the liberation war in neighbouring Mozambique. He, therefore, witnessed at close quarters the effects of the civil war in Mozambique.

My name is Greyford Ndlovu, an Easterner actually from Chipata, Ngoni by tribe. I was born in 1957 on 30th January...in 1957...in Chipata. I started school late [because] of the independence struggle. You know my father was ANC. [When] UNIP [assumed office after independence an ANC] councillor... [at] that time [and] who later turned to be [a relation] because he was related to my wife... turned me [away] from school for two years until 1970 when I started school in term II at Chikando. [At] that time, it was called Avoli School [and was located] in Chipata district. I went through up to Grade VII in 1977. [Afterwards], I came to this same school, Petauke [Secondary school], to do my Form I up to Form V. I completed in 1981. After that I went home... in Chipata. We missed [i.e. were not mobilized for the] National Service. We were the last group to [be excluded from] the National Service program...in 1981. We were enlisted but when we went home to take luggage, we were just told on news [that] the programme has been postponed indefinitely; I think forever now. That... year was wasted [as] I had no programme [in mind], for I [had been] very ready to go for National Service. 1982 was [also] waste[d]. But in 1983, I was invited to take part in... interviews for Secondary tea[cher] [training] at Nkrumah. So, I went [and] was accepted. [I] started [my training] until I completed the course...in 1985. I was [then] posted back to Eastern Province....

I think [the Zambian government's decision to support movements of liberation in southern Africa was made because] ...history and also...experience [have confirmed that] you are not really free if [your] freedom is only in your home. The moment you step out of your home [and] you are in trouble, you run back into the house. So for the sake of freedom, you need to stretch out. I think the idea that Zambia had was to make sure that... everywhere around us there should be [areas] where no one will set a no-go zone. I think that vision [has come full circle with] what is happening in SADC [countries]. [Southern Africa states] are coming together now. That idea was born long time ago. [I would in fact attribute the emergence or birth of SADC to the fact that Zambia played a key role in the liberation of Southern Africa]. We c[ould not] be left out of that because we were actually at [the] centre of almost everything. Going back to those days, Zambia got independence in 1964; Malawi, of course, [also got it] in 1964 [but]...a little earlier. But Zimbabwe[ans] who were in the same Federation as us...are the ones who gave us even more problems.

I think [the country sacrificed] human resources. I remember...in 1979, some of my teachers... were enlisted to go and fight the [liberation] wars [that] the guerrillas

in Zimbabwe, by then [Southern] Rhodesia, were waging seriously. So, they said all those who had done National Service should go, and I don't think all of them came back....They were killed, and I think that was one issue which was very cardinal. Human lives were actually lost. But in sending those nationals for such a task, there was also the financial aspect. You know, an army can be a [waste of] money because it involves a lot [of expenses]. And so when you send [an army to war], it means you have [to give it] very heavy financial backing...[in order for the soldiers] to survive whatever they are supposed to go through. [Besides the loss of human lives, Zambia made other sacrifices, too]. They included the bombing of Chikumbi in Central Province and the Chongwe bridge [E]ven the Luangwa Bridge was at stake....That

infrastructure is very important. All this is a very big sacrifice that Zambia actually p[aid for aiding liberation movement. [At the] Chongwe bridge, a lot of people were killed. In Chikumbi, as well, [a lot of people were killed]. [In] Lusaka West, there was a camp...where refugees were kept. The[...] [camp] w[as]... bomb[ed] [out]....So, we lost a lot [of lives] in those areas.

Looking at where we have reached now [in terms of Zambia's relations with her neighbours], certainly it was worthwhile to make such sacrifices on behalf of the liberation movements in Southern Africa. Now we can [go] to any country around us without restrictions...[because] our neighbours [are now free]. Of course, Zimbabwe is independent but trouble-torn in terms of their [recent] problems...[Zimbabweans] are coming here. So I think as a zone, the southern African zone, we have achieved what we wanted. [By lending a helping hand to freedom movements, Zambia has also benefitted in terms of] trade. We are a landlocked country. There was a time in the 1970s -I was still in junior secondary school then-[when] in the north [actually in the south], Southern Rhodesia closed [our] routes to the] sea, and we had big trouble. It must have been in 1979....We could not go anywhere. So as a result of that TAZAMA was created....

I certainly [know something about the coming of these refugees and freedom fighters to Zambia]. I started working in Nyimba in 1985. That was at the peak [of the Mozambican civil war.] Mozambique was in trouble. FRELIMO and RENAMO were fighting seriously there, and [as] you [may] know, Nyimba is on the border [with Mozambique]. The time that we stayed there, [Zambian soldiers from] barracks [such as] Kaoma barracks and two others, were ...camping in that area....From [the] Luangwa [river] right across up to Chadiza area near Malawi, there were soldiers camping everywhere because [enemies] were coming here. And because we knew that they [wanted to sabotage] our installations [and] because we were keeping [freedom] fighters and...refugees...the Zambian government did not stand and look. They were actually sending soldiers. So, when we were in Nyimba, we saw four groups [of soldiers from] different barracks, who were camping in Nyimba [and] patrolling the border areas to make sure that the incursions from across [the borders] d[id] not actually affect us.

In Eastern province, we had refugees here in Petauke....The first thing I can mention is that...refugees] choos[e] [to settle in] areas which were not very vulnerable and sparsely populated. But, certainly... some [local] people...were evicted to create room for these foreigners in areas that would be difficult for outsiders to come and locate. So, on that premise, [this] was not a welcome idea especially that we knew that the coming of the refugees would also bring enemies [into eastern Zambia] to [attack] us [as] they were [pursuing freedom fighters]. So, to start with, it wasn't good. There was [no discussion between the government and the local people over whether] we would like to [shield freedom fighters and refugees]. [When] government... decide[d] [to settle these people in an area, the local people could not reverse the decision], since the locals didn't sit down with the government to [make that decision]. It was something which was imposed [from above].

In Nyimba where I was, [opposition to the government's decision to harbour freedom fighters] was not ...voiced secretly. It was actually a public outcry. Because of the threats that were there, and the actual happenings...[affecting] the citizens, the local leaders actually were very critical [against] the government's decision. [They would ask] questions [like]: "Why don't you send these people back to their countries because we are suffering [when] we are not supposed to be suffering." So locals [led by their traditional] leaders were complaining. The elite sometimes could not find [convincing] ways to explain the actions of government.

For a very long time, I was not able to understand the government's [policy of supporting liberation movements]. But my wife is here as a witness. We were failing

to sleep on bed, because when you sleep on the bed, you are. exposed through the window and so you put your bed against the wall [and] you... slept [on the floor]. When a rebel comes...[he finds] no one on the bed...One morning, we woke up only to find [that] at Nyimba, there were [so] many buses, trucks and cars [that] we could not count [them]. [The] Luangwa [bridge] was blocked for the reason that... a bus from Malambo [that used to go] Lusaka [had been ambushed on the bridge by RENAMO] rebels.... When the Zambian soldiers were informed, they... camped near the bridge]. So, all the buses... coming from Lusaka were not crossing [the] Luangwa bridge and those which were leaving [for Lusaka] were all marooned at Nyimba. They could not go through. So, that. became a problem because these fellows [i.e. rebels] would just come, wait for a bus in a place where they w[ere] there] no people. They would stop the bus and then they would ransack everything, [capturing] people, killing some, stealing items, as if Mozambique was in ... abject poverty. We were helped by the soldiers from Kaoma [at] that time. They captured some rebels.... [after the rebels bombed a bus]....

I think [that in] the [process of] assist[ing] [our neighbours] to get free, many lives were lost, property and infrastructure [we]re damaged. To me, the people that we assisted have not appreciated [this enough]. You know, if there is a fight in the home and my neighbours... come to help me [to end] the fight... [and to help us] reconcile, we owe those people a lot...[These countries that we assisted to get independence

should show their appreciation towards Zambia]... We were not hiding our support to them... We are not getting anything [from Mozambique]. [What] Angola, who have plenty of oil, diamonds and gold... can do is simply to come with [an aid] package to Zambia and say, "Thank You for what you have done." We only get [such appreciation] in songs when they sing about Kaunda... He is a great leader, but even... Kaunda, what have they given him? What has Kaunda benefited [from the support he rendered to liberation movements? You know... Kaunda was doing it [i.e. supporting liberation movements] on our [own] behalf. So what the governments of Angola, Mozambique and Namibia [do is that], instead of [Sam] Nujoma just befriending Kaunda, we expect this rapport [between] them [to benefit Zambian] citizens who don't even know who Nujoma is, who don't know who Agostinho Neto is. These should deliberately make policies that should benefit Zambia, specifically because we suffered from the trouble [associated with Zambia's support to liberation movements].

At this stage, I wouldn't support that idea [of Zambia getting monetary compensation for the support she rendered to neighbouring territories] because no man [is] an island. We are independent. I earlier... said that it is good that now we can go [freely to any nearby country]. We are free Look at the reason that God made man. You know, we are supposed to co-exist. So the best that Kaunda did is what he did [If he [had] remained aloof, there could have been countries that up to now [would today still not] be free. But [Kaunda's support of liberation movements] at that time [looked like a waste of resources, money [and] personnel] But now, surely, when you look back, you can say that what we did [was worthwhile] because the results... are [now] seen.

Zambia played a key role in trying to bring an end to these conflicts in liberation movements. I can't remember the years, but Zambia played host to warring factions. They were drawn from their countries, to come and sit in our country and resolve [their conflicts] back home....

It is very plain that the role that we played... [enabled us to appreciate] what war c[an] bring. We have always referred to ourselves as a model. Zambia has always been peaceful. Our people are peaceful. So when you talk about wars, we always remember what our neighbours went through. So, I think that has been a stabilizing factor on our part, but on the international scene, I am aware that Zambian defence forces have gone on so many peace keeping missions and have had very good records. I think all that is to simply to say [that] we have not known war in Zambia. But our soldiers know war because they have fought these wars outside where they have [reinforced] the UN [peace-keeping] programmes very, very well....

[Besides Zambia, there were other international bodies that played a key role in the liberation of southern Africa such as the Organization of African Unity which] had a military wing that was used to resolve conflicts.... [However,] I definitely can't point out at [any] tangible things that [that] wing [achieved]. But I am aware that there a wing to help the [liberation movements]....

The United Nation, other than assisting movements of independence] education[ally][andhealthwise], I don't think[itwashelpful] militarily [speaking].... The UNHCR was recruiting personnel...In Ukwimi, for example, Africare was [operating] there, and there could have been other organizations. At that camp, before it was closed, there were...combatants actually....Because of the programs that they brought, these combatants were turned into farmers, something very unique.... Ukwimi [won a reputation] throughout the world [as a place] where combatants were turned into farmers. And Ukwimi... produced [during] the 2004/2005 agricultur[al] [season], the highest [number of bags of maize]....

The Cold War had an impact [on the liberation struggles in southern Africa]. You know when people talk, that is when [solutions to difficulties are] actually [found]. Those who listen and [are] supposed to implement [those solutions] are able to see what...the real issue they are supposed to address [is]. [The Cold War between the East and the West did not merely involve talking]. It led to the incapacitation of minority settler governments. So I think that when the West spoke and the East also spoke, [a degree of political] stabilization of [southern Africa emerged]....

I had a very low opinion of the Non-Aligned Movement] because, I mean, why remain nonaligned? Your brothers and sisters are fighting and then you say, no, you will remain neutral. I didn't like the idea of non-align[ment. I think it was simply important that you think and side with [whichever liberation movement] was actually credible, [because] remaining neutral didn't help. Each of these groups was actually saying something and so it was a question of whether we agree with what they were saying or not. So, how do you remain neutral?

Nyeleti, Gunfighter

Mr Gunfighter Nyeleti was born on June 6th, 1938 at Mushonganende Village in chief Chiawa's area. He is one of the few who witnessed the liberation war in Chief Chiawa's area. Between 1948 and 1963, he worked for the white settlers in Zimbabwe. He returned to Zambia in 1963. He shares his experiences in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa in the interview below.

I am Gunfighter Nyeleti. I was born on 6th June 1938 in Chiawa District, Mushonganende village. I attended school for a short time in Zimbabwe in 1958 at Shabani Mine School. Just standard one, but I didn't even complete it. When I was learning, I was also working in Kitchens in the yards of a company belonging to the whites, in Zimbabwe. I worked there for fifteen (15) years till 1963. I returned to Zambia in the same year and went to Lusaka to work. I worked in the Tobacco Actions Flow as a General worker. In 1965, I was in Lusaka and in the middle of 1967, I left Lusaka and went to Kafue.

When the Boers (whites) came, they started war, and at the end they burnt this village. When they came to burn this village, they came silently. They were coming one by one, gathering in the Kazungula central area. After that, they started leaving that place one after the other, coming into the village. People in this village became suspicious when they saw these whites coming one after the other until they increased in numbers. So what they did in this village is that they started inspecting the homes. First of all, they took all the people and gathered them together and told them that none of them was to enter their village homes to go and get anything, otherwise, they were going to shoot them. So these people just stayed in one place.

When the soldiers from Zimbabwe saw this, they started going into these homes, searching everywhere in order to find out what they were hiding in these houses. They started taking axes and other harmful weapons. They took all harmful things. But here, where we are, that house which is there, where there is that plank, there was a house there. When they arrived, they found out that in that house, there was a machine gun which had wheels; and there were also guns and boxes of bullets. They were all in that house. When they saw that, they started asking us why we refused to tell them when they had asked if there were any guns. They asked us who the owners of those weapons were. They started beating up all the people in the village, beating them terribly indeed. They started beating us and telling us that we were the ones who were making them suffer because when we gave them food, they got satisfied, and they went and started troubling them; and they started beating us even more.

Although some of the villagers ran away, the Boers started burning the houses and even the barns in which we kept food. They burnt everything. They wanted all the houses and barns to burn. After they had finished burning everything, they came back with a helicopter, and after landing they started asking those who were here how things were and they started explaining how things were. Then they asked if there were any men. They were told that men were there, and that others were old men.

They then instructed them to collect all the young men and leave the older men. So then they started taking the young men and some other things.

On their second trip, they came and took young men from this very village and went with them. Those young men who were taken away never came back. Just at the time of the liberation struggle, there was a young man from this very village by the name of Boniface. They found him at the river and picked him and took him in their helicopter, and the plane went to the direction of Feira. They then took a turn and came to Chongwe. It was the plane that you probably heard that it had been shot by the National Service. After it was shot down, it was discovered that there was a black person in there. We heard this person was the same Boniface. He then explained that he didn't know anything about what was going on, and that he only knew about his village where he was coming from. So the National Service came here and started shooting because this was the direction from which the plane came from. That was the same day that one of my relatives was shot at. That is how things were happening. It was in 1977 when there was war, so I think it must have being 1978. At the time when the war was almost coming to an end, that was also the time that they came here and burnt the village. From that same house, a man was shooting from his house where he was hiding. What was unfortunate was that he was wearing a uniform of the freedom fighters which they had given him to wear. Upon seeing this, soldiers thought that he was also a freedom fighter. That was why they shot at him. But okay, these freedom fighters when they saw that there was war here, they decided to come to this village; they said that they could see all that was happening in this village, only that they were very scared to come because their guns at that time weren't powerful enough. So they decided not to approach, but to remain where they could not be seen and just watch.

They were very close and they could see all that which was happening, even when the people were being caught and the villages being burnt, they just watched; and they could see all these things happening. At last they said that could see everything that was happening, but they feared to come because their guns were not powerful enough. This is what they used to tell the people in these villages. When they left this place, they went to the next village in Shisambo. When they reached that place, they found that all the people in that village had ran away. They didn't find any people there, so they just used to walk in that village freely killing and eating the chicken. They just used to eat people's chicken. But there was one old man, he was elderly, Mr Sadina; he was found in I don't know which side of the village; they took him and went with him near the area in Chipulupulu. They found that there were solders in that place, and then they started shooting at the solders. So what Mr Sadina did was to run away into the water, and he was just carried by the water. That was how he survived, if he did not use that trick, he could have died.

Those freedom fighters from Zimbabwe when they attacked the soldiers, the people were very scared, they had never seen anything like that before. It was a kind of thing that the people were seeing, for the first time so they were really scared. But

these freedom fighters from Zimbabwe who used to stay in these villages told them not to be scared and that they were just coming because there was war. From there on in this village, they started teaching both the men and women to be home guards. They were taught how to operate guns.

I think most of the women in this area knew how to operate guns. They were trained to become home guard because at certain times, the soldiers used to be very far away. They were being taught so that they could start fighting the enemies even before the soldiers arrived in the area, so that as they come, they could find them in the middle of the battle. So there was a very big problem with those who happened not to possess guns. Because even the way we are just seated here, they could just loiter around but meanwhile the trenches had already being dug so that if anything happens, they could just run in to the trench. They were being taught to hide and that each and everyone should have their own trench. So when shooting started they could just go and hide themselves in these trenches. They used to come out when it was quiet everywhere.

At that time, people could not go to their farms to plough. All the people were just disturbed. At the time they burnt this village, all the people ran away and went and settled in Chelamushi.

The soldiers then went to that area and took all of them to the area near Siavonga. So that is where they settled, when my father heard that the soldiers were going back to the village, he asked them if he could go with them so that he could meet his son. They agreed; and that was how they came. I just heard that my father was at the station and so when I went there, I found my father.

They used to unite themselves because they were living in a system whereby every person used to be beaten every day. So every person was just hoping in their hearts that these friends from Zimbabwe should also be able to rule themselves. Of course the problem was there but everyone was just wishing that these people should rule themselves. This is the kind of heart that they shared; they were not so scared, but they were hoping that these people should rule themselves. This was the wish, the problem was there, but the longing in their hearts was for these people to start ruling themselves. They knew that if those people started ruling themselves, even then, they were going to live well and in peace because there was not going to be war that side. The people in this village at that time of war, they used to help them cross and then leave them on the other side. The people here used to take them to that side at night. These same freedom fighters, they used to give them food because how could they normally just live, just like the way you have come here. They used to give them food if they ran short of food. When they had enough food, they used to assist them also. For example, they could give them tinned beef. So when they are given one, they could eat Nshima with it and in that way, they could have assisted such people. It was just a built-in-thing in our people's hearts to assist others by providing them with food.

They used to give them food so that they could get satisfied and then go and fight in the war properly. That is how it was. Every person was a loving person. No one hated the other. They were helping them so that they could gain independence the way we got ours. But there were also problems, and where there is a problem, you cannot help thinking of other things. The women have hearts. Some of those who were married to these men, and some of them used to even break their marriages as a man could fear to say anything for fear of being shot. So that system was there. They used to take women; some of them even had children in this same village with the freedom fighters. They even left children here.

There were also landmines planted here. We have a certain woman staying there, up to now, she doesn't have a leg. What happened is that her husband told her to go and stay with him where he was staying, in the area near Chongwe. He picked up this woman and children to go in a vehicle accompanied by soldiers. Meanwhile, the Boers had planted some landmines in that area. They did not know that, so when they reached that spot, the vehicle exploded; the men and the children died there and they were never recovered. It was never known where the leg of that woman, which was severed, had gone to. It was the same freedom fighters from Zimbabwe, the same black people, who heard some noise during the time they were patrolling, and when they reached that spot, and they found that woman. She was still in that same vehicle which had exploded. So what they did was to carry her. They first came to this village and explained that they had found that woman. The people who used to stay with her knew that definitely she was the one. They carried her and brought her here; then they took her to the hospital, she survived and came back here. The problem was that the government was not concerned with the fact that, that woman should be properly operated on so that she could be able to walk properly. What they did was because the lower part was cut, what they did was to cut and make a tree and tied it to the leg. That is how she managed to walk. Even now, she is supported by a stick.

We also have another woman; she was the first lady to die, among those who went to Savage Hospital, some call it Minor Soko Hospital. That woman died because of the Boers from Zimbabwe. She was coming from Chiawa and she was shot at as she was coming here. If we start talking about old things of Chiawa, there was another man from Chiawa, it was on his wedding day, and as they were celebrating the wedding, there were some gunshots from Zimbabwe and the bride was killed. She died just there, and that was the end of the wedding. People ran to the other side to go and chase the killers who were on that side. They managed to catch them but what I don't know is what they did with them. That was before that war.

A lot of women died but there were many more men that died. Others were just arrested by the soldiers from Zimbabwe. These are the same people who used to plant bombs you are talking about, like at the home of Chusu, towards that direction. Before you go very far, there is a very dangerous place when it rains a lot. They call that place Maiye- Maiye because a lot of soldiers were killed at the place. A lot of soldiers died at that place. The sad thing was that when the soldiers came to this place, they took

all the people from the villages to go and mourn the soldiers. Some of them could not shed tears and what they used to do was to just put saliva on the face, pretending that they were tears and the soldiers used to beat the person doing that, and that is why if the tears couldn't be shed anyone, one just put saliva there. Just for fear of being beaten. It is for this reason that the place is called Maiye- Maiye; that was the place where those soldiers died and in mourning them, people of the area used cry calling Maiye-Maiye.

Yes, even that place has a problem, that was the problem which happened. The problem was that the people in Chiawa were being brought by the soldiers. They just used to bribe them with a packet of sugar, bread and so those people knew that at that time, all the people living in those villages at that time, were very poor. Even bread was very scarce to find. It took a long time to access bread. We even used to give them a banana boat which they used to for crossing. They were given a banana boat to say it is very good and that you should be using it for crossing. I think this time it is at Chirundu. That is where the police confiscated it.

Those guys were arrested and they spent many years in prison. The boat was for the Boers in Zimbabwe and that man was given to be using it. At night, he could go there and meet with those whites. They used to give him landmines to come and plant here. A lot of people died here. We just used to hear what that man was doing in that village. They could tell us that he ran away and started co-operating with the whites. They used to bring tinned and all kinds of foodstuff, because those people used to be very busy. They never had the time to prepare Nshima.

Those people used to give their leaders. For example (Robert) Mugabe was in Kabwata, in Lusaka and even (Joshua) Nkhomo was in Lusaka. He was working in the Railways in Kafue. Mr Kambayi, was the one who was a supporter of Nkomo. Mugabe was here and he used to fight in the war, from Mozambique entering into Zimbabwe. Even those people to Nkhomo used to live in this place, entering Zimbabwe because Nkomo's people were here. Those belonging or supporting Mugabe were not here. We can say that they were here at the beginning, but it seemed like when he left, he took his group with him to Mozambique. That time Samora Machel was alive.

In this village, there was Boniface and another young man. Those are the ones who were lost at that time. They were never recovered. Those who were not buried were there, the fourth one was buried. I don't know the actual number of the people who died but those are the ones whom I know and they were never recovered. These people were just being picked, killed and were thrown to that side, but here they were picked alive. Those young men when you said at the beginning that when they were burning this village, they gathered all the young men and went away with them. They took them and were instructed to leave the older men behind. I don't know the actual number. I only know four (4).

Home guards were organized when the soldiers came and found that there was no one who knew how to operate a gun. That is how they organized the home guards. So that is how men and women started training. They used to give them guns and teach

them how to operate them; how to dismantle and also how to re-assemble a gun. Yes! They could be instructed to finish in five minutes time. The women used to manage very well. Up to now, some women in this village are still home guards. Even my wife was a home guard before she died.

The people in the villages were instructed that each and everyone was supposed to dig a trench to hide in. They called it cover, because when you enter that trench, it meant that you had taken cover in a way that even if a shot was fired, you could not be injured or killed because you would be hiding in the trench. So everyone had their own duties so that whenever, they heard shooting they could run to the ditch and hide there. They could only come out when it was all quiet and then they would sit the way we are sitting here. But there was no free and peaceful life here.

There was no benefit that was found, because you know, when a person goes to war, at the end there is a benefit to be found. Some people went just like that, others died and others were injured like the one who doesn't have a leg. Those just suffered. But there was nothing that was benefited. Other people died in Chiawa without even compassion, people suffered a lot without even being compensated, they stayed just like that. Even soldiers, when they win wars and then retire they are given compassion for accomplishing their jobs. Even if a soldier dies, the children are given compensation because their father died at war. At other times, you find that every month, he will be receiving money, but here there was nothing like that. People were dying just for nothing.

What I see is that Zimbabwe was assisted but those who are in the boundary, there is no compensation. We catch fish, but when they find that you have crossed just a bit on their side, they will arrest you. That is why I see that there is no unity. But for them, when they come here, we don't trouble them. We don't trouble them for we consider them to be friends. But if you go their side, you find that you can even be axed; and then you just wonder why people cannot learn to use dialogue. They don't know dialogue.

They have forgotten that we assisted them. Okay looking back, we used to destroy their things and that is why they have taken on bad heart. There was poaching and that is why there was a problem. When they were arrested, they used to take them to Chirundu, but within a short time, the one who was arrested could again be found under arrest. Because of this, they thought that here, we didn't have any serious rule or that maybe we were fooling them. You see that as what used to happen. As a result, they could shoot at anyone they saw. There was nothing like they shoot in the air or arrest a person; they were just shooting.

For the others, they used to break their hands and feet. After this, they could tell the person to lift what they had poached and go. But how could a person lift anything after that. That is the problem even here with Zambians. Sometimes stealing makes the environment poor. One could never even tell that the environment was rich or there was good living. So poaching is not good. I see that poaching is stealing you just hear that the person is a thief, but that is not a good title to be recommended to

a human being, because you can be shot at any time to say that you are a person who brings about trouble.

We assisted them; they are our fellow human beings. There is nothing wrong, but there is nothing that we have benefited. We are still suffering; they burnt this village, our clothes and our people suffered. Like that old man you are seeing over there, those were the suits which I bought for him when I was in Kafue. Now when he came here, the jacket was burnt on one side. That is the issue that was here. This was how I experienced it.

Phiri, Anderson Bernard

[11 September 2007]

Mr Anderson Bernard Phiri was born in 1930 in Katete district, Eastern Province. He obtained Standard VI before he attended a medical training school in Lusaka and qualified as a Medical Hospital Assistant in 1955. After graduating from the medical school, Mr Anderson Phiri returned to Eastern Province to work at what is now Chipata General Hospital. Poor working conditions and racial discrimination at the hospital, however, forced him to resign and trek to the Copperbelt, where he joined the Roan Antelope Mine and the nationalist struggle. Eventually, he returned to Eastern Province, where he witnessed the impact on villagers in the province of the fighting between Portuguese forces and the Frelimo soldiers.

My names are Anderson Bernard Michael Phiri. I am a citizen of Zambia, born and have lived in Zambia ever since I was born. I was born in 1930, and I am 77 years old. I am married with a number of children, and have lived in Eastern Province since... I was born, except when I went to school – a medical training school in Lusaka from 1951 to 1954. After completing my training as a Medical Hospital Assistant in...September 1955, I was sent to Chipata General Hospital, where I worked as a civil servant. I did not stay there long because at that time Africans...Zambians were discriminated against. I was not happy to work there because conditions were not good. I resigned and went to the Copperbelt, where I first joined Roan Antelope Mine in Luanshya.

After working there for some time] my bosses recommended me to...be[come] one of the senior workers at the Roan Antelope Mines. They opened a hospital there in 1957. We were not many at that time in the hospital.... Few friends joined me there. In 1957, the... mines were closed...because they were not operating profitably. After the closure, many miners were sent to their homes. As for me, I remained there because they found that it was important that I remain there as some departments at the hospital were not closed. A few years later, the mines were reopened.

During those days we had two political parties: the African National Congress and the United National Independence Party (UNIP). But before its formation, there was the Zambia National Congress, ZANC. During that time...in 1959/1960, the leader of UNIP, Kenneth Kaunda was arrested and put in jail. The leadership was then taken over by Honourable Mainza Chona...waiting for the return of Kaunda. During the same period, a lot of political meetings were held, organized by different parties.... After all those meetings were exhausted and the white man could not listen to the grievances of Africans, a political meeting was convened in 1961...where Cha Cha Cha was born....It was so interesting that... although I was working for the hospital and, we were not allowed to join politics as civil servants deep inside us, we became politicians. I was one of those who joined the political struggle. I was chairman of the UNIP Konkola Branch... In 1961, after several political meetings, which were thought of... (as fanning) civil disobedience, I was arrested and detained in Chingola for three weeks as one of the rioters. I was lucky because my boss, a white man, came

to retrieve me but my friends remained in jail for eight years. I was arrested on the day that my daughter was born...Finally in 1964, I experienced the hoisting of the Zambian flag...to signal our independence....

Soon after our independence, we began to give support to Africans in neighbouring countries that were not free. We decided to give support to such organizations like FRELIMO in Mozambique, ANC in South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia and MPLA in Angola. One of the reasons for fighting for political independence was to get economic independence. We did not have our own railway to the port i.e. sea. The rail line was passing through other neighbouring countries like Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. We helped our neighbouring countries to get independence because as Africans we wanted first to unite ourselves. That was the main reason. Secondly, we felt that the independence of the neighbouring countries could help us in terms of trade....You will remember that under the Unilateral Declaration for Independence (UDI) by Ian Smith blocked Zambia's access to the sea port....We did not have anything at all. We didn't have... manufacturing industries.... All our copper was flown to ...overseas...countries. It was very difficult for Zambia to work on its own under those conditions. And that was one of the reasons why we helped Mozambique, Rhodesia... and South Africa.

Even though we supported liberation movements and hoped to promote trade between independent African countries through supporting liberation movements, I would not, however, say that we have accomplished what we were fighting for]... because [in the process of helping our] neighbouring countries to get independence, Zambia suffered. We lost a lot of lives. There were wars and during those wars, we could not work. We were all living in fear. Secondly...we lost a lot. But after we assisted our neighbouring countries...those countries have not come to a stage where we can say they are helping us according to our expectations.

I would, in fact, like these countries] to compensate Zambia...not in terms of money but in terms of education. Zambians, if possible, should have chances of being [admitted to] their universities because many countries such as Zimbabwe and South Africa have more universities whereas Zambia has got only one or two. So if they can assist Zambia to train our young Zambians that would be appreciated. Apart from education, I would prefer that those countries that we assisted should come to Zambia to teach us more about development. Without collaborating with our neighbouring countries [on issues of development], this country would still remain poor At the time when there was intensification of in-fighting between FRELIMO,

on [the] one hand, and Portuguese forces, on the other hand], I was living along the line of rail and.... Here in Eastern Province.... the war zones were between Zambia and Mozambique along the border. Places like Chief Kawaza's area, Chief Kathumba's area, and Chief Mwangala's areas were the battle zones. Zambians lost their lives because FRELIMO the interviewee here refers to RENAMO used to come to Zambia to fight Zambians. This was not because the real Mozambicans as Africans wanted to kill Zambians but because they were instigated by the Portuguese.

Our leaders worked hard to bring harmony to these two, RENAMO and FRELIMO. They encouraged them to sit and discuss why there should be unity among Africans [in those movement. They observed that we could not get rid of colonialism if they fought against each other]. So our leaders started discussing and came to the conclusion that we should unite both parties and resolve all our differences so that after they get independence, we would be able to work hand in hand, to bring regional development.

Our support for the liberation movements] has been of great help with regard to promoting good relations with these countries. We have now known each other fully, and as you can now see, we have our brothers and sisters coming to work in Zambia, just like Zambians go to work in these countries freely. Socially, and recently, we have had two presidents from Malawi and Mozambique coming to celebrate with us in Mkaika during the Kulamba ceremony....That is one of the ways in which the assistance that Zambia has rendered to these countries has brought unity between these countries. Even culturally...we have seen cultural groups from neighbouring countries performing in Lusaka or here in Katete... emphasizing the importance of unity and cooperation between these countries.

However, if we were to repeat history, I would, before giving support that I gave the government when...the liberation movements were here... first. suggest that we attend to our own problems. Thereafter, we can come together with our neighbours, discuss and see where and how we can assist them. I feel that there was nothing wrong in helping our neighbouring countries. As you know, you cannot have a village with one person [occupying the entire village. You need to have people for a village to be complete. Similarly, Zambia could not isolate herself. Whatever was spent on the liberation wars was... worthwhile. The problems in those countries needed the attention of Zambia, and we are very lucky that Zambia played a part in bringing independence. Although we lost some lives, I think that was something we could not avoid. Here we are now. We are able to go to Mozambique, to South Africa. As you may be aware, Dr Kalusa, our hospitals are not fully equipped with the best medical facilities....It is no wonder that some of our people are sent to South Africa for better medical treatment. That is very, very important.... So I think that those who say that we spent money unwisely need to receive some political education....

I know some Zambians who might have been totally opposed to our involvement in the liberation of southern Africa But I don't have to tell their names....You see in African politics...it is usually the opposition that speaks the loudest...who condemn the government....but I think they all need...political education....

The Zambian government supported those movements which had leadership that had genuine interest to liberate those countries. Others were there for personal gain. And that is how Zambia, for instance, helped ANC in South Africa, FRELIMO in Mozambique....So the quality of the leadership was a deciding factor as to which of the liberation movements should be given Zambian support. Zambia played a greater role. In those days, we had good leadership. Neighbouring countries admired

the leadership that Zambia had. Zambian leaders came in full force to accommodate these liberation movements. We gave them accommodation, food and advised them on what to do. That is how those parties came to realize that by fighting amongst themselves, they will not achieve anything. That experience has helped Zambia in terms of resolving both internal and external conflicts.... I think Zambia has improved in terms of its ability in resolving conflicts. We have not had the experience that the DR Congo has had.... Neither have we had] the political conflicts of Zimbabwe.... People are suffering there. Zambia has through SADC played a role in bringing those two political parties MDC and ZANU-PF together. We have not had [such problems partly because of our experience in resolving conflicts.

During... the Cold War...our leaders in Central Africa, especially Kenneth Kaunda, played a great role and convinced the Superpowers by way of educating them that killing a man would not solve a problem. Let us come together so that we unite in order to bring development. The Cold War was a big threat to Africa and the entire world. So organisations like the Organisation of African Unity helped in preserving real unity and in ensuring that there are no imperialistic threats on the continent.... Our traditional rulers played a great role in the liberation of southern Africa. I remember [that] Paramount Chief Chitimukulu, Gawa Undi, Paramount Chief Lewanika...accompanied politicians, sat together and discussed self-government for our country. Even now, they are trying to bring unity amongst the tribes in Zambia so that there should be no tribal wars...so that we can bring economic independence....

Phiri, Biseck Jubeki

Biseck Jubeki Phiri is Professor in the Department of History at the University of Zambia. His teaching and research areas of interest include the political history of Zambia and the liberation struggle. He was a witness to the liberation struggle in Zambia, in particular and the Southern African region in general.

My full name is Biseck Jubeki Phiri. I was born in Chipata in 1950. I went to lower primary school known as Ngulube Primary School, which is in chief Musawa and I went to Chalumbe Primary School where I did my grade five to seven in 1970. Having completed my primary school, I was selected to go to Katete Secondary School. I went for my secondary school in 1971 to 1975, where I finished form five (5). Then I was selected to come to the University of Zambia in 1976 and I studied History.

I graduated with Merit in 1980 and I did Bachelor of Arts with Education. My first posting was Chama Secondary School, but I was only there for three months because I received a telegram from the Head of Department of History inviting me to come and take up the position of Staff Development Fellow. I left Chama Secondary School and came back to the University in 1980. In 1982, I completed my Master's degree at the University of Zambia and in 1983 I was appointed a lecturer.

The issue of liberation struggle is also a subject in the department of history. I tried for the next four years up to 1987 when I got a commonwealth scholarship to go and read for PhD in Canada. I went to the Housing University where I did my PHD from 1987. I completed in 1991 and I returned to Zambia re-join the University as a lecturer grade three to the position where I am as full professor of History at the University of Zambia. I am now on 26th year as an academic member of staff at University of Zambia.

During this period, I have held various positions within the University of Zambia also as head of department of History. I was also saved as assistant dean in School of Education. I also saved as Assistant Dean in the School Humanities and Social Sciences. I also saved as Dean of Students at the University of Zambia and for the past six years until December 31st 2007, I was Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences. On the professional level, I have done a lot of publication in research; I consider mine as a political historical. My interest really lies in political issues. My PHD was in the area of politics so the political history of Zambia, the liberation struggle was part of what I studied. But also over a long period of time, I have also been involved with the issues of defence and security. For example, I am a project manager in what is called the Southern Africa Defence and Security Management Network which is based at the University of South Africa. It is found in ten SADC countries, the University of Zambia being one of those institutions that are participating. Also, I have continued to do the research on issues of the liberation struggle and what happened.

It was in the same period that the Portuguese in 1974 and 1975 left Angola. The Portuguese had actually left Mozambique and Angola, but that had been replaced by civil wars in these countries. Many more refugees found themselves on the Zambian side and at the same time, the liberation struggle was also picking up in what is today Zimbabwe and also in what is today Namibia. The main task which Zambia had was how to deal with the problem. Although it was hard to have more Zambians trained in military, it was easy to get support and the training went on. At the end it actually paid dividends because when the liberation struggle was enhanced and more Zambian soldiers were needed for guarding vital areas, they were available. The National Service personnel that had gone through that training were now in charge of guarding vital installation in the country.

In fact, it is on record that when the bombing started, some of the fighting was actually done by the National Service personnel in Chongwe for example. When the Chongwe bridge was bombed, the people who were involved and engaged there to defend the area were National Service trained personnel. They played very crucial role in all the liberation process. They also gave support and back up to the Zambian Army. It was a very useful programme to have in the country; but I should also mention that, as that was going on, another scheme was developed which was known as the Home Guard system, where people at the village level were also trained.

Today Zambians have forgotten. In those days Zambians were very sensitive. They were trained and continued to be able to tell if this stranger was bad or not and therefore informed the authorities. There were these kinds of movements, and because of that, the establishment was kept well informed of what was happening all around the country, through this scheme; also because the Parliament had to pass a law. This was a scheme which assisted in all the processes of the nation. Zambians were aware of the injustices around and therefore supported the establishment of the National Service.

There were a number of things the government did, in terms of preparing Zambia for the tasks of maintaining its independence; and also in assisting other countries to become independent. One of them is the National Service. The National Service was known as Zambia Youth Service, when it was initially mooted. It was not to be seen as another section of the army, but it was supposed to be viewed as training for skills. So the emphasis was training on skills. I remember, Zambia at independence many people had not benefited from European Education. There were a lot of people who did not have education. So they needed to be assisted. The government established a number of youth camps where the youth were to train in various skills.

But at some stage, the decision was taken that there should also have some training in military skills because of the problems that the country found itself in. So that the initial programme was changed so that people had to go to military training, such that it was some kind of what you could call a back-up army, so to speak. They were close to the land army because they were based on the land and so they could play a supportive role if the Zambian Army was to be engaged in the confrontation. But

with time it was to be strengthened because the situation demanded we needed to have it differently. Now it operated along those lines but by 1974 the government decided, because initially it was voluntary to go and join, but in 1974 were a board.

It was decided that first the University of Zambia students should go to National Service military training. There was resistance but some went. It was selected from 1975, those who were completing form five everybody had to undergo the twenty months National Service training, it was compulsory. Every form five school leaver, male and female, had to go through that system of military training. If one is expected to go to college or to come to University, then they would be given the certificate upon completing six months. But those who would not be admitted to any college would be expected to finish the twenty months period. The idea was to be tightened because at that stage in 1976 the liberation struggle was beginning to gain ground in the region.

Zambia decided that it will facilitate the movement of these people. It was first impossible for the Zimbabweans to train within Zimbabwe. There was no way they could have been training elsewhere; at the same time it was felt that because of its proximity to Zimbabwe, it was not possible to have training camps where it would be safe. After training, these people were to be facilitated through Zambia to go into places in their countries to wage the liberation war. So it was a risky undertaking by Zambia.

But on the other hand, as the war was intensifying a lot of refugees came into the country. Now Zambians had to find places where these people could be kept in refugee camps and training camps. There was a clear separation between the refugee camps and training camps. The two had to put separation on humanitarian ground. The two could not be mixed otherwise the refugees would have been put at risk. We had a number of refugee camps where we were housing the Angolan refugees. In the Eastern province, we had the Mozambican refugees and we had a good number of Rhodesians and South Africans.

Zambia also facilitated what was referred to as spontaneous resettled refugees. These were people that could find a livelihood. These were allowed to settle amongst the Zambian people/population. For example, here in Lusaka, we had a number of South Africans. Zimbabweans settled in the community except that they were not expected to participate or to be involved in the day to day activities of the liberation struggle; otherwise they could be endangering the local Zambian people. But as a way of allowing those who could, the Zambian government facilitated that process. First, for those who were engaged in actual freedom fighting; to facilitate their movement as they were moving from where they had been training. They would come in temporarily and then they were moved to their areas of operation, and the passage of those who wanted to join the struggle was facilitated through Zambia. Through that system, the Zambian government was aware of what was happening. Those are some of the ways which the Zambian government facilitated and assisted the liberation struggle.

All the way from 1963, during the federation up to independence, Zambia became some kind of a melting pot so to speak. Because of the development of the mining industry, Zambia moved from difficult parts of the country along the rail to the mines. Also Zambians moved to the mines in South Africa through the process of migrant labour. So in other words, the ordinary Zambians had been exposed to what was happening and they had the experience.

The ordinary Zambians had experienced racial segregation in South Africa. They travelled there; they lived there as immigrant labourers. They had lived in Southern Rhodesia as immigrant labourers and had lived on the Copperbelt as immigrant labourers. So when the leaders were talking about the evils of the political systems of the other African countries they were assisting, the Zambian people understood what the leaders were talking about. On the basis of that, it was easy for the government to gain support of the ordinary Zambian because the ordinary Zambian shared the experiences of what the injustices other Africans were facing under the colonial regimes in the region. I am of the view that experience of the people is what assisted the leadership of this country to be able to govern, and to have the support of everybody. We wanted to assist our brothers and sisters to also become independent like us because if we did not, our own independence would be in danger. So that is what helped the leaders of this country, the founding fathers of this country, to be able to have the support of ordinary Zambians. It was because the ordinary Zambians shared the experiences of the injustices in other African countries under colonial regimes in the region.

Initially, because Zambia was seen as a frontline in the liberation war, Zambia was more at risk from the white minority regimes in the region. What Zambia undertook was to facilitate the movement of freedom fighters once the people in these countries had made decisions that they did not see themselves gaining independent through negotiations or through conferences. But they had to liberate their countries in as far as they were concerned.. Because of that, the decolonization had to take a different approach. Zambia was one of the countries that handing over independence was not subjected to much objection because it was not a territory where many whites had become settlers, so was Malawi. When it came to Southern Rhodesia, the story was different.

When it came to Mozambique, the Portuguese looked at colonies abroad as overseas provinces. The situation was different in Namibia. After the First World War, it was handed over to South Africa. So South Africa treated Namibia in the say way it treated South Africa as the country where the whites will be permanently in-charge. What it meant therefore is that the Southern part of Zambia, to the west and east, had all the white dominated territories, which meant that even after Zambia had become independent in 1964, that independence had a lot of limitations, because all around Zambia we still had colonial powers. At the same time Zambia decided that her independence would be meaningless if other Africans in the region remained under colonial rule.

Further, after its formation, the Organization of African Unity decided that one of its mandates was to assist the countries which were still under colonial rule to be liberated. Zambia supported that very effectively and therefore it decided that it was going to participate because its independence was not complete when its neighbours were still under colonial rule. So this was the starting point of Zambia's involvement in the liberation struggle in the region.

In my view, one of the reasons that assisted, was that the leadership took for instance, adopted the assisting of the other countries in their liberation struggle as part of its foreign policy. But for that policy to be successful it needed the support of ordinary citizens. I believe that one of the things that assisted the leaders of this country in pursuing that objective effectively is the support of the masses. You understand that the colonial period started from 1890, when Zambia was colonized under the British South African Company; and then in 1929 the colonial government took over the administration.

I think one of the things that are to be appreciated is that Zambia was part of a larger community. We are talking about the African Community. At the time of colonialisation process, Zambia found itself as part of the colonial family and therefore it was seen not as an entity by itself, but as part of this growing net. We also note that in 1953, Zambia was grouped together with two other countries, which is Zimbabwe and Malawi under the federation. However what materialized in 1953 was a federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. But at that time, from about the time after the end of Second World War, that is when we began to see African Nations getting rooted.

We began to see independence come especially to a number of the countries that were decolonized by the British. We confirmed that where decolonization was achieved through conferences and negotiations, the independence was granted. But also when you look at these countries, where decolonization was achieved through the process of negotiations and conferences, you see that they were not the areas which the British or the whites were not ready to handover. In other words, they were ready to hand over independence to the Africans, but as the process began to get ground and to gain momentum, it began to touch those territories which they considered as white territories where whites had expected to settle permanently.

We are talking about South Africa itself; then we are talking about Southern Rhodesia, that is Zimbabwe, where the whites saw themselves as being there permanently. But also note that the Portuguese had also a different type of colonial system, which they planted. They were looking at Portuguese territories and colonies as overseas provinces. So in their thinking, these were countries which were not separate, except they were separate physically but in terms of political system, they were seen as provinces out of Portugal.

We need to look at what was the economy like because this was huge undertaking on the part of the Zambian government. A lot of resources had to be put into this. At the time of independence in 1964, Zambia as a country was rich and resources

were so much, that most of these programmes were supported financially. So when the government was taking this bold step, the economy was able to support these undertakings.

However, the situation began to change in the mid 1970's, because of the oil crisis. The oil prices went up and then the copper prices went down. So the economy of Zambia was not functioning well, the resources began to decline. For example, in 1979, when the National Service was introduced, the government was able to support this scheme. You know, taking all schools in to the military camps; all those who finished school in these military schools was not cheap it was expensive. It was abandoned because economically it became expensive.

The Zambian Government said that we should stop it because it was very expensive and it was going to bring other difficulties and challenges to the Zambian people. Zambians began to question whether it was worthy to support this process when the economy was in decline. But fortunately, the way things were going, when these things were moving on that direction, the liberation struggle was also heating up, reacting to its intended objective, so that by the time the fatigue of supporting the liberation was kicking in, the liberation movement also was coming into an end.

In 1980 Zimbabwe became independent and therefore what it meant therefore was that one country had become independent. The Angolans and Mozambicans were having their own process of internal settlement to settle their differences. So these things started to change, although fighting continued. The Namibian process also began to change. So although the economy of the country could no longer sustain and support the liberation as it did in the initial stages, the results were beginning to be seen, but the Zambian economy had already taken a drop. So we began to see more people beginning to ask why we were continuing with this. What was our benefit? And so on and so forth.

This is why as we were moving towards people it was also hard; it had to turn to the political system. I remember when we became independent in 1964; we became independent on the multi-party political system. But we had opposition political parties which began to question why Zambia was spending the money to liberate others rather than channel these resources to develop this country. The political system of the country was also such that we had a lot of in-fighting struggle; fighting political parties. In fact there was actual fighting during independence. The UNIP regime therefore took the decision that Zambia should become one-party state. This was to harmonize and to have unity of purpose as a country because of these extended challenges. That is why in 1973 the country became one party state. Because it was one party state, everybody belonged to UNIP, and the other political parties were closed.

So we did not have internal division which would have certainly gone against what the government was actually trying to do. So in that way, it also helped the way the liberation movement was supported. With the one-party state, things were able to move in unity as it were, but this was taking the drop on the economy. There were

also the Portuguese. On the part of the state, resources were declining and people started to question, especially when the liberation wars became the objective of the government.

Zimbabweans became independent in 1980; Namibia and South Africa also were also becoming independent. People started to question why we should continue having that political system when there were changes in the world itself; one-party governments were becoming outdated. In the long run UNIP found itself in a situation where it could not sustain the one-party system of government and the First Republican President Dr Kaunda opted to sign a Bill which introduced the multi-party political system in 1990. When you look at some of the benefits and challenges over this change, you find that people were incited by the negative impact; especially how much our resources had gone into assisting in the liberation struggle. But when you begin to take sides, personally I think it was a worthwhile cause; it had a positive contribution to what Zambia could have done to this region. So really Zambia played a very positive role in assisting the countries around her to attain their independence. I think as an institution, the University played an important role. An important role in the sense that in the 1960's, we had a lot of academics who were well versed with Marxist teachings in terms of exploitative systems of the west. The colonial system itself was the one that was exploitative, and it marginalized the indigenous people. So when in 1960 the University of Zambia was established and began to grow, the University of Dar-es-Salaam was a very strong and fertile ground for Marxist teaching and these are the kinds of teachings that actually brought out matters and issues of revolution. The liberation which I described earlier on, take place as an idea fully developed and articulated by academics. The academicians were providing theories for what was expected on the ground.

The universities provided the premises to articulate revolution ideas. In those days, when I was a student at the University of Zambia, a student could be categorized as a Marxist or an imperialist from the way they dressed; but it was fashionable to be seen at the side of Resocodist. Even the student publications, if you have a chance of going for the university library, if you have an opportunity, as you are carrying out this research, go and look at the student publications. See what kind of stories they wrote regarding this issue we are discussing, the kind of demonstrations the students carried out, in support of the liberation movements. Students were fully involved. In 1976, even earlier than that, the university was found in confrontation with the army, the government was took the issue, the wrong way. The students saw themselves as revolutionists. Academic members of staff were themselves considered as revolutionists at certain times.

Some expatriate lecturers were being expelled from the country because they were seen to be holding what were called radical views. So apart from the teachings, even the literature which was being taught, even the research by lecturers also pointed towards that. So in other words, the institution itself was also another body that also added weight to the issue of liberation movements. In other words, we see the situation

where the academics were doing something that was centrally to what the policy were doing. They saw themselves as part and parcel of the process. They might have been different in the approach but the agenda was basically the same. The oppressed people needed to be liberated and the academicians were drawing the attention to what was happening. They cited examples of where revolution had taken place and how the revolutionist had been executed, and that they were expecting similar situation, similar activities, even in Southern Africa so that people could be liberated. So as a university at that time, during that period of the 1970's and 1980's, it was the reason why you did not get into a lot of conflict with the government. The differences were in style in terms of approach, the overall objective was the same; in other words the common vision was that people needed to be liberated. People needed to be free. This is why the government was talking about the one party participatory democracy as sort of socialism. As some way of getting support, when they were questioned whether that was socialism in terms of ideas, they usually had a shared platform between the academics and the politicians; but what was different was simply the matter of style. The university as an institution of higher learning was also required in some form to liberate people that were there under the colonial rule. Even the kind of research being done in the University of Zambia, and the publication that came out represented that frame of mind as it were. Tanzania was much more ahead in these matters; in fact there was a thing called the Tanzania School of Thought because they were more consolidated and these ideas were much more solid in Tanzania.

Phiri, Master

Phiri Master was born on 14th May 1951, Eastern Province, Chelo village in the Nyanje area in Petauke District. He started school in Eastern Province in the 1960s when Zambia was in her struggle for independence.

Phiri Master is my name, I was born on 14th May 1951, and I am coming from Eastern province, basically Chelo village in Nyanje area Petauke District. I started school in Eastern province, when the struggle for this country was in its peak. I studied my Sub A at Chataika Upper Primary School in Eastern Province in 1961. In those days there was Sub A and Sub B, and from there you go to Standard One and Standard Two. In 1964, at the time when we got our independence I was doing Standard Two, then I qualified to go upper school at Nyanje Boarding School. That was the time when we were experiencing the struggle for our independence; it was being led by Dr Kaunda. In the villages there was cha cha cha, kwacha ngwee! Kwacha ngwee! We got our independence in 1964.

We had ANC led by Nkumbula and UNIP led by Kaunda so during that time there was a lot of fighting between UNIP and the ANC. After we got our independence in 1964 Kaunda decided that it was not good to fight each other; and that was when it became a one party state; and that one party state helped us to liberate Southern African states like Zimbabwe, South Africa, Namibia and so forth. If we did not have a one party state I don't think that we were going to help out those countries. From 1961 UNIP and ANC used to fight each other, and if at all Kaunda did not introduce the one party state I don't think we were going to achieve what we have achieved. From there that is when I came after finishing my education in the Copperbelt. I came to Lusaka in 1977 and I started work in the Lusaka City Council. From there I came to Kaunda Square stage two.

I was Secretary for UNIP in Munali, and this section where we are was Sandwe Section. So in each section we had the Youth League, Women's League and Security Wing. These wings helped us a lot to identify the enemies. If any visitor comes into our section he was to report to the chairman or the secretary and he had to specify how many days he was going to stay in that compound. We had to know that. Zambia was a front line state.

To start with, most of the freedom fighters used to be in camps in the bush, like in Chongwe. As you are going to the eastern province, you will find those mountains. That is where they were staying; and they were being assisted by our Zambian government. In the long run, when the Boers identified where the freedom fighters were, they started coming to attack them here in Zambia. In most cases when they were coming they used to phone state house that they were coming so Zambia should not attack them, and if Zambia was going to attack them, they were going to bomb Lusaka with jet fighters. They used to come flying nearby with their guns, sometimes

they went along Cairo Road, and started to throw pamphlets after they had bombed Chongwe Bridge.

I experienced another incident when they bombed Chikumbi, and a lot of freedom fighters especially Zimbabweans perished there. From there when Kaunda saw that the freedom fighters were being attacked in these camps, he started changing strategy and all the freedom fighters were brought to stay with us in Zambia. We used to accommodate them feed them and stay with them in our houses; like in the third house from here that is where the freedom fighters used to stay. We used to chat with them, and some of them started marrying our Zambian ladies.

In fact Kaunda used to tell us that we should stay with the freedom fighters; so we, as Zambians, did not have any problems staying with them because all that we were fighting for was to liberate the southern African states like Zimbabwe, Mozambique, South Africa, Angola and so forth. Everyone was geared to say we had to liberate these countries, so we had no problems staying with them. That helped us to liberate those Cadres, because when they were coming into Zambia it was very difficult for outsiders to identify who was a freedom fighter and who was not. They could not identify them, but we Zambians, knew who the freedom fighters were.

We didn't have any problem, the only incident I remember was the time when Kamanga was bombed. At the end of the liberation struggle, they started spotting the freedom fighters in their houses, but the only incident I saw was at Kamanga; no one died there. It was very difficult for them to identify who was a freedom fighter and who was not, We were all Zambian, and so these foreigners, like Ian Smith and his group, could not identify them. There was a system whereby every morning and every evening they used to bring food for the freedom fighters using vehicles, but you could not even know it. It was just a private vehicle coming to deliver food and left. That was the way we helped them.

We gave them very big support. They were not working, but the Zambian Government used to help them by giving them almost everything. Zambia lost a lot of money on these countries, but you find that they do not appreciate what we did for them, Zambia sacrificed a lot of money and also human lives because there were Zambians who died in the struggle. As it happened, when the enemies were bombing, they did not only bomb freedom fighters, but even Zambians; because they did not know who was a freedom fighter and who was a Zambian. So Zambia sacrificed dearly. They were trying to discourage Zambians from supporting the freedom fighters.

They were saying that those people were not freedom fighters so Zambia should stop supporting them. They were even dropping pamphlets telling the Zambian people to stop supporting the freedom fighters. They were even saying that they were not attacking Zambians but they were pursuing the freedom fighters.

We had ANC from South Africa, SWAPO from Namibia and ZANU from Zimbabwe, for both Nkomo and Mugabe. Actually when they were in these houses in the community they were not carrying guns, I am sure they had a special place when

they went, and that is where they were given guns. But here in the community they did not carry guns.

When they were staying with us here in the compound you could not even identify them as freedom fighters; they were just common men as we were; you could not know that they were freedom fighters, but we Zambian, especially those of us who were secretaries and chairman of UNIP, we used to identify that such a house belonged to the ANC and such a house belonged to this and that. We were asked to support them and to report any problem to report to the police or the government so that they could be protected.

We used to work hand in hand with the police. Any problem we encountered with these people was reported to the police; so it was very easy to know if the enemies came to our section. It was not easy for anyone to just come because it was very easy to identify those who did not belong to the section. If a visitor came, he had to report to the chairman. If he was from Chawama, he had to state how long he was going to stay there. He had to come with a letter explain that he was coming, maybe from Eastern Province, and he would be staying with his brother. So we used to know all those links.

The freedom fighters were just communicating through the UNIP party. It was easy because like the members of ANC they used to know each other; and they had a centre near Government stores where they used to go every morning. When they went there they had their own mission. They were trained there and they were just coming here to sleep so that nobody knew where they had been. They used to be just like Zambians, but in the morning some vehicles used to come here and take them for training. When they were on a mission the Zambian Government used to know and helped them to go and attack, maybe in Zimbabwe or South Africa. They went on their own, but they were assisted.

Here in Kaunda Square, most of the houses were under the Government. The system of selling houses started during the Kaunda era. Here in Kaunda Square, it was site and service so these houses were given to their occupants after staying in them for five years and that is what Kaunda said. Most of the houses were given free and most of the people built the houses here. The Zambian Government, under Kaunda used to assist them with money through the Lusaka City Council, and up to this time most of the people who were given that grant have not even paid. They were given cement.

We used to have tractors from the Council for free; cement and asbestos free of charge and after they had built these houses, most of the people now started renting them to the freedom fighters. That is the way it used to be. I had some friends from the ANC, SWAPO who used to come and dance here with us, those times we used to have record players.

They used to come here and chat with us and during weekends like on Saturdays, I used to take them to the cinema. We used to go with them to town, they were our friends and we used to mingle with them freely and ate whatever food we ate; they

were very free. During that time I remember the Zambia Kwacha was very powerful, 25kg of flour was 1 kwacha 20 ngwee. I remember my first salary was k56 and I could buy what ever I wanted; bread was about 3ngwe, in 3ngwe I used to buy butter, milk and meat.

Those second hand cars we used to buy them at K2.50 now it cannot buy a sweet and I don't know where we are going .We used to have coins now they are not there, that is why the slogan of UNIP was Kwacha and ngwee meaning Kwacha is ngwee now ngwees are no longer there, we are using only Kwachas. It was a very strong currency by that time.

The role that Zambia played in helping the liberation of these other countries was worth it. The other thing which I have to emphasize is that without this big man Kaunda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe were not going to be liberated; and what helped us was the slogan "One Zambia One Nation" that united all Zambians. That is why you will find that even now there is peace in Zambia, just because of the foundation of Doctor Kaunda of one Zambia one nation, and that unites us all together.

Sakala, Veronica

Mrs Veronica Sakala, born at Katondwe Mission – Luangwa District. She was an eye witness to the 19th October 1978 raid on ZAPU Camp at Chikumbi by the Rhodesian military under Ian Smith. In the following interview she shares her experiences of the liberation struggle.

My name is Veronica Sakala. I was born in Luangwa at Katondwe Mission. I have never gone to any school. I got married at a tender age in Mulando village. My husband died and we were putting him to rest last week, just the week we were burying one of his relatives who died. Right now, chief Mungule has not yet given us another area.

When freedom fighters were injured in their camp they came here to build a clinic. By that time I was not yet here, I was based at chief Kafela's area. That is where I used to stay. When the freedom fighters left this place, an Induna allowed me to come and live here. We heard that the freedom fighters came from Zimbabwe. They used to tell us that they were from Zimbabwe; they even told us the names of their chiefs. It is just that I have forgotten the name of the chief.

I am not in the position to know how they lived because they could not move from place to place. When they built their camp here, the Zambian soldiers also came here. At that time I used to live in the counsellor's village. Some senior government officials came from Lusaka and asked me to accommodate the freedom fighters at my house. For the sake of not mixing their belongings, I recorded everything they brought to my house so that I could counter check if at all they wanted to get what belonged to them. When it was time for the freedom fighters to go, they got their belongings, and so did the Zambian soldiers who had brought in theirs. They all extended their thanks before they left.

It was the freedom fighters' camps which were bombed. They used to stay in their camps. At that time I was talking to my child as the plane flew past and I noticed that there was a sign that something bad was going to happen. A few minutes later I heard some gun shots. Then I saw some freedom fighters that had been shot. Some had their stomachs ripped open and we could see their intestines hanging outside. Others came running here and asked for some water to drink, but others preferred not to drink water because they wanted to go and die far away from this place. As the freedom fighters were running away, they were being shot at, most of them died as they were running away.

Their attackers had disembarked from helicopters on the hills; they had started advancing here on foot. They had their faces painted black and told us not to run away because they were not after us but were only after the freedom fighters. They were in shorts and they were also putting on long black socks. They had guns and were advancing towards the camp of the freedom fighters. As they got near the camp they started shooting and bombing the freedom fighters. The freedom fighters run away but some were killed.

The freedom fighters asked me if I could allow them to hide in my house, but I couldn't because if they were to be found in my house, then all of us were going to be killed. They were badly wounded and they were in great pain. Some of them had their intestines hanging outside. When Dr Kaunda came here after the Boers had left, he was accompanied by some senior government official, but he could not hold back his tears, he cried. The freedom fighters were badly wounded.

I was in chief Kansela area, Haselengwe village. A lot of people died during that time, most of them were freedom fighters, if you were there you would be shedding tears every time you think of what happened. The majority of the people who died were the recruits. They were found in a parade and the Boers shot them. They were brought here a day before they died. They came from Nampundwe. They were those who had just been recruited. Recently the Zimbabwe soldiers were there to visit the graves of the freedom fighters. They had also gone there. There were camps in Nampundwe; there was a camp for women in VC in Lusaka west. It was a camp for women.

When they came from Zimbabwe they were sold a portion of land in Sawata but the place was too small for them, and they reallocated to another place. Only men remained here and all the women were reallocated to that place. That is where some of them were bombed.

They were people who had respect for others. They never used to disrespect local people here. They used to move around in the village. They really helped people here, as you can see this mark. It was caused by a piece of log that had fallen on me and I got wounded. The freedom fighters came to check on me and they brought three pills which they gave me. They also gave me an injection, and it did not take too long for the wound to heal. We were helped by the freedom fighters in medical areas.

They had built a small building which they used as a clinic. It was demolished recently. When the Zimbabwean soldiers came here last year, they cooked from my place and did the rituals for the freedom fighters that died during the struggle here and ate food. They took the beer to the graves of the freedom fighters and I don't know what they did with it there but the Indunas from here drunk some of the beer.

During that time I had to attend a funeral of my friend's husband in 1985. I don't know how they proceeded with their rituals. It was attended by the Government officials and relatives of the freedom fighters who died here. I could only see dead bodies of the freedom fighters. I did not know them.

The memorial structure was built in 1987, it was a long time ago but they were here recently and built a monument, that brick structure. From there, we went to the camp and ate some food. Then the Government officials proceeded to the VC to go and perform their memorial ceremony there as well. They came back in the evening and left on the following morning.

At the VC that is where so many women died. All their camps were bombed. They started by bombing here, then they went to bomb Mkushi and then Nampundwe. They used to sing songs of solidarity in their native language. They may have been for Nkomo. They may have been helping one another. They married women from here.

The name of the son of the freedom fighter was Kakondo. He is a young man, almost the age of my daughter. We found him in the bush when we went to look for honey. He was a baby by then and we took him to the hospital. I was with my late son and my daughter. But people from Zimbabwe do come here to visit him.

At Kamili two people died. One of them was my son; he was in grade four and the other one was in grade seven. It was a hand grenade. That one was thrown down in the area. The one who picked it up was the other boy. He got it from the camp.

The freedom fighters used to do a lot of farming. They could have farms which extended as far as the railway line. Their fields could go as far as the places where their graves are. They grew maize and vegetables. Also they grew potatoes and many other things. They did not do animal farming. They used to distribute what they harvested to their colleagues in other camps. Vehicles came to collect part of their harvest and took it to the women camps and other camps. They never used to sell. I never saw any of that happening.

The freedom fighters came on buses. They were brought in the night. I think the freedom fighters kept some pigs. A vehicle used to bring some pigs for them. It was a vehicle belonging to the Zambian soldiers. The same vehicle used to bring food for them.

There could have been someone among them who would have leaked the information to the Boers about where they were located. The Boers wouldn't have known by themselves.

There must have been one of them who sneaked out and told the Boers about their whereabouts. The plane went round and finally started bombing this place. There was a helicopter and that was the one which was throwing bombs; the ones in the helicopters were those who had guns and had painted faces. Those who told us not to run away and that they were after the freedom fighters passed through our village.

By then, we were not yet here. We were in that village. But they told us not to run away because they wanted to kill the freedom fighters. We wanted to ask where the freedom fighters were hiding, but they had already known and started bombing their camps. It was after their camp was bombed. The Zambian soldiers went to their camp and got some of the freedom fighters and hid them in the shrubs. The luggage was brought to my house.

The freedom fighters did not move around with guns. The guns were kept by some seniors in the rank among them. They dug trenches and they did their trainings in the trenches. After they were bombed, most of them started spending nights in their trenches, even during the rainy seasons, because they had nowhere to sleep. Some of them went to hide and built tents in the bush. There is so many suffering on earth. God would not allow us to be happy after seeing how people died here. Those who were wounded were taken to UTH. Most of the freedom fighters died on the spot. A vehicle known as a grader is the one which came here to dig their grave.

When they were bombed, their bodies were torn to pieces. So we picked up their body pieces and buried them. The Boers were clever. When they came here, they

first of all bombed the place where the freedom fighters kept their guns and then burned their vehicles. All their vehicles were burnt. As for the person who betrayed his colleagues, he did not do a good thing at all. He caused the death of his colleagues. God created us to be keepers of one another. Why should we kill one another? Taking other people's lives is not a good thing to do.

The place where they were living was a big house and had guns being kept there. It was the first to be bombed and it sunk to the ground. Someone must have betrayed them otherwise they wouldn't have known. Initially, they had passed by the freedom fighter's camp and were approaching then the Boers came back and started bombing their camp. The freedom fighters were killed in cold blood such that when I recall, I feel sad about it. A lot of them died while on parade instantly when they were bombed. They were caught unaware. Others were collecting their uniforms while others were performing their drills.

Shebo, Godfrey Lubasi

[Livingstone; May 2007]

Colonel Godfrey Lubasi Shebo is Southern Province Regional Commander for the Zambia Army. He was born on November 14, 1951. He played a role in the liberation struggle by defending Zambia. He was part of the infantry division of the Zambian Military operations in Kaonga Mashi in the mid 1970s.

I am Colonel Godfrey Lubasi Shebo and I am the Regional Commander for Southern Province. I have been here since 2005

The part I played in the liberation struggle was defending mother Zambia. I was put on operations that were slightly for commission. I went on operations in Kaonga Mashe in the mid 1970s, and I stayed there for almost one year. We operated there in the infantry; you know I am from Tilale. The infantry call was some sort of defensive position that we undertook to deal with the enemies coming into Zambia; and this was in Kaonga Mashe.

The common enemies at this particular time were the Boers, and the Portuguese on the other side. That is the general area that I operated from; and the people I dealt with were the South Africans or the Boers; and we all know that the Boers were administering South West Africa. So we had to stay there for almost one year, before I was recalled to the base; and I was one of the last people to have operated in that area. We saw that there was nothing much that we were offering but all the same, we experienced a few violation by the South Africans aircraft and the South Africans themselves coming into Zambia; but our presence deterred them from doing so, and that is one of the main reasons for our being there.

Some skin heads would come up here only to find there were people, and so they had to go away. After a period of one year, we went back to base. During that time we were still doing very well, in terms of the Zambian economy, so we had to train hard during this period. We went back to Ndola and in 1978, I was again redeployed in Chirundu just near the bailey bridge there, where I stayed for almost another good one year. It was at that same period that I also operated in places like Kariba and Siavonga, just like it was, in Kaonga Mashi. I did not experience much of the encounters with the Rhodesians by that time; it was just skirmishes, Maybe sometimes you could hear firing from here and there, and sometimes you could hear of people who had been hit by landmines. Those were the encounters we met. Otherwise we did not have good experience in this area. After that I was called to go back to Ndola, but within a period of, I think three weeks, I was recalled. I think you remember that was the time school children were been called for national service.

In fact I was given a company of school leavers and I went back to Chirundu and stayed with them. They were in national service, alright, but at this particular time they were kept away, and they were not supposed to go very close to the battle front. They never experienced anything apart from training.

At one particular time, I left this area to go back to Ndola and during my absence the officer that remained there, that was Captain Naguziyabo Francis, from Legal Aid, encountered an attack. The enemy fired upon them; it was in an ambush; and miraculously he escaped without an injury, so we intensified our defence. The Rhodesians crossed into Zambia when they ambushed us. That was at Kapiri Ngozi where they fired a rocket at a driver but it never exploded. Fortunately he escaped without any injuries, and he was then given some support from the platoon which was 5ZR and these rebels went away. From there on we could hear some firings inside Rhodesia, but there were no skirmishes as such. On one particular night again Naguziyabo fired; this is the first time we had to fire across Zimbabwe we fired for close to 15 minutes. This was brought about by them firing at our position; and this silenced them, and from that time on; there was no more firing until we left the place. After sometime, in the 1980s we came back to Senanga.

In Senanga there was a time, I don't know whether it was South Africa or who, when they hit the pontoon at Kalongola in 1979. The number involved could have gone up to a thousand plus. So we were told that we should make a bridge at Kalongola; and we managed to make a bridge which we used for crossing the river, but the fact is the enemies had gone; so we were just worried about what we were going to find across the river. We did not find anything apart from mines that were left behind by those guys, and these mines were put on the Senanga-Sesheke road, but we managed to clear most of them. This was the time they started building that bridge. If you know the Matepele plains that bridge is still there standing. That is a military bridge we used to cross to go and put up the first position that is now in Kalongebwela. This particular time I moved with my weapons; I was a battalion commander and I moved with my 85 millimetre guns, anti-tank guns, and the 122 gun.

I was commanding six guns: One piece is manned by seven people, so seven times; six comes to forty two. That is minus the administration staff, so roughly we were going to seventy per unit. That was one battalion and then the other one also about

75. We stayed there for some time as well, and we never got to do anything tangible, but we used to have skirmishes, and we lost a few soldiers through landmines.

Skirmishes occurred when maybe these people would come and fire at our location and go back; and by the time you into that area, you find they have already gone. So we lost just a few people, all those were those who stepped on landmines; a few vehicles also were blown up.

The enemy mostly came by air and they would come to harass the civilians, but by the time we got the information to go and get them, we found they were already gone. Some came maybe on foot patrols. Most of these harassments came after they had recruited people in some of these villages. To convince them they used to give them some cooking oil, salt, sugar and other things, so if they failed to do as they were told they were sort of harassed. By the time we go there we found they were already gone, and we wouldn't get anything from the villagers..

The villagers were normally asked to locate military locations and maybe to some extent they would tell them to go and plant landmines and these actually involved the civilians. There were no real battles. We settled now in Sesheke in 1980 to 1983 and the problem we encountered was that the troops would be on operation for close to even two three years without been released without going to see their families.

We were few and at that particular time I think we were not well structured. So if you are removed, maybe from Sesheke you would go to some other operational areas, and there was no going back to base. We were fortunate at that particular time most of us were not married. If anything it was going to be disaster, but otherwise we managed, because that particular time soldiers were very loyal.

There might have been some activities. The proximity of the two Katima to one another was just too close; and as such the activities that prevailed there were that people from our side who were Zambians had activities, on the other side; so you find that at night they would go to that side and get a few items. But you find that these were the same people that would get recruited in the police there, although they were Zambians.

They were recruited on the other side, so information was flowing through these people, and we found that when the Mabaluse came they went straight to our positions without any delay, because the information had already been disseminated to the Mabaluse and already the Boers knew where to find us. Activities were there, but they had second thoughts about the defence force when they knew we were ready for them because they also knew that we were particularly strong that time. We had quite a substantial number of troops in the area, so they would not have managed to come in.

The Katima Mulilo Southern African military base was there alright; but then the base was just a transit base. I came to find out after staying there. Two months after the independence of Namibia, I went there and we found out there was nothing there. The thing we feared most, that there was a base, just after the border there was just a guard room where they kept those soldiers who were undisciplined. It was just a guard room; it wasn't a bunker as they were saying. We were told that there were a lot of weapons in that place, but there was nothing; it was just a decoy. They had movements of troops from Katima up to Chimumasebeck, there they had all that free movement on the water and also they had the vessels. They could move from this part to the other part but they were moving on the other side. At that particular time we had no boats, and so they were free. This Sheckmansebeck is almost opposite Mwandji. They used to move freely with their big vessels. At times over the weekend, they were moving with their families up and down so as to show us, they were mighty; otherwise, it was nothing really.

There was no such firing during the period that I was there; I did not experience any battles. Because I came from Hatilale they say, we are cowards, but that is how we fight, we fight from the river and because of the longer range of our weapons, that is how we do it; so the infantry are always in front of us. We sandwiched them; put this

gem in front near the lower end, then you also went behind them in between. That was how we deployed, They were more secure because that was a river and these were infantry men.

The guns went over their heads. These were big guns, they were not rifles. They were big guns - hundred and twenty two millimetre; it is a big distance.. We had the Katushas also, which were deployed there. So we were forced to reckon with them at that particular time. A Katusha is a BM21 it's a 122 millimetre, again but then that one piles 40 rounds in about 3 seconds.

At that particular time we knew that they had a 155 millimetre gun, the Southern African gun, but they never fired that one. I think they never fired it and I never heard anybody been fired upon by that weapon. We fired a 122 millimetre Chinese gun; at that time we fired the Chinese gun. We had got 122 Chinese and 122 Russian. The weapons that were used by Zambia military were both Chinese and Russian They were given to us and the freedom fighters had their own weapons.

But we were disciplined because we had all these weapons and we just did not fire them. It is discipline in any institution you don't just open up. Some of these things, immediately you fire the enemy will know that, that is the Willton there, you see; just by the sound of it. So I remained in Sesheke until a few months before the independence of Namibia, when I had to go back to base again. This was in 1983 I even got married in Sesheke. I was based in Sesheke were I stayed from 1983 to 1987, when I was transferred to Ndola.

I got my bride at home in Mazabuka. That was to show that I was disciplined; I had to leave the operation area to go and look for my wife. That was in 1987 we were back in Ndola. From there on we were just local. I went to Iraq in 1989. I went there as an observer to train. This was during the Iraq war where I stayed for 15 months or so, and I was based in Bassral then the hot seat. We met the Bashaguids trying to stop the war.

By then we were talking about Namibia before independence. I just went there, there was some ordinary board that I went to do, so when one of the members of that place was introduced to us he said this man was here. They were teachers and they said we should go and have a beer across. I said it was not possible, But they got me a pass and we went. That's where they showed me that bunker and I saw there was nothing in it.

We were surprised to see how many civilians were invited to attend celebrations. I missed the Zimbabwean celebrations but I was there for quite a period of time. I also missed the Namibia celebrations although I was there for some time; but a lot of people attended the celebrations.

At independence we were not even invited. Here also I would say we could only get in touch with these freedom fighters after permission was granted to you. We could only mingle with them after getting permission, but it was not allowed. to just visit them. Normally you asked permission from your headquarters and then your headquarters would ask their commissioner; so it wasn't even necessary, unless

maybe something very urgent required our attention. They were very adventurous. When they came to town they made noise fought around, so we had to go there and clear the situation.

We were training home guards in weapons handling; just minor tactics, because these people were supposed to defend their own villages, if anything should happen. We were keeping their weapons so if anything happened they would rush to us get the weapon and go back and fight. There were women as well, and normally it was voluntary. At that particular time, I think there was in fact, there was some age limit. I think it was forty-five years maximum and eighteen years minimum.

The people everywhere we went, they lived in preparedness. Every family had some sort of a trench. This same situation was where the infantry men fought. They fight from a trench just to give them cover, but unfortunately at times, maybe one in thousand times; you have the misfortune of having that thing dropped into your own trench, and this actually happened in Sesheke. I don't know how many died from one trench from one family. They died when a mortar bomb was fired from across and it went straight into a trench; but these play a very big role. In case of the guys firing, if they are also in a trench it gives you protection, because if you are just on the surface, the shrapnel coming from the other side will injure a lot you because they go like that.

So we had to convince every family at every home, when I went there to stay in them, as we had a family trench. Any time during the day time it was normal life as it was normal time, and it is during this time you announce to the people and tell them to dig trenches to help them in case of any attack; but unfortunately that incident happened.

I had home guards in Kaonga Mashe and we had some home guards even in Sesheke and Senanga. At the time we were in Sesheke, people were not all that sure so it was mostly soldiers' presence which was there. In fact, some of these things are funny. When you just come into an area you have to take yourselves to the authorities in the area so, they know of your presence; you have to know the political people there. You know in the military you cannot just go straight like that because others reject you, others don't accept you, so it's through those political leadership that you may be able to convince the characters in the villages because you cannot go just like that, or they will reject you.

We had what we called political commissar, but mainly these political commissars were for these military personnel. They were just educating the military personnel about the policies of the government, and they were making known the requirements of the government. Security Education alright, but then again they were consolidating the military presence in the areas. So for legal common issues they were part of the military personnel, but they there they worked with the governors.

With the military, the weapons were kept very secure, even the ammunitions were counted for them then, but it was difficult with the freedom fighters because we could not go into their camps and see what was obtaining there. We did not know where

they were, and these Zimbabweans could not come and tell us where those things were. So you just find out when children playing stepped on these things and they reported to us. It was actually very difficult.

These camps were for liberation movements in the areas in Kaonga Mashe, just about 2 kilometres north of the Kaonga Mashe School. That was where the camps for SWAPO were. In Senanga, they were about 24 kilometres in Ngande area, somewhere there, and I never used to go there

In Sesheke there was no freedom fighter presence; it was very far away. In Chirundu there was Lusitu for some Zimbabweans, ZANU, and in Siavonga there wasn't anything.

Sometimes ZANU would combine with SWAPO when they go to Kazungula cross to Zimbabwe. They would come from places where they could not camp. Here men in the main land may have travelled to come to a forward camp, where they prepared themselves and then they jump into the canoes to go to fight and come back. So, in Kazungula I am not sure. Those were just travelling troops they, would come and blow the boats of the enemy and cross back..

Cover up or casual evacuation was part and parcel of our job. So the military definitely will play a big role there. The casualties that could have been involved maybe in landmines, those that had been fired upon, and the people were saying they are supposed to be evacuated, both military and civilians. Normally that happened is even here in Livingstone.

Normally what happens is when you are laying and issue the landmines fired, you are supposed to have a map, and this map, is supposed to be preserved; that is by Convention. You don't just put mines like that, but by Convention you are supposed to have a map and so when other people come to clear them they would know exactly where there is a landmine, so that they can go and remove them safely. But as a unit I would not remove those mines because there are some personnel that were assigned to remove those mines.

The problem was that the rebels were not supposed to come and put mines in this country; he was supposed to put mines in his own country. If he puts them in the country, even here, and if he does not show them on the map, that is supposed to be illegal. You don't put mines in a foreign country.

I remember in Kaonga Mashe was the best example. Actually I had a soldier there I cannot remember his name but they were teaching. Even up to know they are. Some are even trained teachers attached to such schools. There were teachers trained at Nkrumah and then they could go and teach but they would be in uniform. There was Colonel Munamulunga, he was governor I think Mongu, in Zambezi there was a Colonel Sesheke these was a Colonel there was Lieutenant Colonel Chalala, and also he was a governor somewhere. There is also General Phiri, at the ministry; he was a governor here in Livingstone. There were a good number of them.

Normally compensation comes in when a person dies, and he is supposed to be paid his dues; but then the government should come in. When such members of the

nation are casualties the government is supposed come in but now they just got their compensation from normal engagement. It's a general property, you had the injury and you break your legs in terms of operations, you might be treated and maybe your legs get better but, you will not be given compensation your formal retirement bills. If you retire because of your bill, not compensation for, the loss of a leg, today you will be given medical providers. There is what they call, the percentage injury. Say, your leg is cut off, apart from that pension, they will give you percentage; let's say 10% of your pension will be paid to you, it's there in the first act as additional to your pay.

Solo, Mambepa Luckson

Mr Luckson Mambepa Solo, one of the first hand actors in the liberation struggle of Southern Africa. He was born in 1951 in Kaputa District. He is a former employee of TAZARA and joined the army in 1974, and participated in the liberation war.

My name is Mambepa Luckson Solo. I was born in 1951 in Kaputa District. I did my Form Two in 1971 at Mporokoso Secondary School. Later in 1974 I joined the Zambia Army. Before that I worked for TAZARA. But presently I am just sitting at home doing nothing.

The liberation struggle, the way I understand it, was the act of those people who were colonized in trying to free themselves from the powers that were ruling them. In our case we were colonized and then we fought for our own independence. When I joined the army, Zimbabwe was still being ruled by whites. That was Southern Rhodesia.

Being a soldier at that time meant that I was so busy. I was assigned to go and assist, especially manning the border areas because the Boers were crossing into Zambia. That is the border with Southern Rhodesia and Namibia.

Zambia as a country was not at war, but being neighbours to Southern Rhodesia which was still involved in the liberation struggle, meant those people were crossing into our country. The freedom fighters used to come here. In fact we were keeping them here. In terms of assisting them, the Boers were following them; and sometimes they used confuse the Zambian soldiers with the freedom fighters, and our soldiers were sometimes in trouble as they were sometimes attacked.

There were no personal roles, as the activities were always collective because it was a national issue. That time I went as an infantry soldier. I was in the armed forces armoury regiment; the 1964 Armoury regiment. We were under the brigade; we went there as infantry men, that time you know as armoury we had our own equipment so I went there as an infantry, assisting in one way or another.

We used to guard the freedom fighters at one time, giving them directions and at times we had to make sure that no Boers crossed the borders into Zambia. There was one time when they came here at ZESCO. It was the time they came there to seek something like a hideout. I was on duty guarding them. These were the Zimbabweans-ZANU group. It was some sort of an operation, but I cannot remember the year or month.

During that time we were not supposed to be in contact with them. We were just patrolling their location. This was at ZESCO Headquarters. There was another time when we travelled to Chirundu. The experience which I had there was quite pleasant. Definitely that time Chirundu was deserted, because people had run away from the impact of the struggle. Some of the buildings were destroyed at that time and nobody could stay there only soldiers. It was us soldiers who were there. I can remember it was in the 1980s. I was just there for a month, then I came back to Lusaka.

The other operations were during the time that Namibia was under struggle; that was when I went there. I was in Sesheke bordering Namibia. In fact, we were just there ensuring normal safeguarding and ensuring that there was no soldier from there crossing the border into Zambia. There was no incident during my stay there. But while we were going round, I could only be shown some of the buildings which were destroyed by the fire from across before I went there.

We were not sleeping; actually things were very bad because it was we who were being fought by the Rhodesians. Even in Namibia, we had impact on the war because we were assisting the brothers and sisters there. On the other hand again, I don't really know where I can put the blame, because appreciation could have been shown. Zambia was involved in the struggle but it was in the course of assisting our brothers and sisters. We had a government here; they could have talked to the government to show appreciation to us through our government here.

I remember when we went the Chakwenga where freedom fighters were being kept. These were freedom fighters from Zimbabwe. Chakwenga is somewhere in lower Zambezi. We were there too and we spent a day, and a night. The following morning we got them on our vehicles and the road was very, very bad. We were using Land rovers then we came to Luangwa, some where there; that is when we could use a bus. In fact one of them died and a chopper was used to take him away. All this was undertaken by our military personnel. I picked them up from Luangwa and took them to Lusaka, where I left them at the show grounds. That is where they camped; from there they were taken care of by our Government.

On the issue of bombings in Lusaka; a liberation centre was bombed. That time I was at 64, in my regiment and during that time I just heard that there were scouts who came to bomb Nkhomo's house. That was the place where there was an office that was looking into liberations issues in the sub region. During that time my friends went there, because that was the time I was posted out of the unit. Also the place, according to the people who went there, was just like in Zimbabwe.

What I know is that it was like a civil war in Angola after the Portuguese colonial power left and we were involved as a country to assist the government by that time. We can see what is happening around us; we are hearing that in South Africa there is our brother there who is now trying to chase foreigners from Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Malawi. We have colonised ourselves because there is no freedom movement, the way I can see it. Right now there is fear that if I go this side, I don't know what will happen to me. Maybe what happened to South Africa might be extended to other countries. Such a thing must be quickly addressed, by the South African authorities there and then. Countries within the region are supposed assist in this situation before it can extend to other countries.

Those of us who are out of the system right now, find that the government has forgotten about us. It is just unfortunate because I know we can do something for our country. I am sure the government is thinking about it. Thank you very much

Tembo, Foley Ashton Mulaishi

[17 September 2007]

Mr Foley Ashton Mulaishi Tembo, an Ex-Headmaster in Nyimba, was born on 3 November 1938 and has spent nearly all his life in Zambia's Eastern Province. Educated partly on the Copperbelt and partly in Eastern Province, he witnessed the experiences of Zambians and Mozambican refugees at the height of the liberation war in Mozambique and played a role in enforcing Zambia policy regarding southern African.

My name is Foley Ashton Mulaishi Tembo. I was born on 3rd of November 1938. [I have spent nearly] all my life within the district itself...Petauke district. This time now, a new district has been born, Nyimba district. My educational background is [as follows]: I...started my Sub-A in Mufulira at Mufulira Min[e] School, sometime about in 1945. My father was a time-keeper [at] the mine....When he retired, we came here home [i.e. Nyimba]. I continued with my education here. I got my Standard IV at Hopeman, now Hopeman High School. By then, it ran [classes] from Sub-A to Standard IV. After completing my Standard IV, I went to Msoro, now Msoro High School, where I did my Standard V, VI Lower and VI Upper. We were the last group that did [Standard] VI Lower...

I think the Zambian government made the decision [to support liberation movements] because you see, even in a family, if you don't involve your wife and children [in your undertakings] you cannot achieve anything. The two groups must be involved. What I mean here is that Zambia...could not stand and could not do anything economically [or] politically [alone]. It was going to fail. But with the help of neighbouring countries, after they ha[d] been liberated, something was going to come up [positively] economically, politically, socially and what have you. So, it's so important that a country, whatever its situation, must help...other countries. We can meet as people of [many] language. Though we differ, [our] colour is the same, and we need to communicate. Without that communication, I don't think we could achieve anything. So it's very important and, for me... I am very grateful...that Zambia did a [a] lot to help ...other countries even though those countries may turn...against us and say after all what we did is [now] over. So, we are [now] standing on our own. [But] they need to remember that they cannot stand on their own minus their neighbours...

Zambia offered to assist those countries. And it was ...assistance [that came with a lot sacrifice]. Zambia knew very well that something was going to take place. The loss of life of its own people [was inevitable]. Because Zambia had that love to liberate others so that they could also be free as us... there was loss of life, but those people were liberated. And it is up to them to think back and say this country assisted us: ["How] do we thank them for [what they did"]? This is rather a difficult question but according to my own thinking, if those countries can establish good relationships with Zambia in terms of politics, in terms of economics, in terms of social activities,

Zambia would easily forget that it had lost its prominent people during the struggle because now it would be getting some benefits. And that I think would be a very good [thing] for Zambia. [But it all] depends on the leadership of [a] country. If the leadership of [a] country...say[s], "Well, our neighbour here did this and that and that," I see no reason why we should not be moving together.

As at now, we are moving together but not to our expectation....When it comes to trade, we are getting something. Agriculturally, we are getting something, though at times we fail to produce our own food but at least we are getting...assistance. The little that that we get from them, well, it's better than having completely nothing. When it comes to peace, Zambia wants to live with its neighbours [in peace] but the question is: "How do we...consolidate our peaceful relations with our neighbours"?. You will

find that [there are] those who are rebels against their own government. These people want to make it difficult for Zambians and their own government. The government wishes to establish good relationship with Zambians but [because of rebels], this relationship does not grow. For example, Congo Dr or if we are to do down south, we have...Zimbabwe.... well, we don't have a good relationship with that country because of the struggle....Mozambique, [too]. [We are trying] but you will find that in certain parts, people are not very cooperative [because in my view], they still think that that political struggle is still on in their country...

Some of the movements that...are souring relations between Zambia and her neighbours might have felt aggrieved by the fact that the Zambian government was supporting some liberation movements to the exclusion of others. For example these movements feel that Zambia...support[ed] FRELIMO at the expense of RENAMO in Mozambique]. But you see, ...there is no man who can serve two masters at a time. It's impossible. When you understand the policies, let's say, [those relating to] FRELIMO, it had its own policies. Then COREMO had its own policies. Zambia studied the policies that were made by those two parties. Then Zambia decided ... [that] the policies that these people have and what we have here are similar, so let's support them...That annoyed [some] liberation movements that were not supported but it's impossible [to support every liberation movement]. You cannot please everybody... because, you see, there is this saying, "If you want to make for yourself more enemies, try to please everybody." Once you say I should please everybody, then you are creating more problems for yourself...

I should say...that when Mozambique was fighting for independence, [some] Zambian people living along the border... lost their lives.... That annoyed some of the Zambians because many of us did not understand what Zambia was standing for....Without neighbours, Zambia, was not going to progress as it has done. [Some] Zambians fe[lt]...that the assistance given to Mozambique [and] Angola was [wasteful], [because] when those people [became] fully liberated, they would forget all the help that Zambia gave them. In fact, even now, some of the people are saying that.... [But] in my own view, [the aid Zambia proffered to movements of independence] was not [in vain]. In fact, before independence the Portuguese in Mozambique were

very hostile against the people here. The British and Portuguese were not in good terms; they were always at loggerheads. But as at now, we are [replacing] that sour relationship that was there, bringing in something [whose] sweetness we are now tasting. Right now, legally, people are traveling to and from Mozambique... There is a free movement [of goods and people], we are benefitting. It's just difficult for us to understand or what we want is to see something tangible, [to say that]... this is what we fought for. That won't come [on a silver plate]... It is up to my own... sweat, that's when it will come. But for me to expect something for free, no! I must do something. You can't compensate individuals. You have got to say: "Alright what do we get from there?" Mozambique would say we want to establish something with Zambia. If that thing is close to the border, Zambians [in general] will get something out of that. For example, I understand that there are diamonds in Angola, and Zambians are going there; they are getting that. They don't have to come in public and say this is what I am getting. If [Angola] can [give some kind of aid to the Zambian government] [and it do[es]] so diplomatically, no problem.

At first, [when Mozambicans refugees came here, there was a [negative] attitude which the Zambians had against the[m]. Those people were less [culturally advanced] and backwards than Zambian themselves. But as time went on, some of them proved to be knowledgeable and that started changing the mindset of the Zambians, who started collaborating with them.... In the long run, there was... rapport... As a result of the presence of the refugees, Zambians [acquired certain skills] such as the [weav] ing of baskets. Mozambicans were very good at that. We complained that the bamboos that we had [here] are gone. Mozambicans were making money, but they were making money for both Zambians and them[selves]. And not only that; Zambians themselves [gained]... from the craft.

[There was no conflict at all between refugees and Zambians]. By then, the population of Nyimba wasn't as large as it is today. There was plenty [of] land, and those people were offered [the right] to carry out their agricultural activities, knowing very well that one day... they will leave for their country, after it had become liberated. I think you will agree with me [that] when you are helping somebody who is in

[a] problem, [some people] will shun [you]; others will talk [against] what you are doing. But when [you know] why you [are assisting the needy], I think that is not a problem. I wouldn't say [the Zambia[n] [government] imposed this [liberation] thing on Zambians. But the leadership in Zambia tried to enlighten the local people to say this is what we want, but some of the people, those who were already enlightened, really saw that [helping liberation movements was necessary].

Yes, there were some Zambians who complained that by shielding freedom fighters in particular, we were putting the nation's at a risk].... If I can cite one example, [such complaints became common after] Alick Nkhata was killed at Chikumbi. Off course that brought some ill feelings against the Zambian government, and many prominent people lost their lives. But here we are today, what have we done... [about] this? The thing is that we haven't established good relationship with Zimbabwe. Yes, there are

problems but what Zambia can do is to say, “My dear, why can’t you do this... so... [that] people m[ay] live in peace....”

A few traditional leaders [came to understand why Zambia was supporting the liberation cause in southern Africa through their interactions with other traditional leaders]. You know these people do communicate. Some traditional leaders supported [Zambia’s policy toward] the liberation movements. Dr Kaunda said our own freedom [would be incomplete if our brothers in neighbouring countries continued to be under the yoke of colonialism.

[As a matter of fact some chiefs] opposed [Kaunda’s policy] but a few who understood...it was supported it. [And] right now, the very [chiefs who opposed the policy are the ones] claiming. money from the government. Now they are coming in the forefront, saying “The government must give us money: this is what we did,” forgetting that [they did not support liberation fight at first]. They did not understand the policy of the government...

When I was a teacher at Nyanje, that was in 1970-71, I remember quite correctly... there was an entry point [at Shinkomo in Chief Nsanje’s area used by FRELIMO combatants to cross into Mozambique... The other entry point was at Chimazi in Chief Nyalungwe’s area...but that was used rarely. The main one was here, [at] Matonje. That was very [frequently used by the freedom fighters....

[The Zambian army based] at Matonje, used to protect the freedom fighters but warn[ed] them especially.. provoke[ing] Zambians. They [told them to live peacefully [with the local people].... At Hopeman here, there was an army camp that did the same job....Collectively, the Zambian army was protecting those people fully knowing that after they have got independence, they will be free and do whatever they liked.

It is sad to see that the OAU is gone but during those days when it was so famous, it did a great job. The leaders who met and discussed...helped those countries that were not liberated to follow the right channel...[regarding] how they could fight the imperialists....The policies of the OAU were so clear: the OAU wanted to see that Africa was free. That was one cardinal point. There was also the United Nations...the Commonwealth.... [not clear]

Zambia played a [mediatory] role of bringing [conflicting liberation] parties... together so that they could have dialogue to reach consensus. They were fighting for independence...so there was no need for them to be fighting between themselves. Independence was no going to be won because an enemy will take an advantage [of that]...and weaken [their] position and th[at] elongate their [enemy’s] stay and continuity in power....Even now, Zambia is calling for dialogue in Zimbabwe, for example....

I think Zambia made history [i.e. earned the capacity to manage conflicts not only in the region but also the rest of the world out of the fact that she played a mediatory role between factions within liberation movements] We have a [good reputation worldwide]. The little that we did [was great]....

Zulu, Alexander Grey

[Makeni Farm, Lusaka; 16 June 2007]

Mr Alexander Grey Zulu was born on 3rd September 1924. Mr Zulu's involvement in the struggle for Zambia's independence goes back to 1951 when he joined the Northern Rhodesia African National Congress. Together with Kenneth David Kaunda, Zulu left the African National Congress to form Zambia African National Congress (ZANC) then the United National Independence Party (UNIP).

Mr A. G. Zulu was appointed Parliamentary Secretary in the UNIP/ANC Coalition Government of 1962–1963. At independence in October 1964 he was appointed a full Cabinet Minister and continued to hold very high offices in the government of the Republic of Zambia until 1991.

Mr Zulu played a crucial role in the liberation struggle for Southern Africa when in 1970 he was appointed the first Cabinet Minister in charge of the Ministry of Defence, and all liberation movements in Zambia were placed under the Ministry of Defence.

Good morning, I was born on 3rd September 1924. My full names are Alexander Grey Zulu. I started learning in a primary school at Chief Mafuta's Village in Chipata, Eastern Province. From there I went for my Standard II, III and IV at Achewa Native Authority School. After completing Standard IV, I went to Madzimoyo to sit for Standard IV examinations. In 1945 I went to Munali Primary School where I did my Standard V, VIa and VIb. After that, that's when I entered Munali Secondary School. On all these standards when I moved from one school to the other they were competitive schools and one should be at the top of the few students in order for him to go to another school. In the Eastern Province, I was one of the four students selected from there to go to Munali. I reached Form II in 1950.

I left Munali in October; I tried my luck to get a job in Livingstone. It was not difficult in those days to get a job for a Standard 8 student. It was like a University degree student. Then I didn't succeed there. Then I came to Broken Hill, now Kabwe. I got a job in Water Development Office. It was the first time for the government to establish a provincial headquarters for Water Development. From there I started a truly independent life. I worked for government for some years. I should say that I started getting interested in politics even when I was at Munali. When I was free now to join politics in 1951, I joined African National Congress. Eh! When I started to participate in government actively in full, not only as a member but as an office bearer, we had our Coalition Government in 1962. I was appointed as a Parliamentary Secretary. I was posted to the Ministry of Native Affairs. Yes, I was under Mr Thomas. Mr Thomas was more or less for the short time he was like – well he used to be Provincial Commissioner at the beginning, then for a short time during the transition he acted as Chief Secretary. From there 1964 I was the first Minister of Commerce and Industry. Previously, it was a department in the Ministry of Finance. I served in many Ministries. I may not put them in their logical order as we progressed. From

there I was appointed as Minister of Lands and Cooperatives. After serving there for some time I was appointed as Minister of Power Transport and Communications. Then Minister of Home Affairs. Then Minister of Lands and what else...another function I can't remember now. From there I was Minister of Home Affairs.... Then I became Minister of Defence.

I cannot tell exactly now without reference when I became Minister of Defence. Then I became Secretary of State for Defence and Security. There I served as Chairman for a number of Ministries like Home Affairs, Defence, and Police which was under Home Affairs and Office of the President.

My last post in Government was that of Vice President. I was Vice President, I think from.....ah. Yes the first thing, that made me support liberation struggles wholeheartedly was, I said to myself, let me think for a moment, that I was a freedom fighter. That I have left my country, left my parents, left my friends and perhaps run away from my employment, and I was in Zambia. I was proceeding to other countries, either within Africa or abroad for education or military training. I don't know when I shall return to my country and if I left my family, how is my child? When I return, if I do, shall I find my wife not married? These are the ideas that made me more determined to support freedom fighters. If they were free like we are free.....That was the motivating power in supporting the freedom fighters. I tried to do my best to do everything possible in our power as a Government. Eh! As a Government, we gave them a place of refuge in this country. When the struggle was fully fledged they started receiving some military ware from various countries. But Zambia was key in this struggle because it was more or less at the gate the last country that was liberated in Africa besides those to the South of us, so we had to help them in all their needs. We made arrangements that when weapons were coming and they knew the date when they were entering Zambia they should tell us so that we can receive them ourselves. We had difficult job here before we were truly independent, in that we were able to put Zambians as commanders of the army. Then we were able to put Zambians as commanders of the army and all security ministries were fully controlled by us. Before that if weapons come on the border we sent one of our ministers of state to go and collect it up from there because it could not be interfered with by our own forces. Some of them were under the command of expatriates before we fully controlled the Defence forces. They used to ask us, look where we are moving and if we meet freedom fighters at the entry point or anywhere, what should we do with them? We said you arrest them and take them to the police, or get the weapons and send the senior man to the police after that the police will deal with him.

That is what we told white officers. And when they handed these to police we told the police that they should check the weapons property and leave the freedom fighters free. And when the Defence Force were fully Zambianised things became easy. Instead of Ministers and police to deal with these it was now in the hands of Defence Forces and of course the Office of the President as well.

To begin with when our Ministers of State collected weapons for freedom fighters at the border, they handed them over to the police, but when we were well established, we had bases or bunkers where we kept these weapons in strategic positions when they were from Tanzania. We handed them to them when they were entering the South.

At the later stage, when we got weapons from outside and the whole thing was in our hands where these storages were established was only known to those who had the need for them to know. Otherwise, arms storages they were known by a few people, even in security and Defence Forces, those who had the cause to know the places.

They were several places in strategic areas. We had some in Northern Province, we had some in Eastern Province, some in Southern Province, and we had some in Western Province. In fact, let me say, except for some urban areas. These were in border areas where it would be easy to have weapons kept there or where they could be easy to be withdrawn from there when the freedom fighters want to go into their countries for battle. And we said, if you found it difficult to break through please, return quickly and surrender the weapons to the places where you with drew them or you got them from. We established the Liberation Centre here in Lusaka which dealt with the senior people or commanders in their fighting organizations, who would talk to us. And they, in turn would talk to their people. If there was any complaint or talking to be done, we had to meet them here in Lusaka. We established an office which had a number of people who were commanding that office the one who stayed longest was Mukuka Nkoloso. His job was to receive complaints from the seniors of these freedom fighters. If there were any difficulties, they discussed with him and he reported to the authorities. If there was need to do something immediately, then Government deals with it as quickly as possible. He was popular among freedom fighters. When Mozambique had its own independence, among those people who were invited Nkoloso was specifically mentioned that they would be grateful if he was included. I had the honour to be chosen by my party to go and represent Zambia at the independence day of Mozambique.

Complaints that Liberation Movements would bring to Nkoloso included complaints like say weapons. You see we think that Government is harsh on us in that we are not allowed to keep weapons with us when we are in the country and yet our enemies colonialist come here with weapons. Sometimes they kidnap us and we are helpless. Why don't we have weapons with us, carrying them wherever we go even if we are not in the battle field?

We did not allow them to carry weapons all the time firstly: weapons were handled by the employees of colonialists and the civilians, Africans did not like weapons. They got frightened even if they had not offended anyone. They feared that they may shoot at us. That was one of the reasons. We needed to make the citizens of this country comfortable, not to be frightened of you as once they see you with a gun they will not know that this one is a freedom fighter or this one is our soldier or policeman. Both of us you and us should establish good relationship between the freedom fighter and the citizens of the country. They should not get frightened of you. This is true even in

your countries you know that it is important that you should be liked by your fellow citizens or fellow Africans wherever you may be coming from or wherever you will be. Government will need cooperation from everyone. When you are in power people will need your cooperation and they should believe and see that your concern is genuine you are not pretending. We added to say that as you know the strength of any government and organization, even freedom fighters, is in the people themselves. You are aware too that not all Zambians support freedom fighters some of them blame us as a Government that why should we be spending time and money on the problems of other countries where these freedom fighters come from. It's their own concern let them continue to fight they will get it but, we should not get involved ourselves.

I could more or less say that it was the enlightened who used to say this or perhaps let us say that the opposition would say look you are bringing problems in our country. Some people of course were bombed here and there. These said that had we not been supporting freedom fighters these people would not come and bomb or attack us in our country. On the other hand the colonialists like South Africa were warning us that wherever any country keeps a freedom fighter has invited us to come to that country. We are not attacking the citizens of that country, those should not fear they are our friends but they should not harbour these guerrillas. Wherever a country will harbour freedom fighters to the South of Sahara we shall attack.

Freedom fighters sometimes complained about general issues really. Like one time we were rationing food here and freedom fighters were affected. They were many here, some with children as well as mothers, saying we cannot get food, now it is three days, we haven't eaten. I am sure you can imagine that position in which we are with youngsters. Complaints really that touch one's heart. So at one time I went to meet the freedom fighters grouped here in Lusaka, not in town but in the periphery of Lusaka. I told them that we would do everything possible to assist you. The problems you are facing in terms of food is not only your problem, even the citizens we are rationing in urban areas. We shall do everything possible to lighten your problems. Unfortunately when I was saying that I thought that I was alone with security men, there was one pressman who published that the Minister of Defence was meeting freedom fighters and he assured them that whatever we have we shall share. That was not helpful to the Government or to me in particular. Those were some of the complaints they would bring. We were importing food. It was in urban areas that we were rationing food. We bought from different areas. It was maize mainly. After it was ground in our mills, this was mealie meal, we were sharing or rationing. We bought maize ourselves and they were getting supplies from our milling company. Actually buying it. They were buying the mealie meal, but when there was a shortage it was difficult for them to get any, unless the government helped. They couldn't even find it. It was difficult indeed. We were rationing in that we were issuing coupons to everyone even to a Zambian. For him or her to buy food for oneself he should go and produce coupons. And these freedom fighters had no coupons unless it was supplied to them. Well the International Relief Organizations came from the time

they were established here and when we already had even freedom fighter camps here. Those used to send relief supplies directly to these camps. They were supplying them with different types of foods. I must say that they helped a great deal to relieve the plight of freedom fighters. No, I think they sent them directly to the refugees. Refugee camps had their own administration which handled these things. Some of the freedom fighters, in good years, they produced themselves a lot of food and vegetables. Where they were established they always found the need to grow food for themselves. There were differences between refugee camps and freedom fighter camps. Those who were refugees were registered as refugees. We knew that they were refugees. But in these too, colonialist regimes tried to infiltrate their own persons who would come as refugees here and stay and to be fed in the camp and when need arose they would slip out and return to their respective colonial masters to tell them what the position is. They knew that they were doing a risky job but they were there. This is how they supplied information of the activities of the freedom fighters here. Oh! If they saw freedom fighter camps they would bomb them. We have good examples here: one near Lusaka, about 30 kilometres from Lusaka. What is the name? It was near Ngwerere, but it had a specific name and they were farming there. They had a good farm and could grow everything sometimes to come and sell in the city without anyone knowing that it was from a freedom fighter camp. It was ZAPU.

Freedom fighter camps were demolished, now they are not there. One of them was in Kalabo. I merely bumped into that one by accident. I was touring in 1968. Touring Western Province, I was going along the border between Zambia and Angola. I found a big tailoring camp there. It belonged to MPLA. Their job was to sew uniforms for guerrillas. And as we travelled there was a road between Zambia and Angola along the border. We moved along that road without knowing that we had our soldiers there. They had hidden themselves, they went into trenches. Fortunately we were flying a Standard. Nearby, the leader, the Commander of the company, came out trembling and asked us – Why did you not tell us that you were coming here. The soldiers were waiting for my command to fire. What has saved you is the flag. And when he was speaking you could see that he was frightened, he was panting. There was to be a tragedy. We didn't know there was a camp there. We said we were sorry. There were camps. Some of them as I say I do not know, even now, where they were. Some were depots of equipment, there was no need for me to go and know that one.

These camps were really hidden. They were hidden completely. Sometimes you could hear that in this camp the commanders put their colleague. I think I have forgotten that I am not talking to you alone! There were some stories that they dug a hole in an anthill and they put suspects there. Unfortunately one or two died there, and we had to tell them that we did not accept that one. There was only one person who could command that this one should be killed, and that is the President himself not anyone else.

The organization known as the Frontline States was established with the intention to help the freedom fighters as a team in the Mulungushi Club, A common approach in

the way to handle them. It was also a front which could work together as governments on how best to assist Freedom fighters. And in their approach to freedom fighters should be common, otherwise if 3 or 4 countries had different approaches to Freedom fighters it would create problems for Freedom fighters or a member at the meeting of this club, Mulungushi Club.

They also adopted a common approach in the fight of defending themselves. That is the governments in case the regime to the South of us decided to attack any of these countries the club should know that they had also been attacked. They should fight the enemy together and at the same time support the freedom fighters in any way they could manage as individual countries.

So for instance, Zambia as an individual country if we were attacked, firstly we shall have to fight it out ourselves. And then these countries forming the Club will inform each other that we have a problem in here. Of course they will decide individually or independently whether they should help or not. And if they help they will do it in the best interests of those two countries. Nigeria was one of the Frontline States though it was very far from the frontline of the battle. But it was prepared to assist in any way if need arose. The country so offered assistance should also accept it not that they were forced.

Some of the Zambian Security personnel went into unliberated territories. Oh. Yes. I can talk of Zambia only and I cannot talk of other countries. I know that when late Samora Machel wanted to go to Mozambique to visit his freedom fighters, some of our soldiers, few though, wanted to accompany him and see what happens there. And when these people came back they talked highly of discipline within the freedom fighter groups. Of course the Portuguese knew that Samora Machel would be entering Mozambique from that direction and when that time came they bombed a lot of villages in Mozambique. Some of them left their villages, they were running towards us going to Nyimba where we had a very big camp there of the refugees. But Machel sent his men to tell those running away that do not go to Zambia, come back. All those who wanted to go to the refugee camp turned back and returned to their villages. Zambian security personnel were not desired to go into unliberated territories.

Any Zambian who went into these territories could be arrested, particularly a soldier, it could be worse off. But once we realized that it was safer we did that. We also did a good job in Mozambique as soldiers when we had small pox. We had in fact, abolished small pox in Zambia and yet for Mozambique we feared that if we did not deal with it there and then, it may come back again. So in Mozambique we went to vaccinate people along the border with Zambia. Zambian doctors from the Zambian Army went to vaccinate Mozambicans.

Yes, on the border. We sent troops there to guard the border because the Portuguese did a lot of attacks on the border with Mozambique. So, troops were based in our country, defending Zambia to guard the border because sometimes they would come and even get cattle from Zambia. That is what forced us to send troops there to guard the border. Along the border, if there is something, treatment sometimes we do share

with friendly countries but on this occasion, they were guarding the border, not that we sent the troops to go and vaccinate them there, it was more or less a preventative measure of not allowing the disease to come here again. Some of the Mozambiquean people, you cannot know the difference between them and Zambians on the border. They speak the same language and so on. We were asked at one of our meetings by Angola that they were told that UNITA people at one stage gave maize to Zambia. That Zambia was facing shortage of food and they donated maize to Zambia. Did such a thing happen? Where did it come from? We don't know. The report that UNITA at one stage gave maize to Zambia, where did it come from to begin with? No, it didn't happen. Not to the best of my knowledge. No it is not correctSavimbi was a good orator, he created a story...No I don't know.

Angola, there were a number of liberation movements; one was operating from the Congo. Then there was UNITA and MPLA. Those did not see eye to eye with each other. We had problems to try and reconcile them here. We called the leaders to come here and let them discuss as to whether they could not find a common way in which they could work together but they did not succeed. They were giving names to each other. This one is this one, and so on...But they met here in Lusaka. They met under the Chairmanship of the late Reuben Kamanga. I think that is all I can do today. Regarding South African liberation movements; there were many South Africans here,. There were many freedom fighters here. Even Namibians they had their officers here. South African freedom fighters had their wives here, their children here and some went for training as freedom fighters and for ordinary education. These were fortunate people they were not like us. They had some links with the outside world in the field of education. As for Namibia, officers from United Nations helped them to plan how they would start developing their country and educating the people who were to man the government when they became independent. The same is true with South Africa.

Lesotho

Independent on 4 October 1966

7.3

Fighting from “the Belly of the Beast” Lesotho’s Contribution to the Liberation of South Africa

By Tefetso Henry Mothibe and Munyaradzi Mushonga

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Introduction 1

This chapter argues that, although Lesotho is landlocked and completely surrounded by, and economically dependent on, South Africa, this fact did not stop the people of Lesotho from supporting liberation movements, which fought against racial discrimination and white minority rule in southern Africa until 1994.

First, the chapter shows that from the 1950s to the 1960s, South African citizens fled into Lesotho driven by various motives and found warm welcome, not only from organised political groups, but also from individual residents and communities. It also shows that the colonial state was, however, not so welcoming as its police participated in various forms of harassment of these exiles. Second, it shows how in the 1970s and early 1980s, the government's open solidarity with southern African liberation movements and increased solidarity work by students and left-wing organisations made Lesotho an important centre for liberation movement activity. Third, it shows that, like other countries in the region which provided asylum to South African freedom fighters, Lesotho paid a heavy price. Finally, the fruits, frustrations, and disappointments that the liberation and independence of South Africa brought for Lesotho are also shown.

Relations between Lesotho and South Africa emanate from the geographical relationship of the two countries. Completely surrounded by South Africa, Lesotho has a weaker economy and is susceptible to political and other pressures and influences from South Africa. As Bardill and Cobbe have aptly observed, "Lesotho's whole society and economy, as well as its culture and politics, are dominated by the powerful influences of the country that [totally] surrounds it. In Lesotho it is difficult to find any aspect of life that is not in some way influenced by South Africa."²

Lesotho and South Africa have long-standing historical links that date back to the 1830s, when, through wars and other means, Free State Boers dispossessed Basotho of a large part of their fertile land to the west of Mohokare River. This 'conquered territory' became home to over 3 million Basotho, compared to only 1.8 million Basotho of Lesotho. Partly because of these and other links, for a long time, British colonial policy in the region was premised on the fact that Lesotho, together with the other High Commission territories of Bechuanaland and Swaziland, would eventually be incorporated into South Africa. Anticipating this incorporation, the British did little by way of economic development in Lesotho, and this led to the country becoming an impoverished labour reserve totally dependent on South Africa. While tens of thousands of Basotho entered South Africa in search of work, successive South African regimes systematically denied them rights inside South Africa, and subjected them to racial policies that were institutionalized in 1948.

(1) The Research Team in Lesotho was led by Dr Tefesto Henry Mothibe and Mr Munyaradzi Mushonga, with research assistance by Basilia Moholi.

(2) Bardill, John E. and James H. Cobbe. *Lesotho: Dilemmas of Dependence in Southern Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985: See p.166.

It is against this context that Lesotho's role in the struggle for the liberation of South Africa can be understood. In this chapter, we show how Basotho, from the time of the Union, threw their lot with the African people in resisting white domination by participating in the formation of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) in 1912; and how, in the 1960s, 1970s, and the 1980s, they provided political refuge, accommodation, financial, diplomatic, and military support, as well as educational opportunities, to South Africans fleeing apartheid oppression and repression.

Following the end of the Anglo-Boer South African War (1899-1902) through the Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902, the process of the unification of the two British colonies of the Cape and Natal, and the two Boer republics of the Orange Free State and Transvaal, was set in motion. This process led to the National Convention which met in Durban in 1908 and 1909 and discussed a 'close union' of South African provinces. These talks, which excluded Africans, culminated not only in "a remarkable process of reconciliation between Boers and Britons in South Africa,"³ but also in the release of the draft South Africa Act in 1909 and the enactment of the Union of South Africa in 1910.

These two pieces of legislation entrenched racial discrimination and the exclusion of non-Europeans from participating in the political system in South Africa. Further, Section 151 of the Schedule of the South Africa Act of 1909 provided for the incorporation of the British protectorates of Basutoland (Lesotho), Bechuanaland (Botswana), and Swaziland into a white South African Union. These two pieces of legislation also marked the beginning of the joint historic struggles of Africans within the Union and Africans from the protectorates, against a 'closer union'. These struggles were sustained throughout the white Union, until the declaration of a Republic in 1961. These struggles were led by the traditional rulers and the missionary-educated elites.

Writing in 1990, Machobane observed that:

Divided as they were individually, and generally unable to acquit themselves as they had done in the pre-colonial period as an institution, the chiefs were united against the proposal that their country be incorporated into the Union of South Africa. They feared the prospect. And they did all in their power to forestall or delay it.⁴

As soon as reports surfaced in May 1908, concerning the Union and the planned incorporation of the protectorates, Morena e Moholo Letsie II immediately convened "Lekhotla la Mahosana (Court of Princes) ... to decide on a course of action to be taken in the circumstances."⁵ Out of the deliberations of the Court of Princes, Letsie II penned a letter to the Resident Commissioner, seeking clarification regarding the reasoning for planning the union, how it was going to be effected, and the position

(3) Odendaal, Andre. *Vukani Bantu: The Beginnings of Black Protest Politics in South Africa to 1912*. Cape Town, Johannesburg: David Philip, 1984: See p.123.

(4) Machobane, L.B.B.J. *Government and Change in Lesotho, 1800-1966: A Study of Political Institutions*. London: Macmillan, 1990: See p.111.

(5) Ibid. See p.114.

of Basutoland in that scheme of things. When the response came from the High Commissioner, the chiefs were alarmed. Even though he held out some hope of safeguards for traditional rulers and their people in their respective areas within the envisaged Union of South Africa, the High Commissioner was categorical that Basutoland and other protectorates were, in fact, going to be incorporated into the planned Union.⁶

This response did not satisfy Basotho. After consultations with the National Council (a consultative body consisting largely of chiefs), Letsie II decided to send a high-powered delegation which he was to lead, with a petition to King Edward VII, to seek assurances that Basutoland would not be incorporated into the Union, and to convey the loyalty of the Basotho nation to the “great white father and protector.” As Machobane so eloquently put it, the petition was

... based as much on Basotho disdain and fear of potential Boer domination as on the suspicion that, as they had proved with the Bloemfontein Convention of 1854, the white people of South Africa, including the High Commissioner, were united in a scheme to sacrifice Basotho to their own political expediency.⁷

Although the delegation was given assurances that their fears were groundless, and that their interests would be safeguarded by the British government, Basotho traditional leaders were unable to extract the assurance that Basutoland would continue as a separate entity. This made them decide to join forces with other Africans in the Union and other protectorates to oppose this union once the new South African constitution was sanctioned by the Imperial government. Following the consummation of the South African Union, Naledi ea Lesotho told its readers that, “...What remains now for us, and for every Native organ and every freedom-loving Native to do, is to work for the consolidation of all blacks into one whole irrespective of nationality or creed, for we have seen, that ‘Union is strength.’”⁸ Basotho traditional leaders responded to this call and co-operated enthusiastically in the founding of the South African Native National Congress (SANNC) (later the African National Congress, ANC) on 8 January 1912 in Bloemfontein.

The meeting called to decide on the formation of the SANNC was an important occasion where a large number of African delegates, representing a wide cross-section of African public opinion from within and from outside the union, participated. Letsie II sent a strong delegation led by his uncle, Chief Maama, and made up of Philip Modise, personal secretary to Letsie II, Josias Modise, Philip Mochekoane, and others.⁹ Some of these men played important roles in the running of the convention and in the decisions that were taken. On the morning of 8 January 1912, the meeting

(6) CO 879/97 African (South), No. 897 Confidential, South Africa Further Correspondence (1908) relating to affairs in South Africa: Letsie L. Moshesh, Paramount Chief – Resident Commissioner, Basutoland, 12.5.1908 (Enclosure 1 in No.100), p.187.

(7) Machobane. *Government and Change in Lesotho*: See pp.115-116.

(8) Cited in *The Christian Express*. 10 January 1909.

(9) Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu*: See p.271.

was chaired by John Mocher, President of the Native Congress of the host province. When it became difficult for him to bring that large gathering to order, it was Mochekeoane who quickly brought the meeting to order, and chaired the meeting for the rest of the day. At the end of his very powerful pan-Africanist speech, Pixley ka Seme moved that “the delegates and representatives of the great native houses from every part of South Africa here assembled should form and establish the South Africa Native National Congress.”¹⁰ He was seconded by, among other traditional leaders, Chief Maama, who went on to exhort the traditional leaders to “go forth and tell their people that the South African races are one.”¹¹

The following day, the meeting which approved the constitution and elected office bearers of the Congress was chaired by another Mosotho delegate, Philip Molise.¹² When office bearers of the SANNC were elected, Letsie II, who had been accorded Honorary Vice-Presidency before the Congress convened, was elevated to an Honorary President of the Congress along with twenty-two other traditional leaders. These traditional leaders were to constitute the Upper House of the ‘Native Parliament’ of the SANNC. Their role was to advise and guide the ‘Executive Commoners’.¹³ Philip Modise was also elected one of the seven Vice-Presidents representing different regions. In closing the conference, Modise, who had taken over the chair since the second day of the conference, recalled King Moshoeshoe I’s nineteenth century diplomatic relations with Kings Shaka, Faku, and Sekhukhune and Batswana rulers. The objective was to forge a united front against imperialism. Modise noted that, although Moshoeshoe I did not live to see the achievement of their objective, the success of the convention represented a beginning. He ended on a strong note that, as delegates returned to their different homes, they should “tell their people that [while] they were identified with different tribal names and dialects just as the different trees in the woods were known by different names; some were eatable and some were not, but the delegates could safely claim that they were now trees of one and the same forest.”¹⁴

In accepting his election as Honorary President of the SANNC later at a pitso (a public meeting) held in Maseru in February 1912, Letsie II is reported to have strongly endorsed Modise’s sentiments when he told his audience that he was no longer the Paramount Chief of one particular tribe, and cautioned Basotho migrant workers on the mines to avoid tribal animosities, as all African people were now one.¹⁵ Quite clearly the SANNC organizers had succeeded in their aim to draw the modern and traditional leaders, including those in the protectorates, into a broad national alliance. The educated class would direct the organization and, with their symbolic importance and mass constituencies, the traditional leaders would provide material

(10) Walshe, P. *The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa*. London: C. Hurst, 1970: See p.35.

(11) Ibid.

(12) Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu*: p.275. Modise was also given the honour to close the conference.

(13) Ibid.

(14) *Pretoria News*. 13 January 1912.

(15) Quoted in Odendaal. *Vukani Bantu*: See p.281.

and moral support for the national movement. This came to happen in the 1950s following the victory of the National Party (NP) in the 1948 general elections and its adoption of a policy of apartheid, and the radicalization of the African National Congress (ANC) following its adoption of the Programme of Action (PA) in 1949.

From 1948 onwards, the NP's policy of apartheid which, Magubane aptly refers to as "a policy of unadulterated white supremacy" was consolidated and "represented the codification in one oppressive system of all the laws and regulations that had kept Africans as nothing but slaves and outcasts and third-class citizens in the country of their birth."¹⁶ In response, the African population, now led by its educated elite under the banner of the ANC, decided to resist. The newly adopted PA "paved the way for a new era of organized mass militant action", and sought to "achieve national freedom from white domination, and the attainment of political independence."¹⁷

Until 1939, secondary education was not available in Lesotho. Because of this, many Basotho went to South Africa to study in institutions such as Adams College, Lovedale, Ohlange Institute, and Fort Hare. These institutions were breeding grounds for greater African militancy, and students studying there became intimately involved in the ANC activities.¹⁸ Among Basotho students, an example was Ntsu Mokhehle, later to become an outstanding politician who left an indelible mark on Lesotho politics and society. He did his secondary and tertiary education at St. Matthews, in King Williamstown, and Fort Hare in the 1930s and 1940s, respectively. It was while at Fort Hare that he became a member of the ANC Youth League, and participated in the formulation of the PA and its adoption in 1949.¹⁹ The implementation of the PA required, among other things, that students and others from territories outside South Africa form 'Congress' organizations in their respective territories.²⁰ The plan was that, at some stage these congresses would all unite to fight racial and colonial oppression in South Africa and the adjacent territories.²¹

Upon his return to Basutoland, Ntsu Mokhehle, in conjunction with others,²² answered the 1949 ANC Youth League call by forming the Basutoland African Congress (BAC) in 1952. The name was changed to Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in 1959. Mokhehle was elected its first leader. Although he started off within the politics of the ANC, he himself had always subscribed to more militant Africanist and anti-communist views; thus when the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) split from

(16) Magubane, Bernard. "Introduction: the Context." *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Volume 1 (1960-1970)*. South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET). Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004: See p.30.

(17) *Ibid.*

(18) Interview with G.M. Kolisang, (Roma) 2 October 2008; Weisfelder, R.F. *Political Contention in Lesotho, 1952-1965*. Roma: ISAS, 1999: See p.4.


(19) Khaketla, B.M. *Lesotho 1970: An African Coup under the Microscope*. London: C. Hurst and Co., 1971; Mphanya, Ntsukunyane. *A Brief History of the Basutoland Congress Party*. Morija: Morija Printing Works, 2004.

(20) Interview with G.M. Kolisang, (Roma) 2 October 2008.

(21) Interviews with N. Mphanya, (Mapoteng) 2 September 2008 and G.M. Kolisang, (Roma) 2 October 2008.

(22) Many names are mentioned such as Nchocho Ntsekhe, Gani Surtie, Taolana Charles Chakela, Dr Donald Cindi, and Patrick Duncan. See Khaketla, *Lesotho 1970* and A.J. Van Wyk, *Lesotho: A Political Study*. Pretoria: Africa Institute, 1967.

the ANC in 1959, under the leadership of Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, P.K. Leballo, and others, the BCP became more closely aligned with it. Leballo was also founder member and patron of the BCP. As discussed below, the BCP worked with the PAC as the latter launched the struggle against South Africa's white minority rule from Lesotho in the early 1960s.



*Map of Lesotho*²³

The Struggle for the Liberation of South Africa, 1960–1965

Writing in the mid-1960s, Jack Halpern described Basutoland as

The paradox of the High Commission Territories: economically their ugly sister, **she is politically their Cinderella, at least to modern African eyes. Completely surrounded by South Africa, Basutoland is viewed as an island of freedom by those who oppose apartheid, and this view is shared, in varying degrees, by the Basuto themselves...**²⁴

[emphasis ours]

Halpern's characterization was accurate to the 1960s: politically, Basutoland was an 'island of freedom' for South African freedom fighters. For example, on 21 March 1960, apartheid police shot and killed 69 people and injured many more, including Basotho, in what came to be known as the Sharpeville Massacre. In the months that followed, the South African government banned the ANC and the PAC. These developments were followed by a period of sustained and brutal repression of South African people and their political organizations. One direct result of this repression

(23) Lesotho Government Online. <http://www.wikipedia.org>

(24) Halpern, Jack. *South Africa's Hostages*. London: Harmondsworth, 1965: See p.135.

was the influx of South African refugees, mostly PAC members, into neighbouring Basutoland. “Basutoland was deliberately chosen as it was ‘the nearest and most convenient’ independent location, yet still ‘within South Africa’. It was also convenient for smuggling arms and its strategic location meant that large areas of South Africa were accessible.”²⁵

Political Refuge

Immediately following the banning of the ANC and the PAC, some individuals and groups of South Africans belonging to these banned organizations fled to Lesotho. In Lesotho, many of these individuals and groups of the liberation movements who arrived at this time found warm welcome, not only from organised political groups, particularly the BCP which had begun its activities in the early 1950s, but also from local individual residents and communities. It was in Maseru where a significant presence of PAC members established themselves. They were received by the BCP, which shared strong ideological and political links with the PAC. “The BCP hired houses [for members of the PAC]. It arranged with Basotho at both Thibella and Seapoint, which are residential areas, to give them dwellings for free. For its part, the BCP bought things like beds for them, and saw to it that they were cared for and fed. As a result, they joined the BCP in large numbers.”²⁶ Joshua Mohau (Meshu) Mokitimi, a long time BCP activist, confirms that he was one of the people assigned by the BCP to welcome and seek accommodation for PAC exiles.²⁷ Gabriel Mphakalasi, also known as Santamela, a PAC member who arrived in Lesotho in 1963 as a refugee, reveals that when he sought political asylum, the colonial government refused on grounds that he did not have any visible means of support. He only got asylum when the BCP intervened and assured the authorities that it would look after him. The BCP further facilitated the refugees’ registration with local and international humanitarian organizations, including the Christian Council of Lesotho (CCL) and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). This registration enabled the refugees to receive monthly stipends from these and other sources.²⁸

Joel Moteki, Arnold Sekamane, and Sidwell Thakalekoala, staunch BCP members who resided at Seapoint, provided accommodation to almost all PAC exiles. Their homes are still regarded by many BCP members as the home of the first PAC exiles.²⁹ Mrs M’athabo Nts’inyi (born Sekamane) vividly remembers that her father and Thakalekoala provided accommodation for PAC refugees in their own homes and in houses they had built for renting. She goes on to mention that one of Thakalekoala’s houses came to be known as ‘Maphekeng’ (PAC house) because it accommodated

(25) Maaba, Brown Bavusile. “The PAC’s War against the State, 1960-1963.” *The Road to Democracy in South Africa, Vol. 1., 1960-1970*. SADET. Cape Town: Zebra Press, 2004: See p.286.

(26) Mphanya. *A Brief History*: See p.47.

(27) Interview with Joshua Mohau Meshu Mokitimi, (Maseru) 23 January 2008.

(28) Interview with Gabriel Mphakalasi (Santamela), (Maseru) 14 February 2008.

(29) Interviews with M’athabo Nts’inyi (née Sekamane), (Maseru) 10 September 2008, and Ntsukunyane Mphanya, (Mapoteng) 2 September 2008.

only PAC members.³⁰ Her description of the PAC house is corroborated by the police intelligence reports which refer to “the boarding house owned by Thakalekoala [which] has been turned by PAC refugees into barracks housing about 40 male ‘refugees’.”³¹

Residents of other Maseru locations of Thibella and Motimpos also accommodated PAC refugees on the basis of their understanding, however limited, of the relationships between the PAC and BCP.³² The network of relatives of Leballo, a native of Lesotho, also helped to provide temporary accommodation to members of the PAC.³³ The BCP leadership, out of funds sourced from Nkrumah in Ghana and Nasser in Egypt, built a two-room house on Mr Pharoë’s site at Matsoatlareng in Maseru for PAC members.³⁴ As the number of PAC exiles grew in Maseru, accommodation became a serious problem. As a result, some groups of newcomers were accommodated in temporary shelters in the backyards of houses of BCP members, while others spread to other towns and villages of Basutoland, for example, to areas such as Mafeteng and Botha-Bothe.³⁵

As the PAC exile community expanded, the colonial security apparatus experienced serious problems monitoring them. Refugees were closely watched, regularly followed, searched, and arrested by Basutoland Mounted Police and its Special Branch, either on the grounds of entering the country without the necessary documents, or mere suspicion of pursuing a political agenda not acceptable to the government of the day.³⁶ Basutoland-based PAC leadership, such as Z.B. Molete, T.M. Ntantala, M. Gqobose, and E. Mfafa, also experienced periods of imprisonment under the Entry and Residence and the Prevention of Violence Abroad Proclamations, which forbade entering Basutoland illegally.³⁷ They were required to report to the nearest police stations on a daily basis. The PAC publication, *The Africanist*, summarized the situation as follows:

PAC freedom fighters escape from Voster’s banishment, arrests, detention and imprisonment in the Republic of South Africa only to suffer the same persecution in Basutoland. The colonial Basutoland government, not satisfied by the nefarious collaboration that exists between itself and Voster’s Gestapo police, has decided to try out some of Voster’s outrageous inhuman practices on PAC freedom fighters in this territory. Without giving any reasons and without any cause and/or justification for such an act, the Basutoland government has restricted PAC members to the magisterial district of Maseru and has asked them to report to the police regularly. The penalty for the violation of these orders is the withdrawal of the permit to be in Basutoland...³⁸

(30) Interview with M’athabo Nts’inyi, (Maseru) 10 September 2008.

(31) *Monthly Intelligence Review*. October 1964.

(32) Interview with N. Mphanya, (Mapoteng) 2 September 2008.

(33) Interviews with N. Mphanya, (Mapoteng) 2 September 2008, and G.M. Kolisang, (Roma) 2 October 2008.

(34) Interview with G.M. Kolisang, (Roma) 2 October 2008.

(35) Interview with G.M. Kolisang, (Roma) 2 October 2008.

(36) *Monthly Intelligence Review*. November 1962.

(37) *Ibid.*

(38) *The Africanist*. Maseru: April 1965: p.11.

The colonial state also took interest in these South African exiles and participated in a number of deportation attempts during the 1960s. These were either at the behest of the apartheid regime or initiated by the Basutoland colonial government itself against individuals it suspected of activities inimical to law and order. Under such circumstances, political activity was difficult, but not impossible, as indicated below.

Political and Military Activities

The first activity was to reconstitute the PAC as a liberation movement in Maseru. There it established its headquarters in 1962 until the end of 1963 when they were moved to Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika (now Tanzania).³⁹ The office was officially opened in Bonhomme House,⁴⁰ the headquarters of the BCP, by P.K. Leballo, following his release from imprisonment in South Africa. He took over from Z.B. Molete, who had been acting President of the exiled PAC. Molete had been appointed by Sobukwe in September 1960 to act as President whilst the rest of the leadership was in jail, while Joe Molefi was appointed acting Treasurer at the same time. Both served in these positions until August 1962.⁴¹

The second activity was to enhance its close links with the BCP with whom it shared a strong ideology of Pan-Africanism. The two organizations actively helped and assisted one another in a variety of ways. Apart from providing accommodation and sharing its office facilities in Bonhomme House, the BCP also assisted the PAC with transport and finances. A BCP Land Rover, with the party identification removed, was placed at the disposal of the PAC.⁴² Shakhane Mokhehle was reported to be the channel for PAC funds from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).⁴³ Prominent members of the BCP, including at least one Member of Parliament (MP), are known to have sheltered N. Pokela and P. Gqobose of the PAC when warrants for their arrest had been issued in 1965.⁴⁴ On the other hand, Leballo was a frequent speaker on BCP platforms, PAC refugees openly assisted the BCP with political campaigning for the Lesotho general and by-elections of 1965, and one PAC member was fatally wounded at Rothe in October 1964.⁴⁵

(39) Lodge, T. "Revolutionary Exile Politics, 1960-1975." Black Politics in South Africa since 1945. Ed. T. Lodge. Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1983: pp.295-369; Karis, T.M. and G.M. Gerhart, eds. *From Protest to Challenge*, Vol. 5. Hoover Institution Publishing, 1973.

(40) Named after Joseph Cyprien Bonhomme, a Canadian born Catholic Bishop, who became the second bishop to be appointed to Basutoland, 1933 to 1947.

(41) *Monthly Intelligence Review*. September 1962.

(42) *Monthly Intelligence Review*. 1964.

(43) Ibid. N. Mphanya and G.M. Kolisang also recalled in our interviews that whenever they travelled to friendly African countries on BCP official business, they always brought back funds donated to help the PAC.

(44) Interview with G.M. Kolisang, (Roma) 2 October 2008.

(45) This violent confrontation occurred at Rothe when Chief Mohlalefi Bereng, Principal Chief of that ward known for his strong sympathies with the Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP), refused to grant permission to the BCP to hold a political rally in his ward. On the appointed day, Chief Bereng sent armed retainers to intercept the BCP convoy of buses, Land Rovers, and cars and (or) prevent them from proceeding to Rothe to the site of a political rally. After failing to stop them, Chief Bereng's men opened fire, causing the deaths of four passengers, including three BCP members and one PAC refugee. Interview with M. Bereng, 20 February 2008.

The third activity was to implement what was decided at the first PAC consultative conference, which was held in Maseru in September 1961. It was understandably a time of anger and great emotions, coming only six months after the murder of Africans from South Africa and Lesotho by apartheid police at Sharpeville. In this atmosphere, Ntsu Mokhehle is reported to have opened the conference by placing a gun in front of him, and requesting all assembled PAC members to talk about nothing else but the armed struggle.⁴⁶ It is further reported that it was at this conference that a decision was taken that members of the PAC should receive basic military training.⁴⁷ This took place in different parts of Lesotho, and was coordinated by P. Gqobose, a veteran of World War II, assisted by T.M. Ntantala, who later played a pivotal role in the formation of the PAC's armed wing, the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA).⁴⁸ These underground operations took place at Mohlabane and Sequbung in the Quthing District and at Mapoteng in Berea District, respectively.⁴⁹ Patrick Duncan, one of the few whites who threw in their lot with the struggle for freedom by joining the PAC, owned two stores in remote parts of Quthing; the stores could only be reached by pack animals. These were actually used as training bases for the PAC.⁵⁰ This use was confirmed by what the police found when they carried out extensive searches of these premises: "...a quantity of ingredients for the manufacture of explosives and a number of metal containers were found...where it was suspected that a PAC [military] training school had been established."⁵¹ A month later, the police reported that they had recovered "70 lbs of dynamite, 40 lbs of gelignite and a quantity of detonators ... The discovery tends to confirm reports that PAC trainees in the area had been undergoing instruction in the use of explosives."⁵²

During December 1961, the police briefly detained 10 members of the PAC in the Mapoteng area. They were for the most part clad in a uniform of blue boiler suits, veldskoens, and had identical blankets and greatcoats. "They were undergoing some form of physical training, presumably under the direction of Gasson (sic) Ndlovu, who was arrested in the same area a few days later..."⁵³ Earlier in the month, the police came into possession of a suitcase containing PAC documents. The suitcase was being carried late at night by a party of three men who, on encountering a police patrol in Maseru, fled, abandoning the suitcase. Some of the documents implicated leading members of the PAC in conspiracies to commit acts of violence in South Africa.⁵⁴ As a result, T.T. Letlaka, E. Mfafa, and V.K. Hlabisa, all members of the PAC

(46) Maaba. *The PAC's War*. See p.258.

(47) Maaba. *The PAC's War*. See p.286.

(48) Ibid.

(49) *Monthly Intelligence Review*. May 1963.

(50) Interview with D. Ambrose, (Roma) 12 November 2007. This story is corroborated by *Monthly Intelligence Review*. May 1963.

(51) *Monthly Intelligence Review*. November 1962/3.

(52) Ibid. December 1962.

(53) *Monthly Intelligence Review*. December 1962.

(54) *Monthly Intelligence Review*. December 1962.

Revolutionary Council, together with five other members, were arrested, tried, and convicted. They were, however, subsequently acquitted on appeal.⁵⁵

Maseru was also a beehive of other PAC activity. Leading members of the PAC who had been granted residence in Basutoland planned military operations against the Republic. The police reported that PAC refugees held secret meetings with leading PAC members from the Republic, “and there are unconfirmed reports that sabotage operations in the Republic are being planned here.”⁵⁶ Leballo was also reported to be holding secret meetings every weekend in Maseru, and that these were attended by twenty to thirty ‘visitors’ from the Republic of South Africa.⁵⁷

As a result of this increased activity, the police obtained a warrant to search PAC offices and two private houses in Maseru. A quantity of documents was seized. From these documents, it was apparent that experiments and training in the use of explosives had been undertaken at the Lesotho campus of the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland. Visits of PAC branch leaders from the Republic to Maseru for instruction in sabotage and organizational matters were confirmed. Although no arms or ammunition were found, sketch maps showing the locations of arms caches in the Republic were discovered.⁵⁸ In spite of the hardships that the PAC experienced, structures which were to lay the foundations of a fully operational exile liberation movement were set up in Maseru.

Other exiles who were given refuge in Lesotho belonged to the South African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC. Like PAC refugees, they had come into the country following the banning of their organizations, and attempts by the South African police to arrest them. The most prominent were Joe Mathews, John Motloheloa, Robert Matji, Jack Mosiane, and Mrs Elizabeth Mafekeng. Most of them joined the BCP “and contributed significantly to the development of the party before some of them were expelled from the party in the mid-1960s.”⁵⁹ They were instrumental in the formation of the Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL) in 1961. The CPL’s Programme, launched in 1962, demanded every Communist Party member to actively participate in the struggle for liberation of South Africa, in accordance with objectives outlined in the Freedom Charter. As one interviewee who was also a member of the CPL explained, Lesotho could not be free until South Africa was free.⁶⁰ The formation of the Communist Party in Lesotho, and its solidarity work, emanated from the founders’ recognition that Lesotho’s stability could only be realized in a liberated and democratic South Africa.⁶¹

(55) Ibid.

(56) Ibid.

(57) Ibid.

(58) Ibid. May 1963.

(59) Mphanya. *A History*: See p.32.

(60) Interview with Vuyani Tyhali, (Maseru) 22 February 2008.

(61) Interview with M. Kena, (Maseru) 10 October 2008.

Educational Refuge

Apart from political exiles, there were many educational refugees, especially secondary and high school students, who attended missionary-owned and led schools in the three High Commission Territories. One of these students, Professor Mbulelo Mzamane, who went to Swaziland for his high school education, explains that parents who sent their children to Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland were escaping “an iniquitous system of Bantu Education which was ...designed to arrest the intellectual development of African children and eventually make them ‘hewers of wood and drawers of water’.”⁶² He notes that “The BLS countries had the finest schools then, mostly missionary schools that were household names in South Africa.” In Lesotho, these included Basutoland, later Lesotho, Peka, St. Agnes, St. Mary’s, and St. Stephens high schools.⁶³ He concludes with a strong assertion that “Educators in these various schools were highly motivated and competent; through- put rates were high; and the schools offered students solid foundations for higher education.”⁶⁴ Tseliso Makhakhe, Principal of Peka High School in the early 1960s, recalls that at his school at least a quarter of his students were South African, while at least six of his teachers were South African.⁶⁵ Raditapole recalls that when an Anglican Church school at Modderport (South Africa) closed its doors in protest against apartheid, students from that school were “airlifted” to the Anglican school of St. Agnes Secondary in Teyateyaneng, Lesotho.⁶⁶

When students completed secondary education from these schools, they were, according to Mzamane, university material and well-grounded in the three Rs.⁶⁷ Some students left for overseas universities, while most of them were accommodated at the Piux XII University College, founded in 1945 and located in Roma, Lesotho. Piux XII represented, during the 1950s and 1960s, just like the university’s successors

– the University of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and Swaziland (UBBS) from 1964, the University of Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (UBLS) from 1966, and the National University of Lesotho (NUL) from 1975 – an alternative to the discriminatory educational system in South Africa, and enrolled most South African and southern African blacks.⁶⁸

The Piux XII University College was founded by the Catholic Hierarchy of Southern Africa in 1945, to cater mainly for the educational needs of “non-white Catholics.”⁶⁹ However, the college quickly became a non-racial training ground for people of various religious persuasions from all over southern Africa and countries as far away

(62) Mzamane, V.Mbulelo. “Revisioning Roma: African Studies the sine qua non for African Development.” Alumni Homecoming: Keynote Address. Roma, Lesotho: National Univ. of Lesotho, 26 October 2007: See p.1.

(63) Ibid. See p.2.

(64) Ibid.

(65) Interview with Tseliso Makhakhe, (Maseru) 18 December 2007.

(66) Interview with K. Raditapole (MP), (Teyateyaneng) 20 February 2008.

(67) Mzamane. “Revisioning Roma.” See p.2.

(68) Interviews with Dr M Mokete, (Maseru) 11 December 2007, and M. Nt’sinyi, (Maseru) 10 September 2008.

(69) Guilbeaut, Rev. Fr. R., O.M.I. “Higher Education in Africa South of the Sahara and the Role of the University College of Piux XII.” 1958 Annual Report. See p.14.

as Uganda. From its founding, until it was succeeded by UBBS and UBLS, Piux XII admitted more “non-white Catholics” from outside Lesotho than those from inside the country. In 1958, for example, out of a student body of 114, only 15 were Basotho, while 87 were southern African, and 12 were white.⁷⁰ This practice was repeated by UBBS and UBLS. The South African liberal press hailed it as “the answer to academic apartheid” and “an important experiment in internationalism,”⁷¹ while, according to Mzamane, “Roma was a SADC institution before there was SADC; its alumni were, in fact, important exponents of the SADC concept with which they felt at one.”⁷²

As a result of the role played by Piux XII, UBBS, and UBLS in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, South Africa and southern Africa gained a considerable proportion of its post-colonial African leadership in the economy, in education, and in politics. To be sure, graduates of Piux XII, UBBS, and UBLS came to play significant roles in the evolution of nationalist politics and post-independence governments in Malawi, Zambia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Bernard Chidzero and John Tembo of Zimbabwe and Malawi are examples. The quality of education and campus discourse was very much enriched by the presence of a student body drawn from many countries and perspectives. In education, the tradition went back to the 1930s and 1940s, a period when Lesotho’s major, but largely unrecognized, export to South Africa was educators of the calibre of the Khaketlas, Lebentles, Manyelis, Mokhehles, Moeletsis.⁷³

The Struggle for the Liberation of South Africa, 1966-1970

Excitement about independence in Lesotho in 1966 was uncontrollable right throughout the country. Despite reservations about leadership, everybody was excited and happy that they were going to be in charge of their own affairs, whatever that meant. The primary benefit of independence was the self-determination of Basotho. R.P. Matete speaks for all those interviewed when he says, “...after independence we took matters into our own hands. We championed development in the way we felt was best for us, according to our needs and not according to the prescriptions of foreign powers.”⁷⁴ Others pointed out that the independence of Lesotho was an important benefit not only to the Basotho, but also to other African countries, and in particular to South Africa.⁷⁵

The challenges of independence were, however, just too many. As Britain had done very little to develop Lesotho economically, the first challenge concerned the

(70) Ibid. Specifically: 28 came from the Central African Federation, 5 from two High Commission Territories, and 54 from the four provinces of South Africa.

(71) *Contact*. 18 October 1958: p.6.

(72) Mzamane. “Revisioning Roma.” See p.2.

(73) Ibid.

(74) Interview with R.P. Matete (MP), (Moriya) 19 December 2007.

(75) Interview with L. Rakuoane, (Maseru) 3 January 2008.

country's economy. Lesotho was heavily underdeveloped and greatly dependent on South Africa. The question was, therefore, how to survive economically, and how to relate with South Africa politically. The major challenge was that of asserting "our status as an independent country", given that Lesotho was an enclave within South Africa. The rulers of South Africa were bent on stifling Lesotho's development as an independent state. They wanted to integrate Lesotho into the Bantustan system; therefore "we were always faced with the challenge to resist being integrated into the Bantustan system and to be part of South Africa. This created a lot of problems because our independence was a form of encouragement to the oppressed people of South Africa."⁷⁶

The second, and equally important, challenge was political. The Basotho National Party (BNP) won a narrow majority of 31 seats to 29 seats of the combined opposition of the BCP and Marema-Tlou Freedom Party (MFP) in the 1965 pre-independence elections. The third and also equally important challenge was the threat posed by King Moshoeshoe II, who was clearly dissatisfied with the role accorded him by the constitution. After independence, he aligned himself with the opposition. The fourth was the relationship between Lesotho and South Africa. The apartheid regime had established direct links with the BNP such that during the pre-independence elections campaigns it provided the BNP with campaign funds and use of a helicopter; Chief Leabua Jonathan of the BNP was, in fact, the only party leader permitted to campaign among Basotho miners in South Africa; and the apartheid regime sent 100,000 bags of grain as famine relief – not to the Lesotho government, but to Jonathan to distribute in person.⁷⁷

Consequently, when the BNP narrowly won the 1965 pre-independence elections, it turned to Pretoria for development assistance. This is what the party had promised in its pre-independence elections manifesto, which, among other things, said that it was "in the interests of the people" to co-operate with South Africa. The above challenges notwithstanding, the BNP-led government, while cognizant of its vulnerability to apartheid South Africa, continued to accommodate South African refugees.

The first five years of independence were the most difficult for the BNP government, which at that time had only one graduate and an inexperienced cabinet.⁷⁸ In the immediate post-independence period, the BNP-led government tended to emphasise Lesotho's political and economic weakness vis-à-vis South Africa, and, because of that, the necessity for a policy of good neighbourliness between the two countries. In the BNP government, Lesotho had, in the words of J.E. Spence, "a moderate, conservative

(76) Interview with R.P. Matete, (Morija) 19 December 2007.

(77) Interviews with N. Mphanya, (Mapoteng) 2 September 2008, and G.M. Kolisang, (Roma) 2 October 2008; Leistner, G.M.E. "Lesotho and South Africa." *African Institute of South Africa Bulletin* 23.16, Pretoria (20 September 1983).

(78) Interview with M. Mashologu, (Maseru) 24 January 2008. M. Mashologu is the first Vice Chancellor of the National University of Lesotho, a former top civil servant and diplomat.

government committed to co-existence with South Africa.”⁷⁹ In answering its local and overseas critics, the BNP government pointed out that Lesotho was a small country entirely surrounded by and economically dependent on South Africa, and that, as much as it detested racial discrimination, it had to be realistic.⁸⁰ Matete explains this situation in more detail as follows:

You can choose your friends, but you cannot choose your neighbours. So we had to find a way of accommodating them, but unfortunately people who were in other countries, especially African countries, were not appreciating our situation. They thought that our type of accommodation amounted to toeing to the dictates of the Boers, especially if you take, for example, our desire to maintain dialogue with Pretoria. People were thinking that we were selling out, but this was the only way we could live with those people, while at the same time supporting the liberation movement. So we had a dual role, seeking accommodation with South Africa, while at the same time championing the course of liberation.”⁸¹

Matete’s explanation echoes in many respects the address made by Prime Minister Jonathan on 25 September 1967 to the UN General Assembly. In his speech, Jonathan urged the international community to be understanding and sympathetic to Lesotho’s geographical, historical, and economic position vis-à-vis apartheid South Africa. This, he continued, did not absolve the Lesotho government of its responsibility to condemn the racial discrimination practiced by the apartheid regime in South Africa. One effect of the accommodation of South Africa by Jonathan’s government was that the Lesotho government was lukewarm towards members of the South African liberation movements. However, South African exiles continued to be allowed into the country. In Lesotho, they were not regarded as fugitives, but rather as part of Basotho. They attended schools and worked without work permits. As one of them told us: “...all refugees who entered into Lesotho were accepted and given political asylum without much trappings and restrictions, you became a Mosotho...”⁸² There were two restrictions, however, for those refugees who chose to remain in Lesotho. First, they were not allowed to participate in any anti-South African political activity while in Lesotho. Second, they were prohibited from interfering in the politics of Lesotho.⁸³

Those who chose to take an active interest in the politics of Lesotho, such as Leballo, who also embarked on an anti-Jonathan campaign overseas and addressed BCP rallies attacking Jonathan’s government, were offered an option of leaving Lesotho, instead of being handed over to the apartheid regime. Jonathan “was honour-bound

(79) Spence, J.E. *The Strategic Significance of South Africa*. London: Royal United Service Institution, 1970: See p.33.

(80) Sixishe, D.T. “*But Give Him an Army Too*” – *Leabua Jonathan: A Biography*. Maseru: Mokorotlo Publications, 1984: See pp.54-61.

(81) Interview with R.P. Matete, (Moriya) 19 December 2007.

(82) Interview with G. Mphakalasi, (Maseru) 14 February 2008.

(83) Sixishe. *But Give Him an Army*: See p.60.

to provide asylum in terms of the UN convention that precluded the host country from returning political refugees to their country of origin.”⁸⁴

The Struggle for the Liberation of South Africa, 1970-1986

Many political developments took place during the 1970s, and one major consequence of this was that the government began to take a strong pro-liberation movements stance. This position was manifested by welcoming and accommodating many South African exiles, especially the youth who fled into the country following the 1976 Soweto uprising. Internally, this stance encouraged left-wing political formations allied to the banned Communist Party of Lesotho (CPL), which had for a long time conducted their solidarity work semi-clandestinely, to ally themselves openly and more vigorously.

Because of the government’s open solidarity with the South African liberation movements and increased solidarity work by student and left-wing organisations, Lesotho became an important centre for a lot of activity by liberation movements; many activists and recruits to liberation movements’ armed wings passed through Lesotho on their way to countries where liberation movements had military training camps, and it is also probable some military incursions into South Africa were launched from Lesotho.

In 1970, the BNP lost the first post-independence general election to the opposition BCP, but Jonathan refused to hand over power. Instead, he declared a state of emergency, suspended the constitution, and arrested and detained the BCP leadership without trial. He later tricked Mokhehle and other opposition leaders into signing a document through which they accepted that the 1970 elections had not been free and fair, and that they should be annulled and fresh elections held.

Following his unconstitutional seizure of power in 1970, Jonathan recognized that he had lost touch with grass-root sentiment in Lesotho, and he switched policies. The change was dramatic. In 1966 and 1967, Jonathan had met with apartheid South African Prime Ministers Verwoerd and Vorster, and had lectured African leaders and the (OAU) on the importance of talking to the Pretoria regime. However, within a few years, he suddenly began speaking out against apartheid, warning Pretoria of the dangers of violent change. In 1972, at the United Nations General Assembly annual meeting, Lesotho switched from a good-neighbourliness foreign policy to open hostility to South Africa. Jonathan appealed to the Ivory Coast and other states considering closer links with Pretoria not to take any action. For example, in 1972, he dispatched an envoy, Dr Sephomolo, to the Ivory Coast, appealing successfully to Ivoirians not to visit Pretoria.⁸⁵ Jonathan further began to appeal for international aid to help Lesotho to reduce dependence on South Africa.

(84) Ibid. p.61.

(85) Ibid. See p.67.

Why this sudden change on the part of the Jonathan regime? First, the cordial relations that existed between Lesotho and South Africa from 1966 to 1970 brought little economic gain to Lesotho, but a great deal of political resentment for Jonathan's government among Basotho. Although Lesotho had filled almost all senior technocratic positions in government with white South Africans, the apartheid regime failed to provide Lesotho with the much needed financial assistance to address some of the glaring underdevelopment legacies of British colonial rule. It was Banda's Malawi, a close friend of the apartheid regime as was Lesotho, which benefited from this friendship: South Africa extended financial assistance to Banda's government.⁸⁶ In 1968, eighty-three white South Africans, including four magistrates, a chief electoral officer, and a senior information officer, were employed by the Lesotho government. In 1969, the Chief Justice, the Judges of the Appeal Court, the Attorney-General, and the Commissioner for Trade and Industry were all white South Africans employed by the Lesotho government. Further, there was co-operation between the security forces of the two countries, as well as an extension of South Africa's assistance in the form of riot equipment to the Lesotho police.⁸⁷ This situation was greatly resented by Basotho whose nationalism was mixed with a hefty dose of anti-Boer feeling as a result of the nineteenth century Basotho land dispossession by the Boers, as well as the twentieth century firsthand experience of naked apartheid by Basotho who worked in the mines and other industries.

Second, at the end of 1971, the apartheid government devalued the Rand and suspended foreign currency transactions without consulting the Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland governments, its equal partners in the Rand Monetary Area.⁸⁸ This unilateral decision was contrary to formal institutional links that the three countries had concerning the Rand Monetary Authority which involved institutionalized consultation mechanisms, in the form of commissions and committees that met at regular intervals. Failure to observe them by South Africa meant that Lesotho ended up with an exchange rate that was far from economically optimal. It was also politically offensive to an independent and sovereign Lesotho to be treated as such by South Africa.

Third, in 1972 there was a bungled coup attempt against Jonathan, most probably hatched and planned by South Africa. This coup attempt was coordinated, according to Sixishe, by Fred Roach, a Briton in the pay of the South African security service seconded to Lesotho as Commander of the paramilitary Police Mobile Unit (PMU).⁸⁹ The plot was discovered and Jonathan expelled the South Africans. Sixishe also attributes the breakdown in relations between Pretoria and Maseru to two other

(86) Leistner, G.M.E. "South Africa's Development Aid to African States." *Africa Institute Occasional Papers* 28, Pretoria (1970).

(87) Khaketla, M. *Lesotho 1970*: See pp.120-121; Interviews with M. Molapo, (Maputsoe) 2 September 2008, and N. Mphanya, (Mapoteng) 2 October 2008.

(88) Stiff, Peter. *The Silent War: South African Recce Operations, 1969-1994*. Rpt. South Africa: Galago Publishing, 2006: See p.408.

(89) Sixishe. *But Give Him an Army*: See p.92.

incidents: namely, Pretoria's snub of Maseru's diplomatic attempts to urge South Africa to accept "...the Lusaka Manifesto as a basis on which dialogue for positive change in South Africa could be initiated," and a strengthened surveillance of Lesotho by South Africa through increased recruitment of political refugees and some Basotho as Pretoria's agents in Lesotho.⁹⁰

Increasingly becoming unpopular for supporting a regime that had shown more ingratitude than appreciation, Jonathan responded by taking advantage of Cold War politics, and adopted what is commonly referred to as a progressive foreign policy. Elements of this policy included the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of Korea, the People's Republic of China, Cuba, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and other East European countries, as well as a vociferous anti-apartheid stance and the acceptance of refugees fleeing South Africa. The Lesotho government refused to recognize the so-called 'independent' Bantustans, made more assertive demands for the return of the Conquered Territories lost to the Free State in the 1860s, gave more forthright support for the southern African liberation movements, and provided hospitality for South Africans and particularly ANC refugees.

There were a number of incidents which further increased tensions. The apartheid regime blocked the development of several industries in Lesotho under the Customs Union Agreement.⁹¹ South African refugees were occasionally kidnapped from Lesotho by apartheid agents, while several Basotho mineworkers were shot and killed during a strike, and others detained. Advocate Sookanan is therefore correct to observe that by 1974, there "was sufficient polarisation between Lesotho and South Africa and that opened opportunities for ANC to establish bases in Lesotho."⁹²

Lesotho's contribution in this period can best be seen in the government's provision of sanctuary, education, and training opportunities, as well as of advocacy, diplomatic, financial, moral, and military support to refugees fleeing apartheid. There was also strong support to the liberation struggle by many non-state actors, as delineated in the sections that follow.

Sanctuary

South African liberation movements carried out their own struggle for freedom, in part, on the basis of their exiled members being hosted in countries in the sub-region, where they were accommodated and resourced. Despite its size and geographical location, Lesotho is one of the countries that played a key role in the liberation of South Africa. The 1970s, more than the 1960s, saw a large outflow of refugees fleeing a regime which was under a lot of pressure internally and externally. The government of Lesotho estimated that the total refugee population in Lesotho numbered around

(90) Ibid.

(91) Interview with B. Monyake, (Maseru) 2 February 2008.

(92) Interview with Advocate Sookanan, (Maseru) 2 December 2007.

20,000 in the late 1970s and early 1980s.⁹³ Just as in the 1950s and 1960s, most of these refugees were crossing into Lesotho where they were warmly welcomed and accommodated by Basotho.

This time they were accommodated in different areas of Maseru – Lithoteng, Borokhoaneng, Upper Thamae, Hoohlo, Maseru East – where they rented houses, flats, and rooms. When asked why they accommodated these refugees in their homes, almost all of those interviewed referred to the sympathy and affinity that they felt for the liberation of South Africa. Not all of the interviewees were educated, and only some of them had a history of local political activism or affiliation. The Rev. Jobo Nkhethoa, a Seventh Day Adventist Church minister, for example, accommodated the Mavimbela couple from the Transkei in his house next to the Lesotho College of Education (LCE, formerly National Teacher Training College, NTTC). He explains that he deeply sympathised with the cause pursued by South African freedom fighters because of his experiences of apartheid as a church minister in the Transkei in the late 1960s and early 1970s.⁹⁴

According to Vincent Malebo, Basotho not only hosted South African refugees, but they also protected them with their bodies. Unlike countries such as Botswana, Tanzania, and others, Lesotho did not build refugee camps. Thus South Africans were never put in refugee camps. Instead, all refugees were made part and parcel of the Basotho community, and accommodated in the homes of different Basotho families, making it impossible to tell who was a refugee and who was not.⁹⁵ According to several informants, Lesotho chose not to build refugee camps because this would have been disastrous in the sense that refugees would have been massacred in large numbers.

In some cases, the Lesotho government applied, through the UNHCR, for the transfer of South African refugees to safer locales such as Zambia, far away from easy attack by the apartheid regime.⁹⁶ The Ministry of Home Affairs, then the Ministry of the Interior, directly dealt with residence issues for refugees from South Africa, as well as their movement across the borders.

Lesotho became a processing station through which South African refugees could be sent to Mozambique, Zambia, or Tanzania.⁹⁷ Not only did these countries host South African refugees, but they also hosted refugees from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola. In Lesotho, each South African refugee received a monthly allowance from the UNHCR through the Ministry of the Interior. The UNHCR funded a centre in Maseru for the purposes of processing refugees, building houses, and providing scholarships, among other services.

(93) Cabinet Refugees File No. CA/UN/2/Vol.1.

(94) Interview with Rev. Jobo Nkhethoa, (Maseru) 7 February 2008.

(95) Interview with K. Raditapole, (Teyateyaneng) 20 February 2008.

(96) Interviews with V. Malebo, (Maseru) 8 December 2008, and Rtd. Major-General Justin Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(97) Interviews with V. Malebo, (Maseru) 8 December 2008; D. Ambrose, (Roma) 12 November 2007; and T. Makeka, (Maseru) 10 January 2008.

Higher Education and Training, and the CASSAS

On the education front, the trend begun by Piux XII, UBBS, and UBLS continued with the coming into being of the National University of Lesotho (NUL) in 1975. Throughout the 1970s to the 1980s, the university continued to offer opportunities for higher education to many South Africans, Namibians, Zimbabweans in particular, and Africans in general. At the only university in Roma, the Lesotho government set aside 25% of scholarships for South African refugees.⁹⁸ Mothusi Mashologu, NUL's first Vice Chancellor, happened to be at the university at the time of the Soweto student uprisings of 1976. After the uprising, thousands of young activists fled to Lesotho. As the VC, Mashologu found himself "participating in the extension of assistance to these students, and the assistance took many forms. Senate and Council agreed that up to 20% of the student enrolment at Roma should be from South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia..."⁹⁹ The university also received external assistance from organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World University Service (WUS), among others, for students from the southern African region in the form of scholarships.

After students from Botswana and Swaziland had left, the campus had about 600 students; about 120 of these were South African students. All these students needed to be accommodated. Consequently other African governments assisted with funds for the upgrading of accommodation facilities. For instance, the Canadian, Danish, and Nigerian governments donated funds for the construction of halls of residence, which still bear the names of either the countries or their leaders. Members of staff also contributed generously by offering extra classes free of charge, especially in areas of English Language and Mathematics. For most South African students, studying at Roma gave them exposure to the outside world, which apartheid denied them, including access to books and journals which had been banned in South Africa. It is important to mention that the award of an honorary doctorate to Nelson Mandela in 1978 by the NUL, the first African institution to do so, was not only in recognition of his efforts in the struggle, but also a form of moral support for the South African struggle.

Thus on the educational front, Lesotho opened its doors wide to South African and other refugees. All those interviewed observe that one of the most important kinds of support that came from Lesotho in general, and Roma in particular, was education. South Africans who came to occupy key positions in academia, politics, and business studied at Roma, including Njabulo Ndebele, Mbulelo Mzamane, Tito Mboweni, Ngoako Ramathloli, Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka, Lindiwe Sisulu, Vusi Pikoli, Louisa Mojela, and many others. It was while they were studying at Roma that South African students were exposed to the destructiveness of apartheid through its destabilization activities, and how all these impacted on Lesotho.

(98) Interview with Rtd Major-General Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(99) Interview with M. Mashologu, (Maseru) 6 March 2008.

One important aspect of the NUL was that it was a non-racial community. It welcomed people from different cultural, racial, and ethnic backgrounds. Whatever barriers South Africans and other nationalities had experienced were significantly broken at Roma, because all the people were able to associate with anyone, without any problem. Students from South Africa could see that the white people at NUL were like any other people, and that some white lecturers who were there were opposed to apartheid. There were some white South African lecturers who chose to come and work at NUL because the university was non-racial. Thus, before and after 1975, the university at Roma was seen as a regional university, a Pan-Africanist institution, because of its cosmopolitan nature. While the 1975 break-up of the UBL was regrettable in a number of ways, it was also a blessing in disguise for southern African students, as Roma was now in a position to accept a large number of refugee students not only from South Africa, but also from Mozambique, Namibia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe.

The university allowed students to organize themselves along political lines, and made a conscious decision not to interfere with such organisations. The Committee for Action and Solidarity for Southern African Students (CASSAS) was one such organisation.¹⁰⁰ CASSAS was founded in 1976, following the flight of many black students from South African universities in the wake of the 1976 student uprisings. It was seen as a ‘school’ for ‘comrades’, especially those who were coming from South Africa. In the words of a former leader, Advocate Rakuoane, “We made sure that there was this political direction and political schooling.”¹⁰¹ CASSAS was a broad front through which students were recruited into liberation politics by selling the broad anti-imperialist perspective to them. Another former leader, Advocate Sekonyela, says that when he joined NUL as a student in 1978/79, he found a home in CASSAS. Those who joined CASSAS were people who were passionate about the struggle against oppression in general, and against apartheid in particular.¹⁰² It was an organisation whose aim was to build all student exiles ideologically, among other things. In southern Africa, the organisation supported liberation movements in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia. CASSAS also supported the Polisario Front of Western Sahara and Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organisation, among others. Advocate Rakuoane says that he was able to get into the university’s Student Representative Council (SRC) on a CASSAS ticket, and that once he was in, he was able to persuade his comrades to use some SRC resources to support and participate in the liberation struggle. The student body also set up a Solidarity Fund whose major purpose was to influence the allocation of WUS scholarships in favour of all South African student exiles in general and those who were pro-ANC in particular.¹⁰³

(100) David Ambrose thinks that the student movement was better known as the Committee for Actions of Solidarity Amongst South African Sponsors (CASASAS), and not CASSAS.

(101) Interview with L. Rakuoane, (Maseru) 3 January 2008.

(102) Interview with H. Sekonyela, (Roma) 8 October 2008.

(103) Interview with L. Rakuoane, (Maseru) 24 January 2008.

Through CASSAS, students in Lesotho were able to demonstrate that they were part and parcel of the struggle for southern Africa, and their view was that an injury to one was an injury to all. CASSAS was clear about its stance against the apartheid regime, and some of its activities received support from both the government and the United Nations.

CASSAS also tried to influence university policy, and to get the university to support the liberation struggle in other ways. At different times both the university and CASSAS invited international speakers to give public lectures at Roma.¹⁰⁴ At one time the then British Foreign Secretary, David Owen, was invited to Roma, and gave a lecture that was followed by a very spirited discussion which was beneficial to the students, the university, and the speaker himself.¹⁰⁵ Advocate Sekonyela claims that it was CASSAS that invited David Owen to the university. CASSAS did not only confine its activities to Lesotho or to the university. Supported by the UN, it took international trips to meet with other progressive forces and comrades of the struggle against oppression; and “no international occasion against the Americans, against the British, and against South Africa went unattended.”¹⁰⁶

CASSAS further mobilized widely and established links with labour movements within and outside the country. Those Basotho interviewed, who were founder members of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) of South Africa, readily admit the progressive role played by CASSAS in support of the NUM and the liberation struggle in southern Africa.¹⁰⁷ CASSAS also provided material support to Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Angola, and Namibia, by collecting clothing from well-wishers, and dispatching it to the liberation movements in those countries.¹⁰⁸

Apart from the university, almost all urban high and secondary schools, the majority of which were owned by the churches and the communities, accommodated large numbers of South African students in the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, it is estimated that there were about 2,000 high school students who had entered Lesotho’s schools, escaping Bantu education. Of these, only 66 reported regularly to the Ministry of the Interior and had been formally registered as refugees. There was a further estimated 7,000 pupils from South Africa, whose parents found it prudent to enrol in Lesotho schools under the name and sponsorship of relatives in Lesotho. Of this number, only 49 reported to the Ministry of the Interior. Other students were enrolled at Agricultural Training Centres and at Technical and Vocational Training Centres throughout the country.¹⁰⁹

(104) Interview with H. Sekonyela, (Roma) 8 October 2008. One such person was Chris Hani; Sekonyela says that his teaching and analysis of the problems in Lesotho and southern Africa was very refreshing. Others were Dr Stan Mudenge, Bishop Desmond Tutu, among many speakers.

(105) Interview with M. Mashologu, (Maseru) 6 March 2008.

(106) Interview with H. Sekonyela, (Roma) 8 October 2008.

(107) Interviews with P. Salae, (Maseru) 15 January 2008; and M. Masoetsa, (Maseru) 11 December 2007.

(108) Interview with H. Sekonyela, (Roma) 8 October 2008.

(109) Cabinet Refugees File No. CA/UN/2/ Vol. 2.

Diplomatic, Financial, Moral, and Military Support

In the context of the changing political landscape in southern Africa in the 1970s, characterized by the independence of Angola and Mozambique in 1975, and Zimbabwe in 1980, and growing local and international pressure on the apartheid state, Chief Jonathan read the signs of the time and changed the policy of his regime by welcoming the liberation movements of South Africa into Lesotho. Most of these were members of the ANC. They included Chris Hani, a member of the ANC executive committee, and a key commander of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), who lived in Lesotho for almost eight years, moving in and out of the country, mobilizing against apartheid. Although officially the ANC was neither allowed to open offices nor to allow its cadres to carry weapons in the country, unofficially it was permitted to store limited quantities of weapons in the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) armoury.¹¹⁰ Hani's task was to infiltrate MK cadres into South Africa, and build up the alliance between the South African Communist Party (SACP), the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) and the ANC in the Free State and the Cape.¹¹¹ He was the most wanted man, and the South African government offered rewards to anyone who could take his life.¹¹² According to one of the interviewees who was a top military officer at the time, Chris Hani was at one time kept in a cell for three months when the South African Defence Force (SADF) was hunting him all over Lesotho.¹¹³

Jonathan flatly refused to hand over refugees to South Africa, and in particular Chris Hani. The apartheid regime offered Ntsu Mokhehle and his LLA fighters (the Lesotho Liberation Army, military wing of the BCP) in exchange for Chris Hani. But the Lesotho government did not budge. Indeed, on a couple of occasions it forced the South African government to return refugees living in Lesotho and captured by South African operatives. For example, one Fanele Mbale, a refugee and a teacher at Maseru Day High School, was kidnapped from Lesotho, but was subsequently returned after intense diplomatic pressure by the Lesotho government. Zinjiva Kondo, a refugee, was kidnapped from Bloemfontein Airport after the plane he was travelling in failed to land at Leabua Jonathan Airport because of bad weather. He was also returned after diplomatic pressure.¹¹⁴ These activities occurred in the early 1980s.

After the independence of Mozambique in 1975, Lesotho in solidarity with the people of Mozambique opened an embassy in Maputo, and also established air travel by Lesotho Airways that enabled South Africans and other refugees to fly direct to Mozambique. This service proved extremely useful as Mozambique was vital to ANC activity in South Africa. When Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, another

(110) Interview with Rtd Major-General M. Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(111) Stiff. *The Silent War*: See p.409.

(112) According to Advocate Sookanan, there were two attempts on Chris Hani's life in 1980 and in 1981 in Lesotho. Tumelo Ramatolo, a member of the Lesotho Youth Organisation, and quite clearly an apartheid spy, placed a bomb in Hani's car, but unfortunately, the bomb exploded on him. After he received bail from the magistrate court, he fled to South Africa.

(113) Interview with Rtd Major-General M. Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(114) Sixishe. *But Give Him an Army*: See p.61.

direct Lesotho Airways connection was established, and this also facilitated easy movement of anti-apartheid activists to and fro. This air connection enabled many South Africans to travel abroad and “many people from abroad were able to come to Lesotho via Zimbabwe to meet with their South African cadres in Lesotho.”¹¹⁵

At the same time, the Lesotho government also realised that it was suicidal to provide military bases for Umkhonto we Sizwe as they knew that they had been infiltrated. Instead of allowing establishment of bases, they provided covert military training by absorbing some ANC cadres into the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), and by allowing some members of the army to provide crash courses in the use of firearms, grenades, and techniques of subversion to these cadres.¹¹⁶

The Lesotho government also provided intelligence information to the ANC operatives, both in Lesotho and South Africa. Retired Major-General Lekhanya was in charge of the ANC’s intelligence in Lesotho. All refugees in Lesotho were under the direct protection of Major-General Lekhanya. This is how he came to know people like Gilbert Hani, Chris Hani, Lambert Moloi, Japhet Ndlovu, and many others. Using powerful radio communication systems acquired from the Soviet Union and China, the Lesotho government was able to predict the next target of attack by the apartheid regime. The Lesotho government also provided arms to the ANC, most of which were sourced from the Eastern bloc countries and other friendly nations such as Libya, Cuba, East Germany, Ireland, and Denmark.¹¹⁷

The Lesotho government provided travel documents to many South African refugees. Many ANC members and South African students studying in Lesotho travelled on Lesotho passports, with a good number of them carrying more than one passport in order to disguise their identity.¹¹⁸ The late Joe Modise, one time Commander of the MK is one good example. Paanya Phoofolo, a former Lesotho Permanent Representative at the UN in the 1980s, recalls an official trip he undertook to Mozambique, when he was Principal Secretary of Transport and Communication in 1978. The late Vincent Makhele, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, asked him to carry a parcel which he had to hand over personally to a contact in Maputo. When that contact received and opened that parcel, he realized that it was Lesotho diplomatic passports. One of those passports, he learnt, was for Joe Modise.¹¹⁹ Thabo Makeka, another former Lesotho Permanent Representative at the UN in the late 1970s and a senior officer in the Legal section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the early 1970s, confirms that they provided passports, acted as couriers and provided air tickets to both the ANC and the PAC UN representatives, J. Makathini and D. Sibeko, in their execution of the duties of their organisations.¹²⁰

(115) Interview with M. Mashologu, (Maseru) 24 January 2008.

(116) Interview with Rtd. Major-General M. Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(117) Interview with Rtd. Major-General M. Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(118) Interviews with R.P. Matete, (Morija) 19 December 2007; and T. Makeka, (Maseru) 10 January 2008.

(119) Interview with Paanya Phoofolo, (Maseru) 24 February 2008.

(120) Interview with Thabo Makeka, (Maseru) 10 January 2008.

The Lesotho government further contributed to the OAU Liberation Committee, and was never in arrears. The government also made cash donations to the ANC. Former Senior Private Secretary to Prime Minister Jonathan, Chief Matete remembers that at one time well over R100,000 was handed over to Oliver Tambo.¹²¹ Rtd Major- General Lekhanya also remembers that Lesotho was a very loyal contributor towards the liberation struggle financially. He vividly remembers taking around \$US 5,000 to an international conference to give to a South African liberation movement.¹²² At the same time, Lesotho received a lot of financial and material support from the international community to cushion it against apartheid, especially during the Transkei border closures in 1976. The assistance also enabled Lesotho to upgrade its essential services, including hospitals, clinics, and schools.

The Lesotho government also adopted a strong stance against apartheid, especially on the side of the ANC, at all international fora. Since the mid-1970s Lesotho became more active in the OAU. In 1978, Lesotho hosted a UN anti-apartheid symposium and became the first among the apartheid neighbours to explicitly reject P.W. Botha's proposals for a Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS),¹²³ a still-born apartheid project aimed at forming a regional economic and security bloc, under South Africa's leadership, to provide economic support to those countries that signed non-aggression pacts and recognized its Bantustans.

South African anti-apartheid activists in Lesotho were also provided with opportunities to lead productive lives and earn a living. Many of them were allowed to set up their businesses in Lesotho and to practice their professions as doctors, lawyers, teachers, and so on, while continuing with the struggle against apartheid. For example, Phyllis Naidoo worked as Chief Legal Aid Counsel for the Lesotho Government after she had escaped to the mountain kingdom in 1977. She was only forced to leave Lesotho in 1983 following South Africa's air strikes. She fled to Zimbabwe from where she continued her political activism against apartheid, and taught law at the University of Zimbabwe. Others got teaching jobs at Lesotho High School, Maseru High School, Lerotholi Technical Institute, and at the university in Roma. A good number of South African refugees were also given jobs in government departments. For example, Joe Molefi of the PAC was one of the longest serving media workers with the Department of Information and Broadcasting; Gabriel Santamela (alias Mphakalasi) served as manager for Lesotho's Low Cost Housing programme, among others.¹²⁴

Some anti-apartheid newspapers and magazines were published and distributed in Lesotho. Initially, the PAC's *Africanist* was published in Lesotho before it relocated to London and East Germany. The ANC's and PAC's newspapers were sent to Lesotho and distributed to the cadres of these organisations. This was dangerous, as the apartheid regime intercepted the newspapers and parcels from East Germany

(121) Interview with R.P. Matete, (Moriya) 19 December 2007.

(122) Interview with Rtd Major-General Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(123) Interview with R.P. Matete, (Moriya) 19 December 2007.

(124) Interview with R.P. Matete, (Moriya) 19 December 2007.

and other unfriendly countries. A typical example was the Sechaba parcel bombs which seriously injured Phyllis Naidoo and John Osmers, an Anglican priest, in the early 1980s.¹²⁵

Basotho women made enormous sacrifices and contributed immensely to solidarity work. For example, Dr Raditapole accommodated a number of anti-apartheid activists at her home in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These included P.K. Leballo, David Sebeko, and Vusi Make, among others. She remembers that several attempts were made on Leballo's life by apartheid intelligence operatives. She recounts how this happened while he was staying at her house in Dar es Salaam following an operation he had undergone before leaving Tanzania for the UK, and how David Sebeko was actually shot dead at her house in Dar es Salaam.¹²⁶ Sebeko had to be buried in Botswana because apartheid South Africa could not allow his body into South Africa. And many more Basotho women played important roles by feeding, accommodating, and clothing South African refugees in Lesotho.

Apart from the support that Basotho gave to the liberation of South Africa in Lesotho and elsewhere as detailed above, there was also a very important support that Basotho gave in their roles as members of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), an important constituent formation of the broad front that opposed apartheid from within South Africa. Many Basotho mineworkers played a particularly prominent role in the formation of the NUM in 1982. All those interviewed who were mineworkers and members of the BCP tell how, with Cyril Ramaphosa and James Motlatsi, they came together to form the NUM.¹²⁷ James Motlatsi became the President, while Cyril Ramaphosa became the Secretary General of the NUM. Many Basotho mineworkers came to occupy key positions in the NUM. They included Emmanuel Masita from Mpharane, Mohales Hoek, a shop steward at Witbank, Justice Tsukulu from Matelile, Mafeteng, a shop steward in Westonia. It is not surprising that during the historic mineworkers' strike of 1987, Basotho mineworkers were among those most affected by the mass dismissals.

As far as the actual armed struggle was concerned, Basotho joined the MK as combatants. The late Sechaba Sello, son of well-known Mosotho lawyer, the late Khalaki Sello, and Major-General Lamberg Moloi of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) who hails from Mphaki, Quthing, are mentioned.¹²⁸

Suffice it to say at this juncture that the award of the Order of the Companions of O.R. Tambo in Gold to the late King Moshoeshoe II and the late former Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan, in 2006 and 2007, respectively, by the President of the Republic of South Africa, "for exceptional contribution to the struggle against apartheid through supporting the liberation movement in times of need", is a fitting testimony of Basotho support for the liberation of South Africa. The two represent the Basotho nation's

(125) Interview with D. Ambrose, (Roma) 12 November 2007.

(126) Interview with K. Raditapole, (Teyateyaneng) 20 February 2008.

(127) Interviews with B. Macaefa, (Maseru) 10 December 2007; M. Masoetsa, (Maseru) 11 December 2007; and L. Salae, (Maseru) 15 January 2008.

(128) Interview with V. Tyhali, (Maseru) 22 February 2008.

revulsion against apartheid in the 20th century, and their determination to play their part in its elimination. Evidently, very many Basotho, individually and collectively, identified themselves with the South African liberation struggle, and it would be very difficult to single out individuals.

Repercussions of the Struggle for Liberation

Contributions of South African Refugees to Lesotho's Development:

The contribution of South African refugees to the economic, political, and social development of Lesotho during and after the liberation struggle was significant. South Africans in Lesotho were professionals in various fields. While they earned their livelihood through their professions, they contributed enormously to the development of Lesotho on various fronts. Immediately after its establishment as a liberation movement in Lesotho, the PAC set up an adult education school for its members and some Basotho at Seapoint. Initially, classes were held in a cleared bush, but later they were held in Fraser's Hall, as the number of students increased.¹²⁹ The fees that were collected assisted in the development of a rudimentary PAC infrastructure in the form of offices and covert military training of the first PAC freedom fighters in Lesotho.¹³⁰ Later, the Lutheran Church in Geneva, through representations of the PAC, funded the school by paying for the science equipment and the teachers' salaries.¹³¹ In 1965, the government recognized the school as Maseru Community Secondary. Today, the school is known as Maseru High School. Its first principal was the late Elliot Mfafa, and most of the teachers, such as Gabriel Mphakalasi (Santamela), were PAC exiles, while others were members of the BCP.¹³² The late M. November and T. Sizamba, who taught at Mabathoana High School and Lesotho High School, respectively, are fondly remembered by one of our informants who taught with them, as dedicated and productive teachers from South Africa.¹³³ Their former students remember these two teachers as highly disciplined and dedicated to their profession and the country. Mr Sizamba was appointed Principal of the prestigious Lesotho High School, a position that he held for years until he died. A famous law firm belonging to Mohaleroe and Sello is legendary for its tenacious defence of human rights and the rule of law in Lesotho.

Paying the Price for Supporting the Liberation of South Africa

The costs to Lesotho for supporting the South African liberation struggle were numerous and not easy to quantify. Once Chief Jonathan had turned against South Africa, the Boers decided to lend support to his enemies. In the immediate aftermath of the 1970 elections, the BCP leadership was arrested, beaten, and jailed. Many of

(129) *Monthly Intelligence Review*. July 1963.

(130) Interview conducted by Walter Toboti with T.M. Ntantala, (Dar es Salaam) 1985.

(131) *Monthly Intelligence Review*. September 1964.

(132) Interviews with M. Nts'inyi, (Maseru) 10 September 2008; and G. Mphakalasi, (Maseru) 14 February 2008.

(133) Interview with Sister Lephoto, (Maseru) 12 February 2008.

the party's supporters who were professionals – school teachers, nurses, and doctors – joined the leadership and went into exile, mostly to Botswana, to find jobs and to escape persecution.¹³⁴ Under exile conditions, the BCP leadership was easily persuaded by the South African security branch to collaborate in destabilizing Jonathan's government. South Africa allowed the LLA to establish a base in Hlatseng, Qwa-Qwa, and to launch attacks on Lesotho from there.¹³⁵ The LLA was a very conspicuous group that tried to sabotage Lesotho's support for the independence of South Africa. They started attacking strategic installations, including post offices and electricity stations, carrying out political assassinations, and so on. One of their biggest attacks was the blowing-up of the government petrol storage facility in Maseru. The attacks continued until the military overthrew Jonathan in 1986 with the South African government's encouragement.

Besides groups such as the LLA, there were people among Lesotho's political parties, including some within the BNP, who viewed Jonathan's support for the South African struggle as futile and detrimental to Lesotho. In 1985 they formed what was called the Basotho Democratic Alliance, BDA. Their main purpose was to stop the BNP-led government from rendering support to the liberation movement in South Africa. According to one interviewee, it should be understood that, in this context, while the 1986 coup overthrew Jonathan, it also stopped politicians from dining with apartheid.¹³⁶

One of the issues around which there were serious tensions between the governments of Lesotho and South Africa was the 'independence' of the Transkei in the mid-1970s. South Africa's project to grant pseudo-independence to the Transkei and other Bantustans was one of the central planks of apartheid, and its success, and thereby the acceptance of apartheid, depended greatly on the recognition of these 'independent states' by the international community. Lesotho's recognition was critical in that it would have set an example for others; on the other hand, the refusal by this small country, economically dependent on South Africa, would be humiliating for South Africa, and would make it difficult for others to recognise the independence of the Bantustans. It is difficult to say how many influential voices in Europe and America were then calling for the recognition of this arrangement. When Lesotho heeded the call by liberation movements and refused to grant recognition, the apartheid regime withdrew a long-standing subsidy on Lesotho grain products and closed three border posts, thus hampering Lesotho's internal and international trade. Due to lack of internal roads then, parts of eastern Lesotho which had no road access were almost cut off from the populated west. But Lesotho held out, and appealed to the UN for international assistance. Border restrictions were relaxed after attempts to secure international recognition failed and lack of access to Lesotho caused problems in Transkei.¹³⁷

(134) Interview with D. Ambrose, (Roma) 12 November 2007.

(135) Interview with D. Ambrose, (Roma) 12 November 2007.

(136) Interview with R.P. Matete, (Moriya) 9 January 2008.

(137) Interview with M. Molapo, (Maputsoe) 2 September 2008.

On the morning of 9 December 1982, more than one hundred SADF soldiers attacked twelve residential houses in Maseru, the capital of Lesotho. According to the South African government, the targets were the “planning and control headquarters of ANC terrorist activities against South Africa, Transkei and Ciskei.”¹³⁸ More than forty-two people were killed, twelve of them were Basotho, and the majority were women and children.¹³⁹ According to retired Major-General Lekhanya, the precision of the attacks on houses where ANC activists were being kept shows that the SADF had accurate information and must have been led by guides who knew exactly where the refugees were living, “...a clear sign that we had been infiltrated.”¹⁴⁰ Besides loss of life, a lot of property was destroyed in these and other raids; many houses were flattened by South African artillery and there was no compensation received despite the fact that the United Nations had passed a resolution to the effect that Lesotho must be compensated for the 1982 raid. Summary statistics do show that in the 9 December massacre there were 18 registered South African refugees, 8 asylum seekers, 2 students, 2 visitors, and 12 Basotho civilians.¹⁴¹

Table 1 shows some the people killed: their names, their nationalities, and the various places where they were massacred by the SADF in the early hours of 9 December 1982.

Table 1: Some Names of People Massacred in Maseru on 9 December 1982¹⁴²

Name	Nationality
Place of Massacre:	Florida
Nqini Zola	A 47 year old South African male from Uitenhage, who came to Lesotho in September 1978 for political asylum.
Mzwanele Fazzie	A South African male visitor from East London.
Dr Ngipe Bantwini	A South African male visitor from Craddock, who was practising as a doctor at Edendale.
Jobo Tiuts	A South African male who came to Lesotho for political asylum, who arrived just a day before the raids.
Place of Massacre:	NTTC
Mavimbela Sidney	A 50 year old South African male from Port Elizabeth, who came to Lesotho on 2 August 1980 for political asylum.
Marwangana Alfred	A South African male, who arrived just a day before the raids for political asylum.

(138) Ibid.

(139) Interview with Rtd Major-General Justin Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(140) Interview with Rtd Major-General Justin Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(141) Government of Lesotho. Cabinet Refugee File No. CA/UN/2/ Vol.1, Folio No. 162, 15 December 1982.

(142) Government of Lesotho, Cabinet Refugee File No. CA/UN/2/ Vol.1, Folio No. 162, 15 December 1982.

Marwangana Mzukis	A South African male, who came to Lesotho for political asylum.
Marwangana Tandizwa	A South African female, who came to Lesotho for political
Florence Motseliso	asylum. A local Mosotho girl.
Place of Massacre:	Upper Thamae - Ha Lehlhonolo
Dyani Lizethile	A 36 year old South African male from Umtata, who came to Lesotho on 14 September 1982 for political asylum. He was burnt to ashes.
Gova Swelendara	A 42 year old South African male from Umtata, who came to Lesotho on 14 September 1982 for political asylum. He was burnt to ashes.
‘Mapuleng Biza Toto	A local Mosotho female from Sefikeng, Berea District. A 20 year old South African male from Cape Town, who came to Lesotho on 23 April 1982 for political asylum.
Zibi Vuyani	A 23 year old South African from Umtata, who came to Lesotho on 8 March 1982 for political asylum.
Ngxito Pakamisa Cecil	A 22 year old South African male from Soweto, who came to Lesotho on 6 May 1982.
Mlenze Michael	A 24 year old South African male from Cape Town, who came to Lesotho on 17 April 1982 for political asylum.
Matandela Dumisani	A 21 year old South African male from Matatiele, who came to Lesotho on 25 July 1982 for political asylum.
Bungane Mbuso	A 19 year old South African male from Matatiele, who came to Lesotho on 25 July 1982 for political asylum.
Notana Siphon	A 28 year old South African male from East London, who came to Lesotho on 24 February 1982 for political asylum.
Kana Noneleli Sampson	A 19 year old South Africa male from Port Elizabeth, who came to Lesotho on 11 November 1982 for political asylum.
Place of Massacre:	Upper Thamae /Borokhoaneng, Ha Mphana
Mazibuko Themba	A 28 year old South African male from Soweto, who came to Lesotho on 28 February 1979 for political asylum.
Matlhare Isaac “Roux”	A 20 year old South African from Soweto, who was not a refugee. He was schooling at Mt. Tabor School and then Masianokeng High School.
Mcube Siphon Mchunu	A South African male from Soweto, who was not a refugee.

Place of Massacre:	Qoaling
Gugushe Jasoni Gene	A 29 year old South African male from Evaton, who came to Lesotho on 5 June 1982 for political asylum.
Ralebitso 'Matumo	A local Mosotho female.
Place of Massacre:	Lithoteng
Khuzwayo Sibusiso	A 25 year old South African male from Soweto, who came to Lesotho on 29 October 1981 for political asylum.
Sello David	A South African male from Soweto.

A second raid happened on the 20 December 1985, when SADF commandos attacked two houses in Maseru in the darkness of night and killed nine people, three of them Basotho.

A number of Basotho were also killed by land mines planted by the apartheid regime along the Lesotho-South African border. The Lesotho government tried to deal with the problem by acquiring anti-landmine vehicles. Major-General Lekhanya himself was a trained expert in handling landmines, and particularly in defusing them. He received his training in the USA and in Scotland.

Lesotho also lost the opportunity to develop because of the South African government's activities of economic sabotage. A number of goods destined for Lesotho were prevented entry into the country through border blockades, which sometimes lasted for weeks. Some goods were actually seized. All this meant that the development of Lesotho was stifled.

The apartheid regime also resorted to coercion and black-mail of the Lesotho government. Lesotho suffered from periodic economic blockades in which South Africa curtailed the movement of people, goods, and services. One interviewee remembers very well how South Africa not only refused passage of crude oil that had been donated by the Libyan government, but also refused to have it processed on South African soil, forcing Lesotho to have it processed and sold in Maputo, where the ship had docked. In the end Lesotho did not even receive the oil it gravely needed.¹⁴³ In 1984, Lesotho was pressured by the apartheid regime to sign a nonaggression pact; following the success it had had in forcing Mozambique to sign the Nkomati Accord. Pik Botha, the South African Foreign Minister, and his delegation met Leabua Jonathan at Peka Bridge to try and push for a nonaggression pact. But Jonathan refused to sign and asked for time to consult with his people. After two pitsos (public meetings) with his people, he was advised not to sign, and he never did. "He was a

(143) Interview with Rtd. Major-General Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

very clever person who would never sign anything without consulting his people,"¹⁴⁴ said one interviewee.

Chief Jonathan's refusal to ditch the ANC, his anti-apartheid stance, and his support for the liberation struggle, were some of the reasons for his being overthrown in January 1986. The coup had been preceded by an economic blockade in December 1985. Having declared themselves unable to withstand South Africa's political and economic pressure, the soldiers who seized power advised and oversaw evacuation of members of the liberation movements from Lesotho to third countries. The coup brought the military to the centre of politics in Lesotho, and with it, a military government which was tolerant of the apartheid government.

The Fruits, Frustrations, and Disappointments with South African Independence

The benefits that Lesotho has gained from the independence of South Africa seem to outweigh the frustrations and disappointments, by far. All those interviewed agree that the best reward to the Basotho was South Africa's freedom. With this freedom, Basotho were afforded the chance to pursue their own desired developmental path. Freedom for South Africa also meant that Lesotho could focus on development issues in an atmosphere of relative peace.

Basotho have also gained from South Africa's independence in many ways. A number of Basotho have found employment in South Africa, as well as easy access to education and medical facilities. At the official level, the only known rewards were the posthumous honouring of the late King Moshoeshe II and Chief Leabua Jonathan by the South African government. As indicated above, the honour, The Order of the Supreme Companions of OR Tambo in Gold, was presented by South African President Thabo Mbeki at the Union Building in Pretoria on 24 April 2006 and 24 April 2007 respectively. But Advocate Sookanan had this to say, "...awards are not good enough, we need rewards."¹⁴⁵ And Chief Matete added, "I wish South Africa could be more honest in acknowledging the contributions that Lesotho had made towards its liberation."¹⁴⁶ He thinks that the small contribution made by Lesotho can be acknowledged by more rewards such as assistance in agriculture and a deliberate programme to reabsorb those retrenched from the mines into the South African economy. He bemoaned the fact that South Africa seems to be more forgetful with the passage of time.

Chief Matete also expressed the desire to see agricultural co-operation between South African farmers and the Basotho. "In the past, even during the apartheid era, there were warm movements between the two governments with South African farmers along the border helping our people to plough and plant their fields, resulting in good yields. Now I don't see any reason why, after South African liberation, this

(144) Interview with Rtd. Major-General Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(145) Interview with Advocate Sookanan, (Maseru) 2 December 2007.

(146) Interview with R.P. Matete, (Moriija) 9 January 2008.

cannot be formalised in order to help our people fill their stomachs by assisting them in agriculture. This would really go a long way towards reciprocating Lesotho's support for their liberation.”¹⁴⁷

Some Basotho feel that their country paid a heavy price for supporting the South African struggle and that the new rulers in South Africa do not seem to recognize this adequately. But it is also possible that their frustration is precisely because they expected too much to come out of South Africa's independence. According to many interviewees, the removal of border restrictions would be a major reward for Lesotho's role in the democratisation of South Africa. A big source of frustration is that fourteen years after the independence of South Africa, Basotho are still harassed at the border posts.¹⁴⁸ Discussions between the two governments “... [intended] to establish a system that will allow people to cross the borders between the two countries without presenting passports for stamping”¹⁴⁹ have gone on for far too long. All that Basotho expect is that they should be treated as human beings, with full rights and entitlements to economic, recreational, and social services in South Africa. The majority of those interviewed are bitter that this issue of border restrictions is yet to be resolved. They are bitter that their people are still treated as strangers and inferiors at most South African border posts.

In the recent past, the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) has been campaigning for the abolition of border controls. The leader of the party points out that Basotho's unrestricted movement to and from South Africa is long overdue.¹⁵⁰ An agreement has already been signed between the two governments to deal with this matter, and there are expectations that people will soon cross borders without the need to stamp passports. The concern is that the free movement of people across borders still remains unresolved. The movement of people is still very difficult. Many of those interviewed felt that their government has not put enough pressure on the South African government for this freedom to be realised.

Basotho are also bitter that the promised economic improvement through bilateral agreements has not come to fruition. This, according to some interviewees, is a major source of frustration. Some of those interviewed emphasized that they expected that relations between Lesotho and South Africa would produce more benefits than has hitherto been the case. They expected South Africa to assist Lesotho in eradicating poverty and improving the general wellbeing of the ordinary Basotho, particularly after the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, was on record as saying he will “take trouble to see that poverty is alleviated in Lesotho.”¹⁵¹ However, President Mbeki did nothing in that direction. The same disappointment with Mbeki's promise was shared by Chief Matete: “Nothing has come from South Africa as a reward for what

(147) Interview with R.P. Matete, (Moriya) 9 January 2008.

(148) Interviews with M. Mashologu, (Maseru) 6 March 2008; R. Matete, (Moriya) 9 January 2008; and Rtd. Major-General M. Lekhanya, (Maseru) 16 December 2007.

(149) *Public Eye*. 4 April 2008.

(150) Interview with L. Rakuoane, (Maseru) 24 January 2008.

(151) Interview with Rtd. Major-General Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

we did. At some stage, President Mbeki promised a special assistance programme to lift Lesotho out of poverty within five years. From that day he made this promise, five years have passed and we haven't seen any concrete action in that direction."¹⁵²

The ongoing retrenchment of many Basotho mine workers is another source of frustration. The retrenchments have affected Basotho in a number of ways. For example, there has been an increase in theft and crime rates in Lesotho. Many of those interviewed expressed disappointment with these retrenchments, pointing out that it was the Basotho people who built the South African economy in many ways, and that retrenchments in such large numbers were hard to justify. Basotho had expected that the retrenched workers could be absorbed into the South African economy. In the opinion of Chief Matete, his greatest disappointment with South Africa is these mining retrenchments, and the tendency to see Basotho as "outsiders."

The 1998 SADC military intervention in Lesotho was seen by many as a South African National Defence Force (SANDF) invasion. Coming as it did, just after the then President Nelson Mandela had said, "Never again will Lesotho be attacked from South Africa," the intervention caused a wound among some Basotho. The fact that when the SADF arrived in Lesotho they went to the Lesotho Highlands and killed soldiers who were guarding the dam, suggests to some that South Africa came to protect its interests.¹⁵³

The shortage of land, in the eyes of some, remains a burning issue. Some of those interviewed point to the need to re-open debate about the Conquered Territory in order to address the shortage of land in Lesotho. "There is no reason why we should abandon our own land claims"¹⁵⁴ said R. Matete, since other countries such as Namibia and Botswana are pursuing their own claims. M. Mashologu thinks the same, and sees the issue of the Conquered Territory as something that complicates Lesotho-South Africa relations. He does not see any reason why the conquered land should not be returned.¹⁵⁵ But Advocate Rakuoane thinks that there is no way Lesotho can have the Conquered Territory. For him, the best route is collaboration with South Africa and the Free State, moving towards gradual incorporation. He emphasized: "We cannot see how we can ever govern the Free State except if we unite Lesotho and the Free State, and agree to make Lesotho part of South Africa."¹⁵⁶

Lesotho has also lost in terms of aid and international support. During the apartheid era, Lesotho received a lot of aid because of sympathy for its plight, and for being "right in the belly of apartheid."¹⁵⁷ But at the end of the white minority rule, a lot of international aid agencies relocated to South Africa, and many diplomatic missions also relocated to South Africa, or left all together. These included the British

(152) Interview with R.P. Matete, (Moriija) 9 January 2008.

(153) Interview with V. Malebo, (Maseru) 8 December 2008.

(154) Interview with R. Matete, (Moriija) 9 January 2008.

(155) Interview with M. Mashologu, (Maseru) 2008.

(156) Interview with L. Rakuoane, (Maseru) 24 January 2008.

(157) Interview with D. Ambrose, (Roma) 12 November 2007.

High Commissioner. As former colonial masters, the departure of the British has important symbolism.

The condition of Lesotho, completely landlocked by South Africa, without access to the sea is another source of frustration. Many Basotho wished they had a corridor to another country, or to the sea. But one thing that worries Dr Raditapole is the fact that after forty-one years of independence, Lesotho looks like it is still teething: “It looks like we make a few steps forward and then very many steps backwards, and that is sad.”¹⁵⁸ She added that probably it is a necessary condition that should help them to reflect on what the country has done right and wrong in those forty-one years of independence, and what should be done to correct the mistakes of the past. She also bemoaned the fact that Basotho have lost the spirit of national pride, which was flourishing in the 1960s, in favour of “village politics” that tend to portray people in terms of the colours of their political parties.¹⁵⁹

While a good number of those interviewed blamed South Africa for failure to reciprocate Lesotho’s support in the struggle for democracy, Advocate Rakuoane thinks that the blame should be apportioned proportionally. In his view, blame must also lie with Lesotho. “We cannot put blame on South Africa alone. The main blame lies with us because of the nature of our politics, our narrow perception about how to move forward on a lot of things.”¹⁶⁰ Dr Raditapole shares the same view. She thinks that Lesotho did not take advantage of a new South Africa, probably because Lesotho was still swallowed up in its own honeymoon of the 1993 democratic landmark elections. Thus when South Africa became independent in 1994, Lesotho was not ready to take full advantage. She said, “We did not allow ourselves to become visionary enough, to say, without necessarily saying you have to pay us, we needed to say, how we were going to relate to a new independent South Africa. I don’t think we did sufficient preparation.” She added that while she was still in government, her own ministry prepared some documents which never saw the light of the day because there was no clear government policy. Raditapole strongly feels that a lot of preparation needed to be done before the independence of South Africa, but that, that opportunity was lost due to the narrowness of Lesotho’s own politics. Consequently, Lesotho has missed many opportunities.¹⁶¹

It is known that, in some cases, the post-apartheid South African government has been willing to discuss cooperation in economic and other matters, but have found the Lesotho government lacking in initiative, interest, and technocratic ability. In this way, Lesotho’s inability to maximise benefits from cooperating with South Africa cannot be blamed on South Africa alone.

(158) Interview with K. Raditapole, (Teyateyaneng) 20 February 2008.

(159) Interview with K. Raditapole, (Teyateyaneng) 20 February 2008.

(160) Interview with L. Rakuoane, (Maseru) 3 January 2008.

(161) Interview with K. Raditapole, (Teyateyaneng) 20 February 2008.

Conclusion

The courage to confront the apartheid state derived from different motives. One of these is historical, going back to the 19th century, when the Basotho successfully resisted the Boers despite the fact that they were outgunned. The other factor was that the Basotho experienced apartheid in their own individual and national capacities. The migrant labour system exposed every Mosotho to the evils of apartheid. Apartheid was against black people, and Basotho people were not treated differently. Basotho were prepared to contribute whatever they could in order to overthrow the apartheid system which was very humiliating to every black person including Basotho. The system did not care whether a person was a Mosotho or not: as long you were black, you were discriminated against. This is where the courage came from.

David Ambrose says that the Basotho themselves had their own struggle against white South Africa, which finally saw them asking for and getting British protection from the Boers. Therefore from the start, the Basotho never wanted to be part of the Free State Republic, or white South Africa. For that reason, they were prepared to fight apartheid in different ways in order to preserve their own independence. On the other hand, in the eyes of the apartheid regime, an independent Lesotho was a bad example to the people they wanted to keep oppressed. According to one person interviewed, Lesotho did not assist in the liberation of South Africa, but rather, it participated in the liberation of both Lesotho and South Africa.¹⁶² This view was also shared by Dr Raditapole, who pointed out that Basotho took what was going on in South Africa to be the same as what was going on in Lesotho, given the fact that Basotho and South Africans have strong relationships: “We have got half our families there and half our families this side.”¹⁶³ In her view, supporting the South African liberation struggle was the right thing to do. There were more Basotho living in South Africa than in Lesotho as a result of migrant labour, she said, pointing to the very close ethnic ties that bind Lesotho and South Africa together. There are very few families in Lesotho that do not have relatives in South Africa.

The issue of the free movement of people across borders also ranks high among the reasons given for supporting the South African liberation struggle, including a speedy resolution to the land question, popularly known as the Conquered Territories. Even today, Basotho still feel that there is need for some kind of land settlement regarding the territory of the Free State lost to the Boers. Other reasons included the anticipated employment opportunities, and the need to access some of the best services offered in South Africa, among others.

Kwame Nkrumah was fond of saying that the independence of Ghana was meaningless unless it was linked to the total liberation of Africa. The Basotho were quite aware of this too, knowing very well that their independence was meaningless as long as South Africa was under apartheid rule. It was therefore clear to them that,

(162) Interview with M. Mashologu, 24 January 2008.

(163) Interview with K. Raditapole, (Teyateyaneng) 20 February 2008.

as long as South Africa was not free, their own country too was not free. They wanted the hostage position of their country to be completely removed. As retired Major- General Lekhanya puts it, “the main aim was to see apartheid destroyed because our freedom meant nothing without the freedom of our brothers and sisters in South Africa.” He pointed to the wide geographical spread of people who share common cultural traits with the Basotho of Lesotho all the way from South Africa right through to Zambia.¹⁶⁴ Chief R.P. Matete put it in nearly the same words, stating that “...we realised that our own independence would not be complete without the freedom of our neighbours.”¹⁶⁵

There were clear motives for supporting the South African struggle. One of them was the issue of the free movement of people across the borders. Apartheid was affecting all the Basotho, and the feeling was that the sooner it was ended the better. Many Basotho realised that there would be benefits that come with the independence of South Africa, particularly the free movement of people between Lesotho and South Africa. Other sources of motivation were the anticipated employment opportunities and accessibility of services offered in South Africa that would come with a black government in power.

Abbreviations

ANC:	African National Congress
APLA:	Azanian People’s Liberation Army
BAC:	Basutoland African Congress (later the BCP)
BCP:	Basutoland Congress Party (previously the BAC)
BAC) BDA:	Basotho Democratic Alliance
BNP:	Basotho National Party
CASSAS:	Committee for Action and Solidarity for Southern African Students
CCL:	Christian Council of Lesotho
CONSAS:	Constellation of Southern African States
CPL:	Communist Party of Lesotho
LLA:	Lesotho Liberation Army (military wing of the BCP)
MFP:	Marema-Tlou Freedom Party
MK:	Spear of the Nation (Umkhonto we Sizwe, military wing of the ANC)
MP:	Member of Parliament
NP:	National Party
NUM:	National Union of Mineworkers
OAU:	Organisation of African Unity
PA:	Programme of Action
PAC:	Pan-Africanist Congress (South Africa)
PF:	Popular Front for Democracy

(164) Interview with Rtd Major-General Lekhanya, (Maseru) 9 December 2007.

(165) Interview with R.P. Matete, (Morija) 19 December 2007.

PMU:	Police Mobile Unit
SANNC:	South African Native National Congress (later the ANC)
SACP:	South African Communist Party
SACTU:	South African Congress of Trade Unions
SADF:	South African Defence Force
SANDF:	South African National Defence Force
UNDP:	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR:	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WUS:	World University Service

7.4

Lesotho

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Ambrose, David

[Roma; 12 November 2007]

David Ambrose arrived in Lesotho from England in 1965, just a year before Lesotho became independent to take up a lectureship position at the National University of Lesotho (NUL), then University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS). Throughout his stay in Lesotho, Ambrose took a keen interest in the politics of country. He participated in anti-apartheid activities on and off campus. After retirement, Ambrose established a Publishing House on campus, publishing a wide variety of materials on Lesotho, and in particular the country's history, something unexpected of a Mathematics professor. After the expiration of his publishing contract with the University, Ambrose relocated to Ladybrand, South Africa, a small border town 11km from Maseru, the capital of Lesotho.

Well I think in relation with myself, I arrived in Lesotho in March 1965. So that

was still in the colonial period. The colonial period is one of three periods of interaction with South Africa. Following that there was a period, after independence, when Leabua Jonathan worked very closely with South Africa so that exiles in Lesotho ran a risk of being deported back to South Africa, or in some cases they were sent to some country, but they were not particularly welcome in Lesotho. If they were completely apolitical and got on with their jobs as school teachers and something like that, they were alright. If they were lawyers, practicing law in the normal way, and if they got into some tangling case with the government, they were unwelcome and were deported. Then in the 1970s, I can't give you the exact year, but I think it will be somewhere around 1973 or 1974, it can be looked up, Leabua discovered that rather than being friends with South Africa, he could benefit from being friends with the enemies of South Africa because he could get a lot of aid by adopting anti-apartheid stance. So at that point a lot of exiles were not only tolerated, but were actually made more as part of Lesotho. Although the pressure from South Africa was intense, it came to a point where in the end Lesotho became a processing station, where exiles came to Lesotho and some were sent on to Maputo or perhaps further on to Zambia or Tanzania.

Well, initially it was a government of Leabua Jonathan, who had been democratically elected at that time. And it is well known that his election campaign had been supported by South Africa. I think even in the 1970 election campaign, the Afrikaners in South Africa supported him with bags of maize and so on. South Africa assisted him in the 1965 elections in campaigning, I think that is when they gave him a helicopter with a South African pilot. He says he was flown over the country for his election campaign. And then after independence South Africa gave him a lot of technical aid. So there were a lot of people from South Africa in senior positions. The Director of Information, I think he was one Collin Hayens who was a South African expatriate with his team. The Chief Justice was from South Africa. So at that point

there were quite a lot of expatriates from South Africa, when the Afrikaners were doing all sorts of things in Lesotho. They were not only tolerated but welcomed.

Well, Lesotho played a major role by giving a place for people to escape from South Africa. If you look up the book *South Africa's Hostages* you'll read about a case, for example, which is one of the classic cases when South Africans actually kidnapped a South African refugee and cut his neck, just across the border. And that's written up in some detail there. Another thing which happened in the pre-independence period is the rise of Patrick Duncan. Now Patrick Duncan is an extraordinary man. He was the son of the governor general of South Africa. He joined the Basutoland administration as a colonial officer. He rose to become judicial commissioner, very extraordinary; actually he was very able. But he waged campaigns against the administration ultimately. Even within the Anglican Church he waged the campaign for equal salaries for blacks. When political parties, the BCP, BAC, and the BNP, began to emerge in Lesotho, he encouraged them. He assisted them to form political parties and to start newspapers. The newspaper of Khaketla was leading political activist; he threw himself in with the BAC for a while. By the time that was suppressed in Lesotho, Patrick Duncan had gone to Cape Town and started to deliver the newspaper. He printed it under another name Mohlabang; when the colonial administration thought they had managed to bury it, the newspaper came out in a new enhanced form, with more polemical material, directed at the colonial administration. Basically the newspaper was against inequalities, against different salaries for black and white civil servants. Thus Patrick Duncan threw his lot with the freedom struggle. As you remember the ANC split.

Patrick Duncan bought two stores in Quthing district at Mohlabane and Sequbung. They were remote stores, stores you could not reach by road; you could only reach them by pack animal. He designed these stores so they would be training bases for the PAC, and were probably not noticed because they were in such remote places, and the colonial administration tended to stick to places where there were roads. Actually the colonial administration got wind of it when Patrick Duncan was overseas on a fund raising trip. Patrick Duncan eventually became a PAC representative in Algeria's and he died of a rather peculiar blood disease ultimately. His widow is alive, I believe. His papers are in New York University. And there is a biography written by Josh Traver. Patrick Duncan which is quite good. It's a bit lacking on Lesotho in detail because Josh Traver was a South African white, exiled in Britain. So when he was writing the book he couldn't come back to Southern Africa. So, some of the detail on what Patrick Duncan did in Lesotho, is perhaps a little bit incomplete. But, I think he sent somebody else to interview people on his behalf while he was writing the book.

The Basotho themselves had a struggle against South Africa, as you remember, the Basotho in 1868 were given British citizenship, really they became British subjects, but not protected subjects. They actually became British as a result of the proclamation. They had been asking for this to protect themselves from absorption by the Boers, exactly the Free State republic. Once they became British, the British took decisions

on their behalf without consulting them freely and they were sore about that. In 1871 they were annexed to the Cape Colony. In 1872 the Cape Colony got the so called responsible government which they probably weren't ready for, because they then managed to completely mess up their relations with the Basotho. The Basotho rebelled in the Gun War which the Basotho won in the sense that they waged a successful guerilla war against the armies of the Cape, until the Cape basically had to say, 'Please rid us of this Basutoland problem.' The way it was dealt with was, the British actually dis-annexed the Basotho and made it an independent separate crown colony. That experience, was really the war of Lesotho independence, because when the Union of South Africa was mooted in the 1900s, it finally took place in 1910., the Basotho did not want to be part of it. They didn't want to be part of a union where they wouldn't have a vote in the Cape Parliament. Following that, Lesotho didn't want to be part of anything where they were not represented. In a sense, that was the beginning of resentment against white South Africa. If things changed, then things might change with Lesotho, but it is a long story, and I mean that is when you want to review the whole history of the struggle. I think, obviously Lesotho would be sympathetic to the black South Africans who didn't have the vote, just because they did not have the vote in the South African Parliament. Also, there were more Basotho living in South Africa than there are in Lesotho, as a result of migrant labour and people settling in South Africa.

There were a number of countries which were particularly leaders in the anti-apartheid struggles. They were countries like the Netherlands, Germany, Britain, probably not so much overtly, but there were a lot of organizations and exile groups in Britain, who were definitely supporting the anti-apartheid struggle. So, there was a lot of money from the United Kingdom. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees actually funded a centre for processing refugees in Maseru. They built a house for them, found scholarships for them. A lot of them came to the university here. When this university broke up in 1975, which was a tragedy in many ways, it had one expected bonus. There were lots of spaces at Roma because the Botswana and Swaziland students had been withdrawn, and it was therefore able to accept a large number of refugee students. There were many from Sudan, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, but the largest number was from South Africa. So we had a lot of high profile people here: People like Tito Mboweni, the Vice President of South Africa, Pumuzile Mlambo Nquka.

There was a very militant group in the university; I think it started by calling itself SASAC and it changed to becoming CASAS, which was something like the Committee for Action Solidarity Amongst South African Sponsorsee. Anyway, that is very well documented, because they produced a periodical called the Vanguard with a slogan like 'Fight we will and surrender we will not.' or something like that. It was produced on the campus here. One of the key people in it was Judy Kimble who was born in Ghana, incidentally, and was a graduate student here, working on Lesotho history on relations with South Africa on migrant labour. She was an interesting person because

she worked with this group. The rest of the group was all black and she was the only white person. She was also the only woman in the group and she used the synonym Ntsoaki, which is always the name of a girl in Sesotho; it is the name of a girl who is born in a family where all the predecessors are boys. So her mixing with this group of black activists who were men made her a Ntsoaki. She got into trouble at one point because there were several different South African groups in Lesotho and not all of them were supporters of the ANC or PAC. Kimble got herself into trouble after she gave a terrible review of a book by one South African. They (CASAS) had to publish a retraction, I think, in one of their issues.

There were a lot of things that were going on. One was, because Leabua Jonathan was starting to support the anti-apartheid groups, he allowed people like the Chinese, the North Koreans and the Russians to establish their embassies in Lesotho. The Russian Embassy, I think, was more than fifty people strong and the South Africans got very annoyed about North Koreans being in Lesotho.

Also, Jonathan did something which was incredible to many with the BCP, which was the exiled party which should have been in power in 1970. When the BNP lost the elections, everybody was arrested and very badly treated; they were beaten up and thrown in jail for winning an election. The intellectuals mainly supported the BCP, so did the school teachers, other trained professionals like nurses and doctors, amongst others. Many of them lost their jobs and as a result they left Lesotho, and went elsewhere to find jobs. They went to work in Botswana and South Africa. The South Africans let it be known to the BCP that they could operate from South African soil, because they would do anything to irritate Jonathan because of his friendship with the Eastern block countries. So they allowed them to set up a base in Hlatseng which is part of Qwa-qwa, and they started the Lesotho Liberation Army. It had some activities inside Lesotho, but mainly I think they tried to ruin the borders, and they launched most of the bombs into Maseru, for example, from across the river without being stopped by the South African police who could obviously have stopped them. The biggest thing they did was that they blew up the petrol storage facility in Maseru. Nobody was hurt because it was triggered off by an initial explosion which warmed the petrol line, and the security guards all fled when they saw that happening. Anybody who was within 200 metres of the explosion, I mean, everybody in Maseru thought it was like a hydrogen bomb! You know, there was an enormous explosion in the sky! So it had a big psychological effect, and it continued until Leabua was finally overthrown. He was ultimately overthrown by the military, who had been tipped off by the South Africans that they would be happy to see a military coup in Lesotho; although probably there was also an infighting, because there were two armies in Lesotho at the time. The main Lesotho defence force was very angry that there was a second defence that was so called the 'military group', which was a youth wing of the BNP, who had been armed and trained by the North Koreans. When the defence force found out that they could not discipline this group, they went and staged the coup, and then they were in full control.

South African political parties for one thing operated in Lesotho and they produced periodicals from Lesotho. The PAC periodical was the Africanist, I think. It was operated and published in Lesotho for a while, though ultimately, they were relocated to either London, East Germany, or other places like that, where the publications were coming from. Lesotho acted as a distribution point because they were sent through to Lesotho. It was dangerous because the South Africans sabotaged the parcels, and we had bomb explosions in which people were injured seriously as a result. For example, Phylis Naidoo, an exile, and another person were both seriously injured, by parcels coming from East Germany, in the parcel explosion of Sechaba.

Regarding the part played by the church, I don't think any church has been in favour of apartheid. It does not square with Christian doctrine. Often they got involved by giving shelter to refugees in Lesotho, supporting them in one way or another by allowing them to attend their schools. For example, in the case of refugees from the 1976 Soweto uprising, the churches played quite a significant role.

On this particular campus, the person who played a major role was somebody called Michael Lapsley. There is a biography of him, ultimately, but it doesn't say much about his years at the university, I think a lot more could have been said. Michael Lapsley was from New Zealand, and had been in the university in Durban, but probably because of his sympathies with the black South Africans, his visa was not renewed. So, instead of going back to New Zealand, he came here as an Anglican chaplain, but at the same time he registered as a student; he was very active in the student politics, and he became, I think, president for the SRC. During the time he was president of the SRC, he led a strike against the university administration; because of that the SRC were excluded from the campus by the university authorities, but he gave them refuge in the Anglican Chaplaincy. It was not clear whether the Anglican Chaplaincy was part of the campus or not. He ran a revolution called "the sociology of empowerment". That is a long story, but it led to a commission of inquiry and some members of the Sociology Department were reprimanded but the main thing was that he was very much in favour of the armed struggle in South Africa because he preached the doctrine of a just war. He said 'for so many years people put up with Hitler but ultimately it was necessary to go to war with him. For so many years, people put up with apartheid and nothing has happened'. I think he publicly joined the ANC saying he was becoming a member of the ANC. Can you imagine an Anglican priest being very militant?

Ultimately of course it was very tragic really when the Maseru raid took place in December 1982, I think, when the South Africans came in and killed a number of ANC but incidentally killed a lot of Basotho, innocent Basotho. And I should say they killed a lot of innocent ANC as well because most of those ANC people were schoolchildren and students. It was a terrible occasion because they killed children and women as well. At that time Michael Lapsley happened to be in his home in New Zealand, and we heard that he condemned what had happened in Lesotho, on New Zealand television. The Anglican Church was worried that he might come back to

Lesotho, and they were afraid that if there was another raid on Lesotho, the Anglican Chaplaincy at the university would become a target, because there were a number of South African students who were staying at the Anglican Chaplaincy on campus here. So, they send him a message telling him not to come back. However he came back and said that he never got the message. When he arrived Donald Bisto, the South African Bishop, was there at the airport to meet him, told him that he had to leave immediately. But he argued, 'When does the church flee from adversity?' He said it was the duty of the church to minister to those who are suffering as a result of the raid; and so he was not going to leave for something like six weeks. I went to his farewell party which was on the campus here, and it was boycotted by the Anglican Church. Ultimately he ended up in Zimbabwe, where he received a letter bomb and lost one arm. Presently he is in Cape Town, where he ministers to the victims of trauma. He is a very brave man; he even drives around.

Desmond Tutu was on the staff of the university (UBLS/NUL). He came in January 1970, and stayed for two or three years lecturing in theology. This is actually the only university in which he was a lecturer, because all his other appointments were ecclesiastical. So he was one of the links that we had with the South African struggle for freedom.

There is also Lesotho's relation with South Africa, but of course this was quite separate from internal politics. Lesotho High School was an important place; then it was Basutoland High School. They employed three very interesting people. They had Zeth Motapeng who later became the leader of the ANC, Ntsu Mokhehle who was, I think, already or becoming the leader of the BAC which eventually became the BCP, and the third was B.M. Khaketla who was one of the best writers amongst them, a novelist and a poet, and he founded the newspaper Mohlalani, which wrote about the colonial administration. The colonial administration expelled them all from Maseru. And Khaketla went to Kronstat, Zeth Motapeng must have left I think the quiet way. So you see right through we had a group of people who became prominent later.

The South Africans actually raided Maseru twice. There were also other occasions when there were incursions into Lesotho soil. When the South African defence force carried the raid they could hardly disguise what was going on because they landed in helicopters. What exactly happened in the 1982 raid has not been fully written about, but I think somebody could make a research on it one, and get more details. They might even be able to find some members of the South African defence force who were white members or even black members, because there were some, who might talk about what happened, after all these years.

What we believe happened is that, a few days before, some of them checked into hotels in Lesotho, in civilian clothes, and the day before they went around in cars looking for the targets. Then the other group, who were armed, landed by helicopter and were then taken to the spots which had been previously identified, you see.. They killed one of the university staff, who was our librarians, thinking she was Limpho Hani. You see Chris Hani lived in Lesotho in exile for quite a long time. He

married Limpho. Limpho Hani was a Mosotho. The South Africans even attempted to assassinate Hani when he was here. They sent a black South African to assassinate him, but the person they sent was very incompetent, and he blew himself up outside Hani's house, but Hani was not at home when it happened. You can see the house when you drive on the road to Maseru. It was at Lithabaneng where this man blew himself up and lost a leg. The SADF tried to kill Limpho, but they got the wrong flat; although they announced that they killed her, they were lying because they had killed the wrong woman. The woman they had killed was the daughter of Ramabitso, one of the members of BNP who was a government minister. His daughter was a trained librarian, and she had just come back from training in London.

So the 1982 raid was it done on specific targets which they had already identified or was it random? Everybody was in a state of shock. Basically what they did was that they knew various addresses of people, and I think the day before they had gone around to those addresses to see where they were. Some of them were houses rented by ANC but they had moved somewhere else six or four months earlier, and Basotho were living in those houses at the time of the raid. They just killed the people inside, without asking them who they were; just assuming they were ANC. In one case there was a South African doctor who was visiting friends in Lesotho, and he had come through the border post quiet legally the day before to meet friends of his. He was one of the people killed because he just happened to be sleeping there that night.

I was working in the Institute of Southern African Studies (ISAS) at the time, and I had an assistant in ISAS, a South African exile from East London; he moved to Canada eventually. I don't think he has come back. His brother was one of the people who were killed in the raid. We were doing clippings for the press at the time, and it was very detailed. It was a very detailed list including all the people who were killed. The thing was, a lot of those ANC people were walking under synonyms and aliases, but we knew who they were. So I asked him if he really wanted to work on that because it must have been very distressing for him. He had to go to the mortuary to identify his brother after the raid. But he said he was going to do it, as he would like to have it done accurately. He was able to decide the synonyms for me, and we were able to get the index to those clippings.

They were buried in Seputana cemetery, a special place in Maseru, and Oliver Tambo came to the funeral service. He flew over South Africa at considerable risk in order to come to the funeral. I think a few are still buried there, but progressively, in the last ten years or so, they have been interred to their own homes in South Africa, where they have been solemnly reburied. There may still be about eight or ten in the graves there.

The secretary of the ANC also came. I remember he came twice; they were able to fly in because we had a direct flight to Maputo. That was the way the refugees were flying from Maseru to Maputo. The North Koreans, the Russians and practically everybody else came through Maputo using the national airline, Lesotho Airways. I think all of those flights were probably Lesotho Airways flights. There was a direct

flight to Botswana as well. Air Botswana used to fly to Lesotho at one point. But Air Botswana used to serve as a SADC airline because it flew from Gaborone to almost all the SADC capitals. That was before SADC enlarged.

On whether Lesotho was rewarded. Well, obviously the fact that South Africa has changed is a reward in itself. During the apartheid struggle it got a lot of help and aid because of a lot of sympathy for its plight. To have been seen as being right in the belly of apartheid obviously helped Lesotho quite a lot. When South Africa normalised, Lesotho lost a lot of aid; I suppose you could say it was transferred to South Africa. Many of the diplomatic missions relocated to South Africa. All the Eastern Bloc countries left; the Germans left; the Swedes left; Britain eventually left, but for other reasons. All that was left were China, Libya, Ireland and the United States. So Lesotho's importance diminished after that.

The question that was being asked after that was "What should Lesotho's role be in the new South Africa?" Now that is very controversial, and if you really want to find out you probably ought to have a referendum; but in the meantime the Basotho have in many cases decided themselves, that it is preferable to live in South Africa, and many, particularly those with relatives in South Africa, have left. We had lost half a million people in the last census; half a million less than were expected to be in Lesotho. Probably more than half of that figure could have been the result of the impact of AIDS. But a significant part is due to people who left for South Africa.

Now some of the mine workers can legally settle in South Africa after working there for five years. A number of other Basotho have been able to pretend they are South Africans. They have a system whereby a person at the age of, I think sixty years, if you are a woman, can get a pension of M800 a month, which is quite significant. Of course there is also the child support grant in South Africa, where any poor person with children under the age of fourteen, gets R200 a month for each child up to I think a maximum of three children. I've forgotten all the rules exactly but there are a number of financial incentives. So lots of people have left Lesotho because of that. Education and primary education is free here, although a lot other things which you pay for here, are free in South Africa. So if you had referendum here many Basotho might vote for Lesotho being part of South Africa. There are some people who are of the view that we should get back the conquered territory we lost, but possibly the way to do that is for Lesotho to absorb the Orange Free State.

Lekhanya, Justin Metsing

[Maseru; 9 December 2007]

Retired Major General Justin Metsing Lekhanya was born in 1938. After a stint as a migrant mine worker in South Africa, Lekhanya joined the Basutoland Mounted Police in 1960. He became the only Mosotho heading a paramilitary Police Mobile Unit platoon after its formation in 1965. In the early 1970s he received further training at police academies in Scotland and the United States of America. In 1974 he assumed command of the Police Mobile Unit as a Major-General and saw its transformation in 1980 into the Lesotho Paramilitary Force and, later, Lesotho Defence Force. Following tensions within the uniformed forces, Lekhanya became the choice of army officers who mounted a coup against the Basotho National Party government (BNP) of Chief Leabua Jonathan on 20 January 1986. And for four years he was the chairman of the Military Council which governed through a Council of Ministers until he was forced to resign by members of the armed forces in 1991. He eventually took over leadership of the BNP, the party he had overthrown in 1986, and in 2002 the BNP contested and lost all 80 constituencies. Lekhanya still leads the BNP as its leader. In the days of apartheid, Lekhanya was charged with establishing a strong Lesotho Defence Force (LDF), where he was in charge of training. LDF shared information with the African National Congress operatives who were in the country as refugees. All the refugees in the country at the time were under his direct protection, and that is how he knew Chris Hani, whom they had to keep in a cell for three months because apartheid South Africa was hunting him all over.

Let me start by saying that Chief Jonathan had worked in the mines. He had had the taste and the feel of the wrath of apartheid. He was a strong believer of freedom of all peoples; freedom of mainly the African people, because we were sort of oppressed by the minority white rulers of Southern Africa. So, Lesotho, having been an enclave in South Africa we had to struggle. We were hit the hardest by the sanctions. When our brothers and sisters there were getting the brunt of apartheid in South Africa, we were only a step outside South Africa. We always admire this old man, Jonathan. He stood his ground; he did not allow refugees here to be returned to South Africa, even when they wanted comrade Chris Hani badly, and they wanted him badly. He was a good man, and a good operative who was well trained and disciplined. I had the honour to be very close to him. He was a Christian like me, and he was a Roman Catholic. Do you know that Catholics make the best communists because of their strict rules and discipline? The South African apartheid regime wanted nate Leabua to hand over the ANC, particularly, Chris Hani, so that they could hand over Mokhehle and his LRA, to him in return. LRA was supported by the South African apartheid regime, and it was in the program of their programme of trying to destabilise all of Southern Africa, in fact, the whole of Africa. I don't know if you are aware that they were even involved in Nigeria. They were involved in Biafra.

On 19 August 1981 Lesotho's Foreign Minister Mocki Molapo met South Africa's Foreign Minister. According to Molapo the SA Foreign Minister produced photographs of an LRA training camp in QwaQwa. They were trying to blackmail us

that we will give you the LRA; we will give you Mokhehle if you give us the refugees. Ntate Leabua said, 'No ways!' The advantage that this old man had was the wisdom not to build a refugee camp. They could have been kidnapped. They could have been massacred like in 1982. But this old man never agreed; he never allowed that. We knew all about the operatives. Our task, given by Jonathan himself, was to work with the operatives in order to protect them.

Ntate Chris Hani was one of them. We had to keep him in a cell because they were hunting him like anything. We kept him in a cell at the headquarters for three months. So he had to disappear completely otherwise they could have got him. I am so sorry that when he left for a new South Africa he was assassinated in his home. I felt very bad.

Fortunately all of us, even with the King, could see on this score. King Moshoeshoe II had agreed, because they had the foresight that one day, South Africa would be free. They had that foresight, even under those circumstances that were very difficult and very unhealthy for Lesotho.

We were also hit by the sanctions that were applied to South Africa to try and change the apartheid regime. Even on the 1982 incursion, the askaris who came in were infiltrators who came to infiltrate the ANC, the operatives and everybody, in order to get firsthand information. If you take the 1982 incursion, where 42 people were killed, 12 Basotho and 30 ANC, they had correct information. They had guides who lived with them, who lived with the ANC or Basotho, and they knew exactly where they were going. That operation taught us that we were deeply infiltrated, but fortunately we had very good commanders. We had very strong people like the kinds of Chris Hani. Knowing that they were infiltrated, I even offered to look after them directly, in liaison with the Prime Minister.

We knew when they were going to attack. We had vibes and information. We had a facility of taping their radio communications, and we had a very strong radio network here, both FM and VHF. So whatever code they used, we were able to disseminate their information at these frequencies. Some of the radios came from the Soviet Union and some of them came from China.

For instance in high schools when I took my first daughter who was born in 1963 to high school in Pitseng, I found that in our high schools we had more than 60% of South African children running away from Bantu education. At the university campus we had 25%. Even the students at the university were carrying a heavier burden, because they were given more support than our local students. This is why sometimes it was quite a struggle. Lesotho played a very important role.

Some people don't know what really happened out there. We are just a step away, across the border, within a stone's throw. Even when they wanted to come and hit them in here, we were very close. It was very easy for them. So we sometimes had to apply through the United Nations High Commission for Refugees to move them a little further away, which was better for them. Some of them felt bad that we moved them away, to Zambia or some other country, but it was for their safety.

Travelling was very difficult for us. At one time I was carrying five passports, all of them Lesotho - an international passport, an official passport, a diplomatic passport, and so on, because in some countries, let us take Libya for instance, we were not allowed to leave the transit lounge in Libya, with South African stamp in our passports. In 1966 Lesotho and Apartheid South Africa, was a very difficult question. We used to say they were neighbours. You can chose friends but you can't chose neighbours. We had to live with them. We had people from outside or from schools abroad; some of them had to be confined in transit; some of them had to be subjected to interrogations. It was very difficult to get out of here and get in there. It was a big problem with our Lesotho passports, because they were doing all in their power to try and harass Basotho. After Mozambique was forced to sign the Nkomati Accord, we had a meeting between ntate Leabua and P.W. Botha at the Peka Bridge. Ntate Leabua said, "No never." He did not agree to sign that thing. And he said, "Ok, wait...wait a minute. Let me consult". He was very clever. He was never forced to sign anything without having one or two pitsos. We used to have a big gathering. And he would say, "Ok here comes the Boers with this agreement. They want me to sign an agreement." And we would say "No don't do it." He then said, "I don't do it, yes I will not do it." Then he'll never touch them. He was very clever.

The relationship was neighbourly. We had to go through with them. When we were hit by famine like we are now. We had to go and get maize and everything from out there; when it was about planting season we had to go and get seed and fertilizer from there. We had no choice. We had to go through there. Let me put you in the picture here, for instance the old man went to Liberia. He was given tons of oil, crude oil. The ship came into Maputo, but South Africa did not allow that crude oil to get into Lesotho. As it was crude oil, they could not allow it to be processed in their refineries, so we had to refine it in Maputo; we had to sell it and all the by-products in Maputo and only get some other commodities in kind. We couldn't get the oil through to Lesotho. They said "No, not even on our trains. We shall never allow that oil to travel on our railways lines." It hardened our attitude so much. The majority of Basotho felt very bad about the apartheid regime.

I am glad that we have just celebrated Jonathan's award that was awarded to him by Friends of Oliver Tambo very recently. He was just as brave as O.R Tambo himself. Can you imagine O.R. Tambo coming here for a funeral? Jonathan sent the King out to the UN to go and condemn the atrocities of the South African apartheid regime. Ntate, relations were very tense. They never really warmed up, but we had to live with them because they were our neighbours, our one and only neighbour. We wish that we could have had a corridor maybe to the sea or to another country. If we had been bordered by another country, life would have been much easier for us. Imagine, if we got opportunity to study in the Eastern bloc we were exiled. You know people like Dr Raditapole. She was exiled because she went to study in the Soviet Union and Egypt. She could not come home.

This is why we really formed that institute of so called Frontline States. Lesotho was said to be behind the enemy line. We did not even deserve to be called a frontline state, because we were behind the enemy line. We were really held hostage. It was a hostage kind of relationship, if you want to put it that way. It felt so bad sometimes when we got to our brothers and sisters and said “No! How can you survive?”

South Africa came out strongly as an enemy and we had to establish the Lesotho Defence Force. That is where I started training my guys. I went for training in the United States. As a person, Lekhanya wanted Southern Africa liberated. We wanted to share information with the ANC operatives that were in the country. In some cases I had to make sure that they would not be ambushed, or it was not a trap laid for them, because they were highly infiltrated. We were using all our resources through the military intelligence, which I also established, the National Security Services. We had to keep our eyes and our ears open all the time because our job was to protect their lives. They were here as refugees. They were under my direct protection. That is how I got to know Chris Hani.

We were sharing some ammunition dumps with them. That is how we established a relationship with East Germany, where we got most of our AK47s. That is how we got through to Cuba, because we were assisting the liberation movement. This is how we got related with Denmark and Sweden; those three countries played the most pivotal role to have Southern Africa liberated. That is how we got so friendly with the late Samora Machel, may his soul rest in peace. He was a liberator, that man; he was a fighter, that man. It is a pity we lost people like that. He loved Ntate Leabua Jonathan Well we were loyal contributors towards the liberation struggle; financially, materially, or as humanly as possible. We were paying our dues to the liberation struggle office in Tanzania regularly. We were the most regular contributors. Every time we went to international symposia, seminars and conferences, we had a minimum of US\$50 000 in our pockets, to give to the ANC. The last time I met with comrade Zuma and the late O.R. Tambo, it was in Angola. I used our own private plane.

Basotho are free people. They do not want to see anybody oppressed. The main object was one day, someday we will see South Africa free. One day, someday we will see apartheid destroyed. One day, someday we will find ourselves free, because our freedom meant nothing without our brothers and sisters. If you check the relationship between Basotho in Lesotho, we go as far north as northern Transvaal. I've got cousins there, direct cousins there, let alone the Free State. The other motivation was, we have got this conquered territory that nobody, no white man talks about it. Then we thought maybe the borders will one day be removed. We will one day be one people again. That one day we will be having one government. That one day we were going to have one currency. That one day were going to have one religion.

At the university, they were influencing our local students to become rebellious or whatever. They played such a pivotal role in support of the liberation struggle, because we had liberation movement guys studying there. We had liberation movements sometimes housed in there, getting communication to the outside world from there.

The South African liberation movements were getting more. They were paid more than the local students. People like Tito Mboweni studied in Roma and married here. People like Tokyo, Ramahloli and the rest. We were really preparing them. The Deputy President (Pumuzile Mlambo). We were really preparing them that one day someday they will be free. Collectively the whole campus played a very important role.

Above all our people died with those cadres of the liberation struggle. People were kidnapped. People were killed. The highest price was human life. I don't think anything compares with human life. The cost of human life was quite high. I don't have figures, of people who were directly involved, losing their lives because of the liberation struggle. They are quite many. I will remember some names of the people who were even kidnapped. But nate Leabua fought tooth and nail to bring them back. Others like those who were kidnapped from Qacha's Nek. The others were kidnapped in Bloemfontein. It was not the first time in 1986 when they closed the borders. I think it was the second or third time. We realised we couldn't last three days. We could not last three days. I was watching here in 1986 watching cars queuing there at the filling station. I said 'oh my God at one point one drop, the last drop will be dished out'. People bringing groceries perishables. They were turned back there on the side on the other side of the border. Not only here but even Ficksburg and all over. Food stuff was rotting and they were being dished out and thrown out here.

Lesotho rewarded? That's the most difficult question. It is the most difficult question because South Africa is now free we are all happy. The best reward is we are happy that it is free. The personal reward that would go to Lesotho and Basotho, unfortunately we don't feel it is even being appreciated. Rather than being rewarded we are feeling very sorry that we are being forgotten. We have become a forgotten legend. But anyway the brighter side of it is when we go and contact these comrades out there. They do remember. The last time we went we met with President's spokesman Ngonyama and the secretary general nate Mohlanthe. Really he said 'what changed us to have gone further in collaborating with Lesotho and trying to alleviate the poverty that Basotho are in. We are ashamed of what happened in 1998. It was the worst mistake ever. It was not more than a month after nate Mandela had just said "never again will Lesotho be attached from South African". Ntate Mbeki has said he will take trouble to see that poverty is alleviated in Lesotho. We have not seen him doing anything tangible to date really. He was reminded when we inaugurated the Mohale dam. I was there talking about a certain program that will sort of help Basotho alleviate poverty.

The biggest disappointment is that of our internal conflicts though normally they say they do not want to interfere with local internal troubles. But what made them come in 1998?

But one day we would like to have collaboration like in agriculture during Leabua's time. The farmers around Free State collaborated with Basotho farmers on this side and we improved the yield in farming, on maize planting, wheat farming and in everything. They were bringing their tractors in. We were paying for them and they were bringing fertilizers, taking loans on fertilizers and seed. So, we were really

changing or improving on the quality of the yield and the quantity of yield, so that Basotho can be able to feed themselves.

Why don't we remove this border? This is an artificial thing. Why don't we remove this border? Does it mean that criminals from South Africa will come and hibernate in Lesotho? Basotho would not allow them to do that. Do you mean that criminals will cross the border from Lesotho and go and hide in South Africa? There is this criminal exchange treaty. We have got the extradition treaty. You can get anybody anywhere in this country.

Ideally, I'm looking at the total economic integration; may be a federal political situation. Economically, we are really one thing. No country is an island. I would like to see a total economic integration.

About the role of women; as you realize that women are mothers in the houses. They were the ones that were making bread for us to break it together with our comrades in here. Over and above that, we have women who were directly involved. In the massacre of 1982, there were women there Miss Ralebitso and a few others, who were involved. Even if it was not direct political involvement, they had to become politically involved at the end of the day. I remember a couple of women, one of them was a Xhosa woman in Lesotho by the name of Nomaquetha Xachela. She originally came from the Republic; that woman was strong. It is a pity you find that there is no consideration, while they had suffered so much. There were many that suffered. Basotho women suffered a lot but now nobody remembers about them. They really played a very important role.

Well the church had a role to play; the Anglican and Roman Catholic as well as the Lesotho Evangelical Church. They were all quite protective because they hid people, and they protected people who were being molested. Archbishop Desmond Tutu, got the Bishop-hood from Lesotho. He was in here. So if you can take Bishops like Tutu, his predecessor ntate Makhetha, his successor ntate Mokhukhu, they all played a very important role.

Even the schools like Lesotho High School, Maseru High School, I have mentioned Roma, Lerotholi Technical Institute. Our LTI was very useful throughout because all the students wanted to learn skills. In some of those skills, science schools and LTI, they were very helpful in mixing explosives. Science laboratories were helping them to manufacture lots of explosives. They learned to make bombs even from fertilizer. They used to make their own detonators. Yeah it was very interesting.

Lesotho did not provide any bases for Umkhonto We Sizwe. That we found to be fatal to their safety. But we used to take some of them covertly inside our armies. That was the most dangerous of all and at times we tried to avoid it. But they continued covertly, underground. They used to be allowed to do some training. They had to have some new recruits, give them orientation on the use of weapons and explosives and that was it. We never had a base per se, because we knew we were highly infiltrated. No open bases because we were even forced to make a law that was passed and a statute stopping that. It was called 'violence abroad'. Like I said we even shared some

ammunition dumps. In the main, some weapons that we got from East Germany and Cuba were meant for us to assist the liberation movement. So that is why we ended up having AK47s from East Germany and some other weapons. Some weapons were terrible, they were meant for us to stand against South Africa. I was flying them in from Maputo, straight from Maputo most of the time; I was passing them in front of their noses. They heard that some of the boxes were still marked agricultural equipment. They passed through Durban marked agricultural equipment like, you know, like putting a couple of these hand driven tractors. And in there I would be having more than six, seven, ten canons or twelve canons. I flew in tonnes of arms and ammunition directly from Maputo. So whatever communications, the only thing we had to do it was to get it directly from Maputo. We had favour of the role that Mozambique played in assistance to Lesotho and assistance to the struggle. The first time I met Mugabe was in Maputo, Mozambique. That guy was eating from my hand. It's a pity he is doing this to his country now. I'm feeling bad. He was eating from our hands.

Lesotho was playing a major role because we were the only stepping stone from South Africa from whether the east or the west or north. You had only to run to the border and jump. You just cross on foot. You don't need a bridge. You don't need a fence. You just walk through. There's no fence. You won't even see where the border is. They pulled out the entire fence.

We feel proud of the success that Basotho achieved. We would benefit a lot by integration. But we will also benefit a lot by maintaining our sovereignty, our uniqueness. Like we said the Free State is called Free State because they did not fight for it. It is Basotho land. They did not fight for it. You look at the border lines; they have been changing them going back and forth back and forth. I think people like Basotho did not get real recognition. Maybe we could benefit by removing passports and removing border control points. Let us try to educate our people politically. Let us try to remove borders where there were no borders before; and let us have freedom of movement. My quest is freedom of movement, economic integration.

Malebo, Vincent Moeketse

[Maseru; 8 December 2008]

Vincent Moeketse Malebo was born in 1935. Teacher, civil servant, diplomat, Cabinet Minister and a political party leader, Malebo has a diverse career. Malebo was a senior interpreter in the colonial government. After 1966, Malebo served in London and the United Nations as a diplomat. He also served in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Information and Broadcasting. In 1991 he became leader of the Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), but did not put up a good show in the 1988 and 1993 elections. His new party, the New Lesotho Freedom Party, again had a poor performance in the 2002 elections.

I would even say God willed it that Lesotho should remain a little patch which looks independent and sovereign, and Lesotho was ready in terms of its history and in terms of its position and in terms of the will of the people to accommodate South Africans who were fleeing apartheid into Lesotho. The Basotho were willing to receive them.

I like to tell many people that we protected South Africans with our bodies and not with our guns, just here at the corner I will show it to you, here in this yard here, the South Africans came in with muffled guns to kill refugees, one of these refugees was actually working in a school, Sefika High School. She came from Natal and I knew she was a refugee. I took her but she came to be killed here with muffled guns one night and I heard it and I came out and I called the police. We had an obligation to protect the refugees; we had an obligation to protect them. I came out, I waited for the police to come; we found them dead and those South Africans had run away.

After 1982 there was a second attack and that attack was also here; it was inside Hoohlo. They had followed them to up to this place. It was an important role, and I know it because I was in Foreign Affairs, at some stage as a chief of protocol, and also as the Principal Secretary; but that doesn't matter, we saw South Africans come in. They reported their presence there and they moved. We never ever worried about them, we knew they had to come, we knew they had to go, we knew that they had to disappear in Lesotho, we knew that. We even gave them passports, I used to go to Mozambique and when I went to Mozambique, to get foreigners who were running away into Lesotho; I would tell South Africa that I'm in a plane X, flying into Mozambique, and that I will be coming back. So, you see, this is what we did.

The motive for supporting the South African struggle was clear. It was so that we could get to be free, with South Africa there was no freedom, Lesotho was not free; it was really a hostage country and we wanted to see that hostage position removed completely.

The churches, the Anglican Church in particular played a role. The Catholic Church also played an important role. I belong to LEC, I know they also worked really hard to support the Liberation struggle; they sheltered the people, they made their own humble contributions, I know that for a fact, and the most important, the institution

of monarchy in this country played an important role. The King of this country went out of his way to make sure the refugees were welcomed and were well looked after.

The cause for supporting was that we could not stay out of the struggle because we were not free in the position we were in, with the South Africans across the border. The Basotho were killed for offering that help; because they kept the refugees in their homes, they were bound to be killed. There were some collaborators, you know, the espionage was very strong, I know they even knew that the man called Chris Hani. Chris Hani was one of the leading members of the ANC Communist Party, who was fighting, and they knew he was one of the activists in Lesotho. I remember one day I had gone out to South Africa with my Minister Molapo. Molapo was at school with my big brother, in the University of Cape Town. They did law together so we went out to Pretoria and my Minister rode in a different car from mine. In my car there was, the Director General of the Foreign Affairs, and I said to him, my dear Chair, what do you think you have to ask me. He said to me, "If only you could be a person about that man, his name starts with an 'H', then you will know very well." He was referring to Chris Hani, yes, and then I said to my Minister, "Minister be careful, guess who's coming, Chris Hani." Because we had been invited to go to South Africa, that was the only matter to be dealt with there, and there was a big fight, where these two colleagues were now fighting over and he said, "How can I release a man to you to come and get killed?" Yes, he was very blunt, I loved Molapo. I had great respect for him, he said, "How can I? How do you expect me to release Chris Hani to be killed by you? I'm not going to do it!" That is how strongly we felt about this whole saga of apartheid.

Talking of reward. No, Lesotho has not been rewarded. South Africans know that they can afford to pay that money for the reparations for the attack to Lesotho, but they are not doing it. We had to beg them to return the status of free movement on the borders, which was stopped in 1948, and they are still reluctant. Last night I went out and I found them asking for passports and whatever else; they were still asking for passports. Why should they do that? They still think we are strangers to this country. We have not been paid back. But worse still was when South Africa, in 1998, agreed to send a whole army and went straight to the Lesotho Highlands, and killed people there; they killed soldiers, they came back into Maseru. Of course they know it is not easy to come into Maseru and start doing things, so they had to apply the scotched earth policy.

The disappointment of Lesotho with South African independence, in my own view, is that the first statement that I heard coming from the President of South Africa was that he could only get a corridor to deceive; I was very surprised how he should think like a Boer. The Boers were saying the same thing; this man (Mandela) does not recognize the fact that we are the same people. He doesn't see that we are the same people who came from the north, came out straight into Lesotho, went into the east, into the Transkei, into the Cape, we were some of the first people to work in the Cape. The South Africans still have got to learn; they still have a lot to do with their mindset;

they still think that we are foreigners from Holland. The foreigners from Holland are in South Africa, they are the wealthiest people. I am very disappointed and I am telling you what disappointed me the most. The first statement that was made to recognize that ANC was in power was that we could get a corridor. It is a disgraceful thing. This man had forgotten that before 1948 I was still free to move around going to South Africa and coming back without carrying any document; but now they are allowing corruption at the borders there. They get Basotho seized for crossing the border; once they see that people crossing the border are many, they block it, and then they take money from the people. Personally, I am very disappointed.

We give these people water; we are now giving them diamonds. Of course we are being stupid here, I think we are really being stupid about everything. We have to think. Let me tell you, I was part of that and we were told quite frankly. They had their own council, we had our own and every time we came together, I am never sure in my mind whether people were not taking instructions from somewhere else, in other words the military. The military has its own language, it was the military this side, the military that side, civilians this side, civilians that side, so we did not know. They could have been getting orders from somewhere, so I'm really taking an interview right here I wouldn't say this publicly because those were my colleagues. But with this interview I want to give you the benefit of my thinking because funny things happened. They were in a hurry; they said no let us do it quickly. Of course we came around and said ok, because we had to, and we had some reason to.

Yes, there were collaborators. There was the South African who gave an opportunity to a group of people in South Africa. Then there was one of them who called himself Sehlabaka. That man Sehlabaka happened to be a BCP man. I did not know him, but apparently people used to think that he was a fierce man, I was very surprised when I saw him. The white South Africans used our own people to penetrate every single grouping happening in Lesotho. They allowed them to cross the border at will and they protected them to go back; they knew when they were coming and they knew when they were going back. Sehlabaka was simply selling us down the river and we were moving there. Instead he told us he was bringing the South Africans into Lesotho. Yes he is still alive, in T.Y; he is in the Berea district. He was a Parliamentarian, he has always been a Parliamentarian and of course even today we still have Parliamentarians who were actually collaborating.

When I was a Chief of Protocol, for some unknown reason I went to church in T.Y and I sat I the back row, right at the back close to the door. Before sitting there for long, somebody touched me on the shoulder; I found it was a policeman. He told me that the Commissioner of Police wanted me in Maseru and he was sending a vehicle to pick me up. I asked him what was happening exactly, as we drove straight away, and he told me that there was shooting across the border, in between commandos and Litlhoaseng in Leribe. Our army was fighting with the SADF. So I picked up the phone, immediately and I spoke to a man called Busty Henson. They called me because I was the only person who could talk to the South Africans on Sundays. They

did not have their telephones but I had mine and I could speak to them anytime. I said to him, "Busty, what is happening here? Some people are shooting from across the border, they are shooting at our army in Leribe. Who are these people? He said, "Oh, I don't know." I asked, "Is it the group that you keep in Bethlehem?" He said was going to check. After five minutes they told me that he had sent the police to go and pick those people up. I asked, "Are you arresting them or are you taking them back to their normal residence?" They took them away and on Monday they took them to court and put them before the Magistrate. They were found guilty, but they were given their guns back and taken to Bethlehem. It was as bad as that. If this was happening to us, how then did South Africa send an army, air force, ground forces and whatever in 1998? How did they do it, in the name of elections? How do the South Africans do that when they are free? Why? And they caused such havoc! Do you know those people are the ones who burned our towns? People say it was us. It was not us; it was the South Africans who did it.

In terms of relations with South Africa, I think we have to join. No longer, and never just a mere relationship, but a real relationship of people who are bound by geography to be in an area. We cannot run away from the fact that Basotho are in fact South Africans; it is natural, it is historical. The fact is that we had missionaries that helped Moshoeshe I, using their diplomatic skills to preserve this country; although many people say that they preserved this area so that they could strike cheap labour, I don't share that view. I share the view that the missionaries were really keen to see Moshoeshe I survive, and Moshoeshe I wanted to survive, with his people. I think the priests had their own ulterior motive of spreading the word of God; that was the ulterior motive. I don't think that they had any motive of selling us to anybody. I really don't think so. Of course I know that when they came in they found us extremely difficult. They found that one of Moshoeshe's brothers was very, very hostile towards them. I could see that when I read, I find that the man was just too hostile. Some of the missionaries were beginning to get discouraged although this man turned around and gave in to be baptized before he died.

Maope, Kelebone Albert

Kelebone Albert Maope was born in 1945. He has had a diverse career as a lawyer, civil servant, university lecturer, Cabinet Minister, and recently as leader of the Lesotho Congress Party. He qualified as a lawyer in 1972 when he obtained the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. He began his career as a public prosecutor in 1972 before going into private practice in 1974. Then in 1978 he left Lesotho for further studies at the University of London where he obtained a degree of Master of Law in 1979. Upon his return to Lesotho, from 1979 he took up lectureship post at the National University of Lesotho until 1986, when he left the university to become Attorney General under the Military Government, with the mandate to guide the country towards democratic rule, as his major task. In 1990 he became the Minister of Law while he was still serving as Attorney General, holding the two positions at the same time, as he did under the military when he was both the Attorney General and Principal Secretary. He helped in drafting the constitution for the country, which culminated into the first democratic elections of 1993, after 23 years of dictatorial rule. In the new government, he became the first Minister of Law and Justice, then Minister of Agriculture and then Minister of Foreign Affairs. Instead of negotiating for a new relationship with the ANC government of Mandela, Maope emphasized reparations for the wrongs done to Lesotho. He left government service in September 2001 when he became an ordinary Member of Parliament as well as leader of a newly formed party, the Lesotho People's Congress.

Well, independence from foreign rule is first seen as a matter of pride. Every people would like to govern themselves, so I think that is the first benefit. But I must quickly say that it is not an easy responsibility on the part of the leadership of the country, Lesotho is geographically very disadvantaged, even at independence I notice when I read, that there were serious problems facing the country; but some of those problems are now behind us, although there are others which are still there.

Let us look back and see what major problems were facing the country at independence, in 1966, as far as politics and government were concerned. I think we had problems of conflict between the monarchy and the newly elected government. In other words, it was a question of what the relationship should be between the King and the Prime Minister; that was a major problem. The other, but related problem was between ministers of government and the traditional chiefs. The other problem was our relationship with South Africa. Lesotho was a predominantly black country, inhabited by black people, and then South Africa was inhabited by black people, but ruled by the white minority settlers, who were practicing apartheid; so those whites in South Africa did not tolerate any black country which was independent next to them, and that was a major problem. Then, there were the issues of economic development; Lesotho was virtually under-developed, in fact it had been deliberately under-developed by the British imperial authorities, so the question was how that country would survive economically.

Then, there was the cold war, and a country like Lesotho was supposed to choose its alignment among the big political powers of the world. So, it was not an easy

situation. I notice that now we have put some of these problems behind, because politically, in my view, we are doing well or we should be doing well, because the issue of the monarchy and the government has been settled; even the issue of the chiefs and the ministers as I mentioned, has been largely settled.

I think the constitution, since the passing away of King Moshoeshoe II, I think there is now stability, the relationship between the King and the Prime Minister is good; it has been ironed out through the constitution and there has been acceptance of the constitutional position on both sides. The issue of the traditional chiefs has also been largely settled through law, although I would say still a lot has to be done. It is an uneasy relationship, but I would blame the rulers of the country because they have not really ironed out the relationship. There is no willingness to abolish traditional chieftaincy, so its place in our society must now be settled through law. The conflict is no longer there because in the past even political parties were aligned along those lines, whether they supported traditional chieftainship or not; now it is not a big issue anymore. I should add that recently there was this democratic dispensation in South Africa that has been a big boost for Lesotho's relationship with that country, what remains, in my view, is the economic situation, because the country is economically in a bad state.

I can now say that the challenges of independence, at the moment are not unique to Lesotho as such. I think they are challenges that are facing all developing states within SADC, and also in the rest of the world. It is an issue of the relationship between the developed and developing world. Then there are new problems arising out of this so-called globalization of world economy. I think, we, as part of the developing world are in the same boat as any other developing country.

We have had our own problems; political problems of repression in the country because immediately after independence there was a lot of repression in Lesotho. But since 1993, after we restored democracy in the country, that problem is largely behind. There are still pockets of resistance against democratic rule, but I think we have largely put that behind us. The challenge now, in my view, is really the management of the affairs of the country. I think that is where we are poor; the management of public affairs, meaning management of finances, management of our economy and even management of our governance. I am sad to say that is still an issue of politics, which should not be really. We should be ahead, but I think it is still a problem.

Lesotho's relationship with South Africa was a most difficult one, but it also went through certain phases. At first the independent governance of Lesotho had what I might call friendly relations with the South African government. But as far as the mass of the people of Lesotho were concerned, they were victims of apartheid and indeed there was resistance from our people against apartheid South Africa, despite the government of Lesotho being friendly to apartheid South Africa. The reason simply being that the nature of apartheid was such that it did not matter, as long as you were a black person. It did not matter where you came from, whether you were a foreigner or not; the system suppressed your rights. So our people suffered, and

Lesotho continued in its traditional role of receiving foreigners who were persecuted elsewhere. I say it continued to play that role, because throughout the history of the country it has been like that, that people who were persecuted in Southern Africa fled here. In 1960 we saw political refugees running to Lesotho, members of the ANC and members of the PAC, they fled here and they were received. The government of Lesotho was not strong enough to protect them adequately, but they did receive protection here. Later in the 1970s, during those troubles about language in South Africa; it was in 1976, when hundreds of young people from South Africa fled to this country, again they were received, but then the government of Lesotho had changed its relationship with the government of South Africa. It was aligning itself with the democratic forces of the world; with the eastern countries. The South African regime became very vicious and we were subjected to attacks, which made our relationship difficult. So, it is a relief that now there is a democratic government in South Africa. The strange thing is that even as South African refugees found asylum here, the government in Lesotho was not democratic. From 1970 there was no longer any democracy here, and there was a lot of repression in Lesotho, but there were still people fleeing to this country. The Basotho National Party government was not democratic from 1970 but it was now accepting refugees who were finding asylum. I can say they were happy to be here, but in Lesotho there was no democracy, there was repression. We had this strange relationship where foreigners were happy, but the nationals were not happy. I notice this amongst those who are now in power in South Africa; there are two groups or two generations. There is the generation which came to Lesotho from the 1960s, who have a different understanding from the group which came in the 1970s. Those who came in the 1970s feel that the government was good, but those who came in the 1960s know that it was not good, not good at all.

The cost for supporting South Africa's liberation struggle was mainly related to the physical attacks which were made by South Africa in Lesotho in the 1980s. These were really very vicious attacks. But before that, I ought to state that the policy of the British when they deliberately under-developed this country, for the benefit of South Africa continued. I think that is the most damaging aspect of colonialism where Lesotho was deliberately made a labour reserve for the sake of South Africa I think that is the most damaging aspect of imperialism in Lesotho as well as South Africa. Particularly those parts of South Africa which were treated the same way as Lesotho. So apart from those attacks in the 1980s, I want to mention that the most enduring damage that has been done here is that which has been done by under-developing Lesotho. As a country we have to recover from that, and we cannot succeed unless South Africa comes to our assistance. In fact, not only because South Africa will be a nice country to do that, but they are really morally bound to do so because they have inherited the proceeds of our oppression, therefore they must pay us back.

Lesotho has not been rewarded for supporting South Africa's struggle. I don't think Lesotho has yet been rewarded sufficiently. In fact, the only significant contribution which South Africa has made towards the development of Lesotho, in my view, is the

Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme and ironically it is a scheme which was conceived during apartheid South Africa. I have yet to see a similar scheme which is conceived by the present democratic dispensation in South Africa. I observe that in South Africa the government is controlled by black people, by the black majority, which is how it ought to be, but I also notice that the economy is still controlled by the white people, who are behaving in the old mould of apartheid South Africa. As far as Lesotho is concerned, that is why we still see the retail outlets, in other words, white South Africa continues to regard Lesotho as being a mere market but they are not willing to invest in those areas which would uplift the country from its damaged economy. So, I think we have not yet been rewarded, but at least we have that agreement, between Lesotho and South Africa where South Africa is supposed to uplift the country by 2015 which is a good agreement. I am not so sure how it is being implemented.

I think we have contributed to the liberation struggle of South Africa and we have strangled apartheid as a result, and therefore we ought to benefit. We ought to see visible benefits, but do not. As far as labour matters are concerned, our people are still treated as if they were foreigners from say Nigeria, or Senegal. Our population is very small, and it would not matter if the borders between South Africa and Lesotho were opened because our people are so few it would make no impact on the South African economy. If you look at people say from Zimbabwe or from elsewhere in Africa, we are told that there are basically millions of refugees from Zimbabwe who have fled to South Africa. In Lesotho, we are not millions, we are only thousands, and so there would be no impact; there is no reason why we cannot freely seek employment in South Africa. That is why I say in terms of the economy, the South African economy is behaving as if it was still the apartheid economy.

There were collaborators of the apartheid regime during the liberation struggle. Unfortunately I am not privy to what really happened. I have heard it mentioned that the Basotholand Congress Party collaborated with apartheid South Africa, but I don't have sufficient information to be able to make a clear judgment about what really happened. What I can say is that the BCP was fighting a liberation war within Lesotho, and they had to operate from somewhere. It was a very difficult relationship because then there was South Africa, our only neighbour, so they really had to wage a war against the oppressive regime of BNP from South Africa; they had no alternative. So that is my comment which I can make.

I certainly would like to see a close relationship between Lesotho and South Africa at the moment. The question would be what kind of relationship. First of all, I think it must be an equal relationship; it must not be a relationship based on an unequal footing. We are both independent countries, therefore, in my view, the easiest relationship that we can have now, and I emphasize now, is that of economic cooperation. I would like to see economic integration of our economies. I've already mentioned the use of natural resources like water; yes, I would like to see that developing because that is really one of our main assets in this country. I would like to see the development of Lesotho's waters, but then we lack capital, and then I would expect that capital

to come from South Africa because our labour was used to develop that capital in South Africa, and also because South Africa consists of our people, I mean we cannot remove our countries from each other, so we ought to enjoy our resources together. We are just bound together and we can't part ways, but then I would expect equal development, equal economic development in Lesotho as well as in South Africa so that there is freedom of movement of people between our borders.

I want to pursue this issue of water a little bit. When you look at the topography of Lesotho, we occupy high ground in this region and then we are a source of fresh water. When you look at the rising population of Southern Africa you can see that within a few years the issue of fresh water will be very important. I am thinking of Botswana, Namibia, and also South Africa which are countries with some desert areas and rising populations. Therefore, they will need fresh water. Now what we do about that? It means Lesotho will become important as far as the water resources are concerned, it then means that the region, meaning SADC, ought to invest in the conservation of these resources in Lesotho, and therefore we do need capital. First of all to protect the environment so that the waters continue to flow, and secondly we ought to develop reservoirs and Lesotho is suitable for those reservoirs. We are then to release water as and when it is needed for the region; and Lesotho will benefit. I notice that there is some water in South Africa that is flowing into the sea, fresh water flowing into the sea, such water can actually be passed into Lesotho and stored there, and then it can be released as and when it is needed. In other words we can play a role for the benefit of Southern Africa, not just for Lesotho; but then we need capital.

I would like to see the closer co-operation, say in communications, electricity supply, and road infrastructure. The sea port of Lesotho is Durban, it is the nearest, and yet we have no access to that sea point. When you look at South Africa itself, if I take the city of Kimberley as an example, you can see that the nearest route from Kimberley to Durban is really through Lesotho. Therefore there is no reason why we can't have a road infrastructure through Lesotho to Durban. That is something that I would like to see happen here.

I would like to see the economy integrated; that way it becomes irrelevant whether Lesotho becomes part of South Africa or not. Some people are saying Lesotho should be a tenth province of South Africa. By the way, I dislike this idea of a province. Not that I wouldn't like Lesotho to have some political relationship with South Africa, but there are other kinds, other forms of relationship which preserve our dignity as a country, like a federation, or a confederation, or even becoming part of another province of South Africa. But this idea of a tenth province seems to me to be aimed at preserving the status quo of under-development. In other words, since we are already poor, then we are going to be counted amongst Eastern Cape, or Limpopo, and yet here is the Free State. Nobody says, 'No, why don't we become part of Free State?' Because if we became part of Free State it means then we would benefit from their developed economy and they would be bound to develop us, as a whole. But nobody

talks about that. I really dislike this idea of a province; but the easiest relationship is that of economic integration. That is my view, and I say this is overdue, but we are not doing much as it is now.

Mashologu, Mothusi Thami

[Maseru; 24 January 2008]

Mothusi Thami Mashologu is a graduate of universities in South Africa, the United Kingdom and Canada. He has had a wide career in Lesotho's public service. He is a former Pro-Vice Chancellor of the Lesotho campus of the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS). He personally witnessed the 1975 abrupt and rancorous break-up of UBLS which led to the formation of the National University of Lesotho in the same year. Mashologu now devotes much of his time to writing and publishing.

Thank you very much Mr Mushonga. I am happy to get to know you are trying to make a modest contribution to this important study. I would however want to record that I'm also aware that the exercise of recording recent history is not an easy task. Sometimes being very close to the scene possess certain clear complications for a study of this nature. I therefore participate on the understanding that there may be problems of perception and interpretation on my part, arising from the immediacy of the situation.

As you have correctly stated, I have been in the Lesotho public service. I first worked in the then Ministry of Home Affairs before independence. And it was a ministry or department which was directly exposed to the problems of apartheid and Lesotho because it handled the affairs of movement between Lesotho and South Africa, and issues such as the question of residence in Lesotho by people from outside, as well as trying to resolve difficulties of Basotho who were encountering difficulties when they wanted to travel to South Africa. One realised that the relations between Lesotho and South Africa were very complicated because there was a long and bitter legacy of bad relations, if one can put it that way, between the two countries at the time because of the colonial occupation of parts of Lesotho territory by white colonial settlers. So the issue of the so called conquered territory, which had been a running theme in political debate in Lesotho, and still is to some extent even today, was always manifested in some form or the other.

There was also the persistent problem of the treatment of Basotho especially in the mines of South Africa where they were being treated very badly by white South African supervisors at work. Then there were the problems at the borders, where our people were sometimes subjected to very cruel arbitrary treatment. Then for those Basotho who were living in South Africa they were very often exposed to the harsh raids for passports in the townships which in some instances led to their being thrown in jail, sometimes being subjected to kangaroo justice. Now, some of these issues ended up at our desks in the Ministry of Home affairs or the Department of Home affairs in those days. I then went to work in the Cabinet Office where one had again a much broader view of the very difficult and complex relations between Lesotho and South Africa. And finally when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lesotho was established I was one of the first officials, and of course one of the primary tasks was handling

the relations between Lesotho and South Africa at independence and in subsequent years. The major and underlying factor is the historical relationship, that Basotho have never felt comfortable with the white settler mentality that was evident in South Africa. The Basotho felt that they were part and parcel of the Southern African region. And the treatment that was being meted out to them as well as to their King, and in South Africa, was a major challenge to them. The Basotho exposure to the situation in South Africa is not only because of working principally in the mines, but also in South African factories. And many of us also attended schools in South Africa at institutions such as Hill Town, Lovedale, St. Matthews, Hillside and the University of Fort Hare. As a result, we had firsthand direct experience of apartheid in its raw forms and this meant that we could not ignore the existence of apartheid in our lives. Very unfortunately in Lesotho, itself there was a lot of discrimination, racial discrimination in the old days, even in the public service. The British administration seemed to have adopted some of these South African practises such as discrimination in salaries and in benefits. In public institutions such as hotels there was discrimination, post offices and naturally this gave rise to a lot of resentment among the Basotho. But overall, one can say the relationship between Lesotho and South Africa which eventually defined Lesotho's role. South Africa was its own worst enemy because of the treatment. It meted out to Basotho and because of the racial attitudes which Basotho could not and would not accept.

What one is trying to say is that Lesotho was not merely assisting in the liberation of South Africa but it was in fact participating in the liberation of Lesotho itself from the tentacles of apartheid and colonial attitudes. Therefore it was not simply a matter of Lesotho assisting. It was a matter of Lesotho participating in a major process of liberation. Therefore one says that Basotho have always identified themselves with the struggle to liberate Lesotho as well as South Africa because many of our political leaders used to say that Lesotho would never be free until South Africa is free. So, it is the role of Lesotho defined if you like, by geography as well as by history. When the Sharpeville event occurred, there were many refugees who came into Lesotho from South Africa. They were not merely refugees in the sense of running away from a situation. They were refugees also in another sense as people looking for a kind of base in which to regroup rethink their strategies. These people were welcomed here in Lesotho and they came from all the strands of political affiliations in South Africa. There were those who came from the African National Congress, there were those who came from the Pan African Congress, and then also from other movements, and others came as individuals. But they were welcomed in Lesotho and they were not treated as refugees in the sense of being put in camps. Those who were professionals were permitted to set up their professional offices as lawyers, as doctors and to teach as some of them were employed as. But it was clear that beyond the conduct of their personal lives, they were also continuing their struggle in South Africa and the Basotho were fully sympathetic and supportive of the efforts of these people.

The independence of Mozambique in 1974 and of Angola in 1975 opened a new dimension because then it was possible for South Africans to come into Lesotho as a staging point for travel to other neighbouring countries which had already received their independence and this particularly applies to Mozambique. The government of Lesotho established a very close relationship with the government of Mozambique and even opened an embassy in Mozambique, and then established air connections which enabled South Africans to travel to Mozambique directly via Swaziland by air and also to come back. And so this was a very important avenue of communication for the South African Liberation Movement. And as the struggle in Zimbabwe intensified there were many Zimbabwean's who came to study and to live in Lesotho while they also participated in the liberation struggle of their country. And in Zimbabwe and when this liberation had been achieved in 1980, direct air connections were established between Lesotho and Zimbabwe. And therefore many South Africans were able to travel abroad through Zimbabwe using air connection. And many people from abroad were able to come to Lesotho via Zimbabwe, to meet with South African cadres here in, in Lesotho.

I have already stated that the question of land is one which is still pending in Lesotho. The question was that the white settlers in South Africa were occupying what was Lesotho territory. And I think Basotho still have a strong feeling that there has to be land settlement of that land which is referred to as the conquered territory. Secondly the Basotho people felt that Lesotho's independence was incomplete because when they go to South Africa they are treated as incomplete human beings and subjected to all sorts of humiliations. It is a matter of regret that even after the liberation of South Africa the treatment of Lesotho citizens at the borders with South Africa sometimes leaves a lot to be desired, compared to the treatment of travellers in other borders such as in Europe and North America. Therefore, there are still some people who feel that the legacy of apartheid and colonialism unfortunately, still manifests itself in some of the attitudes of the South African officials at the borders.

Regarding access to educational institutions in South Africa, Basotho are people who value education and they are aware that there are highly developed and advanced educational facilities in South Africa. They have always wanted their children to have access to those institutions, but this was severely restricted during apartheid days. So, they felt that if apartheid was removed there would be better access. Indeed, today there are many Basotho studying courses which are not available at our own university, but are available in South African universities.

Basotho feel maybe some justification that they were historically exploited in some industries such as the mining industry, and think that they have some entitlement to share the benefits of development in South Africa, as equal citizens of the region. There is an integration of the economies which is historical and they feel that they were prejudiced in the sense of the sharing of the benefits of the economic development of South Africa. So Basotho really feel that they have a stake in the liberation of South Africa and it is a commitment which they still feel even to today.

Then there are ethnic ties. There are very few families in Lesotho who do not have relatives in South Africa; also in South Africa there are families who have relatives in Lesotho. There is mutual interest even at that level of family and clan relationships. So the links actually extended beyond South Africa to Botswana and Zimbabwe; and people feel that apartheid thrived on trying to cut these natural ties, which had existed for many, many years before, and which are now being revitalized since South Africa was liberated. There is a recognition that this is one region and people should be free to move in the in the region. A tourist who lands in South Africa should feel that he can drive, fly, or walk to Lesotho quite freely, and not be harassed at the borders, which was the situation in apartheid days. So Lesotho had an interest in the liberation of South Africa.

I do not think that Basotho were expecting reward in the sense of a thank you for whatever they had contributed. I think what they are, quite correctly expecting, is that they should be treated as human beings with full rights and entitlements to economic participation, to social participation, by way of participating in recreational and other activities. So, it is not as if South Africa owes a particular debt for whatever Lesotho did. It is that the new dispensation has to deliver on its promise of a full life for all citizens regardless of race, colour or creed. I think that is the basic thing. Basotho are now able to buy property in South Africa; they are working in South Africa, their children are studying freely in South Africa. Therefore they feel that this is what it should be, so long as they are treated as full human beings, with the proper dignity that is due to them as human beings, and as citizens of a region.

It is not easy, as Africans say, for a finger to point at itself. But I think my personal role was not greater than that of other Basotho, because as I indicated in our discussion last time, all Basotho were to a greater or lesser extent forced by circumstances to participate in some way or other in the struggle for the liberation of South Africa. It was quite clear, right from the onset that Lesotho's independence could not have its full meaning until South Africa was liberated. I happen to be at the National University of Lesotho at a critical stage; I went to the university in 1975. You may recall that in 1976 there was the Soweto student uprising, which resulted in many students from South Africa having to find alternative avenues of education outside South Africa. A fair number came to Lesotho, and it was a policy of the government, strongly supported by the public, that all possible assistance should be given to these students. Therefore, being at the university, I found myself participating in the extension of assistance to these students.

The assistance took many forms. Those who were already at university at places like the University of the North, the University of Fort Hare, and could no longer continue, we had to arrange for them to continue with their studies at the National University of Lesotho. The Senate and the Council agreed that up to 20% of the student enrolment should be students from South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique. We had well over a thousand applications from students from these countries. We were not able to accommodate that number; many of them seemed to

be potentially well qualified students but we had a limitation of facilities, especially accommodation. The university received a lot of external assistance, so that it could play its role towards the students from the Southern African region. It took many forms. There were scholarships which were offered by various organizations. Many of them were channelled through the United Nations Development Program (UNDP); others came from the World University Service (WUS), and other agencies of that kind so that the students were not lacking for scholarship support.

Secondly, when it transpired that accommodation was a serious limiting factor, some governments actually contributed funds for the construction of residences on campus. For instance, the Nigerian government donated the Murtala Hall of residence, and the Danish government contributed to what was later called Africa Hall; both were very welcome contributions to support the university. The members of staff found that they were challenged to give some remedial courses, especially in areas such as English language and mathematics to some of the students, to upgrade them so that they could continue with their studies at the National University of Lesotho. I must say that the members of staff sometimes contributed their time free of charge for this extra effort. The members of staff were very supportive of this effort.

For the students from South Africa, the opportunity to study at Roma provided a welcome exposure to a wider world which they did not have in South Africa at the time, because one of the strategies of the apartheid regime was to isolate black students from contact with the external world. At Roma we had access to books and journals, some of which were banned in South Africa, but South African students could read these freely. We had many international visitors coming to Roma. Some of whom were banned in South Africa; there were contacts for the students with the outside world.

There was also a lot of moral support given to the struggle generally because you will recall that in 1978, for instance, the University gave an honorary doctorate to Nelson Mandela while he was still incarcerated. This was not just recognition of his contribution to the struggle, it was also an effort to give moral support to all the other participants, to know that their efforts were being recognised and supported by institutions outside South Africa. The students, from South Africa of course, were free to organize themselves. Those who could travel from within South Africa came to Lesotho fairly regularly, for meetings with their colleagues who were based here at the University. This provided a welcome opportunity for them to exchange views and information and messages. We were aware of all these activities. Most unfortunately we were also aware that the South African security agents were following up on the students, sometimes on campus or outside. We tried to advise the students to be very prudent in their activities, and we succeeded, in general, but occasionally the students sometimes forgot to be sufficiently prudent because of their frustration with their situation in South Africa, and their impatience. One cannot go into all the details, but sometimes we did have a few direct encounters, resulting from lack of prudence on the side of the students. But that was part of the overall situation.

Students were well below a thousand. After the students from Botswana and Swaziland had left we came down to something like 600 students; and 20% of that would just give you about 120, half of whom would probably be from South Africa and the rest from Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique. So the overall, absolute numbers might strike you today as low, but they were fairly significant in those days because the student enrolment was still very low.

If you look at the subsequent roles of the students, you will see that many of our former students from South Africa went on to play key roles in the new South Africa as politicians, and leaders in the economic and social transformation of South Africa. The present Vice-President of South Africa, Mrs Mlambo Nqkuka and Minister Lindiwe Sisulu were a students at the university; the Governor of the Reserve Bank of South Africa, Tito Mboweni, was a student at the university; and the outgoing Vice- Chancellor of the University of Cape Town, Njabulo Ndebele, was actually lecturing at the university after studying here. There are many and fortunately most of them maintain links with the university, and have been coming to alumni gatherings at Roma, in the recent past. They seem to treasure the memories of their experience at Roma, and feel that the university contributed significantly to their subsequent careers. I think whatever psychological barriers could have existed, especially among the black South African students towards whites, were significantly broken by the experience of life at Roma, because students were able to associate with the people of other races without any barriers. They could see that white people are people like anybody else, and this was a welcome experience for those people who had not been exposed to that kind of social interaction. There were a few of the lecturers at Roma, who actually came from South Africa, and were generally people who were opposed to apartheid, and so they had chosen to come and work at the university, precisely because the university was non-racial.

There were many ongoing activities on campus, some of which followed the specific political persuasions of the students, and the lecturers consent, but from the side of the administration we did not interfere in the activities. We were aware that different political movements were operating on campus. Sometimes they organized public meetings to which all would be invited; sometimes they organized their own meetings which were closed and restricted to the supporters of a particular movement. We were aware that there was a lot of debate among the students and staff about the issues of strategy, some of which flowed into the students politics on campus. But we took it as part of the healthy situation that should exist in any university and environment. We tried as the university to invite a wide variety of visiting lecturers. I recall that at one stage during the very difficult situation in Zimbabwe, David Owen who was the British Foreign Secretary actually visited Roma and gave a lecture which was followed by a very spirited discussion: it was a welcome exposure for the staff and students. We learned subsequently that he also felt that it had been a very valuable experience for him to hear the views of the students and staff at the university. There was a lot of activity going on.

There were also programmes for scholarships which were sponsored by the Americans, which provided opportunities for students to go and study in other African universities. The handicap here was that some of the students from South Africa did not have travel documents. But the Lesotho government made arrangements for some of the South African students to obtain Lesotho travel documents to enable them to take up these scholarships in other countries in Africa. That was another useful contribution. It was known that the holders of the passports were South Africans, travelling on Lesotho passports. On their return, some of them came to work in Lesotho and in the neighbouring countries such as Botswana and Swaziland before they ultimately returned to South Africa after the changes of 1994.

There was a book written as a modest contribution to the history of the National University of Lesotho, so that those people who were not there at the time could have an idea of what happened from a certain perspective. It was a traumatic event because the University of Botswana Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS) was a regional institution, and many people viewed it in the light of Pan-Africanism. So when the university split, it seemed like a major setback. However, one is aware that the close links were revived in no time; the collaboration, the exchange of students the sharing of ideas among the staff and the students is now going on again. So, *The Broken Reed*, as I say, is a very modest contribution to the record. One expects that there will be some more detailed studies which will look at some of the issues that have been highlighted in this very modest record. But that will be left, I think, to researchers and scholars, just as a follow up.

There were incidental benefits, as I indicated. With the growth and demand for accommodation at the university, there was some international response to provide more student accommodation; some of it was emergency accommodation. There were some lectureship positions which were also sponsored by various governments as part of their contribution to the liberation of Southern Africa. These were funded positions on the establishment of the university. Sometimes the positions were fully funded, and sometimes they were supplemented by external donors. The university received considerable support because of the contribution that it was making to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, generally.

I would hesitate to say that Lesotho's contribution was motivated by expectation of returns. I prefer to say that the benefits were incidental. Probably if Lesotho had been more entrepreneurial it could have benefited even more. If the contribution which Lesotho made to the liberation struggle laid foundations for some of collaborations, one has to be aware of course that there may have been other forces which did not want to see successful collaboration between these countries. That is all the more reason why people who have had foundations of collaboration should work harder so that even those who are trying to frustrate such collaboration are not given easy success. The recent example is that of the alumni gathering. It was suggested or recommended very strongly that there should be a data base of the skills of different

people within the region, who had studied at the National University of Lesotho, because some of them went on to acquire additional degrees.

The movement towards easing of border controls is another area because all over the world one sees the movement of people from neighbouring countries being facilitated, but here we see that the progress is very slow. When I see people waiting at the borders to have their passports stamped or to get border permits, I think we really have not moved with the times. We are still having a lot of work to do, especially now that you we have electronic means.

Matete, Ranthomeng P.

[Moriija; 19 December 2007]

Ranthomeng Matete is a hereditary chief of Moriija, a missionary settlement to the south of the capital Maseru. Matete is presently the Secretary General of the Basotho National Party (BNP) headed by Retired Major-General Justin Metsing Lekhanya. He is serving his third term as Secretary General of the BNP. He is also a Member of Parliament (MP) on the Basotho National Party ticket. He worked for many years as Senior Private Secretary to Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan from 1979 up to 1986 when the military took over. Before that, he once served in different ministries namely, Information and Broadcasting, the Central Bank and the Development Office.

While at the then University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS), he served in the Students Representative Council (SRC) in various capacities where the SRC was interested in matters of liberation struggle, interacting with various other student bodies in South Africa and other African countries. On campus, he was most specifically involved in the formation of what was called the Committee for Action and Solidarity for Southern African Students (CASSAS), an organization whose sole purpose was to bring together all the student organizations in the Southern African region and mobilise them towards the goal of liberation.

In terms of co-existence with our apartheid neighbours South Africa, and although we differed fundamentally in our political beliefs with the South African Boers, we had to find a way of co-existence, as the saying goes, you can choose your friends, but you cannot choose your neighbours. So we had to find accommodation, but unfortunately people in other countries, other African countries, who did not quite appreciate our situation, thought that the type of accommodation which we were seeking, amounted to submitting to the dictates of the Boers, especially if you take, for example, our desire to maintain dialogue with Pretoria. People thought that we were selling out. But this was the only way which we could live with those people, while supporting the liberation movements at the same time. And we never stopped supporting the liberation movement. We were regular contributors to the OAU Liberation Committee, and we always paid our dues. Even in other international fora, like the United Nations, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NUM), we always paid our dues. Our Prime Minister and his subordinates always stood firmly, agitating for the liberation of not only South Africa, but also Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique which were under oppression. So we had this dual role of seeking accommodation with the South African racists while at the same time championing the course of liberation. You could say these were conflicting positions, but they had to be pursued.

Above all, Lesotho played a very crucial role in the liberation and democratisation of South Africa. I have alluded to our role in the OAU Liberation Committee. We were never in arrears with our payments to support the work of the Committee. And the Committee as you know was assisting all parties in the oppressed countries to advance their cause.

We also hosted various refugees from different countries. We hosted ANC refugees, PAC refugees, and refugees from Namibia, Zimbabwe and some few from Mozambique and Angola. We also opened up our educational facilities for them. There are quite a number of refugees who studied at our university in Roma. We can mention the Governor of the South African Reserve Bank Tito Mboweni, Ngoako Ramathloli; the list is long.

We had refugees, not only at the university, but also in primary schools. Our primary schools were full, you know, with students from South Africa. And this was a deliberate move by our government to assist in the training of the future rulers of the oppressed countries, particularly South Africa which is our neighbour. There was quite an influx of young people coming into Lesotho especially after the 1976 Soweto uprisings.

It was not only in the educational sector that we assisted South African refugees. Quite many of them, you know, came into Lesotho and settled here; others were offered employment and even given jobs in our government. I can mention names here, for example Joe Molefi who was from the PAC was one of the longest serving media workers with Radio Lesotho in the Department of Information and Broadcasting. Mrs Phelis Naidoo of the ANC worked in our legal aid department. Mr Gabriel Santamel who is now Mphakalasi served as the manager of our low cost housing. These are just a few examples, and many of them lived just like ordinary Basotho without any distinction. Others used Lesotho to pass on to other countries. We facilitated their movements.

That is that is not all, ntate. Even the external missions of the liberation movements like the ANC, we helped them with our passports so that they could travel all over the world. There are quite a number of them who used Lesotho passports, you know, to disguise their identities and to facilitate their movements. I remember the late John Modise of the ANC for example. He was a senior commander of Umkhonto We Sizwe. He was using a Lesotho passport. There are several others. Maybe one should also mention the fact that even when the South African Boers wanted us to hand over some of the refugees whom they considered most dangerous, we never agreed to that. I remember the case of Chris Hanu who lived in Lesotho and the Boers were very uncomfortable with him, because as you might have known he was commanding the operations of Umkhonto We Sizwe from Lesotho. Our government knew this but all the time we pretended that these are just ordinary refugees. At one time they mounted intense pressure for us to hand him over. But Dr Jonathan flatly refused. Even when they offered an exchange of Chris Hanu and the then leader of the so called Lesotho Liberation Army Mr Ntsu Mokhehle. The Lesotho Liberation Army was operating from South Africa, mounting attacks in Lesotho. Dr Jonathan refused on the basis that he did not trade in human beings. When some of the refugees were abducted from Lesotho by the South African operatives, they were subsequently returned after serious diplomatic pressure had been mounted by Dr Jonathan and his government. One of the abductees was Fanele Mbale, who was a teacher at Maseru

Day High School. Another one I remember was Victor Matlou, who was kidnapped from a plane that had landed in Bloemfontein, from Swaziland, and it could not land at our airport here because of bad weather. The Boers immediately seized him and our government mounted pressure that this person must be returned.

In terms of what motivated the Basotho to support the South African liberation struggle, we realised that our own independence would not be complete without the freedom of our neighbours. I have just said to you a few minutes ago that the white South Africans did not relish the idea of our being independent because this was being exemplary to the people they were oppressing. So we could not enjoy that independence before our brothers and sisters also became independent. Now the liberation of South Africa is a reality and we are now leaving in a more relaxed atmosphere, free from attacks, free of pressures, free of border closures, because the Boers sometimes just closed the borders in order to bring pressure on us to do certain things. For example in 1976 when they gave independence to the Transkei Bantustan, we refused to recognise that independence, and in retaliation the Boers closed our south eastern borders just to make things difficult for us, and in order to force us to recognise the Transkei independence. So, pressures like that, were really a reminder to us that as long as apartheid still subsisted, our own independence was meaningless. That is just one of the considerations why we supported the South African struggle.

The other reason, which is more fundamental, is that, we did not believe that anybody had the right to oppress any other person, politically, economically, or otherwise. So our belief in the freedom of people, prompted us to put in a hand in the liberation of South Africa, to assist those people to be free. That was the primary consideration. And if you want to single out individuals who played a key role in this, it is none other than the late founder of our party and our Prime Minister, Dr Leabua Jonathan. He was really very motivational, and he succeeded in bringing the entire membership of the party to that cause. Of course, as in any situation, it is not everybody who would join the band wagon. We still had, even within our party, some of the people who were flirting with Pretoria, and who were cooperating with the Boers, to try and prevent the advent of independence in South Africa. But through his sheer strength I can say that the whole party and indeed the whole country swung in favour of the liberation of South Africa. Chief Petepete is another individual who ably assisted the Prime Minister. He was a Minister in the government of Lesotho, and was also at some stage a Foreign Minister, at the time when our policy in favour of liberation began to show prominence not only in Lesotho but also internationally. He was a patriot and a great supporter. There were also people like Chief Lekhoana Jonathan, who has just been elected into our executive again. The later generation of leaders in that regard included the late Monts'i Makhele, Vincent Makhele, and the late Desmond Squeshe. They were very prominent in assisting Dr Jonathan in his course for liberation. Our ambassadors and high commissioners in different countries were also included. We should mention people like the late J.R.L. Kotsokoane. We could mention people like ambassador Makeka who is still alive. I think he is working for the employers'

association or something like that. He is a lawyer by profession. We can mention also the former High Commissioner to London, Mr Joe Mollo, he's living in South Africa now. We can mention the late Albert Mohale who was Ambassador in Washington and New York. We can mention the late Teboho Masholugu, who was Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs for a long time. I think the list is endless; Dr Jonathan's people were really supporting that cause. This is why he succeeded in articulating what he stood for in that regard. This was a very huge cause, a huge commitment.

Regarding where the resources were coming from, I can say, if we had sufficient resources, we could have done more than we did, but we were always limited, by the scarcity of financial and other resources. We shared the little that we had with those whom we were trying to help. I can mention in this regard, that even organizations like the ANC received cash donations from our government. I remember the time when the Prime Minister was in Maputo. I was actually a witness to the handing over of cash to the late Oliver Tambo as a contribution from the Lesotho government, for the ANC's cause. I think the donation was about a hundred thousand rands, and at that time it was a lot of money. This did not mean that we had a lot of money, no, we did not. That was not the only occasion, but it was the occasion when I was personally present. There were several other incidences in which such cash assistance was even given to the PAC.

Other than our own financial resources, I must confess that we also had a lot of assistance from the international community to enable us to withstand the pressures of apartheid. For example, in 1976, during the border closure, after we had put our case to the Security Council, a lot of assistance came to Lesotho to cover practically all the spheres of our economic life. This was to make us not feel the impact of the pressure that was being put by the border closure. We were even assisted to build a hospital in Qacha's Nek so that we could not rely on the Transkei for medical services. Another example is that after the 1982 army raid in which 42 people were killed, Dr Jonathan asked his majors to the late King Moshoeshoe II to take Lesotho's case to the United States Security Council, and other than condemning South Africa for the raid, a lot of assistance also came in to build the capacity of our economy, to stand the pressures of South Africa. This capacity building, in turn, enabled us to extend further assistance to the oppressed people, who were living in our midst. Our schools were expanded, and we could accommodate more pupils and students. So, it was not only a matter of domestic resources, we also got a lot of financial assistance from the international community.

The Church in Lesotho also played a role. While the church had a moral or religious role to play, you still found members of the refugee community, even within the various church institutions. So, the refugees were not discriminated by the various churches. Morally the churches were speaking out against apartheid oppression. Virtually, all the main churches of Lesotho, the Lesotho Evangelical Church, Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, and others, mainly within the Christian Council of Lesotho, spoke out against apartheid. They never stopped, condemning

the evils of apartheid and encouraging the oppressed people. I think that was a great service towards liberation.

The youth. Most of the people who fled to Lesotho especially after 1976 were young people. And when they got into Lesotho they lived as equals with their brethren and sisters here in Lesotho. They were never discriminated against. They got full acceptance from the youth of Lesotho and I think that was very important by way of making them comfortable. As for the women, as you know in Lesotho, and I suppose in other countries, women are the real operatives within families. These refugees when they came into Lesotho they were not living in camps. They were living in the homes of Basotho people, and these were the homes which were being cared for by the women of Lesotho. So in a practical sense, we can say the mothers of Lesotho, the women of Lesotho, were really the people who were caring for the refugees. In the past, many Basotho men were working in mines in the Republic of South Africa, and the women remained at home. Therefore, it was these women who were caring for the refugees, and I think in that regard they played a very crucial role; because without their co-operation the refugees could have had a bitter life in Lesotho. But they were welcomed and made comfortable. Here I don't want to single out any women. This is very dangerous because once we start mentioning names it is as if we are saying the others did nothing. But I can say that all, virtually all the women of Lesotho came in to contact with the refugees and made them comfortable.

There were huge costs for supporting the South African struggle. First of all nate, people were killed. Take for example the 1982 raid, not only were ANC members killed, but a number of Basotho were also killed. Not only were lives lost in that raid, but a lot of property was also destroyed. You know, many houses were flattened by South African artillery, and these houses belonged to Basotho people who never got any compensation; even after the United Nations had passed a resolution to the effect that Lesotho must be compensated for the damage inflicted in that raid. Those are some of the costs, but other costs really relate to the opportunities that we lost. Because, you know, of the stifling pressures that were mounted against us by apartheid, we did not develop in a normal atmosphere. The atmosphere was very tense. Sometimes our goods were prevented from coming into the country. As you can imagine that impacted adversely, on our economy. When they mounted these blockades at the borders, khele! It could take weeks without anything coming in, and that was an opportunity lost.

Even in terms of our own defence, it was compromised. We ordered defence equipment from overseas. This was seized in ports like Durban, and so on. So it means that the development of our defence capabilities was also stifled. It is things like that really. In short, the atmosphere was so bad that we did not have the opportunity to develop as normally as other countries which did not suffer from these pressures.

As to whether Lesotho has been rewarded for its role in the liberation of South Africa, in a direct sense I would say no. But in an indirect sense I would say, yes, because after the removal of apartheid, an atmosphere has now been created which

is relatively more conducive to development than was the case during the apartheid era. I think this is a reward in itself. But as I said there is no direct reward from the countries which were being assisted towards liberation. No, I have no evidence for that.

What I was saying in short, nate, was that the Basotho people knew very well that their own independence would not be meaningful without the liberation of South Africa. As long as South Africa continued to live under apartheid oppression, the avenues for the self-expression and self-realisation of the Basotho would not be fully realised. In this regards, my admission is that some of the practical problems we were having, which resulted from apartheid rule, included the embargo of our goods. Some of them were held for long periods at ports like Durban; here I am talking especially about our defence equipment. You know, if they did not want it to pass through they would just hold it, without even giving any reason. So even our freedom of movement from Lesotho to other countries, sometimes it was not easy to pass through South Africa. Various problems, would be created, just because they did not want us to interact with the outside world. So it is in that sense, primarily, that I am saying our own freedom could not be meaningful, until the whole of Southern Africa was liberated.

Other than that, there was a purely humanitarian consideration that you would not like your neighbours to be suffering under someone's oppression. That is a humanitarian consideration, and that consciousness filtered down to the ordinary Basotho as you know that many Basotho mineworkers were in South Africa. At any given time you would not find less than a hundred and fifty thousand (150 000) of them working in South Africa. So they also experienced, physically, the conditions under apartheid, and they were aware of what was happening. When they came back home to their families, their families were conscious of what rule existed in South Africa as a result of the experiences of their fathers and husbands. So, Basotho people were very much aware of what apartheid was all about.

I can say one thing that Lesotho politics, even the birth of political parties in Lesotho, were in some way influenced by developments in South Africa, and by political conditions in South Africa. For example, many of our leaders in Lesotho were members of South African political organizations. I can mention, for example, the late Ntsu Mokhehle, the former Prime Minister and others. During their stay in South Africa, where they went to universities and so on, they were members of the ANC Youth League, and when they came back home, you could see even from their patterns of organization that their parties were modelled, more or less, on the ANC type of organization. Not only those; my own leader, Dr Leabua Jonathan, and many of his colleagues lived and worked in South Africa; and they could also see what was happening by way of organization because, as you know, the ANC is the oldest political party in southern Africa; some say even in Africa as a whole. So all our leaders, you know, I think, benefited from the influence of the ANC; and when they came back home they modelled their parties, because they had an example to emulate from

ANC. More specifically, I think political parties in Lesotho, themselves, all of them had something to say, about the liberation of South Africa, even in their manifestos. As for the role of women in the liberation of South Africa, even if I may not mention names of individual women, but take our own party, for example, it has always been a party dominated by women. So when we talk about the BNP, we are more or less talking about a party that is anchored, on the presence and participation of women. Whatever the party did in connection with the liberation of South Africa, we can say it had the support and active participation of women, who were the main stay and the main pillars of the party. I think it is more or less the same with the other parties. I can repeat stating the costs for the South African struggle to Lesotho. Other than direct punitive action by South Africa, we can also talk about the opportunity lost; but first of all, let me refer briefly to punitive action. I think one of the punitive actions that South Africa took was to seal our south eastern borders blocking the flow of traffic, that is human traffic and traffic of goods and so on and so forth. Not only that, but even the Maseru borders Bridge, on several incidences, was closed completely without any traffic coming in or out of Lesotho. Those are a few examples of the punitive action that was taken. But I cannot leave without mentioning also, support for insurgency against the government of Lesotho. I think a lot of insurgency we saw in the 1980s was sponsored and supported by the South African racist regime. Many people were killed in Lesotho, especially those living along our common borders, because as the many of the insurgents came in from South African farms, they started with the people near the border, just near the border; but some of this infiltration came into the interior of the country where buildings were bombed and so on and so forth. Other than those direct punitive actions, I referred to the opportunity lost because we were more or less in the shackles of apartheid; we were not as free as many of the other African countries, to do whatever we liked, by way of developing our economy and interacting with the international community. It is only after the liberation of South Africa that we were more or less free to do whatever we liked. Let me say, for all those years, since our independence, even before independence, up to the liberation of South Africa in 1994, we lost a lot of opportunity to develop ourselves, the way we would have liked.

If you talk of rewards by South Africa for supporting its struggle, I don't think there is any concrete action that has come from South Africa as reward for what we did. I know that at some stage President Mbeki promised special assistance programme to lift Lesotho out of poverty within five years. Now, from the day that he made this promise, I think five years have passed and we haven't seen any concrete action in that direction. So really, I think our interaction, presently, is a normal interaction between two neighbouring states. There is no specific programme you could call a reward programme from South Africa. Perhaps it is still coming, because as you may have realised, the contribution made by our late Prime Minister Dr Leabua Jonathan was recently recognised through an honour, posthumous honour, awarded to him by the Republic of South Africa. This came a long time after his death; and maybe

it signals that the South African government and the South African people are still conscious of the fact that Lesotho did something towards their liberation, and that maybe eventually we are going to see some form of practical reward, which will be of benefit to the people of Lesotho. But so far, I think it is fair to say we haven't seen anything like that.

There is a very wide range of possibilities of reward or assistance. I know that some form of agreement has been reached to ease movement of people; free movement of people, between South Africa and Lesotho. If that happens, it would be very important because as of now, we Basotho are very dependent on South Africa for a lot of things, and this matter of passport and things like that, places a very heavy burden on our people who may want to go for medical treatment and to seek employment opportunities. If free movement of people could be facilitated, it is one area which I would see as a step in the right direction, by way of rewards to Lesotho. There are other areas, for example, agriculture as you can see now, even after these good rains, agriculture in Lesotho is in a very poor condition. In the past, even during the apartheid era, whenever there were moments of warmth between the two governments, it was possible for South African farmers along the border to come into Lesotho to help our persons plough and plant their fields; this resulted in very good yields in agriculture. Now, I don't see any reason why, after South Africa's liberation, that type of thing cannot be formalised, because as you know South African agriculture is very strong. They are highly developed, and this is one area in which they could help Lesotho. Even if they fail in all other things, they could help our people to feel their stomachs by assisting them in agriculture. This would have gone a long way, really, towards practical support for Lesotho.

Another area, nate, relates to employment opportunities in South Africa. Earlier, I said that, from time immemorial, many of our people have been working in South African mines; but the latest developments are that many of them have been retrenched from South African mines. I can well say that our people built the South African economy, because it is they who opened the South African mines. The Basotho people, for example, are adept in shaft sinking, so it is they who opened the South African mines. It is very tragic that after the South African liberation they were retrenched in such big numbers. So much so that they are now idling here at home, and they are not able to support their families. Now if some way could be found, of reabsorbing them into the South African economy, it would ease a lot of problems that we are now having in Lesotho, of many able bodied men just idling and causing a lot of problems. These are just a few examples of things that I think, could be done by South Africa. The greatest disappointment is this retrenching of our people in such large numbers. They are saying people who are outsiders should not be given first preference in the opportunities that are available in South Africa. And we are saying as Lesotho, are we really, outsiders in that context? We have built the economy of South Africa. When you are throwing out people whom you consider outsiders, are you really including us, Lesotho, in that category? That is the greatest disappointment.

Well I may not mention names of people who collaborated with apartheid. Some of our people, you know, collaborated with South Africa's racist regime. I think these were people who were so short sighted that they thought that the matter of South Africa's liberation from the Boers was just a pipe dream. And as some of us talked about this issue, they thought that we are just academising. So to speak, in our own party for example in the BNP, there was a section which thought that maybe the Prime Minister and some of his colleagues were causing trouble, unnecessarily, by advocating for South Africa's liberation. They even connived with the South African racist regime to have him removed. In 1984, for example, there was a group of them who ganged up with others, from other political parties and formed what they called the Basotho Democratic Alliance. Fortunately it was short lived. But its main purpose was to try and stop this gravitation of the Prime Minister and others, towards supporting the liberation of South Africa. They even went to Pretoria and were well received by Pik Botha at the State House, and collaborated with him to see what could be done to change the government in Lesotho. Well the military chipped in before the politicians could do that. This matter of destabilising Lesotho was not only within our party, and it was very pronounced in the 1980's.

The main opposition party the Basotho Congress Party, had its so called Lesotho Liberation Army (LRA) being trained in South Africa and being sent to Lesotho to carry out the destabilisation activities, under the supervision, of white army commanders from South Africa. Even the leader of that party the late Ntsu Mokhehle, after he was expelled first from Zambia, and then from Botswana, he ended up living in South Africa commanding his army with the support of the Boers. But, well, I don't think it affected the momentum so much, but it was an irritant, of course with significant loss of lives in Lesotho. I think you must have read about the 1982 raid; it really did not stop us from supporting the liberation struggle of South Africa, but it was really irritating. It was very irritating.

We have been talking about the influence of the South African apartheid regime on Lesotho; part of the reason starts from there. I think the Boers took every available opportunity to ensure that there was no stability in Lesotho, and we are continuing up to this day to reap bitter fruits from the seeds sown at that time because the enmity which was sown at that time is still continuing up to this day. And in my opinion it the main reason why there was such polarisation between the different sides in Lesotho. But I would not be honest if I left the matter at that. There are also internal reasons for example, the religious factor. In Lesotho we have two main religious denominations; Roman Catholic and the Lesotho Evangelical Church which really was started by the French. If you look at the formation of political parties in Lesotho, you will find that the BCP which kept on splitting until now we have this Lesotho Congress of Democracy which is ruling now. It had its base of support from the Lesotho Evangelical Church from the Paris Missionary Society. On the other hand our party, the BNP, had its base of support from the Roman Catholic Church. Now, the traditional rivalry between those churches passed on to the political parties that

were supported by these churches, which also has been a cause of instability and polarisation. But that is not all.

Another factor is that of the conflict between political parties and the traditional authorities, the chiefs, right from the Paramount Chief, who is now the King. This was because obviously the demand for democratisation which was pushed by political parties, impinged on the powers of traditional authorities. That also was a flash point, and it continues today, even though not as sharply as it was in the past. So, all those factors taken together, in my opinion have contributed to the present instability.

The churches have come in because we should appreciate that they were competing for influence within the populace of Lesotho. Even in one family, if one was a member of the Catholic Church and the other of the Evangelical Church, you would find that they don't quite pull together, within the family. The reason was that they had been taught by the missionaries that 'the other church is evil...', so they look at each as antagonists. And what I am saying is that, these churches sponsored, or at best supported the different political parties. That antagonism, filtered through to the political parties respectively. Efforts to revolve the conflicts are there. As far as the churches are concerned, I think, I can give credit to the Christian Council of Lesotho, which is an ecumenical body bringing the different churches together. They have more or less cleared the animosity that prevailed for a long time. It is still there, but at a very low level now, and although it is still causing a bit of a problem up to now, it is not as sharp as it was in the past.

Coming to SADC, I don't think SADC has managed any conflict in Lesotho. I think there has been a disaster. There has been a disaster in the sense that the heads of state seem to be a club of rulers who support each other irrespective of what problems anyone of them is causing. I think in Lesotho, specifically, there is nothing to which I can point and say that SADC has assisted Lesotho to resolve conflict by doing this and that. I think all they have done is to support the government in oppressing the opposition. They have been a disaster, quite frankly. Even if you look at the recent problem over the allocation of parliamentary seats after the last elections of 2007, they claimed that they had assigned the former President of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire to come and resolve that. But since Masire started the process, only two meetings have been held. He went away and made a pronouncement that since the matter appeared to be in the high court of Lesotho, there was nothing he could do before the high court pronounced itself. At the same time, through some very funny processes, the case in the high court is not proceeding. We are now told that it will sit sometime in April or there about. SADC is just folding its hands. So I cannot point out to anything that SADC has done since 1998, when we had that big problem of towns burning, other than them sending South African troops into Lesotho to oppress, not to facilitate discussions. I don't think they have done anything. SADC is just a club of big boys. It seems it is not an organization of the peoples of Southern Africa. It is just an organization of the heads of state who scratch each other's back. In terms of reforming SADC, well in my opinion, unless civil society has a meaningful

stake within SADC, the present state of affairs will just continue with heads of state supporting one another. I would like a situation where the people themselves are represented in SADC and not only the heads of state.

Regarding a model for conflict resolution in Lesotho, it may not be perfect but one of the starting points I think is Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). It should be overhauled and political parties form the IEC with equal numbers of all registered political parties. At the present moment there is a mechanism under which the political parties nominate and recommend to the King people who should be IEC commissioners, but you find that civil servants comprise the staff of the IEC. Civil servants are paid by the government, and you can take it that they take orders from the government. I think that whole system should be overhauled such that decisions, major decisions rest with the political parties. I know that in Mozambique, for example, the IEC there is made up of equal representatives of political parties that are registered in the country. Well I know there are still problems in Mozambique but they are better managed than in Lesotho. So that is the first level where these things should be tackled.

Perhaps in only a few words I would say, especially about South Africa, that I wish South Africa could be more honest in acknowledging the contributions that Lesotho has made towards its liberation. I'm not suggesting that South Africa could not have been free without Lesotho's contribution, but I am saying that the modest contributions that we made, as a small poor country, should really have been acknowledged by more rewards of the type which I have indicated to you, namely, assistance in agriculture, assistance in reabsorbing our retrenched mineworkers, the facilitation of movement between the peoples of Lesotho and South Africa amongst others. It seems to me that with the passage of time South Africa seems to be getting more forgetful about our contributions and I think this should not be the case. I would wish that, they could be more forthcoming about rewarding us for what we have done for them. This is about all I can say.

Mathibeli, Monyane

Monyane Mathibeli was born in Maseru the son of a policeman in the colonial service. He is a former ambassador to Libya, a former Assistant Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He did his primary school virtually everywhere in Lesotho as his father was constantly transferred from place to place. He did high school was done in his home town of Mafeteng before moving to Lesotho High School to complete his Cambridge Overseas School Certificate. His peers at school and university were the current Prime Minister Pakhalita Mosisili, Deputy Prime Minister and leader of the main opposition Tom Thabane, among others

As an individual I would not really say I did much to liberate South Africa. I would say, as a civil servant, yes, because we were carrying out the policies for principals of the government, particularly through the statements that they made at international fora. I took some pride in helping some people, during the difficult period of military rule. I did not participate much during the period of Jonathan because I was transferred to other ministries. I left the Ministry of Foreign affairs in 1982 after working there for ten years. I was recalled to the Ministry after his fall, when things had really changed. Lesotho was walking a very thin line, because the government that was pro- South Africa was also trying to come out with a profile that would still be in support of the struggle; it was a very difficult situation. It was a very difficult struggle not only for me. As the Principal Secretary here in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was liaising here with the colleagues in the Embassies to make sure we did not lose.

Regarding Lesotho's role in the liberation of South Africa, there were many approaches. Let me start with what Lesotho did not do. The OAU at some point had established what they called the OAU Liberation Committee and that was accompanied by the OAU Liberation Fund. Lesotho did not openly contribute to that fund but we know for certain that behind the scenes contributions were regularly made, particularly to the ANC by the government. The most open support was diplomatic; in many conferences whether the OAU, the Commonwealth, the United Nations or the Non-Aligned Movement, Lesotho used them to make very strong policy statements in support of the liberation struggle. The second level of support was material support. I have referred to part of it when I said funding was also provided behind the scenes. But there was also an open support in allies that were held by the ruling party and sometimes by the liberation movements themselves. The government was always there to support them. The government also provided refugee facilities at that time; I remember they even built a small refugee shelter, it was not a camp, just a residential area, in support to the policy that the refugees had to integrate completely. So, in the end, the integration was really the main thing, the assimilation was the main focus. I can say that provision of places in our schools was another major contribution.

My feeling is that the old man, Jonathan, was convinced that the future of the region, the future of South Africa itself, and the future of Lesotho, could be seen in no other context except in the context of the liberation of South Africa. He definitely

got convinced beyond doubt that it was inevitable to follow that course, and that it was time for Lesotho to start a key role towards the realization of that goal. He was a wise man.

The Basotho National Party, which was Jonathan's party, was a key player in that regard. Also there were individuals; I know of people who used to serve as carriers of information. Well, the churches in Lesotho, the Christian Council of Lesotho was also very supportive, and I think in this instance one has to mention the name of Reverend Desmond Tutu who came to work here at the National University of Lesotho and later on became the Archbishop of that Church in Lesotho. He did quite a lot of work to influence the church thinking in Lesotho towards supporting the Liberation movements in South Africa.

The most obvious cost was related to education. The educational cost, the support for making places available to students from South Africa, was a direct cost on our educational system. The health services were supporting the exiled staff that were here. Then of course there were the economic costs of the direct sabotage of the Lesotho economy by the apartheid regime, because of Lesotho's support towards the struggle in South Africa. This took so many forms; periodic closure of the borders; sometimes there was information infiltration that South African was going to attack Lesotho and that immediately scared off the tourists that were planning to visit Lesotho. Our hotel industry virtually died, although it used to thrive so much with tourists from South Africa. It was the case in Swaziland at some point, but in the case of Lesotho that used to be so flooded before that, tourism virtually died. Then of course there were the acts of sabotage, some perpetrated by the Lesotho Liberation Army (LRA) through the sponsorship of the government of South Africa. We cannot forget that during the raids in Lesotho lives were lost and a lot of property was destroyed.

I could say the biggest reward has been this change in the situation; that we now have a neighbour that is free. At least with regards to us as people, we continue to have our own people working in South Africa in thousands. I would like to say that South Africa has definitely turned a blind eye towards those people, in the sense that they work in South Africa illegally and the government of South Africa has not really stood up to the situation. South Africa has tended to be against people from other countries; I think what is referred to as xenophobia. But I'm saying, in spite of that, there is a large element of tolerance for people from Lesotho, better than from other countries; there is still that preference. There is this bilateral agreement whereby South Africa came up to say that they feel uncomfortable that they are a rapidly developing economy yet we are living in this part of the world inside them. So they said they would like to assist this country within a period of five years for it to graduate out of this situation; of course that has not really been in practice, and it has not turned out to be anything meaningful. It has just been a paper declaration so far, very little has come out of that political desire. We see, of course, some recent developments like the easing of the border procedures; the idea of making it easier for people of the two countries to cross the border without much difficulty.

Mphakalasi, Gabriel

[Maseru; 14 February 2008]

Gabriel (Santamela) Mphakalasi was born in 1927 in the Vaal, in the old Transvaal Vereeniging area. His father was Pelesane Mphakalasi, but he died when he was young and his mother married a Van Der Merwe who brought him up; so he is also known as a Van De Merwe so, he has two fathers. He attended school in Verneegigng Primary; High School at Kinglaton at Pretoria, a very popular school for Africans. He matriculated at Adam's College in Natal, where his political inclinations were really built. That was where a group of students and a very influential teacher formed an underground political unit, unknown to the students, and they studied political situations in South Africa. They left in 1957, at the time of the split within the ANC. They began the formation of the PAC, which was launched in 1959 and he became a founder member and got involved in PAC politics. In 1960 PAC launched a campaign, which in their view, changed the history of South Africa, as it led to shootings in South Africa like Sharpeville, Langa in the Cape and the banning of ten African institutions among them ANC, PAC, Coloured people's Organization, and the English party. Dialogue had come to an end, military action had to take place and that's why today Lesotho is his home. He came to Lesotho as a fugitive in 1963 and landed in Maseru, and has been in Lesotho since then. To start with he taught as an unqualified teacher. Later he went to Morija with a teacher's certificate majoring in History and Mathematics, and then he went study Economics at the University of Lesotho where he passed in Economics and Accounting and got the Moshoeshoe Award as a best completing student in 1977.

When you look into the liberation struggle of South Africa, it is a war of invasion on the black people in Southern Africa, and they attacked Zulus, Xhosas, Basotho, and everybody, and dispossessed them of their land. You can't begin the history of the arrival of the white man outside the conquest that went around where they were superior enough in the mission with guns, and took the land from us by force. So, as a result, Lesotho was also part of the people who were oppressed by the arrival of Europeans in this part of the continent. Moshoeshoe I had his own struggles, and he had his braveries and how he ultimately saved the Basotho, but the Basothos themselves lost their land, they claimed the Transvaal and the Free State until today. They were therefore incapacitated; they felt very bitter against the arrangement and therefore we cannot talk of South Africa and leave out Basotho, because they are a part of that struggle. There are Basotho who schooled in Fort Hare, like Mr Mokhehle, like all other leaders of Basotho, went and studied in African schools in South Africa. When we arrived here as refugees, some of us arrived here during the colonial rule. As a person, I had to seek political asylum and I had to fill up forms and get interviewed. I was ultimately given asylum, after it was refused first time on the grounds that in Lesotho I had no visible means of support and that there was no way I could live on my own. But then, you know, through the Basotho institution BCP, PAC, and ANC arrangements, the matter was finally settled and I got political asylum. What is really interesting about Basotho is that we were told by the then first Prime

Minister of Lesotho that he is not regarding us as fugitives, he regarded us as part of the community of the Basotho, and that we could attend schools here, and we could work here without having to get working permit. So that is one area in which all the refugees who entered into Lesotho were accepted and given political asylum; without much trappings and restrictions, you became a Mosotho.

I don't think it was really a motive really. I would like to see it as part of their own struggle to try and regain what belonged to them and which was taken away from them, so there were alliances of the organizations in Lesotho and South Africa political groupings that came into Lesotho. We had alliances between the ANC and the communist party of Lesotho, and we got all types of assistance, because when it came to military war fare, we used Lesotho as a border of which we could go into South Africa. This was a key element of our struggle after the 1960s and the Basotho used to shield us here you see. In establishing rules throughout Lesotho you pass very friendly communities who would hide you even against the police of Lesotho, take your guns, put them away and allow you to sit around them or with them. So they had very strong support and we saw it as part of the struggle of the Basotho with us. BCP tried to find us facilities like where to stay and made sure they helped us get monthly supplies through the Christian Council and the UN. We were able to get help and arranged with those institutions so that we could find some money so we could afford to buy bread for survival. So we had amongst the people there, Mr Mokhehle, and there are so many other different names. There were members of the BCP, members of Maramatlou Freedom Party, and amongst them you had Mamolapo who was a PAC member in Johannesburg. It was her home here, she was the sister of Hana kemangeo, the doctor of Hlotse; he passed away. She is a Miss Makotoko; she was married by Molapo, a very active PAC member and the founder member of PAC in South Africa; she came back home. It's so difficult to mention everybody because doing that, I might go through a whole list of members of BCP and other institutions like the World Council of Churches in Maseru, very progressive institutions, who came to the assistance and they viewed this struggle as part of theirs.

It might be difficult for me to remember now, but we had very strong support from the women in the BCP, who were very strongly aligned to us. All Basotho women, I have forgotten their names, made sure that they were part of the machinery set up by their own party to give assistance to the political organizations in Maseru. It went deeper like I said. Just to give you an instance, when we had some of our men arriving here with guns, it was with the help of the Basotho that we could store those guns. It was with the help of the Basotho that we could travel through Lesotho with arms, if we decide we were going to Transkei, or up the mountains. We went to the Transkei with their assistance, and women were as much involved as the men were.

The costs were quite clear, because South Africa wanted Basotho to hand over South African refugees to them and Lesotho refused to do so. I know about an incident when Leabua the then Prime Minister of Lesotho, met Voster, the South African Prime Minister, where Voster asked to be given refugees and Leabua told him that he would

not give any refugees to South Africa; and he asked him for three but he said he could not give him even one. So we had a very strong support coming from that direction. It is quite amazing that I always thought of it. It was I, Joe Molise and Letlaka; I think Letlaka is still alive living in the Transkei. He was a lawyer involved with the Tsotsi, lawyer groups in Maseru. I was called by Molapo the Foreign Minister of Lesotho by then, who is now late. He wanted to know what I have done, that made Voster ask for my head; my view was that I played a major role in the liberation, particularly in the Vaal. I was a key person in the Vaal and at one point when I went into the regional committee of the Transvaal, Vergeeniging the Vaal area, Vaal Triangle as it is called. A part of Vergeeniging refused that I should really go because they felt the work of the organization in the Vaal was collapsing. It needed my attention so I think that is why because those brains present there knew that I was, if not at the top, and then I was amongst the very top leaders of the Vaal. I think that is all.

I don't think Lesotho is getting the sympathy that it deserves. All the leaders of Lesotho studied in South Africa. Today we are having a problem of having just one University while there are plenty in South Africa. I went to the University of Lesotho and I was given all the assistance, but then you find Basotho students who currently want to go and study in South Africa have difficulty in obtaining permits through which they can study at a university in South Africa; whereas here we had institutions like the Christian Council of Lesotho that made sure that if you are admitted at the National University of Lesotho you got a scholarship. We need to look at Lesotho as a place where we were given very strong support and assistance. We should really provide a lot more, in the issue of schools and the issues of work. We should have made special concessions for the Basotho who have suffered like us and even fought with us.

I don't know if there were disappointments because I haven't heard about any from the Basotho themselves. They really recognized the changing conditions in South Africa, and they should have looked into the advantages and disadvantages of being independent and not being part of South Africa, because Basotho don't want that and you can't blame them. They want to live independently as Basotho. So we could gain a lot if arrangements were done so that they could become part of South Africa. But I don't want to tell you that, I still think you know it is very difficult, a lot of unemployment still exists in South Africa; some concessions should have been done for Basotho to be able to get jobs easier in South Africa. It is a very difficult area but I still think Basotho are only two million and not all of them will want to go and work in South Africa; but that small group, I'm sure should have been given better facilities because of their contribution towards the liberation of South Africa and the suffering they underwent when the borders to South Africa were closed.

It is a very difficult area you see, very phony also because when Leabua lost elections, at some point, he took over forcefully and those that had won elections went into war with Leabua. They could never travel through South Africa without the blessing of the South Africans, the then South Africans, who themselves were not happy about

Leabua. So, at some point they were even ready to harbour Basotho revolutionaries who wanted to topple the government of Leabua, I mean the BCP; and you remember Mokhehle, he used to reside at QwaQwa there with the blessings of the South African government, so that their men could willingly somehow go into Lesotho and fight and I don't see how they could have done that without having some arrangement with a powerful regime like that one. They had an excuse, like here are people who have won elections and they lose those elections because of emergency regulations being installed; they are arrested and they are put in jail; they have no other way than to find ways in which they could connive with the South Africans in order for them to get a chance too. One should understand, I am sure.

The Boers must have demanded a lot of other things. BCP had a problem in that they had to go and train their men to come and fight in Lesotho let alone the problem of having to cross into South Africa. No African country or government, even today, is allowed to train an army to go and topple another African country, even if they do it without letting people know. So we had a camp in Tanzania and it was through that camp that that the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) was trained. They trained as South African Freedom Fighters, and came back to fight in Lesotho. So you realize the ties were very strong, and these were the ties between Mokhehle and our Secretary General, later our president, Potlako Leballo. They were very close, so we trained the Lesotho Liberation Army in Tanzania because they could never get that facility anywhere else; so they were given that facility and PK used to claim that they were South Africans and they were members of PAC. They joined to come and train when they went to South Africa they attacked Lesotho; so what could he do. He said that he was really preparing an army to come and fight in South Africa but some of them suddenly abscond and they go and fight in Lesotho; and he could not help that. He knew it was against the regulations and the requirements of the African governments. PAC had very close ties with BCP, but the ties between BCP and ANC seemed to be not so strong. At some point because the leadership of the ANC in Lesotho was really mixed with leadership of the Communist Party, and BCP felt that The Communist Party of Lesotho was not serving the interests of Basotho, so there was a clash between the Communist Party of Lesotho and BCP, and the relations between BCP and ANC became rather strained.

There was mixed reaction from the people; some people felt that they must agree with BCP, while some people debated between BCP and Lesotho government. I always took the view that it was a matter I shouldn't go into. I felt it was purely a Lesotho issue and it should be left to Lesotho's political parties, yeah really but at some point you might have this feeling or that feeling but really PAC soldiers or cadres were not taking guns to shoot Lesotho government you see, but that association of PAC and LLA made us suffer a bit because at some point when our men were going through Lesotho at Qacha's Nek and wanting to go into the Transkei on some mission, eight of them there were killed by the Lesotho military. The Lesotho army attacked them and killed eight of them in Maseru. Our suspicion was that they were thinking it must

have been us, because they knew our cadres were somewhat involved with the BCP so they killed them; they were very involved, and they thought those people were going through to fight South Africa. They knew PAC was associated with LLA and they were fighting LLA so they killed eight of them. I forgot the year this happened, but it was in the late 1960s. We even put up some tomb stones there at Thibella; and some families had come to take their remains back home.

You must have heard that at one time I left Maseru because I had quarrelled with PK Leballo and PK Leballo was very influential, influencing BCP against us. Then I went to Hlotse, I went and settled in Hlotse because I had a friend there who said why do you stay in Maseru when there is so much anti-you by BCP, because you have quarrelled with Leballo. The friend was Tefo Nkabane, he is dead now. He was a Mosotho boy who was part of PAC. We were together even at school in South Africa so I stayed with him. But there was an old man there who used to work for the South African Special Branch; he was a Mosotho but employed by the South African Special Branch working in Hlotse and investigating all the political parties. We all knew him, so we avoided him at all costs. I remember I was invited to go back to South Africa by a special branch man in Ficksburg, and he used to send that old man to meet me. The first time I went somebody sent me a word that the owner of the hotel wanted to contact me. When I went there I found out that I was being called by the South African special branch who offered that if I went back to South Africa, I could go to jail for a year or two, and they would give me a big salary for every month I was in prison. They told me that my condition would be made very comfortable in prison, because they wanted me to go to prison. They told me to cross as if I am going to Botswana and then they would arrest me. The idea was that they would use me as an informer so that in the people's eyes in South Africa, it would appear as if I was arrested while going to Botswana. This was to settle any suspicions so that when I came out of prison they would not be suspicious of me; and then I could really work for the South Africans. My final answer to that fellow, when he sent the Mosotho special branch man to come and see me again, was, "Tell that fellow, he knows I have problems with my leader PK Leballo, and therefore PK has put BCP on me. If BCP sees me holding meetings with him, they will kill me. So tell him I won't accept his offer because as I have said to that old man, if I have to move from here and go back to South Africa I shall be fighting against myself." The only way I could do that was by doing what the Christians say; I had to be born again, I had to be a different baby, to accept a situation where I was now joining a different camp and become one of their members. So I said the Christians say you have to be born again and unfortunately I couldn't be born again.

South Africans would do anything to try and get information from Lesotho. Some were known, some were not known. They said the special branch invited me to go into South Africa and I refused to go. I met this man once after I had refused to accept his offer, at Lancer's Inn (Maseru). When he saw me there, he ran into Lancer's Inn, chatted with me and said I must see. He was with a Molapo fellow, a Molapo fellow

who was a Personal Secretary to Leabua. That fellow was going to all their rivals to get people whom they could get information from. He was a Molapo fellow, a fellow who was once a principal of Lesotho High School. So you realize that, Leabua did not necessarily refuse to give away refugees, but he had servants within the system, the civil service who were really informing the South Africans.

You hear it just in rumours; the idea of even Basotho not having to carry a passport to go to South Africa. I still think you know the relations between the two could be improved significantly. There is a talk now that they would make border crossing very easy and comfortable. It is very sad when you cross into South Africa. Some of us have an arrangement of six months visa, where we are given multiple entries into South Africa. When you go through and you really get sad when you see the queues on the side of Lesotho, of the people crossing into South Africa, some for business and others for health reasons. It really disrupts the Basotho completely. I still think the rumour that things will be made easier, should really be taken up by the Lesotho government, because it is the Basotho who are suffering.

I still think Lesotho should be a little more aggressive about making arrangements. We have been promised over the radio that things will be changing soon, but we don't see that change coming soon. There should be things like projects which should be of post struggling in here, extending into the Natal, you know, they can promote a lot of activity and business between the two countries, so that all those things that are being spoken about, could happen.

Raditapole, Khauhelo

[Teyateyaneng; 20 February 2008]

Dr Khauhelo Raditapole (MP), as she puts it herself is a Mosotho woman, an African woman, born in Lesotho almost 70 years ago. She schooled in Lesotho, and got interested in politics very early in her life, maybe because of the interest her parents had in politics. She became interested in politics in the early 1950s when she found herself right in the middle of politics, not only because of my parents, but she found myself staying with ntate Ntsu Mokhehle, the former Prime Minister, who was teaching at Maseru Control Intermediate School where she did her Intermediate and the former PAC person, ntate P K. Leballo, who was her teacher. She was modelled by people who became very influential in the politics, not only of Lesotho, but of Southern Africa as a whole. She got BCP scholarship in 1961 and went to Russia at the time when most of the African countries were getting independence and so most of the students had gone in there through political scholarships. So in Russia they found themselves in solidarity with the liberation struggles in Africa. At that time Lesotho was not independent and Lesotho had no mission in Russia, but they all received hospitality from Ghana, and they realized that Lesotho was part of Africa and that and that they were together in the struggle for liberation. After completing her schooling she ended up in Tanzania in 1967 where she really got herself involved with almost all the liberation movements of Southern Africa. Her former husband who was a Tanzanian, happened to be the medical doctor of the OAU Liberation Committee, and at that time, all the liberation movements of Southern Africa were accommodated there. She came back the first time in 1976, which was almost 15 years after leaving Lesotho. She had left Basutoland and came back to Lesotho. When she came back in 1981, she had been seconded by the government of Tanzania, to work for the government of Lesotho in Mafeteng, and she had to stay in Lesotho on a resident permit from 1981 to 1987. After the re-democratisation of Lesotho in 1992, given her history, she soon found herself in the structures of the BCP at branch level and constituency level. And then in 1992, she was elected into the National Executive of the BCP. In 1993 she became a member of parliament and then the Minister of Health.

Thank you Ntate. We are talking about a Mosotho woman, an African woman. I think that's the best way I can say it. I was born in this country almost 70 years ago, and I schooled in this country. You are talking about somebody who got interested in politics very early in life, maybe because of the interest that my parents had in politics much much earlier. One remembers very vividly during the second world war, when issues were going on and my father used to go on and talk about some of these issues, so we ended up literally knowing that something was not right somewhere. So that is me, someone who is interested in politics, and especially the marginalisation of the poor has always concerned me quite a lot. That is me that we are talking about. I think the interest in politics that really became me came around the early 1950's when the actual activity of politics was going on in Lesotho so I found myself right in the middle. Not only because of my parents, but I found myself staying with Ntate Ntsu Mokhehle, the former Prime Minister, and also with the former PAC person who was based in Lesotho then, Ntate Potlako Leballo who was also my teacher. I am that

person, who was modelled by people who became very influential in politics, not only of Lesotho, but of Southern Africa, as a whole.

After getting the BCP scholarship in 1961 and going to Russia, again I became another Khauhelo Raditapole, because we got there at the time when most of the African countries were getting independence; so most of us who were there had gone there through political scholarships. We found ourselves probably doing what is happening now; I think we had an OAU much earlier. I mean ok, we really had our own AU in the Soviet Union up to a point where when something that was not right was going on in one of the African countries, we used to stay away from school, in solidarity. I remember during the several coups that took place in Nigeria, there was that solidarity; and when there were issues happening in Ghana there, that solidarity was shown.

When I was in Russia, Lesotho was not independent and Lesotho did not have a Mission there, so we were given to the Embassy of Ghana to take care of us, and what surprised me most was how an African country so far from Lesotho could have people so interested in us, that they made us feel home. Again that is the sort of thing that helped one to realise that as a Mosotho I was an African; that's why I said I am an African woman. It is because, that much earlier, I had already realised that Lesotho was part of Africa and Africa is part of us, and we are entangled, whether it is in a struggle, development or destiny, we are all together.

From there, when I completed my schooling I ended up in Tanzania, arriving in Tanzania on 8th July 1967. That was the day after the declaration of the Arusha Declaration. That took me into another country whose leader was very much involved, and probably again somebody who influenced me, and the kind of person that I have turned out to be, over and above the other influences I have talked about. Tanzania was the hot-bed of the liberation struggle for Southern Africa at the time, and probably you will recall that the office of the OAU Liberation Committee had its headquarters based in Dar es Salaam, and at that time almost all the liberation movements within the Southern African region all met in Dar es Salaam. You can name everybody, they were all there. Sometimes I sit down and ask myself, "Am I really just a Mosotho?" I think I am an African because I seem to identify more with every other person within the Southern African region much more than I identify myself with Basotho. Maybe it is basically because, you know, when you are coming from school at a young age, your brain is receptive and you develop; so that kind of influence has really made me the kind of person that I am. That is saying a lot, but that is me really right now after coming back to Lesotho in 1981.

After leaving Lesotho in 1961 I came back for the first time in 1976. That was almost fourteen years away from Lesotho. I only stayed for a little while as politics here were very tense, and so I went back to Tanzania. When I came to Lesotho in 1981, unbelievable as it is, I was seconded by the government of Tanzania, to the government of Lesotho to go and work in Mafeteng, and I had to stay in Lesotho on a resident permit from 1981 to 1987. It was interesting because I used to forget

even when my resident permit expired. Those were the politics of the region of Southern Africa.

In 1992 when Order Number Four was removed, having told you who I was, it would have been very difficult to keep me out of politics. I found myself getting into the structures of the Basutoland Congress Party, at the branch level, then at the constituency level, and then in 1992, the first congress after so many years, I found myself elected to the national executive of the BCP. Then came 1993, when I ended up as a member of parliament, and then as a Minister of Health.

Now probably the sort of background of who I really am has landed me in trouble in some situations. Because when I got into government, my way of looking at things went beyond just Lesotho. It was definitely much broader. I got frustrated, I think, in the narrowness of the way some of us looked at the politics of Lesotho, in a very narrow sense as if Lesotho was not really part of the bigger region. So initially it got going. Maybe if you could recall at that time during the preparation for the elections, there was a group of the BCP; we used to call ourselves the 'think tank'. We were trying to see how we could address the woundedness of the nation of Lesotho and then take the advantage of the mass support that we felt at that time, to accelerate the development of the country. We really wanted to bring unity and oneness within Lesotho, and extend that into the region, so that Lesotho continues as an independent country to excel its energies in becoming part and influencing whatever remained and the unity of the Southern African region. I think it started getting us into trouble because I think there was an issue of those people who were outside the country and those who had been in the country.

Coming to the de-democratization of Lesotho in 1992/1993 I don't think we gave ourselves sufficient time, nstate, to say what happened in Lesotho. What pushed Lesotho to where it was? What was it that ended up in the army taking over and all sorts of things that happened in Lesotho; the Constitution disappearing into somebody's pockets? We never really sat down and asked ourselves and said, 'From now on, how do we move on, in order to make Lesotho a truly independent country?' My information on what Lesotho did to assist the South African struggle will be a little limited. I will tell you what I saw happening outside because during the earlier part of the struggle I was outside the country. But even then one could realise that Lesotho was playing a very critical role. I remember one time I had come home on leave. I was from Tanzania, visiting my parents, and there was that South African journalist, a white one, Donald [Woods]. He was 20 years. He came across the river, and I happened to be with him at the place where a dinner was held for him by the British High Commissioner. Looking at the supporting role that Lesotho was playing, I mean really that was the first issue that I saw; I saw a country that was ready, despite its size, its smallness, its proximity to South Africa, and its intertwined economy with South Africa, knowing very well that if South African apartheid regime wanted to do anything it could destroy Lesotho. But I think the boldness of the Basotho to take the responsibility for those people who were suffering in South Africa was very

great. The second one which I saw, again when I came home visiting, was that where I was in Tanzania and the other places, there were specific camps for the refugees, but we did not have that in Lesotho. They were just part and parcel of us, and you couldn't tell who was a refugee and who was not a refugee. I think it takes a very bold step on the part of the country to be able to do that. The good thing which I saw was that regardless of who was doing it, you did not get resistance even from opposition parties. They did not say the government was doing wrong. We felt like this was what Lesotho had to do, as a country, protecting people who were in danger and being threatened.

There is something I remember about the time when we were in school in the 1950's, when one school was closed in South Africa. I was doing my secondary school here at St. Agnes. The Anglican Church just literally closed the school. So they airlifted students to St. Agnes in Teyateyaneng (TY) and the uniform that we all used was that of their school because they didn't want to make it difficult for those children from South Africa to have to change their uniform. So we used their uniform until much later that we came to the blue and white of what became the uniform of St. Agnes. Those students just came in and they were just assimilated like Basotho children and nothing went wrong. We did not say, 'What would happen to our children?' But we said, 'Ok, these are African children, they need education, the Bantu Education is not right.' And they were accommodated within the system; so I think Lesotho really played a very critical role.

I came back home in 1981, after 20 years I'd been away from Lesotho, and again things were not comfortable. That's when the South Africans invaded Lesotho. When it happened I was here. And you saw the number of Basotho who died with the South African refugees. That was a lot of sacrifice; and one remembers the statement that His Majesty made at the UN at the particular time. I remember that the Basotho were very vocal, and that is what I said. What impressed me most was the oneness, the unity of the Basotho when it came to that issue of the struggle of Southern Africa. But I don't know whether this one would actually be relevant but maybe it will be relevant. I told you that before I left home I was doing my intermediate school. I don't know whether that part of education is still there. You know after primary you went to Intermediate before you went to secondary school. I did mine at the Maseru Intermediate School and that was when the late Dr Ntsu Mokhehle was teaching there and P.K. Leballo was there too. I was staying at ntate Ntsu Mokhehle's house when the BAC was formed, and that is how he got me in introduced to somebody like ntate Leballo. When I went to Tanzania ntate Leballo was there as a PAC refugee, in Tanzania so the solidarity continued, and we always found ourselves part and parcel of the Southern African people especially those from South Africa who were in the struggle.

When I found myself in Tanzania I knew that one day I had to get back home. I didn't know how or when, because at that time one didn't even know whether the apartheid regime would ever disappear. But I'll give one example which always stands

very vivid in my mind. When I arrived in Tanzania in 1967 we went to a cinema and for the first time I heard a national anthem of a country and the national anthem of Tanzania is like 'Morena boloka...sechaba sa heso.' And I could not help tears coming down from my eyes. I said, 'Listen, here is an independent African country; I have never seen my own country independent.' And one felt like here you are in an independent African country where you don't sing 'God save the Queen.' That is why when Zimbabwe got independence, I was still working in Tanzania, I told myself and I told my boss that was not going to work, because I was celebrating the independence of Zimbabwe; anyway, most of them were my friends. So, in Tanzania I really got myself involved with almost all the freedom fighters from the Southern African region, because we were all there trying to support each other in any way we could. I remember I used to use a lot of my spare time helping some of those who did not have professional qualifications in my pharmacy. We used to get a lot of drugs from the eastern block and one was supposed to sit down and sort them according to their grouping. Just by helping to do that, one felt like it was a contribution to the liberation struggle. And my former husband who was a Tanzanian happened to have been employed as the medical doctor of the OAU Liberation Committee; so we were really very much in touch. One could say that I was a Mosotho away from Lesotho; I think I was still playing a role that was being played by Lesotho. So I found myself a part of the whole liberation struggle of Southern Africa when I was there. I remember when the first wife of President Samora Machel died. We used to call each other 'homeboy', and whenever he was out of the bush, he would come to my house and he would want to eat home cooked food for dinner. He had not met his wife for some time because his wife was still based in the war zone. He was told me, 'My sister, you know, I think you need to meet my wife.' I had really wanted to meet the wife, but unfortunately, by the time she came she was expecting; she got into a whole lot of problems and complications, and she passed away, when the husband was not there. It was something very painful whenever death occurred within part of the liberation movement. I mean we were all there and we all suffered. I remember I had a small bottle of perfume and when President Samora wanted to come and see the body of his wife at the morgue, I used the last bit of my perfume just so that when he gets in at least you know...

I remember another issue that happened. One may not remember all of them, but there was a time when problems started happening within the PAC. This was when they started being infiltrated quite heavily by the South African apartheid regime. Ntate Leballo had gone for an operation and after that operation I said to him, 'Ok, why do you want to go and stay alone? Why don't you come and stay with me in the house until you get better?' That was the time when a whole lot of things were happening, and I think one or two attempts on his life were made. I told him that if I kicked him out of my house it would be as if I was saying that he should go and die. We stayed with him for quite a long time, and after that he went back to the UK. So one day he came with two girls to my house, and I asked him why he could not give

me the two girls to stay with me; they were PAC girls. At first he thought I was joking but finally we stayed with the two girls. One happened to have been a younger sister to the late nate Joyous Mapetla, the former Chief Justice. In fact, we only found out when we were already staying together, because then we started asking each other questions. So then we found out we were family.

I mean one would just pick up some interesting stories. There were scholarships organized by the PAC to get these girls to go out, so they were sent to Geneva. When they got back on holiday, the first story that they told me was, 'You know, the person who's... who was given as our contact and who met us at the airport and who took us there.' They said they used to call me my sister not my friend. They said, 'My friend, that was a South African Boer. We don't care what happens.' I knew their seniors were not very happy about it. You know, as fate would have it, that was the Craig Williams who penetrated the US system, and you can imagine how many African children had passed through that person and the amount of information that had been given. So those were some of the problems of the liberation struggle.

Now being young girls, I remember there used to be some of their colleagues who used to come and visit them as friends at the house. But one day, after they had already left, and I was staying alone at the house, there was a meeting of the OAU taking place in Dar es Salaam, and almost all the people were coming in. At that time there had already been some factions within the PAC, and one was beginning to feel a little uncomfortable. The PAC people asked me to accommodate some of their colleagues; there was David Sebeko coming in from New York, and there was David Make coming in from Lagos. I think at that particular time and the hotels were full. I didn't have a problem because they used to stay with me. I remember saying to the men who came in, 'You know, funny enough this time I'm feeling a bit uncomfortable because of the factions that are happening within you. I'm a little bit concerned because I don't want to be part of your factions but again I don't want to see something happening.' And nate Leballo was already in London at the time. They stayed, you know. They came in on a Sunday and they were together on a Sunday. On Monday they came to my office, they wanted to take me out for lunch, but unfortunately I already had a lunch date with business colleagues, so I didn't go. They said, 'My friend, you better come back home early because we are going to cook dinner.' They were very good cooks. So I was building a house in Tanzania in Dar es Salaam and I went to the site and from the site I went to another friend of mine from Lesotho, Dr Qhobela. He was working for WHO based in Dar es Salaam at that time, as I needed some material from him for a paper I was writing, which I was going to present in one meeting. We were sitting down looking at the material, when he said, 'Ok dinner is ready.' Then we got ready for dinner; as we were at the table, the telephone rang and he said, 'You are the only person who knows this number except the office people, but now its late so it cannot be the office people. Have you given it to anybody else?' I said, 'No, at least I have given it to some people at home so that in case of emergency they can get hold of me, they can at least ring your number. Something came to my mind immediately and I said

‘Jo-Oe! Something happened at home. Is my father dead or what?’ He picked up the phone and he spoke for some time, then he came back and said that they had just shot David Sebeko in my house. It was Make who was calling from the hospital and he said that the people who did that were not known, and they were still at large. He told me not to move from where I were, and that he was till at the hospital. It was extremely sad. I remember very vividly when his body had to be brought. I mean it had to go to Botswana because he couldn’t go to South Africa, coming to be buried in Botswana. And we stayed in Dare Salaam and it was very sad. So, as I said, those are part of the contributions to the struggle. Much as I was not here in Lesotho but I still felt like there was that contribution.

Two weeks after that incident I got a call from home, my father was seriously sick. I had to come home. I didn’t know how I was going to pass through South Africa. I used to remain at the airport, but with all these issues, I mean they knew that it happened in my house. So those are some of the incidences that really one remembers about the struggle for Southern Africa. Lesotho was very much involved, even outside Lesotho. As to why Lesotho had to make those sacrifices. I think, what was going on in South Africa we felt like it was going on in Lesotho. I think the relationship between Basotho and South Africans is so strong and so high that, we’ve got half of our families there, half of our families this side. So it didn’t look like we were sacrificing, It looked like what Lesotho was doing was the right thing. Indeed it was the right thing. I think that was the sort of thing. Like I have been telling you about ntate Leballo, he came from Mafeteng, and he was my teacher; we knew each other. But he was now with the PAC in South Africa, so how do you separate the two? It becomes very difficult. So I don’t think that we were doing was sacrifice -we did what we had to do. I cannot put what the struggle cost Lesotho in terms of money. Rather, the cost, to me, was that we were saying to the South Africans, ‘You and we are one, and if we have to share a piece of bread, we shall share it.’ I think that is the cost. I mean, I am not exactly sure but I am told that even at the university, I mean, the South African students at the university were not treated like foreigners. Maybe they were even treated better than the local people, just to alleviate their pain because we felt like they were Basotho, they were our children. You cannot put monetary value to things like that. So there are very heavy costs but my concern is how we have dealt with that after 1994.

I remember things were happening in South Africa, in a whole lot of areas. Within the area where I was, the Minister of Health, part of the issue we were trying to do with the office in Maseru, was to try and see what was going to happen to the health system once South Africa became free? We have got referrals, we had students in trainings. We, as Basotho, put together the scenario of options and possibilities that would happen in 1994 when South Africa became free. Maybe we ourselves were still swallowed up in our own honeymoon of our 1993 landmark elections, and we did not allow ourselves to become visionary enough to say, without necessarily saying South Africa had to pay us, ‘How are we going to relate to a new independent South Africa?’ I don’t think we did sufficient preparations.

I remember in the Ministry of Health we did prepare some documents, but I don't think they ever saw the light of day, and they never went far. But then even if we prepared them only in the Ministry of Health we needed to do that as a totality, as government. Now we started crying when South Africa was saying that referred patients from Lesotho were like any other foreign patients, and they have to pay a lot of money. Were we supposed to wait until that time? I think we needed to sit down with the ANC and the other stake holders in South Africa to say what is it that we were going to do once South Africa was free, but we did not take that opportunity. Also I don't think they saw Lesotho as being so small that they forgot about it. We failed to consider what was Lesotho's place in the future. The reason was, because of our geographical position, we had the sympathy of so many foreign countries, and as a result there was so much money in terms of aid that was coming in to support this country because of the apartheid regime. We did not realise that when South Africa got free we would not get that money, and it would move from Lesotho to South Africa. I don't think we really anticipated that and made preparations for that. Those maybe are some of the issues and very serious situations that we really found ourselves in. Look at it right now, how many countries have got missions here in Lesotho? They just left. All of them moved to South Africa, including the British.

On how to deal with Basotho crossing the border. How do you keep on stamping our passports which are so costly? I would say that the relationship between Botswana, Swaziland and Mozambique is different from the relationship of Lesotho and South Africa, we should have had some special concessions. I'm not saying as a payback, but because of the position we are in, and the sacrifice that we made.

I would like to see a relationship of equal partners regardless of the size of the economy of Lesotho. But I think the position of Lesotho is very critical for South Africa. The sacrifices that Lesotho made, I think were made with the full knowledge about the size of the country and that of our economy. So I am a little worried because the relationship is seen as being not quite equal; one may say that the country might be small but its contribution was great, so let us look at that kind of relationship. Look at Israel, it is a small country, but Israel and America have got something in common. I mean America would sacrifice a whole lot to make sure that Israel is comfortable. What I am saying is, that is the kind of relationship that one would really like to see between Lesotho and South Africa. Thank you, nate.

Rakuoane, Lekhetho

[Maseru; 3 January 2008]

Lekhetho Rakuoane was born in the mountain district of Thaba Tseka. Now the family is staying at a place popularly known as Katse Dam, right in the middle of the mountains. That is where Lekhetho grew up. He did primary education at a number of Catholic schools, before going to Paray Secondary School. He then went to Holy Names High School from 1977 to 1978. His main entry into politics was when he joined the National University of Lesotho in 1979/1980. At the University he was recruited into the Committee for Action and Solidarity for Southern African Students (CASSAS), an organization that tried to help those comrade students from countries under racist rule like South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. He also served in the Student Representative Council at the university and used his influence to the cause of the struggle. After leaving the university in 1985 he went into private practice as a lawyer. In 1991 he was instrumental in the formation of the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) of which he is its President today, and its only representative in parliament. He is the chair person of the Parliamentary Reforms Committee.

My main entry point in terms of politics was around 1980 after I joined the National University of Lesotho in 1979. That was when I was recruited into the organization of the Committee for Action and Solidarity for Southern African Students (CASSAS, where I got exposed more to the liberation issues; and we played a main role. I hope that one would disapprove that may be in the context of what you are trying to look at is the role of the students. I think in terms of the Southern African and South African politics, we used to call Roma the melting pot in terms of the intellectual interventions, especially by the students.

In 1982 we were able to get into the Students Representative Committee (SRC) where we were able to interact with other students or comrades from the University of Swaziland and Botswana. Of course, the history knows that Roma hosted students that ran away from South Africa into Lesotho. Those are really the politics that, that one puts up and then, that took us a force.

CASSAS, as an organization, to us, especially in terms of its contribution to the struggle, was crucial. Indeed we were guided by also common a body that was representative for the students, and that constituency was CASSAS. We were looking in terms of how to help those comrades from different areas materially. When we had people from South Africa who could not have a home here, it was important as a forum to build them politically and also relate them to Lesotho. So we were hosting them, with the view that we should make sure that we were looking into the politics of South Africa and also their well being. But I think we were able to do more work because with CASSAS we were able to get into the SRC and also to use World University Service (WUS) which was giving scholarships. So there was always a lot of struggle in terms of who controlled that. Because the resources were there, depending on who could control them it was very important in terms of who would get the scholarship and then relate with those other people outside.

So basically when I was in the SRC we were able to use the resource of the SRC to make sure that the SRC itself as an institution participated and then supported the struggle. One of the most important thing was that CASSAS was a school for comrades, .especially the comrades who were coming from South Africa and who were at the university, and comrades who were also in town here. We made sure that there was that political direction in that political schooling. So really that is the kind of participation that we were in. We were also influencing the policy of the university as an institution to make sure that the university also supported the struggle and that was basically some of the things that some of us did when we were in organizations such as CASSAS, SRC and WUS.

CASSAS also supported the trade unions. We linked with the trade unions outside campus to make sure that there was solidarity and tried to strengthen the progressive forces as a broad anti-apartheid front. This is how I summarize the activities that we were involved in, and the main achievements that one can point to when we were involved in CASSAS. Besides CASSAS, we had another much more theoretical organization called Lumumba Society. But for CASSAS it was really the question of a broad anti-imperialist look. There was also the Christian Student Movement and by 1985 we, during the year of the youth, launched the Lesotho Patriotic Youth Organization. The Lesotho Patriotic Youth Organization gave birth to the Lesotho Youth Federation. So in other words, CASAS was broad but from there we were able to launch different organization some of which are still in existence today. CASSAS was like a cell. Then that cell would multiply in to different fora. As I said we were a small group; we were hardly more than 20 people.

I left Roma in 1985 and joined private practice and our firm then, which was a legal firm with comrade Seanamarena Mphutlane was basically charged to supporting the movements. We were part of the underground structures, in the sense that we were also acting as a support base in terms of resources, where the office was getting accommodation for the comrades. We would also interact with their office in Lusaka to get them vehicles. We were the cover of that office. I still remember that unfortunate attack in 1988 after the state of emergency. The car that was used by the comrades who were later killed in Queen II Hospital, was our office car; the driver of that car was Ntate Mofokeng's son, Lereko. That was basically the background of where we are coming from in the struggle.

We then formed the Popular Front for Democracy (PFD) of which I am presently the president. When we launched it in 1991, I was the deputy secretary general of the party, then in 1995 I became the Chairperson of the party, and by 1999 I was elected the president. I've been the president of the Popular Front for Democracy ever since and its soul representative in parliament. In 1998, after the political disturbance, I was the co-chairperson of the Interim Political Authority that moulded the model of the mixed member proportional system that we have today. After that, I went to parliament in 2002, and I think by 2004, I was also elected or appointed to lead the reforms of parliament. I'm still in that position as the Chairperson of the Parliamentary Reforms

Committee. It's a joint committee of both senate and national assembly. At present I am also a Member Parliament.

We were offering them motivation and hope to South Africa; that is the strategic position that we were holding in terms of the struggle. I think the shift of the Jonathan regime, for whatever reason, and the politics of the BNP, helped when the students and the other bodies were supporting the struggle. The BNP really did play a very critical role. When the people or students were running away from South Africa, it was easier for them to come to Lesotho and then from here they could go to other countries. So I think we were a natural hide out for South African refugees; but we did offer a lot of services like education and health, amongst others. I think we were able to play that role well. Our people who were working in the mines in South Africa reminded us of solidarity, and that we are almost part of South Africa. It is only that we were able to use the artificiality of independence in our favour. I think we were forced to contribute as a country.

The whole idea of UFF and then PFD was the decision by the Communist Party of Lesotho that 'we should have our own front where all people who want to work with us are not necessarily communist' So then the UFF was launched and that was the time when the opposition was being helped by South Africa. The so called BDA and the BCP with the LLA were directly now involved in the military skirmishes with the Jonathan regime straight from Pretoria. But then there were people who were opposing Jonathan and supporting South Africa. So we had the dilemma; either we were with Jonathan or with apartheid. We felt that the opposition was betraying the long term interest of Basotho by associating themselves to apartheid for the convenience or the expediency of removing Jonathan, by using the apartheid regime. We, as the communist or the left, felt that it was not the way we were supposed to deal with that issue. So that is basically the background to the UFF. The idea was that we wanted the entire progressive, all the democratic forces to come together and chart the way forward. That is why in our manifesto the relationship between Lesotho and South Africa to us is very strategic. We also wanted issues of dual citizenship, free movement across borders addressed, and there is nothing to stop us from that vision, because it was the very vision we had while we struggled for the liberation of South Africa; that at one time Basotho should enjoy the benefits. Indeed we should enjoy the benefits of that struggle; it was part of our struggle and it was our own liberation.

We wanted the borders to be opened yesterday. And indeed last year we made it a point that we were campaigning for this. Some of our big campaigns last year were demanding the free movement of people across borders. We were really excited when in June 2007, for the first time, there was the signing of this agreement that we should have this free border movement. The President Thabo Mbeki and Prime Minister Mosisili signed the agreement. Right now I'm from 'Manthabiseng over the very same issue. I am told that now what remains is the question of tabling this business in parliament. I don't know whether we shall see that argument revolve to a treaty, should it be brought to parliament. In fact we are insisting that we should

not use passport but IDs, especially because for us passports are very expensive. South Africans already have IDs; most of them don't have passports, and that is very interesting. In Lesotho, people do have passports but they are expensive and very difficult to get; they involve such a long process. We think that the IDs are going to be free, in terms of our law, which has not yet been implemented.

I'm actually having a pending question in terms of the implementation of the border movement. So we are pursuing that, but we are also working on the modalities which will make this easier. We are pushing that issue because it is a very strategic thing, that is also a sign of collaboration through which the ordinary people can benefit.

Sekonyela, Habokhethe

[Roma; 8 October 2008]

Habokhethe Sekonyela is a hereditary chief, and as such, claims that chiefs were always leaders involved and interested in the liberation struggle. He is a Motlokoa by clan. He studied law at the National University of Lesotho, where he is currently lecturing in the Faculty of Law. When at the University he was a member of the Committee for Action and Solidarity for Southern African Students (CASSAS), an organization fighting for the welfare of foreign students whose countries were under minority rule. In CASSAS, Sekonyela found a home for people who were passionate about the struggle against apartheid. Currently he is involved in a project that is working towards uniting all the black people in South Africa, especially the Batlokoa and Basotho. He also has passion for indigenous knowledge systems.

I joined Roma in 1978 and that was after the 1976 student uprising. At the University I was a member of the Committee for Action and Solidarity for Southern African Students (CASSAS). I think that the organization by then was made up of three or four people when we joined. I think there was comrade Ajuru who was from Kenya, the other was Judy Kimble, the lady from Britain, comrade Sehoai Santho was there, and comrade Kwenche from South Africa. It was a very interesting organization and we listened, young as we were. We admired the foreign language of these people against apartheid, and we were attracted to that. I joined with comrade Mahao, who was already more enlightened, because he had already met the chaps before. Some of us were boys from the mountain and they would say, 'No, these boys speak good English, but it appears as if they have something, you know they talk about justice.' You know being from the chieftaincy family, these are the things that attracted us. There was also comrade Tsikoane and a few other comrades who started joining.

Actually CASSAS was Committee for Action and Solidarity for Southern African Students, not for South African students. So it was an interesting organization and we learned internationalism based on principles of international solidarity, which meant an injury to your brother is an injury to yourself. CASSAS had interesting and clear principles. It supported ANC in South Africa, and we didn't just support organizations, we first looked at the constitution to find out what the organization stands. We looked at the ANC in South Africa and supported that; we looked at Zimbabwe and supported the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe; in Mozambique we supported the liberation struggle there, we similarly supported the struggle in Angola, through the MPLA, and all other forces which were against any kind of colonialism. At international level we also had solidarity with the struggle in Western Sahara and in the Middle East. We were more international, but we did what we could to mobilize people at different levels. We were able to demonstrate that Basotho were part and parcel of South Africa; that is why we said that an injury to the people in South Africa was our concern. There were also people from Zimbabwe and South Africa who joined CASSAS.

Around 1979, South Africa started its destabilization campaign; they used their agents in Mozambique and Angola. They started destabilization because you will remember the then Prime Minister of Lesotho, Jonathan, was pro South Africa initially but later on he became anti-South Africa, because of the influence from this university, especially the influence from CASSAS. When we started our campaign, we did so as an anti-apartheid organization. We were battling under the UN and the UN used to take students to go and celebrate. What we did was we wanted to push the government because it was pro South Africa, first of all. At one time we invited C.D Molapo, the Foreign Minister, to the UN occasion, and then used that platform to say that apartheid was a crime to humankind, and said all the bad things against South Africa. The minister was there and he was so embarrassed that he could not say, 'No, look we are in good terms with the apartheid regime.' So he had to tell us lies. This is the thing that launched Lesotho to be anti-apartheid. This thing started because nobody in their right mind could sit there and discriminate against the white man.

Another thing which triggered the anti apartheid move in Jonathan's ruling was that Jonathan himself had been in the mines. When we started saying these things, these young chaps from the university having researched and were now saying these things, it triggered his long ill feelings about apartheid where he was ill-treated in the mines and left them in stables called compounds and so forth. So he started saying that maybe we were right, then the government started taking a stand against apartheid and people did not realize how that started. It was started by this university and that is how most of the people came to be involved. The students who were being oppressed in the liberation struggle used Lesotho as base.

Let me start off with the other countries like Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and I will come back to South Africa. We used to collect clothes and then dispatch them to the liberation organizations in Mozambique, Angola and so forth; those packages used to go to Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Angola. We also had SWAPO in Namibia and we had comrade Hambo and all the other comrades who were in the organization and we also collected clothing for them. Those were the countries which were not yet independent. The most important kind of support was education of students; trying to show them the evils of colonialism and the evils of apartheid. Remember we used to say that Lesotho cannot be liberated unless the whole of Southern Africa is liberated. Unfortunately some of the guys now regard themselves as isolated; isolated even after independence. Now they no longer have something to say about Lesotho. All this was the material kind of support for the organization and also the moral kind of support which was there.

The other information was that we had a publication which was called the Vanguard. I have old copies which I keep in my files; sometimes I put them here. The Vanguard was for the working class. Our slogan used to be we should never 'lose our hearts'. It was a very difficult time and some of us were banned from going to South Africa. You know for Lesotho we get everything from South Africa and when we were banned from going to South Africa we said that we were never going to lose our

hearts no matter what turn history took; history would never take a turn without our participation and without the participation of the most advanced class. So we had to sacrifice some of these benefits, and those were the slogans we used.

It was nice but that was how we used to encourage the other students because inside the campus, the pressure was so much for the students especially after 1979. With the South Africa's destabilization campaign where the LRA was born, which was just an agent of South Africa to destabilize Lesotho, especially that it was taking a stand against South Africa. So it was a whip by the big brother; it came and started bombing certain places, economic places.

'Which way Lesotho?' was another slogan of the Yellow Vanguard. We used to attack Jonathan's internal policies, although we used to support his foreign policies. We used to say, 'Ok fine, you support the liberation struggle but you also need to improve the internal policies because that is what will destroy you.' And that is exactly what happened! We used to try to show students, and pin point these things to Basotho, at large, to make them aware that the destabilization was a ploy from South Africa. It was not for the liberation of Basotho but was to perpetuate the liberation of South Africa and that Basotho should be able to support the liberation struggle because South Africans were our own brothers.

We became very unpopular because everybody was just looking for change and saying that Jonathan must go; and we were saying, 'What is his replacement?' So we said that as intellectuals we had to be able to analyse what kind of change we wanted. People started saying 'Mopheme o lahlisitse students tsa ona , o ka khona hore o phele' in other words 'in 1979 BCP won the elections,' We said that were 10 years after that, and asked what program the BCP had that was going to relieve the people. The people said that the slogan 'Mopheme' meant that they had the right, the birth right to elections. They were trying to make people focus on the real enemy which was South Africa, because it was now deploying all its forces into Southern Africa, so it became very hostile. I remember we were so unpopular that even some of the liberation members were involved. I remember that some delegation had to be dispatched from Lusaka. In one case some of the people here on campus, I still remember some of the names, but I cannot mention them because they are now in higher places, who said that the people who were saying that they should not support the BCP, were making the ANC unpopular. We said that we were going to stick to principles. In one case we had to ask if we were wrong because even our friends in the ANC, which was more on the liberal side, and who did not know politics properly, started to be against us. When this high powered delegation came we were warned that if we still wanted to survive we had to say nothing about Lesotho politics; we were only to say things to support the people in South Africa. But we said we had issues here which we needed to address so we started addressing those issues.

It was only comrade Chris Hani; oh that comrade was just amazing. I remember he came and we were at his place at Arrival Centre; there was just a few of us and we were just about to break down. Then he came with a very powerful analysis saying

that it was not our fault that people were against us, it was because of the system, the apartheid propaganda; it was because now BCP was more popular that people could not even see that it was being used by the Boers. So it was just the apartheid propaganda so we should not even worry. We felt so good after that meeting, I had never in my life seen these people called terrorists, and here we were seated with comrade Chris. People asked how he could be a terrorist. They said he was a revolutionary and so we met a revolutionary for the first time. I tell you, it was so exciting when he came! That was the kind of man I was longing to be like. He sat there and analysed the situation for us; he was just amazing!

When he was killed, I knew that the struggle was going to be derailed. That man was so clear on the humanness; he would come and talk to you about your personal problems, your family, and how they are as if he knew them. I had never seen a person like that and that was what it meant to be a revolutionary. He was so concerned about our own problems that we understood the essence of supporting him in the struggle, because he was relating all these things. He said, 'Look at Lesotho and the migrant labour system in South Africa; you Basotho are responsible for building the gold mines and for building those resources. Since those resources have to be shared, you are part and parcel of us.'

The other thing that we used to do was that the campus used to be so alive. We used to invite international speakers to come to Lesotho. When we invited those public lecturers, the campus used to be full because that was the only place where people could speak out. On campus we were free under the guise of academics and so forth. We used to invite all those people and we were able to rush to the library and do a research on that topic and say we were going to crush them. I remember one of them was Dr Owen, the Foreign Minister of Britain, and the other one was Dr Mudenge. It was such a pleasure. When Dr Owen and Dr Mudenge from Zimbabwe came here, we had very hot debates. I also remember Archbishop Desmond Tutu came here to preach about politics of non-violence. I tell you we were hot and we spoke out there and then; I can still remember the late comrade Ajuru from Kenya, in these debates. So that is how we used public lectures.

We also had societies where we actually had to discuss politics. It is unfortunate that these things are no longer on campus. It was very good because it gave a lot of comfort to our South African comrades.

We were also in close contact with the Lesotho Communist Party, under Ntate Mokhafisi Kena, and I think you should meet him. He is very powerful man. He is one of those old men who we as young men looked forward to meet. That is why in every struggle the elders are so important.

We had trips organized for us to places like the Soviet Union, to meet the youth from international organizations. At one time, three of us, comrade Lethobane, comrade Matlosa and me, were travelling to Mozambique; at the airport they told us that the plane was almost full and we were on standby, only to find out that in the plane it was only four of us. Guess who the fourth person was, Hani's wife! I tell you

we were shaking all the way in the plane and then the plane was driven by a Boer, a white man, and we had just come from South Africa. We were saying “God, is this guy going to land in South Africa?” But you know God was always with us, and we landed in Mozambique. There were times that we were going through to Swaziland to meet some comrades. Roma was a very powerful institution, some of the people that we used to invite who were inspiring were Hugh Masekela, because he was also in the liberation struggle. He used to come and tell us about the struggle and life in exile. That was when things were very interesting. Ultimately we found old men, like Thabo Mofutsanyane of the South African Communist Party. He lived in QwaQwa all of his life and passed away some time ago.

We used to commemorate these special occasions like women’s rights and so on, in South Africa. Another thing that is very important, which people don’t realize, is that Workers Day, came to be honored as a public holiday in Lesotho, because of CASSAS, when we started to invite the trade union. The most powerful thing, at international level, was that in 1982 after the killings of the South African refugees together with Basotho, by South Africa, we were invited to make a presentation. I remember comrade Mahao made a very powerful speech against South Africa on that occasion. There were, I think, about 42 people killed. Some of them were burnt to ashes just like that and it was not only South Africans but Basotho too.

All in all, it was very exciting and I must say that it made an impact to a lot of Basotho students. Even after the independence of South Africa, I met some of the people who were against us in the student organization and they said that they still remember what we used to say and now our words are coming true. Our slogan was that the liberation of South Africa was the liberation of these other countries.

Of course there is still a lot to be done now. Even the ANC itself has lost focus and the pride of these people in South Africa and Southern Africa when people shed their blood to support them. Among the people who came to see us and pay homage was comrade Chris Hani. He called on us to say thank you for our support in the liberation struggle, but it was unfortunate that people did not take that into consideration.

I think CASSAS was formed in 1976; it was I think a year or so when we came in 1977. It went on from 1976 to 1994 when we left. We left other comrades who carried the banner up to now, I think. I don’t really know because the students are no longer active and they no longer focus on issues.

Sookanan, Advocate

[Maseru; 2 December 2007]

Advocate Sookanan came to Lesotho in the early 1960s as a political refugee from South Africa. He acquired Lesotho citizenship in the early 1970s and became active in defending both the PAC and ANC freedom fighters in Lesotho courts. In the 1970s, he was a legal adviser of the BNP and an active supporter of Jonathan's progressive foreign policy which was characterized by strong anti-apartheid stance and support for the liberation movement. He passed away last year.

As I see it Lesotho has played such a dynamic role in the freedom or should I say in the fight for democracy in South Africa, yet it is so difficult for me in a short period of time to assess what it has really done, as you know the struggle itself started hundreds of years ago, indeed we are newcomers, but I was lucky I have lived. I was a young boy during the period when there was tremendous isolation in changing the ANC from an old fashioned thing to a more dominant style for Africa and that happened in 1955.

That now brings me back to Lesotho's situation. You see BCP, lead by Ntsu Mokhehle was born on the ANC; that nobody can deny. Ntsu Mokhehle himself was a very powerful leader of the late 1940s, exactly they were all together. He was part of the youth league that basically created the program of action of 1949, He was a very powerful man in his young years but the BCP was born from there. ANC therefore on this chapter that we see, took it as its child. On the other hand if you look at Leabua Jonathan, his history was different, he was a mine-worker and basically he was not very educated like Ntsu Mokhehle, educated in the sense of being instructed but it doesn't mean that he was stupid, I will say that very carefully because to be honest Leabua Jonathan was one of the most brilliant persons I have ever met in my life and I'll explain to you why later. I have some things to say to you which may surprise you but it is the truth. Anyway, what I am saying is that for many years because of the strangle of apartheid on our people, we had to help the people oppressed by the apartheid regime. For many years refugees from South Africa continued to trickle into Lesotho, being hunted down by the apartheid. At that time these refugees came to Lesotho, they were not very welcome because most of them were the allies of the BCP, which I've just explained, so from a point of Leabua, they were trouble-makers, so they were not treated very well. If you look at all the people who came in the city mainly Ntate Mabandla, maybe the late Ntate Ndlovu, all these tended to be more aligned towards the BCP. The more modern ones do not, you must be very clear about that, and I will analyse for you the facts which lead me to that conclusion. The facts are very clear especially at the National University of Roma, where the struggles were fought between the two groups. However, we shall go into that later, but for now it is safe to say that people who were coming into Lesotho, were tolerated because they were black people and being oppressed, but still the regime was wary of that.

By 1972 the relations between Lesotho and South Africa deteriorated; the reason for this was because Foster was the main guide in South Africa and he devalued the Rand without consulting with Leabua or with Botswana, the neighbouring states. There was a lot of anger against him, you know. Chief Jonathan became hostile to Foster as Foster began to accommodate the BCP, who propped him up. Well as I said, Jonathan, was saying, 'How can you be my friend when you are accommodating my enemy?' That was the beginning of the problem. Now Jonathan on the other hand, decided to lend his support to the ANC, and he did that. So he organized seats for the ANC, the PAC and SWAPO observers in the United Nations. Each was to bring peaceful change to South Africa. So way back, this man was involved, so people wondered why he got bigger reward from the ANC. He had reasons for that, and we are the witnesses of that. We know where we are going here nate. In May 1973, Chief Jonathan demanded that the conquered territories be returned to Lesotho; this was another point. In 1974, Chief Jonathan complained bitterly about the support given to the BCP by South Africa. That period, 1974, is very important, there was sufficient polarization between Lesotho and South Africa for the ANC to begin to establish political structure in Lesotho. So there was trouble between Leabua and Foster that opened opportunities for ANC to begin to establish the base. So what did the ANC do? They sent their best man; the task was given to none other than Chris Hani, who moved from Botswana to Maseru. His task was to build transit facilities to enable MK cadres to infiltrate South Africa. Previous to that, he was one of the few who had survived the Wankie battle in the 1960s, and he was a trite and tested comrade and he was very much respected. He was a member of the South African Communist Party Central Committee, and by 1975, while he was still in Lesotho, he became a member of the ANC National Executive Committee. But they did not make note of this. From the beginning there were difficulties in the setup of strong bases, because of the scarcity of proper leaders. The whole South African revolution had span into a lull, people were tired, people just gave up, and so it was very difficult. However, it was that conscious way of changing their mind sets. But here, the regime was fighting it mile to mile, it was trying to get back people to be dignified to be, not to disrespect themselves, being black. We will come to that when we discuss people.

By 1976, everything changed, the Soweto uprising caused thousands of activists to leave South Africa, and many were recruited to the ranks of ANC by Hani. Now, if you could go to the graveyards here in Lesotho, and you look at their ages, clearly most of them were in their twenties; most of them were brought by Hani. Others were sent to the ANC Headquarters in Lusaka, and it was Chris who trained most of these recruits politically and mentally. Chris Hani became became one of the most wanted men in South Africa, and rewards were offered to anyone who could take his life. There were two unsuccessful attempts of Chris's life in 1980 and in 1981. A member of the Lesotho Youth Organization by the name of Tumelo Ramatolo placed a bomb in Hani's car, unfortunately for Tumelo the bomb exploded on him, he thereafter fled to South Africa. He was pretending to be an activist, but he was actually a plant. After

he was bombed he laid in Queen II Hospital for about three months, then he got bail from the magistrate's court and he fled; that was the end of him. They are all in Ladybrand, enjoying our freedom. Anyway, we are told we must forgive them while we are left in Lesotho to die, how do you do that?

Chief Jonathan through his Ministry of interior conducted a refugee programme to assist refugees from South Africa into Lesotho. That is important because you want to know what Lesotho did. The Ministry was assisted in its task by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. Each refugee was given an allowance every month, and they were accommodated. These refugees in turn were divided into groups, and trained to recruit new members to enhance the struggle. There was intensive political education embarked on as cadres were chosen to go on military training elsewhere, not here. However, to keep continuity, others were trained in Lesotho and sent into South Africa on missions. In these courses Lesotho's army the PNU played a critical role, they were actually involved in training ANC cadres to go into South Africa but secretly, If you can interview some of the older people, maybe even Lekhanya., they will tell you the truth, they must say how they were trained by the ANC. They must tell us, in all these activities, mainly a Mosotho had to pay the supreme price. It also lead to the eventual demise of Leabua in 1986. That is the first introduction to my story and I will build on it.

Today, for us to understand the challenges of Lesotho, we have got to take Lesotho and put it in the principle of struggle for Southern Africa as a whole. Precisely, because Lesotho has never been splendidly isolated by itself; it has always been part and parcel of the South African social commission. If you look at the role that was played by Lesotho, first of all it was a colony; and then after independence it became a nil-colony. It was a nil-colony at a particular time, when it was basically a Bantustan. Much as you would like to say that it had an independent parliament or whatever, but if the principle export of a particular country or region is principally labour, they are a Bantustan. This is because the country does not have anything else to give except to send the children to go and work as slaves in the mines of the white clan. I think that was the role of Lesotho. So I am saying, the Liberation of South Africa should lead to the Liberation of Lesotho. But what actually happened was that all those treaties and agreements between Apartheid South Africa and the regime, save for the military regime, had remained intact. This is something that is surprising, because one would expect there to be progressive agreements between the two countries; that never happened. Let us just unpack the Lesotho Highlands story. Do you know Lesotho Highlands was one of the two reasons why the coup d'état took place in 1986? They wanted your water, but Leabua was being very stubborn, he said, 'No, no, no, this is Basotho's white gold.' So he did not want to give them water unless they said, 'Okay, the first person to drink will be Basotho.' The second reason, as you know, maybe the more important one, was to get rid of the ANC. He was Pro- ANC, and the reason that I defended him and put my life at great risk, was precisely because I was told from Dar-es-Salaam through Ntate Lekhona Jonathan that it is my duty

to basically give him the support. So I supported Leabua and his party, as you know, from 1986 onwards.

But you will also notice something before 1986, before the coup, I was representing the BCP people. They had confidence in me as well as Ntate Sello. So if anybody's Human Rights were violated, it was our duty as lawyers no matter what our political persuasion was, to basically protect that human right cause. That was more important to us than any other interests; yes we had to do that. In September 1985, there were about 87 BCPs that were taken into custody, they were making a disruption in Lesotho, they wanted to capsize the government. You know about that? So I defended about 87 of them, and Ntate Makutu Chachil defended about five women. The men were all with defended by me, until the coup took place in January 1986. In fact the buildup did not even start then, it started much earlier, you should go back to around 1982. Lekhanya was being persuaded to make coup d'état against Leabua and he just would not; he was approached several times by the Boers but he kept on refusing. That was from 1979. When they created the Lesotho Liberation Army in 1979 then they fought together against Leabua and the ANC. That is how it was, but we'll probably go into that more in detail as we go on.

I think Basotho have always been our comrades in the struggle and I think they expected a lot more from what we have given them. For example, first of all, the King was given an award, and we fought very hard behind the scene, to say that they gave the King an award. I know he was a member of the ANC, but what about Leabua? Eventually they did give him an award. So my point is awards are not good enough, we need rewards. The fact is, Lesotho is, as I am saying, in the same position as it was under the Boers. Nothing has improved nate, nothing. As I am saying here, in the year 2007, Lesotho is still with all its various problems, with Chinese, with people on the streets selling vegetables, people trying to cope with poverty in different ways. You know the RDP in South Africa was a recon structural and development project; it was basically as you earlier said, to teach us, to give us skills, so that we can trust ourselves in doing that particular task. The problem is in Lesotho, the same as in South Africa, we bring Chinese here with those big, big factories. Basotho are learning how to make things but at the end of the day, I think our process is incorrect. We should concentrate on education, it is very important; it is the thing of the white man basically used against black people. You make sure they are not educated, and those few that are educated, he bought them over for the few pieces of gold. I am saying we have got to start from the ground. Exactly, teach the child how to fish not give him fish. Yes, this is what we are missing.

Billy, Macaefa

Macaefa Billy went to the mines in 1981 after completing COSC at Bereng High School, Mafeteng. He joined the National Union of Mine Workers (NUM) when it was formed in 1982. He was elected shop steward and later chairman of the Saaipias mine branch of NUM in 1983. He also played a part in the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) in 1985. In 1987, he was part of the thousands of mine workers who lost their jobs following a protracted strike over working conditions. Most of these workers came from Lesotho. On arrival in Lesotho, he played a very important role in the formation of the Construction Workers Labour Union (CAWULE) which was organizing workers at the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. He was also instrumental in the formation of the textile union known as Lesotho Clothing and Alliance Workers Union (LECAWU), which later split into Factory Workers Union (FAWU). In 1992, he attended a labour law course at the University of Belgium. Macaefa has attended workshops locally and internationally. Currently, he is the Secretary General of FAWU, and leader of Lesotho Workers Party and its representative in Parliament.

Lesotho has played a very important role in the struggle, first they welcomed the South African refugees, second Lesotho influenced the international community to address the apartheid issue in South Africa and I believe His Majesty the King at that time (late king Moshoeshoe II) emphasized on the issue of Apartheid in South Africa at the United Nations after the meeting in 1982. Also Lesotho offered free Education to South Africans in this country, I think people like Jama Mbeki, Tito Mboweni are the products of this country, and many other people who benefited from the Lesotho education under the National Manpower Secretariat.

Lesotho, from a while ago, infect, the history clearly stipulates that from a while back, Lesotho has never supported the Apartheid Regime. We are told that, when the Union of South Africa was formed, the idea was to incorporate Lesotho, but the Basotho were adamant that they would only join the Union of South Africa when the apartheid Regime was annulled. I recall very well that that answer was given by the Leader Ntsu Mokhehle, infect they have never supported colour discrimination as individuals, even during British colonization, there was a hotel named Lancers Inn, where only whites could enter and have alcoholic drinks. Then Mr Ntsu protested and entered in that hotel and had an alcoholic drink, and then the whites left because it was clear that he hated Apartheid.

In particular, it was the Basotho National Party (BNP) which participated in helping the South Africans with a number of things, to help them flee from their country as well as to find different scholarships. As for organizations like the Lesotho Council of Non-governmental Organisation (LCN), they have just emerged.

There were many economic sanctions on Lesotho which were caused by the South African Apartheid Regime at that time. At the border gates, sometimes, one would find that the authorities were very strict, in the sense that the imports could not get into Lesotho as expected, that is, there were economic sanctions then, the movement of people on their own became difficult, even just to take flights, infect they made most things difficult for us. So, I think basically, Lesotho suffered a lot. They sanctioned it on many things just so that Lesotho could stop helping the ANC but truly we were still able to help them regardless of those circumstances. I think it's a lot of things, because the things which hindered development like during the construction of the Setsoto Stadium, the building materials couldn't leave the country (South Africa) legally, infect they hindered us in so many things that we could not make any developments.

Because we were facing this challenge, the then government became very strong and ensured that there were cooperatives that helped the nation very much.

There are no important things that we can say we achieved because in 1992 when South Africans became independent, yes in 1994, well, they no longer focused on their friends who helped them, in particular, this one who is landlocked, who is not like Eswatini or Botswana which share borders with other countries, they were supposed to have a project for Lesotho only, a special project. And now they are even stricter, they still take Basotho as foreigners in South Africa, they deport them to come home which is something they shouldn't do, in other words, I don't see Lesotho benefiting from the South African freedom.

Infect, we are disappointed in the sense that, they have not done anything for us, they have not considered us, they did not even want to negotiate the issue of boundaries because it is still a problem for Basotho that now that South Africa is free, they could sit down and discuss the fact that maybe, hey man, here is a country and fortunately it has not yet been named, it is called a Free State, this means they have not yet given it a name, they have respected us very much the Boers of that time, now that they are free from apartheid, we were supposed to talk about that country that it is not Free State, it is Lesotho and then Lesotho goes back to its boundaries even if it becomes part of the Union of South Africa, it should be on its original boundaries but you see now many Basotho, when they are retrenched from the South African mines, when they arrive here, they have nowhere to work, infect there is no other country we can trade with, we can trade with only one country which is South Africa and this does not sit well with us, even on fair trade.

Infect, I will talk about groups, let me emphasise that the BCP was not loyal to the African struggle because it ended up working together with apartheid because its main reason was they could come and attack here, they had to buy that passage by selling out the ANC, where they were training in Libya, if they could see/hear thing that the ANC was doing then they would become the informants of the apartheid so that they would still be given that opportunity of having a base that side so that they would come this side. So that issue is the one that made ANC say that until South Africa is free, Lesotho will not be free and that remained so even when the BCP was now in power in the country, it had the challenge of governing without trying to mend fences with those who were still in South Africa and this is where there were sell-outs who were helping the people of apartheid.

These two countries needed to cooperate, and not to say one should stop the independence of the other but they should be stay as they are because of geography, because of our geographical set-up, we should sit down and make sure that between these two countries there is what we call free movement of people, these borders should be removed but not interfering with the independence of each country, there shouldn't be a difference between a Mosotho from Lesotho and a South African Mosotho, one should just have free movement, when he/she wants a place to stay, that should happen freely because we address the concern that a big portion of Lesotho is still part of South Africa and we are left with a smaller portion than the one that was taken by the people of apartheid and there is no boundary because this thing was a decision made by the British because of one reason, they wanted to supervise apartheid while still living in South Africa. In fact even us, we are supposed to be part of South Africa. There is no country, in international law, that we can say it is independent within another country when it

has got no other way of survival without that country because South Africa, at the moment, if we can declare economic sanctions against it, there is nowhere where we can receive goods from other countries, there is no way we can trade with another country, we are entirely dependent on South Africa. The British have left, you see even at the American Embassy, there is no longer a monitor, they all go to South Africa and continue so the thing is, we have gained independence, otherwise we have nothing, and we only have pride.

Hlaoli, Tankiso

Tankiso Hlaoli is the first son of Zorro Hlaoli and my mother is Mrs 'Matankiso Hlaoli and they are both the Bafokeng clan. They were born in Leribe at Ha Mafa Thaba Phatšoe. I was born there in 1943. I attended school at Matšekheng until when I left for Peka High School in 1962. I then went to the UBLS where I did Bachelor of Law. I went to Peka High School already mature enough and we got a teacher or education that was more inclined to politics. When I arrived at Peka High School, Mr Tšeliso Makhakhe was the Headmaster and they were members of the Congress movement and almost every teacher at Peka High School belonged to the congress movement, I think it was only three people who were not members of the congress movement.

I would say that my political affiliation was based on the belief and understanding that South Africa is part of Lesotho and even now, I still maintain that and it's something that is not appealing to most people when you say Lesotho and South Africa are one thing. Infact, accept the fact that the people who have the same authority have to work together in every way, we have to put together our resources as neighbours, we should work together and even in other countries it is the same, even you, in your village it is the same case. Working together with your neighbours will assist in your security and your success, even with countries, it is the same and it has always been my understanding that these countries should do everything in their power to cooperate so that they succeed together because if they don't do so, the enemy will approach them individually and the enemy has always done that and that enemy is wealthy people from other countries. These wealthy people from other countries who can see certain opportunities here come and approach one country individually, that's what happens to people who don't work together, you come to them and call them individually and show them the benefits of helping them alone and how they can destroy others, once he does that, you should know that the enemy is done with you as a country. They approach them this way, you will then hear that one country here in Africa collaborates with someone, someone works with another person somewhere, someone belongs to the Americans, another one belongs to the British and another one belongs to the French and when you do that you already understand that when you talk to someone from West Africa which was a French colony, they trust their French people and they will only work with them and the French are whites. Somewhere, in Kenya, Tanzania or Lesotho, they will only work with the British people, they don't care about other Africans, those people trust the British and they have always worked with them even in the past and the British will continue to separate them, even for those, it is the same because, the rich people, whether they are black or white, rich people are like-minded and even their interests are for the rich people, the poor people are also like-minded and their problems are for the poor people. I wanted to say, if you talk about South Africa, to me, I consider it as a general question because my understanding is that I didn't fight for South Africa, I was fighting for Africa and South Africa is part of this Africa that I'm talking about and we worked very hard because even at the beginning, this congress movement that I'm referring to was formed in South Africa in 1912. The congress movement struggle began in South Africa, the struggle about recognizing the Southern African countries, it was formed in South Africa in Bloemfontein, the chiefs of Lesotho were present, the chiefs of Lesotho represented Lesotho in the formation of the ANC of South Africa. Infact it wasn't South Africa because it was the Southern Africa, it was

Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho until they started this thing of separation, then we ended up having the BCP which was only for Basotho, there was also the ANC for Zambia, then Kaunda formed a unit, so on and so forth, they differ. Even in Zimbabwe it was still called the ANC until they started these things of political parties which were localized and the challenge with this one is that you now see the interests and objectives being directed to us as regions, to us the Basotho, to us the South Africans, to us the Zimbabweans which is very dangerous according to me. You start separating people according to their nationalities, that is why we wait in long queues at the border just so that we cross to South Africa, a country which already surrounds us. When we don't even know where we can go, they could just let us move freely and cross the border, when you arrive there, you get arrested, you go to prison in the country where you committed a crime of stealing. But because people say, this is our place, this is my country, this is other people's place, this is where you find that the old Pan-Africanism approach poses challenges of intervention nowadays, how can you intervene in issues that you don't have interest in? When you say you don't belong to that family, how can a South African come and intervene when Basotho have problems, when he doesn't feel like the issues concern him. According to countries in general, it is clear that if you can hear a person from South Africa or from Botswana saying they are coming to help Basotho resolve their issues but not feeling like the issues concern him, one can only intervene with the aim of bringing peace because one is badly affected when they have problems, but when you already think that even those people, you can help them and try everything to help, this is why there can never be any kind of intervening that can be done Sir. So I'm saying, we have been fighting, our struggle was about fighting for Lesotho and South Africa to be free so that it also participates, but the struggle itself e tsoitse because it has generalized that it is for black people of Africa who understand each other, when they start doing what they are doing, there is nothing, according to me, there is nothing that can continue, there will always be problems, another thing that I have realized, you can ask me a question sir.

Let me start this way, I was trying to run away from saying I, because I thought I was working as a connectivity, as people, as Basotho supporting the struggle for freedom of South Africa with our blood, with all the responsibility, protecting them, hiding them in our homes, when countries put people at the camps and say those are refugees and they should be kept in one place alone, not interacting with other people. Basotho didn't do that, every refugee could stay where they liked and could work anywhere, our teachers were refugees from South Africa who got jobs just like Basotho and that was their self-enrichment. So we have tried in many ways, working toward the freedom of South Africa so that they become like us, so that we work together, not that they address their problems alone, they can visit us whenever they want, so that we work together, the struggle for freedom of people with similar problems is like that and even here in Africa, moho(mandate) of Lesotho and South Africa are the same. We used to stay with people who were hiding here when apartheid was giving bad education-the Bantu Education, the Basotho are on that side because of the histories of development and the empowerment of black people, the Basotho who are on that side and those who are still here are the same people. I wanted to start with this one in particular, you will observe that everybody who lives here in Lesotho, here where we call Lesotho

now, if it were parathetsoe with that one where they are together, all the people who live there whom we call Basotho, are the people who have always lived there, not here in Lesotho, they were in many different places in South Africa, the Bataung hailed from many different places sir from South Africa until they arrived here. We are trying to trace their steps until they arrived there where Basotho want to know where they came from, and I'm still working on that even now, I visited the Bataung who reside in Rustenburg, there at Ntsoana-Tsatsi, which is where the great one of Basotho, His Majesty the King of Lesotho originates from. I would like to put it this way and if there is any objection, I'd like to hear it, his great grandfather Napo's home is Hidelburg, Tebang, this Tebang which is in Mafeteng is named after the Tebang which is found next to Ntsoana-Tsatsi at Vrede. We went there and we discovered where the grandfathers like Motebang and Molemo had had their homes in South Africa, they came down with people like Chief Monaheng until they got to the Bafokeng at Fothane next to Butha-Buthe. Monaheng and Mokheseng hail from Ntsoana-Tsatsi, all of them come from South Africa, even all the Bafokeng come from South Africa, and this means it is one nation, some have the problem that even my great grandfathers left Leribe and went to Matšekheng. We are now the people of Matšekheng but we originate from Leribe and our families are still there in South Africa, our people are still there, they are all over South Africa and still many and separating according to places. You see that people from Eswatini, Botswana and Zimbabwe are in South Africa, all of them are like that and this means it is only hypocrisy according to me when people say, here is Lesotho, here is South Africa, here is Botswana, just so that the people who are in leadership of those places can benefit and rule over those ones who follow them.

Let me first start here, this person called Thabo Mbeki, who is the current president of South Africa, his third brother called Jama Mbeki, who married our sister from the family of Mofikeng here in Matelile, a daughter of Matete, he was an expatriate together with Thabo Mbeki because of the apartheid that was in South Africa and he ended up attending school at Peka High School. He schooled with us. I was in the same class with him, even when he was made to escape back to his home, he was assisted by us. We walked as a group, as if it wasn't only him who was not going to come back, it wasn't only him, but he had the intelligence of his brother Thabo Mbeki, the third born brother after him, and Thabo was Jama's advisor.

Jama attended school with us at Peka High School. He even went to the National University of Lesotho at Roma after completing his studies at Peka High School, but we worked together in so many ways. His brother disappeared and went underground here in Lesotho by going to the National University of Lesotho at Roma. Jama left Lesotho after predicting the results of the elections of Lesotho in 1970. He wrote on a paper and showed how the Congress Movement was going to win the elections, when it won the elections and there was state of emergency, he had to flee; he was at the University at Roma. He died and we did not know where died. They say when a person dies during war, you don't sit down and cry but you just continue. I knew him very well together with his elder brother who attended school at Christ the King whose name was Moeletsi, who came after Thabo, those people are Basotho, their mother comes from Ha-Moerane in Mokhotlong. Thabo Mbeki's mother is the daughter of Moerane here in Lesotho. She is a lady from

here, she is still alive even now though she got married that side. My people are there, that means we are working together with these people since that time.

Let me give you recent examples. When these refugees resided here in Lesotho, we worked together, we gave them jobs, those who had skills in handicrafts, those who had other skills we worked directly with them, we found jobs for them so that this person who knows how to paint should get the job so that s/he can have something to eat and for get about the handouts given to the refugees. We worked with them like this ever since, others fought at a certain point, the Boers came in and shot people here. Let me give you another example, that in 1982 they came here in Lesotho and I was in Morida's government's house there next to Ntate Mothebesoane, that is Ntate Mothebesoane 's house, opposite Ntate Mothebesoane, I mean opposite that building which looks like a hotel, that is on the other side where the road turns to the circle of Florida where there were flats, just when you turn, the building which is opposite Mothebesoane's house, that is where the refugees resided and I was staying at the house next to it. When the Boers arrived, shooting and killing people here, I went outside when I saw the smoke, I tried to see what this smoke was about and there were people falling down outside, only to find that it was the Boers, shooting people and they had painted themselves with the soot, they had killed seven, if not eight of the refugees right next to us. There were no Basotho amongst them, the Basotho were in other places, there were only Xhosa boys who were refugees from South Africa. Early in the morning, we were there and we were so scared and we did not know what was happening. I came out of that place unaware that I had gone there, I was then frightened by that riot and then I had to run away, guns were used and I realised that people were being shot and others had already fallen down and I noticed that in other places were still under attack. I was not sure but it seemed like a government house, the building looked like the government house which was just next to NTate Mothebesoane's house, they were ancient houses. Not too far from these houses, there were flats, and they belonged to the university. I was a bit far, not far from where there was a turning point, where we had to turn right at the road that lead to the Chinese. This means that we worked on these issues for a very long time especially when it was said that it should be taken into consideration that the place should be named Borokhoaneng. These were the Basotho houses where they lived and we were there, astonished and frightened, we were attacked just like that. As a person you would be surprised that if you are in a free South Africa, what do you say, go there and spend the whole day queuing just because it is said that these people are criminals, they bring crime here? Can't a person who has committed a crime be arrested, whether they are from Zimbabwe, South Africa or Lesotho, be it that s/he has stolen, shot someone or committed other crimes, can't s/he be arrested?

That's my concern and even the parliament, think of how they can get involved or participate. On Friday, at the parliament, I gave all examples of things which can be done, and I suggested that we should discuss the issue of this country of Basotho which has been won over, which is the Free State, what do the Basotho say to the South Africans? I pointed that, when I was at the Senate, there are recommendations which are still there even today which I proposed should be discussed in the parliament. Like how should the primary relations between Lesotho and South Africa be like, we discussed this with other people who were in power, about the efforts that they made,

we should see it, and hear it, the push for the Basotho to be free and their country which was won over, should be free. It is what we agreed with them, and when we are told about the issues of OAU, its decision was that, the boundaries should be marked, and it is a good idea because the way Africans are educated and when I say we are educated I mean, we learned that as Africans, our continent is different from those of white people. To Africans, when you talk about a country, you are actually referring to the nation, about the people not the land, according to Africans, land belongs to the people, when we say, this is Taung or this is Lesotho, it simply means the place is owned by Basotho. If you are the head of the Bataung family, it means everywhere, where there are Bataung you are their leader, this is the wisdom of Basotho, I'm saying, all the properties of those people belong to you, that is, all the properties of the people of the chief actually belong to the chief, the properties of the people you lead, whether you are the chief of Bakoena or Bafokeng , all those people's properties and their fields, you say they are yours, when they fight and have disputes, you are the one who goes there and intervene and resolve their issues, in other words, it is your country and that means, in the same manner, in every place, where the Basotho live, that land belongs to their chiefs.

We tabled this before the senate, it was discussed and approved, it was a heated debate with the senators of high stature and we suggested options on what could be done. We tabled it this way, if Lesotho and South Africa are made one country that will only be differentiated by regions that, this side is Lesotho, this side is Zululand, this side is Xhosaland, this side is Tswanaland according to how the regions have been allocated. If it is done that way or taken on federal basis, that is, Lesotho should have its own parliament, even in South Africa they have such things, then our parliament addresses the issues of Free State, so that is how it should be done., As we think of different ways of working together and we should go down to the lowest level possible which allows for Basotho who love both Lesotho and South Africa to acquire dual citizenship, those who like prefer it should be allowed to be South Africans when they are in South Africa and be Basotho when they are in Lesotho and one will abide by the laws of the country that one is in and this is would be referred to as voluntary or optional citizenship. Laws are made by the national parliament, currently, the Lesotho law doesn't allow for dual citizenship but the South African law does. Even with the existing law, its still parliament that decided that we don't have dual citizenship, we don't know the reason behind that, for one to be denied the opportunity to acquire dual citizenship, I fail to understand what Lesotho stands to gain. Whereas, according to me, with dual citizenship there will be free movement of people, that is a person will be able to work easily in South Africa even if he/she is a Mosotho, he/she will work for his/her country.

Jonathan, Moletsane Simon

Moletsane Simon Jonathan hails from Leribe district and a close relative of the late Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan. He is well known for his trade union activities. He studied at Claver House in London and is a founder and leader of Lesotho Trade Union Congress, a federation of unions closely allied to BNP. He has never worked outside the unions and has traveled widely on trade union business and remains a trade union activist until today.

In those days, it was indeed very difficult, in the beginning when we got our independence, South Africa seemed to have pity on us and they tried to help us in many ways., The problem with South Africa was that the ANC and the PAC and others were fighting, so people began to come here in Lesotho and Chief Leabua defended these people and then the Boers started to be against Basotho and this worsened the situation. Chief Leabua wanted to bring them together so that they could come up with a solution to this but he did not succeed. The ANC and others seemed to prefer to fight and when they started fighting, people began to come here in Lesotho and we protected them. They considered Lesotho first before they could go to any other places and and then when they were in Lesotho that is when they would be taken to other countries so this thing angered the Boers, that is why in 1982, they attacked Lesotho and killed members of the ANC and Basotho and this destroyed the relations between Lesotho and South Africa and birthed the so called Lesotho Trial Frontline States. Lesotho is not a Frontline State unlike other countries because it is surrounded by South Africa so you will understand that the situation is different from other countries that are next to South Africa. Lesotho is in the heart of South Africa so we are forced to be careful in everything we do so that we may not get ourselves into trouble.

Lesotho did so many things; first, it protected the refugees who ran away from the spears of the Boers. Second, Lesotho had forums with all countries that addressed the issue of Apartheid, it had forums within the country, outside the country and worldwide, the world knew that Apartheid was a bad thing because Lesotho was considered as being part of South Africa and as for Lesotho, it wanted the world to know that it is not part of this and the world listened to Lesotho. For Lesotho there is nothing that will be imported and exported that will not pass through South Africa, so you understand our situation that, that put us in a tight spot. However, Chief Leabua worked as if he was not in this situation. He was brave and powerful, even from his speeches you would hear that he was brave and powerful, this helped to make South Africa independent as it is today.

Another thing is that this country has different people, that is there are black and white people. They still had rights but they were few in numbers when we talk about democracy, democracy for all the people, black people were not allowed to participate. The main issue that was fought for was for people to participate. They fought for people, other countries to come and take over just like that. They

benefited from the government's resources, the world also understood what the activists were fighting for and what they wanted.

Lesotho provided South African children with schools and accommodation. There was a quota that they were given so that they could study in Lesotho and abroad. Lesotho played an important role here because many people including those who were at higher positions/ranks did not only come to Lesotho but also they went to other different parts of the world with its assistance for example with the funds of Basotho.

Well, maybe there is something, but I personally haven't seen the benefits that I can stand here and say we got this benefit because when there was political instability in Lesotho these people whom we protected and whom we got killed for were the same people who came to our country and killed our people so that is the only thing that surprised me. We had believed that this attack which happened in 1998 would not happen because in 1982 it was done by the Boers and others. We did not think that the black South Africa, after gaining its independence, we would encounter such problems. Instead of benefiting, a lot of things happened taking the example of what happened at Letšeng and at Makoanyane, Lesotho lost a lot of equipment as well as that one of 1982, His Majesty the King Morena Moshoeshoe II went to the UN, to represent those cases and a verdict was given to South Africa to reimburse Lesotho but until today as we speak there has never been anything done, so the most recent one is this one of 1998 when weapons were used on peoples' lives.

My understanding on the situation of Lesotho is Lesotho and South Africa are neighbours and this means that their relations should be good, that is, they should both protect each other because blood is thicker than water. I am trying to say we should unite because there are multitudes of Basotho working in South Africa. I also worked there, therefore we are related, some have married in Lesotho and others in the Republic and this makes us one nation. Therefore, there is no reason that will hinder us to get economical benefits because most of the Basotho men are working in the mines in South Africa and have worked in other places and this has improved their economy. Also Basotho women are still going to South Africa to work as domestic workers and other places hence we must have good relations because Lesotho does not have any country that it shares the boundaries with except South Africa. We also know that there are issues about Free state so I personally believe that Free State is part of Lesotho and if governance does not come this other side that means we must go to it.

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Lepphoto, Sister

[Maseru; 12 February 2008]

I hail from Roma, Maphotong Ha Lepphoto; I am the daughter of Ntate Aresene and 'M'e Melita. My father passed away but I still have a mother. She is 93 years old. I am the principal here at Mabathoana High School since 2001. I became a principal since 1984 and in 1990 I moved to Mazenod High School. I was the principal in that school and I left in 2000.

Truly I don't know much but let me just say to you that, there were people that I grew up with. I worked with Ntate November as my Deputy Principal here at school [Mabathoana High School], he worked with us for years, since 1969 when this school was established but he also worked with 'M'e Laura, who is the founder of this school. They used a hall as their classroom. Ntate I will say, we helped him because Ntate November was a refugee. However, we tried by all means to find a job for him. I will not say he talked too much or a lot about their politics because he was a very quiet when he was at school. He worked very hard but still shared with us the problems he encountered, etc. Elaborating on that, I was just trying to say that we helped him by trying to find him a job so that he could survive and so that he could be able to be in contact with his people or have a relationship with them. In those days the medium of communication was through letters and we understood that there were children that he knew who could pass these messages, the pupils that he lived with and those that he knew. I am not sure if those students were South Africans or were Basotho. There is another person apart from Ntate November that I know whom Lesotho protected he was known by the name Ntate Sizamba. These two are both deceased. I worked with both of them as we were all school principals. I knew Ntate Sizamba from the principals association and he was very close to me such that we even discussed with him about how we would improve the education system. Lesotho also allowed these refugees to be teachers hence played a vital role in the lives of these people. Besides this, I once taught one of Ntate Ralebitso's children called 'Matumo here, she was a young girl. If you remember very well Ntate, when there was a search for Kaisano, I don't remember very well, she was an ANC member and she was one of the leaders. It happened that they fled from South Africa to this side, after fleeing, we heard that there were aeroplanes that were searching for them. And these aeroplanes demolished our houses and bombs landed where this child of Ntate Ralebeitso who was here at Lekhaloaneng was. She passed away here at Lekhaloaneng. I believe it was her home or where they lived because there were no houses then like we see now but her family was there, at that time. To my knowledge it seemed like there were some girls who were staying there coming from South Africa as activists if I can say so because sir, anyone who was against the struggle was forced to flee the country. You know and you are a witness, their politics were those that were against people who would talk badly about that government or the country of South Africa, maybe the government was not aware but

the people didn't like the way they were treated and that is why I say they might have suspected that there were activists living in that house. 'Matumo together with those other people were killed at that time, I am not really sure how many they were, maybe they managed to go out because even Ntate Chris Hani was able to arrive at the boarder, at those houses that were on the right side when you go to the boarder. Beautiful houses were built there and at that time there were no flats. Next to the road, there were houses that were demolished, when you go up from the boarder, there is Hoohlo Primary School and opposite this school other houses might be the houses for those people even though I can't remember Ntate very well. It's like he arrived at that place and they knew that he was staying somewhere around that place but they couldn't locate him. We heard that he hid himself there and after they knew that he was there, he managed to flee by earoplane and he escaped and left to Eswatini. He used Eswatini airline when he left the country so. This is a child I have known better because I taught him when he was young and this had affected everyone and that had ended up making this leader (Hani) to escape and that time one could see that Lesotho was indeed committed.

There are many Basotho in South Africa because they work at the mines, because most of our children are on that side truly when they were crying, their lives being miserable and we would pity them and to me this was one of the reasons we helped. I didn't know much about politics because I was young at that time.

Here in Lesotho I don't know the names of the people or people who protected those people, meaning those who welcomed them in their homes even though they knew this was dangerous but we have our fellow nuns (sisters) who are stiil alive and they are still here in Lesotho and we learnt much from those sisters from South Africa, so in this case I can say we have given them a warm welcome for them to feel at home. They joined the nuns when they arrived here in Lesotho yet they were South Africans who left their country. Even though they were not refugees, since they were girls it wasn't that vivid/ clear/noticeable but you would see that they came to Lesotho for peace and they also liked the fact that here in Lesotho people were not being killed/shot.

In 1982 they were not happy about what SADC did in Lesotho, you could tell from what they were saying. I have confused the two, it was the Boers before then ,sometime in 1982 so one could tell that they were not happy in regard to what happened and as well as what happened in 1992, I am sorry Ntate it seems like I am confusing the years, in 1998, you see people were very hurt. Besides this, on the side of religion, we participated through prayer and listened to Ntate Hail as the archbishop from South Africa and also as an outstanding public figure, he was reluctant to fight against things that were bad that were caused by apartheid so you understand that we read those papers, we buy, we give input if we have other facts which maybe anyone has. Just like you, when you come and talk with me and we talk to the individual who wants us to share our knowledge in the same way you came to talk to me about issues like these. We are saying indeed this issue needs to be prayed

for because it is not of God. We are God's children and then we would like the nuns, priests, and those who have this calling, who are holding onto it, may God change the situation, soften the hearts of these people, this was really bad. The person who was not happy about this thing even though she is now dead was 'M'e Veronica, she was our provincial mother and indeed she was against it and sometimes she would say I should be careful that they do not arrest me. She used to say if they have done what they have been doing to other people and sometimes they refused. I remember the other time when they refused to issue him a passport, he was supposed to go abroad and in this case he fought for himself to have it. He did so many things to have it and even by explaining himself. I will say he was not reluctant to talk to other nuns who were in South Africa to discuss this issue on what should be done for people to be liberated/free specifically on that side. Here in Lesotho we only knew he will encounter problems when he was supposed to cross the boarder. They gave him troubles in regard to the passport. They did not lock him up but they wasted his time when he was supposed to cross the boarder. I really do not know what will other people say, but I also noticed that he had a problem, it was clear to everyone that he had problems. He passed away, even though I cannot remember very well when, I think it was around 199... if not 1994 or 1995 I cannot remember very well. He is somebody that I know very well. I think he is somebody that I know very well because we met though it's been a while.

I will say truly our relations were nearly shaken. We began to have fear; we noticed that we were not supposed to feel free when we were in South Africa. I will say things such as businesses were very close to deteriorating, they were badly affected. According to me, recently when we heard that Morena Leabua might be honoured, if I am not mistaken, due to the fact that indeed he allowed the refugees to come and reside here in Lesotho, the refugees, and others who loved peace and they fled to Lesotho, this award as I perceive it as, I have not heard where it was said Lesotho, Lesotho, Lesotho should be given enough. Independence itself, I don't think it brought any problems but the problem that I cannot forget, I don't know sir, it was a political problem and I am not knowledgeable in this field but there was a time when the borders were closed, it was after South Africa gained its independence. It was a while after South Africa had gained its independence. It gained its independence in 1994 and here in Lesotho in 1996, that was when the borders were closed. The truth is, when one reflects on the incidents that happened in the past, that we helped these important people, people like Ntate Chris Hani. He once used Lesotho as an escape route, but sir I do not know, South Africa had already found its feet because, it had been two years post the apartheid era. But you know we may gain independence but finding stability takes a while, that is why I say I'm not sure if these were the effects of independence. Apparently this happened as a result of failure to reach an agreement in relation to the Lesotho Highlands Water Project in 1986; Basotho did not have any problem with this project. Please note those years because I might mix the events that happened in different years.

In this case I don't think there are specific people who did that. You know Ntate, in yesteryears like today, when a white man is in power, people consider him as God himself. Most of the Basotho still assume that when a white is in power, things go smoothly, so all I'm saying is I'm not aware of anyone who was a sell-out but what can I say, its in human nature that in a group of people, there is always that one person who would turn out to be the boss's informant, do you get me sir? I still believe there were such people and they thought they were right, you see, just like you and me, for example, we can develop jealousy if we think there is an opportunity that might come to me, not you, and the fact that there is no trust amongst people, this ends up causing division amongst us. I don't really have an opinion in regard to this issue but I thought that Lesotho and South Africa, the services that they are providing to each country even South Africa are supposed to be affordable except the services that are provided at the borders. The issue of VAT should also be very clear. Except the issue of VAT, even our economic relations were supposed to be clear. Sometimes when we had problems here, South Africa was willing to assist us and I saw this creating good relations between the two countries, in this way, South Africa would come and help Lesotho with its skills, knowledge and technologies and things that could work. In short Ntate I can say, they have equipment for that problem. The fact that, they brought their helicopters to Lesotho, indeed it was a good step and another thing that I see that can create good relations is that our identity be valued and respected. I don't agree with people who say that we should be part of South Africa. I don't agree with them because we must value our identity. Morena Moshoeshe also worked very hard for Lesotho and we should take that into consideration. We should not take it for granted, as if it is a minor thing to be just another province in South Africa. I don't agree with these people. We must be left alone for who we are, being free, and be respected the way we are, whether we are poor or not. But where there is a need to give a hand they should do so but they should not take our country to make it their other province.

Makeka, Thabo

[Maseru; 10 January 2008]

I was born at Ha 'Manteko Qacha's Nek. I attended school at Pitseng. I studied Law at the National University of Lesotho. I went to America and studied Law there and I then went to Geneva to specialise in International Law. I was preparing myself to work as a diplomat. Besides International Law I also did a diploma in diplomacy and after graduating I joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1972.

I worked at the Department of Law at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We focused more on the issues of International Law as the law of the foreigners and amongst these; the most important responsibility/task was to advice the government in regard to the relations between Lesotho and South Africa, which surrounds Lesotho. I would like to explain that our ministry's task was to advise the Prime Minister in regard to the issues that affect Lesotho and South Africa and most importantly, I participated in the international forum called the Law Forum. The objective of the forum was to see how Lesotho and South Africa could work well together. An expert was found who would assist these two countries using an Australian model. We worked together on this issue from 1973 to 1980.

Another important issue that was discussed in this forum was the issue of Lesotho being won over by South Africa. A country that is just across Maseru. We worked on this issue and we were under the supervision of the Prime Minister. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was then elected after and Morena Peete Peete was sent to Van Tonder at Manchester University to study about Land and Boundaries Dispute in Lesotho and the United Nations delegated an expert, who was called Prof. Chukura whom we worked with as the Department of Law, advising the government in regard to these two issues that were between South Africa and Lesotho. I would like to elaborate more on this because the government's policy since then was that the future of South Africa will be in the hands of black people.

I would like to state that our responsibility was to work on it and we met several times with the South Africans who were oppressed, like you said you will ask me questions. I will explain the stage that we were at. The process was done so fast to the South Africans, under that leadership. Lesotho knows South Africa more than any other country because indeed Lesotho had to inform the world that this is bad and the leadership that is seen fighting against Apartheid, which is ANC where the government and the party that was ruling at that time established a relationship with ANC in order to assist ANC in all the ways to continue the struggle. I would like to clarify again that at that time when PAC, the government of Lesotho and the party that was ruling [Basotho National Party] tried also to work together with Ntate Potlako Paballo who was the leader of Basotho National Party while he was still in Tanzania.

These two parties and we as their employees worked with them. Let me show that most of those people from the two parties were given diplomatic passports so that they could travel without any problem. I would also like to clarify that we were delegated to meet with the leaders on behalf of our leaders/government. Indeed we worked harmoniously with them because you know that ANC had an ambassador and PAC as well. They were both ambassadors there. The other ambassador was called David Sebeko while the other was called Ntate Macathini and Morena Mbeki. We worked

with them and others to fight against Apartheid and if we have to state the kind of the assistance that we offered, it is countless. And in that Agreement that we entered into, they were given scholarships in order to further their studies so that they would come back home to lead the nation. They were given passports at that time and their trips were fully sponsored so that they could go and do their tasks especially because ANC's headquarters was in Zambia Lusaka while PAC's headquarters was in Dar-es-Salaam. There was a necessity for these business trips to be taken between New York and Lusaka, and New York and Dar-es-Salaam, so as I said that the leaders were there and it was difficult to travel at that time as you know that Lesotho is surrounded by South Africa the management was there so even us who were outside the country we were the ones who were communicating with them like I showed that in Zambia, it was Ntate O.R and in Dar-es-Salaam.

There were two reasons why Lesotho helped South Africa. Firstly, Basotho were suffering due to Apartheid. I am not only talking about Basotho who were in South Africa even here we experienced it as black people. Indeed in South Africa the Boers took us for granted like a thorn in the eye. They treated us badly like they did to the South Africans, and in English I would say, it was in our interest to fight against Apartheid. There was nothing that we could do because Lesotho is landlocked by South Africa yet the sanctions were directed to South Africa but it suffered the consequences or the effects. The sad part was that politically, economically and socially this was causing a negative impact on the development of Lesotho because opportunities that Lesotho could have, like investments, South Africa was against them.

There was one meeting I attended representing civil servants where the Boers told us that they would not allow investors to come to Lesotho, first, in pharmaceutical industries, second in the motor industries and third they clarified that their reason was that these industries could easily be turned into military industries so they did not allow investments from other countries to come to Lesotho. They told us that for us to have investments in electronics; they created televisions and IT and so on just to meddle with their freedom as the television would be watched by those people so they would not allow it. They did not hide it and you will understand that if the nation that was independent like this one was given the dos and don'ts.

It is very clear that, we were under the governance of the Boers and our leader, Ntate Leabua was very clear that we should not allow the Boers to rule us. He vowed that it was fine even if he would die instead of allowing the Boers to rule us. In the year 1862 the British government ended up intervening by protecting us. They said we won't be governed by the Boers and most of them they did not know that later he did not agree to unite with Voster. The Boers ill-treated the black people. There was hunger and poverty. There was no food and we begged him to talk to these people but he said we should suffer. He compromised by meeting them at Peka bridge when we told him he won't set his foot in South Africa and or he should never go to South Africa. He died and some people came to report what caused his death and may his soul rest in peace. He made an oath that he won't go to South Africa while he was still alive and the government being in the hands of the black people. Here in Lesotho, like I am a civil servant, I won't be able to talk about it in depth because I was serving the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My key responsibility was to work on the affairs of the country both inside and outside. What I can tell you is that, in my knowledge, the Prime Minister got a support when he disclosed it, so as it is a culture, there were people who made presentations that Lesotho was turning to be a colonial country. And

they talked a lot at that time when the Boers were treating us so badly in 1976 and this was not good especially in Qacha's Nek where I come from. So the South Africans gave the Tanzanians the power to rule. Some people said Lesotho should not make Transkie to unite and this was the decision that was made because Morena Leabua had a vision. Even though we advised him, there were technicians to assist him to do so. He saw the importance of doing so. We did so yet we knew that there were some people who were advising him on the other side. His vision would bring benefits maybe because people from Qacha's Nek knew that one day they would have a hospital called Machabeng, maybe it is that unity/oneness that Quthing and Qacha has. The policies that were established by Morena Leabua at that time, I remember in 1976 I was the ambassador of Lesotho, I went out with the senators, a thing that had never happened before. We were with them and they ended up going to Qach's Nek and one of those senators whom I went with was called Senator Biden, he was one of the people who campaigned for the presidential position in Nigeria.

We stayed with him at Cabanas and we even went with him to Qacha's Nek. He then saw how people were suffering and he agreed that Lesotho must be supported in all the ways and immediately after this, we were supported and Lesotho became part of the UN. And Lesotho went to Africa in a strange/bizarre way at that time and this is how Lesotho was respected. I would like show that there were people who were against this. It was when the Prime Minister showed that the Republic of China was a member of the Security Council so South Africa made it compulsory that we must get the support from the Security Council because Lesotho was struggling.

There is no need to state many examples on what happened thereafter. Unfortunately in 1982, 1983, and 1984, the Boers ended up using the political conflict in our country, which was between BCP, BNP and LLA and tried to topple the government (coup d'état) and that was when many people started talking about those things. The essence of the government under the leadership of Morena Leabua seemed to ... it was because it had become a very serious thorn in the eyes of South Africa and no doubt that Morena Leabua was toppled by South Africa especially because at that time there was an Ambassador representing, who was from America and I personally think he was very instrumental in the sense that, that government that was under the leadership of Morena Leabua was toppled. I tried to talk to that ambassador before he stepped down and he said that he has identified the colonial government. At that time it was only the ambassador who was supposed to talk about this issue. It is clear that after he left serving the government, he ended up being a South Africa citizen and he owned a farm there. I do not know where he is but he was one of the right leaders who were anti revolution according to me. I can point out some who we were working with at that time. He is the late Mrs Chabangu. She was called ausi Mphaphathi. We worked with her but she passed away. So the other lady whom we worked with and is still alive is Mamello Morrison. She is a hardworker. She worked with Ntate C.D. Molapo, who was the Minister of foreign Affairs. I would like to show that in this policy that were using, all of us were united. However, I would like to point out the three ministers in particular; Ntate Peete Peete, this policy was very instrumental to its consolidation so we were working with people like the late Ntate Teboho Mashologu, Ntate Mooki Molapo, who was the ambassador there. Let me show that we worked very hard in his times. The person who elaborated more on this was Ntate Kotsokoane, when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. What I am trying to say is that Ntate Kotsokoane too was fortunate to serve as the PS of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

However, he is now late. He was in this position at that time when it was implemented. Actually after he passed away Ntate Montši Makhele was appointed and he served the ministry well and he was very strong. Unfortunately, he was in that office for a very short period of time. At that time when he was in this office, he was very effective to consolidate our relationship with ANC as well as PAC. Truly I have to explain that, what was important is that people forgot that we were very instrumental in regard to the issues of Namibia's freedom. Some people do not know that our relationship with SWAPO was very strong. For example, some people do not know that when these dams were built, we had to negotiate with SWAPO and we had to negotiate with ANC and PAC because such projects were long term projects therefore we knew that in future, those people will be in power so these water that we are collecting will have to pass in these countries of these people.

We signed agreements with them, that we would do those things so that they would not think that we sold water to the Boers. Then we agreed that this must be planned together with the liberation movement. They were the ones who negotiated with the Security Council and ensured that such agreements were signed. So the Boers were not happy. It was clear that in a short period of time the ANC would rule South Africa and that was going to be the party that will be governing Namibia so the agreements that were made at that time with them were signed. I went to school in Scotland and studied Law. So in 1970 while I was still in Scotland, I received banning orders and I came to South Africa terrified.

I stayed there and they brought that banning order to my room. I was not allowed to come to South Africa at all. I was allowed to go to South Africa only when I was delegated by the government. I was not allowed to come to this country at all and this happened maybe in 1986. That is when I realized that I could also come to South Africa because my name was deleted so I came to South Africa and indeed we were so proud because we were banned for something that could be noticed. But let me clarify that I was not a member of ANC and I was never a member of ANC. I was the member of the [Basotho] National Party and I am still fighting even to date.

We suffered a lot because of one person. South Africa has been very unfair to Lesotho. According to me we suffered a lot because we were on the forefront because most of Basotho lost their lives in South Africa due to Apartheid. South Africa came and attacked Lesotho. I mentioned South Africa because in 1982 when Lesotho was attacked, I was the Acting Government Secretary at that time. It was the most difficult time because we did not know what to do as most of Basotho lost their lives because the Boers attacked them for what they didn't do and it is still shocking that even to date we have not been compensated. The Prime Minister's office made this policy that we must not have refugee camps in Lesotho because they become easy targets and these people were all over and our people ended up losing their lives. Their families have not yet been compensated. We hoped that ANC would have compensated and this would have enhanced our relationship more than it was. I would like to give you an example that most of the prominent people from South Africa studied in Lesotho; some are ambassadors, ministers, etc. The taxes of Basotho were used to pay for their education so that they could be educated.

Some of them only think that Lesotho invested in their education so that it could benefit in the future but it was for the sake of South Africa. And I still believe that South Africa owes us even though it gave us handouts yet the treatment that we are getting as Basotho is not the treatment we were giving them because we thought we were one nation/united. Yes, they sometimes happen. We are a swollen state which

thought that if South Africa gained its independence, Basotho would go freely to South Africa not this thing that has been done to Lesotho that people were deported. I did not understand how they were deported because I for example, had relatives in Gauteng, Free State, Matatiele and all over South Africa. I had brothers and sisters because some of them were married in South Africa so I do not understand why we are being deported.

Let me give you an example nate, in the history of this country, there is no one who does not know that Moshoeshe 1 united different tribes/cultures in South Africa. There are all these tribes/cultures here in Lesotho; Maswati, Mahlubi. Me too I am a Ndebele. We come from Pietermaritzburg at Mpakoana. We left that place running away from Chaka. We first arrived in Matatiele and some of our people stayed there while others came in Lesotho, some went to Qacha's Nek and some went to Butha-Buthe and they moved liked that until some ended up going to Swaziland. There is no tribe/culture that is not here in Lesotho, so one will begin to ask herself/himself when Basotho are still being deported from South Africa does that mean that Basotho should go back to Lesotho yet Lesotho is a cosmos that is, it's a representative of all Southern African tribes.

The good thing about us is that we marry amongst ourselves unlike others who are marrying from other tribes. We married amongst Basotho. You will find that we relate to each other because even if I am Letebele I still relate with Bafokeng, Basia and Bakoena. We are all related. That's why I am saying if these other tribes could have listened, such problems would not have been experienced like it is in Kenya, where people are being attacked. We don't have such problems here in Lesotho. I mean even if you ill-treat someone you will find that, the very same person who had ill-treated me, we meet at the funerals of people that we are related to. Therefore, that is why I said if Africa had copied/done what Moshoeshe 1 did. They would see that the way he led the country is still being practiced even to date.

It is the only solution for Africa. I'm terribly disappointed because we thought that after it had gained its independence in 1994, South Africa in particular things would change as we were an independent country. I don't know what to say because things are far from what we thought they would be. We knew that we had the National Party. The pre National Party and the post National Party in 1986, we knew what we wanted to do. One, we were going to implement free movement of people between South Africa and Lesotho. Free movement of investments like I showed earlier that there were investments that were hindered by South Africa so to my surprise I see that in this post-governance, which started in 1995, those things still exist. However, I won't say much because I am no longer in Lesotho/serving the government. I do not know what is happening within the government corridors but I only see the results that show that economically Lesotho is definite.

So I personally think Lesotho was better in those days of Apartheid because we were able to... and it's a fact. We blackmailed the Western world as it was South Africa's backer and tried to see what we could do so that we got benefits in the name of Apartheid as we were the victims. The unfortunate thing about the post (after 1994) is that the world did not believe that Lesotho could be squeezed by free black South African government economically. Recently when Ntate Mbeki visited Lesotho, we were at the palace. It was him, His Majesty and I was still the State Councillor at that time. He told us that it is a shameful thing that South Africa could be the least of all the countries because South Africa actually is a developed country. The question is what happened there after, I think there is nothing.

I am currently working in the private sector. There is no difference between the pre 1994 South Africa and the post 1994 South Africa as far as the economy of this country is concerned. There is no difference; we still suffer the same way. There is no valid reason why we are still in this state. On the contrary, really it is becoming very, very difficult because we are supposed to be united, economically, on the economic policies of South Africa, Lesotho doesn't have a say. The monetary policies of South Africa were imposed on Lesotho but you don't see South Africa agreeing that even their commitment or those size policing is affecting us so you see people who don't care whether they affect us negatively or positively. That is why I am saying I don't know what is happening and I don't really want to say I know because sometimes all that I can say is that our government's policies differs with the policies of South Africa and vice versa so they leave a lot to be desired.

Makhakhe, Tseliso

[Maseru; 18 December 2007]

I was born at Matelile, in the Mafeteng district in 1925. I grew up and attended school there then went to another school at Khubetsoana, after Khubetsoana I went to Thabeng High school, from Thabeng I went to Basutoland High School, as it was called in those days then went to the University of Fort Hare. After completing my studies there, I came back home to be a teacher. I became the Principal of Masitise High School, I left Masitise for Peka High School where I became a principal for many years then went to MoshoeshoeII High School for a very short period of time. I was a candidate of Maliepetsana constituency at the 1970 national elections. I won but then there was a state of emergency. In 1994, I became the minister of Natural Resources.

In those days, the Basotho did not associate themselves with the leaders of apartheid, this means they distanced themselves from them because as Basotho, we did not like what was happening but didn't know what to do. At that time, that was the situation but I think I shouldn't just be as brief as that, let me tell you that the apartheid regime troubled the Basotho in a very deep way from the beginning because the Boers won over the Basotho country and you need to understand that, their country is at their hearts. From 1909-1910 when the Union Government took power, the Basotho were very worried because when the British parliament made a law that the four provinces should be united, they also made a clause that says Lesotho shall be part of South Africa but they had said that there would be consultations and agreements with the Basotho but the Basotho were afraid.

The Basotho politics were based on that, there were disagreements because of the consultations and really, what does consulting people mean? This was very big and they felt like, yes you might be consulted but at the end of the day, their (the British) decision will still prevail. The fact that there is no development in Lesotho, the Basotho understood that it was done on purpose, in order to hinder Basotho from developing so that they end up saying, here it is difficult to survive so it is in our best interest to surrender ourselves to that government. So in 1912, when in 1913, they made the law that 13% of the land shall be rendered to the Black South Africans, while the whites were left with the 87%, this was very frightening because our understanding was that we were also included in the 13% and that meant our land was not going to expand, for that reason, the relations were bad sir. Let me pass to another point and say, our boss, when we were learning at Fort Hare University, the biggest issue was that, they came before us, I think we came after two or three years later, this means we consider ourselves as part of the Liberation Movement of South Africa. In fact we were not even members of the BCP or the BAC, we were just a department of the ANC. It was our understanding that we could not fight our battle alone, we should unite and fight together as men. This is what we called Sokland African Congress Lesotho so people must understand that, Lesotho had its independence but also had good relation with South Africa, so when we went to Fort Hare, I went there already having been involved in the Defence Campaign in 1952, I was in Lesotho but the struggle in South Africa still affected us and at that time I was in Butha Buthe, teaching at Qalo High School where I worked for two years after leaving Basutoland High School. I learned more about the Defence campaign there, maybe because of the Indians who lived there who knew well about Gandhi and his Sיערall Defence which is also called Passive Resistance, we talked a lot about it with the Indians, so when I left that place, I understood the politics of South Africa.

I lived by the Defence campaign and when I arrived at Fort Hare, I found people like Mr. Kolisang and others; we were all members of the BCP but also members of the ANC so it was like that. Things changed at a later stage and I still don't know the depth of what led to that situation but things changed. If you could remember, in 1992, as you say that you were there at the political rally at the Pitso Ground, at a certain point during the rally, somebody shouted and said, "hey, there is a member of the ANC", I heard but nobody knew and nobody followed it up, so, because I was very sensitive, knowing how big the damage between the ANC and the BCP was, and I had observed it over a long period of time, I even observed it outside and I hope we will be able to elaborate more on it because I think I have deep information on it.

I don't know how we can go about it because when it happened, I hoped that the damage that I had observed since the 60s, 1959, 1960 and 1961 when the ANC members came here in Lesotho seeking protection, some because of Bantu Education that was in South Africa, as well as the refugees, but one could see that, we didn't want to welcome them, we welcomed the PAC but as for others we didn't like them. It's true that the ordinary members of the BCP and those of the ANC had good relations sir, but I could see that at the official level, there was animosity but I don't know what had caused it and I'm still trying to find out even today.

What Lesotho did, even though we can't really say it was a government's decision, was that when South Africans were running away from their country because of apartheid, in 1948 when the Boers were in power, they welcomed them in their homes without any conditions. We knew that our brothers and sisters were in danger and when they came to us we should just welcome them warmly everywhere in our villages and all over Africa. For those who ran away because of Bantu Education, schools had to admit them without any terms and conditions, even many teachers from South Africa came to Lesotho.

At Peka High School, the majority of those teachers who worked there were from South Africa, I personally went out of my way and recruited teachers from there and they were very happy with that, because they were many. I mean Matebesi, Mamba, etc, I can immediately count six, they were the majority of the staff, and I select these ones on purpose because I know their good quality of teaching. They are the ones who were in the forefront in ensuring that the school reached the highest limits, so sir that's all I can say.

This happened because the Basotho considered the South Africans to be their brothers; the people of Free State are Basotho. The Basotho never accepted that the Free State was won over for good. The people who live there are our brothers and sisters and what hurts them, hurts us too. That means, at the end of the day, the Basotho are still expecting a war, there might also be big changes and those changes won't be coming for only South Africans but also for Basotho.

This one is very controversial because it's going to touch on the depth of the liberation struggle. Do you mean as organized groups? They worked together in order to help. Ok, well, I didn't look at it from that angle, maybe I have bigger things in my mind because the issue of Bantu Education was very clear because the Basutoland High school took in many teachers from South Africa during the era of people like Mr. Lebentlele and those who came after him and because, he had worked in South Africa before and came back home to continue teaching, then when these things happened, he was already here, so those people knew him as

their teacher, many of them came here to continue working with him. It is the same case with me, I was with/had these friends and those whom I didn't know, and I ended up knowing them through their letters after getting the mandate of coming to help Lesotho to develop.

The issue of Bantu education in South Africa which expressed the oppression of black people, we were supposed to fight it in the manner that those children from that side should come here to get good education, even teachers should come and give good education so that ultimately they would be able to make a strong contribution to their country. Another thing sir, I don't like talking about myself but I think I should mention this one because nobody knows about it; even you will be the first person to hear about it. In 1958, I went to Bristol to do a Postgraduate Certificate in Education through a scholarship that I still don't know how I received and I think even the people who were involved are no more alive and there is no way to find out what had happened. I'm trying to write a book but when I get to that point I become overwhelmed and confused. What happened is that, after Trevor Hudleston, the one who was societal fled after he finished writing his book-Not for Your Comfort, he published its manuscript secretly and sent it to South Africa then he also got a chance to flee.

Upon his arrival in South Africa, he became very instrumental in the struggle of ANC. Amongst the things he did, he used to go to the University of Bristol to evangelise the struggle of South Africa and he was very eloquent. He was of the Anglican religion and we heard that the ones who were in Britain decided to form a society that would help them kill the apartheid. They named it Assegai Society Party. 'Assegai' means spear in the Xhosa language so the Assegai are spears that the Xhosas used to fight other nations with. Then they decided to have a fund that would help students to leave the country and go study in Bristol University so that after completing their studies they went back home to kill the apartheid. I hope you are following this thing, and then they announced in South Africa that they were looking for the first candidate to give the scholarship but I didn't know. The registrar of Fort Hare sent a copy of that advertisement. At that time I was at Maseru but I thought that clearly this was for South Africans and I didn't want to interfere with things which were meant for South Africans. Ntate Moholi are you going to come back? You see, there are too many things to talk about and I feel like they are all important and another thing is I have this destruction, I need to go get some money that side, please excuse me, I hope Mr. Mothibe will hear my plea. However I didn't want to turn the Registrar down and then I wrote a letter of application which stated that it was a loud call. You know, I won that scholarship. At Fort Hare I performed very well. I was a member of the ANC and it was well known. We used to attend meetings with people like Mr. Mandela and Mr. Mdala. There was no VC, everywhere, everyone, where we met, there were no signs. Anyway I made the application and I won the scholarship. I was very surprised, but I went to Bristol, I went there to be prepared so that I come back home with a spear that was going to kill the apartheid, so that tells you why I did what I did and why I behaved the way I did. During the liberation struggle, the times of LLA, I will tell you that Ntate, the situation was very serious, I will tell you all about that and you will understand that this is personal, it was a mission, I was sent there with a purpose and I couldn't just go behind peoples backs and going to Bristol at that time is still not known in South Africa up to now. I still want to communicate it but I don't know how because this is part of hidden history, people don't know about it.

He passed away. I went to Bristol in 1958 and finished in 1959 and had to go back to South Africa then they sent somebody else in 1959. He was from Transkei, the first South African who went to Bristol. I heard that he was based somewhere at Oxford and he even came to see me. I don't know where he is because that was the last time I saw him. At that time in 1959, there was a big conference held at the University Of London School Of Economics somewhere there, then I got an invitation, he was also there and we met. In fact, he couldn't make it but we met there and that is where a very big step to fight apartheid was taken. We could not only defeat it at an organizational level of ANC, we needed support from other governments. We had to ensure that we were understood sir, I know that I was one of the people who spoke very strongly about that, infect I am Umkondo we Sizwe, I'm one of the best, one of the first.

For women, I don't really know because as much as I was a teacher, I knew that somehow the BCP which was in Lesotho worked together with Transkei, especially Transvaal, Springs and Free State but the Basotho women who were at Transvaal were very instrumental in the issues of BCP and the intention was for them to pretend as if they were not interfering in the issues of South Africa but they knew that ultimately what they were doing was to ensure that the South African struggle was a success, I mean both men and women. Our biggest role was to welcome the refugees.

Well, the most painful, are the things that happened. But please understand that I'm not talking in terms of money. The biggest and most painful cost that Basotho incurred because of apartheid is the hindrance of its independence. The Boers that side made sure, because they knew what the BCP was fighting for. This BCP is the LCD, they have the same mandate, and everything is the same. I listened to how they run their conference; everything is the same, like when they welcome the delegates. It is the same way we welcome our delegates. I'm sure in the beginning, the constitution was the same but the Boers thought the BCP was not aware that they were going to attack, so they fought the BCP secretly through propaganda that would hinder their success, so that is the big cost that Lesotho suffered. In 1965 when we were preparing for the national elections, sir I must tell you that in 1964, nobody thought the BCP would win the elections but at the beginning of 1965, the propaganda coming from South Africa was now worse and they had their informants this side, well that's how they operated, they worked with influential people in order to frustrate the independence of Basotho and they ultimately succeeded because in 1965 the BNP won the elections. I was not a candidate at that time, I was still a teacher. I became a candidate in the 1970 national elections.

As much as the BNP won, it was a miracle to win all constituencies but the struggle was terrible and the Boers had done everything in their power to change Basotho's minds so that they voted for the BNP.

The helicopter came later but before the elections they sent 100 000 bags of grain and gave it to people all over Lesotho and it was clearly written that it was a gift to Chief Leabua for the Basotho. After that, when it was nearly time for elections, they gave him a helicopter. We could see it all the way from Peka because it was in Ficksburg and it was flown by the Boers so he toured and landed here. Then people made different noises of happiness. The purpose was for the Basotho to see that if they voted for him, they would be voting for an important person. So after the elections, you already understand that from 1966 to 1970, the Boers had their technocrats here, these fellows headed what we might call the Ministries, the key departments of the country, like the judge of the High Court was from South Africa, I don't understand what the BNP was doing but they considered South Africans to be their mentors, so South Africa was here to develop them, to help them succeed.

The Boers were in control, they were here, and I've got their names and the departments they headed. So, that is the cost I'm talking about. But later, there were conflicts between the Boers and the BNP because they continued coming here to cause trouble when initially it was a real struggle. They were no longer in good terms with the BNP and in good terms with the BCP because of the reasons that I did not explain, infect, that one is such a big item which I want to explain.

No, I think the reward that the Basotho got was a political and ethical one in the sense that they were dedicated to help in the South African struggle and therefore they were easily welcomed in the liberation movement around the world, I mean through the BCP, the voice of Basotho was heard, the Basotho got to be known that they existed but they are suffocated by the Boers who are trying to steal their country but the Basotho are resistant, they just can't give in to the apartheid, that's why I say it is political, its ethical, there is no material reward. We were only fighting for what would eventually be of benefit to us. The collaboration that I know was very clear and very outstanding; there wasn't any other force, other than the BNP, it was its policy and its leadership. They collaborated with the Boers in order to frustrate the BCP, to make them fail to achieve their goal of gaining independence so that the Basotho would benefit from the government.

I can't actually identify individuals, I want to identify that party, as well as the Marematlou Freedom Party, the true people of God, as you observed that they even took the colours of the ANC, their involvement was very narrow, and they only wanted to protect the chieftaincy. Initially it was the issue of His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II and Her Majesty Queen 'Mantšebo. Their struggle ultimately evolved around chieftaincy while the struggle of BCP was broader than that.

It was not about chieftaincy but to liberate Basotho from everything that oppressed them. The motive was simply that the Boers that side and this policy that has been working right up to independence in 1994, they wanted to find Puppet Regimes so that apartheid could succeed, that was all they needed and they didn't like the fact that Lesotho was inside South Africa but was not under their control and South Africans flee to Lesotho and use it as an escape route to other countries in order to continue with their struggle. They wanted to ensure that they were in control even in Lesotho.

I would like to see good relations between these two countries, they should work together with peace and respect in every way. I would like to see relations that allow the Basotho to feel free because of the fact that we are a kidney in South Africa. I hope you are aware that the map of Lesotho is positioned like a kidney, and that it is very uncomfortable and even if we can try to ignore them, we'll continue to suffer when we are suffocated like this. They should make things easier for us because it's just a matter of formality that we are inside South Africa. The second one that is related to this one is that they should allow us to cross to and back without stamping our passports, we shouldn't go through the South African territory and that is possible and we have been talking about it for so long and Mandela talked about when he was here in Lesotho.

He volunteered to talk about it and said that what Basotho wanted was good but also very difficult and it would take a very long time to address it. That was his language when he addressed the Basotho at the National Stadium. But he said there was something immediate which could be done. In the mean time, the Basotho should sit down with South Africa and discuss this issue and find a common freedom to the sea. Mandela said through Matatiele from Qacha's Nek and to Matatiele and so on and so forth. While we were discussing this other difficult matter which we still insist that a wrong-doing cannot go forever unpunished, one can even pay with a child. (Sesotho proverb) This one I'm writing a lot about it, I don't want to bluff because this is our country. Now that the Xhosas, the Zulus, the Pelis and the Batswana have their own land, all these ones from the Northern tribe and the Cape have their land, we also want our land, a wrong-doing cannot go unpunished they may take a long time and maybe we will die before they resolve the matter but you should continue with this, even our children should continue until we get our land back. I won't back down, I'm serious when I say, even with a child, and one can pay.

Mokete, 'Musi

[Maseru; 11 December 2007]

Dr 'Musi Mokete, is an ophthalmology with thirty years experience. Before this he has worked as a medical practitioner for nine years in many countries including Nigeria and Lesotho. Dr Mokete has also been a political activist of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) since his student days at Piux XII College in the 1950s where he served, at one time, as President of the student union. In this capacity, he is well-known for his strong resistance to racial discrimination and apartheid. He has occupied a number of very important positions in the country including Chairman of the National University of Lesotho Council, Chairman of Lesotho Bank, President of the Lesotho Red Cross, and President of Lesotho Medical Council.

During the time of racial discrimination, Lesotho was in a major unrest and some of us still found that even when crossing to South Africa, we were still not free to do so because even Basotho who worked at the border gates or the authorities of South Africa, they still discriminate the Basotho. Yet we had thought that those people would not discriminate us after gaining independence. For example, we see discrimination at the border gates yet we are not supposed to be discriminated because we assisted South Africa during apartheid by educating their children not even asking them for anything in return. Even though the British people prohibited them from coming here, we did not listen to them but we still welcomed them in our homes and they lived with us without any problems.

Second, those who came here just stayed with us without being asked any questions by the authorities. Third, most of the people who occupy important positions in the Republic of South Africa are those who got their education from Lesotho and the government of South Africa is supposed to show some gratitude to Lesotho for doing that for them during the apartheid regime. However, I blame our previous leaders; they did not fight hard enough for us because when people talked about SADC countries, the Front-line States, Lesotho was always excluded and that was a big mistake because Lesotho has always been a Front-line State because when a person from Natal had problems, they would cross over to Lesotho, a person from Free State, Xhosa land and the Cape would do the same so all those who came here at the end of the 50s and the 60s, when they left for other countries, they used airplanes or they were made to escape in many different ways because during those days, the British airlines could fly freely in other British colonies, nobody could stop them or interrogate them. They left Lesotho like that and you will understand that our boundary surrounds the whole country unlike that of Botswana, Eswatini or Zimbabwe which only have one boundary. We had a big boundary here in Lesotho and the South African leadership owes us very much. They are not grateful.

These people who escaped to Lesotho were still able to go back to South Africa or to send some messages home and in that way, we helped them a lot. Second, there were prominent men during those times, like Ntate Ntsu Mokhehle and others who worked with him because the BCP was on their side, I will not say it was the BNP because it was not supportive in the fight against apartheid, they stood their ground and fought against racial discrimination. They were able to go out of the country because there was an opportunity to go to countries like Ghana and other countries to present their side of the story, in particular this issue of Lesotho and South Africa that was hidden and which the government of South Africa could not respond to. The Basotho students who were here also went of the country. In our

times we would go out and present our side of the story in every platform that we got, like at the conferences.

We disseminated information through education on what was happening in Lesotho, we knew everything and very well. I would say, other than those Basotho who were at home protecting South Africans we also fought to stop apartheid in many departments such as the Health Department. In the Health department, doctors stood on their feet that the South African Association of Doctors employed doctors from other countries. For so many years since 1980, from all those years until in 1990, we were sanctioned therefore we were happy for the association that accepted black people as well as white people who were anti-apartheid. They were the ones whom we supported to disseminate their messages to reach people out there. We did so because we went abroad where WHO was based and we showed them that those things that were done in South Africa were not right and even in south Africa we did not stay long.

It was in the early 90s. We visited Wits, Medunsa, University of Johannesburg and other hospitals. We told them that if they did not change how they did things, there was nowhere in the world they would be accepted and at that time we were the members of the Confederation of African Medical Association Societies. I was the President at that time and we tabled our grievances, let alone those that were presented by the Student Organization which was at Roma fighting against apartheid. The apartheid came to an end until in 1960 at Lancer's Inn when we made a demonstration there during the final examinations so we knew that at that time we had stopped the apartheid because we ambushed them but the atrocities/situation still continued. I do not know if you are satisfied with what I have just told you.

The Basotho understood Human Rights that bringing change was something else to God-fearing people and to those who were true Africans at heart and there was already a good spirit flowing around all Africa, other than ours because as Lesotho, we didn't have any changes. So since *Morena* Moshoeshe said when a stranger had nowhere to stay, he would be accommodated or s/he will be taken to the chief's house. We were aware that the whites had practiced racial discrimination for a very long time even in their governance and we hated it. During those days, many people worked hard. When we were in High School in the 49s, there was a person called Lefela and Lefela used to put his red flag at the stadium. He would tell people how much he hated the discrimination that the whites were bringing in our country. He fought for independence. We would go and listen to him. He talked about UNO. We did not know the benefits of UNO, but he told us how the whites were discriminating the black people. There was the so called Legislative Council and he would go to it and say his side of the story so that it would be published on the newspapers *Mochochonono* and *Leselinyana* and these newspapers were very powerful in showing how the white people's governance was discriminating and torturing black people and things that white people were doing to the black people. Therefore, I think the party did a great job at that time. Besides them, people who also did a great job amongst them was *Ntate* Mokhehle because, in his politics that he came with from South Africa and people whom he was working with and supporting him were many, the list is endless, if I have to mention them and maybe the whole of our conversation would only be names.

I would say until the formation of the BAC in 1952 and the issue of this hero; *Ntate* Khaketla, these were the people who revealed to the nation how the whites were ill-treating Basotho. They revealed this discrimination in many ways.

And meetings were held in order to present their grievances and reported to Basotho on what was happening in Lesotho and they told them that they were still fighting for their freedom. *Ntate Mokhehle* taught us before the National Party was formed in 1957 and from the education we received mostly from *Ntate Mokhehle*, as students who were at Roma at that time, was that he educated teachers at Roma who did not want us to join them. And they ended up joining. I won't go into details on this issue because what I am trying to show is that wherever he was he talked about the topic, "Who's a Politician". He showed that everybody was a politician whether you like it or not because everybody has opinions like how s/he is supposed to live, what will s/he wear and eat when s/he wakes-up and where is s/he going to sleep; everything that one could ask herself/himself because when you are hungry you are supposed to ask yourself what you are going to eat. You are supposed to know that there will be people who will be leaders; maybe they feed us this way, whether we like it or not. He said that there are those who are leading us and perhaps they are feeding us in a proper way or not.

So I totally agree with them. And by agreeing with them, I mean if you do not agree with them it simply means you're on the opposition side. There are those when they hear the word "politics", they become scared so they just decide to be in between/they decide not to belong to any party yet they still have opinions, whether it can be done or not or when I am hungry like this, what will I eat or not having a place to lay my head, what will happen or where will I sleep. They still ask themselves such questions. So for those who do not belong, those who are at the opposition side and those who are ruling all of them are still politicians. In other words, those who are members of certain parties are active politicians. So for those who do not belong to any party, they are passive, that is they have that one party they could vote for but they do not want to be members of that party. However, the bottom line is all of us are politicians. Let me give you this example, why do our priests drive Ford cars and not other models? Why don't they drive other models? He said it is because their politics brought this model and thus ended up making them drive this model. There were German Roman Catholic priests who were here and they were arrested during the war of Hitler together with those who were in Madam Hill and Mariasdale because they were Germans and they were still using their cars and pursuing their politics and the whites (British) also came with theirs. We see them as they are. They came with their politics and sometimes you will even agree with them. He still remembered the issues of his country so he said in this way everyone is a politician whether you like it or not and this was an important education because some were afraid to be involved in politics. He showed that politics existed so after that, he spoke at many platforms such as in the meetings to multitudes of people who accepted that they were politicians and he would talk about politics wherever he would set his feet.

People like Mrs. 'Makoali Makotoko and Mrs. Masiloane and others are some of the women who formed the BAC and later joined the BCP now they were amongst people who were fighting against racial discrimination and most of the people who worked as domestic workers for the white people, they understood apartheid very well.

Basotho have lost a lot. Even if you could try to count them, the loss and the expenditure incurred are immeasurable. Because, for example, when you take in a refugee, you feed them and cater for all their needs. That is why I'm saying those people owe us a lot; think of the education we offered to their children that we have

already stated earlier. Let's count how much the government of Lesotho has spent in building schools so that they could get education. The money that has been used is too much if were to count it, including the health treatment because they went to our health centers. This was just too much. Even an ordinary Mosotho who was providing food, that's immeasurable. Let me talk about the political parties which assisted in ensuring that those people had clothes. That's incalculable sir.

Lesotho got some minor benefits because for our people who went to South Africa for jobs, things are better for them lately. They now get better positions since the racial discrimination stopped. Some went to the mines but those mines still owe them and there are associations like TEBA which have offices here in Lesotho but we have not benefited from them. If *Ntate* Ntsu was still alive I would tell him that we have not benefited from them. We still have problems even today because we have not received what we were supposed to be given as we worked hard for South Africa. So even all these things still can't be calculated and for that reason, they owe us.

Their independence would be beneficial to us if we didn't have to produce passports to get into their country. If they could make sure that the money that we spent on their children's education as we do now when a child wants to go to university, we pay some extra money which is never paid back to Lesotho, I would say maybe they have done something different from what they are doing to other countries when they remember the benefits they got from our country because we never demanded those things. For instance, when a Mosotho child wants to go study in South African academic institutions, medical aid, study permit and tuition fees are a requirement but this money is never reimbursed.

In this way, they've wronged us. Even when a Mosotho goes to South Africa to look for a job, they want him/her to have an I.D; they want all the things which they are not supposed to require from Basotho. We are not many here in Lesotho. Most of Basotho are here in Lesotho, not in South Africa. A good example that I can use is this one of England and Ireland. The Irish would leave their countries and go to other countries like England without any hindrance. When you are travelling to Ireland, the stamp that you get upon arrival at Hiso will take you through to Ireland without being asked questions. This means they have good relations and they understand that one is looking for a job or going to pursue your studies.

In regard to the issue of sell-outs; they were there even though it's difficult to remember their names. I will have to verify first but I know the person who caused troubles for Lesotho. However, you know that even today we still have such people. Activists would flee from South Africa and hide themselves here but would still end up being found and get arrested or murdered and here many Basotho were killed. Again it still happened that if you would want to cross to South Africa, it was surprising that the authorities at the border gate would search and try to stop you from crossing to that side. That means someone, somewhere might have said, Mokete said or did this, Mokete has hidden a certain refugee and because of these people, we encountered many problems and for a long time. I still don't feel comfortable or free when I have to go to South Africa because my fear is that even those who are currently in power do not control it completely.

Associations/organizations and individuals who supported this struggled sir, the struggle against racial discrimination here. Because our issues are current, I didn't get a chance to think deeply about them. It's bit difficult to say, but during that time of the Boers, who agreed with *Morena* Leabua before he left them, it helped the Boers in the 1965 elections and their relations lasted for some time until he turned against them

in the 70s after the state of emergency. Maybe in the 75s when he found that he was supposed to be independent and align with his goons/the accomplice who were there and things that were said about Africa and also prevent them from coming to Lesotho at that time. That is when they started saying; they wanted to be given certain people and that's when he was trying to settle because he had taken a long time to find his feet, in fact at that time, you see now I'm thinking on my feet so, that's why I say, I've just found out what had happened. So if I had known this in time, I could have investigated to see who those people who sold out the struggle were. Maybe we will get back to this issue. .

I was expecting that we would have good relations; relations that will make us respect each other. I still believe that the South Africans do not respect us; they still believe that because of their economic muscle they would do whatever they want to do to Lesotho. Let me give you an example, in 1997 when *Ntate* Ntsu was sick, Lesotho was supposed to have been given the Chairmanship of SADC but it did not get it. Those who went there just left like that. This was not good at all. In 1998 it happened that South Africa came here with all its arrogance and without respecting us. Those problems could have been solved here in our country and I think that South Africa did not respect us even when we humbled ourselves. I thought that we would work together so that we would be equal regardless of the financial muscle of the country.

Indeed, in the past when we were voting it was one vote, one nation. However, I was expecting that many things that could prove this would be in the Department of Education, at work, all these things were supposed to have been recorded that we once helped each other so we should work together. I was expecting that on issues like the Lesotho Highlands Water Project, those agreements that were signed, I still feel that we have been cheated. Let me emphasise that to us who once used our big boats in this dam, only a few are left. However, other countries that have dams they use these dams for tourism activities.

In Lesotho we cannot make use of these boats because we are being told that they contaminate the water. But the very same water is the water that is taken to Clarens. The tunnel of this water goes until it reaches *Lekoa River* and in this regard, we have been cheated. This is oppression because they are saying they have money and they will not allow us to get some benefits because they saw that Lesotho would benefit from this project. This Lesotho Highlands Water Project has indeed helped us in terms of money. It's sad that this water that has been collected through this project does not belong to us yet it is in our country. We were supposed to benefit from this project and have full control over it. Even if we owe them, we have paid them a long time ago with the money that we made from this project because they paid us and it went back to them if we owed them. I still want to emphasize that they are taking us for granted.

I talked about education and business but even that business, the way it is, if Basotho go and work in South Africa, they encounter so many problems like, they are supposed to have work permits and other things. The Boers are still the ones in control there and the process for correcting this takes time. Also the issue of wool and mohair, we could still do everything with our wool and mohair including cleaning, weighing and pricing it. I understand that even if we still like these blankets that have been made by the whites, it is still a good thing. However, by the time you buy this blanket it means you are making these white people happy because you give them money. You make them rich but if we have our factories here they would want us to do something for them.

Even people who are working in these factories are still Basotho. Basotho could benefit but you find that our government is not doing anything in regard to this issue.

Ntate Mokhafisi Kena

I was born in the Qacha's Nek district, 80 years ago. I went to school in the Republic of South Africa and after my High school education I went to Fort Cox. By then, I want to emphasise that I had already returned from the military so I was already conscious about politics but when I arrived in South Africa, Fort Cox which is very close to Fort Hare University there was a lot of activity at that time. In the 1950s I then started being active in politics and when I was there, I came in contact with the communists; the [South African] Communist Party. I went to the mines. After spending two, three years in the Republic I came back to Lesotho, and upon my arrival in Lesotho I joined the Department of Agriculture. I was one of the founders of the Lesotho Communist Party.

In the early 1960s when I came back from South Africa to Lesotho, that was the time when the Basotho were being deported, then I joined the BCP but even before that, when I was still working at the mines, I was already a member of the BCP and this was a political party of my youth/adolescence. Coming to the role that I played and the role that was played by Lesotho in this, it happened after the truism trail in 1957. After this, many Basotho and other people fled to Lesotho. What's important here again is the fact that, after the truism trail there was a split which led to the formation of the PAC and at the same time, it was when there was a rift between the Soviet Union and China. That rift affected the Lesotho politics badly and the BCP, of which I was a member, sided with the PAC and the BCP also acquired the Chinese political ideology, so in the early...

Through the influence of South Africa, in 1962, we formed the Communist Party which addressed the ideological structure which was in Lesotho. So as Basotho, the debate was on whether to support the Soviet Union or China, and the PAC or the BAC. At that time there were different groups of people who participated in this debate which was in South Africa and in the whole world. Err..., after forming the communist party, most of the people who joined the party at that time were the South Africans who had fled to Lesotho and most of them played a very important role in the formation of the party. As I have mentioned, there were people like Joe Matthews, Maji and those whom I might be forgetting their names. At that time we, as early as the 60s, we organized ways of protecting the refugees from South Africa so that they would feel free in Lesotho.

That was during the colonialism era and the Lesotho politics were also very challenging so we found those who ideologically followed us and we tried to help them and the BCP in the same manner helped those who followed the PAC and those who were pro China etc. It started that way, the Basotho started as early as that to help the Basotho who were running away from South Africa so let me talk briefly about what was practically happening at that time, err... The BCP, after supporting the PAC, it ensured that the refugees were members of the ANC and at that time the BCP was very hostile to those people, they were not only verbally hostile at their political rallies but also physically hostile. They wanted to exterminate those members of the ANC and tried to... at that time there were people who actually got shot; we were then able to support them because we were on the side. Do you want to ask me a question?

The Communist Party was formed on 6 May 1952 with the strong influence of the ANC because they understood that if in Lesotho there could be political parties and political movements which were ideologically the same, it would be easier for them to be welcomed in Lesotho so that they could live in there having the support of a party that ideologically accepts them as I said, that was the beginning of our

relations and we were able to hide those people from South Africa, we were to prepare homes for them and maybe I mentioned that it was because of the influence of the communists here in Lesotho and in South Africa who identified me to be one of those who would work and deliver their messages since as early as that, we worked hard to protect these people and even during hard times, when we had to deliver sensitive messages to certain prominent people, we still found ways of protecting them and did many other things.

I played a very important role but coming to politics, it wasn't personal, it was just politics and here you know the role of the communist party to the young people and the way we worked with the university's employees and the students, we were even able to secretly send our people outside the country to meet with the ANC representatives so that they could take them to trainings and work with those in South Africa. All that was personally handled by me but doing it in my capacity as the party's representative so that was the contradiction that one could say we made. Err... I'm not sure if there are any points that I had left out but I can say from that period, up to the beginning of the struggle and when the Boers raided and did other things. It was part of the Basotho who, most of them were in support of this struggle. The care, advice and guidance that the Communist party offered those people made them suffer. I think that was our contribution, err...I'm not sure, maybe there was oppression and one looked at other aspects when seeing that after a long time one could remember such things.

Yes, we were part of the trade union and we decided to form parties like MFP which were intended to fully support the South African struggle. There were workers unions like the Lesotho Mineworkers Union, there were also church organizations that we worked with like the transformation and there was an attempt to form a peace and solidarity movement but it was unfortunately destroyed by the BNP. Those were attempts which were made in order to mobilize the nation at grassroots level so that they could support the South African struggle and be conscious of what was happening. The benefits of South African freedom to Lesotho and its people, who worked in South Africa, would be enjoyable to them.

The Communist Party was formed in 1952 and at that time we worked with a legal party. We owned a newspaper that was known as Mafube. It condemned the relations between the government of Chief Leabua and the government of the Boers. In 1970, that was the first causality which was suppressed. It was banned. Err...even the party got banned in 1970 because of our activities and because of our support to the struggle in South Africa, that's why it was only the communist party which was totally banned, other parties were only denied the opportunity to perform their daily operations but they were not free. As for the communist party, it was banned all together and all its leaders were imprisoned.

As early as that, our people left and joined the struggle and after early in the 1980s, there were about two people, I mean a very small group which left Lesotho for South Africa in order to join others but it was too early, it was a small number but later, in the 80s, the number increased, I am one of them, I..., especially after Hani came to Lesotho, I worked very hard inside and outside Lesotho, working with the MK people and I got err...a passport which I used when I was in Lesotho and the one which I used when I was outside Lesotho. I was given that particular passport because I worked directly with the MK people. As I mentioned, this particular role was directly played by me. Let me emphasise that, the Soviet Union trained many people for us

and not only were people trained academically but also politically.

When they were at the Soviet Union, some of them were identified to be the people who would do the work directly, for example, they had to delivered messages. We received money from the Soviet Union to South Africa, I would be given a luggage from the Soviet Union to bring it to South Africa through Mozambique, especially after Mozambique had gained its independence, we would enter illegally and cross over to Eswatini, then to South Africa and to Lesotho and met the people who operated in South Africa to deliver their messages and some money from the Soviet Union. That's definitely what I was doing.

Chief Leabua did not have a stance to support the struggle of South Africa because he could not be against the Boers. He visited these Eastern countries and at that time, the most important thing that I remember, that we tried to do with BNP was what was called err...it was some sort of a Friendship and Solidarity with the people of South Africa or the people of Africa. It was a very powerful organization in the Soviet Union and this organization existed in most of the countries because members of the BNP were still hostile to us but we formed it with people like Makhele and Ranthomeng but it didn't operate for long because their intentions were only to appear as good people but at least we made that attempt even though that Friendship and Solidarity organization didn't operate.

The activities were about the solidarity and support of the people of South Africa but we worked a lot when the struggle was getting tougher, most of the international funds that helped South Africa were in the hands of the people who had special accounts which were meant to help. People like Matji and Khalaki (Sello), because Joe Matthews left quickly because it was clear that he could not work with the government of Lesotho because even the Boers pointed fingers at him saying they didn't need him here, so he had to leave. After sorting out his issues, he left and he was heavily involved in the running of the party. At that time, it was very difficult to support the people who were in South Africa, the issue was how these funds were going to help them to survive and continue the struggle and those who fled were to be welcomed as refugees but how were they going to survive? So the funds had to keep coming and the people like Maji owned businesses and it was easy for them to open such accounts directly.

I think Lesotho benefited, not only Lesotho but even other African countries because today, as we speak, many Basotho work in the Republic of South Africa and they are treated well while in the days of apartheid, they were oppressed so I believe it's important that the Basotho have the freedom to go to South Africa and work when they have work permits and they work freely. So I take it as a benefit but let me conclude this issue by saying, I still believe that it is the responsibility of our current leaders to enter into discussions with the government of South Africa to form new relations and new ways of working together especially after the struggle so it is in the hands of the leaders of Lesotho to ensure that the relations between these two countries are improved because the problems that we used to have were still handled in the same manner.

Mokitimi, Joshua Meshu Mohau

[Maseru; 23 January 2008]

Joshua Meshu Mohau Mokitimi is a self-educated individual who works primarily in painting and sculpture. He is also a consummate BCP political activist born 83 years ago. He joined the Basutoland African Congress (BAC); now BCP in the 1950s after it was formed by the late Ntsu Mokhehle and became a leader of its Youth League for a long time. He is rumoured to have been a political advisor of the late Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhehle and the current Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisisli.

First, I know very well that after 1960, after the Sharpeville shootings, many people ran away from South Africa and I am one of the men and women who were selected by the BCP and given the responsibility of welcoming and ensuring that they got everything they urgently needed even before they could settle. Those included beds, mattresses and to help them settle in the homes of the BCP members. We encouraged them to welcome those visitors as their own brothers and sisters in the liberation struggle. I don't think there was any other political party at that time, which was more committed to helping those refugees in order to get the everyday welfare than the BCP.

The BCP, with its leader, Ntsu Mokhehle, was involved in freeing Africa from colonialism and through the leader and the youth of that time; we used to go to West Africa, especially Ghana in order to learn more about good politics which would help in the liberation of Africa. At that time, the leader of Ghana-Karame Karuma had already started showing the whole of Africa that it was important for South Africa to be liberated, that if it would be free, the whole Africa would be free because that was only where the problem was, so that determination of ensuring the freedom of South Africa was the one that influenced that in 1960 when there was that massacre, they found us ready to welcome them.

I was just a small fry, most of the people who were involved in this were those whom the party had entrusted to do so in the sense that they would work on the expenses and the number of refugees accordingly as they were experts. The people like Ntate Godfrey Kolisang and 'Me 'Mapharoe were some of those who were directly involved. In fact there were a lot of women involved, I can mention 'Me 'Mamaphathe from Mafeteng with many others from Leribe and others from Maseru, people like 'Me 'Mamosena and 'Matau, they were very instrumental in helping people during that time.

Particularly, the BCP had received funds from Ghana which were meant for the party but the party gave them up in order to participate during that calamity. I recall very well, despite the fact that some documents got burned because of some problems, there was also something called All African People's Conference of which Ntate Ntsu was a member, which influenced A.K Burden of Ghana to bring funds for the expenses incurred so as to assist in that emergency of welcoming the refugees. Other expenses, even though I might not be able to be specific in terms of numbers, in general, at that time, you will get to that answer that you have mentioned. The lives of other Basotho were badly affected and they also needed to be helped so I take it as a big loss when it comes to peoples' lives.

Not only Lesotho took in political refugees, but the whole Africa and other countries assisted these warriors when they fled and I don't know of any conference/summit which was prepared to pay reparations, when South African would pay because they were assisted. I think the spirit of oneness of the Basotho nation and other nations which took in the refugees was that they would be compensated by God when He freed South Africa from its problems.

I know very well that there are problems and others which I may not be aware of which many people went through. Even I personally went through certain problem. First, I was banned from going to South Africa but it wasn't only me, it was also my fellow colleagues and many others and this caused problems to Basotho. Second is that, during 1980s, South Africa came here to attack and exterminate those refugees and because the Basotho didn't have refugees' camps, the refugees and warriors lived in normal homes.

I recall well that the refugees themselves said others who had fled to other countries told them that they were living in refugees' camps but here in Lesotho they were part of the nation, leading a normal life like anyone else. Well, I don't think the Basotho encountered any problems after South Africa had gained its independence, even people like me who were banned from travelling, we now got a chance to go wherever we wanted. Another thing is that Kwame Nkrumah and his age mates from Addis Ababa's dream that Africa should align boundaries, to ease the movement of people. There is a rumour that, leaders, at different levels are discussing the same issue on how they can ease the movement of Africans and that is a very important issue.

When the BCP started welcoming refugees, other parties like the BNP were against the fact that there were people coming into Lesotho. They referred to them as refugees, while we referred to them as warriors and activists and to them it was like a stigma that they had fled to Lesotho but because we were now influenced by the spirit of African unity, that helped our party- the BCP to be able to address that issue regardless of the conflicts between us and the BNP. We were supposed to ignore the conflicts and accept that those fellow brothers and sisters were activists and were to be welcomed with dignity. Ever since I came back home, there was a time when the BNP had to change its mindset. When it was in power, it was forced by the agreements of the international community to change and welcome those people and protect them but this hasn't always been their objective, the international community forced them to change.

We adopted the ideology of one African man called Kwame Nkrumah of living together in harmony because there is a saying that an injury to one is an injury to all. Peace should prevail at all times. My inner most feeling is that Lesotho and South Africa as independent countries should have good relations and should interact harmoniously.

Molapo, Mooki Vitus

[Maputsoe; 2 September 2008]

Chief Mooki Vitus Molapo, is a former newsman and diplomat- turned politician. Born 72 years ago, Molapo was one of Lesotho foremost diplomats who cut his teeth during the turbulent times when Lesotho had to play a balancing act between the demands of an unfriendly apartheid regime in South Africa and the imperatives of supporting the liberation movements. Chief Molapo passed away on 30th May 2009.

Then one looks at Lesotho and South Africa, one must understand the demographic presentation of Lesotho and how it was governed because Lesotho is landlocked in South Africa. While the population of Basotho who live in Lesotho is 2 million, in South Africa, there are about five million Basotho. Lesotho gained its independence in 1966 and it became a member of the Organization of African Union, the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement Committee and those organizations were very clear that they were against the Boers' policy of separate development and apartheid. We found ourselves having to participate in the liberation struggle of black people that was caused by apartheid in order to ensure that it stopped. We also assisted them in making their independence strong and successful. We did so many things...because of apartheid, black people were tortured.

The Boers introduced Bantu Education for black people, with the intention to produce a black person who would believe in this rule of a white man forever. It was their policy. The Boers enforced it and as a result, many black people were forced into exile. And then Lesotho turned to be the first country to asylum. People who were fleeing from apartheid and were learners, most of them were those whom their parents did not like the corrupting facts of Bantu education so they brought them to the institutions of higher learning which would help them get a genuine education which would make them productive people. The government of Lesotho made it easy for them to come and enroll with our institutions of higher learning. These learners who were in Lesotho err... the government of Lesotho contributed to their conditions of living because through its formal policy, Lesotho ensured that there were no refugee camps. These learners were part of the nation and lived in our villages, towns/cities, and were admitted in our educational institutions with the same conditions as Basotho and because of this; these learners pursued their studies freely.

When Lesotho err...when its economy was growing, the government established the policy that their school fees shall be subsidized because they said it was a contribution of Lesotho towards the struggle that was in South Africa at the time. The students who were studying at the National University of Lesotho were to pay a tuition fee of eight hundred per annum while those who were refugees paid half of that. However, for many other services they were still subsidized so that they could be educated. So this was as far as Human Resource Management in South Africa was concerned at that time, and when you think of most of the leaders in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, you will find that the university which has produced these prominent leaders is Pius XII College and the National University of Lesotho and there was one objective. *Morena* Leabua believed that when they were educated, they would go and continue the liberation struggle in a non-violent way. Do you understand *ntate*?

Yes *ntate*, so another thing that Lesotho did, because of the problems in South

Africa, we could not help these people with... err their liberation struggle but we participated in that liberation struggle because *Morena* Leabua went to the United Nations, the Non-alliance Committee, the OAU, without a fail. When he went there he took some money that he was going to use to pledge to the so-called Liberation Committee of OAU. However, he stated that in his nation there was too much infiltration. He would put the security of the country at risk if he could give out this money there; saying that it should be used to buy guns that will be used to shoot the Boers. He did not want it that way or take that direction but he only wanted to contribute in the liberation struggle in that he wants these children to be educated. Do you understand? And the money was taken in order to be used as a pledge in the Executive Committee that was well known and leaders like Mbeki could talk about it. The money that was taken to the executive, *Morena* Leabua gave it out from his own briefcase to Oliver Tambo. He gave it out in the presence of Tambo and his deputy and *Morena* Leabua and his minister of Foreign Affairs and I was his Ambassador that time. He gave him and told him that he did not know how they would spend this money but they should know that he supported them in their liberation struggle but for security reasons he did not pledge like other countries did at the pledging conference. Countries like India said it would sponsor with canons and machinery while China promised to train people etc. But *Morena* Leabua did not do it the way these countries did.

He contributed so that they continued doing the things that they were already doing because they were costly. He contributed so that they could accomplish them. The current leadership of ANC knows about this and apart from that *ntate*, you will recall that after this, when the liberation struggle was worsening, the Boers said they were going to kidnap the activists here in Lesotho. They were arrested though I cannot remember their names but *Morena* Leabua fought against that. He made sure that his minister of Foreign Affairs went to South Africa and talked with them saying, "These people came here for protection, it is true that they are activists but they are not fighting against South Africa from our soil, so for this reason, you do not have the right to violate them.

Monyake, Bureng Lengolo

[Maseru; 2 February 2008]

My name is Lengolo, Lengolo of Bureng, Bureng of Monyake, Bureng of Lengolo of Mahlehlenyana, Mahlehlenyane of Monyake, Monyake of Moletsane, Moletsane of Mphethathu who had many cattle. I am a former student of Fort Hare and a former civil servant who has served Lesotho in very different and many capacities since independence. He was the Director of Statistics, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance, Foreign Affairs Minister, Ambassador, and Deputy Executive Secretary of SADC and lately Chairman of Lesotho Public Service Commission.

Well, even though it may seem like Lesotho's support is not that much, it is important that we look back in the past and then we will have direction. We see that the South Africans and the Basotho have lived together and they lived amongst each other and continued to do so. They however still had their differences throughout such periods. People who are on that side of the boundary which was created by the whites and those who are on this side, are related in many ways. There are still Basotho who reside in South Africa and vice versa. So whatever, be it positive or negative that South Africa goes through surely it also affects Lesotho. When the South Africans were being tortured, the Basotho were also affected and that made Basotho help them as much as they could. Basotho were still benefiting from South Africa and the situation of oppression that was in South Africa, they also experienced it.

While we were fighting for liberation the role we played in helping South Africa was not only here in Lesotho but even the Basotho who were in South Africa at that time were also helping where they could and then when political parties were formed in South Africa and also participated in the struggle, things became tough in their very own country. Amongst the political parties, the central one was the African National Congress. It was well known that it was formed in Bloemfontein and even Basotho from Lesotho were there when it was formed. *Morena* Lerotholi was there as well so when they were fighting for their liberation, it was then clear that it was a war. They were not fighting physically but they were also exchanging words and their actions could tell that they were fighting and it was a war. There was instability in their country. They were not free in their very own country. They were constantly chased day and night therefore some of them had to leave South Africa so that they could accomplish their plans and their key plan was to fight for their liberation. Some political parties' leaders also had to leave the country and some found places where they could stay in Lesotho. They fought while they were still here in Lesotho but the decisions were made by the leaders because some of the political parties suggested that some of these people should leave the country while some of them had to leave because they were instructed to do so.

And some left because people were being killed. There were those who fled to Lesotho. They came to Lesotho through different places. And when they arrived in Lesotho, there were decisions that were made by the government of Lesotho that people who fled from South Africa should be welcomed and Lesotho adopted the International Policies that were based on the issues of the refugees since there were many people who were fleeing from their countries to Lesotho. They fled because of apartheid. However some were not just fleeing to Lesotho just to live here but to find ways that they could use to fight back. Some got an opportunity to go to other countries. Even though when one looks at the situation of Lesotho, that it is surrounded by South Africa, one still asks himself/herself how these two countries

will work together. However, they worked together. Some people at that time were empowered by the government during the reign of the Boers.

Another weapon which they used was education (educational struggle). They tried to deteriorate the level of black peoples' education that was similar to theirs. They deteriorated it to the extent that black people had to fled from that country because of racial discrimination. Yes, it was called Bantu Education. They fled to Lesotho so that they could study freely and so that they could get better education than that one that was created for only black people. It was tailored in such a way that these people could get admissions so that they could get the education they wanted. We can even look at the school that you were attending *Ntate Moholi*, most of the people who were from South Africa and schooled here in Lesotho are the leaders in South Africa to show that they were fighting against their liberation, they showed it through education. But the people who were protesting against this were only Basotho but there were those who came from Zimbabwe who ended up being leaders but our main focus was on these ones who were the South Africans.

I said that they came as refugees in two different departments; Department of Health and Department of Public Service. I mentioned only these two departments because Lesotho adopted the policy that said it won't treat these people like other nations did or isolate themselves from them by establishing the so called refugees' camps or have a specific place where they would say this is where the refugees reside. There were two reasons, the first reason was that we are related to these people as I stated earlier. They are our brothers and sisters and we did not find any problem to live with them. The second reason was if they would stay in groups in one place, there is a Sesotho proverb that says "when one walks alone without advisors, one is bound to fail", those people had their informants and if the refugees would be grouped at one place then they would be attacked easily and we were not strong enough to stop the attackers or protect them from the attackers, so it was important to give them accommodation within the villages so that they lived among the Basotho, One time, the Boers came into Lesotho and were informed where the refugees lived then the Basotho ended up being attacked too and there was bloodshed in the country. Not only the refugees died but also the Basotho died.

Basotho did not even complain because they were committed to live with these people and to protect them. And they gave them an opportunity to go to their schools, gave them accommodation and gave them jobs so that they could have salaries to use for their needs.

The Lesotho political parties participated in this because people like Mrs. 'Maposholi, who was a daughter of Makotoko, were some of those people who lived in South Africa before. They were even members of South Africa Liberation Struggle Movements. They ended up being expelled from South Africa just because they were involved in these movements so they came back to Lesotho. However with that same spirit that she had when she was living in South Africa, she continued fighting for liberation through the political party that she joined when she arrived in Lesotho. It was a political party that pitied and supported those people who were in South Africa fighting for their liberation. The party that supported the South Africans in their liberation struggle was Freedom Party. Freedom Party joint with Marematlou Party and it ended up being called the Marematlou Freedom Party. The leader of this political party was Doctor Makotoko's sister.

Even though the National Party faced a lot of criticism from the onset as it was

called a communist party and communism was under attack in South Africa, it was difficult to differentiate between the two and it was something that was fought for in South Africa so it looked like they would join the Boers. They too were on the frontline to fight for the rights of these people. They welcomed these people and they lived in this country under the leadership of the National Party, which was formed just like that but ended up being there. The BCP at that time welcomed these people warmly, you will learn that, maybe there were problems there and there because these two political parties which were on the frontline in South Africa, were the ANC and the PAC so it was difficult that when you were not part of one of these parties or belonged to both of them; will there be people who will trust you when you haven't chosen a side or you have chosen both of them? Or you choose one political party that you think is right or the one you support its manifesto.

You must ask yourself why you make such a choice and what your decision is based on. It should be based on what is right for you or on the party whose manifesto you support. There was a problem of people not knowing which was which, however all of the people accepted this concept of belonging to a certain party and you would find that someone who was in the leadership of the PAC would get platforms to deliver a speech at the BCP's rallies and this showed the empathy that the BCP had toward the PAC at that time. But that was not done with the intention to discriminate others. The liberation struggle was an issue on its own. The Xhosas from South Africa worked together with the Xhosas from Quthing. They created a network for themselves, So those from South Africa would bring messages to those in Lesotho. Amongst others, *Ntate* Mokhafisi was one of the people who worked very hard in helping the ANC during their liberation struggle.

It is very unfortunate that Chris Hani has passed on and he no longer has a chance to enjoy independence. He married our daughter from the clan of Bataung in Lesotho, our daughter's husband was very helpful in delivering messages from South Africa to Lesotho and vice versa. He was a coordinator at that time while others also ensured that the people from South Africa got to Lesotho easily. For example, one would just be told that he would go through Qacha's Nek and upon arrival, he would meet Mr Kena and those who entered through Quthing would meet Mr Chale and these people would have already organised accommodation for them. This is how they operated.

What occupied the minds of Ntsu Mokhehle and his peers in politics was the liberation of Africa as a whole and Dr Kwame Kurume used to say Ghana would not be liberated until the whole of Africa was liberated and this was the viewpoint of all the politicians at that time that all the countries must get their freedom. so what were in the minds of our first politicians was that they must get their freedom. They wanted to see all of the African countries being liberated. But South Africa was the last country to gain its independence, so when you think of the burden that these countries had, as I said I cannot say we incurred expenses because other countries did not take them as expenses. First, I said that these people were provided with accommodation. One would just come here with an old blanket but was supposed to eat, bath, have clothes, and do what one was here. We expected everyone to have all these things including, to have a job so that they could have a salary.

Even though the international organizations that supported the refugees were still giving a hand, you will understand that those funds were insufficient. So the country was supposed to use its funds to assist here and there. The second one was they were supposed to study. Educational institutions could not even

accommodate every Mosotho. However, for these people in particular, for them to be admitted in these institutions there were two things; the first one was that Basotho won't be able to go school and study due to costs of high tuitions. There were Basotho who were not given an opportunity to study because we did not have enough educational institutions. These institutions were full of these people. However, Basotho didn't complain instead of complaining, they tried to find ways to establish more schools so that these people too could find institutions where they could learn.

The third one like as I said earlier was we had to provide them with accommodation, some land that could be given to some Basotho was given to these people. They built houses and some of the land still belongs to them even to date. Those people came here as refugees, they are not Basotho. These are some of the things that were done to these people yet Basotho never complained about them because they worked so hard for their brothers and sisters to be liberated. The last one that was the worst maybe was that Basotho lost their lives in the attacks, when people were attacked by the Boers at that time though I cannot remember the years. I didn't like history because

I was told that I should just remember and know the years and I said if they could ask and let me know only the cause and the effect, it would be enough. So when you are telling me that I will know it when time goes on, then I rest my case hence it is difficult to say the exact years but it is something that was known and it happened several times. Thank you *ntate*.

Some of the associations which were working on the issues of the refugees, supported by giving us funds that we could spend on these people. Some of the aids were meant for establishing more educational institutions and some of the things were done for Lesotho because it welcomed and helped these refugees from South Africa. These were the fruits of Lesotho's labour. We are waiting to see if these people who were helped by Lesotho during apartheid will ever appreciate Basotho. I still believe that even the way they work on our issues they still remember what Lesotho has done for them. Lesotho sympathised with them. It helped them and our relationship maybe would not be like this if it was not because of what it did for them.

I personally think that South Africa's independence did not bring any problems. Before South Africa could be ruled by its citizens, that is the black people, it was difficult to cross at the border and it was indeed difficult to study in South Africa. Earlier, I showed that it was not difficult to cross to South Africa in the past. There were no boundaries at all in those days and we would just cross to that side just like that. But after they started fighting in South Africa that was then when they started not allowing people to cross to South Africa and it started being difficult to us to go to South Africa. Besides this, their education system was no longer good like it used to be. When South Africa gained its independence, it tried to improve its education system because one of the reasons that caused fights was education. They were fighting for their children's education. Even if the study permits were required but we still had many students who were still studying in South Africa. For example, at the University of Fort Hare, there was a time when it admitted Basotho because Lesotho had contributed with its money for it to be established. So since it gained its independence, our children then got the opportunity to study with the University of Fort Hare. I have also studied with the University of Fort Hare.

These two countries must sit down and discuss this issue of boundaries. People who have marked these boundaries are neither these people nor the people who were assisting South Africa nor Basotho. They were marked by the whites. My desire is that the South Africans and Basotho should sit down together and discuss this issue, show each other the needs and our relationship and then reach a consensus and what could be done about this issue of the boundaries. Apart from this, what can be done to families which were affected by these issues? And see if the relationship of these two countries won't be good. I personally think that this could help for the betterment of our relationship and this can still help us that we should still remember that there were people who came all the way from Durban (from Zulu) and came to Lesotho. We kept them. They are now Basotho who are living here in Lesotho yet they originate from South Africa and their families and relatives are still in South Africa. And we left some of our brothers and sisters there when we came here. When we crossed the river coming to Lesotho it did not mean that we were crossing Lekoa River literally but it was the boundary that was marked showing that when one has crossed it s/he is now in Lesotho. You will find that my sister/brother's house is on that side of Lekoa and mine is on this other side but just because of that boundary, it has separated us.

These are some of the issues that I personally think that they can be considered

because in regard to the issue of education we have started working well together. And on the issue of enriching one another/developing one another we are still working well too. There has never been a problem. There was a story that was told and we will still say it is a story, there was this thing called Soviet Union. It had boundaries which were known by the countries which were members of Soviet Union; it had representatives at the International Associations which were working together in regard to those issues of the boundaries. The boundaries have been dealt away with and independent nations arose from there because it was corrected and I do not see us sitting down together and discuss these issues. If we could sit down and talk about these issues this would not have separated these two countries like this.

Morrison, Mamello Rafutho

Mamello Rafutho Morrison has a degree in Politics and Public Administration from the University of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. She worked in the Ministry of Information for three months; Ministry of Foreign Affairs for six years and the Ministry of Education for three months. She then left Lesotho and worked in Qwa-Qwa and came back to Lesotho during military rule and worked in the Ministry of Home and Chieftaincy Affairs for three years. She then left the public service and worked as a freelance journalist for SABC and BBC for a while before joining party politics in 1998.

The relations between an independent Lesotho and a South Africa which is under the apartheid regime, I will not explain in detail but I will just refer to certain things that I have observed when I had already matured and was working at Foreign Affairs. At that time I realized that there was a huge difference on how South Africa was governed and how Lesotho was governed. That is why the likes of Chris Hanani exiled to Lesotho and Limpho Hanani, the wife of Hanani was ill-treated. I remember one time, I'm not sure whether the Boers had kidnapped her or they just met her in Bloemfontein when she went for shopping and then they arrested her. I remember specifically the minister of Foreign Affairs Mr. CD (Charles Dube Molapo) calling the minister of Foreign Affairs South Africa by the name of Muller. He was a Boer, a giant who was also very pompous.

I was very scared because it was the first time hearing a black man (CD) threatening the white man on the phone saying, they should bring Hanani's child back immediately, failing which, he would report them to the international community. I think that's what he said then I realized that the relations were not good. The second one that I remember specifically was in 1976 when I was still serving at Foreign Affairs, there was a student uprising in South Africa and the students fled to Lesotho. They came to my desk, at that time I worked on the international affairs desk and I was able to handle them by interviewing them and the UNHR would select those whom it would transfer to other countries like Zambia etc, some lived here at the cubicles which were built under Lesotho High School and attended school there. It was my responsibility to find schools for them, so I transferred others to St. Agnes and other schools.

I remember well that among the people who fled to Lesotho at that time when I was working at Foreign Affairs, there was a white man called David Woods; no it was Donald Woods, the one who came in through the Tele Bridge. He was one of the people whom I helped on my desk, so I think another one that I can remember is that, at that time I became aware of many things because one of my responsibilities was to write speeches for the prime minister to present internationally. One time Mr. CD blamed me because chief Leabua said his speech was not hot enough in relation to the issues of South Africa, so he wanted to me to add more flames to the speech.

Then I also observed, when we got to international forums, we would get there unaligned. At OAU, at the time, we were a small country which was respected by everyone because of the position we had. Let me conclude by saying, as I have mentioned that we were respected, they would say when Chief Leabua has arrived, and then Africa has arrived. He was a respected man and I was very proud to be part of such a delegation of respected people because they knew that when he had arrived, he would deliver a well prepared speech about the issues of South Africa, a full report on what was happening, what has been achieved etc. we were well informed, even the exiled South Africans, at that time there were people called Makhathini, the representative of ANC in New York, the PAC members who were very strong whom Mr. Potlako Leballo referred to as his two baby elephants. Those were Sebeko and Mabe; they were fireworks in the discussions.

They would come to us and get the information on what was happening here in Lesotho, so at that time, Lesotho had much influence on what was happening in South Africa as I've said and they would come hear from us on what was happening and they regarded the Prime Minister of Lesotho as their own prime minister. We were seen as a well informed and respected delegation all the time and for this reason, Lesotho played a very important role but I was aware that there big discussions between our prime minister and the leaders of the ANC and the PAC. It was during that time when Lesotho had a very big harvest of beans then we donated to Mozambique and bought goods for them. We will not talk about the other prominent members of the ANC who were in the military constituencies.

I have already talked about the support of Lesotho to the South African liberation struggle. I also know that, people like the late King Moshoeshoe II was also the king of South Africa. There were meetings that he held with Oliver Tambo but I don't have the details of the meetings. Some of the people on your list will give you those details, so I say, Lesotho was a power house where Africa got all the information regarding the issues of South Africa because we are neighbours and we were well informed on what was happening and we were in the beauty of the beast. We provided accommodation to South Africans for a very long time, we allowed them in our best schools, they were given accommodation at the UNHCR, the Lesotho government was very helpful but I think there are other people on your list who are better informed than me who can give you other details.

The reason Lesotho supported the struggle was because the whole world said the apartheid regime was an abomination; it was a disgrace which deserved to be spit on, so we were supposed to help the South Africans until they were free from the apartheid regime. Again, I think all the leaders in Africa felt very strong when there was a role that they were playing in helping South Africa or Namibia or Rhodesia, I mean, generally, the independence of these people was important to all the leaders of Southern African countries because they felt good when they had a role to play in the matter. We know that history will judge them right. The South Africans ended up honouring Chief Leabua by giving him an OR Tambo award and that award is well deserved because I've always wondered when South Africans would show some appreciation for what we did for them. I know that the late king was also given an award as they were two people who had shown good leadership skills here in Lesotho.

The BNP as an organization played a key role so there are people on your list who will give you all the details. It's not my place to talk but I'm sure they will be in

a better position to tell you about everything and I don't know other organizations, I'm not going to talk about the UNHCR because they were just doing their job. It was formed with the intention of taking care of all the refugees. I don't know others, but most of the individuals like chief Leabua and King Moshoeshoe II, were in power at that time and the ambassadors who were in the Lesotho offices shared their homes with South Africans, you would go to London and find students from both Lesotho and South Africa and go to New York and find the same case. You would find them having a party at an ambassador's house and you would find that South Africans were more than Basotho in number because they felt that it was their rightful home.

Even in Washington as well, and I remember specifically that at that time when Mrs. 'Malineo Tau was the ambassador in Washington, I visited her and found so many South African and Basotho students at her house so I'm just trying to show that even our embassies were homes to South Africans. There are those who will tell you in detail, the likes of Moleki Molapaoe. I'm not sure but I don't see Thabo Makeka on your list, he was once in New York for a long time and I know that he was one of the representatives of Lesotho who was very active in helping South Africans.

There were women and it was a number of them who were involved in the liberation struggle, even though their role will always be undermined. When South Africans were murdered by other South Africans, people like Miss Ralebitso died during the struggle but nobody will mention them and the truth is these South Africans were welcomed and taken care of by women in their homes.

For example, when I was growing up, at our neighbours house Mrs. Manthoto Pharoee, there were people like Mr. Joe Molefi and some members of the PAC from South Africa who were accommodated by her family but she died and no one recognized the role she played and I believe that even at other places, women played a very important role, I'm just talking about this particular one because she was our neighbor. I know this because I'm a woman and I was also helping when I was at Foreign Affairs and got paid for it and some things were done in a way that didn't sit me well as a mother and if you could dig deeper, you would find that many women played very important roles in all these but especially by housing and guiding these people as well as helping with other things when they were here in Lesotho and even outside. I've already said that for Lesotho, the ambassador in London at that time was Mrs. Mathato Sehlabo, some people lived in her house, and then Mrs. Malineo Tau who was the ambassador in Washington also had people living with her. As women, they were playing a very important role. Maybe if you dig a little deeper, some of these guys will give you more information on what other women did.

The repercussions of apartheid to Lesotho and Basotho are huge. Lives were lost because the Boers attacked us, they destroyed properties, and they killed people next to NTTC and at other places. Some of us suffered a post traumatic stress due to the happenings; especially the bombings. The houses of the people who had accommodated the South Africans were demolished but more importantly, this was a pain to South Africa that Lesotho was helping South Africans and found ways of avenging their anger. There are people who say in 1986 when the army toppled Chief Leabua's government, it was assumed that South Africa had sent its people here to influence that but I was not convinced and the people I have talked to, who were involved in the 1986 saga, they didn't sound like they were influenced by South Africa in every way apart from the fact that

they felt that the BNP youth poked them in the eye and as a result they felt humiliated,

I'm still left with a question mark as to how the 1986 saga was related to the Boers but I think the people who were behind it know it better; the likes of Chief Sekhobe; I think they'd probably explain it better, that's why I say, the soldiers whom I talked to didn't mention such things but they didn't have any obligation to tell me but I doubt. The likes of Mr. Khaketla, as politicians, they could do what other politicians are doing. Some call a stay away then it takes a very short time and the next day, they say Mosisili changed his attitude because there was a stay away. I don't know sir, but sometimes it takes a lot to convince me but I wouldn't continue even when I'm aware that people are really affected by these.

The UN made a resolution that we should be compensated that was when His Majesty was there (at the UN). But the leaders of this country have chosen not to do a follow up and in the same way; they can't say that the compensation was not offered. I remember specifically, after 1993 when Mandela had visited Lesotho, he urged Mr. Mokhehle that they sit down and discuss some issues when he was still the one in power because he said he was old enough and would understand better. Then nate Mokhehle said that he didn't want South Africa to do anything because he didn't want to ruin the existing relations and today, if I can say that, it would seem like an insult.

I would not see any disappointments, (regarding lack of financial support from a democratic South Africa to Lesotho). I would instead see an opportunity which gave Lesotho an international recognition at that time and all the pains that came were because every struggle comes with its pains, nobody can enter into a struggle without expecting pain so I don't know whether they are disappointments but other people will see differently.

I would like to see South Africa and Lesotho working together with respect. I would like to see the people of these two countries living in harmony but that cannot happen with the type of political leadership that we have and when I talk about political leadership, I'm not referring to the government but the politicians who are in power and the opposition. If they are still focused on the seats of the NIP, for example and do not have a broader focus, I don't think they will be able to help the ruling politicians to consolidate the position with which Lesotho and South Africa will relate. Respect is the most important thing but I see us playing petty politics which hinder us from benefiting from South Africa. There is no reason why until now there is still no free movement of people. When people are in certain positions at the ministry, you will hear one saying, I did this, the other saying I did that but nothing ever happened. There has never been any implementation. There is so much I think South Africa and Lesotho should be doing together, when there are joined projects of Tourism, we don't benefit in terms of money or being hired, so I don't know.

Ndobe, Victor Teboho

I, Victor Teboho Ndobe, am Mosotho man. I am now in business but I served the government of Lesotho for a very long time. I do not know if you would like me to state the positions I held. In short I was once the Principal Secretary in some few government ministries; Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ministry of Health and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Besides serving the government of Lesotho as the Principal Secretary in the above-mentioned ministries, I also served as Press Secretary of Prime Minister Dr Leabua Jonathan and I was a Diplomat in Denmark.

Your question is a good one sir and because of the time I will just talk about a few points. While I was still in high school there was a time when many people came to Lesotho fleeing from the burning political issues in South Africa so most of them lived here in Maseru. What I only know is that these people were welcomed by all the Basotho and the political parties and they lived with Basotho. They were not discriminated because they were not put in refugee camps but, they lived with Basotho in their families. They lived with Basotho and they worked whenever they got jobs and some of them worked as teachers in different levels; they worked in primary schools, secondary schools and in high schools. They were welcomed warmly by Basotho and some of them even came with their children and those who did not come with their children, other people whom they left in South Africa ended up coming to Lesotho.

They were given a very vital thing which is education. They were allowed to attend schools here in Lesotho, some started at primary level, secondary level, high school until they went to the university, which is now called the National University of Lesotho. There were no terms and conditions put in place, they were treated exactly like the Basotho, and some did not even speak Sesotho sir. They were Zulus, some were Xhosas and some were Batswana. I am trying to show that they came from different tribes like it is in South Africa. Some were Basotho and so regardless of their tribes, be it Zulu, Xhosa, Motsoana, Mopeli or Mosotho, because there were Basotho in South Africa. These people were welcomed and they were not discriminated.

I believe that the situation that was in South Africa because of the Apartheid during that period in regard to South Africa's independence, there was a saying that even countries like Lesotho, its independence does not mean anything unless South Africa gained its independence so people then realized that we were one nation with South Africa because Lesotho is landlocked by South Africa. There is no where we can go without going through South Africa because we are surrounded by it, I mean wherever. The most important issue that is not supposed to be forgotten is that most of Basotho are still working in South Africa and we are related to these people who are across the Mohokare River.

And most of the families that are in South Africa are Basotho families because you will see it when we there is something that needs to be planned for like when somebody has passed away while in South Africa, you will see that those who are in South Africa will have to wait for someone coming from Lesotho to help with the arrangements. The first thing that we do when we go to South Africa is to find accommodation.

The second one is the relations of these two countries with regard to the economy. These two countries work together. The third one is that we are all Africans but most importantly, we are related. We are biologically related to so many Basotho who are in South Africa and other people from other tribes because we have married or our daughters have been married in these tribes.

I think some women were already involved in politics at that time but I cannot exactly say the years to be precise. There were times when our political parties had big rallies and invited South African political parties or South Africa Liberation Struggle Movements and you would find that from these two sides most of the people who were very active were women in the issues of liberation struggle and in that way you would find that there was a network between women who were in Lesotho and those who were in South Africa except that this issue of accommodating people you would find that even people who were taking care of these people in the families were women. Women were the ones ensuring that the people had good life, a place to stay and were taken care of.

These big political parties have participated and supported the South Africans in their liberation struggle. I do not want to say Basotho take pride in their political parties but what is clear and very straight is that these big political parties of Lesotho in their different times supported the South African liberation struggle. Maybe I can even say it was out of the good heart of every Mosotho to understand that they should support these people because if they did not support them they would not have their liberation or they would not have a future.

The costs were very huge in Lesotho. First, as poor as we were, we were supposed to help these people who came with nothing because they had fled from their country. When somebody comes as a refugee, the first thing that you must give that person is accommodation, food, clothes before you can even see how their children may join them and how they will survive. So the lives of these people were in the hands of Basotho and Lesotho because they were taking care of them on daily basis yet our economy was not good. Besides this, it was their health. When they were sick they went to our health facilities. Spaces that they have occupied in our schools could have been occupied by Basotho or Basotho's children. Apart from that, truly this oppression from the Boers that was indeed very rough, we know very well that it ended up causing instability and this instability most of the time, it made people live in fear. During the night you would find that in the villages, in towns and in the families, people lost their lives and lost their properties. Also when I talk about this apartheid, it has cost us so much that the Basotho were not allowed to cross to South Africa but as I said we are the most immediate neighbors to South Africa. The fact that sometimes when Basotho went to South Africa for shopping, to buy the assets/equipment, grocery or when they went to their health facilities I am telling you that there were times when people were tortured because they were not allowed to cross to South Africa. Basotho suffered. The whites would not allow them to cross the border without a valid reason. The whites took us for granted and with all these things they did to us one would say it was a way of making the Basotho pay except that there were some Basotho who lost their lives because many Basotho were killed at that time when the Boers attacked these refugees who were here in Lesotho and this caused instability in the country. The refugees died and the properties of Basotho were damaged and Basotho died. In other words Lesotho heavily paid the prize and Basotho were affected psychologically, mentally and emotionally, Lesotho as small as it is was terrorized by a powerful country that was developed. This is how Basotho paid yet they were resilient.

I think the most important issue here is that there were no expectations of reparations. It was just that people were willing to help their other brothers and sisters because we were one nation with similar problems. Basotho know very well what racial discrimination is because they have experienced it. So even when they gained their independence they understood that it meant nothing as long as South

Africa had not yet gained its independence. Maybe the expectation was that when these two countries had their independence, they would be able to work together. The expectation that one had was that South Africans would claim that we are one nation so we should join hands to see how can build the future of these two countries.

How do we work together in regard to economic issues and the fact that Basotho are not allowed to go and work in South Africa. There should also be no problem when Basotho visit their health facilities when they are sick, when they want to go for shopping in South Africa, when they want to go and sell or do whatever they want to do in South Africa. In other words I simply mean that we should try to work together harmoniously and help each other. I think the other important expectation was that both parties should not expect any reparations just because they helped each other in desperate times. We should be happy that we all have our total freedom and therefore work together and move forward together.

We expected all these to have been done by these two countries because they are both independent countries but nothing has been done. You know *ntate*; I sometimes do not like this conflict that is between Lesotho and South Africa especially because we are neighbors. The most important thing is that people should sit down together and discuss what they want and forget about reparations. We must all work together because Basotho need South Africans and the South Africans need Basotho. That's all. We need each other and if there is anything that maybe each country thinks they are being denied justice to, then both parties should sit down together and discuss the issue. For example, if either of the two parties feel like the issue of the border gates is not handled well, that is, when we cross to that side it is not easy. The border gate services are not different from those which were delivered by the whites during their rule and it is also important to show if the services have improved.

Show that it is now easy for Basotho to cross to South Africa or suggest to the government of South Africa on how to make it easy for Basotho to cross the border because they have families and relatives in South Africa. Our children are in South Africa. You will even realize that even our surnames and our names are mixed, that is you will find that I have a Sesotho name for example Teboho and my surname is a Xhosa surname which is Ndobe, even people like Thabo Mbeki you still realize that his first name is a Sesotho name and his surname is Mbeki which means it is from another tribe in South Africa. We are related to these people. In the past there were people who would go to South Africa for their studies. However, things changed when the Bantu Education was introduced. Most of the people left South Africa and came to study in Lesotho during that time when there was political instability, when those people were tortured, when they were fighting for their freedom. They came to Lesotho for their studies and I think there are people who know better than me about this issue.

Besides this, the majority of people in the South African government attained their educational qualifications in Lesotho and I think it is unnecessary to mention their names. The fact that the majority of them attended school in Lesotho was just the matter of showing that we are one nation so that means where there could be problems... recently I see that there is a swing again. The majority of Basotho like to attend schools in South Africa and these are some of the things that make us happy when they are made easy for Basotho. There should also be equal distribution of wealth and people should find/get things that they can use easily and I think these are

some of the things that we can still use so that they we work together and they must be mentioned and where there is a problem people should sit down together and discuss that problem. And when they do so, they should act like countries that are independent. They should state things they would like to discuss and then ask the South Africans for their opinions. If they also have things that they would like us to continue doing for them, then they must tell us.

Good relations mean people who are neighbours like these two countries should try to find time to sit down together and discuss issues. It is for our benefit *ntate* that we should have good relations with South Africa at all times. South Africa is our neighboring country which we lived with for a very long time and whom we will still live together with for the next coming years. You know in good relations the first thing that we should see to it is to look at the interests of each country, if it has a programme that will lead the country to have the discussions with the other country and how they will work together with this other country/person because each country has its own interests. The first interest of every country is its economy. To see to it that its economy is good because if its economy is good that means even people as well will have a good life.

It also means whatever the country has will be well developed be it their property or their education and other things. The first issue that must be looked at is the economy of the country; create jobs so that individuals can work for themselves. These should be the country's first priority in regard to the issue of the good relations. The second common issue is the security of the country. One must feel like when s/he is living here/in this country is safe and s/he will not be attacked. There must be security. One should feel protected, safe and know that his/her freedom cannot be hindered by anyone. There should also be peace in the country, amongst people who are our neighbours because where there is peace; the economy of the country will be good. The economy and the security of the country are very important.

Nkhethoa, Jobo Molefi

[Maseru; 7 February 2008]

1, Reverend Jobo Molefi Nkhethoa, am the son of Molefi, Molefi of Nkhethoa who resides in Leribe at Ntšasaneng. I was born and grew up there and I attended school at Emmanuel Mission then from there I went to a college at Transkei where I studied Theology. I worked here in Lesotho and at many other places as a priest at the Seventh Day Adventist Church.

These people were refugees whom our government pleaded with us as the Basotho to live with in harmony in our families and I am one of those who welcomed some refugees in my new home which I had built in Maseru and immediately after its completion, I was sent to be a priest in the Butha Buthe district. I left those people in my house. I knew very well that they were refugees. I did that because the government had asked us to do so. You will realize that, those who came to my home were the ones I was with at Transkei where I studied but we didn't know one another from school but I sympathized with them as individuals. They lived in peace and we got along so well because we spoke the same language. They also paid rent without any problems. Well, they didn't have any demands. It was only a husband and his wife. The husband's name was Mavimbela. I don't even know what he did for a living because they arrived when I had to leave for Botha-Bothe so I didn't get to know them.

I was in Botha-Bothe even though I can't recall well where I heard about this but I think I heard it on radio Lesotho that there was an attack and I found that my house was also affected. Then I sent my wife to Maseru and upon her arrival, she found that it was true then she called to ask me to come as quickly as I could. I found my house still standing but six people had died in my house and my wife found an old woman and they had a small chat and she said they were there as visitors from Transkei but didn't know how they were related. They all died, except that old woman and her granddaughter. I am not sure if she was Mavimbela's mother or she was just a relative, when I arrived they were already taken out of my house. But I was shocked when I found eighteen holes of bullets and you could see outside through them. My windows were all down and we were able to see people from far away. (Laughing)

The doors and windows were totally destroyed but what hurt me the most but also made me laugh was that, the bathroom, where this old woman had hidden herself, the toilet seat was broken and it was still there as the exhibit but by the grace of God, she survived (laughing). We never met the leadership of the refugees at all but my wife was the one whom the government invited to a meeting of all those who were attacked and had to report to the government and my wife went there more than once because, as I said, my wife went there on my behalf and the names of the people whose properties were destroyed were written down at the Ministry of Foreign affairs.

The truth of the matter is that I had rented out everything in my house except the wall to wall carpet that I had just bought and it was all covered with blood. The floors and everywhere in the house had to be washed but when I arrived, the dead people were no longer there.

You know, as a layman, not an expert, I found that the expenses might amount to thirty thousand but it's like everybody was asked to mention their problems and we did so, but ever since then, nothing has been done but His Majesty King Moshoeshoe II ended up going to the United Nations and came back saying that the

decision was that South Africa had to pay reparations to the Basotho whose properties were destroyed and the families who lost their loved ones. This seemed to have been well planned and we all thought it would be implemented. My wife kept going to South Africa and they told her that they were still trying to sort things out and they had many people to help but at the end, this was just a joke. I ended up thinking that maybe there were others who had already been compensated but the bottom line is, until today, nothing has been done.

Nothing at all sir, I'm not a person who gives up easily, I persevered and even wrote a letter in December, no sorry, it was in January 2004, I wrote this letter to the South African High Commission where they gave me a very warm welcome and after reading my letter they told me that they understood my concerns but they explained that they were here in Lesotho as a government and they could only talk to the government of Lesotho so they advised me to take my letter to my government then they would help me through my government. I went and years have passed but there is still no progress. I have gone to all the government ministries but I haven't given up. After failing at the ministries, I took this matter to the ombudsman and as we speak, it is in the hands of the ombudsman, it's been six months but he keeps saying that he is working on it.

I have learned through my investigations that these people are also victims like me. Their homes were also attacked and people died. There are others whom I didn't contact but I know that the place next to Lancers Gap was also attacked. It was a building that looked like... a hotel, was it a hotel Mr. Phalatsi? As for Mr. Maphaleba, of Upper Thamae, I didn't find anybody at his house. I know Mr. Nqoko's family next to Maseru East but I don't know the building which was attacked, so I'm doing the follow-up alone because some have already passed on.

As Lesotho or Basotho, our brothers and sisters from South Africa exiled to us and we welcomed them and lived with them. That is the point I observed but I don't know others, I don't even remember them. We gave them accommodation. It was a show of empathy to each other. We are related and even share the same religion.

Very much Sir, I was personally hurt because my house was destroyed and...but I wasn't given even some soap to wash the blood of those people who died in my house. As a Mosotho man, and other Basotho, we are still hurting and we wish South Africa could show us some kindness and compensate us. Some people, whose names I can't mention have given up, even their children have died and left orphans in this country but people pretend as if they don't know that such orphans exist.

As I have said that the South Africans are our brothers and sisters and I would like to see us having good relations, relations of empathy. Other than this, I was born in Leribe and my home is next to the Mohokare River, we used to hunt rats and rabbits in the Free State only if we had been given the permission by the owner of the farm. Another thing which I can tell you, which has surprised me is that, in 1948, when I wanted to go to work at the mines, I went to my principal chief who wrote a letter to Toby Middleton in Free State who made me a special passport and I went to look for a job at the mines and the good relations that existed at that time, I still want to see them between the current governments.

Nkoebe, Nkau

Chief Nkau Nkoebe is the son of Chief Tshepo Nkoebe at Sesolong in the Quthing district. He is 83 years old and has worked closely with the Lesotho royal family, of which he is part since the reign of the Regent Mants'ebo Seeiso in the 1950s. He studied at Lerotholi Polytechnic and taught there for many years as a car mechanics instructor. He was a close confidante of the late Majesty Moshoeshe II and remains close to the current monarch Letsie III. He is a well known commentator on Lesotho politics especially traditional leadership.

Morena Sempe is the one who taught me about governance. That's when I got to know what chieftaincy meant. I learnt that there is no chief without the people and he believed in that because he would never plan or do anything without calling a public gathering for his people to discuss with them first. Then they would decide together on how to go about things. There is a saying that the chief's voice is final but to him that didn't apply because he would never do anything without considering the opinions of his people. The word 'le lumme' which means 'agreed' turned out to be a stigma because it seemed like the chief did as he pleased. Let me start it this way so that you understand well.

There is no chief in this country who marked or allocated sites to people or marked the pastures, that is, there was no chief in this country who would do as he pleased without consulting his people. So that is why you would find that when it was the time to mark the pastures, there would be chosen men entrusted to do a good job and the chief would just be told that we have marked the pastures with clear marks then his job as a chief would just be to tell his people that certain pastures have been reserved. If anyone would be seen there, (at the reserved pastures) the villagers would arrest them and take them to the chief. The land is under the control of the chief, even the fields, for example if one person has many fields, the chief has a right to take some away from him and give them to other people. In that way, his people are able to share. But the chief does all this together with his people.

When the British people arrived here, they found chiefs as judges in the courts and when a case was presented to the chief, he would sit down with his ministers and listen and ask questions and when they are satisfied, they ask to be excused and they give themselves time to look at all the sides and analyse and also think of the judgement, then after some time they ask everybody to come back into the court so that the chief presents the judgement that has been agreed upon.

And after the judgement, the plaintiff and the defendant are expected to shake hands and make peace. That was how the chief dealt with the court cases, not these judgements of today which don't bring peace. The ultimate intention of the court should be to resolve matters and help people reconcile but the British realized this and took powers from the chiefs because they didn't believe in unity and then they introduced their ways in a manner that people didn't even realize. So when I left Quthing, I went to school at Lesotho High School but the chief told me that he didn't want me to follow the British Education and had to go to Lerotholi Polytechnic. The chief had realized that when they went to school, his children no longer wanted to go to the well to fetch water; they no longer wanted to collect wood for cooking or food for his animals when they came from the fields which he used to do. No woman would go to the fields and come back without food for the animals. So he insisted that I went to Fokothi and luckily I got the admission.

I performed so well that upon the completion of my studies, I became an assistant

teacher but because of Queen Mantšebo [Queen Regent], I was taken to Matsieng to work with her but my knowledge was on the cars so I was a chauffeur. But I only drove her on special occasions. When she was just coming to town, she would come with anybody then she ended up realising that it was a mistake to be going to the emperor in Maseru, the emperor was the one to go to her as the queen then it was agreed that every Wednesday the emperor would go to Matsieng. The good thing is that, he went there to meet the queen's ministers but if there would be something that needed the queen's attention, she would just be called and addresses the matter, then leave them. But there was nothing they would agree on without inviting the opinions of the people and this brought conflicts between the queen and the British people.

First she said it was wrong to be going to Maseru and made the emperor go to Matsieng, and when she was at Matsieng, she wouldn't make any decisions without consulting her people. She went to Pretoria to talk to the executive but when they had to reach a decision, she said she had to go and consult her people first then she would give the answer. That scared the British and they were forced to believe the fact that Bereng Seeiso was Queen Mantsebo's son.

People don't know that Bereng was a special child that brought many conflicts in the family, he is the child of queen 'Mabereng in the second house of Seeiso because in the first house, there was no son so according to our culture, they had to take a son from the second house so because Bereng was still young, but was supposed to become king, chief Bereng of Phamong, Seeiso's younger brother, queen Mantšebo's husband wanted to raise Bereng but queen 'Mantšebo refused and this issue drove the family to the High court because Mantsebo wanted to be the one who raised Bereng because he was her husband's son, Seeiso and she thought she had good reasons.

Bereng and his brother didn't get along so well and our father, chief Gruiffth liked the young one but Mantsebo didn't trust him. She thought he would kill him because he also wanted to be the chief so Bereng ended up being the child of 'Mantšebo and he was taken away from his biological mother 'Mabereng. You already understand that in a polygamous family, when a child is taken away from his mother, she gets hurt and worry that the other wife would kill her child because he is to become the chief and that's how polygamous women are. But the biggest challenge was that 'Mantšebo didn't want Bereng to be anywhere next to the Bereng of Phamong where he could have access to him because she thought that, because he lost the court case, she might find other ministers because they loved Seeiso more than him. Then there was a huge argument that 'Mabereng was the one who had problems with the fact that 'Mantšebo had taken her child.

People thought 'Mantšebo had the ulterior motives of killing Bereng. Others thought the Bereng of Phamong also wanted to kill him because he wanted to be the king. So I found the situation like this in the family but in all this, I was fortunate because the queen didn't only consider me as her chauffeur but I was in charge of all the equipment used in the fields including the tractors but other than that, we are both the children of Nkuebe and we valued chieftaincy and where she had problems, she would come to me and tell me what was being planned and what her input was and I would tell her that she was right because she knew how we were raised at home. Fortunately, Bereng loved me more than everyone in the family and this didn't sit well with Mantšebo and she didn't even like it if we gave him food because she feared that if anything could happen to Bereng, I would be to

blame.

If he wanted to eat chicken, we had to give him a live chicken to take it to his house so that they slaughtered and cooked it there. If he wanted to eat mutton, we would do the same. But he liked eating in our house, especially with me. We shared a plate together and Bereng was like my own child, we became so close that even when he went to school, I was the one who accompanied him to and from. We used to do almost everything together.

My sister would then be angry with me saying that Bereng would cause conflicts between me and his family because they would think that I wanted to kill him. She said the domestic workers might be bribed to kill the child but at the end of the day people would think that he was killed by her. That's how he grew up and when these British men wanted us to gain our independence which was fought for by Mokhehle through Mr. Josiel Lefelae. We were a British protectorate and things seemed better in our country but we could see that the Boers wanted to win our country over so it was a high time to be an independent country. This was where the problem was, the British had to advise the queen to strive for independence with the intention to bring our country back from the Boers.

We didn't benefit at all, rather, the same country that we helped, didn't do any good for Lesotho. You mean the expenses that Lesotho incurred? Sir, Lesotho incurred a lot of expenses, we didn't only lose our country but we also lost a lot of money because the funds from the international countries which were meant for Lesotho only got to help South Africa. let me tell you what many people don't know, Leabua's government was toppled, but he still continued to give money to the refugees just so that they would not turn against him and become his enemies when they came back home and by so doing, he was trying to prevent a situation whereby they would come here and attack him and other refugees would know the ones who came to attack and that is how I also got to know them.

They are all in South Africa, the likes of Thebe Motebang and Sekamane, I knew them and their actions, and I also knew the people they killed. While they were in South Africa, a conflict erupted among them because of the money that the Prime Minister was sending. Some of them ruled them out and said, even if they were Basotho, they were sell-outs because the Basotho had always valued their country. So when Mokhehle planned to kill, they would arrive at your place and after killing, it's clear that your family member who is that side would not feel good and then find ways to form an army and they ended up having many different armies. They knew that the Mokhehle's army was formed not to fight against Leabua but the Basotho who were in South Africa. In other words, it was the Boers army but was using Mokhehle. This was Vlakplaas's army and he became the leader.

He couldn't lead because there were no agreements. He came back home with a different character and he had to become an enemy to the people who were with him in South Africa because they thought they still had a common understanding, not realizing that things had changed. They ended up saying he now focused on helping the members of the National party more than helping them.

But they didn't know that he took orders from that side, that's why when he realized that they had arguments in the parliament and there was hope to win the elections then he announced a state of emergency in the parliament and toppled the government right in the parliament, immediately he became the head of the government. We all know that a party can't make it to the parliament without its voters. The fact that the law has some loopholes was taken advantage of by Mr. Maope and Shakhane. They wanted to escape through the loopholes and it's obvious that these people were no longer working toward the unity of the nation. So Maope and others became aware that Ntsu Mokhehle was not doing what was right, so they wanted to form a government in the parliament but they failed because the ministers were scared to stab their prime minister behind the back. They approached Tom and told him that they wanted changes which will continue to benefit them, not necessarily the country because the truth of the matter is that, this country is richer than most of the African countries in terms of minerals; diamond, gold, iron, uranium and oil.

Sir, there is no South Africa. You are asking me a good question and I want to show you that actually, South Africa and Lesotho are one country and if we want good relations, this country should recognize its head, which is His Majesty the King and immediately when they acknowledge him and give him powers, then South Africa and all African countries will fall under Lesotho because of what King Moshoeshoe I did for them, they are just waiting for the king to get his powers so that he absorbs them and they all become a black Africa because they believe that as Africans, they have one king who is Moshoeshoe I and they also had Moshoeshoe II and this clearly means that the heart of Africa is Lesotho and if this is the case, then that means if His Majesty the King is given his powers back, we would be free from poverty because all those European countries rely on Lesotho for their power and economy and that's what they want.

Lesotho can rule the whole Africa and Europe can end up being at our mercy because it doesn't have anything except that salty water that surrounds it. So that's where the argument is, and they wished that His Majesty King Letsie III would not have a son because he might want to fight for his powers. According to them, they believe that Moshoeshoe's family has challenges, infect, killing the chieftaincy is a priority to them. They are not aware that it is a very complicated issue and all the time when people have problems, they still run to the royal house and they realize that this is very deep.

When I started working on the issue of Lekhoaba, my intention was to challenge a person who could tell me when we gained our independence and who gave it to us and who he gave it to because if we were a British protectorate, we were supposed to be under our king and he would be the one holding the reigns after gaining independence but that is not the case. The question we need to ask ourselves is, what have we been given? It seems like this isn't really independence but something that has brought conflict in our country and fortunately the late Moshoeshoe II spelt it very clear out that now that we didn't gain independence the way we had wanted, it is clear that as the nation, we shall continue to consult you and work according to your opinions. Now these people still make stay aways and I ask them why they use the nation to push their personal interests, in other words, they use the Basotho as their baits but it's clear that the Basotho will never have the wisdom to realize that the independence wasn't good at all and each and everyone does as they please and even the one who is in power now does things without

consulting us.

Phoofolo, Paanya

[Maseru; 24 February 2008]

Paanya Phoofolo is a former civil servant who rose through the ranks to become Principal Secretary, Ambassador of Lesotho at the United Nations and the first Government Secretary of Lesotho since its redemocratisation in 1993. Since his retirement from government service, he briefly joined the New National Party (NNP) of the late Chief Nkuebe Peete and has since become a political activist of BCP and then Basutoland African Congress (BAC).

We should start looking at our relations from the time when the Union of South Africa was formed; during the rule of the whites in South Africa. Basotho refused to be part of the Union of South Africa. I think you still remember as a person who knows history very well that when people like *Morena* Maama, went to Bloemfontein, Perensula, they were expelled and they were told that they won't be part of South Africa because we were still a protectorate not part of South Africa. There was a big challenge between the British and the Boers after Jan Smut's death. I believe you also know very well because it was in the early 40s when the National Party emerged and took over governance; so after that, people started being told/taught about the racial discrimination that was happening in South Africa until people like Dr. Van Rooit brought along their apartheid practices and incorporated them into the laws.

Those were the laws which governed South Africa and when black people arrived in South Africa, they fought for their liberation. They wanted to have a say in the governance. In the struggle, Basotho were not left out. Many of them worked in South Africa because food was insufficient here in Lesotho and they ended up being part of the struggle. When we talk about the whole Southern African struggle, we all know that its hot bed was the University of Fort Hare. That was where the majority of our political leaders were trained, for example, people like *Ntate* Ntsu, *Ntate* Mandela even Mugabe. I forget the name of the president of Uganda because he was also trained at the University of Fort Hare. When people said it was time for the struggle and there was a momentum that followed the Second World War, then the question was, what are the values that we are fighting for? That was when they were in Europe and they said if that's the case, then we also want independence for our countries.

So in this apartheid struggle, the Basotho who were in South Africa realised that apartheid was real, the racial discrimination was clear it was against the black people and then Basotho took a position that they will fight against racial discrimination with those black people in South Africa until it stopped and the Boers noticed that they detested it. This liberation struggle lasted for a very long time and during the times of Ver Voot, for one to get international..., one could not make noise about it, Dr. Ver Voot made the decision with his National Party to withdraw from the common wealth and after that, the opposition against Apartheid got very intensified. A lot of bad things had already happened, in places like Verneeging people were killed. Black people were shot and their passports were taken and those laws were not human at all. After our independence, the issue was what position Lesotho is taking in this current situation. I know *Morena* Leabua was accused that he supported the Boers because at the beginning he worked with Dr,

Ver Voot after Lesotho attained its independence and parties like BCP and MFP were dead against apartheid. They were made Liberal distance community parties by the governance system of the Boers. The political leaders of these two parties that I mentioned earlier which are the BCP and the MFP were banned in South Africa.

People like Dr. Makotoko even left Ficksburg because he was a communist and he came to Lesotho. He left Ficksburg because he had his own reasons but it was also found that he was accused of being a member of the MFP during the days of Communism because people like Joan Matthews supported the MFP financially so that it was able to sanction itself in the country. Apart from this, we still encountered problems and it was found that with time even *Morena* Leabua went there and people like *Ntate* Ntsu had run away from their domestic politics. They left the country during *Morena* Leabua's rule and as time went on he took a firm position against apartheid because when he was at the conference which was in Cuba, he aligned with diplomatic nations of Eastern countries like the USSR, North Korea and China.

Later on, South Africa through the ANC joined the struggle so you would find that even the SAP intensified the struggle, fighting for their independence. Countries like Namibia, Angola and Mozambique were just about to attain their independence, so South Africa at that time was fighting a three pound attack if I can put it that way because it was assisting Smith to declare the UNR. It focused on containing SAPO in Namibia and also focused on containing what we call the communist slot in Angola so with time even countries like Cuba came out strongly in support of the liberation of South Africa. You will remember that at the time we found countries like Tanzania were very supportive for the struggle of Southern African people when there were Frontline States. Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania were part of this even Lesotho was part of this though it came much later just before the formation of SADC to be directly involved that was then called Frontline States. These Frontline states helped these liberation movements; the PAC and the ANC got the support from these neighbouring countries when the issue of apartheid was announced. Lesotho was not excluded. These black people who were oppressed in South Africa fled to Lesotho and the South African government was not happy about Apartheid. They wished that the government of Lesotho could send back those people into South Africa but Lesotho refused. Lesotho was steadfast that it will abide by international laws and treaties especially when it comes to the protection of the refugees. You will find that these people were staying here in Lesotho to the displeasure of South Africa. Basotho took the position through the government at that time that these people are their relatives or families and they will therefore support them. They were not supporting people who came as refugees and those who fled from Bantu Education who were so many in Basotho's schools, for instance, St. Agnes Secondary, there were quite a number of students from Johannesburg who went to Peka High School, I also went to Peka High School and after I finished my high school, I went to the National University of Lesotho, Roma.

You would find South Africans studying there because the government of Lesotho allowed those black people from South Africa to be helped then it's clear that Lesotho had taken a firm position against apartheid. I thought you were asking me a question? One, Lesotho was dead against apartheid. Since that time Lesotho was an independent country and it was also fighting for majority rule in South Africa because what they were fighting for was democracy, that the government in the region should be democratic. So one of the things which influenced South Africa was the

majority rule. The few were pressing the majority and that was the major thing that motivated us to take that position, still hoping that it is going to help us to strengthen the Southern African region as a whole as I democratically said or established, we all knew that the majority of people in South Africa were black people, they were oppressed by the whites because as you know, truly the number of these black people was more than the number of the whites but they were still oppressed by these Boers. They controlled the economy and the armies so these black people were only being used in the police sector but the army was prelin to the whites.

All Basotho were against apartheid and I do not deny that at that time when this struggle was being intensified, the BNP was in control but BCP ended up going to South Africa, this ended up coming to Lesotho and it was well known also that it is against apartheid. Every Mosotho detested this racial discrimination therefore Basotho as a whole were supportive of the position that was being taken by the government everyday to protect the interests of the refugees even to ensure that apartheid was stopped. Even at the international forums you would find them participating. Lesotho was always consistent in supporting the call for the emulation of apartheid. There was never a time you would find Lesotho compromising itself. People whom I remember very well who were in the forefront in the national politics were; *Mme MaPhosholi*, *Mme Posholi Molapo*, a sister to Dr. Matokoto. Yes I remember her vividly. People like *Mme Mamanka* were there and even now when they are civil servants of our age. People like *Mamello Morrison*, yes, they were there too and people who were very premium fled here in Lesotho. We did not have the so called refugee's camps. Those people lived with us in our villages. The majority of them resided at Ha Thamae location (next to the school) which is not too far from when you are from Europe. There were refugees living with us and that means they had support of the Basotho nation.

It was quite a lot of costs. There were times that you will find or see Basotho at the border posts..., this issue of having to show a passport at the border posts indeed is a direct product of apartheid. We used to cross the border without showing our passports but in the 60s we were told to have valid passports. And for Basotho to work in South Africa they were supposed to get section 12 to allow them to go and work there. Going to work in South Africa was made to contain the movement of Basotho while those who were in South Africa must show their passports at the border posts. The racial discrimination in South Africa was very bad. I do not deny the fact that we used to have long queues at the border posts but in those days you will find that they were doing it purposely so that we felt that they were in control, that we were nothing in their very own eyes.

Some people got banned in South Africa and some got arrested so sometimes..., let me tell you this one in particular, these cross border attacks that were being done to Basotho at that time was because South Africa had already infiltrated Lesotho. It wanted these people; those who were ANC and PAC members because the most brutal one that occurred was on the 9th of December 1982 if I remember well. Quite a number of places in Maseru were attacked at night by the South African Defence Force. Basotho and some members of ANC and PAC who were in Lesotho died and even after this there were negative consequences, I must say in as much as we had our own international political programmes, the downfall of Leabua was a direct intervention to South Africa by closing the borders, it wanted to topple *Morena* Leabua because of the position he had taken during that time when

there was a war in South Africa. They are the ones who caused political instability in this country. These are a few that I can tell you for now.

What Lesotho was fighting for was a majority rule in South Africa, now I can tell you that Lesotho has been part and passive at the formation of SADC. As I said Lesotho at the international forums was always consistently willing to support black people in South Africa. I worked for the UN Lesotho, there's not a single resolution that we made that stood for apartheid or said it is not a co-sponsor of apartheid. They were always supportive even the very last one that was in 1990 which was called apartheid and its destructive consequences in Southern Africa. It was piloted by Lesotho for that resolution to be accepted by all regional parties that existed so when we came and talked about the reward, first of all we were going to talk about stability, that is what we were fighting for, racial discrimination has come to an end so one expects to see what they will do for us. I think we are to blame ourselves as Basotho.

Lesotho did not take immediate advantage of the black rule in South Africa. Basotho are still being treated badly at the border posts just as they were treated during apartheid. Most of the time you will hear these politicians saying to the people that they have signed papers and Basotho will no longer show passports at the border as long as one has a valid passport yet they do not follow up. So Basotho are benefiting from South Africa which is an independent country and through remittances they are able help their families. Maybe the other ones will only depend on us at a political level, what do we do to ensure that there is fruitful cooperation between Lesotho and South Africa because those people I still maintain that they were not treated/ handled well and they are not against Basotho but it is only us Basotho who could not say how we can benefit because indeed there are so many benefits. But what I am trying to say is that we are to blame.

An average of Basotho is not happy with the treatment they get at the border posts. It is not good at all. , the issue of getting jobs in South Africa is still a problem. They are talking about the free movement of labour within SADC. We are saying an average of Basotho is not happy with this and the Basotho are the people that we can say they are proud in their own way and they know how much they contributed towards the liberation of South Africa. Let us take the recent elections of ANC, people who are in Free State are more than those in Lesotho in number when you take that executive of Zuma, how many Basotho were there, you don't see them. Ace Makhashule sees himself as Motswana not Mosotho. Terro Lekota was here with us and I once heard that Terror Lekota is a Mosotho.

I do not know why other people don't really appreciate the role we played. A few years back they tried to stop Alumni Association at Roma, this thing just collapsed here in Lesotho and if we take influential people in South Africa like the Vice President, majority of them studied in Lesotho but it just collapsed. There is a Sesotho proverb that says you help somebody who is trying to help himself/herself and if Basotho are not trying, then nobody will come and tell them what to do. Thabo Mbeki said long time ago that we must have projects together but we know why our projects are not successful; we are the ones who are betraying our own relationship within a matter to benefit from the free South Africa.

All the governments have their own intelligence. The government of Lesotho and the present South African government have intelligent people. Recently I can tell you that during the formation of SADC I was one of those people who were involved at a technical level, following the Lusaka 1998 when they attained

independence; first, you won't believe that at one time, the late *Ntate* Vincent Makhele once gave me a parcel to take to Mozambique and he told me that strictly when I arrived there I must make sure that I meet the person I was told to give it to. He was given my profile because he was the director at that time and so surely he knew me. I went with the late Mr. Lehlohonolo Mophethe. He was working at the Ministry of foreign Affairs and I was serving at the Transport and Communication department, so I was told that this person was going to follow me all the way to Polana Hotel after we greeted at the airport.

Immediately when we arrived in my room, he would come within no less than five minutes and I should make sure that I give it directly to him and we were not supposed to be seen by anybody. He would then check it and *Ntate* Mophete should be in his room and should not what's happening. He checked and found that it was the Lesotho Diplomatic passports then he counted them and thanked me. He spoke English and told me that the other one was going to help Comrade Joe Molise who was injured in Angola and was going to fly to the USSR that night. Can you see what we mean by intelligence? The ANC is a liberation movement but it has a relationship with the government of Lesotho, in the same manner, the Boers had their own international people and at other places, the Basotho who were the ANC members were using their own intelligent people. That's a fact and we should accept it. The Boers were once in a war. They had to send their own agents, there was a young person who was caught at Foreign Affairs because he had stolen the Foreign Affairs' files and gave them to the South African operatives. He got arrested by the Head of State Security because the Boers wanted to infiltrate the government of the day in Lesotho. They had to find where the ANC members lived and they were able to attack them because they had the intelligence information. Let us accept that at that time it had to happen that way. Russia has just poisoned somebody and that person died and countries like America also have their own intelligence.

You know the whole thing is determined by what type of leadership we have as Basotho, if we can have leaders who know the interests of people rather than their own interests or their families' interests then it would be better. They know things that need to be considered in democracy and they are fight against them. We are still talking about corruption, nepotism, service to the nation, but once we have identified our own concerns of a diplomatic nation then we are able to interface our relationship with South Africa and we will say that it was our luck as Lesotho because we are completely surrounded by this country.

Let me just say I don't take it as a bad thing because it has a strong economy. It is just the matter of how it benefits Basotho, I think Lesotho can benefit enormously if we could take the advantage of South African strong economy. We are not fighting and our concern is what do we do to improve our relationship with South Africa, are we really taking advantage of the strong South African economy? We are not, what I see when I look at the so called South African investments in Lesotho, there are shops that are productive. We are just selling the products of South Africa, the Chinese who currently reside in Lesotho by the time they leave Lesotho we will be left with this shell and nothing would have been done.

South Africa has got a fairly farm community, what do we do with it to the Basotho who cannot even plough and cultivate their fields because they do not have cattle. We could have taken this advantage because there are tractors there and they have expertise, then we could take advantage of that for the benefit of Basotho as a whole. These are the things that when I look at them, I say we are truly not being

serious.

Posholi, Matholoana

Matholoana Posholi completed COSC and a Diploma in Nutrition at the Lesotho Agricultural College. She started work at what was then called Lesotho Hilton International, now Lesotho Sun Hotel where she spent many years before she joined Victoria Hotel. It was whilst she was working at both hotels that she met a number of South African refugees who were employed there.

I think Lesotho helped South Africa in many ways because it is a neighbouring country and a country that we consider as part of Lesotho. Those who were in schools, fled to Lesotho and we welcomed them in our homes and others became our colleagues at work and others went to our schools and while many things were happening, they were here with us. This is how I think we helped them because we welcomed them and considered them as our brothers and sisters.

The reasons for Lesotho to have done all these, I think it was out of empathy and because we are all Africans and we love one another and the truth is their country surrounds us totally, we speak the same languages and are of the same colour. I personally worked with those refugees. I remember the boys who lived at Hills View. I worked with them and others while I lived with one, and the other lived next door. I knew them so well that we even socialized together.

I don't really know that much about my boyfriend but because he knew many people and was very advantaged because he could speak Zulu or Xhosa, I can say he knew them but I'm not sure because sometimes, as women, our husbands don't want us to know certain things they do especially because, as much as those refugees were our friends, they were not very open, so maybe, he was one of them but I really am not sure because sometimes, I realized that it wasn't easy to cross the border with him. At my workplace, it happened that when some visitors arrived, I was able to distinguish between a British and an American person and one day when a white man arrived, as a hostess, I had to welcome him and ask him where he was from and had a small chat and laughed together. Then he said he came from Netherlands and I was very surprised. I asked him why he had visited Lesotho, then he told me that he was a pensioner on holiday, then I said, if you are from Netherlands, then you are an English man, he said yes. Then I said, "But you don't look like an English man", then he asked, "How do I look like?" I said "You look like a Boer" I just said it like that and amongst the Boers, you are a soldier. Then he said, "Hao! Why?" then I said that's how I see it because I deal with many people and I'm able to differentiate between different nationals. He left his documents and...suddenly I had a bad feeling then I told my boss. Her name was Susan. I told her that I didn't like the character of that man; he said he came from Netherlands but I didn't believe him. He looked maroon on the face and I just felt that there was something off about him. I observed that he called our waitresses many times, asking them if there were any ANC members who lived in Lesotho and the waitresses said yes. He wanted to know if there were some who worked at the hotel. I then asked one waitress what they were talking about with the man and she confirmed that he was asking about the ANC members who lived in Lesotho.

I asked that lady not to show him any of them. Out of a good heart, I asked one boy who was from South Africa to carefully look through the window and confirm if that man was a Boer or not because he was asking about the ANC members and I thought he was a snitch. The boy came back to me to confirm that indeed, he was a Boer; a soldier for that matter. Then I told him to make sure that that Boer never

sees him. His colleague who was also from South Africa wasn't at work during that man's stay at the hotel. His name was Luwanda. Then the one I had asked to confirm if the man was a Boer or not also signed for a leave because he could see that the man really wanted to see him.

The Boer started asking me where the ANC members were, where they lived and what they did for a living, then I asked him why he was so interested in South Africa and apartheid when he was from far away and he said it was just out of interest because from Lesotho, he wanted to visit South Africa and Botswana. He used to wear a pen on his neck and I realized very late that he used it to record our conversations because he used to touch it before we started talking and he would never allow anyone to touch it. This didn't sit well with me and I told my police friend that there was a white man at the hotel and they should just check on him. They found that in his car there was a plate and a pair of trousers. The car was very untidy, ugly and old.

So the policemen asked him where he was staying because most of the time he was seen on the streets always talking on a walkie talkie and when asked what he was doing, he would say he was just talking to his friends and I could feel that there was a problem. Then later, the ANC members were attacked and killed at many places but this particular man arrived way before the attack and he was already here when it happened. After the attack he told me that he heard that people have died but he was laughing and I asked him why he was laughing because the attack had also affected Basotho and we couldn't even understand why and he asked me if I thought it was because of apartheid. He also bought me a drink. The members of CID did a follow up because they had a lead. Fortunately our colleagues were not affected but their houses were destroyed. That day, we knocked off at 2p.m. and when I arrived home, I met them and we agreed that we would go to a bar later. They lived at Upper Thamae where there were tall trees and others lived not very far from there. I don't know the owner of the house they were renting. The ones who got burned in their car were my friends who had promised that they were only going to change their clothes so that we went to the bar but I wasn't in a good mood to go out that day, then I asked my nanny that when they arrived, she should just tell them that I had already left the house to Lekhloaneng and I just went inside my house and rested.

Then they left without me. Later, one of them asked me why I didn't go and I told him that I wasn't feeling well. That night, all these things happened. People died, my friends got burned in their car and this means I could have been one of them. I realized after the raid that I could have died. When I arrived at the border gate, even if we would give the same address, I would allow you to pass, if they took my passport and went inside the offices with it and then came back and wanted to destroy my passport, I said no problem, don't destroy it, I will never cross the border. They said we are sorry; we are just doing our job.

No sir. He didn't like to involve other people. When he wanted to run some errands, he would go alone. All they did together was just to socialize and be among other people and so as to not feel isolated and that was not nice because later I sat down and thought about this man from Netherlands and I asked myself if he was a snitch from South Africa. It was clear that he was here to find information on where the refugees lived and he succeeded. The problem was I lived together with those people because this other lady whom I worked with lived at Mr, Teeane's house with the other lady by the name of Lucy Jafeta. They were both my colleagues at Lesotho International.

One day after work, as the car was dropping each of us at our homes; the driver started with me because I lived at Ha Thetsane and then went to Qoaling, that's when the attack started. People were shot. When my friend arrived at her place, just a few seconds after she changed clothes, she heard a sound of something like a helicopter on top of her roof. The house she lived in was once rented by refugees but they no longer lived there but it was Basotho who lived there. The lady by the name of Lucy, her husband was supposed to cross the border because he was taking a business trip so the lady I worked with was on one side and the other one on the other side, so when she heard about this, she hid herself under the bed. Her name was Lesanta Mojaki. She said they brought down her trunk from the top of her wardrobe and shot it. They spoke slang so she realized that they were not Basotho. They were Boers with one black person who was showing them the houses and when they realized that the lady was a Mosotho after checking her documents, they left the house and after they left, she ran out of her house calling 'm'e Lucy, her neighbour and she found that the door was wide open and she stepped on a dead person and there was a smell of blood.

A mother, child and father were killed then she ran to the house of another woman who was our colleague by the name of Pauline. She was one of the refugees who survived but as for the boy, he just disappeared like that. The other boy married a lady from Motimposo. It was not a secret that they were refugees. Even the management knew that they were refugees but they had to live like anyone else, otherwise, what would have happened to them if they didn't have jobs? They could have been thieves. Some of them married Basotho ladies and had children with them, so they had to work.

Well, I have never seen, I have never heard and I don't even think it will happen but I think such things could happen if the Basotho maybe would work together with the South Africans. To the people who suffered at that time, there should be reparations because those people lived in Basotho houses and the houses were destroyed and some had to build them again from scratch so if South Africa doesn't pay the reparations, then our government should do something for those people because the leaders of this country allowed the refugees to live with us in this country, so when the house is destroyed, I shouldn't be alone, the country should help. These people whose houses were destroyed and lost their family members should be compensated.

I really don't know, except the one for the youth. The youth said their issues were the same as the issues of the ANC, the youth of Lesotho used to associate with those ones but I didn't really know how they helped them, in fact, things like Christian council and others were used as a front to help the members of the ANC but I'm not really sure of what was happening but there were things which didn't sit well with me like the ICM, you would hear that they were helping the ANC and they were all young.

I don't know maybe if we had something...because we have everything that can put our country at the same level as South Africa. At the moment, we just don't have the financial muscle but if South Africa could pay the reparations because when they had problems, Lesotho helped them and they should show some gratitude by helping Lesotho explore the resources it has and see how we can make a living out of them. I mean it has to help us, I don't know how but maybe this needs our leaders to be caring. I'm sure they could just meet those people from South Africa and discuss how they can help us because we don't have political problems or discrimination.

Our problem is poverty but we have minerals and other natural resources, we just need help on how to explore them. The problem is that politicians think these minerals and natural resources belong to them. I see them working for themselves and their families but not the country.

Salae Liphho Pusetso

[Maseru; 15 January 2008]

My name is Liphho Pusetso Salae. I work here at Mineworkers Development Agency, which is the branch of the National Union of Mineworkers, South Africa. This office was established by NUM in 1987 after the big strike, which lasted for 21 days. I first worked in South Africa in 1975. I worked at TEBA for five years. In South Africa during Apartheid it was called NRC. In 1980 there was this strike that was called a legal strike at that time. I have been the president of the union ever since I have been working there. We officially worked together with Moerane and then I was deployed in Klerksdorp. When whole of Klerksdorp for the first time heard and knew about the workers unions, they heard it from me when I arrived there. I organized miners and I worked there in 1986. It is very unfortunate that when I was released from prison after a year, I was deported to Lesotho.

Let me start with our struggle as Basotho for the unions of the mineworkers and then I will come to other issues. Our liberation struggle as I said, we were members of the Congress movement and we understood that we were fighting for our liberation and we wanted to come back home. We were fighting for our liberation while we were in the country of the oppressors and unfortunately, at that time the government of apartheid had a relationship with our government. In those days, Basotho were taken as cheap labour yet Basotho contributed in the formation of the NUM. Let me clarify *ntate* that in 1982, Basotho who were working at the mines in South Africa were 200 000, only Basotho men because you would find that you work during the night or during the day you go to NRSU.

As the NUM, we participated in changing the situation that was in South Africa. Our liberation struggle through the strikes that were against discrimination at the work place... at the mines where we were working..., we did not like the discrimination which was at our work place, for example, what broke my heart was when a Mosotho man died while he was working at the mines, he would be buried in South Africa but we fought against this through our unions and said in such instances, people should be taken to Lesotho and be buried there, Yes, the workers unions at the mines gave us the power to transform the mining industry because the economy of South Africa was in their hands. These unions were the ones which were influential during apartheid and so we fought for our liberation through these strikes.

I remember when I was told that the MP from Pretoria wanted to meet me in person as the organizer of the NUM and it was my first time to see the MP. I asked them what MP meant and they told me that it was Member of Parliament. The police officers came to fetch me at my house, telling me that the MP wanted to see me. We were on our 16 days stay away. No one went to work at Klerksdorp. When I arrived and spoke with him, he told me that what we were doing was affecting the economy of the country negatively so he suggested that we should sit down and work out this together and I told him that we should go inside Wimpy restaurant and eat while we were still discussing because we were not allowed to get inside there. I told him that I was uncomfortable because we were not at the police station or it was not at his work place so I suggested that we went to Wimpy and sit down and then we could talk.

He agreed and we went to Wimpy but I told him that my colleagues would join us as well and I told the chafshots of NUM that they should be ready because the Boers were ready for the discussion and I told them that they should be presentable

because the Boers will in their suits and ties. I told them that they should have their newspapers with them even those who could not read must have a newspaper. We arrived there and we sat down at Wimpy and then we talked. There were only Boers in that meeting and we agreed on how we were going to work. From there *ntate* to answer your question, after we fought for our liberation through our strike in 1987 which lasted for 21 days, there were immediate changes. We heard that we were still going to have those changes after Mandela was realized from the prison anyway but it came very strong in the strike that the parliament paved a way for even De Klerk to take governance, to take leadership.

After he was elected as the leader and there was an alternative process that was supposed to be followed in order for Mandela to be released, so we were told those steps in order. As Basotho who were working at the mines we participated in the liberation of South Africa in that way and we also welcomed ANC members during the times of Leabua Jonathan when he was the prime minister, as Basotho we fought for the liberation of South Africa especially for ANC members who lived with us, whom we fed and provided with everything they needed. Unfortunately I was not part of this because I was not in Lesotho because I left since 1975. I came back in 1986 after 10 years when I was deported and I did not even know Maseru because we came through the LLA. I was a member of the LLA. We threw stones and we retaliated, we demolished the durawalls so that is how we participated. We contributed in the economy of South Africa as labourers because we were treated as cheap labour. Truly we contributed in the economy of South Africa.

We were aware that some people knew what apartheid was and they had experienced the torture that came with it, while some have not but have read about it but as for us we saw and felt how painful it was. Let me give you an example, when I was working for the NUM, it was when I learnt that the hostel manager only had Standard five and the one who was our manger in the mine had high qualifications and had the experience but was just a dunderhead that was told to go and manage the kaffirs (black people) or the monkeys because you are a dunderhead so the reason why some jobs were said to be job reservations it was because such positions were reserved for whites only. You would not drive a horse and trailer because code 14 was only given to the Boers and it was only for the Boers who were dunderheads.

The most heart breaking thing in the mine was that it was clear that we were teaching these Boers the work yet they were our bosses and they earned more than what we earned yet they were working for few hours unlike us. The worst one was countries like Botswana, Zimbabwe and Malawi were independent and South Africa was still left behind and this affected us as a region, it affected the economy of South Africa. It affected our economy because in South Africa at that time there was still the so called apartheid, our understanding when we were fighting against apartheid was that since South Africa was once ruled by the neighbouring countries like Malawi, most of the people died in aeroplanes that were coming from the mines. People were taken by flights to Mozambique. We wanted to benefits in the post apartheid South Africa. We are supposed to get the opportunity to have a slice of cake. South Africa is not supposed to be the only one that benefits from the liberation. During apartheid when people like Piet Botha made dangerous statements showing that they wanted to control the neighboring countries because they didn't have power so it just happened like that because they participated in toppling *Ntate* Leabua Jonathan by influencing Lekhanya to topple him. If you remember very well, when Lekhanya appeared was on television shooting, Leabua appeared on the other side and he was still fine. However

the mission was already finalised. It was concluded that they should go and topple Leabua so that they would be able to take over the Lesotho Highlands Water Project very fast so he signed quickly in that very same year.

You would learn that truly those people have taken us as black people. Our Africa was doomed because of one nation because now you will understand that there are changes. We know Batswana, their music and their culture. We also know Malawi and we also know other people from other countries and we interact with them. Socially we integrate now and so economically we want to see that there is that integration in the economy of South Africa and Lesotho at the SADC level.

When I arrived here in 1986 after I was deported, I did not know many unions. I only knew the Christian Council because when we were fighting for our liberation in South Africa we used to communicate with this union. But fortunately, after I was deported and left the border post and handed to the police, the police searched me and took me to my family so after all these things I went to meet Mr Kena who is still alive. I heard from somewhere that Mr Kena Mokhafisi was a communist too and he helped me when I arrived and he even supported me. He told me that they had unions in Lesotho though I cannot remember the names of those unions. There were unions like the Popular Front at that time which was later taken over by Mr. Rakuoane and named it the Popular Front for Democracy. He was the first advocate from Leribe.

The Popular Front was led by another Rakuoane who is late now and his colleagues were people like Mr Mputlane and Mr Sekonyela. There were so many people there and I was given a platform to address the NUL students. Mr Santho was also there. Indeed people who were the communists whom we walked this journey with were also there. When I went to Roma to address the students, they knew me as a representative of the NUM but *ntate* was the only one who knew all the details so they appointed me and said I was the right person. We went to Roma to address the students when they were still going around the university's campus and passing by the halls and we tried to mobilize them. Fortunately, the Christian Council with its representative, *Ntate* Taole who is now late and may his soul rest in peace, the secretary of the CCL and others, they called me to go and hide there and I hid myself there so this *ntate* has passed away and it is very unfortunate that I cannot recall his name but he was not a member of this church. He used to go to church with *Ntate* Kena most of the time. *Ntate* Hooхло died and I can't remember his first name. They used to assist the Christian Council. Indeed I was welcomed when I arrived there and I was also given a job as a guardman. There were unions/associations in our country. At the Christian Council offices we had a desk that dealt with our issues. It was called a democracy what what what what..., they knew very well that we were against apartheid, for instance, I remember very well the first strike that happened in 1987, I was still in Lesotho. We managed to stop the district labour strike. We used the Christian Council's funds to go to the border post. The Christian Council told us that we should support the strike while we were still in our country and when we went there we should make sure that we should ensure that they didn't accomplish their plans. The Christian Council was the association of Roman Catholic Bishops Scountus. They were on the frontline in that liberation struggle and we worked with them at that time to show that apartheid was a bad and we didn't like it.

When I was still at the Christian Council, I knew people like Mrs Limakatso Mokhothu who is now working for the IEC. I also knew Mrs Lineo Nketu and others, even if I cannot recall their names because they were many. People like Mrs Moholi,

we were with her at the CCL. Yes, I think she is your sister, we were with her at the CCL too so our liberation struggle became powerful. I remember at the CCL's conference it was emphasised that we should come up with projects and we must be responsible and perform our tasks and we must also be accountable for the money which was given to us by the CCL but we must also know that the support that we got from CCL was simply a way of showing its support to Basotho because we were fighting against apartheid.

I do not know how you want me to put it or if you wanted me to generalize because earlier when I talked about our support... our liberation Struggle, we were fighting against cheap labour at that time. We built our own wealth yet we were oppressed. This costed Lesotho and I do not remember anything which our country gained that benefited us. We still get what is called... when you are at the labour office; they give you a stamp to show that you are crossing. Lesotho got something like R10.00 per head when Basotho men went to work in South Africa.

On the side of Basotho, I remember something that was very important but not sweet at all. If you can remember the weight that was on Lesotho after Ntate Leabua left, after they toppled him and the army staged a coup and took over governance; we could say it was close to our democracy. Before then it seemed like the South African army had caused a huge damage. They just ambushed Lesotho and killed Basotho and we lost a lot as a country. I still do not know what those Basotho received as a form of compensation or who were taking care of those families which were affected. We lost a lot as a country. Except that loss that we had as a nation, you can see that most of our neighbouring countries did have left us behind.

As for us, we are still under South Africa but we were not getting any benefits during apartheid and when we entered in our struggle as mine workers, we told them. We lived with them you know that too. Socially we lived with them and we were still able to have clothes. Those South Africans came to study in Lesotho through our tax. These were the expenses that Lesotho got into. We are talking about people like Tito Mboweni, Ramahloli and Phumzile and some South Africans who came to study in Lesotho. We spent a lot on these people. The association/union was based in Britain at that time. This union was established by Mr Santho. This union helped those people who came to study in Lesotho to even go to other universities in other countries after completing their studies at the University of Lesotho.

Lesotho has not been rewarded. There was no compensation that we received so having said this; the expectation was that now that the ANC is in power we will benefit from South Africa. Let me tell you that we are not yet compensated because study permits are still required from our children who want to study in South Africa and the tuition fees are still expensive so indeed Lesotho has not been compensated at all. We do not see any changes at the border posts. We are still not treated well yet we were expecting that there will be changes regarding the services we get at the border. Again, we were expecting that the Basotho who qualify for jobs in South Africa will be allowed to work in South Africa and those who reside in South Africa should permanently reside there if they want.

Seqhobane, Morena Lebeko

Lebeko Seqhobane resides at Ha Hoohlo, a village very close to the Lesotho –South Africa border. He is chief of the area. He was born in that area and completed his primary and high school education on Maseru schools. After that he did commercial subjects and then started a café business. So, he is a chief and a café owner. He made friends with refugees who stayed at Ha Hoohlo and patronized his business. As more refugees came, he was instrumental in getting them accommodation. ke itšebetsa hona businessing mona.

Lesotho participated in the South African liberation struggle by...Err...the refugees fled to Lesotho when they were oppressed in South Africa and we welcomed and protected them. We lived with them in our villages here in Lesotho and they continued with their studies freely at our schools and they were not discriminated at all. The reasons for doing so was just to support them in their struggle because we believed that they were doing the right thing by fighting against apartheid and we supported them in every way we could.

Yes sir, I can recall an old man by the name of Thakalekoala who resided at Seapoint Maseru. There were male members of the PAC and the ANC who lived at his home and another one is Mr. Tlelai, who is a business man. I remember him because he is my neighbour. He supported the struggle because the refugees lived at his house. There is another one but I can't recall his name. He was Mr Chabalala's neighbour and when the Boers attacked the refugees on the 09 December but I'm not sure if it was in January or February. I only remember that it was the 09th at night. The Boers attacked Mr Chabalala's neighbour, I'm still trying to remember his name. They shot and killed people. I remember there was a party and they were very relaxed, not thinking that they would be attacked.

I also remember that it was Mr Tlelai's house and the house next to Mr Chabalala who owned a butchery, others were at Mr Tlelai's house, next to Mr Lenko on the road to the station, next to Mr Sehlabaka's house. That day Mr Tšeliso Sehlabaka's wife was shot dead on the forehead. One of the things that those Boers did was to kill seven people who lived next to Mr Chabalala's house, err... they were the revolutionists and they were together as friends, err...one of the refugees was shot at the gate and a cow that belonged to Mr Sekamotho also got shot next to Mr Tlelai's place. I already mentioned that Mrs 'Mapoloko Sehlabaka, the wife of Mr Tšeliso Sehlabaka got shot on the same day with the cow which belonged to my neighbour; Mr Sekamotho Kheseng. These are some of the events that I remember and the people who gave a helping hand. As for me, I participated this way sir; a man by the name of Malefetsane Mofokeng who is my neighbour once told me that there were some men from the National University of Lesotho who would come to me and I had to help them cross the Caledon River. Mr Mofokeng is still alive but he resides at Kroonstad with his family but he often visits Lesotho during December. Here, he was just a refugee and was a member of the Popular Front for Democracy.

But he was interested in the liberation of South Africa, so he said there would be two people whom I would help to cross the river because they didn't have passports. These were the people who embarked into a campaign of trying to liberate themselves in many ways. So I helped the two men to cross the river, it was on a rainy day and the water was up to my chest. I didn't know their names and couldn't even see their faces. The person who knew them was Dr. Mazizi, err... Dr Mazizi was a lecturer at NUL, he also taught at NTTC a while back, so I observed that he

was also on the struggle because he was a refugee and was banned from South Africa. These men were supposed to take a train that came from Durban to Gauteng. We used to call it Level Down, so I accompanied them to the Marseilles train station and waited with them there because they were going to take the train at 11 at night.

Mr. Mofokeng is my brother-in-law and he knew very well that I was good at crossing the river, whether full or not. I helped people at all times so after helping the two men and ensuring that they were in the train, I had to come back home. They needed help from me but I want to assure you that I didn't even get a cent from them. On my way back from Ladybrand, there was a lot of thunder and lightning and the rain was pouring. I couldn't see the way because I had taken a small road that lead to the Boers' farms, so I walked through the fields and it was very dangerous because I could only feel the wires when I collided with them. But at least that road was leading me to the river. I just continued walking until I got to the river bank and there was a lot of water. Err...

Because of this rain, I walked like a blind person until I fell from a cliff. I don't know what I fell on, so I was told that I fell on the seals. They looked like dogs but their fur was very soft and black. Fortunately I didn't fall on my head because if I did, I could have drowned in the mud and disappeared but still, I drowned until the mud was on my knees, but I managed to go out and I realized that the river was full, and I was wet, all over the body and I pulled off my shoes and carried them on my back then started swimming until I was on the other side of the river. I was on the side of the farm next to the station and it was just a matter of walking through the fields in order to get home.

Everything was done underground. The woman I knew was Mrs Mamofokeng and others who worked with her. She used to cook for the refugees as her visitors; others were welcomed in Mr Moshe Badela's house.

He is still alive. He owns a few rented houses but he used to work in Gauteng. He is a Mosotho man who used to welcome the refugees in his house which is not very far from here. I think you might know him because he helped many refugees.

I'm not in a position to know if Lesotho as a country benefited anything from South Africa but it is well known that Lesotho participated in the struggle and many Basotho lost their lives. I think it's just a matter of approach here, a person should know which approach they choose because at the end of the day, people don't know the role we played but it is very fortunate that you are here and we are talking about all these things so that people know that I also played a very important role in helping South Africa.

In 2004, I helped a person from Matsieng who had drowned in the river. The river was full but it's like when he crossed for the first time when he was going to look for a job, the water was not like that, but upon his return, he found the river full, so he said he couldn't wait for the water to subside because he was hungry and tired... then he just crossed and the water swept him away but he was able to touch a tree and he held on to it and started shouting for help. Then some people from my village told me and asked me to go help that person. When I arrived, he was already complaining that he was tired and could no longer hold on to the tree but I asked him to hold on, then I jumped into the river

And held him then one boy from the Ngwenya family arrived and I asked him to help me so that the man couldn't fall again because we were afraid that if he fell again, he would drown. He held on to me so tight that I couldn't even swim, and then the Ngwenya boy went out to get us a poplar tree. He reached out for us to grab it and it made it easy for us to get out of the water.

There were a lot of expenses. The problem that Lesotho has is that they lost their freedom because they were friends with the revolutionists. We lived and schooled with them and some were our teachers. I remember that my teachers were Mr Mfane and Mr Mangae and they were both revolutionists. They were very instrumental because they gave us good education and we lived with them in our homes. They were not put at a particular place alone but the problem is that the Basotho died for these people.

The people who worked with the government of racial discrimination used to give information about the people who were helping the refugees and if they found you, you were in trouble because they arrested you err... you mean the names of the snitches? (He giggles) err ... well, that question is a bit sensitive because I can't just mention people's names here but they were well-known. At that time I experienced problems when I went to apply for a six months in South Africa. they wanted to know why I applied for a six months because they said I was a crook who helped people cross the river and I didn't know what they meant but that day they denied me a six months because I also didn't push harder. I just went back home.

After a month I went again and succeeded. I could see from their faces that they didn't trust me but they were not sure why. I don't even know what their informant had told them.

I would really like to see these people recognizing the support they got from each other. South Africans should see Basotho as their brothers and sisters who supported them fully during the liberation struggle and we have heroes who fought for South Africa. When it comes to the issue of the arm struggle, there are many Basotho who were involved because they participated directly in the struggle of the army of South Africa, so we have such people because we equally suffered. In fact, we wanted them to be free from their problems and by helping them, we didn't want to experience the same problems as South Africa and we wanted to be known as part of South Africa. We needed to find jobs easily there just as they attended school freely without visas. They were refugees here but they were able to go to school up to the university level so I say the people who want to work in South Africa shouldn't be bothered, even those who want to go to school should do so freely, err...they should remember the warm relations they used to share with Lesotho because now that they are liberated...some of them seem to forget how Basotho supported their liberation struggle, now they tell us that we are Basotho from Lesotho and we want to take their jobs but they forget that during their struggle, we indulged ourselves and they should do the same for us.

Tsatsanyane, Moeketsi Chaletine

Moeketsi Chaletine Tsatsanyane is a well known former BCP and All Basotho Convention (ABC) political activist. For years, his house in Maseru became home to most BCP and Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) fighters. He only left the BCP in 2007 when ABC was formed. He has recently left ABC and publicly declared that he was retiring from politics.

Mr Chaletine Moeketsi is the son of Tumo, Tumo of Tsatsanyane of Mokherane. I hail from Qeme, Matukeng and amongst *matuka*. My clan is Mosia and regarding the politics of Lesotho, my political party is congress even though I have changed to ABC [All Basotho Convention] which was founded by *Ntate* Motsoahae Thabane.

We grew up knowing that some of the unions which were fighting for South Africa's liberation were established by Basotho. The congress party was my family's party and I also became a member of the congress movement. It was founded by *Ntate* Ntsu Mokhehle and he was also a member of the South African's unions like the ANC. We also knew that Ntsu Mokhehle was a member of the ANC Youth League. When this political party was formed even though I cannot remember its first name before it was called BCP, BAC... the BCP was formed around the same time when the BAC was formed. It was founded by ANC at the Ladybrand branch. So we can say that in the liberation struggle of ANC, Basotho played a vital role because even before our political party was formed, people were already members of ANC so that is how we can say we participated as Basotho.

As I said, if ANC and PAC participated then Basotho who were the members of these parties participated. That is to say the Basotho who participated in such parties so that there could be changes in South Africa; we believe that they were also part of those who brought the changes if they were members of ANC or PAC. They participated and we know that many South Africans fled to Lesotho because of apartheid. The truth is we know that Lesotho was a place where these people fled to. They sometimes went back to South Africa to attack the Boers and the Boers complained about this. Lesotho played a vital role because they welcomed and took a good care of these politicians from South Africa who were refugees in Lesotho and ended up making the Boers in South Africa come to attack Lesotho.

Besides this, they ended up detesting Basotho. When they were killing the ANC members they killed some Basotho as well, so the fact that Basotho protected those members of ANC simply shows that they played a vital role. Some members of the ANC also supported the BCP and we understood that as people we won't leave members of the ANC just like, that means where we found an opportunity to assist, we assisted them. For example, there was a man called *ntate* Mathabatha Sexwale, the brother of Tokyo, he was my brother and he was also my best friend. I have heard that he is now residing in Eswatini (Swaziland). He was one of the people who were very powerful during apartheid and they were against it so even if I do not see him these days, I wonder how he is doing.

I used to meet him and we got along so well. In those days, he also used me to pass his messages. He recorded those messages on the cassettes and he would tell me that I should take them to South Africa. He would also tell me that the messages have been recorded on those cassettes and if I played and listened to them I would be tempted to want to know what was said and after I heard, I would one day want to share what was recorded on the cassettes with someone and so I would put my life at risk. So because I did not want to meddle in peoples' affairs..., he would give me those cassettes and when he gave them to me, he would also tell me that I will meet a particular person a particular place and at a time we had agreed upon and then I would go and give them to that person. He would be wearing in such a way that I would not even identify him even if his clothes could be described.

He would already be aware that we would meet and the kind of person I was. We knew each other very well and he also knew my political party. He was very brilliant. Chris Hani, I worked with him too and as for *Ntate* Ndlovu most of the time I would work with him in regard to transport issues hence they trusted me. I was their mechanic so *Ntate* Khalake Sello, who is still the only one alive because *Ntate* Ndlovu and *Ntate* Chris Hani who were my friends have passed away. *Ntate* Sello and *Ntate* Ndlovu their cars were fixed by me. I had a garage that was called MaAfrika Motors and I fixed their cars in this garage. I played a vital role by fixing their cars during the South African liberation struggle.

I explained earlier that we know very well that the South Africans were the members of the ANC and some of them were members of the PAC. We still understand that what we are and where we are is because of them so our understanding as Basotho was that when we attained our independence and South Africa was left behind, it was still not enough. We also believed that our independence here in Lesotho..., we have Lesotho as the only country which has attained its independence and South Africa had not ... when we are the only ones who have attained their independence yet South Africa had not, we still believed that our liberation here in Lesotho, it was our understanding that even if we were truly liberated, those Boers were still oppressing us. Lesotho is surrounded by South Africa and that means we are part of South Africa and because we are part of South Africa so for us to live in total freedom that would mean even South Africa should be free. We helped South Africa to attain its freedom.

Basotho women who played a vital role by helping... in fact they take care of every one's life here on earth... so they played an important role to the refugees. If you live in my house, it is the woman who takes care of you. A man does not play a role that is being played by a woman. A person's life is taken care of by women because they are the ones who cook for them. Some of them when they arrived here in Lesotho they just came with nothing and some of them even got married to Basotho women who took care of them. You will also find that their lives were protected because of these women. Women played a vital role because the refugees' lives were in the hands of women.

It is well known that before Lesotho attained its independence the political party that was governing was BNP. We know that this political party had good relations with the Boers so at that time you could say life was better but it was not. Our lives were better but it was just because we were just the boys of the South Africans. However, at some point, us as the members of the Congress we emphasized the fact that it was not right if the Boers controlled Lesotho. We fought for Lesotho to attain its independence but not to be controlled by the money of the Boers and food parcels like maize and animals

which were given to us by the Boers. They gave us so that they could oppress the black people in South Africa. But we were still saying it was not the right thing. Fortunately, the congress party hated this and it was against it. *Morena* Leabua, in 1980 stopped working with the Boers. He saw that this won't take him anywhere as an African.

We ended up having a common understanding on how we wanted things to be like. Unfortunately the members of the congress when Leabua was now abreast with the modern changes that the Africans should support him, it was found that there was no chance because he was united and working together with the ANC party. That is when the members of the congress party had a problem because it seemed that to the ANC party the apartheid during that time was brought by the National Party governance and we could not tolerate it and we waited for them to attain their freedom first and then after they got their independence that is when we could fight for our liberation.

The sad truth is that the person who is ill-treated is the one who feels the pain. The unfortunate thing was that we did not sit down together with the members of the ANC to discuss issues and maybe advice Leabua and tell him that those people were still our colleagues so he should not oppress them. We could have also handled these issues harmoniously. I believe that if we could work like that we would not be where we are today like taking each other as enemies, that is, ANC and us, only because they took someone who was their enemy and now he is their friend so it turned against us because we were first their friends but later we turned to be their enemies.

I do not see any appreciation that is significant that I can say South Africa showed regarding this problem. For example, our union which is called Lesotho Political Victims Organization's first wish was to see South Africa attaining its independence so that there could be strategies that would bring peace and reconciliation with Lesotho. With this association we approached Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) of South Africa because we were trying to figure out how Basotho who were affected by the problems that were brought by the politics could be helped. However, indeed there are documents which are with me which show that truly South Africa has not taken any initiative which we thought it would to assist those families that were affected by the apartheid in South Africa at that time and so as I said; there is nothing significant that was done by the government of South Africa.

The only benefit that South Africa got when it attained its freedom was that there was a communication between a black person to a black person and the communication was no longer between a white person and a black person. The white people no longer took black people as kaffir (dogs) and no longer oppressed them. The better thing was Basotho could speak to one another whenever they wanted to and it was their right to do so. Changes that may be brought to that black South African, a black person from Lesotho will benefit from them as well. That is the benefit that we got as Basotho. I was a political activist of the BCP here in Lesotho. I did not have any connections with the political leaders; it is the truth that I cannot hide. The issue of Vlakplaas was Leabua's thing. These are some of the things that happened during his governance and our leader was South Africa so he was now against the agreements that took place between them as leaders.

He ended up being in South Africa so I am saying because my leader was in South Africa, I had to go to South Africa and meet him there. So the fact that I knew that I would meet with those people in South Africa obviously it showed that we had an opportunity to meet them with the permission from the government of South

Africa. When I met them, I was only meeting them regarding the issue of toppling the government of *Morena* Leabua and we were not meeting about what could be done with the members of ANC who were here in Lesotho. I was only doing my job and I still insist that I worked independently because I am explaining to you that I discovered that *Ntate* Mokhehle was in Qwa-qwa and people were being killed there and these people who were being killed were the members of LLA.

They were fighting and people were killed and I took a decision in 1982 that I wanted to topple the government of *Morena* Leabua without *Ntate* Mokhehle because I noticed that they were not winning. That is why I approached my friend *Morena* Sekhobe Letsie and told him that we must topple the government of *Morena* Leabua and this was known and it was also documented. I even shared with the newspaper publishers, TRC and Leon Commission how we toppled the government of *Morena* Leabua and I also showed that as for *Ntate* Lekhanya, he did not participate in this. My mission was to topple the government of *Morena* Leabua and truly I ended up using the army to do so, so regarding the issue of ANC I personally did not know about it.

As I said earlier, you cannot separate Lesotho and South Africa. Except fact that Lesotho is surrounded by South Africa even people from Lesotho live in South Africa and you will find that some of our people have two identity cards that is, a Lesotho identity card and a South African identity card so this shows that we are interlinked hence we will not be separated from South Africa. What should be worked on is to see to it that we are respected as Basotho. It should be known that Basotho have their own governance and they are independent. There is no country that will use its power over the other. I wish we could be let alone to work our issues independently and they should help us only where we need their help. I mean that we should not see South Africa meddling in the issues of Lesotho like it did in 1998 when we were on a stage to solve our issues and South Africa came and meddled tragically in our issues and it came and did whatever it wanted to do in our country, maybe let me say that I personally believe that if South Africa did not meddle in our issues at that time, Lesotho would not be where it is today.

If you look at the issues of Lesotho you will see that we have been independent for more than thirty-four years but when you look at the life of Basotho you will see that it has not improved. What I am saying as Moeketsi Tsatsanyane is that, I came up with a suggestion that we should look back and think of things that brought conflicts and see how we can correct them. As I said, since the 80s I suggested that there should be a commission which will be called Peace and Reconciliation Commission and I shared this with people like *Ntate* Ndlovu. I shared my thoughts with them and it was something that could bring peace in Lesotho and that commission must work on all the conflicts that we have and if this suggestion would have been taken into consideration like South Africa did..., South Africa did exactly what I suggested.

It has united the whites and the black people, as you can see South Africa is solving its issues harmoniously and now South Africa is taken as a developed country and it is trusted to assist other countries because of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which was formed. That was my idea as Moeketsi Tsatsanyane and South Africa is doing exactly what I suggested to my comrades that we should form such a commission. So you are you aware that Moeketsi Tsatsanyane originates here in Lesotho but they are not using his skills and knowledge because we are taken as one of those black sheep of the family of Basotho so these are some of the problems that we have in Lesotho.

Tyhali, Vuyani

[Maseru; 22 February 2008]

Vuyani Vuyani is currently a teacher at a High School in Mafeteng, Lesotho and is also a political activist in progressive social formations. He is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lesotho, Popular Front for Democracy and Secretary - General of Lesotho Teachers Trade Union.

The Lesotho communists did not help in the issues of South Africa. They actually participated. Helping and participating are two different things and that's the first thing that you have to be mindful of. Let's start with the issues that concern the army, some members of the communist party in the army, for example; the late Mr Sechaba Khalaki, the son of advocate Khalaki were also members of Mkhondo we Sizwe, we were with a man from Mphaki by the name of Major General Lamberg Moloi who has now retired from the South African military- the SANDF. Well, I won't mention all names because some didn't want to be known. During the war of guns, the communists from Lesotho were there. This appeared in the 1962 program during the launch of the Communist Party of Lesotho. That program stated that all the communists from Lesotho must participate in the South African struggle because Lesotho could only be liberated when South Africa was liberated then all communists were called to be part of the program.

VUYANI TYHALI: I was saying, you have your questions and we have our own answers as communists but we still answer your questions. We were not helpers at all, we were just communists who were part of the struggle as I've given you examples of names of two members of the Mkhondo we Sizwe army. That means, in the liberation struggle, we actually participated, we didn't just help because even the program showed that every communist must be in the front because Lesotho could only be stable when apartheid had stopped, that's why some of our members were also members of Mkhondo we Sizwe.

Communism has three pillars. There is what we call, dictator democratic centralism, we have...communist internationalism which states that a communist shall associate with all the oppressed people in the entire world, not only to associate but also to help in every way he can, so it was part of our internationalist duty. We were not only to be internationalist verbally but also by actions, hence why I say that some of our members went for a military training. Others didn't go but they found accommodation for them in order to hide them. Let me tell you that, there was a very hard time when Chief Leabua's government was toppled because he had allowed the ANC and Mkhondo we Sizwe to do as they pleased here in Lesotho. When Lekhanya come in power in 1986, he introduced a joint patrol between the army and the police. The members of Mkhondo we Sizwe were scared and the one who was in the country of Sauli was supposed to find accommodation in his name. He was a person from Maseru. He is still alive and lives at Ha Thamae if I'm not mistaken. Yes it's Sauli, he was sent to find them

Accommodation, to pay for their electricity and rent because they could not surface because they were like preys of the Lekhanya and Boers' army through their joint operations, so the people who were in the forefront were the likes of Hildasa and Motjoboka. Motjoboka was my homeboy; he ended up losing his job. He was a civil servant. We hid them sir and that was called survival underground.

We were in a battle. Actually, I lived in Mafeteng. My team was built up with two old men; one was Chris Hani's father; Gilbert Hani and the late John Motloheloa. We were always on the way, especially after the fall of Leabua's government. The movement of the ANC members became very difficult when they couldn't see us ... because they knew us from Cape Town, Eastern Cape even Maseru. They knew many people, if there was a problem in one district, they would contact that particular person they knew. So I operated with these two old men. If there were any uncertainties on the way, we would communicate with Mr Gilbert and ask Mr Motloheloa to accommodate some people at his flats. My other responsibility was to spy on the roads. I always had to know where the road blocks were so that these people could be free to move around.

... I had good relations with the police, I can actually say I had befriended them, one of them could inform me on the daily road block schedule, we knew that a bakkie was hired for them, when it left Mafeteng it took the Kilo route to Maseru which was gravelled, we had learnt that the Lesotho intelligence only extended as far as the tarred road (laughing) it was the old man Gilbert's duty to rent the bakkie because I didn't want to be exposed, he was acquainted to those people but could not operate freely, only a person who knew those people could ask from them for the bakkie rental, mine was to sit down with the old man, and inform him of the road block that's in Morija and also en route from Mafeteng to Maseru and that it was wise for them to off ramp at Tšakholo and to join the main road in Maseru, that was my main duty, my third duty besides spying was to deliver messages to Lusaka via old man Kena because he delivered intelligence report to Lusaka, collected money from Lusaka, also collected armoury using the... aeroplane which was from Mozambique to here but did not land in South Africa but am not really well informed about that.

It was his, Nqosa Mahao's elder brother and his fellow intelligence colleagues responsibility to know, he could inform them about its arrival date then they would work things in such a way that they would be on duty at the airport operation to collect them coming in vans from Maseru to perform relevant duties. Gilbert Hani resided in Mafeteng opposite the St. Gerald Catholic Church. The operations were not that much because Leabua had allowed the ANC to operate freely so they just had to find cars for their own use. We would only be asked to assist here and there, with small things like accommodation. They did things on their own. I will differ from other people because they only went underground when

Leabua was toppled; it was when the members of the Communist Party of Lesotho had to be functional and operational from 1986 until 1990.

Comrade, one of the reasons I haven't published my book until now is that, except the fact that Mr Ndlovu didn't agree with me on some chapters (may his soul rest in peace, says the interviewer) ... the PAC didn't get any form of help from the Communist Party of Lesotho, the Communist Party of Lesotho clearly only worked with the BAC and South African Communist Party, that's where the old man Mr Kena said we shouldn't include certain things, so I said no, we would be biased, when we tell history...when he realized that some bad things happened, he said I shouldn't write them exactly as they happened.

Comrade, it is very difficult to know, it is very difficult to know because we operated in cells and units, we would find that we were five in our unit but didn't know one another or some would only be two, in case some got arrested, others would still continue to operate, so the rules at that time didn't allow anyone to be able to say "I was also there" it's only when we followed up this history that one begins to understand the roles of different people; for example, Mr Malefetsane Mofokeng, when Chris arrived here in 1974 where we now have the government complex, it was a thing of the British which was called...I've forgotten. His role was to hire people. It was called the officers' best so Mr Malefetsane Mofokeng would be given money as the treasurer of the Communist Party and Chris would just tell him that his responsibility was to provide accommodation. These people liked having parties with officers from the officer's best and others would join and have fun and drink alcohol.

Mr Mofokeng went back to South Africa after the war just like other Basotho did. When he was in Lesotho, he lived at Ha Hoohlo but he left his children when he left. Among other things he was here to study the movement of the South African Defence Force (SADF), his role was to help them cross the river and he knew when they would arrive so that he could help them. One time, Ndlovu escaped death in ten minutes. Immediately after helping them cross the river, they went back to the car which they had left at Fouriesburg and just after starting the car, SADF arrived with canons there.

It was the comrades who helped these people by giving information to the authorities and then they received letters which were informing them that they were banned from South Africa. Unfortunately, I wasn't in touch with the C1 because there were a lot of Boers' spies amongst the CI...yes I'm talking about the youth who had joined Mcondo and others, so I was fortunate because I worked with the old men, so when they arrived, it was just a temporary stop, we couldn't even talk but people like Dr. Nqosa Mahao, Mr Sehoai Santho, Mr Kena and many of our comrades got letters that informed them that they were banned from South Africa. (You've just mentioned an important person; Mr Sehoai, is he still alive? asks the Interviewer) He now resides at Ladybrand. I don't know much about him now.

The input of women was in different forms. Let us talk about the trade union. When you go to Dr Jonathan's offices, you'll find a woman called Puleng, I don't know her surname. She works at the Lesotho Labour Congress offices which are at a junction next to Lesotho High School. You will remember that the transformation of South African trade unions was done here in Lesotho. The people who took an active role were the likes of Miss Puleng and Mrs Hilda because they went to the Soviet Union and did trading of trade unionism to the South African trade unions; I said before 1974, before Chris arrived here, there were Africanists in content, those things that went with the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM). Because ANC and BAC were banned, I said these trade unions

should change and support the ANC and they were transformed here in Lesotho. The Lesotho trade unions used to invite them to their workshops and they got the opportunity to meet people like Mr John Nkalimeng and many other SACTU members (South African Congress of Trade Unions). This is where they were taught about Africanism until they became a chanter supporting union, after the ANC was seen predominantly in South Africa, the trade unions followed the Black Consciousness ideology ... of Chris, he was the one who asked Lesotho to agree but it was already agreed on what they were going to talk about.

The Lesotho politics are influenced by the South African politics. The BCP which was originally called BAC was formed by the ANC while the BNP was formed by the South African Nationalist Party in 1959 but they have now turned against the ANC and the communists. For example in 1959, the ANC and the communists had a discussion among themselves that they no longer had friends in Lesotho and they didn't know whom to operate with, that is why they took the initiative with the likes of Mr Kena, Mr Motloheloa and Mr Mofokeng to form the Communist Party of Lesotho just like other Lesotho political party which emerged from the South African politics so we were not just saying we loved the ANC, by then, the main activity was to find people who had just arrived.

I always say, the Lesotho politics and the politics of the region started changing in 1974 upon Chris's arrival here in Lesotho. The main activity was to look for new arrivals, I'm glad though Ndlovu has passed on, on the tape he left me, he says the ANC was acting like a gangster organization. It started being an effective organization in 1974 after the arrival of Chris and there was a clear cutter thing that had to be done. They had medical activities to perform. My party was formed by the ANC, they were part of this and their role was to find accommodation and to assist them when they went out of Lesotho and with other things.

For example, the BCP didn't like communism at all and there was a man called Picket Motsamai; a street vendor who sold peanuts. He lost his teeth because Mr Malefetsane Mofokeng punched him. By then, Mr Mofokeng was a member of the communists' self-defence units because the members of the congress used to hunt them down whenever they saw them on the streets, so that is one of the factors that pushed us closer to the ANC. These self-defence units started here in Lesotho when the members of the congress tortured the communists. Mr. Malefetsane Mofokeng will tell you that he was a leader of the Communist Youth League, he was in charge of protecting the leaders and it took him six months to stop the congress members from fighting the communists on the streets and by then, the BNP already existed.

Well, we paid the price when there was a raid in 1982 and 1985. There was also a coup, (in which year was the coup? Asks the interviewer) in 1986 ... we paid also through the raids which happened, some of the Basotho were killed by Pretorius. These are the prices we paid, the third price was economic destabilization, and we had things like the LLA which was supported by the Boers. The LLA members used to break electricity installations with Leabua. We felt the regional destabilization policy of apartheid.

Lesotho was rewarded after Leabua took a clear stand that he would support the liberation movements, all donor agencies of the world opened offices in Maseru, Lesotho got a lot of material support just for supporting the South African Liberation, for example, the LDA in Mafeteng, the Dutch came all the way from Holland and

said, if apartheid sanctioned us from getting medication, then they shall build us a pharmaceutical agency.

I remember that time there was an article on Lesotho Today by the former Finance Minister Retselisitsoe Sekhonyana where he said Lesotho is experiencing economic boom because all donor organizations in the world had offices in Maseru and they relaxed and did not grow their economy and relied on the funds. That is where the problem lied. If the funds that we got were not consumed and were meant to develop the infrastructure, we would be far ahead. The struggle brought us some benefits but we consumed them unwisely. The main problem is I always argue that Lesotho is a labour reserved economy. A lot of money came in from donor agencies but it just vanished quickly, in fact they were Dona petit, they packed and left. Embassies closed down, so our economy shrunk to where we are today.

Members of the BCP and the LLA and some individuals..., let me tell you what happened, I had a girlfriend and we were having sex and when I was about to ejaculate, she told me that I was a member of the ANC. The intelligence people had learned that there were ladies who worked for the BCP and they earned five hundred for being informants and ten thousand if they had helped kill the communists or ANC members. These were Basotho ladies. Some are still alive; some are dead, while others ran away.

I don't want relations comrade, I say that two guys deserve to come together to form a union. We can call it an interaction; you can call it a union. That is why I organized and led the march on the 14th of December 2006 with the petition that we wanted free movement at Tele and Butha-Buthe on the 4th of February 2007 and then in April I went to Maputsoe. I have been part of these marches sir and I will be part of these marches, we do want free movement because this one country divided by colonialism, no we are not talking about provinces, we are talking about two countries uniting. We form a union to represent a federation, not a federation but the dominant view in my party and the BND is not a federation, in a federation the central government gets responsibility of foreign policy, defence policy and economic policy. We will still remain Basotho, make our own laws and remain a monarchy, but some things will be taken by the central government although myself I believe in the unitary state.

Malawi

Independent on 6 July 1964

7.5

Malawi and the Liberation Struggles in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, 1964-1980

By Kings M. Phiri

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Introduction 1

Assessments of Malawi's role during the liberation struggles through which the neighbouring countries of Mozambique and Zimbabwe progressed toward independence have generally presented a negative picture of the Malawian contribution. A key factor in this assessment was the country's policy of 'Contact and Dialogue' with the white minority regimes of southern Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, the first Malawian Head of State, pursued this policy against the Pan-Africanist declarations of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which favoured support for nationalist movements that sought to dislodge the white minority regimes in question by force of arms.

For example, in his detailed article on the development of relations between Malawi and Mozambique from 1961 to 1987, David Hedges, a Maputo-based British historian, maintains that Malawi's role in the nationalist struggle for the liberation of Mozambique was consistently negative. He attributes this negative contribution to two main factors: (a) Banda's close dealings with influential Mozambique-based Portuguese capitalists such as Jorge Jardim and Jaime da Souza, who did not want Portugal to abdicate its empire in Africa for economic reasons; and (b) Banda's partiality for smaller, moderate, and non-Marxist nationalist parties in Mozambique such as the National African Union of Independent Mozambique (UNAMI), the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), and the Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO), which, while competing with the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) in the struggle for the liberation of that country, also seemed amenable to the possibility of partitioning it along the Zambezi river in order to establish a conservative, Malawi-like or Malawi controlled republic north of that river, including the provinces of Nyasa, Cabo Delgado, Mocambique, and Zambezia.²

An equally critical, though somewhat sympathetic, assessment of Malawi's role during the Mozambique struggle for independence was that presented by Carolyn McMaster, a Canadian political economist, at the time of Mozambique's independence in 1975. McMaster portrayed Banda as a conservative, but astute, ageing statesman who was singularly obsessed with doing his best to bring development to his country, one of the most underdeveloped in Africa, and who was, in the process, quite prepared to forego the needs and demands of liberation movements in the region. In other words, Banda had little scope for making the political choices and material sacrifices that would have facilitated progress toward independence in the then white controlled neighbouring countries of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Consequently, whatever support and assurance he was able to give liberation movements in the

(1) All interviews cited in this chapter were conducted by Kings M. Phiri with the assistance of Paul Chiudza Banda, who served as Graduate Research Assistant for the Malawi component of the Hashim Mbita History Research Project.

(2) Hedges, David. "Notes on Malawi-Mozambique Relations, 1961-1987." *Journal of Southern African Studies* 15.4 (1989): 617-644.

neighbouring countries was merely cosmetic, because the necessity of maintaining viable diplomatic and economic links with the white minority regimes of the region was of greater interest to him. He desperately needed the support, in trade and aid, which the white regimes in question could extend to Malawi. But McMaster also noted that Banda could be devious in his dealings with southern Africa's minority regimes at the time, because he was still a pan-Africanist at heart, one who cherished the fact that he was the nationalist leader who engineered the destruction of the British sponsored Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in south-central Africa.³

The research out of which this chapter has grown was designed with the purpose of establishing how Malawians themselves assess the role they played during the liberation struggles in neighbouring Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The exercise was undertaken in clear cognizance of changes which have taken place in Malawi's relations with neighbouring countries over more than a generation, that is, since the end of the liberation struggles and the triumph of the independence movements they represented. The research ultimately revealed two strands of opinion about Malawi's role during the nationalist liberation struggles in southern Africa: the official opinion and the grassroots or people-centred opinion.

Quite early in the study that was undertaken for this chapter, it was pointed out to me that, for an authentic picture of how Malawi had dealt with liberation movements in neighbouring countries in the 1960s and 1970s, I needed to interview prominent elderly Malawians who were at that time close to Banda, as special assistants of one sort or another. Those who could be traced included Mama Cecilia Tamanda Kadzamira (who served Banda as official hostess throughout his term in power), Hon. John Z.U. Tembo (who served as virtual chamberlain in Banda's presidential establishment by virtue of his avuncular position in the family on which Banda depended socially), Hon. Aleke K. Banda (who served as personal assistant to Banda and General Secretary of the Malawi Congress Party during the early years of Malawi's independence), and Mr George Jaffu (who served President Banda as first Malawian Head of the Civil Service). As explained in the next section, most such persons who closely served with Banda at the time of liberation struggles in neighbouring countries prefer to remain silent about what they saw or did while working with Malawi's first head of state, perhaps because that is the best way of safeguarding his legacy as the 'father and founder of the nation'.

The view presented by the few who are willing to talk is that Malawi made a limited, but significant contribution to the cause of liberation movements in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, within the context of President Banda's ambiguous and secretive diplomatic dealings with the liberation movements, as well as the white minority regimes they fought. In other words, Malawi should be given some credit for the limited support the country was able to give to liberation movements under

(3) McMaster, Carolyn. *Malawi: Foreign Policy and Development*. London: Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1975: passim.

the difficult circumstances prevailing at the time. But these prominent Malawians also said that the country should not be spared criticism for not having done much in that respect because of the strict controls Banda imposed on what could be done. For example, Hon. Aleke Banda was of the view that Malawi made a significant contribution to the effort of liberation movements in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, but that the contribution in question was relatively small in scale and was largely dependent on Banda's personal whims. It was not possible to organize the kind of support that would have involved many hands, because Banda had to appease the white minority regimes of the region as well.⁴

The other opinion about the role Malawi played during the liberation struggle in Mozambique, and to some extent Zimbabwe as well, was that which was tendered by ordinary Malawians (the people) in the form of chiefs, headmen, and villagers in the border areas separating Malawi from neighbouring countries. This opinion reflected a widespread network of support, which existed for transiting or asylum-seeking freedom fighters from 'across the border!' The testimonies we gathered, especially along Malawi's long border with Mozambique, underlined the extent to which the war of liberation in Mozambique in the late 1960s and early 1970s was a burden that Malawian villagers shared with their Mozambican counterparts, willingly and without bitterness. Thus, at the grassroots level, the Malawian contribution to the nationalist struggle for Mozambique was enormous.

In this chapter, effort is made to revisit Malawi's role during the liberation struggle in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, in the light of critical assessments made by earlier, expatriate scholars such as Hedges and McMaster, but especially in terms of how that role is being remembered, perceived, and interpreted in Malawi today. The connecting thread in the discussion which follows has been the need to document official positions, as well as the memories of ordinary people, on the role Malawians played in support of the liberation struggle, through which independence was achieved in neighbouring Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

Four categories of potential interviewees were targeted in the course of conducting field work from November 2007 to June 2008.

- Politicians and ex-politicians who held positions of influence in Banda's government during the period covered by the study. The few that are still alive and can be traced are concentrated in or around the cities of Blantyre in the southern part of Malawi, Lilongwe in the central part, and Mzuzu in the northern part.
- Those who served as senior public servants close to decision making circles during the first twenty years or so of Malawi's nationhood. Of special interest in this category were those who occupied key offices in the Office of the President and the Cabinet (OPC), the Police, the Immigration Department, and the Army.
- Chiefs, village headmen, and ordinary villagers in the border areas along Malawi's long international boundary of over 2,000 kilometres with Mozambique. The areas

(4) Interview with Hon. Aleke K. Banda, (Nation Publications Bureau, Blantyre) 22 June 2008.

selected for intensive interviewing included Mangochi, Phalombe, and Mulanje along Malawi's eastern border with Mozambique; Nsanje along the southern border; and Dedza, Ntcheu, Mwanza, and Chikwawa along the western border.

- Remnants of those who represented or served as contact persons in Malawi of various nationalist groups in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Quite early in the study, it was reported that these could still be identified or located, especially around Blantyre in the southern part of the country.

In the actual fieldwork, it was relatively easy to identify and sample those who could be interviewed under the categories of former civil servants and villagers in the borderland zones. The situation became complicated with regard to the categories of ex-politicians and country representatives of the nationalist movements in neighbouring countries.

The problem with those who were close to Banda politically is that they still adhere to the 'culture of silence' under which they were raised when they were in government or in power. Under Banda's leadership, no one, no matter how highly placed or rated, was permitted by the regime of the time to talk about the country's dealings in the area of foreign policy and relations, without explicit authorization. It was the exclusive right of President Banda, as head of state, to articulate whatever there was to say about such matters. The consequences of not complying with the directive were often serious. So in today's Malawi, even when the culture of silence and fear is a thing of the past, there is still lingering evasiveness among those who were sternly subjected to it, whenever they are called upon to share their experiences during the period they worked closely with Banda. A good example is that of Mama Cecilia T. Kadzamira, former Government Chief Hostess, whom we repeatedly made an effort to interview in mid-2008. After rescheduling the interview several times, she finally declared:

I am not the right person to provide the information you are looking for. My role at State House was to prepare tea and meals for the many dignitaries we hosted from all over the world. The one who could talk to you about what went on politically is Hon.

J.Z.U. Tembo, because he used to be present at most of the meetings. He is the one you should be trying to interview!⁵

But then, Hon. Tembo himself could not find time for an interview; he always promised to call us back later to arrange such an interview, but he never did. His calendar always seemed to be full with political appointments.

We were similarly unlucky in scheduling interviews with those who had served as agents or representatives of nationalist groups in neighbouring countries during the period covered by this study. It proved difficult to locate and interview Mozambicans and Zimbabweans who were in Blantyre to serve as a link between freedom fighters from their countries and the Malawi leadership of the time. Apparently, most of the people in question returned to Mozambique and Zimbabwe after 1975 and 1980,

(5) Telephone Conversation with Mama Cecilia Tamanda Kadzamira, (Zomba to Lilongwe) 30 May 2008.

The people of northern Mozambique, namely the Makua, Lolo, and Lomwe, have traditions which maintain that they started to interact with the Maravi cluster of people, found in the south-central part of Malawi, as early as the 16th century AD. That was during the golden age of Maravi political expansion, which resulted in the creation of a Maravi sphere of influence over the greater part of the region lying north of the lower Zambezi valley.⁷ In other words, the peoples of southern Malawi and northern Mozambique have interacted for the past five centuries or more. Similarly, the Maravi and Ngoni people, straddling the long border which separates central and southern Malawi from the Tete Province of Mozambique have evolved from common cultural roots that trace back to the 15th and 19th centuries, respectively.⁸ The Ngoni or Maseko Ngoni are a revealing case in this respect, for it was at the time of the Anglo-Portuguese partitioning of east-central Africa between 1889 and 1896 that they were split into two kingdoms, one of which was allocated to Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) while the other was granted to British Central Africa or Nyasaland. Today, as one travels by road from Lilongwe in the central part of Malawi to Blantyre in the southern part, eighty kilometres of the road mark the border, with Malawi on the eastern side and Mozambique on the western side. The people found on the eastern side of the road are referred to as Maseko Ngoni of Dedza and Ntcheu in Malawi, while those on the western side are Maseko Ngoni of Angonia and Tsangano in Mozambique.⁹

A similar situation of cross-border ethnic networks binds peoples such as the Yao and Lomwe found on both sides of Malawi's eastern border with Mozambique. The Yao in Malawi trace their source to Nyassa Province in northern Mozambique, from where they migrated westwards into the south-central part of Malawi between 1830 and 1870, at the height of long-distance trade in ivory between the east African coast and the central African interior.¹⁰ Similarly, it was between 1876 and 1914 that the Lomwe in Malawi migrated in large numbers from Zambezia Province in north-central Mozambique to the Shire Highlands in southern Malawi, where they were drawn by prospects of securing wage labour on plantations established by the British missionaries and settlers.¹¹

The peoples of Malawi and Zimbabwe began to be drawn into close relationships from the late 19th century onwards by the history of British colonial development

(7) Nurse, G.T. *Clanship in Central Malawi*. Wien: Series Africana 12, 1978: 126; Phiri, K.M. and O.J. Kalinga. "The Northern Zambezia-Lake Malawi Region, 1500-1800." *General History of Africa*. Vol 5. Ed. B.A. Ogot. Oxford: Heinemann, 1992: 618-619.

(8) Newitt, M.D.D. "The Early History of the Maravi." *Journal of African History* 23.2 (1982): 145-162; Rennie, J.K. "The Ngoni States and European Intrusion." *The Zambezian Past: Studies in Central African History*. Eds. Stokes, E. and R. Brown. Manchester: MUP, 1965: 302-331.

(9) Englund, Harri. *From War to Peace on the Mozambique-Malawi Borderland*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2002: See pp.40-45.

(10) Rangeley, W.H.J. "The Yao." *Nyasaland Journal* 16.1 (1963): 6-28; Abdallah, Yohanna B. *History of the Yaos*. New Intro. by E.A. Alpers. London: Frank Cass edition, 1973:1-12; Alpers, Edward A. *Ivory and Slaves in East-Central Africa to the late Nineteenth Century*. London: Heinemann, 1975: See pp.1-32.

(11) Boeder, Robert B. *Silent Majority: A History of the Lomwe in Malawi*. Pretoria: Africa Institute, 1984: See pp.11-21.

and exploitation in south-central Africa. The development of mining enterprises in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) by the British South Africa Company in the 1890s, called for the sourcing of labour from territories north of the Zambezi River, what is now Zambia, Malawi, and Northern Mozambique. The Malawi region began to be affected as a source of migrant labour for British enterprises south of the Zambezi as early as 1893. However, it was about a decade later, in 1903-1904, that recruitment of Malawian labour by Rhodesian interests was formalised, through negotiations between the Southern Rhodesia Native Labour Bureau (SRNLB) and the Nyasaland (Malawi) Government. The agreement, which was at first implemented hesitantly, was consolidated in 1936, so that by the 1940s, Nyasas or Malawians in their thousands were migrating to Zimbabwe for wage labour each year.¹²

What started as a primarily economic link between the two British colonial territories of Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia, acquired a political dimension in 1953, when the British Government decided to create a federal system of government to embrace their three central African dependencies of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland.¹³ Under the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as it evolved from 1953 to 1963, Malawi became even more closely tied to Zimbabwe economically than it had been before the federal arrangement.

During the Federal Period, among other things, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi were organized into a Free Trade Area or Customs Union, involving the free movement of people and exchange of goods and services among the three territories.¹⁴ In particular, Malawi became an intensively exploited labour reserve for the booming mixed economy in Zimbabwe and the mining one in Zambia. According to one estimate, Nyasas (as Malawian migrant workers were then known throughout southern Africa) then accounted for about 34% of the Africans in formal employment in Zimbabwe. Malawians there then enjoyed a protected status on the labour market as 'citizens' of the Federation. In other words, the labour economies of Malawi and Zimbabwe became fully harmonized in the decade preceding that of independence in Africa.¹⁵

(12) Boeder, Robert B. "Malawians Abroad: The History of Labour Migration from Malawi to its Neighbours, 1890-1974." Unpublished PhD thesis. East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1974: See p.26-42; Makambe, Elliot P. "Nyasaland African Labour and Southern Rhodesia, 1903-1923." *African Affairs* 79 (1980): See pp.548-566.

(13) Gifford, P. "Misconceived Dominion: The Creation and Disintegration of Federation in British Central Africa." *The Transfer of Power in Africa*. Eds. P. Gifford and R. Louis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982: See pp.387-416.

(14) Hazelwood, A. "The Economics of Federation and Dissolution in Central Africa." *African Integration and Disintegration*. Ed. A. Hazelwood. London: Oxford University Press, 1967: See p.190.

(15) Gray, Richard. *The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland*. London: Oxford University Press, 1960: See p.332; Gann, L.H. and M. Gelfand: *Huggins of Rhodesia: The Man and His Country*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1964: See p.209-218; Welensky, R. *Welensky's 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*. London: Collins, 1964: See p.79.

Malawi's Support for the Liberation Struggles

At the official level, the support Malawi was able to extend to the liberation movements in Mozambique and Zimbabwe can be gleaned from the public pronouncements by the Banda regime at the time, as well as from the testimonies of politicians and high ranking public servants who took part in carrying out Banda's policies, which were synonymous with Malawi's essential policies. Beyond the official view, however, one has to examine the testimonies of numerous informants from different border areas to get to the perspective of ordinary Malawians and their perception of what they did or did not do in support of the liberation struggle in neighbouring countries.

The official side of the story can be found, for example, in a speech addressed to Kenneth D. Kaunda, the then State President of Zambia, and other Zambian leaders on 12 January 1975, by Banda. The President of Malawi declared that he was a realist who believed in doing what was practicable and affordable, and not what was being suggested or dictated by leaders in other parts of the African continent.¹⁶ He was, at the time, specifically referring to what countries like Malawi and Zambia needed to do about the intransigence of the white minority regime in Zimbabwe, under the leadership of Mr Ian D. Smith, which had by then intensified its war against nationalist freedom fighters, with dire consequences for neighbouring countries such as Zambia. Glimpses of what Banda meant by playing a practicable and affordable role in support of the liberation struggle in Mozambique and Zimbabwe are found in some of the interviews conducted with those who were senior government officials at the time.

According to Mr George Jaffu, who was head of the Malawi Civil Service between 1972 and 1976, Malawi was able to present itself as a neutral bridge which could be used or crossed by the liberation movements, as well as by the colonialist forces they were fighting to dislodge. In other words, Malawi was one of the few 'safe' spaces that were then open to both parties in the conflict.

The policy of Contact and Dialogue which we pursued as a country under Dr Banda benefited everyone: the liberation movements in neighbouring countries like Zimbabwe and the white minority governments they were fighting. Our government was able to maintain contact with both sides to the conflict in southern Africa at the time. Take the case of Zimbabwe: Mr Ian Smith, the Prime Minister there, used to come to Malawi and I would meet him at the airport and take him to his meeting with the President. Two weeks later, it would be Mr Joshua Nkomo, the nationalist leader, also coming to meet the State President. It was the same with those who were fighting in Mozambique. We had dealings with the likes of Jardim and da Souza on the part of the colonialists and also with leaders like Chissano and Guebuza on the part of the nationalists in FRELIMO!¹⁷

(16) Banda, His Excellency, Dr H. Kamuzu, President of the Republic of Malawi. Speech delivered at State House. Lusaka: Government of Zambia, January 1975: See pp.8-9.

(17) Interview with Mr George Jaffu, (Mpingwe, Limbe) 25 June 2008.

Mr Martin Focus Gwede, who served as Head of Malawi's Intelligence Services between 1964 and 1976, indicated that Malawi made discreet arrangements for dealing with FRELIMO as it struggled for independence in Mozambique, and did so by making available to FRELIMO's leadership what limited support the government was able to spare:

It was in 1968 when the Malawi Government advised Dr Banda, the State President, that Malawi should assist those who were fighting for independence in Mozambique, because if that was not done Malawi would be in trouble when Mozambique became independent. She would no longer be permitted to use the port of Beira. So, Dr Banda advised the FRELIMO leadership in Tanzania that their Secretary General, Mr Joaquim Chissano, needed to get in touch with me, so that the two of us could work out plans through which FRELIMO could convey arms from its bases in Tanzania through Malawi to the front which FRELIMO had by then opened in Zambezia Province.

Chissano used to drive from Tanzania to Malawi through the border posts at Mbeya and Kaporo in vehicles bearing Tanzanian registration number plates, the boots of which were loaded with firearms. Once in Malawi, we replaced the Tanzanian number plates with Malawian ones and took over the driving or sometimes transferred Chissano and his goods into our own vehicles. We then conveyed them right across Malawi to the Muloza area in Mulanje, overlooking Milanje on the Mozambican side. From then, Chissano would follow routes leading to his contacts in the area who were responsible for taking him and the arms across the Ruo River into Mozambique.¹⁸

In his interview, Mr Raphael Kaligomba, who served as Malawi's Chief Immigration Officer from 1974 to 1991, explained that Malawi's assistance to liberation movements in neighbouring countries took diverse forms. These included granting the leaders of those movements and the freedom fighters who got to Malawi or had to pass through the country transit facilities, stay permits, advice, occasional financial assistance, and brotherly treatment:

We in the Immigration Department were mostly available to give them permission to transit or stay in the country for some time and to monitor their movements while they were in Malawi. They had to identify themselves and state why they were in the country and for how long they would stay. Our role was to give them advice, treat them with brotherly kindness, and issue them passports, visas, transit visas, permits to stay for a while, etc, as the situation demanded. We did not involve ourselves in other dimensions of their operations, such as transporting of arms. That was the role of other branches of government.¹⁹

The interviews with ordinary Malawians in the border areas provide a fully comprehensive picture of the scope and significance of the contributions Malawi made to the liberation struggles in neighbouring countries, and especially in Mozambique. The interviews in question relate in detail the many gestures, on the part of Malawian villagers, of solidarity with freedom fighters from neighbouring Mozambique, who

(18) Interview with Mr Focus Martin Gwede, (Magola Village, Mphopezinayi, Ntcheu District) 20 November 2007.

(19) Interview with Mr Raphael Kaligomba, (Bangwe Township, Limbe-Blantyre) 22 November 2007.

crossed into Malawi under the heat of fighting inside Mozambique, as well as with ordinary Mozambicans who got displaced by the war in their country. These people had to be sheltered and fed and those who were wounded had to be nursed to recovery. In areas where sympathy and support for the freedom fighters were high, Malawian villagers also helped them to head-load military supplies and convey them through bush paths to combat zones. In addition, it was the villagers who furnished the freedom fighters with intelligence reports about whatever counteracting movements by the colonialist forces were underway.

Indeed, credit should go to chiefs, headmen, and commoners in the border areas of Malawi for having sacrificially borne part of the burden of the liberation war in Mozambique, in the conviction that it was their own people (*abale athu*) who were struggling to liberate themselves from one of the worst forms of colonialism in Africa, the evils of which were well known, even in Malawi. This feeling of solidarity with 'our people' on the other side of the border was quite strong along, for example, Malawi's south-eastern border with Mozambique, where the Lomwe in Malawi are but extensions of clans and ethnic groups in Mozambique. One of the headmen interviewed, now very old, but alert, conveyed the following sentiments about how he and his people reacted to the war FRELIMO fought against the Portuguese colonialists in Mozambique and the effects it had on the Malawian side:

I was already a group village headman in this area when FRELIMO opened a front in Murrumbu District of Zambezia Province, which is across the border from our own area here. At first, we only saw FRELIMO guerrillas coming-running away from the heat of the fighting inside Mozambique. Later, it was both guerrillas and ordinary Mozambican villagers coming as refugees to seek asylum. They were fellow Lomwe, so we treated them very much as our own people. Although we were also poor at the time, we were able to accommodate them and share with them whatever little food we had.

Our government [Malawi Government] had to be involved because the problem of so many people running in from the Mozambican side was too big for us, the chiefs and our people, to handle by ourselves. We were given strict instructions on how to interact with those who were fleeing the fighting in Mozambique. They had to be screened and registered and those who had been soldiers were asked to surrender their arms. We had contingents of the Malawi Army and Police camped in this very same area to assist. All the people we received as refugees from that war in Mozambique were explicitly told not to cause trouble while in Malawi.²⁰

Relations With the Liberation Movement in Mozambique, 1964-1975

Malawi attained its independence from Britain in 1964; and it was in the same year that FRELIMO launched its armed struggle in the Cabo Delgado Province of northern Mozambique. In Malawi then, there was scepticism about FRELIMO's struggle, as the

⁽²⁰⁾ Interview with Bizwick Jackson Mandawala, Group Village Headman, (Nambazo Trading Centre, TA Chiwalo, Phalombe District) 10 December 2007.

general feeling was that the anti-colonial war against the Portuguese in Mozambique was mere propaganda fomented by Pan-Africanist groups gathered around President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere of Tanzania in Dar es Salaam.²¹

President Banda, himself, was at the time being approached for support by Mozambican nationalists based in Blantyre, Tete, and Salisbury (Harare), and felt that the best interests of Malawi as a newly independent country could only be served by maintaining cordial political and economic relations with whoever was then in control of Mozambique, i.e. Portugal.²² Against an avalanche of criticism from the rest of independent black Africa, Banda then went further to create an enabling environment for Portuguese investment in Malawi's economy. Notable in that respect was the acquisition by Portuguese capitalists of parity shares in the Oil Company of Malawi, which was then in charge of virtually all of Malawi's petroleum imports through the port of Beira, and the Commercial Bank of Malawi, which was the first commercial bank to be commissioned by the post-colonial national regime. What is more, in 1966, Banda persuaded the Portuguese government to join hands with the Malawi Government in the construction of a second railway line to the sea, which was to run from Balaka in Malawi to the port of Nacala on the northern Mozambican coast. According to rumours at the time, the deal also implied that Malawi would have a political stake in the part of northern Mozambique through which the proposed line was to run.

All these developments of the mid-1960s in Portuguese-Malawi relations gave an icy feel to the relationship between the Malawi government and FRELIMO as it expanded its war capacity from Tanzania. The initiative to build a relationship of some sort, meanwhile, came from FRELIMO. It is reported that as early as 1965, the then leader of FRELIMO, Dr Eduardo Mondlane, approached Banda about permitting the passage of FRELIMO troops through Malawi without harassment. Banda apparently agreed, but on condition that FRELIMO would not also ship arms through the country, as it was already permitted to do so through Zambia. Following that agreement, FRELIMO was also granted permission by the Malawi Government to open offices at Zingwangwa and Bangwe in Blantyre, through which it was able to mobilize support for its cause from Blantyre-based Mozambican nationals and their Malawian well-wishers.²³

Indeed, in line with Mr Gwede's interview already cited above, it was after about 1968 that Malawi began at the official level to extend material support to FRELIMO freedom fighters as they advanced from their bases in Tanzania into Nyassa Province in the east and from south-western Tanzania via eastern Zambia and into Tete Province in the west. But, at that point in time and up to about 1971, the support

(21) Englund. *From War to Peace on the Mozambique-Malawi Borderland*. See p.5.

(22) McMaster. *Malawi: Foreign Policy and Development*. See p.120.

(23) Interview with Raphael Kaligomba, (Bangwe Township, Limbe-Blantyre) 22 November 2007; Interview with George Jaffu, (Mpingwe, Limbe) 25 June 2008.

Malawi was able to give was limited and it was rendered cautiously and in a highly controlled manner.

One reason for the strict controls and secrecy which surrounded Malawian support for the nationalist struggle in Mozambique at the time was that FRELIMO advanced its struggle against Portuguese colonial forces in Mozambique from training and support camps in Tanzania, at a time when Banda and his government lived in fear of an imminent rebel attack from that same direction. That fear in Malawi was a spin-off from the 'Cabinet Crisis' of 1964-1965, during which six of Banda's most able cabinet ministers rebelled against his autocratic style of leadership, were expelled from the government and the Malawi Congress Party, and thereafter fled the country along with many supporters to seek asylum in Zambia and Tanzania. Those who ended up in Tanzania found favour with the government of President Nyerere, and there were strong suspicions in Malawi that the rebels who had fled to Tanzania were then being militarily trained and equipped side by side with FRELIMO cadres.²⁴

From 1971 onwards, support for FRELIMO in Malawi became more evident than it was prior to that period. This was dictated by two developments arising from the intensification of the liberation war in Nyassa and Zambezia Provinces in the east and Tete Province in the west. One was the deepening plight of Mozambicans fleeing the fighting inside Mozambique and the Malawian communities that became their hosts. The other related development was the increasing violation of Malawi's territorial integrity by Portuguese colonial forces, which, in a spirit of desperation, intensified their cross-border hot pursuit of FRELIMO freedom fighters that had become too many to pin down.

There were varied responses among borderland Malawian villagers who were exposed to the intensification of the fighting that occurred in the early 1970s. They all underlined the extent to which ordinary Malawians shared the pressures and deprivations of the war with their displaced Mozambican counterparts, occasionally they enlisted to fight alongside their Mozambican comrades, and they were prepared to provide a wide range of services to the fighters during their transitory appearances.

Along Malawi's western border with Mozambique, many people provided accounts of how the fighting in the neighbouring Tete Province intensified during this period (the early 1970s), the effects this intensification had on communities on the Malawian side of the border, and the extent to which some adventurous young Malawians voluntarily went to fight or work with FRELIMO forces.

According to one village headman in Chief Njolomole's area, Ntcheu District, FRELIMO's war against the Portuguese colonialists began to impact on them at this late stage in the struggle that had gone on for a long time.

FRELIMO's war of liberation only began to affect us in the early [nineteen] seventies, because that is when the guerrillas infiltrated the Villa Ulongwe area in Angonia. We began to hear of villages being looted or burned by either Matropa (Portuguese) or

(24) Banda, His Excellency Dr H. Kamuzu. "Addressing the Press on the subject of Malawi's Relations with Tanzania." Blantyre, Zambia: Malawi Government, Information Department, February 1967.

FRELIMO soldiers, depending on who was being sided with. We were directly affected only twice. The first was when a village belonging to our own clansmen, Masatila, near the Villa was burned to the ground by the Matropa who suspected that it had been harbouring and feeding FRELIMO men. Those who managed to escape came here to seek asylum among my people. They did so after spending three days in the bush, since they could only move during night time. We looked after them for over twenty years, but they later went back to Mozambique.

The other episode out of that war, which affected us, involved one man, Rodrigo Kanyemba, and his family. He was a driver working for a farm near Tete, and fled here together with his family when a band of FRELIMO soldiers hit the vehicle he was driving with a bazooka and blew off the legs of his Portuguese master. Rodrigo only returned to Tete a few years ago, following the end of hostilities between FRELIMO and RENAMO [Mozambique National Resistance] in Mozambique, but some of his children are still with us because they got married here.²⁵

In the area of the Ngoni Chief, Kanduku, in Mwanza District, which adjoins Kazula District in Tete Province, Mozambique, a number of the men interviewed went to train and fight with FRELIMO forces in Tete Province when they were young. The impression they gave was that they did so out of a sense of adventure, rather than a consciousness of solidarity with nationalist forces in Mozambique. In the words of one of them:

FRELIMO advanced from camps in the Luangwa Valley in Zambia through Chitutu and Kaswenthe until they reached Kazula. That was in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Their commander then was comrade Sigauke Mandevu and under his guidance they built a large training camp at Mphonde, after driving away all the Portuguese settlers and entrepreneurs from the area. Those of us who were young here were attracted to go and join. We were told we could train as soldiers in no time at all, and master the technology of handling and using a wide range of firearms: AK47, PM Kulenta, Pesa, Somati, etc.

Several of us young people from Ngoni villages here in Malawi, including those who ran away from school, went to join FRELIMO forces in the bush. But, we had bitter experiences there. They used to send us on long journeys, to collect weapons and supplies in Zambia. We would spend up to one month wading our way through bushes between Zambia and Mozambique, before the weapons were delivered to FRELIMO training camps. Most of us ended up deserting to return to our homes here in Malawi at the earliest opportunity.²⁶

One area where FRELIMO was universally popular, and was in a position to recruit many young Malawians, was at Chapananga's in the western part of Chikwawa District. FRELIMO was able to recruit scores of young Mang'anja, Ngoni, and Sena for training, fighting, and social service in the adjacent Moatize District of Tete Province. One such recruit in time gained heroic and legendary fame, if only because she was

(25) Interview with Herbert Kalulu Nkhoma, Village Headman, (Kalulu Village, TA Njolomole, Ntcheu District) 24 November 2007.

(26) Interviews with Adiliyano Chitseko, Ondifara Amon, Abilio Nsinga, and Rector Pamdera, (Njazo Village, TA Kanduku, Mwanza District) 4 December 2007.

then a young woman of daring courage, with crusading zeal for FRELIMO's cause. Elina Shabalala joined FRELIMO at Chibisa's in Chapananga area, went for training at camps in Tete, and, in time, rose to the rank of Captain within the FRELIMO forces. This was because over the years she successfully supervised the movement of FRELIMO freedom fighters and supplies when they had to be conveyed across the Lower Shire Valley, from Moatize District in Tete in the west, to Morumbala District in Zambezia in the east. Elina was fully pensioned by the Mozambican Army upon retirement and continued to receive her dues from that source up to the time of her death in 2006.²⁷

Another factor that induced Malawi's involvement in Mozambique's war of liberation in the early 1970s was the violation of Malawi's territorial integrity by Portuguese troops, when pursuing FRELIMO guerrillas. Such violations escalated as FRELIMO forces made progress on virtually all fronts of their operations. They were vehemently protested from time to time by Banda's government. In reaction, the Portuguese colonial government in Mozambique repeatedly complained to the Malawi government that FRELIMO was being allowed to use Malawian territory as sanctuary from which they were able to launch attacks on Portuguese forces inside Mozambique.²⁸

The emerging tense situation in the border areas then forced the Malawi government to deploy almost all officers and men of its minuscule army (the strength of which was then estimated at 5,000-8,000 soldiers) on garrison and patrol duties along the long border with Mozambique. Given their few numbers, Malawi's troops had to be strategically deployed at the most sensitive border zones, such as Mangochi/Mandimba, Phalombe/Murrumbu, Mulanje/Milanje, Nsanje/Morumbala, Chikwawa/Tete, and Mwanza/Zobwe.

According to Ret Major General Buxton Namwali, who was then a colonel and battalion commander, once deployed to border areas, the role of the Malawi Army was to protect Malawian villagers, advise them on how to relate to Mozambicans who were fleeing into Malawi, and to temporarily look after them, and then repatriate any Portuguese soldiers or FRELIMO freedom fighters who strayed into Malawian territory:

The real challenge for us in the Malawi Army began in 1971 when Portuguese forces used aeroplanes to bomb some villages in T.A. Makanjila's area in Mangochi. Several people were killed and wounded, and a lot of property was destroyed. We then received instructions from higher authorities to mount garrisons and patrols from Mangochi to Nsanje.

One of the worst affected border areas was Muloza in Mulanje District, where the Ruo River is the boundary between Malawi and Mozambique. In that area, Portuguese and FRELIMO soldiers were, from time to time, engaged in heavy fighting which

(27) Interview with Lucius Kalima Chapananga, Senior Chief, (Chibisa Headquarters, TA Chapananga, Chikwawa District) 5 June 2008.

(28) McMaster. *Malawi: Foreign Policy and Development*. See p.129.

sometimes spilled over to our territory, such that a lot of Malawians were affected. I recall vividly that we lost many lives in that area, both through live bullets and landmines planted by FRELIMO.

Sometimes our task as border patrols was a simple one of monitoring the movement of Portuguese and FRELIMO troops, and then raising alarm if there were any territorial violations.²⁹

Indeed, 1971 was a terrible year as far as the security situation in the border areas was concerned. There were reports of Malawian villages being bombed by Portuguese forces from Mozambique, not only in Mangochi, but also in Mulanje, Nsanje, and Chikwawa. One eye-witness, an old village headman who lived through the ordeal, provided an account of what happened in western Chikwawa:

I remember one particular night in 1971 when the Matropa [Portuguese soldiers] attacked our village which they suspected of harbouring FRELIMO guerrillas. We fled in different directions, but the Portuguese captured or killed a lot of people (including my brother-in-law). Most of us lost our property and I personally lost the property I had just acquired from wage labour in Zimbabwe.

Through Chief Chapananga's court, a report was sent to the district commissioner at Chikwawa, who sought assistance from the Malawi Army and Police. These arrived within a few days of being alerted. We saw top army and police officials like General Graciano Matewere and Mr Mac Kamwana, the then Commissioner of Police, coming to our area. They ordered their troops to move in and provide us with all the necessary security. They also helped us to get back the maize harvest we had left behind when we fled the Portuguese attack.

After that, all of us were ordered to move away from this area and to relocate ourselves near Chapananga's court, east of the Mwanza River. But from time to time, we would still come back to this area to collect our food stuffs, while escorted by soldiers of the Malawi Army. On one such occasion, I was nearly struck by a stray bullet, when a Portuguese Army helicopter flew past the area, shooting anyone they suspected of being FRELIMO.³⁰

Relations With the Liberation Movements in Zimbabwe, 1964-1980

Relations between Malawian and Zimbabwean nationalists dated back to the Federal Period in British Central Africa, when Malawi's labour relations with Zimbabwe or Southern Rhodesia resulted in the emergence of huge colonies of Malawians or Nyasas in the urban-industrial centres of Zimbabwe. To a lesser degree, the labour market of the time led to the growth of a small community of Zimbabweans in Blantyre-Limbe, then the only significant urban centre in Malawi.

The ties between the African nationalists agitating for self-government or independence in the two territories of the Federation were further strengthened

(29) Interview with Buxton Namwali, Rt Major General, (ESCOM House, Blantyre) 20 June 2008.

(30) Interview with Tobias Tembo Madewu, Group Village Headman, (Mgoola, TA Chapananga, Chikwawa District) 6 June 2008.

between 1958 and 1961, a period when the wind of change leading to independence engulfed much of the African continent. Banda, the leading nationalist in Malawi, was at that time a hero in the struggle against the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, whose fame was acknowledged throughout central Africa and especially in the territories of what would become the states of Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe after independence. For example, on his return from the Pan-African Congress held in Accra, Ghana, in December 1958, Banda flew back to Malawi via Salisbury in Zimbabwe. During his three day stop over there, he was hero-worshipped as the leader in the struggle against the Federation. Among other things, he addressed a mammoth nationalist rally in the Highfields Township, where he vehemently denounced the Federation, urged Zimbabwean nationalists to adopt a non-compromising stance in their struggle against it, and to shun any form of collaboration with the so called liberal-minded white Rhodesians of the day.

Banda's fiery speeches against the Federation at the end of 1958 were followed by draconian reaction on the part of British colonial authorities in central Africa. They declared a State of Emergency over the three territories of the Federation in February and March 1959. During that state of emergency, senior nationalist leaders from all three territories were incarcerated together in prisons in different parts of Zimbabwe. At the famous prison of Khami, outside Bulawayo, for instance, all those who had been very active in the African Congresses of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia), and Nyasaland (Malawi) were represented. Consequently, that prison served as an important school in the development of Pan-African consciousness in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.³¹

Indeed, so strong were the ties between Malawian and Zimbabwean nationalists then that when, in 1961, the first multi-party general elections were organized in Malawi, Zimbabwe nationalists raised money, bicycles, and motor vehicles in support of the campaign of Banda's party, the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). That material support from African nationalists in Zimbabwe, coupled with an almost equal amount of support from Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana, enabled the MCP to win all the seats for which it contested in that election.³²

Consequently, when Malawi was granted the right to self-government and secession from the federation between 1961 and 1963, she was a model and inspiration to nationalists in Zimbabwe. One of our key interviewees, Hon. Aleke Banda, spoke at length about this:

Things started to ease up for us, the nationalists in Malawi, much earlier than for our colleagues in Zimbabwe, who continued to suffer under white settler domination.

(31) Ranger, Terence. *Are We Not Also Men? The Sankange Family and African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920-1964*. London: James Currey, 1995: See p.175.

(32) Mair, Lucy. *The Nyasaland Elections of 1961*. London: Athlone Press, 1962: See pp.19-42.

As such, during the early years of our independence many of the nationalist leaders in Zimbabwe would come to Malawi, usually while on their way to Tanzania, Zambia, London, and other places of exile. I remember how prominent Zimbabwean leaders like Nathan Shamuyarira, Herbert Chitepo, and others used to visit us in that way, to share ideas on how to enhance the nationalist struggle in their country.

It was, of course, only after we achieved independence here that we were in a position to give some material assistance to liberation movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa. But our capacity to do so was at first limited because we did not have resources to spare. Moreover, such assistance as we could afford, had to be rendered secretly because Dr Banda did not want the white governments of Rhodesia and South Africa to strangle us.

Later on, when we organized the Press Holdings in which we were able to raise enough funds, we began to give substantial support to our colleagues in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Dr Banda used to send money to Nkomo and Sithole in Zimbabwe, and to Oliver Tambo of the ANC in South Africa, who was then based in London. I remember that he at one time even bought Land Rovers and bicycles for Sithole.³³

Perhaps because of the trust the Zimbabwean nationalist leaders had in Banda then, they turned to him for advice and support when the Rhodesian settlers led by Mr Ian D. Smith of the Rhodesian Front launched their Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965. But, Banda was conservative in his response, because, having secured independence for his own country, he could no longer afford to be militant in his demands for nationalists in neighbouring countries. He urged both Nkomo and Sithole to enter into dialogue with Ian Smith and other Rhodesian Front leaders, such as Mr Clifford Dupont, arguing that Rhodesia's political problems would only end through negotiations. What is more, he offered to mediate in any talks to that effect, if Malawi was chosen as venue.³⁴

Perhaps because Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) faction of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe appeared amenable to Banda's overtures, from the late 1960s they began to be accorded greater attention in Malawi than Mr Joshua Nkomo and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) faction. At the time of independence in Malawi in 1964, it had been Nkomo whom Malawians (including Banda) clearly recognised as the man who would lead Zimbabwe to independence.

So, there was a shift of focus in Malawi from the late 1960s onward as to which Zimbabwean leaders should be prioritized. The ZANU of Ndabaningi Sithole had gained centre-stage limelight. Again, the views of veteran politician Aleke Banda shed light on this matter:

When it came to dealing with the Zimbabwean situation, Dr Banda tended to prefer Sithole to the other nationalist leaders there, because he (Sithole) was more moderate, more reasonable, and more accommodative. Furthermore, Dr Banda did not like the

(33) Interview with Hon. Aleke K. Banda, (Blantyre) 22 June 2008.

(34) McMaster. *Malawi: Foreign Policy and Development*. See p.114.

fact that Nkomo later on aligned himself with Russia (a communist country with which Dr Banda had differences in principle). That is why Dr Banda felt more comfortable dealing with Sithole, though he did not necessarily abandon Nkomo.³⁵

Indeed, the ZANU of Sithole had a lot of support and influence in Malawi in the 1970s. The backbone of that support consisted of Zimbabweans based in Blantyre, where many of them were employees of subsidiaries of Zimbabwean companies with head offices in Harare. Prominent among their leaders were the Rev. Dennis Munyaradzi Nyamurowa, who was based in Blantyre at the time as a representative of the United Bible Societies in Africa, and Mr Joshua Kadene, who was Chief Marketing Officer for the Malawi branch of Lever Brothers Southeast Africa Ltd. Up to the time of his return to Zimbabwe in 1977, Rev. Nyamurowa, who had vast contacts in other parts of the region, is said to have played a crucial role in facilitating the movement of ZANU cadres from Zimbabwe, then through Blantyre and Malawi, and onwards to guerrilla bases in Tanzania.³⁶

Outside Blantyre, there was a small but staunch group of ZANU members and supporters on the main campus of the University of Malawi at Zomba. Prominent among members of the group were Dr Hoyini Bhila, who was a lecturer in History and Mr Stanley Made, who was the university librarian. On most weekends, members of the ZANU group in Zomba used to commute to Blantyre, for meetings and fellowship with the larger Zimbabwean community.

It was undoubtedly because of the rapport which existed between Banda and Rev. Sithole that Malawi was encouraged to serve as a key broker in 'internal accord' negotiations which would have led to the transfer of power from the white settlers to moderate African nationalists in Zimbabwe between 1975 and 1978. In the negotiations in question, most of which took place in Blantyre, so called moderate nationalist leaders in Zimbabwe such as Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, and Chief Jeremiah Chirau were persuaded by Britain, South Africa, and Malawi to reach a political settlement with the Rhodesian Front government of Ian Smith. The agreement sought would have neutralized the militant ZANU and ZAPU wings of the nationalist movement, which were then fully committed to securing independence through armed struggle. It was a late and misconceived initiative on Banda's part, because the military wings of ZANU and ZAPU had by then fine-tuned their strategies and appeared to be making steady progress on the battlefield, especially in the eastern and western parts of Zimbabwe, which they were able to penetrate from their bases in Mozambique, Zambia, and Botswana.

Conclusion

In summarising the contribution of this chapter, it is necessary to firstly restate the difficulties of researching and writing about the subject with which it deals, and to

(35) Interview with Hon. Aleke Banda, (Blantyre) 22 June 2008.

(36) Interview with Mr Godfrey M. Uka, (Malawi Heritage Centre, Limbe) 26 June 2008.

appreciate the limitations of earlier interpretations of how Malawi's foreign relations were managed in the period covered by the study. Banda ruled Malawi with an iron hand for thirty years, during which those of his policies which were controversial were not open to scrutiny and criticism within the country. A 'culture of silence' was strictly observed about these matters. This approach invariably applied to the way Banda perfunctorily interacted with leaders of liberation movements in neighbouring countries, out of respect for the charter provisions of the Organisation of African Unity, while nurturing political and economic ties with the white minority regimes of Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.

But, previous assessments of Malawi's role during the liberation struggles, through which independence in countries like Mozambique, Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Namibia was achieved by means of arms, have been excessively skewed and negative in their verdict and the means through which that verdict was reached. This is because they narrowly focused on the behaviour, utterances, and dealings of the leadership in Malawi at the time and completely ignored the humble stand, roles, and contributions of the Malawian people at large. So, a major contribution of this chapter has been to promote a more nuanced approach to the role Malawi played and the contributions it made during the liberation struggles in east-central Africa. This approach encompasses the dimension of what went on at the level of official policy, as well as that of the people at the village level.

It has been shown, for example, that at the official level, Malawi's role in supporting the cause of liberation movements in the region was extremely limited, especially when compared to that played by countries such as Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana. The reasons for that have been clarified. They included the country's dependence on material support from the white minority regimes of southern Africa, the differences Banda had with presidents Nyerere of Tanzania and Kaunda of Zambia, over the style of leadership that was being cultivated in Malawi, and Banda's preference for dealing with moderate or non-militant wings of nationalist movements in neighbouring countries.

Of even greater significance is the attention this chapter has drawn to the contribution to the liberation struggles in Mozambique and Zimbabwe that was made by ordinary people in the Malawian countryside. This is an important fact which has yet to be incorporated in the literature on the subject. Malawians generally acted as hosts to Zimbabwean freedom fighters. Moreover, especially in the border areas of Likoma and Chizumulu Islands, Mangochi, Phalombe, Mulanje, Nsanje, Chikwawa, Mwanza, Ntcheu, and Dedza, chiefs, headmen, and ordinary villagers supported the liberation struggle in neighbouring Mozambique, and sometimes did so against official Malawi government policy or advice. What is more, they paid the price for doing so.

7.6

Malawi

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Banda, Aleke

[National Publications Bureau, Blantyre; 22 June 2008]

Hon. Aleke Banda, aged 70 years is a Member of Parliament (MP), President of the Progressive Peoples Party (PPM) and business manager. He is a veteran politician who was one of the three or four most influential politicians around Dr H Kamuzu Banda, the first head of state at the time of the struggle for independence and during influential political and administrative positions, as first Administrative Secretary and then Secretary general of the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), National Chairman of the Malawi Youth League, Commander of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP) and Personal Assistant to Dr Banda. Upon entering government as a cabinet minister in 1967, he successively served as Minister of Economic Affairs, Minister of Finance, Minister of Trade and Industry, and Minister of Information and Tourism. He was witness to the unfolding of relations between the Malawi Government and Malawi Congress Party, on the one hand and the Nationalist Movements in Zimbabwe and Mozambique, on the other, at least in the 1960s and early 1970s. Our interview with him focused on what he witnessed of the way Dr Banda and his government dealt with the various nationalist groups in neighbouring countries between 1959 and 1974.

My involvement with the MCP started much earlier than the 1964 which you are talking about. Anyway, in 1964 I was Secretary General of the MCP, but I was not in the cabinet; and I was responsible for consolidating the party. Before that going to the 1961 General Elections, I was unable to stand for any parliamentary position because I was still a young man, although I took part in the negotiations for a new constitution in 1960. In 1964, as well, I did not stand for any position because I was still a young man. So I was entrusted with the task of consolidating the party. Apart from being the Secretary General, I was also in charge of the Youth League of the party, Director General of Malawi Broadcasting Corporation (MBC), and Editor of the Malawi News.

I joined the cabinet in 1966, as Minister of Economic Planning and Development. In 1968 I became Minister of Economic Affairs, which encompassed various ministries, such as Trade, Economic Planning and Tourism. In 1969 I became Minister of Finance, after the abolition of the Ministry of Economic Affairs; this was after I had told Dr Banda that the Ministry was too big for one person to handle, and also because of the petty jealousies in the cabinet towards me as I was entrusted to control such a big ministry. Later on I was also responsible for both the Ministry of Information and Tourism.

In 1972 I became Minister of Trade and Industry, only to be dismissed from the cabinet a year later, in 1973. This was after some newspapers in Zambia had written about me as a possible successor of Dr Banda, although I had nothing to with it, but I still suffered for it. After that I went back home in Nkhatabay, where I spent a whole year, before I was called back by Dr Banda, and I was appointed Managing Director General and Vice Chairman of Press Holdings, which later became Press

Corporation. I ran that company for six years up to January 1980, when we also had differences with Dr Banda which led to my dismissal. This time around I did not go back home, as I was jailed for twelve years. Upon my release from jail in the early 1990s I joined the bandwagon of those who were calling for the reintroduction of multi-partyism in the country, such as Dr Bakili Muluzi. I was elected First Vice President of UDF and after the General Elections that took place in 1994, which were won by UDF, I became Minister of Finance, later on Agriculture, then Health, and then back to Agriculture.

For you to understand the relationship better between the Malawi Government and the nationalist liberation movements, particularly those from Zimbabwe, we have to go back as early as 1958. After Dr Banda came back from exile in July 1958, to lead the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) and to spearhead the struggle against the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the struggle in Zimbabwe was not as strong as it was here in Malawi. As such, it was Dr Banda who invigorated them, when in December 1958, upon his return from the Pan-African Congress, which was held in Accra, Ghana; he stopped in Harare Zimbabwe, and made a fiery speech so as to inject life into the political struggle in Zimbabwe.

This was followed by the State of Emergency of 1959, which was first declared in Southern Rhodesia on 26 the February 1959, and later on in Nyasaland on 3rd March 1959, in which many of us were sent to various jails across Central Africa. For instance, I was sent to Khami Prison alongside other fellow nationalists from both Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia.

In Southern Rhodesia the main leader at that time was Joshua Nkomo, who by 1959 was already outside the country. But some of his lieutenants, such as George Nyandoro and James Chikerema were all locked up in jail.

In these jails there was a lot of interaction between nationalist leaders from both Zimbabwe and Malawi. In fact, it was during that time that I met Chikerema and others, discussing our political plight at length. We also met with other nationalists from Northern Rhodesia.

Dr Banda was at Gweru Prison, where he too had his own experiences. But upon his release from prison in 1960, we went to London to push for a new constitution. As such, things started easing up in Nyasaland while our friends in Zimbabwe were still in great problems.

Many of the nationalist leaders in Zimbabwe would come to Nyasaland on their way to Tanzania, London and other places. I remember that people like Nathan Shamuyarira, Herbert Chitepo and others came to Nyasaland to gain a few ideas on how to enhance the nationalist struggle in their country.

It was only after our independence that we started to give some material assistance to the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. You have to know that this was done secretly because Dr Banda and his government adopted a policy of cooperating with the Rhodesian Government for fear of being strangled; since that time Malawi was not in a position to fight a major war.

That time we were also able to help our brothers in South Africa. For instance, Oliver Tambo of the ANC, passed through Malawi when he was going into exile in Dar-es-Salaam and then to London. So Tambo and his colleagues were secretly given some assistance by Dr Banda.

Later on when we organized the Press Holdings, in which we were able to raise enough money, we were at ease to help our colleagues in both South Africa and Zimbabwe. That is why when Nelson Mandela was released from jail he made sure he came to visit Dr Banda to pay his respects and express his appreciation.

The same was true with the people of Zimbabwe. I remember that Dr Banda bought Land Rovers for people like Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, who was at that time more prominent than Robert Mugabe, who was operating from the bush. Even Joshua Nkomo also got material assistance from Malawi.

But certainly from South Africa, the major contact with Dr Banda was through Oliver Tambo because at that time Mandela was in prison. At that time Oliver Tambo was based in Tanzania, but he also frequently visited London where his wife was working as a nurse. During those movements he could also secretly come to Malawi to get material assistance.

In 1963, when the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe split into two camps, Dr Banda was very careful and he did not want to be aligned with any particular group, because it was not quite clear which one would prevail. As such, he supported both of them. From ZANU another splinter movement also emerged, and this one was called National Democratic Party (NDP), which was led by Michael Mawema, and he too used to come to get assistance from Malawi. So Dr Banda's policy at that time was simply to support the nationalist movement as a whole and not any one particular party.

After that split, Nkomo's close lieutenants were James Chikerema and George Nyandoro. But I am not very clear who else Dr Banda dealt with, but certainly not with Mugabe, who came much later. But from ZANU he mainly dealt with Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole.

In 1960, during the Federal Review Conference in London, the main players from Zimbabwe were Nkomo and his lieutenants; but both Mugabe and Sithole were not present. From Zambia, we had people like Kenneth Kaunda, Harry Nkumbula, Mainza Chona, and Sikota Wina. From Malawi, there was Dr Banda, Dunduzu Chisiza, Orton Chirwa and myself.

As far as I am aware the ZANU and ZAPU officials did not seek government's permission to open up their offices in Malawi. And even if they did they would not have been allowed because Dr Banda was very careful not to antagonize himself with the white rulers of Southern Rhodesia. As I said, the assistance we gave them was very secretive, such that very few people knew about it.

Dr Banda seemed to favour Sithole and not Joshua Nkomo because probably Dr Banda was very extreme when it came to issues about Malawi's independence. But when it came to dealing with Southern Rhodesia, he tended to like Sithole more

than the others because he (Sithole) was more moderate, more reasonable and more accommodative. Furthermore, Dr Banda also did not like Nkomo because later on he aligned himself with Russia, with whom Dr Banda had differences in principle. That is why Dr Banda dealt more with Sithole, though not necessarily becoming enemies with Nkomo.

It will be difficult for me to explain anything about any Zimbabweans who worked as agents for ZANU in this country because as I said that for a good part of that decade I was not in the government, but rather in the private sector. I was not even in the National Executive Committee (NEC) of MCP from 1973 to 1980. But as a senior member in charge of Press Holdings I was still in contact with Dr Banda, but I could not have known some of the activities that took place at that time. Although I do know that some politicians from Zimbabwe such as Shamuyarira, Herbert Chitepo and others used to come to Malawi to meet Dr Banda.

I think that the biggest contribution from Malawi through Dr Banda was his contribution to the breakup of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, because our colleagues in Zimbabwe were not as organized as we were to influence such a move.

Secondly, when we became independent, Dr Banda made sure to secretly organize material support for the liberation movements in Zimbabwe. He made sure he dealt with both the white regime and the liberation movements, all this behind the back of Ian Smith.

Dr Banda did the same with South Africa, that is, he dealt with both the white-led government and nationalist movements. For instance, I remember that in 1967 when I was in the cabinet, we were the first ministers from 'black' Africa to go to South Africa, to negotiate credit and also to learn a few ways of running the government. Despite that cooperation, the nationalist leaders could still come to Malawi to get material support, in terms of money, vehicles, and other things.

Malawi also allowed nationalist leaders from both South Africa and Zimbabwe to pass through its territory, provided they did not make any 'noise' about the kind of assistance they were given and also as long as they did not come in with their weapons.

Dr Banda dealt with the responsibility of looking into the transit of these nationalist leaders personally, with little help from the security personnel. But that issue was not dealt with at the cabinet level.

There were no links between the MCP and FRELIMO at the party level because Dr Banda had friendly relations with Portugal, so he would not allow it, because it could have been problematic, since Malawi relied on Mozambican ports, and Mozambique was a colony of Portugal at that time. But still the Malawi Government helped a number of officials from FRELIMO, such as Joaquim Chissano, Samora Machel and Edward Mondlane, although there were no formal links at party level.

FRELIMO opened offices here in Blantyre in the early days. I remember that they operated some offices at Zingwangwa right here in Blantyre. But that was kept as a secret from the Portuguese.

When the fighting between FRELIMO and the Portuguese forces intensified we were informed in the cabinet, but that was a business which was directly handled by Dr Banda. Dr Banda was careful not to be seen to openly side with any of the two groups. He made sure to maintain friendly ties with both the Portuguese and the nationalist leaders, whom he assisted both financially and materially, through direct money handouts or by purchasing vehicles for them. Dr Banda did not want to anger the Portuguese who were in control of the harbours at Beira and Nacala.

Not many prominent FRELIMO leaders would come to Malawi because of the secret nature of the contacts, which had to be made. But it was Chissano who was the most outstanding visitor to Malawi. We were able to see the progress that was made by FRELIMO. That is why Dr Banda was also giving them assistance after observing that progress.

Malawi assisted the liberation struggle in Mozambique both morally and materially through Dr Banda, who handled the issue personally.

Thank you, thank you.

Chapananga, Lucius Kalima

[Chibisa Headquarters, T/A Chapananga, Chikwawa District; 5 June 2008]

Senior Chief Lucius Kalima Chapananga or Chapananga IV, aged 49 years is one of the most senior chiefs in Chikwawa district. He has been Traditional Authority since 1996, and presides over a large area covering the greater part of western Chikwawa and having a long border with Moatize and Tete Districts in Mozambique. Chapananga is recognized as Traditional Authority over many people of Mang'anja or Maravi origin in Chikwawa, many of whom have family connections with the Mang'anja on the Mozambican side of the border. The interviewee was of special interest because Chapananga III, whom the interviewee succeeded, was a strong supporter of FRELIMO at the time of the liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonialists. He did a lot to facilitate the movement of FRELIMO cadres and supplies between Tete and Zambezia Provinces, through the lower Shire Valley.

I keenly followed the war of liberation between FRELIMO and the Portuguese, which was fought at a time when I was a boy and by that time my father (Chief Chapananga) was in charge of this area. That war started around the late 1960s and intensified in the early 1970s. At that time the Portuguese soldiers were called 'matropa' or 'matula'. That war affected us in a way that most of the ordinary Mozambicans fled Mozambique to come to the Chapananga area in Chikwawa. Due to that influx of refugees, the Malawi government asked its soldiers to come to provide security to our area. At that time, the Army Commander was General Matewere, who came here to pacify the situation working hand in hand with the FRELIMO guerrillas.

It was easy for the Malawi Army to work with FRELIMO guerrillas because at that time most of these guerrillas were using our area, Chapananga, as their base for launching attacks on the Portuguese-led government in Mozambique.

At that time the government troops in Mozambique could also enter this area to kill both FRELIMO guerrillas and ordinary people and that is what made the Malawi Army to intervene. I remember it was in sub-chief Chapasuka's area, on the border between Malawi and Mozambique that the Malawi Army demolished a Mozambican Government Army Camp which was used as a base for launching attacks on the Malawi side. The Malawi Army enlisted the support of the FRELIMO guerrillas to defeat the Mozambican Government troops.

Since I was a member of the royal family all I could see was that our house was used as a storehouse for FRELIMO weapons. We used to be told that these weapons were actually coming from Tanzania, and made a brief stopover at Chilobwe in Blantyre, where FRELIMO had another storehouse, before being transported to Mozambique with a brief stopover in my father's house. FRELIMO guerrillas would then come to our house to collect these weapons to unleash them on the Portuguese-led government.

My father was actually accepting to keep those weapons because the FRELIMO guerrillas were our fellow black Africans, as such he felt compelled to offer them a hand of assistance so that they could gain independence like Malawi had done.

Most of these weapons were actually transported by Malawian nationals and some Malawians from Chapananga joined the FRELIMO guerrillas as ordinary soldiers. Since that took place so many years ago, it is hard for me to remember the names of people from this area who were involved in assisting FRELIMO guerrillas in transporting these weapons, but I can tell you about one woman, who died just two years ago; her name was Mrs Elina Shabalala, who actually left Malawi and was enlisted in the FRELIMO ranks as one of the guerrillas. As such even when she retired from FRELIMO she was still receiving her pension up to the time she died.

I do remember the places in this area where FRELIMO and Portuguese troops were involved in fierce fighting, such as Chief Chang'ambika area and Chief Khundile's area. In both these places the fighting intensified, such that some ordinary Malawians were also killed at the height of that war.

Most of the weapons were very strange to me since I was a young boy at that time. But I remember there was something called a 'Cantiga' which they were using for storing drinking water, and we used to steal such items from my father's house to use them at school. We also saw a lot of foodstuffs that were distributed to FRELIMO guerrillas including tinned fish and tinned beans. We also saw medical equipment such as bandages and medicine meant for use by the guerrillas. But the actual weapons were put in sealed bags of which we were not able to get access to. But all these things were taken to Mozambique by the FRELIMO guerrillas with the assistance of Malawians, both soldiers and ordinary people. At one point I was nearly tempted to drop out of school to join FRELIMO because we thought it was fun to be recruited as soldiers at that time.

But let me also put it to you that at that time it was always kept as a hot secret that these weapons were being kept in the Chief Chapananga's house, such that anyone who dared to disclose it would actually be immediately arrested. People were not expected to reveal this deal because it was a secret between our government and the FRELIMO leaders.

I remember the name of their commander; he was called Sigauke, who was a very close friend of my late father. This man also worked hand in hand with my late father to track down other Mozambican chiefs who were assisting the Portuguese troops. Such chiefs were actually put on the throne by the Portuguese so that they could act as spies for the government troops. One such chief was Chief M'boola, who fled Mozambique and sought refuge in our house for about two weeks, and afterwards he fled to Mwanza district where he was finally killed by FRELIMO guerrillas.

So it was Sigauke who was in charge of FRELIMO in the Tete area, and he oversaw the destruction of most of the railway lines in the Tete area, so as to hamper the movements of government troops in that area of Mozambique.

During that same war of liberation not many people from our area were injured or killed as was the case during the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO which started immediately after had been granted to Mozambique.

What prompted the Malawi Army soldiers to intervene in that war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese was actually the fact that the Portuguese could sometimes come to the area of Chief Gola in T/A Chapananga's area to kill ordinary people on a number of occasions. Some of these Portuguese troops could do that out of ignorance because they could not tell the boundary between Malawi and Mozambique. One day they came to kill Malawian women who were drawing water at a borehole, and this forced the Malawi Army to intervene to stop such killings.

The Malawi government also reacted further by opening an army base called 'Gola Training Base' where Malawian soldiers were always put on alert to stop the intrusion of Portuguese troops on the Malawi territory.

At that time there was a general feeling in most African countries that black Africans should be granted their political independence. These Mozambicans are our close relatives because we intermarry and conduct trade with them, and so the Malawi government always felt compelled to assist FRELIMO. It was therefore very easy for our government to harbour the FRELIMO troops.

For instance, I remember that at one point the FRELIMO guerrillas worked hand in hand with the Malawi Army to destroy a Portuguese Camp at a place called 'Adro Piyo' on the Malawi-Mozambique border.

Later on we just heard that the Portuguese had been defeated in about 1974-1975, such that our neighbours in Mozambique also got their independence. But that peace did not last long because it was only a few years later, in the late 1970s, that we heard that an internal dispute had erupted within FRELIMO which led to the outbreak of a civil war that devastated a lot of people. That war was fought between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

Since Mozambique is a very big country, it was always difficult to have one main political party to which everyone could align themselves to. As such, it was within a very few years that we heard that these people had disagreed over the distribution of top party and government positions. That split sparked off that war between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

At that time relations between Malawi and Mozambique were strained because the Malawi Government was accused by the Mozambican government of harbouring RENAMO guerrillas. The then Mozambican President, Samora Machel, actually went public to condemn our government.

The first leader of FRELIMO was Edward Mondlane, and that it was only after he had died that Samora Machel took over. On the other hand, RENAMO was started by Afonso Dhlakama who was most powerful around Tete, Zobia and Zambezia areas. It is difficult to explain what sort of problems prompted the refugees from Mozambique to flee to this area in details because all we used to do was to welcome

these people before our government, the UNHCR and the Red Cross Society intervened to assist them.

The refugees were coming from different areas, such as Kaphiridzinje, Zobue, and Nguluwira all from Tete Province. We have a good number of these refugees who decided to stay in Malawi permanently, even after that war had come to an end in the following villages: Khundile, Gola, Finiyasi, Chang'ambika and Madeu. Most of these people were afraid of going back to Mozambique because they did not want to face the same hardships that they faced during the civil war.

In this area the camps were constructed at Chang'ambika and Kunyinda, where the refugees were given foodstuffs, blankets and kitchenware. Some of the children were also provided the privilege of attending schools that were specifically built in the camps targeting children of these refugees. Health centres were also opened to assist these people.

These people did not bring any good thing to us rather they brought a lot of problems to us. Firstly, they contributed to the deforestation of our area, and they also killed most of the wild animals that we used to cherish.

What happened was that when that civil war came to an end, most of the soldiers (from both FRELIMO and RENAMO were not disarmed, and they used these weapons to kill our animals.

More to that, these people were and are still very unfriendly to us. Such that even up to now they cause all sorts of problems and harassment to Malawian businessmen and women who go to conduct trade in Mozambique, something which we do not do to Mozambican merchants in Malawi.

Thank you.

Chitseko, Andiliyano; Amon, Ondifara; Nsinga, Abilio; Pamdera, Rector

[Njazo Village, T/A Kanduku, Mwanza District; 4 December 2007]

Andiliyano Chitseko aged 70 years; Ondifara Amon aged 65 years; Abilio Nsinga aged 65 years; and Rector Pamdera aged 75 years, are a group of male elders Drawn from the fairly large Mozambican Community that is accommodated in about seven villages about two kilometres north of Kanduku's headquarters. Andriano Chitseko, who fled the war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese around 1970, was the chief spokesperson. He and his colleagues claimed that most of the Mozambicans found in Kanduku's area fled Mozambique during the war of liberation because both FRELIMO and the Portuguese were indiscriminate in dealing with non-sympathisers.

The war started slowly to attract us local people to join, especially because most of us used to admire the weapons that were used by FRELIMO. The major problem that we saw with this war was that with time the FRELIMO guerrillas started to kill and spoil our own relatives. So from that time we decided to run away to Malawi. As far as I know this war, originated from Zambia before reaching our area; it first passed through Kaswenthe. We travelled in the bush with our children, spending over a week before we reached Malawi, passing through Chief Chibayeni's area in Mozambique when we arrived here in Mwanza, and it was Chief Moffat Kanduku who welcomed us and took good care of us.

The main areas surrounding Kazula District that were also affected by that war were Kalanzi Village, Mvutuko Village and Chikandula's Village and T/A Kamtedza's area. That war was fought between the Portuguese and FRELIMO. Samora Machel was the leader of FRELIMO at that time.

The FRELIMO troops were using three types of guns, called Pesa, PM Kulenta and Somati. They usually used to ask for food from the local people. Their headquarters was in the bush in an area called Mphonde under the leadership of a man called Mandevu.

We used to assist them in collecting the weapons from Zambia. We could spend up to one month walking in the bushes between Zambia and Mozambique. We were delivering these weapons in FRELIMO training camps, before going back to our homes.

I cannot really tell from which part of Zambia we were you collecting these weapons, because we were simply following the FRELIMO troops. But we were passing through Kaswenthe and Chitutu before reaching Zambia.

The FRELIMO leaders were also asking the local elders to provide them with young boys and girls to be enlisted in the militia but most of the time they used to pick up our children from schools. For instance, some of our children in Chiilize area were

captured at a mission school. The youth were actually forced to enlist as FRELIMO troops or else they would be killed.

Before I came to Malawi, in 1970, the war of liberation was intensively fought right in our villages. I decide to run away to come to Malawi at the point where the war had become so intense, such that even some of the FRELIMO troops were running away together with us. So, just imagine, if soldiers were running away, what about us, ordinary villagers. Luckily enough, we managed to make it to Malawi.

I left Mozambique with my family and Mr Kashuga's family. Each of us had a wife and children. But unfortunately, my friend, Mr Kashuga, passed away a long time ago. I came here with two children. When we came to Malawi we were not following anyone; all we wanted was to find peace and freedom. From Kazula we passed through Matenje, then Mawe, then Manica Desert in Chief Chibayeni's area. From there we reached Chief Kasuza's area, then to Chief Rabisoni's area, and then we got to Chief Kanduku's area.

I first settled at Chief Mateche's area, where I was employed by Mr Mateche as a farm labourer in October 1970. I stayed with him for only three months, and in January 1971 I decided to go somewhere else after realizing that I would not be able to find a piece of land to open up my own garden. That was when I came to Chief Moffat Kanduku who allocated us a piece of land in Njzao Village and a garden near the hill in the same village. I was allocated that piece of land because there was a lot of idle land which we were allowed to use for farming. There were a lot of other families from Mozambique that joined us, such that we formed about six small villages. We planted mostly maize and peas in our gardens.

I cannot explain to you about Mozambican refugees who came here due to the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO because by that time I was already here. **(Ondifara Amoni):** To tell you the truth, by that time most of us were already here and most of those people (the refugees) were sent to Chifunga Camp. We are just here enjoying our freedom, such that we do not even Dream about going back to Mozambique, because we did not want to face the same hardships and killings that we faced during the war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese.

The people were saying that the war started because there was struggle for power between RENAMO and FRELIMO. But for us, we ran away from that war of liberation which was a very difficult war because we did not know who our enemy was. What used to happen was that when FRELIMO troops passed by our village, the government troops could come to terrorize us, accusing us of supporting FRELIMO. Likewise, when government troops passed by our village, FRELIMO troops could also come to accuse us of supporting the whites (the Portuguese).

I had been here for about a year and that was in about 1972, when the Malawi Government opened the Chifunga Refugee Camp. We used to see trucks carrying refugees to Chifunga Camp. These refugees were mostly given foodstuffs, soap tablets, cooking oil and blankets. After both wars had come to an end in Mozambique, many

of us decided to stay in Malawi on a permanent basis, because we did not want to face the same hardships back home.

Since I came here in 1971, I have never gone to Mozambique, especially because I came from an area which is very far from here.

We did not bring any cultural practices or talents which Malawians have benefitted from us. Most of us were simply assimilated in the Malawian cultural practices.

In my case I fathered ten children in Malawi and all of them regard themselves as Malawians and they do not even go to Mozambique.

Gwede, Focus Martin

[Magola Village, Mphepozinayi, Ntcheu District; 20 November 2007

Focus Martin Gwede, aged 70 years, was head of Intelligence in the Special Branch Section of the Malawi Police for twelve years, from 1964 to 1976. In that capacity, he was also a member of the National Security Council at that time chaired by Mr Albert Muwalo Nqumayo, whose membership included the Inspector General of Police, Mr Mark Kamwana, the Army Commander, General Graciano Matewere, and the Secretary to the President and Cabinet Mr John Ngwiri. In October 1976, following allegations that he had plotted with Mr Muwalo to assassinate the Head of State, Dr H. Kamuzu Banda, and Mr Gwede was arrested and sent to prison. He spent 17 years there and was only released in 1993, at the dawn of the multi-party era in Malawi. Since then, he has been languishing in his village near Mphepozinayi in Ntcheu. He remains extremely bitter about the MCP regime for having sent him to prison as well as about the UDF Government for not having lived up to the promise of restoring to him all the property that was confiscated by the Banda government.

I joined the Police Service in 1954, and it was in 1964 that I was appointed to serve as head of Intelligence, the Special Branch to be specific, and I was in that position until October 1976 when I was removed.

It was the government at that time which advised the President, Dr Banda, that Malawi should assist those who were fighting for independence in Mozambique because if that was not done then Malawi would be in trouble once Mozambique becomes independent. So, Dr Banda advised FRELIMO in Tanzania that its Secretary General, Joaquim Chissano, needed to get in touch with me, Focus Gwede, so that the two of us could determine or work out plans through which FRELIMO could convey arms from its bases in Tanzania through Malawi to the front, which FRELIMO had by then opened in Zambezia Province.

As already explained by my wife, most of the times Joaquim Chissano used to sleep in my house in Lilongwe, when he was in transit from Tanzania to Mozambique. We used to remove his vehicle's registration number plate and replace it with another vehicle's registration number, and I would drive him to Mulanje, on Malawi's border with Mozambique. We had a fear that Chissano could be identified by Mozambican Government soldiers, since Dedza is near Mozambique, and the Mozambican Colonial Government knew that we were cooperating with Chissano, so they were always searching the vehicles using the main road. As such, we made a plan in a way that when we took Chissano in the car, we were putting him in the middle between the drivers through Muloza Police Post with ease because I would tell the Police Officers that I was with a very important visitor. From there I would escort him to Malawi- Mozambique border so that he could enter into Mozambique with the weapons that he had acquired from Tanzania. Secondly, Dr Banda also used to say that because he had fought for Malawi's liberation to gain independence, we Malawians should also help our fellow fighters from Mozambique, so we followed his orders. We helped them to

pass through Malawi with their military machines. The FRELIMO chief army leader was Samora Machel, but he was not in close contact with us (security personnel), rather we were dealing with Joaquim Chissano, who was personally dealing with me. It was in 1968 when Chissano first started to come to me personally, and I had just been transferred to Lilongwe, early in that year. When Chissano came to meet me I cannot remember whether he was alone or with his colleagues, because he came so many times. Samora Machel told Chissano that when he was in Malawi he should not meet any other person apart from me, as a security officer. He could not even meet any other politician. I helped Chissano up until 1975 when FRELIMO won the independence struggle. The most dangerous place to pass through was at Dedza, which was very close to where the Mozambican Government soldiers were stationed. When we reached Mulanje, there were some routes which we were using, which I cannot reveal to you, and we were passing through a certain river going into Mozambique. I was doing all this following Dr Banda's advice that we should help FRELIMO, so that when they won their independence we should not have problems to use the port of Beira.

I was not involved in assisting the FRELIMO soldiers to pass through Malawi, since that was the duty of the districts that border Mozambique. My role was to assist Joaquim Chissano, such that when Mozambique gained her independence, my name was included on the list of those who were supposed to be given money for pension, as recognition of the role which I played in the liberation of that country. When I was arrested, Samora Machel was not happy because he wanted to help me. In fact, Samora Machel was assassinated by the whites at a time when he wanted to wage war on Malawi.

It was Joaquim Chissano who told me about the pension at Sanjika Palace in Blantyre, when he called me and told me that he wanted to thank me for my role in Mozambique's liberation. He said that he had resolved that I should be taken to Mozambique, especially in Beira, to become a District Governor. He also told me that Samora Machel had prepared my pension for the role that I played.

I was not involved in helping FRELIMO members to access passports to pass through Malawi.

In short, the entire job that I was doing to assist FRELIMO officials was done in secret. As such, I was reporting directly to Dr Banda through the late A. Muwalo, who was more or less like a Vice President, so when Dr Banda travelled outside the country, all security matters were reported to him, since he was the chairperson of the security committee. This committee also comprised of me, the Army Commander, General G. Matewera, the Inspector General of Police, Mark Kamwana and the Secretary General to the President and Cabinet, Mr John Ngwiri. As a committee, we used to meet once every month to discuss security matters. But the issues concerning FRELIMO were not discussed in this committee.

Malawi did not play any role in the liberation of Zimbabwe; we were only concerned with the liberation of Mozambique. The Zimbabwean liberation leaders used to rely on the assistance from Zambia.

In Mozambique I was only dealing with Chissano, because we wanted to make our cooperation as secret as possible, otherwise he could have been killed. When Chissano was entering Malawi from Tanzania, he was using the Songwe Border Post, using touring or saloon cars and the weapons were loaded in the car boot.

When I went to Sanjika Palace the meeting was only between me and Chissano. President Muluzi actually excused himself and he left the two of us. Since that time I have never talked to Chissano again, but he had told me to go to the Mozambican Embassy in Malawi to ask for transport, preferably by air. But the officer there told me to wait so that they could ask for permission, not knowing that he was actually refusing. It was actually the Malawi Government which refused to grant permission, especially Bakili Muluzi who did not like that arrangement.

In fact, Muluzi promised to give me back all my property which was confiscated by Dr Banda. This made us to refuse the offer which Dr Banda had made, through Mr Tseka Phiri, to give us back all that was confiscated from us, including my vehicles and houses. Even the current Speaker of National Assembly, Louis Chimango, also came to Ntcheu to try to talk to us, but we still refused, thinking that Muluzi would fulfill his promise, which he has not done up to now. We could not trust Dr Banda because of the way he had ill-treated us. Imagine, he also imprisoned my wife and her relatives. Although he had tried to send people to take me to see him, I did not accept because I trusted Muluzi. Moreover, although I had worked for 22 years in the Police, I did not receive my pension.

Jaffu, George

[Mpingwe, Limbe; 25 June 2008]

Mr George Jaffu, aged 72 years holds the distinction of having risen fast in the Malawian Civil Service during the early years of independence and served as the first Malawian head of the Civil Service from 1972 to 1975 when he was forced to retire. As Head of the Civil Service, he was also Secretary to the President and Cabinet, and a member of the National Security Committee, along with the Secretary General of the Malawi Congress Party, Commander of the Malawi Army, Inspector General of Police and Head of Intelligence services. His job included the submission of daily briefs to Dr H Kamuzu Banda, the head of state, on the security situation in the country. Upon his retirement from the Civil Service, Mr Jaffu joined LONRHO Company as its Chief Executive Officer and served that company for twenty-four 24 years, from 1978 to the time of its liquidation in 2002. During that period, he became conversant with the security situation throughout East-Central Africa, because of the bearing it had on LONRHO's investments in Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Zambia and Malawi.

I joined government in July 1964, the time when Malawi attained its independence. I first worked as an Administrative officer in the Ministry of Education. Later on I also served in various capacities in various government ministries, such as the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Transport and Communications, Ministry of Finance and finally as Secretary to the President and Cabinet from 1972 to 1976.

As you may be aware, the foreign policy of that time was one of 'contact and dialogue'. The President of that time believed that fighting alone would not achieve the desired effect. So the government was in contact with both sides of the conflict. I can recall that Ian Smith used to come to Malawi and I would take him to the President. Two weeks later Joshua Nkomo would also come to Malawi to meet the State President. So our President was acting like a bridge to these two warring sides. In general, the Government never recognized those running away from the war in Mozambique as 'refugees' rather our government simply said that these people were coming to Malawi to visit their relatives. As such, at that time, the government never sought any assistance from foreign donor agencies to handle these refugees. Even Zimbabweans were treated as people who were coming to Malawi as their 'home' and not as refugees. For instance, in Mangochi District, the Chowe area is full of people who originally came from Mozambique and never returned, even after that war came to an end.

There were a good number of leaders who used to come to Malawi from Zimbabwe, including people like Joshua Nkomo. But the discussions were usually held in camera between the visitors and our President. So one could not tell what they were discussing. In certain cases he was accompanied by his political aides, but we could not tell which one was inside with him. That was beyond our jurisdiction.

From the Africans I also remember Rev Ndabaningi Sithole coming to Malawi. Then as I have already told you, Ian Smith was also coming to meet our President.

All we had to do was to pick these people from the airport and escort them to the State House.

On the side of the white leaders from Zimbabwe there was also another white man called Laden Burg, but I am not sure about the position which he held in the Zimbabwean Government.

The nationalists in Zimbabwe at that time were divided into ZANU and ZAPU factions. It is difficult to say which of these two groups our government supported most. But naturally we worked well with the more conservative side, which favoured dialogue, such that we gave them a better reception as compared to the more militant or radical side.

We also used to hear in the early 1970s, that Rev Sithole used to visit Malawi more frequently, unlike Joshua Nkomo, but such decisions were made at political level. Although we could hear about such changes we could not tell exactly why that was happening.

The issue of assisting the Zimbabwean freedom fighters to pass through Malawi when going to their training bases in Tanzania was left to the Special Branch of the Malawi Police, because that was a security matter. So it was up to the Police to liaise with the Malawi Army and the nationalist leaders from Mozambique and Zimbabwe on how best they could use our territory for transit purposes.

There border clashes from time to time. But there was no time where our armed forces clashed with their counterparts from Mozambique. But in a number of cases Mozambican troops could stray into our territory and disturb our people. People from Nsanje, Ntcheu and Mangochi districts were subjected to such frequent attacks. I was the Chairperson the National Security Committee. The other members of the Committee were the Army Commander, the Commissioner of Police, later on Inspector General of Police, and the Head of the Special Branch of the Malawi Police responsible for 'Intelligence'.

The issues about the liberation movements and the pressure upon our country were also discussed in that committee, almost on a daily basis. We used to get reports from each district and we channelled such reports to the President or took any appropriate action. We also had to decide what sort of intervention was needed, either political or technical, through the Police and Army.

Being a one-party state, there were different establishments responsible for spreading the policy of contact and dialogue at that time; and the issues were handled at different levels as well. If an issue was technical it was handled by the Army, the Police or even the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP). But if an issue was political in nature, it was handled at grassroots level. But as I said earlier on, Malawians and Mozambicans in the border areas are more or less related.

I must be honest with you that we did not have any access any information that our former President, Dr Banda also used to financially assist the nationalist leaders from both Mozambique and Zimbabwe. There was always a limit to what we knew, especially if it was a political meeting.

I remember that the Mozambican issue was very difficult to deal with. The leader of FRELIMO at that time, Samora Machel, was very militant. But the only person I remember that we dealt with at security level was Joaquim Chissano, who was the Head of Intelligence in FRELIMO. He stayed right here in Blantyre, at Chimwankhunda for a long time. He mainly dealt with the Special Branch of the Malawi Police. But on the side of whites, our government dealt with George Jardim and Jaime Du Souza, who assisted in setting up the Commercial Bank of Malawi.

But even after that war of liberation came to an end, we still did not have good relations with FRELIMO because their leader Machel used to accuse the Malawi Government of supporting the Mozambican Colonial Government and later RENAMO.

Even when I left my job with the Malawi Government and joined LONHRO, my boss Tiny Rowland discovered that Samora Machel was preparing to wage a war on Malawi. Machel even influenced the former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda to bomb Malawi as well. So Tiny Rowland had to move around the surrounding countries, starting with Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where he held discussions with the Heads of State, telling them that the war would not be of any profit. In fact, Rowland was in one way protecting his business interests and investments. But my point is that at that time a war between Malawi and Mozambique became imminent.

At the time I went to OPC in 1972, it was very clear that FRELIMO was gaining ground on the battle field, but there were no changes due to these developments. That policy of 'contact and dialogue' still remained intact. I remember that the current Mozambican President Armando Guebuza was in direct contact with our Army Commander at that time, General Graciano Matewere.

But I must also say at that time we used to run Nacala Railway, and we did not want to seem to favour any side. All we used to do was to send our soldiers to protect the railway.

Let me say that we dealt with Joaquim Chissano at the level of security or intelligence. He used to deal directly with the Head of Special Branch. But on the political side that was handled by our top most politicians, such as Hon. John Tembo, who I have no doubt ran errands for our President.

Generally, it was easy to work with our first Head of State over foreign policy matters and indeed any other issues of national interest. But one always had to work within limits. In my case I had to know where the Civil Service line started and ended. As such I made sure not to handle political matters, and I left that for the politicians to handle. On a number of occasions the President would listen to our advice. But we had to be extra careful in a way that we did not want to show that we knew better than he did. But he was open to us and he also used to advise us on a number of things.

Beside Hon JZU Tembo, the other assistants who worked closely with Dr Banda were Hon. Aleke Banda, Albert Muwalo Nqumayo and Focus Gwede, who I am told had now gone mad. But a lot of people fell out of favour with Dr Banda, because of

the political jostling and backbiting that was there as Dr Banda was often told lies by those around him.

In my view, morally, our contribution was by accepting the people from both Mozambique and Zimbabwe to come into our country, where we could assist them without the help of any other foreign agencies. We could give them land and places of settlement such that even when there was peace in Mozambique, these people decided to remain here.

Thank you, thank you.

Kakhobwe, Sam

[Offices of Millennium Challenge Account, Capital City Lilongwe; 27 August 2011]

Mr Sam Kakhobwe aged 71 years is a retired Civil Servant who is now an influential resident of the City of Lilongwe. Mr Kakhobwe served the country as a Civil Servant for twenty-two years from 1967 to 1989; and as Ambassador for six years between 1974 and 1983 to such countries as Germany, Britain, Zambia, and OAU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Since retiring from the Civil Service in 1989, he has served as executive head of several development agencies and programmes including Business Development Africa Ltd (1991- 1994), Malawi Poverty Alleviation Programme (1994-1995), Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF) (1995-2005), AND Millennium Challenge Account (2008-2011). Mr Kakhobwe talks about Dr Banda's foreign policies and dealings with leaders of the Liberation Movements in neighbouring countries of Southern Africa such as Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa. Mr Kakhobwe worked closely with Dr Banda when he was the Principal Secretary for the Ministries Dr Banda himself headed such as Agriculture and Foreign Affairs; and Secretary to the President and Cabinet (SPC) during his last years as a Civil Servant from 1985-1989.

Dr Banda's Foreign Policy was not very different from the other emerging independent African countries, whose first consideration was to ensure that the countries should feel independent both politically and economically. In the early years, the leaders of the newly independent states were interested in getting economic assistance, no matter where it came from in order to develop their countries. As such, Dr Banda's foreign policy was based on the needs of the country. You will also appreciate that when he became President of this country, it was at a time when the Cold War was still in progress, and Dr Banda completely aligned himself with the West.

For instance, it is recorded that during the early years of independence the Chinese Government had offered Dr Banda 6 Million British Pounds for development, and then trebled the figure to 18 Million British Pounds, but still Dr Banda refused the offer. In other words, he had nothing to do with the Communist bloc during the Cold War era. So, his foreign policy was to totally align with the West. He voted with the US and the UK over Israel. He also supported the British adventure over the Falklands. Therefore, I would continue to say that his foreign policy was influenced by the economic and developmental needs of the country.

In terms of regional politics, Dr Banda was of the belief that 'contact and dialogue' would be the most appropriate. This made him different from his colleagues at the OAU. But he did not hide his intentions. For instance, there was a time when he went to Ghana to attend an OAU meeting which had been organized by Kwame Nkrumah in October 1965 he maintained his stand on the policy of contact and dialogue. He made reference to the fact that Arabs had for a long time collected slaves from sub-Saharan Africa, including Nyasaland (Malawi), but after independence the same

Arabs could be in a position to shake hands with the same sub-Saharan Africans whom they had enslaved before. Black Africans were now able to shake hands with great Arab leaders such as President Nasser of Egypt, and so on and so forth. Dr Banda thus believed that it was possible to use the policy of contact and dialogue to solve the Southern African regional problems.

However, it seemed as if many African leaders at OAU were not in favour of Dr Banda's policy of contact and dialogue, and this prompted him to slowly start withdrawing from OAU activities. He was being attacked for being friends with the Portuguese in Mozambique and the Boers in South Africa.

As you might be aware, his relationship with South Africa culminated in his visit to that country in 1971, where he repeated what he said in Cairo in 1964. He addressed a crowd at the University of Stellenbosch, which was an Afrikaner based institution and therefore a centre of pro-Apartheid scholars. He told the gathering that he had not changed his policies; that he was still a nationalist; and also that he was not in favour of the Apartheid system in South Africa. Rather, he had gone there to tell the Afrikaners and nationalists to engage in dialogue. He advised the Afrikaners to initiate the dialogue process, as time would come when both white and black South Africans would have to work together as equals.

He also went to Mozambique and said the same things to the Portuguese. The Portuguese appreciated one side of Dr Banda's policies, which was the one that Dr Banda was not openly supporting FRELIMO and indeed any other nationalist group in Mozambique. Banda assured them that FRELIMO and other such groups would not create a military base in Malawi, from which they could launch attacks against the Portuguese in Mozambique.

Dr Banda had two things in mind. Firstly, he wanted Malawi to have a good relationship with its neighbours, including Mozambique. Secondly, he was also looking for dialogue, not just between himself and the Portuguese, but also dialogue between the Portuguese and the people of Mozambique.

The policy of contact and dialogue was meant to benefit Africans, especially the nationalist groups such as ANC of South Africa, ZANU of Zimbabwe and FRELIMO of Mozambique. However, Dr Banda used to acknowledge that his policy of contact and dialogue would not in the short term benefit the freedom fighters in Mozambique and South Africa, because the immediate needs of these freedom fighting groups were to be given arms with which to fight against the colonialists. And this was something which Banda never encouraged and was thus not in a position to provide arms to these groups. His main policy was that of contact and dialogue, and therefore even if he had arms here in Malawi, there was no way he could have distributed them to the freedom fighters.

You have to know that Banda recognized that his policy was a long-term one, but he had to make a start, and that is why he had to contact both Mozambique and South Africa, although he knew that his colleagues at the OAU would not support it. But he was prepared to be the odd man out in terms of regional politics as promoted

by the OAU. He was different from Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia; both of whom allowed freedom fighters from neighbouring states to establish military camps. Both Tanzania and Zambia allowed Russia and China to supply arms to these freedom fighters. For instance, the Russians supplied them with AK 47 Rifles, which were very common amongst these groups, such as within the ANC, ZANU PF and FRELIMO.

So, the policy of contact and dialogue did not immediately help the freedom fighters in the region, and Banda knew that, but he kept a blind eye in terms of allowing freedom fighters to operate from Malawi. Off course a good number of them, especially from Mozambique could pass through Malawi, but they were always afraid that they would be captured and turned over to either South African or Mozambican Government authorities.

The ones who used to frequent Malawi were those from Mozambique, who were allowed to open offices in Blantyre. But what Banda did not do was to invite FRELIMO to openly offer them assistance. All he wanted to do was to stick to his policy of contact and dialogue, although he had nothing against any of the nationalist groups. As such, he had no problem to work with the Portuguese in Mozambique and the Boers in South Africa. But he did not take a deliberate step to explain this policy to the freedom fighters. Apparently, some of the freedom fighters, such as FRELIMO, understood this policy and were thus comfortable to operate within Malawi without any fear of being captured by Malawi Government authorities.

During my early years at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to start with, Dr Banda knew the Mozambican freedom fighters, such as Dr Edward Mondlane, very well, including where they came from. But he never came very close to these leaders to establish personal relationships. However, he ensured that there was contact between FRELIMO and other smaller political parties and the Intelligence Personnel in Malawi. Our Intelligence Officers supervised the activities of these freedom fighters within Malawi. The fighting groups were given all the protection and were thus able to move freely within Malawi, without fear of being captured and handed over to Mozambican authorities. Our Intelligence Services had the privilege of getting in touch with the Portuguese Intelligence Services in Mozambique and also the military leaders of the freedom fighting groups. This gave Malawi an opportunity to have prior knowledge of the intelligence motives of the Portuguese in Mozambique and would thus pass on the same message to the FRELIMO freedom fighters then operating in Malawi.

The FRELIMO freedom fighters that had a camp in Mozambique were privileged because they had prior knowledge of the Portuguese Intelligence, and could thus plan their guerrilla activities much more effectively than if they were in the dark about what their enemies were doing.

If at all the Mozambican freedom fighters complained about the role played by Malawi, especially the rhetoric by Samora Machel at political level, was in the way that Malawi did not offer arms to FRELIMO. Machel used to complain about that; and also that Banda was still talking to the Portuguese. However, at Intelligence

level, there was a lot of appreciation by the freedom fighters. For instance, Joaquim Chissano, one of the FRELIMO leaders, who succeeded Machel, did acknowledge the assistance which FRELIMO got from Malawi. Even the Zimbabwean leader, Robert Mugabe, also openly acknowledged the role Dr Banda played to assist the freedom fighters in his country.

The names of the Malawian Intelligence Officers who were working hand-in-hand with these freedom fighters from Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa at operation level, were people such as Lywel Ngwata, Commissioner of Police; J. Kamwana, Inspector General of Police; and General M.M. Khanga, Army Commander. There were also other Police Officers such as the late Mr Itimu, Mr Peter Chikuta and Mr Mijoso. There was also another Intelligence Officer called Mr Kalembe, who I regarded as an interesting character. For instance, he was responsible for bringing Alfonso Dhlakama of RENAMO to Malawi to meet Tiny Rowland of Lonhro, and not to meet Dr Banda. But Tiny Rowland was also able to talk with both Machel and Dhlakama to bring peace between the two. And it was Kalembe who organized such meetings.

Our Police also received support from the Army, where people such as Melvin Khanga, the Army Commander and Lobby Liabunya, the then Head of Intelligence in the Army, helped the Police in dealing with these freedom fighters and indeed the colonial Governments in both South Africa and Mozambique.

John Ngwiri had a lot to do with the ANC, beginning from his days when he was Malawi's Head of Chancellery to London, at the time when Nyemba Mbekeyani was the Ambassador in London. When Ngwiri came back to Malawi to become Secretary for External Affairs, he continued his contacts with the freedom fighters. He also had an advantage because he came from Dedza, which is a district that borders Mozambique, and was thus able to meet FRELIMO people passing through his home area.

FRELIMO was allowed to establish and operate offices in Blantyre, but let me stress that such offices were not open to the general public. By design they were meant to operate secretly, because they were afraid of the Portuguese Intelligence. As such, it was mostly our Intelligence Officers and Senior Malawi Congress Party (MCP) officials who knew that FRELIMO had offices in Blantyre. It was these officials who provided security assurance to the FRELIMO operatives here in Malawi. But there was no formal interaction between them and our Ministry of External Affairs. Such offices were simply used as transit and/or operative posts for FRELIMO, and were in no way used as points from which FRELIMO could organize its fundraising and arms-sourcing activities. Such offices kept foodstuffs and some weapons for guerrilla fighters transiting between Tanzania and Mozambique. Malawi was used more freely by such guerrillas because of the friendly manner in which our Intelligence Officers presented themselves.

The most prominent FRELIMO leader who worked here in Malawi to supervise FRELIMO activities was Chissano himself. The others chose to remain underground, because of fear of reprisals that could have come from the Mozambican Government.

There was a senior Portuguese Government official in Mozambique called George Jardim, who helped Dr Banda to set up the then Commercial Bank of Malawi, who used to frequently visit Malawi. So, most of the senior FRELIMO leaders used to avoid any open contact with the Malawian public for fear of exposing themselves to Portuguese Intelligence.

The late John Ngwiri's contacts with the ANC leadership in South Africa were mainly social, in a way, because he met the ANC leaders in London. So they could meet over a drink. Ngwiri was also responsible for giving money from Dr Banda to ANC leaders such as Oliver Tambo and Jean Wala, who became the first Speaker of the post-Apartheid South African National Assembly. I actually met her in London with John Ngwiri, and we discussed a lot of issues concerning South Africa and Mozambique. She was a socialist and was thus in support of Communist ideas, especially because the ANC used to get huge support from Communist China, and she thought that it was the only way through which South Africa would be liberated. Thus Ngwiri was used to convince the ANC leadership that Dr Banda was not against the ANC, rather he favoured a peaceful South Africa, and he hoped this would be achieved through contact and dialogue rather than going to war. He encouraged ANC leaders to look for ways of sitting down at a discussion table with the Boers, rather than merely relying on using arms to achieve political independence.

It is difficult for me to tell exactly what Ngwiri's role was. But all I know is that every contact that Ngwiri made with the ANC had the approval of Dr Banda, because each time Ngwiri met the ANC leaders he used to come back to report to Dr Banda. The money that was given to Oliver Tambo had the approval of Dr Banda. I do not remember a time when Dr Banda ever stopped any of his foreign envoys or local ones to meet with ANC leaders. I remember when I was Malawi's High Commission in Lusaka, Zambia, people such as Thabo Mbeki and indeed other notable ANC leaders would come to our Independence Day Celebrations to party with us, although other leaders stayed away for fear of being recognized by the general public. Some ANC leaders also appeared at parties hosted by Communist embassies in Lusaka, where I was able to meet them as one of the invited guests.

First of all, you must understand that the policy of contact and dialogue was not applied to Zimbabwe. Dr Banda still considered Zimbabwe as part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, as such, his fight against the Federation continued even after Malawi and Zambia had become independent. So Dr Banda had no wish to dialogue with the settlers in Zimbabwe, rather he wanted them to hand over political power to Africans. The very same Federalists had no plans to economically develop Malawi; all they wanted was to use her as a source of labour.

At that time, Dr Banda worked with Joshua Nkomo and Ndabaningi Sithole on the ZAPU side, and also Robert Mugabe on the ZANU side. However, Dr Banda seemed to trust Sithole more than Nkomo, whom he considered to be untrustworthy. Later on Dr Banda discovered that Sithole was weak, and so he gave more support to Mugabe, who seemed to be a much stronger leader. It was at that time that Dr Banda

bought a vehicle, a Land Rover, for ZANU PF for campaign. But even Nkomo himself also used to come to get tactical, financial and material support from Dr Banda.

I remember, one time when I was the High Commissioner in Lusaka, Joshua Nkomo complained that Mugabe was not respecting him: was calling him names; calling him stupid. Then there was a meeting at the State House in Lusaka, where the then Zambian Head of State, Kenneth Kaunda, asked Mugabe to apologize to Nkomo. Mugabe however, refused to apologize insisting that whatever he said about Nkomo at the time was right, but he promised not to say it again.

Other nationalist leaders who also used to come to Malawi were Abel Muzorewa and Mr Nyandoro, who were sent by Mugabe.

So in a nutshell, I would say that Dr Banda significantly assisted the nationalist cause in Zimbabwe. He wanted them to be independent at all costs. He thus made sure they were given money, tactics and others materials which they needed. However, they were not given arms at any point. The two factions, ZAPU and ZANU, were at home here in Malawi, and they had all the liberty to do so. But I think they never saw it fit to open offices here.

One thing you have to know is that Dr Banda ran this country with the help of the Civil Service. The Cabinet Ministers had no real powers. Their responsibility was to run the MCP: to mobilize the sale of party membership cards; and indeed mobilize party support. In fact, the MCP itself was funded by Dr Banda himself. He used bank loans from the National Bank of Malawi and Commercial Bank of Malawi (CBM) to run the party. There were times when the party went into overdraft with the CBM account, where I got involved much later.

Almost all Government decisions were made by Dr Banda and the top Civil Servants. At the policy level, it was Dr Banda, the Secretary to the President and Cabinet (SPC), the Army Commander and the Inspector General of Police. We were thus what one would call the 'inner circle' of the country. It was Dr Banda who told us what to do and what not to do. For instance, on the question of family planning, he rejected the idea, saying that it was not his duty to tell Malawians how many children they ought to have, but such decisions would be better if made between husband and wife.

So in terms of Government policies, be it foreign or domestic, Dr Banda dealt with this team. In terms of national security, both the Army Commander and the Inspector General of Police and indeed the Head of the Malawi Young Pioneers (MYP), used to report to me and I would forward their reports to Dr Banda. But there were other confidential reports which were given directly to Dr Banda by the responsible officers. As SPC I was Chairperson of the National Security Council, whose members included the Army Commander, the Inspector General of Police and the Head of Intelligence, who was the Secretary. Here we looked at a number of issues, including political, economic and indeed security issues affecting the country. I would then give monthly Intelligence reports to Dr Banda on the conclusions arrived at during our meetings.

It was in such meetings where we insisted that Malawi should have good relations with Mozambique to avoid being attacked, especially because Mozambique is our neighbour. We also discussed political developments in Zimbabwe and South Africa. I remember giving him a 10 page report on developments in South Africa which he never gave me back.

With regard to South Africa, Dr Banda never sent me to discuss any issues with ANC leaders. Rather I made sure to report to Dr Banda any conversations I had with ANC leaders who I came across, especially the time I was in Zambia, or indeed from reports I used to get for our envoys in Lusaka and London. He encouraged us to meet them and discuss with them the developments of their struggle, in the hope that one day the Boer-led Government in South Africa would realize the need to hand over power to the black majority.

I would say that Malawi's contribution was very commendable although our contribution was very different from what other countries did. In a way, that was done within the context of Dr Banda's foreign policy. For instance, without necessarily publicizing it, Dr Banda allowed Mozambican freedom fighters to use the Malawi territory as much as they wanted without any harassment. They were given accommodation, office space and transit facilities.

South African freedom fighters also used to get assistance from Dr Banda, although they never opened offices here in Malawi, but in Zambia.

Zimbabwean freedom fighters also got a lot of assistance from our Government. Most of those who escaped the harsh treatment under Ian Smith were able to get British Passports from Malawi.

So if we are to analyse Malawi's foreign policy we need to leave out the sentiments of other African leaders who thought Malawi was not helpful enough. Rather, we need to start from the standpoint of Dr Banda's policy, where we could see that he substantially assisted the freedom fighters from our neighbouring countries.

Thank you.

Kaligomba, Raphael R.

[Bangwe Township, Limbe-Blantyre; 22 November 2007]

Mr Raphael Kaligomba was in the late colonial period one of the first African officers to be professionally trained for the Nyasaland (Malawi) Police Service. Originally he is from Nsanje District and is currently a retired Civil Servant residing in Bangwe Township in Blantyre. At the time of Malawi's independence in 1964, he was one of those who were identified to serve as understudies of British expatriate police and Immigration Officers whose contacts with the Malawi government were about to end. He joined the Nyasaland Police Service in 1956. In 1965, he was seconded to the Immigration Department where he in subsequent years served as Permit Office and then Passport Officer. In 1974, he was promoted to the rank of Deputy Chief Immigration Officer, and nine years later in 1983 to the top most rank of Chief Immigration Officer, from which he retired in 1991. As Deputy Chief Immigration Officer and Chief Immigration Officer, he had confidential contacts and was mandated to deal with liberation movements and their leaders in the region, including those of neighbouring Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

As Permit and Passport Officer, as well as Deputy Chief Immigration Officer, we had contacts with all the liberation movement in the region. I say with all of them, just as we had contacts with all those who came and went as tourists. Our duty was to monitor their movements while they were in the country.

In the case of FRELIMO in Mozambique, we had contacts and dealings with the leaders and their followers, especially when they had to move from their bases in Mozambique, through Malawi, to Tanzania or Zambia, and then from those countries back to Malawi, because from here they then made their way back to Mozambique, through the many exit points along our long common border which they used.

One FRELIMO leader I got to know so well because he lived in Malawi for some time, in Bangwe Township in fact was Joaquim Chissano. He was a big man within their movement. I also got to know and have dealings with Alfonso Dhlakama. We monitored their movements whenever they were in the country, but we had to be secretive about our dealings with them, because those were the instructions we operated under, from above. In fact, this is the first time in my life I have had to talk to someone about these things.

The dealings we had were mostly to give them permission to transit or to stay in the country for some time, and we monitored their movements. They had to identify themselves and state why they were in the country and for how long they would stay. Our role was to issue them passports, visas, transit visas, permits to stay for a while, etc. We did not involve ourselves in other dimensions of their operations, such as trafficking arms. That was for other branches of Government, because several branches of Government were involved so as to ensure maximum security for our country.

There were a number of other Mozambican leaders who we dealt with, but as of now with the passage of time it is difficult for me to remember their names. Remember that war ended in 1975 unless if I was still working for the Immigration Department I would be able to trace their names in the files. In actual fact, I handled so many of them, I cannot remember their names.

Apart from Bangwe, these Mozambican leaders stayed in other areas. They had so many points, such as Nsanje, Mulanje, Mwanza, Tete and Mangochi on the Nanmwera-Mandimba side. You know Malawi has a long border with Mozambique, such that there are so many points of contact between these two countries.

Other people like the combatants were also coming to Malawi; sometimes they could come with their leaders, while in other instances they could come on their own and they did not want their movements to be known because of the arms they were carrying. More to that it is not conventionally allowed for soldiers to carry arms from one country into another. Assisting these people with transportation during their stay in Malawi was the role of the other branches of government, especially the ‘Intelligence’ wing of the Malawi Police or the Malawi Army who knew how to handle these people.

Due to the state of war at that time, we had to handle these people with care. As such we did not apply deportation orders to people who had fled from a war. If they contravened the laws of this country, then one branch of our government would come in. Sometimes these people would face the law, where depending on the sentence some of them would be allowed to stay in Malawi or some of them would be told to go back to Mozambique, but without necessarily applying deportation orders. Our aim was not to do things that would jeopardize their safety. In fact, according to an agreed convention, it is not allowed to push people from another country back into a war which they are fleeing from. I knew all these things because I was well trained. When I was appointed Chief Immigration Officer, at that time the designation of the office was that of Deputy Chief Immigration Officer. Later on it was elevated to Chief Immigration Officer. Then I was the first person to become Chief Immigration Officer. I was responsible to report to the Inspector General of Police, which is where the branch of the law comes in. From the Inspector General next to come was the Secretary to President and Cabinet (SPC) and then to the State President. Later on, when the first Malawian Inspector General retired, the Immigration Department was asked to be directly reporting to the Office of the President and Cabinet (OC) and I was reporting to the SPC, such that my Minister was the State President.

Nearly all of the factions involved in the Zimbabwe liberation struggle came to Malawi, either to seek advice or to flee from the war, and indeed for anything they could ask for, such as seeking transit. We normally saw Joshua Nkomo coming to Malawi. But the other names did not feature highly in our records. But Nkomo always came with some people and we could be tipped well in advance to assist these people with all the ‘intelligence’ measures required. We were not working in isolation, but as a machine with so many parts. James Chikerema came to Malawi, but we did not come

face to face with him and others, because sometimes they were handled by other branches of the state system. From ZANU I remember Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole used to come to Malawi; and even Bishop Abel Muzorewa was very familiar to us.

These leaders of the liberation movements from Zimbabwe came to Malawi mainly to seek refuge, and also to seek advice from the Malawi Government, especially from the political leaders. The Zimbabweans did not come to Malawi for periods of time, as was the case with the Mozambicans. Their case was different because Malawi has got a common border with Mozambique unlike with Zimbabwe. As such these two groups from Zimbabwe and Mozambique came at different levels. The Zimbabwean leaders came here to seek advice and financial assistance. Even when Zimbabwe got its independence, our leaders could state it openly that the Zimbabwean leaders were coming to seek assistance from Malawi during their war of liberation. It was no longer a secret that they could hide.

What I have done is to give you an insight of what happened from my professional perspective (as a Chief Immigration Officer). On our part, we were civil servants and we did not take a great role in political activities, although we saw so many things but that was out of our jurisdiction, so I reserve my comment on how Malawi could have contributed to liberation of Zimbabwe in other areas.

Our general policy on the people from Mozambique who were fleeing the war of liberation between FRELIMO and the Portuguese-led government was that they should be allowed to come into Malawi, because they are our brothers and that they should not be forced to go back to Mozambique. If some of them came with arms, it was our responsibility to inform other branches of the government to come and deal with them in respect of the arms they were carrying. And in most cases these people were disarmed. The weapons were kept by those who were responsible.

The majority of those who came to Malawi were registered, whether at a point of entry into Malawi, or in the camps where they were staying in Nsanje, Mwanza and Mulanje. These people could be registered by the Immigration Department, the office of the District Commissioner and the UNHCR. So there were about three registers: one for the actual people; one for food distribution (by the UNHCR); and one for the Social Welfare Department at the District level. The Immigration Department registered all these people at the national level.

Nsanje and Mwanza border posts proved to be the most difficult to control as far as the influx of Mozambique refugees was concerned, because there is an open land near these border posts.

Thank you.

Kaminyu, Lydia

[Namasalima Village, T/A Njema, Mulanje District; 18 December 2007]

Lydia Kaminyu, aged 40 years was married to a Mozambican from Milanje District. Together with her husband, they were in Milanje when the war between FRELIMO and RENAMO broke out. In the countryside where they were, they were displeased from one hideout to another before they sought refuge at Villa Milanje. They were forced to flee the Villa along with many of its residents and defenders when RENAMO occupied it and Drove out FRELIMO soldiers in 1982.

I left Malawi for Mozambique after getting married to a Mozambican man. We were staying in Milanje District and our stay there was very miserable in nature. We spent a good part of our stay in Mozambique in a cave. We could only go out for short periods to look for piece jobs, fearing that we could be captured by either FRELIMO or RENAMO troops. But the more dangerous of the two were the RENAMO troops, who were making frequent patrols in our area up to Benfica. Sometimes the FRELIMO troops could come to fight against the RENAMO guerrillas. The RENAMO guerrillas were so harsh towards ordinary people, for instance, they could pound our children or even hit them against trees, if and when they found the children just roaming around. After these atrocities had increased in intensity I told my late husband that I wanted to go back to Malawi. My husband did not like the idea because he thought that it would be difficult for him to find any other income generating activity here. As such we agreed to go and stay at Villa which is nearer to our home in Malawi. This was a better option because I had grown tired of having our food and property stolen and confiscated by the RENAMO guerrillas.

We left at night and our first stop was at Thengwa, then we reached Villa Milanje Boma. The government officials at Villa welcomed us as being successful by running away from RENAMO'S areas of influence. We stayed at Villa a few years and then we heard that RENAMO troops were nearing the main government office at Villa. As such, government officials advised us to dig holes where we could hide from the guerrilla attacks. We were also told to be crawling when fleeing from the guerrillas so that we could not be hit by any stray bullets. Within days the RENAMO guerrillas invaded the town and we saw the troops wearing red head band, this caused the people flee in different directions. We returned to Villa only after government soldiers had managed to chase the guerrillas away. But one night, the RENAMO troops came back again with heavy weapons called Bazookas and killed a lot of people. As such we decided to flee to Malawi.

The initial assistance that we got in Malawi was in the form of water, foodstuffs and medical attention, since most of us came here with injuries. Then we started receiving tents which we used to make temporary homes. We could hear that the RENAMO troops had succeeded in plundering and looting all the property at Villa Milanje. Later on we were given permanent pieces of land for settlement and farming.

But one day we just saw a number of war planes from Mozambique moving around our area and dropping bombs. As such we started running away towards Mount Mulanje. In some of the planes we could see some soldiers dropping down using parachutes, which frightened most of us. One plane actually reached Ruo River which is on the Malawi side in Mulanje District. That was a market day and the troops cut off the throat of one woman who died on the spot.

After staying in Malawi for some years we just heard that the war had ended, such that we returned to Mozambique as commanded by the government officials.

At the time when we were still in Mozambique, the people were saying the leader of RENAMO was Alfonso Dhlakama.

Some people and even relatives of my husband were being forced to join RENAMO and some of them were actually killed. A good number of my husband's relatives were killed by RENAMO troops. They also wanted to kill my husband and that is what prompted us to flee to Malawi seeking refuge. My husband was doing businesses, so they became suspicious of him that he was harbouring FRELIMO troops, or that he knew where FRELIMO troops were found during his movements and business transactions.

The RENAMO troops were stationed in a number of areas, but I have forgotten the names of the areas. At that time the RENAMO troops were mixed up, some were coloured and some were black people, so we could not tell who they really were. In fact some of the troops were those who had been captured in the villages to carry the goods and guns for the guerrillas.

Villa is a town and initially we were renting someone's house. But with time we managed to build our own house, in which we only stayed for a short period because of the disturbance caused by the war, which saw us running away to Malawi. One day we went to fetch firewood in the mountains and one of us was captured by RENAMO troops. We reported the matter to her husband, who in turn alerted FRELIMO troops about the capture of his wife. So the husband together with the FRELIMO soldiers followed where the RENAMO troops were but they failed to locate where she was. When we were fleeing to Malawi we only did so with the husband and we do not know whether the woman survived or not, especially because in those days young women were in high demand by RENAMO troops to be used as cooks in the camps. There were thousands of FRELIMO troops in Milanje, but the RENAMO guerrillas were tactically good, in a way that they started with de-connecting all electric lines in the town, something which disturbed the FRELIMO troops because most of their weapons were electricity driven. This made most FRELIMO troops to flee in different directions. Most of them run away together with us to Malawi. Some of them were simply throwing away their weapons, but others who carried the weapons into Malawi went straight to the police where they were disarmed. We also fled together with other government officials, including the District Commissioner of Milanje.

At first here at Limbuli we were just bunched into one place, but when medical officials came to see our unsanitary conditions they asked the chiefs to provide more

pieces of land to the refugees. As such, we ended up being scattered in different places; others went to settle at Gambula, Suwazi, while some remained here.

Before we went to the camps we first stayed with our local relatives, but because we came from Mozambique in large numbers it could not have been fair for us to burden my own relatives with the task of looking after us. We were so many in number that some of us were actually sleeping on verandas. This is what made us to go to stay in the camps.

We were given foodstuffs and clean water. Each household was given food according to the number of people in the house. We were also given clothes. The school was at Mitawa, right here at Limbuli. The school blocks are currently being used by Malawian pupils. Most of the teachers in these schools were Mozambican and they were teaching Portuguese.

Most of the people suffered from malaria, cholera and diarrhoea. The government sent us medical staff that were assisting us with all sorts of medicine. In fact, the government also built a health centre for us, using tents and iron sheets.

Some refugees were able to do personal businesses, especially those who were already businessmen whilst still in Mozambique; they just continued with what they were doing. When such people went back to Mozambique they had amassed a lot of money which they used to build strong good houses back home, roofed with iron sheets. Such people made more money than most local Malawian businessmen make.

When the war ended in Mozambique it was announced on the radio for a number of weeks, telling all the refugees to go back to Mozambique. Following that, some people went to build houses in Mozambique and then came back to take their families; others still remained here because they were not sure if the war had really ended.

We were not happy being refugees because our lives had been disturbed up to the point of eating donated foodstuffs which were not always enough. As such most of the times we did not have food to eat, because it took long for the food to be distributed to us. We had to rely on doing peace jobs in Malawian people's gardens.

Thank you.

Madewu, Tobias Tembo

[Mgoola, T/A Chapananga, Chikwawa District; 6 June 2008]

Group Village Headman Tobias Tembo Madewu, aged 86 years, is highly regarded as the gate keeper overseeing the western-most-part of Chapananga's area. He earned special recognition in the 1970s for his effective monitoring of and reporting of cross-border intrusions by Portuguese colonial forces at the time of their struggle against FRELIMO d freedom fighters in Tete Province. He claims to have on several occasions interacted with General Sigauke, who commanded FRELIMO forces in Tete Province at the time. Madewu is also well known throughout the Chapananga area for his services as a herbalist. He presides over several senior minor headmen of Mozambican origin in the area known as Mgoola, which adjoins Moatize District in Mozambique.

During that time the war of liberation in Mozambique, between FRELIMO and the Portuguese-led government was being fought I was residing in this same village. I remember that in 1971, on the particular night, our village was invaded by Portuguese soldiers, which caused most of us to flee in different directions. A lot of people were captured and killed on that night, including my brother-in-law. Most of us lost our property and I personally lost the property that I had acquired when I went to work in Zimbabwe.

After the Portuguese soldiers had left our area we sent a report to the DC at Chikwawa who sought assistance from the Malawi Army, and they came a few days after being alerted. We saw the top army officials, including General Matewere and Mr Kamwana, the then Commissioner of Police, coming to our area. These military officials ordered their troops to come to our area to provide us with all the necessary security. The soldiers helped us to get back our maize which we had left behind when we fled the attacks from the Portuguese troops.

After that all of us were ordered to move away from this area, and most of us crossed the Mwanza River and stayed near Senior Chief Chapananga's court. From time to time we used to come back to this area to collect our foodstuffs under the escort of the Malawi Army soldiers. And due to such movements I was nearly struck by a stray bullet, when a Mozambican Army helicopter flew past our area, shooting anyone whom they suspected of being a sympathizer of FRELIMO.

In 1972, Malawi government officials came to record the atrocities that had been committed by the Mozambican soldiers, such that within a few months of that exercise most of us were given compensations. The villages around this place that were greatly affected by the intrusion of the Mozambican troops into the Malawian territory were Mvula and Gola, where some people were killed.

The soldiers advised us to move out of this area to go and settle near the Senior Chief's court, while they were left here to patrol the area. It was only in 1974 after that war had come to an end that we were allowed to come back to this village.

The FRELIMO guerrillas could sometimes come here, but not to stay, but rather they would just pass by our area on their way to Mozambique. At that time the leader of FRELIMO around Tete Province was a man called Sigauke, who at one time ordered his troops to provide us with all the necessary security to get the foodstuffs which we had left behind when we fled the Portuguese attacks. In fact, these FRELIMO troops also benefited from us because they could also partake of our foodstuffs which we had left in the silos.

Most of the FRELIMO troops were coming from Angoniland, via Tete Province, passing through our area on their way to the Zambezia Province where there was another FRELIMO camp. At first we used to fear them and we would flee upon seeing them, but they called us and told us not to run away, saying they were our relatives. We used to recognize them because most of the female troops had earrings. They had hand grenades, guns and other weapons which we cannot tell because some of the weapons were carried in bags. FRELIMO troops just passed through our area, but they did not recruit our youth.

During that same war of liberation we saw a lot of Mozambicans fleeing towards the Malawi side to seek refuge, and most of them settled at Chang'ambika Village and Kanzimbi Village. Most of them came here with amputated body parts.

Within a few years of Mozambique achieving independence, a civil war broke out between FRELIMO and RENAMO, but we did not know what caused that war. That was an internal affair to Mozambique, and all we heard and saw was that another war had broken out in Mozambique, which was even more brutal than the first one. During that war it was the RENAMO guerrillas that were very harsh towards ordinary Mozambicans.

The RENAMO guerrillas used to accuse the ordinary people of assisting FRELIMO troops to win that war hence they vented their anger on our relatives who came to seek refuge in Malawi. Our government helped those refugees by designating special areas where camps were constructed to provide shelter to them.

At that time RENAMO was led by Alfonso Dhlakama, while FRELIMO was led by Samora Machel.

Most of the Mozambican refugees used to come from areas such as Samua, Mvulatsitsi, Mvunga, Minjokha and Chiwodzi. I can just say people from Tete and Zambezia Provinces. Some of them were from the Ngoni, Sena, Nyungwe, and Tonga ethnic groups. Others came from as far as Manica, and they were speaking in Shona language.

Initially we used to give them foodstuffs before handing them over to the police, who were then responsible for directing them to the refugee camp at Chang'ambika. At the refugee camp our government gave them foodstuffs such as maize, beans and sugar, so that most of the refugees were very appreciative of our government's gesture.

When the civil war in Mozambique come to an end, we just heard on the radio that the two warring sides, FRELIMO and RENAMO, had agreed to stop fighting

and had decided to settle their differences amicably. Later on announcements were also made calling upon all the refugees to go back home. We had cases where some of the refugees decided to stay in Malawi on permanent basis. These were mainly those people who did not want to face similar hardships to those they faced during the war. In all the surrounding villages we have such people and they are now treated as Malawians and some of them have successful businesses.

Thank you.

Mafelo, Gunduze and Phiri, Malesi

[Kunenekude Village, T/A Kanduku, Mwanza District; 6th December, 2007]

Mr Gunduze Mafelo aged 72 years and Malesi Phiri aged 65 years and their families fled from Kazula District in Mozambique in the early 1970s, following the intensification of the war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese. They describe the ordeal of having spent about two weeks in the bush before they reached safely in the Dedza-Ntcheu area of Malawi. The main informant was Gunduze Mafelo.

In the beginning of the war of liberation the Portuguese used to move around in our villages to tell us to report to government officials the movements of FRELIMO guerrillas. As such when FRELIMO troops came to our village, we decided not to tell the government officials because we saw it as a problem. But after some months had passed, we became frightened with the way the white Portuguese were killing our relatives and other fellow Africans. As a result, I decided to take my family and ran away to Malawi. Here, we were well received, such that we no longer think about our home areas in Mozambique, currently our home area is Kunenekude Village.

The village I came from is called Chitutu, under Sub T/A Molosoni, T/A Mchiza in Kazula District. And I was the one who was Sub T/A Molosoni.

The new group of soldiers that came to our area were called FRELIMO troops. I cannot really tell where these troops were coming from, because all of us were terrified by their presence, so we could not even dare to ask. I cannot explain who their leader was, because as I said, we were frightened by their presence in our area, and all we could do was to run away from these 'animals'. Most of them were initially putting on civilian clothes, such that it was very difficult to recognize them.

Most of them used to ask for food, especially maize flour and chickens. But with time, they started to use force to take our livestock and maize.

No close relatives of mine were taken to be trained as guerrillas, but there were some people that I knew that were taken. I denied them to have access to my close relatives.

It was at the time when six of my fellow chiefs and their people came to my village to tell me that they would openly support the FRELIMO troops, that I decided to run away with my relatives at night; this was because I was afraid of openly joining the war. I was not prepared to join the war to fight against the Portuguese.

The FRELIMO and government troops had fought a major battle at Ferancungo, where the FRELIMO troops received reinforcement from Zimbabwe to fight against the Portuguese-led government.

When I left my home area, I went towards the Lilongwe direction, and my first stop was at Thumbé, where we slept. From there we had to climb Mwala wa Mpando Hill where we spent two days. After that we reached Lisangadzi where we found that the FRELIMO troops had just passed area a few days earlier back. From there we reached

Dedza District in Malawi. I was together with my whole family, my wife, my kids and my mother. We were eight people in total.

Initially I settled at Kaphiri Uta in Dedza District, at a place called Diamphwi, where I got a job as a farm labourer. I did not stay there long and I decided to come to Mwanza District because my grandparents who were of the Chabweza family, had already trekked to Mwanza from Mozambique, so I decided to follow them. When I arrived here in Mwanza, I did not stay with my parents but I chose to come to Kunenekude Village where I was well received in a way that I was given a piece of land to do some farming. There was a shortage of land where the Chabwezas had stayed that is why I came here; and it was Sub T/A Kunenekude who allocated a piece of land to me. I arrive here in about 1975 and I was the first one from Mozambique to come here. When the Mozambican Civil War started I was already settled here, so I was not aware of the causes of that war.

The major form of assistance was the one that I have already said that we were given a piece of land for both settlement and farming. But it was me who assisted these people when they asked me to be the Area Chairman for the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) for the Kunenekude area. I do not know why they gave me that position while I was a foreigner. Maybe because I have a good behaviour, which I believe could be what swayed the chief to give me that position.

I came with four children from Mozambique and none of them were interested to go back to Mozambique. All my children are citizens of this area.

I did not bring anything new to this area, because as a foreigner I was simply supposed to follow what the indigenous people of this area do.

I cannot remember when other Mozambicans ran away from the civil war to be settled at Chifunga Camp. I was just hearing about that war. In fact, I have never been to Chifunga Camp in my entire life.

Chief Kunenekude also Joined the Conversation and said:

Most of the refugees came during the Mozambican Civil War, and very few of them came during the war of liberation. We were assisting them by allocating them pieces of land. We stayed with the refugees for about a year, before the government of Malawi came to take them to Chifunga Camp. But some of the refugees decided to remain here, especially those that had already acquired land to farm.

At Chifunga Camp the Malawi Government gave the refugees foodstuffs, clothes, medicine and blankets. The children could also go to school.

After the war had come to an end in Mozambique, there came a letter which called for all the refugees to go back home. With time, our government started transporting these refugees to Zobue, from where they could be taken to their respective home areas.

Mandawala, Bizwick Jackson Namondwe, Time

[Nambazo Trading Centre, T/A Chiwalo, Phalombe District; 10 December 2007]

Mr Bizwick Jackson Mandawala, aged 85 years, is the current Village Headman Mandawala. Mr Time Namondwe, aged 59 years is the current Group village Headman Nambazo. Mandawala was already headman of a border village during the war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese colonialists in the late 1960s and early 1970s. His people played an important role in accommodating refugees from that war as well as from the later civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

I am Village Headman Mandawala from this area. What I saw is that after we got our independence here in Malawi, things got worse in Mozambique as our friends were also fighting for their independence against the Portuguese. That war affected me as someone who stays in the border area. After that first war, there also came the civil war in Mozambique. During this war ordinary people were being ordered by troops to run away to Malawi, hence the influx of Mozambican refugees in our area. We just left everything in the hands of our government which assisted these people by allocating them pieces of land, something which we also did. Throughout their stay in Malawi, our government did not stop assisting them on a daily basis up to the end of that war. Most of the refugees went back home, but others still stayed on in Malawi on permanent basis; especially those who got married in Malawi or had established personal businesses.

At the time of the Mozambican war of liberation, between FRELIMO and the Portuguese, I was working for the Malawi Government, doing the job of issuing 'passes' or permits for people going in and out of this country and Mozambique. When that war intensified, our government told me to stop issuing the permits, since our friends in Mozambique were at war. After all, a gun and a paper are incompatible. That created problems for us to travel along the border areas because sometimes we could meet Mozambican Government soldiers, right in our area, as such we used to run away for our own safety. We lived like that until the war came to an end with the defeat of the Portuguese. We did not know what really happened, we just heard the result.

Mlumbu District in Mozambique in which that war intensified was very close to our area. I saw the war being fought in Mlumbu District, although this war intensified in areas that were close to Tanzania. But in our area we could mostly see the soldiers running away. As chiefs our role was to go to confront these people to tell them not to cause trouble in our areas because that war was not ours. Most of us barely slept on some days, just making sure that they did not infiltrate into our area.

Both ordinary people and FRELIMO soldiers used to run away from Mozambique. But for the soldiers, we used to tell them not to bring guns into our area if they were to be welcomed. I saw FRELIMO troops running away from Mozambique into our area here in Malawi, with my own eyes.

We prohibited them from coming to our area with guns; told them that once they enter our territory they should not be going to Mozambique frequently. Once we heard that someone was involved in that we openly told them to go back to Mozambique and never to come back to Malawi.

FRELIMO troops did not come to me to look for boys and girls to be recruited as soldiers in our area, but in Mozambique that was taking place.

I have forgotten for how long we kept the Mozambican refugees who came here during the war of liberation and the dates, but were with them for so many years, and in some instances our government came to assist them. Although we were also poor at that time, we could still give them some food, just to complement on what our government was giving to them.

From what I heard, the main causative factor behind the civil war was that the FRELIMO-led Government wanted to force people to do a number of things, for instance, that people should build their houses in a straight line; that all people in a village should have one garden, one food storage point and even one livestock kraal. These rules and policies did not please other people who thought that independence would free them to do anything without being coerced. These differences led to the outbreak of the civil war. The main leaders behind this civil war were Mondlane and Samora Machel.

The civil war affected us because of these refugees who were coming here. But we were not directly affected because our government was protecting us. The refugees were from Mlumbu District and Mikanyera District. They were running away from the war between FRELIMO and RENAMO, which had intensified at that time. But it was difficult for these people to tell who they were running away from, because some could tell us that they were running away from FRELIMO and others from RENAMO.

As chiefs, we could first report the arrival of the refugees to our Group Village Headman, Nambazo, before proceeding to report to the police and handing over these refugees to the police. As initial assistance we used to give them food, because most of them came with very small children. After the Government was alerted about the coming of these refugees, it took only two days at most then we could see Government officials coming to pick these people to resettle them in the camps. There was a refugee camp built in our area called Micheriwa Refugee Camp. In most cases we also used to help these people because we were treating them as our own visitors. The Government could only come in to distribute medicine to us and even to the refugees whenever they fell sick. There were very few classroom blocks to accommodate all the children.

When the civil war came to an end, all we heard was that some international organizations and the Pope played a big role to pacify the warring sides, and that brought the war to an end. But we never heard who lost or won that war.

Before the refugees went back to Mozambique, our Government addressed public meetings, telling the refugees to go back home in Mozambique. But they were not forced to go back home. Some opted to stay permanently.

Some of the negative things were that we used to complain about food shortages because our area was overpopulated, such that we could no longer afford to keep food. Some of us had cassava gardens, but all of them were emptied because some people stole the cassava. Our maize silos were also emptied.

On the positive side what I saw was that the coming of these people to Malawi encouraged the friendly relationship that exists up to now such that people from either Mozambique and/or Malawi can travel to either country without any problems. So I attribute this friendship to the war time, the influx of people from the other side of the border, and the care that we gave to the people from Mozambique.

Mr Time Namondwe the Group Village Headman Nambazo chipped in and said: Sometimes government troops used to come from Zomba to protect us from any attacks from the Mozambican government troops, and as local leaders we used to offer the Malawi government troops places where they could set up their camps in readiness for any attack on us. So Chiefs Nambazo and Mandawala played a key role in protecting both Malawian and Mozambican ordinary people from being attacked by the Mozambican Government troops. It was at that time that we put up rules that we would no longer entertain anyone from Mozambique who brought guns into our area, because in our area we were relying on pass permits and not guns. We also emphasized that our country was peaceful and we did not want it to be disturbed by these Mozambicans. The Malawi government troops were both white and black and were fighting against any intrusion of soldiers from Mozambique, either from FRELIMO or from the Government side.

Thank you.

Masina, Oniasi

[Ntchache's Headquarters, Mwanza District; 2 December 2007]

Mr Oniasi Masina, aged 65 years is one of the people who fled from Mozambique during the liberation war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese colonialists. He is now living in Ntchache's Headquarters, which is located about eight kilometres Southwest of Mwanza Boma. He was keen to share about the circumstances under which he and his family fled their homes of origin in Mozambique in order to relocate themselves in Malawi, where they are now fully assimilated in the Ntchache's community.

When the war of liberation came, there were a lot of atrocities, especially the killing of soldiers as well as ordinary people. This is what caused some of us to run away from Mozambique to come to seek refuge here in Malawi.

I was in Chief Manjanja's Village, in Fulankhungu District. I do not know who the leader of FRELIMO was at that time. I came here during the time of the war of liberation between FRELIMO and the Portuguese; so when the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO started, I was already here in Malawi.

Due to the liberation war, our lives were disturbed because we used to run away from one place to another, hiding from the gunshots. With time, we got tired of living such a life, hence we decided to come to Malawi.

The liberation war was started in Maputo, where it was fought intensively, before it spread to our villages. It is difficult for me to tell if some of my relatives were killed in the war because most of us fled in different directions. I came together with my family, that is my wife and two children, and also with my uncle's family with his wife and children.

When we were coming from Mozambique to Malawi we passed through numerous bushes before we arrived here. It took us four days to arrive here. The local chief welcomed us and gave us land where we could settle down. In most cases we were also given foodstuffs, and we used to go to Mwanza District Hospital to access medical care. Our children were also allowed to go to school without any hurdles.

There were other people from Mozambique who came with us, but very few settled in this village. Most of them went to settle at Lupiya Village, which is not very far from here. I only know about myself and my family, not what happened to others.

We chose to stay here instead of going back to Mozambique after peace had been restored because, as I have already said, we were thinking about the hardships that we faced during the war, which we did not want to face again. There was no way we could have a peaceful place like this one here in Ntchache Village. None of my relatives went back to Mozambique. All my children remained here.

Munthali, Beaton E.K.

[Capital Hotel, Lilongwe; 28 August 2011]

Mr Beaton E.K. Munthali, aged 61 years is a retired Civil Servant. He was educated at Robert Blake Secondary School, Kongwe (1966-1970), University of Malawi where he studied Public Administration (1971-1974), and Georgetown University in Washington DC, USA (1981-

83) where he did an MA in International Affairs. He had a distinguished career as a Civil Servant and diplomat for the Malawi Government, from 1974 to 2010. During this period, he served as Administrative Officer in District Administration (1974-1978), then in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as Director of Political Affairs and Diplomat (1978-1997), and then as Principal Secretary for Information, Education, Office of President and Cabinet, and Tourism and Culture. He gained first-hand experience of the workings of Dr H. Kamuzu Banda's foreign policy during the two decades he worked in and for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His understanding is that through his strategy of quiet diplomacy which was embodied in his policy of 'Contact and Dialogue', Dr Banda played a significant role in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. He was a common point of contact for leaders of liberation movements in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa on the one hand and those of the white minority regimes the liberation movements fought to dislodge on the other. Mr Munthali also believes that Dr Banda also did offer financial assistance to liberation movements in Zimbabwe and South Africa, but did so discreetly through Malawi consulates in Lusaka, Addis Ababa and London.

Indeed Malawi did play a significant role towards assisting the liberation movements in Southern Africa. This was articulated clearly by Dr Banda, our first Head of State, when he delivered a speech at the OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964, and also in another speech at the UN General Assembly in December 1965. In both cases he emphasized on the point that the independence of Malawi would be incomplete if other African countries were still under colonial rule. He specifically indicated that his approach would be different from others, because he had his own perspective of tackling the continued colonization of other African states. In his speeches, he emphasized that the approach taken should not be through violence, but rather through 'contact and dialogue'.

That was not to say that we did not sympathize with the countries that were not yet independent at that time. Rather, he favoured an approach where the freedom fighters would apply political pressure rather than through violence. That is why you see that from the mid 1970s, he allowed the freedom fighters, especially those from Mozambique to pass through Malawi from Tanzania.

From what I can recall, most of the freedom fighters in Mozambique were operating from Tanzania and Dr Banda was in touch with their leaders through his officials. It was at that same time that Dr Banda was in touch with the Portuguese Government in Mozambique. Dr Banda was totally against the war in Mozambique because of the landlocked nature of Malawi, which makes the country to be dependent on the Beira rail route which is in Mozambique. If there was continued war in that country it

could have affected Malawi's imports and exports. He had to specifically get in touch with FRELIMO because there were rumours circulating at that time that the freedom fighters wanted to attack the railway line in the Tete Province.

The approach that the Malawi Government pursued at that time is what is known as 'Quiet Diplomacy' – as opposed to 'Podium or Conference Diplomacy', where one goes public to make their views heard. That probably explains why Dr Banda only attended one OAU Summit and one UN General Assembly, and sent his Cabinet Ministers to the rest of the summits. If anything he attended more of the Commonwealth Heads of State meetings than any other international meetings.

So throughout his State Presidency, Dr Banda stuck to this policy of contact and dialogue. I still remember that even in the early 1990s, when Nelson Mandela had just come out of prison, Dr Banda insisted that Mandela and F.W De Klerk, the then South African Head of State, should sit down and discuss their differences.

Dr Banda relied on his officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and those serving in Diplomatic Missions outside the country to advance his policy of contact and dialogue, with regard to the liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and South Africa. Sometimes he could even send special envoys for discussions with leaders of the neighbouring Southern African states. The only difference is that when you send a special envoy very few people are privileged to access the details of the discussions that have been conducted. Again, as we are saying that he allowed the freedom fighters to pass through this country, it meant that a Department such as that of Immigration and us in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Office of the President and Cabinet (OPC) had to be involved as well.

I recall that during the time I was at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs there was one ANC representative who was operating from Lusaka – who I personally met. We also knew that our Diplomatic Staff in London dealt with most of such leaders in the UK. I would not know the exact names of the individuals involved in granting travel permits to allow the freedom fighters from Mozambique and Zimbabwe to pass through Malawi, but definitely it was the Department of Immigration that was tasked to carry out such errands. Again, the Department of Immigration was under the OPC. It must however be known that such movements were always kept in secrecy.

We had information in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the offices which both FRELIMO and ZANU had in the country, but such offices were not open to the general public. Our Government gave them assistance as was required. I also heard about that Dr Banda offered financial assistance to the freedom fighters from Mozambique and Zimbabwe, but such moves usually involved his special envoys that he used from time to time.

I mentioned Malawi's Embassy in London was one important point of interaction between our Government and the freedom fighters, but that role was not played at our Embassy in Pretoria. This was because our role as Malawi was to show the then South African Government that the use of force would not work, rather that the two sides must sit down and discuss especially as South Africa used to carry out raids

to the neighbouring countries - Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana, where South African freedom fighters had set up camps. Dr Banda never liked such raids; that was why he sent his envoys from time to time to hold talks with the fighting sides. Dr Banda emphasized this to the Apartheid regime in South Africa, by stating that the difference between a white and black South African was just based on the colour of the skin, and insisting that both white and black South Africans were to be treated equally as human beings.

I would say that Malawi made a positive contribution in the sense that Malawi was in contact with almost all the liberation fighters in the region. If there is any doubt, it is just a question of the degree to which such contacts were made. As I have already indicated, Dr Banda had a policy of 'Quiet Diplomacy', which probably other people failed to appreciate. And indeed if we are to go by what Dr Banda himself said at one time in July 1992 – he insisted that it was very important for Malawi to have cordial relationships with its neighbours. So the fact that Malawi did not allow the opening up of military bases by the freedom fighters, it does not mean that we did not do anything as a country. Even the ordinary people in the villages along the border areas also assisted these freedom fighters.

Dr Banda had his own leadership style. He liked what one would call 'Face-to-Face' or 'One-to-One' or 'Personal Diplomacy', where people could sit down and discuss emerging issues, and he was very good at that.

On the other hand, he did not seem to be good at what is called 'Conference Diplomacy', as I have said he only attended one OAU Summit and one UN General Assembly, and a couple of Commonwealth Conferences.

Thank you.

Namwali, Buxton

[ESCOM House, Blantyre; 20 June 2008]

Rtd. Major General Buxton Namwali, aged 70 years and currently the Director of Security Services, Electricity Supply Commission of Malawi (ESCOM), is one of the few officers still around who was in active service throughout the period of liberation struggles in Mozambique and Zimbabwe, from 1964-1980. After joining the Army in 1963 and attending officer training courses in Britain, he rose in rank through the forces from Lieutenant to Captain, Colonel and then Major General, the rank at which he retired in 1977. At the height of the liberation struggle in Mozambique, he was a Colonel in command of the First Battalion of the Malawi Army in Zomba. It was the force that was responsible for the mounting of border patrols in Mangochi, Mulanje, Nsanje and Chikwawa. He maintains that they mainly depended on Platoon Commanders to carry out the job on the spot, except for a period of two years in the early 1970s when a whole battalion had to be deployed along the Malawi-Mozambique border in Mangochi because Portuguese forces bombed some villages, killed one person and wounded many others.

I joined the Malawi Rifles in December 1963. In July 1964 I was commissioned as an Officer Cadet, after undergoing training in Britain. That same year I started working as Second Lieutenant. In 1966 I was promoted to the rank of a full Lieutenant. In the late 1960s I was promoted to the rank of Captain. In about 1970 I was promoted to the rank of Major. Throughout that time I was also going out to Britain to undergo a number of small courses. In 1972 I was promoted to the rank of a Lieutenant Colonel, meaning that I was going to command a Battalion. From that time I was also deputizing the Army Commander of that time General Matewere. This was the time when the European Generals were being phased out, such that General Matewere was the first indigenous Malawian to become Army Commander.

Later on, I was promoted to become full Colonel and I was sent to Mzuzu where we opened a military training base at Moyale. Later that school was transferred to Salima in 1976. Later on I was promoted to the rank of a Brigadier and I was posted back to Lilongwe. It was in 1976 when we were opening the military base in Salima that I was officially pronounced as Deputy Army Commander by the then Head of State Dr H.K. Banda. This time I assumed the rank of a Major General. But within a few years I lost my job in the MDF due to some reasons.

The war of liberation in Mozambique became a major security challenge to Malawi as a country. Usually we were alerted of whatever that was going on in Mozambique during the war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese. We had to be alert because on a number of occasions each of the two groups could go astray and intrude into the Malawi territory, as such, we had to try as much as possible to patrol the border areas. I remember one time when the Portuguese went astray up to the point of bombing a whole village in T/A Makanjira's area in Mangochi in about 1971. A lot of property was destroyed and one person died.

Apart from that incident, there were numerous border clashes between FRELIMO and the Portuguese which disturbed Malawians living in the border areas, from Mangochi to Nsanje. Sometimes we welcomed them, and looked after them before dispatching them accordingly. I remember that it took us almost a whole year of patrolling the border areas.

There were some incidents that took place in other border-lying areas and affected us, as Malawians, especially along the Muloza border in Mulanje District along the Ruo River which borders Malawi and Mozambique. In that area, the Portuguese and FRELIMO were sometimes involved in heavy fighting which spilled over to our territory, such that a lot of our citizens were also affected. I recall vividly that we lost some lives in that area, both through live bullets or through the landmines that were planted. But it was difficult for us as MDF to intervene in the war due to the limitations that were placed on us by our government. All we did was to rescue those Malawians, or even Mozambicans, who had been disadvantaged by that war.

Much of our work, as MDF, was slightly easier because this was treated as a political issue. As such, we simply used the local leaders who could in turn alert their subjects, to warn them about the war being fought in Mozambique, so that they could take care when walking along the border areas. Apart from these chiefs, the party (MCP) officials and Malawi Young Pioneers (MYPs) were also responsible in spreading this message.

All we did was to confront the combatants from both FRELIMO and the Portuguese who strayed into the Malawian territory and asked what was going on, without necessarily engaging in physical fighting with them. Later on we could dispatch them back to Mozambique. But there was no exchange of fire between them and our troops. It was mainly the National Intelligence Committee (NIC) that was involved in discussions with the FRELIMO leaders. That sort of arrangement was done at a political level and was not for the junior army officers. All we did was to implement the instructions that were put to us.

We had very restricted instructions on the FRELIMO leaders who could pass through Malawi, either from Mozambique to Tanzania or from Tanzania to Mozambique, because mostly it was the role of our colleagues in the Malawi Police to handle such matters. But the army was aware of the movements of these people although we were not dealing with them directly.

If there were clashes in the border areas and the Mozambican troops encroached into the Malawi territory, we did not separate the troops from their weapons. All we used to do was to send the troops back together with their weapons, without confiscating any weapon.

As far as the MDF was concerned the support was mainly at moral level, especially because our government did not want to intervene in the internal affairs of Mozambique. All that our government did was to support the movements of the FRELIMO leaders and troops in our territory; if there was any assistance maybe that was at a higher political level.

The issue of those who came here from the liberation movements in Zimbabwe, from ZANU and ZAPU, was also dealt with at a higher level and by the Police. So we just heard about it, but we did not deal directly with the concerned people.

It was difficult to differentiate the two main groups, ZAPU and ZANU, because that issue was handled at a higher political level, so it was up to the politicians to differentiate the two.

The Army was not directly told that the liberation movements from both Mozambique and Zimbabwe were sometimes having offices here in Malawi, but we used to have a rough idea about the operations of these groups and some of their establishments in the country. But since that was a case for internal security, the Police could be better placed to explain about it.

Apart from the Army, there was also the Malawi Police and the Malawi Young Pioneers, which was a force to reckon with at that time. There was also the National Intelligence Committee, comprised of the Secretary to the President and Cabinet, Head of the Special Branch of the Malawi Police, the Army Commander and the Inspector General of Police, that was dealing with such matters. I cannot really tell whether Malawi Congress Party (MCP) officials were also represented in that Committee; may be the Secretary to the President and Cabinet (SPC) was also representing the party at that level.

We were at risk from the war of liberation in Mozambique for a number of years, up to about 1974 when Mozambique got its independence. By that time the FRELIMO troops had managed to make great progress, such that they took over many rural and urban centres, such that the Portuguese were overstretched, hence they gave in to the demands of the local people.

I cannot really remember the names of the military personnel from the MDF whom I worked with at that time, especially because a good number of them died a long time ago, and also because most of them were my juniors.

The officers sent to oversee the developments in the border areas depended on the level or extent of the situation. If it was a small incident we could just send a platoon, which was under a lieutenant. But if it was a big incident, we could send a number of platoons, led by a major. Sometimes we could even send a whole battalion. For instance during the incident that took place in Mangochi where the First Battalion was sent under my command. During those incidents, as MDF, we were not appealing for any support from outside the country to contain the situation. We were using local resources from the Malawi Government.

I cannot really say much, except that I was proud of the troops that were under me at that time, because they were men who could follow our instructions. That made us not to be involved in any war with either FRELIMO or the Portuguese troops.

I would also like to thank the Police Mobile Force (PMF) which also joined us in Mangochi, in a way that we easily cooperated with them in dealing with the situation.

I would also thank the local Malawian citizens who easily followed the instructions that we put to them as the operation was in progress.

Thank you, thank you.

Nansanya, Tobias Dzimbiri; Makwangwala, Raphael; Dzimbiri, Funny Somela; Dzimbiri, Margaret Bewula; Chinkango, Dorothy

[Nazombe Headquarters, T/A Nazombe, Phalombe District; 14 December 2007]

Tobias Dzimbiri, Village Headman Nansanya, aged 59 years; Raphael Makwangwala Village Headman Makhonja, aged 78 years; Funny Somela Dzimbiri, aged 56 years; and Margaret Bewula Dzimbiri, aged 38 years, made the group of headmen and councilors around Chief Nazombe that was interviewed. They mainly concentrated on the huge influx of refugees from the war between FRELIMO and RENAMO with which Nazombe's area was burdened in the 1980s. Chiringa, Nazombe's area, accommodated about twelve refugee camps at the time. It

was the centre of large operations by the Malawi Government, Red Cross and the UNHCR.

1. Village Headman Nansanya

As Chief Nansanya and my people, we just heard that a war had broken out in Mozambique. Later we saw that some of the refugees from that war started arriving in our area. They first arrived at T/A Nazombe's court. The then T/A called all his lesser chiefs to a discussion on how we could assist those people. At that meeting the chiefs agreed to take care of the people, just as we do with any other visitors who come to our homes. We also asked the Malawi Government to provide any sort of assistance it could to these people. We called the Phalombe Police Office, where police personnel came to assist us in allocating the people arriving from Mozambique in different places. The police and the chiefs decided to settle these people in our villages so that they could not feel sidelined from us. The leaders and the police decided to make up camps in which these people could be staying, ranging from camp one to camp twelve. It was only after the war had come to an end that these refugees went back to Mozambique.

Most of the refugees came from the areas T/A Khoromana and T/A Namarohi in Mlumbu District. Most of them were saying that FRELIMO and RENAMO were at war. Each of these two sides was going around the villages to pick young boys and girls to train them as soldiers. More to that, they were saying that most of their relatives in Mozambique were being killed, hence they decided to seek refuge in Malawi. From what I heard, they were saying what led to the outbreak of that war was a struggle for political power between FRELIMO and RENAMO. They used to tell us the names of the leaders of both RENAMO and FRELIMO, but unfortunately I have forgotten. When the first group of these refugees arrived here, the assistance given by the local leaders to these people was usually in the form of foodstuffs, especially maize flour and relish. The government made sure that these people were offered enough security and they told us to stay close to them so that they could not be harmed by anyone.

There were thousands of people in the camps. The refugees chose their leaders amongst themselves. But in case of some problems, they could tell the surrounding chiefs to assist

When they were finally settled in the camps the government provided these people with foodstuffs, blankets and cooking oil.

In assisting to educating the children of these refugees, the government built special classroom blocks for them at the local primary school here. But sometimes these people could be offered lessons right in the camps where temporary schools were opened.

In providing medical care, the government sometimes sent medical personnel to help them in all the camps. But the refugees could also access medicine from Chiringa Mission Hospital.

The role played by the local chiefs over the refugees in the camps was limited to may be overseeing funerals in the camps; not too much. Because of the dense population in these camps, diseases spread much easier and faster. The people there died mainly from diseases such as cholera and measles.

With the coming of the refugee we experienced some problems because some of them were violent people, especially the drunkards, who caused havoc in our villages. We did not see any of them bringing guns with them, because these people were refugees and they knew that if they were found with guns, they could be deported back to Mozambique.

The level of robbery did not increase so much in our area when the refugees were here.

2. Mr Raphael Makwangwala

We did not have any problems with the refugees, up until they went back to Mozambique. The kind of work they were involved in was mainly working in people's gardens; others could also go up the hills and in forests to fetch firewood which they sold to other people. The government did not lay down any rules on how we were supposed to relate with these people. They were just living as relatives without any restrictions. There were people who came here as refugees and got married here because the local people, both male and female, like to be associated with foreigners. So, most of our boys and girls got married to these people. Some of our daughters went to Mozambique with their husbands.

3. Funny Somela Dzimbiri

Our children got married to these Mozambicans, and some of them are now living in Mozambique. The Mozambicans who got wives here were usually those who were teachers in the schools established here in Malawi. Most of these people had left their wives elsewhere and they could not afford to live without spouses. There is one specific teacher that I know who teaches at a school at Mathache, in Mozambique, who got married to our daughter here. At the end of that civil war it was the government

which sent vehicles for the refugees to be taken to Mozambique. Some of the refugees who were actually our relatives came to our homes to say goodbye.

Since the refugees went back to Mozambique, we exchange visits with them, especially those who stay close to the Malawi – Mozambique border, because we formed a good relationship with them. So they come here with different foodstuffs from Mozambique, to appreciate the role that we played when they were here as refugees.

4. Margaret Bewula Dzimbiri

The refugees who lived here were indeed many in number and they were warmly welcomed here. Most of them came with nothing because they had just run away from the war. Thus it was the role of the local rulers to see to it that these people were assisted. The chiefs first located the refugees in classrooms and also sent a message to the Police to come and assist in handling these people. The District Commissioner for Mulanje also came to see to it that the refugees were given a suitable piece of land for settlement. Later on the DC sent some tents where they could be sheltered temporarily. That was in about 1982. There were a total of twelve in which these things were taking place.

These refugees were given all sorts of foodstuffs by our government officials. But the first foodstuffs came from us local people. The refugees were also hardworking people, because some of them could do piece jobs to supplement what they were receiving from the government. The UNHCR also brought some clothes, blankets and tents to distribute to the refugees. The government established a ‘Nutrition Unit’ where the refugees could get medical attention and nutritious foodstuffs for the malnourished children.

We were very friendly with these people, such that we did most of the chores together. The only problem that we experienced when these people were with us was that they contributed to the deforestation in our hills and forests, because they used a lot of firewood. More to that, we experienced frequent outbreaks of diseases because of the increased population in our area; we also no longer managed to maintain the quality of our water in the rivers and streams. The good thing that the refugees left for us were the classroom blocks built by the United Nations, which when the refugees went back to Mozambique, are now being used by our children.

It was about 1992 that these refugees started going back to Mozambique, but we could see that most of them were not happy to go back to Mozambique because they were used to staying in Malawi, so most of them still come here as our visitors.

5. Dorothy Chinkango

My job with the refugees was that of a volunteer. I was involved in distributing food to the refugees. The food was distributed according to the number of people per household, in intervals of two weeks. We were making sure that each household could be given food accordingly. Apart from the food, we were also distributing

blankets according to the number of people per household. We also gave them plates and clothes.

Further, I was one of the people who volunteered to assist in conducting 'Adult Literacy classes' to the refugees in their camps. I and my fellow teachers were sent for special training on how to handle the elderly people. As a result most of the refugees left Malawi for Mozambique in a state where they were able to read and write. Apart from adult literacy classes, we also operated nursery schools in the refugee camps. The Government was distributing milk for the children in those schools. I actually donated my own garden where a nursery school was built. My children also benefited because they were also attending the same school.

We used to live amicably and happily with these people, such that I did not like it when I learnt that these people would be going back home, because we had forged very good relations with them. In fact, when the civil war was about to end, some of them managed to go to Mozambique and they brought us gifts upon their return. We managed to stay with them as if we were members of the same family, such that it was difficult to tell who was a Malawian citizen and who was a Mozambican refugee. Some of the Mozambicans said that they no longer wanted to face the same hardships that they faced during the two wars in Mozambique. For instance, some of them claimed that they were actually forced to kill, pound and cook their own children by the soldiers who had come to look for food in the villages. But as they were about to cook the 'meat' the soldiers would run away, leaving the people crying for the dead. Such hardships made a lot of people not to want to go back to Mozambique. There are some of the refugees who stayed here permanently who are now well-to-do in society. We have people who were free to do all sorts of businesses, ranging from owning grocery shops and houses for rent. Such people would literary cry if they were told to go back to Mozambique. Some of these people are actually well-to- do than many Malawians.

Phelatu, Raul Phakati

[Kalusa Village, T/A Ngabu, Chikwawa District; 12 June 2008]

Raul Phakati Phelatu, aged 42 years, is originally from Nyakafura in Thambara District south of Tete, is of Sena origin. He was recruited by RENAMO in the early 1980s, but while in training at a base near Tete decided to flee to Malawi in a bid to regain his freedom. He did so through the Tsangano area in Nicheu and later found his way to Mkumaniza Refugee Camp in Chikwawa. Following the end of the civil war in Mozambique he decided not to go back to Mozambique because he had established himself in a fairly lucrative business in Chikwawa.

In my case, during the war of liberation I was a very young boy so I cannot explain what really happened in detail. All I can remember is that I ran away with my mother to a FRELIMO base. We were running away from the stray bullets that were coming from the Portuguese war planes, and so we fled into the FRELIMO camp to seek protection. We only stayed away from our home for about one year after which the war came to an end.

According to what I know, the civil war started because immediately after FRELIMO won the first war and become the ruling party, it announced that all the Portuguese nationals should go back to Portugal. That directive angered some of the Portuguese who came to Mozambique as businessmen, especially when some of their property was confiscated by the Mozambican Government. Some of the merchants fled to Zimbabwe and other neighbouring countries and it is these people who organised a guerrilla army to fight against the FRELIMO-led Government. Their aim was to get back what had been confiscated by the Mozambican Government, by supporting that group to launch attacks on the government.

That guerrilla group attracted most of the Mozambican people especially the youth who were unemployed because this served as their reliable source of income. This guerrilla group was known as 'Africa Livre'.

After fighting for close to two years or so, the Portuguese realized that they had been fighting a losing battle as such they decided to pull out their support for the group. That decision did not go well with the African troops who thought it would be risky for them to go back to Mozambique as civilians because they had already been identified as criminals by FRELIMO.

This is what prompted these remnant guerrillas to form their own political party called RENAMO, under the leadership of a man called Andrea Matchangaisa, the Secretary General was Paulo Liverda who was of Portuguese nationality. The major differences between RENAMO and FRELIMO were that FRELIMO favoured a communist system of government, whereas RENAMO favoured a capitalist system of government.

It was only in about 1988 that war reached where I was staying, at Nyakafura village, and we saw a lot of people being captured or even killed. For example, I was one of those people who were captured, but fortunately in September 1989 I managed

to escape and I decided to flee to Malawi. It was only later that year that I went back to Mozambique to take my wife and brought her to Malawi.

We were just two people when we fled from the FRELIMO camp. We managed to escape when we were sent to look for food in the villages. At that time we were on our way from Manica Province to Tete Province. So we just took advantage of that situation and fled to Malawi.

In Malawi, I first arrived in Ntcheu district in Chief Mpando's area, where I spent two months. Later on I managed to find some money which I used to pay for a bus fare to Chikwawa. I only stayed here for a short time, about a month, and then I went back to Mozambique to pick up my spouse. In Chikwawa I was welcomed by Chief Thambala, who was from Mozambique, but was in charge of his fellow Mozambican refugees.

In the refugee camps we were given food, especially by the UNHCR and The Red Cross Society. The foodstuffs included sugar, maize flour, groundnuts, cooking oil and others.

I stayed in the refugee camp for about five years, from 1989-1994. After that we, including my parents, just decided to stay put here in Malawi. My father died here in 1996, whereas my mother died in 2007. As such I cannot go back to Mozambique because all my parents are now dead and I cannot trace my relatives in Mozambique. Here in Malawi I am both a businessman and a farmer. I currently own a grocery shop which is doing very well. Most of the times we go to Blantyre, Chikwawa Boma or even Ngabu Trading Centre to get supplies for the grocery shop. In the past we used to go to Tete in Mozambique, but since the Malawi Revenue Authority (MrA) started charging us tax for goods bought in Mozambique, it became very expensive and we decided to stop going to Tete.

I have four children. One is in form 2, one is in standard 8, one is in standard 5 and the last born is in standard 2.

Thank you, thank you.

Phiri, Albion Thomson Phiri, Ann Jonasi

[Mkumaniza Village, T/A Ngabu, Chikwawa District; 10 June 2008]

Albion Thomson Phiri, aged 56 years and Ann Jonasi Phiri, aged 54 years are Mang'anja village heads. Their people witnessed a lot of disruptions as a result of the war of liberation between FRELIMO and the Portuguese and then during the civil war that erupted in the 1980s between FRELIMO and RENAMO. They were the ones who hosted the huge camps that were set up around Mkumaniza to cater for the influx of refugees from Mozambique at the height of the FRELIMO-RENAMO civil war.

As Village Headman Dzenje and the late Group Village Headman Mkumaniza, we

were both involved in welcoming Mozambican refugees starting with those from the war of liberation. We used to give them foodstuffs and any sort of assistance that they needed.

I remember at that time, the FRELIMO guerrillas could also come to our areas to look for food, but mostly to look for young men and women they would recruit into their camp.

The civil war was even more brutal than the first war, and we also received a lot of Mozambican refugees in our area, such that at least five refugee camps were constructed to accommodate them. It was our government and other donor organizations that played a very important role to help the refugees, up until the war came to an end in the early 1990s. We still have some Mozambicans in our area who decided to stay put in Malawi.

During the war of liberation the refugees were running away from the Mozambican government troops who used to accuse them of supporting the FRELIMO guerrillas. Most of them were beaten up by the Portuguese for supporting the FRELIMO guerrillas. We used to hear names such as Lingilirani, Kajankalowa, as being leaders of FRELIMO.

Sometimes FRELIMO leaders used to get our youths into their camps, for instance, they recruited someone called Minechi and it is him who used to come back secretly to recruit his fellow youths into the FRELIMO camps.

The FRELIMO's training base at that time was in Senior Chief Chapananga's area, and upon finishing their training, the troops were deployed in different areas. I remember that one day a truck full of FRELIMO guerrillas passed through our area going to Mozambique.

Immediately after Mozambique got its independence another war also broke out. The refugees were telling us that the Mozambican leaders failed to agree on what system of government to follow or practice and so their disagreements led to that civil war. In fact, RENAMO and FRELIMO had different visions on how to run the country.

Most people were running away from the FRELIMO troops, who were accusing the local people of supporting and harbouring the RENAMO guerrillas. Most of the refugees were coming from Dowa and Tseweza in Tete province, and they were Senas, Chukundas and Nyungwes. But we also welcomed a lot of refugees from FRELIMO who fled Mozambique when that civil war intensified. After some time the Malawi government helped the FRELIMO troops to find their way back to Mozambique.

The assistance we were giving to the Mozambican refugees was mainly foodstuffs, especially maize, potatoes and fruits. Later on the government of Malawi and other NGOs joined us in assisting these people with foodstuffs, clothes even drilling boreholes for them. A soap manufacturing centre was also opened to help these people. The Kunyinda Refugee Camp that was so famous in this area was constructed after seeing that these Mozambican refugees came here in large number, such that we could no longer afford to keep them in our homes. As such, the Malawi government saw it was necessary to allocate special places for these people, hence the establishment of the camp. There were about five camps in total, all of them surrounding our area. The refugees actually settled in our gardens.

There were problems when the refugees came in large numbers because most of them settled in our gardens, so we had nowhere to do our farming. Furthermore, these people cut down our trees carelessly, hence contributing to environmental degradation and deforestation in our area.

The only thing that we benefitted from them was that we also used to benefit from the food handouts and donations that were given to these refugees. We also used to access some of the facilities such as clinics and boreholes that were specifically meant for the refugees.

When the war came to an end, it was announced on the radio that the war had come to an end and all the refugees could go back home. Despite that call, some of the refugees decided to remain in Malawi because they did not want to risk their lives any longer. Others also decided to remain in Malawi because of the prevailing peace in our country, while others chose to remain because they were married to Malawian spouses.

Thank you.

Phiri, Azzelia Banda, Grita

[Dzenje Village, T/A Ngabu, Chikwawa District; 10 June 2008]

Azzelia Phiri, aged 61 years and Grita Banda, aged years are elderly women of Sena origin in Mozambique. Their original home was Doa in Mutarara. They lived through the war of liberation between FRELIMO and the Portuguese colonialists and fled to Malawi in the 1980s, at the height of the FRELIMO-RENAMO conflict because the FRELIMO government was then losing control and many innocent people were being killed by either side. Azzelia and her son were actually shot during a RENAMO attack on Doa. They miraculously survived and had to be carried to Malawi by relatives, and recovered from the gun wounds after a long spell of hospitalization at Chikwawa District Hospital.

During the first war between the FRELIMO and the Portuguese we faced a lot of hardships. I remember that sometimes the Portuguese would conduct public meetings in our villages, warning us not to support the FRELIMO guerrillas and that we should not give them foodstuffs.

So what used to happen was that the FRELIMO guerrillas would come to our villages at night to beg for food. But as soon as the Portuguese realized that we were assisting these guerrillas they came to torture people in the village and some of our relatives were captured and killed. It was such hardships that made a lot of Mozambicans come to Malawi.

We were staying at Doa, Tete Province in Mozambique. We used to hear that the leader of the Portuguese was Caetano, while FRELIMO was led by Edward Mondlane and Samora Machel.

The FRELIMO guerrillas were coming in the villages to look for young boys and girls for recruitment in their camps, as a lot of youths were captured and trained in FRELIMO camps at Tete and at Dondo. After training, these youths were dispatched to different parts of Mozambique. A good number of my relatives were captured. For example, my own brother and his friend were captured and trained by the Portuguese to fight against FRELIMO guerrillas. Their job was to patrol our villages at night so that the FRELIMO guerrillas could not have any access to us. My brother is still alive by now.

I cannot really tell what tactics FRELIMO used to win that war, but all we could see was that FRELIMO guerrillas used to hide in bushes while the Portuguese troops were using the main roads where they could easily be spotted and killed. The FRELIMO troops were also planting landmines along the same roads which many government troops fell victim to. Sometimes truckloads of Portuguese troops could be wiped out in such attacks.

We run away from the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO. I cannot really tell what the major cause of that war was; all we could hear was that there was a civil war because the top leaders were fighting for positions. We just heard that FRELIMO

was fighting against 'Matchangaisa' (RENAMO), up to when it reached where we were staying at Doa. Before the war reached Doa, we just heard that the RENAMO troops (Matchangaisa) had been to the neighbouring villages to look for food. But one day they came to our house at night and captured most of us and took us into the bush. While they were there they started interrogating us to reveal the numbers and names of FRELIMO officials at Doa. Upon failing to reveal the names, the RENAMO guerrillas started accusing us of hiding the names of their enemies such that they started torturing us.

Later on, we travelled with the RENAMO guerrillas, going towards Doa Post, closer to where the FRELIMO camp was located. Just as we were about to get to the FRELIMO camp, the RENAMO troops told us to go back to our homes, such that we walked through the bushes the whole night to get back home. As we were walking in the bushes, we could hear the exchange of bullets at Doa between FRELIMO and RENAMO troops.

What happened to make us flee to Malawi was that early one morning, at around 4.00 am; the RENAMO troops came back to our village, trying to capture some people. This made most of us run away from our homes because we did not want to face similar hardships to the ones we faced when we were captured the previous time. But as we were hiding in the bushes, we heard gunshots fired by RENAMO troops targeting where we were hiding. That was a very frightening experience to us because the gunshots were just fired widely and a lot of people were hit by stray bullets. Unfortunately I was one of the people who were shot together with my son, who was strapped at my back. I was shot in the ribs while my son had his right leg shot.

It took a lot of time for the FRELIMO troops at Doa to realize that RENAMO guerrillas were causing trouble, such that when they came to our rescue a lot of damage had already been done.

Because I was shot, I found it difficult to walk back home we were rescued by the FRELIMO troops. I and my son had to be carried back home on a stretcher. But because there were no reliable medical facilities at Doa, due to impact of the war, we were carried on a stretcher to seek medical attention in Malawi.

On that day we were lucky, because as soon as we entered the Malawi territory, we met a group of Malawi Police Officers who were patrolling the border area between Malawi and Mozambique. My relatives asked them to assist us with transport to go to the nearest hospital, which they easily agreed to. My son and I were both admitted at Chikwawa District Hospital and it took one month for me to be healed, but my son took a little bit longer. Up to now my son has problems in moving his leg. But both of us are still alive. After being discharged from Chikwawa District Hospital we came to this area and sought a piece of land in Chief Dzenje's village. Later on we started doing some piece works to raise money for our living. But now we are now settled and we have our own gardens.

Due to such hardships, we saw no need of going back to Mozambique. After all, one of my brothers, who was a primary school teacher, was killed during those wild RENAMO shootings.

Thank you.

Phiri, Edward Dalesi

[Kalumbi Village, T/A Ndamera, Nsanje District; 15 May 2008]

Edward Dalesi Phiri, aged 46 years, is a relation of the current Traditional Authority Ndamera. He spoke in Chimang'anja on the strength of having witnessed how the people of Ndamera were affected by the wars in Mozambique; first with the war fought between FRELIMO and the Portuguese colonialists and then the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

The war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese was an intensively fought war, which FRELIMO managed to win in the end and formed an independent government.

It was only two years later that FRELIMO and RENAMO quarrelled and another war broke out in Mozambique of which we could see bullets entering our Malawian territory. In the end, FRELIMO also managed to win that war. But one major thing that took place during that civil war was that most of our relatives from Mozambique ran to Malawi to seek refuge. When these people were here we faced a lot of problems, especially as most of our trees were carelessly cut down by these refugees, to be used as firewood and charcoal for cooking. But most of these people went back to Mozambique after that war had finally come to an end.

We used to hear that FRELIMO was established by Edward Mondlane, who was later on joined by Samora Machel. But Mondlane did not live long enough as he died mysteriously and was replaced by Samora Machel. And it was Machel who was very brutal and was responsible for the killing of many people in Mozambique, especially during the civil war.

We were not directly affected by the war of liberation as was the case with the civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO. But in very few circumstances there were times when FRELIMO soldiers could pass through our area to launch their attacks on the Portuguese-led government. Sometimes our fellow villagers here could help the FRELIMO troops in carrying their weapons or even given them foodstuffs and shelter. Some of the troops who were injured during that war were sometimes given medical treatment in our rural health centres.

The FRELIMO troops were under the watchful eyes of Malawi government officials who used to get in touch with the FRELIMO leaders whom we could see coming to pick their troops to go back to Mozambique.

FRELIMO won because they had more troops, being the owners of the land, unlike their Portuguese opponents.

The civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO started because the FRELIMO government had introduced communism in that country, something which many people did not like. For instance, the government wanted all the farmers and all the peasants to surrender all their harvests to government officials for redistribution. This is what prompted Alfonso Dhlakama and others to wage war on FRELIMO. The main leader was Alfonso Dhlakama, and he campaigned against the communist ideas that were introduced by Samora Machel.

The civil war had reached its peak in Mozambique between 1984 and 1986; and that was when we saw a lot of refugees running into our territory. Even soldiers from both RENAMO and FRELIMO used to run into our area to seek refuge.

The ordinary Mozambicans started running away into the Malawian territory mostly because these they used to face a lot of pressure from both RENAMO and FRELIMO troops to provide them with foodstuffs, which most of them could not afford. But the more brutal of the two were the FRELIMO troops who used to accuse the local people of siding with RENAMO, hence beating them up.

It was the T/A Ndamera who welcomed the Mozambicans into Malawi and gave them places to settle. Later on the T/A could alert the District Commissioner about the coming of the refugees into his area. The DC also brought in foodstuffs for the refugees.

The Mozambican refugees come from came from different areas including Nyaphali, Ntalala, Nyang'oma, Bambala, Khwithi, Malingwe, Tete, Zambezi Province and Mulumbala. Most of them used to tell us that it was FRELIMO which was giving them a lot of problems, as its troops were accusing the local people of supporting RENAMO guerrillas. FRELIMO troops were also forcing the people to carry their luggage, and anyone who refused was killed on the spot.

The places in Nsanje where refugee camps were constructed with the help of the Malawi government were at Ntowe, Tengani, Kamphata, Nyamithuthu and Sibula refugee camps. A hospital was built to assist the refugees if and when they needed medical attention. The drugs were brought by the Red Cross Society and the UNHCR. The refugees were also given foodstuffs, clothes, blankets and plastic sheets for roofing. A number of schools were also built specifically for the refugees, and the teachers were also fellow Mozambican refugees. Some of the school blocks are now being used by our children.

There were also problems that were brought by the refugees to our area, especially the careless cutting down of trees which led to the deforestation of our area. It is only now that our government is encouraging us to grow more trees to replace the old ones. Secondly, we experienced a lot of disease outbreaks especially water borne diseases, such as cholera during rainy seasons. There were also many incidents of armed robbery in our area, since most of these Mozambicans brought their weapons into our area. As I have already said, some of them were soldiers in Mozambique, so they came with their weapons into our area.

When the war came to an end we just heard on the radio that war had come to an end, and announcements were thus made calling on all the refugees to go back home. So, transportation in the form of buses was arranged by our government to transport these people back to Mozambique.

A few refugees decided to remain in Malawi. Most of those who remained in Malawi had actually opened up private businesses, and were no longer willing to take risk by going back to Mozambique. Others were not sure of their own safety back

home in Mozambique, because they themselves had acted brutally towards others during the civil war.

Phiri, Wesley Malemia Phiri, Set Ndafakale

[Chief Tengani's Headquarters, Nsanje District; 16 May 2008]

The two interviewees, Wesley Malemia Phiri, aged 67 years, and Set Ndafakale Phiri, aged 64 years, are closely connected with the present Senior Chief Tengani and have intimate knowledge of how refugees from the civil war in Mozambique were managed in the 1980s. They served at the refugee camp that was established at Tengani in various capacities throughout the period of refugee influx.

Wesley M. Phiri: We can ably tell you about the civil war which we heard that it started in the late 1970s before it spread to all parts of the country. But it was in the mid 1980s that we began to witness an influx of Mozambican refugees into our area. As such as our Chief (Tengani) agreed with the DC for Nsanje to allocate pieces of land to the refugees. Later on the government officials sought assistance from the UNHCR to assist them with provisions of foodstuffs, shelter in the form of tents and even clothes.

They used to say that the reason for running away was FRELIMO troops who used to terrorize them, as they were being accused of supporting RENAMO guerrillas; some of the refugees were actually forced to pound their own children as a form of punishment.

Apart from foodstuff we used to give them clothes since most of these people came here in rugs. Our government also helped by giving medical services to these refugees if and whenever they got sick. Another international organization called MSF (Medicine San Frontiers) also opened up temporary clinics in most of the refugee camps.

Schools were constructed in all the camps for the children of the refugees, and the teachers were also refugees from Mozambique. The children were given all forms of support by the United Nations ranging from school uniforms to stationery. Most of the schools that are in our area were actually built for the refugees and only became Community Day Secondary Schools (CDSS) after the refugees had gone back to Mozambique.

As an administrator in the refugee camps I had my own members of staff, who used to assist me in recording the number of refugees that we had in the camp. At the end of each year we used to conduct a census in which each family was given an identity card, which also indicated the number of people for each household. The results of such censuses were sent to the DC's office for action. We were also overseeing the distribution of foodstuffs to these refugees once per fortnight. There were all sorts of foodstuffs, such as flour, beans, groundnuts and salt. The rationing was done in accordance with the number of people in the household, that is, the more family members the more the amount of food that could be distributed.

Since most of us were associated with these refugees, we used to benefit from the things that they were receiving from our government and from other donor organizations. Things such as food and clothes were not scarce to us during that period. In fact, some Malawians were also taking advantage of the census that were conducted by our government officials and also registered themselves as refugees so that they could also benefit from the donations in terms of food, clothes and medicine. Most of us also got jobs amongst the refugees, as camp supervisors or as ordinary workers.

There were also some problems associated with the coming of refugees to the area because that influx contributed to the rise in deforestation in our area, especially because these people needed both firewood and charcoal for cooking. This contributed to the erosion of our soil because the soils were no longer held together by the roots of the trees.

The other problem was that the refugees brought a lot of insecurity into our area, because they came to Malawi with dangerous weapons, such as AK47. After they got settled they started terrorizing people in the villages, such that cases of armed robbery were rampant in this area. Some of the robbers could even steal food from the refugee camps. I was one of the victims because one day the robbers came to cause havoc at my house in 1992. These robberies are still continuing up to now.

The other problem was that these people contributed to the rapid increase of population in our area since most of them refused to go back after the war had ended. As a result we are having problems to do with pieces of agricultural fields.

When the war came to an end, most of the refugees were actually refusing to go back to Mozambique, because they were enjoying the peaceful life that we had offered them here. As such officials from the United Nations and the Mozambican government had to take the initiative to convince the refugees that the war had finally come to an end and that peace had been restored in Mozambique. Despite that, a good number of the refugees refused to go back home.

I think some of them thought it was still risky to go back and did not want to risk their lives again; they were afraid of facing similar hardships to the ones they faced during the civil war. Other refugees were very clever and they were able to open personal businesses and became more well-to-do than most of us indigenous Malawians. It was such people who could not accept to go back to Mozambique.

Seti N. Phiri: The people started arriving here in about 1986 and most of them settled with us in the villages. But it was in about 1988 that the numbers of these refugees skyrocketed in our area and this prompted our chief to set up special camps for these refugees.

Most of the refugees were coming from Zambezia Province. They were from different ethnic groups; some were from the Sena, Lomwe, Ngulu and Mihavani ethnic groups. So, we had problems to communicate with some of them.

The refugees who had relatives in Malawi could go and settle amongst their relatives. But those who did not have relatives were seeking refuge at Chief Tengani's Court, who then decided to open up special camps for them.

The whole of Chief Tengani's area was affected by the problem of refugees, including the following villages: Kachitsa, Kachere, Mphamba, Ntolongo, Dumba, Ng'ona, Chikhawo, Kalumbi and Chazuka. All the lesser chiefs were coming to report to Senior Chief Tengani about the influx of refugees in their areas and it was the T/A who used to communicate with the DC's office. Apart from the refugee camp which was built near Chief Tengani's Court there were other camps at Mankhokwe, Nyamithuthu and Kamphata, but other refugees went to settle as far as in Mwanza District.

In order to repair the deforestation damage caused by the refugees, prior to their repatriation it was announced that both the refugees and we indigenous Malawians, were supposed to plant trees in both our gardens and at our homes. So seedlings were distributed to us, and some of the trees are still there up to today.

Thank you, thank you.

Samuel de Almeida, Rosario

[Ntambalika Village, Namasalima, T/A Njema, Mulanje District; 16 December 2007]

Rosario Samuel de Almeida, aged 52 years is originally from Beira District in Mozambique. Rosario tried to enrol in the Portuguese army at the height of the war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese. He was rejected as one of those whom the Portuguese could not fully trust. He then joined the Jehovah's Witnesses Sect. When FRELIMO took over the government, the Jehovah's Witnesses began to be harassed because of their apathetic stand on political activities. Along with the other Mozambican Witnesses, Rosario was exiled to camps in Milanje District where Jehovah's Witnesses from Mozambique and Malawi lived side by side, under supervision by the FRELIMO government. Things turned upside down when RENAMO overran the area and began to kill those who resisted their demands. It was that which forced Rosario and his family to flee to Malawi between 1982 and 1986.

All that I can tell you is that I never joined mainstream politics in Mozambique, but I have stayed with the white Portuguese for a very long time. While in Mozambique, we just heard initially that a group of FRELIMO had risen against the government. That war started at Cape Delgado before it reached Maputo, the capital city. At that time, because I was young, I did not really know about the developments in the war. As I grew I began to be interested in the progress of the war, especially when I started hearing about the deaths of both the Portuguese and the African troops, FRELIMO. I could see helicopters and other war planes flying all over our area, for the FRELIMO and the government troops. That is when I realized that FRELIMO was also a strong group. With time the war intensified up until the Portuguese surrendered and Mozambique achieved its independence on 25th June 1975.

But we, as Jehovah's Witnesses, we started to hear about our brothers and sisters in Christ from Malawi, who were chased away by their Government in Malawi to Mozambique in about 1972 to 1975. We heard that the Mozambique Government decided to give them permanent settlement at Khaliko in Milanje District. They were chased away from Malawi, because just like us, they refused to take part in politics. As such the government officials decided to send us where our colleagues from Malawi were located in Quilimane Province (Zambezia). That is why in mid 1975 we were transferred to that place. It was the District Commissioner at Milanje who welcomed us and led us to where our colleagues were. At that time it was the DC at Milanje from Malawi who welcomed us, since they were already settled. We also settled down and we built our houses and opened up large gardens. The Mozambican government also assisted us in the early days by giving us foodstuffs.

With time, as we were enjoying our stay in Milanje, we started hearing that another war had broken out between FRELIMO and RENAMO. This war did not necessarily start at one place as was the case with the earlier war we just started hearing gunshots from most parts of the country. At that time the leader of RENAMO was called

Matchangaisa, who was replaced by Alfonso Dhlakama after the former had been killed. It was around 1982 that the war reached its peak and it affected most parts of Mozambique, including our area. One day we just saw RENAMO troops invading our camp and killing some people. At that point even the local policemen had run away fearing for their lives. The RENAMO troops took away all that they wanted, especially foodstuffs, and went away.

The RENAMO troops actually became suspicious of us, Jehovah's Witnesses, thinking that we did not want to tell them where FRELIMO troops were hiding. Thus the RENAMO troops came again one night and started killing people. The following morning the RENAMO troops called for a meeting between us and them. Fortunately, I was at my garden and when I was told about the meeting, I refused to go there because I did not want anything to do with politics. At that meeting about ten to twelve of our colleagues were killed by the RENAMO troops.

Later on, in October 1986 we learnt that our State President Samora Machel was killed in a plane crash. By that time most of my fellow Witnesses had on a number of occasions been forced to carry weapons for RENAMO troops. I managed to evade the RENAMO troops for a long time by going to hide in the bushes. But what made me to decide to run away to Malawi, was when one day RENAMO troops called my wife to cook for them. At first I was against the idea, but later on I bowed down to allow her to go to see for herself. What I disliked most was that by that time I was sick, which meant that I had no one to cook food for me. She returned home late in the evening and that is what made me to think of going somewhere else to escape from that torture. When I got better (two days later) I told my wife that I wanted to go to Malawi, firstly to see if I could find a peaceful place for settlement. When I went back to Mozambique I collected my whole family to come to settle in Malawi. We travelled at night and we arrived at Makokola in Mulanje and stayed there for almost a year.

My family faced a lot of problems there in Makokola; that is when I decided to look for the place where our fellow refugees had been settled in Malawi. At first the Malawi Police refused me to enter the refugee camps saying that I did not run away from the Mozambican civil war. It took the intervention of the camp leader who was from Mozambique, for me and my family to get permission to enter the camp. I was actually staying at camp 4, right here at Limbuli.

Regarding the first war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese, at that time my thinking was that I should proceed with school, but due to the fact that I came from a poor family I could not do so. I met a certain white man, an architect by profession who paid fees for me to be trained as a panel beater. I used to hear about both FRELIMO and the Portuguese, but although I was young I still wanted to join the war, firstly in FRELIMO, but because I did not have enough money I failed to join FRELIMO. As such I changed my mind and I decided to join the Portuguese-lead army. When I went there they refused to recruit me because I was only 16 years old, while the recommended age was 18 years. The army officials were also suspicious that I could turn against fellow soldiers if they were to recruit me. That was really true

because all I wanted to do was to raise enough money to join FRELIMO. But God had another plan for my life, because in 1971 preachers from Jehovah's Witnesses came to our area. Although I was initially reluctant to be converted to their sect, later on I got converted and I was baptized in 1972, and that marked the end of my interest to join the war.

None of my relatives joined FRELIMO. But one of my relatives who joined the Mozambican army only stayed at the training base for three months, instead of the required 6 months, thus he did not make it as a fully trained soldier.

There were some people who were jealousy of our group and these are the people who reported us to the Mozambican Government that we were not taking part in any political activities and also that we did not support FRELIMO. So it was government officials who were responsible for transferring us from the place where we were initially staying.

The number of people in the camps was about eighteen to twenty thousand in the nine camps that were there. The camps had A and B, whereby Malawians stayed in As and Mozambicans stayed in the Bs, i.e. Camp 1A for Malawians, 1B for Mozambicans and so forth.

The major factors that led to the civil war between RENAMO and FRELIMO was that the leaders of the two groups disagreed on whether Mozambique should have a Democratic or Socialist system of government. The RENAMO troops were suspicious of us because we were being taken care of by the Mozambican Government, which was under FRELIMO. So, the RENAMO troops were simply thinking that we were keeping state secrets. So when they came to ask us some questions which we could not answer, they slowly started to dislike us.

The RENAMO troops were demanding mostly foodstuffs, and when we said we did not have the food they could force their way into our food storage points to get whatever food they could lay their hands on, including our livestock. They also came to our camps to ask you people to assist them in some errands; mostly they wanted people to help them in carrying whatever they had confiscated from wherever they had passed through.

In the refugee camps we used to receive foodstuff from the Malawi government, which made my life and that of my family to be made much easier. At present I make and sell hoes, which is something that I learnt to do back home in Mozambique.

Uka, Godfrey Mayamiko

[Malawi Heritage Centre, Limbe; 26 June 2008]

Godfrey Mayamiko Uka, aged 78 years is a retired accountant and senior resident of the City of Blantyre. He is still active in the society of Malawi where he is widely used as a resource person on early development in Blantyre. This is because he was born and grew up in a family that originally came from Khomeriwa Village in the area of Traditional Authority Bvumbwe but took residence in Bangwe Township, Limbe, in the 1940s. A son of clerk who worked for the Imperial Tobacco Group Ltd (ITG), Godfrey went to school at St Pius Primary School in Limbe in the late 1940s and from there to Zomba Catholic Secondary School from where he graduated with a Junior Certificate of Education (JCE) in 1952. He then joined ITG as an accounts clerk. From there, he moved to Brown and Clapperton Hardware Supplies where he served as a senior accounts clerk. In 1965, he moved to ADMARC where he served as an accountant, only to move again to Malawi Housing Corporation (MHC) in 1974 where he served as senior accountant until the time of his retirement in 1986. Since retiring, he has been an active elder member of several committees in his church, Limbe Cathedral Church and of the historical and civil organization, the Society of Malawi – Blantyre Chapter.

Between 1964 and 1980 I was right here in Blantyre as a member of the working class. As an accountant, I changed the offices I was working for several times during that period. At the time of Malawi's independence, I was working as a senior accounts clerk at Brown and Clapperton in Blantyre, having moved there from Imperial Tobacco Group (ITG) in 1960. In 1965, I moved again from Brown and Clapperton to Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC), where I was offered the post of accountant. But, in 1974 I again moved from ADMARC to Malawi Housing Corporation (MHC) where I was offered the post of Senior Accountant from which I retired twelve years later in 1986.

In Bangwe where my family lived for the most part, we had many Mozambicans around us. Remember, we Malawians of Lomwe origins were also Mozambicans originally. Our forefathers migrated to Malawi in search of jobs on European estates in Mulanje, Thyolo, Blantyre, and Chiradzulu. Those Mozambicans we had as neighbours in the Bangwe townships of the 1950s and 1960s included Cotinyo Nkuluzado, Rodrigo Machado, Perera Raimundo, Antonio Sumani and Joas Serapiao. Most of them were either truck drivers or small-scale businessmen operating groceries, butcheries and repair workshops for bicycles, and motor cars.

The Mozambicans used to follow what we Malawians were doing through the Malawi Congress Party (MCP). They too were organised into political parties or groups that were branches of political parties in Mozambique, such as UNAMO, COREMO, FRELIMO, RENAMO, etc. All these groups had followers and offices in Bangwe and Zingwangwa. That was especially so at the time of our independence in Malawi in 1964. Later on, however, Dr Banda, our President killed most of these Mozambican political parties because he wanted to cooperate with the Portuguese

who still controlled Mozambique. A very powerful Portuguese national, George Jardim, built a large at house Chichiri from where the Portuguese were able to spy on what was happening among black Mozambicans.

Indeed, ordinary Malawians were very supportive of the Mozambicans because among us the Lomwe, Lomwes from Mozambique are our brothers, sisters, and cousins. How could we not support them? Even Dr Banda was a double dealer who supported both sides: FRELIMO and the Portuguese colonialists who were killing black Mozambicans who belonged to FRELIMO.

Rumours used to be rife then about visits by prominent FRELIMO leaders like Joaquim Chissano, Alberto Chipande, Alfonso Dhlakama, and so on. Bu we only heard rumours to that effect because Dr Banda did not want anyone to know what was actually going on. That way he was able to deal with both sides to the Mozambique conflict, without their being aware that this was what he was doing.

We had many Zimbabweans in the Blantyre of the 1960s and 1970s, because they were in Malawi, mainly in Blantyre and Limbe to work for subsidiaries of Rhodesian companies like Lever Brothers, Bata Shoe Company, Brown and Clapperton Engine and Hardware Dealers, Central African Airways, and British and American Tobacco Company (BAT). I myself had a Zimbabwean girlfriend Stella Marula, a secretary when she and I were both working for Brown and Clapperton in the early 1960s. We dated for almost two years but I later found out that she had another boyfriend in Salisbury (Harare). Yes, we had many Zimbabweans around Blantyre then because their companies used to move them from Harare to Blantyre and Blantyre to Lusaka, I am sure in the 1960s and 1970s there was a lot of support for Joshua Nkomo's movement as well as for that of Ndabaningi Sithole from the Zimbabweans in Blantyre. But, I only know of two Zimbabweans who used to be very active in raising support for ZANU of Mr Ndabaningi Sithole if not Robert Mugabe. These were Mr Joshua Kadene, who was then Chief Executive of Lever Brothers here in Limbe and Rev. Dennis Munyaradzi Nyamurowa, who was Director of United Bible Societies in Malawi. These used to receive, accommodate and fund ZANU cadres as they made their way from Zimbabwe and then through Mozambique and Malawi to military training camps in Tanzania. They had other fellow Zimbabweans to support them in these operations, but I did not know them personally.

We only used to hear about visits by leaders of the nationalist movement in Zimbabwe through the grapevine that they all used to come to see Ngwazi Dr H. Kamuzu Banda, the man who destroyed the colonialist federation in central Africa. Joshua Nkomo, the father of the nationalist in Zimbabwe, Ndabaningi Sithole, James Chikerema, Bishop Muzorewa they all used to come and seek advice from Kamuzu. At least that is what used to be said.

I do not think Dr Kamuzu Banda would have permitted Zimbabweans in Malawi and their Malawian sympathizers to work together to raise support for the freedom cause in Zimbabwe. As in Mozambique, in Zimbabwe he was also collaborating with

the white colonialists while giving the African nationalists what limited support he was able to spare.

Thank you.

Zongani, Kuyipa

Mrs Zongani, Kuyipa aged 75 years is one of the people who fled from Mozambique during the liberation war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese colonialists. She decided to move away from Mozambique after her husband was killed in their village. She is now living in Ntchache's Headquarters, which is located about eight kilometres Southwest of Mwanza Boma.

I came here with very little children who could not even manage to walk to this place (so we had to carry them on our backs). But the first people from our family to come here were my two elderly children (my son and my daughter), who settled at Gonamake. At first I chose to remain in Mozambique, but things got worse when my husband was killed during the war, right in our village, Kazula Village.

This was the same war between FRELIMO and the Portuguese. My husband was actually captured in our garden, especially because the government troops were jealous and suspicious that we had bumper harvests, as such they thought that our family was providing food to FRELIMO troops. After that I decided to get married again to another man. It was with this second man that we decided to run to Malawi to seek refuge. This man died here in Malawi, and since then I no longer want to go back to Mozambique, after all I do not have any problems here.

I decided to stay here because Ntchache is the main chief in this area. But my daughter chose to stay near Mpandadzi River. I left her when she got married. I did not want to stay near her because I did not want to be entangled in her marital problems.

When I came to Ntchache Village I had seven children, together with my husband. My late husband was working as a farm labourer for a Mr Bendala. This man used to give us food and he also gave us a piece of land where we were farming.

I did not know any other people who ran away from Mozambique and settled in this area because I was only concerned with my family problems.

I cannot say anything about those who run away from the recent civil war in Mozambique. Since I came to Ntchache Village I have never moved to any other place. I can say if there are any villages around Ntchache Village where there are some people who ran away from Mozambique because I have never moved from this village

since I left Mpandadzi.

Swaziland

Independent on 6 September 1968

7.7

Swaziland and the Liberation of Mozambique and South Africa, 1960-1994

By Bonginkosi Azariah Bhutana Sikhondze

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Introduction 1

Like other neighbours of South Africa, Swaziland made significant contributions to the liberation struggle in that country, particularly from the 1960s when struggle started to get heated. Swaziland provided refuge to South African and Mozambican freedom fighters, though evidence on the latter is thin. This chapter reviews the operations of the ANC and the PAC of South Africa and FRELIMO of Mozambique, whose members sought asylum in Swaziland after the Sharpeville Incident of 1960 in South Africa and similar events at the same time in Mozambique.² Sharpeville is the starting point of the study because it was after Sharpeville that South Africans who fought the Afrikaner regime began to engage it in a military confrontation that led to South Africa's decolonization at the end of the 1990s.

Swaziland, being one of the closest neighbouring states, was inundated by members of the two political organizations who had sought asylum.³ Most of them were professionals such as teachers, medical doctors, nurses, and others. Whilst in Swaziland, freedom fighters pretended to seek employment, their main objective was to use the proximity of the state against their target, the racist regime in South Africa. At the same time, the members thought that Swaziland might be a good hide-out from the killer squads of the racist regime.⁴ Most South Africans were related to several families in Swaziland due to the historical drawing up of boundaries that separated some members of families. After the demarcation, families emerged as two camps where some remained in South Africa, while the others fell on the Swazi side of the newly created boundary. Swaziland was one of several countries which were divided during the colonial scramble for Africa. Even though the scramble caused the separation of related people, the relationship was maintained through illicit border crossings from one side to the other. Two different but related nations were formed by the demarcation between South Africa and Swaziland. Similarly, the border demarcation between Swaziland and Mozambique produced the same result and nations were split into two, yet their links could not be erased. Thus, in both South Africa and Mozambique, there were groups of people whose linguistic links with Swazis in Swaziland were very strong at the beginning of the 1960s. The present relationship between South Africa and Swaziland continues to be just as complicated as suggested by this introduction to the demarcation history.⁵

(1) The Research Team consisted solely of Bonginkosi Azariah Bhutana Sikhondze. We regret that Professor Sikhondze passed away while completing this chapter. The interviews that he conducted will be included in the second volume.

(2) Davenport, T.R.H. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 4th Ed. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991: See p.358.

(3) Interview with Mr Aaron Mthembu, Teacher at Ngololweni Primary School from 1963-1970, (Mkhwakhweni, Shiselweni District, Swaziland) December 2007.

(4) Interview with Aaron Mthembu, (Mkhwakhweni) December 2007.

(5) Recently, Titus Thwala, Zombodze Emuva Member of Parliament, tackled border crossing issues and fought for daily travellers across the border to and fro, especially school going children, to receive exemption from the South African cross-border immigration laws.

A study of the liberation struggle activities by the Mozambican and South African political organizations which converged in Swaziland at the beginning of the 1960s becomes especially interesting in the post-1976 Soweto Uprising period, when even the Swazi youth began to identify themselves with and to participate in the South African liberation struggle.⁶ The participation of the Swazi youth in the struggle was influenced by the South African youth with whom Swazi children attended school in Swaziland before schools at Mpaka and Ndzevane were constructed at the end of the 1970s to cater for the academic needs of refugee children in the country. The South African youth, most of whom had relatives in Swaziland, were welcome to attend school anywhere they chose until 1978, when the first large-scale student class boycott was organized in Swaziland and left behind a trail of destruction, especially of government property (cars and buildings).⁷ It was alleged that the ring leaders of the strike were South African born students, hence the decision to separate South African students from Swazi ones to avoid similar strikes in the future. Attending school together with the South African children exposed the Swazi students to political ideas that were the basis of the revolutionary activities, and the Swazi began to appreciate the problems the liberation struggle posed for South African students and other revolutionaries, hence the decision to embrace it. On the other hand, there was hardly any mention of Swazi youth embracing the Mozambican liberation struggle or of the extent to which the youth facilitated guerrilla activities of Mozambican freedom fighters who resided in the country while they fought the Portuguese across the border. It seems that the spirit of oneness influenced the Swazi youth in the latter part of the 1970s, by which time Mozambique was already independent.

Due to the proximity of Swaziland to South Africa on the one hand and to Mozambique on the other, the arrangement that Swaziland had with these liberation struggle organizations was not palatable because it necessitated that the liberation struggle organizations remained in the country as refugees only for transit to the countries of long-term exile: Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania. It seems King Sobhuza II, who was a member of the South African ANC, played a major role in coordinating the efforts of these freedom fighters while they remained in his country. It is his success in bringing together the two major South African organizations that made it possible for these to concentrate more on fighting the racist regime in their own country. Children of the South African activists attended school in Swaziland without any discrimination. Conservative politicians in Swaziland, however, believed that the country's contribution to the liberation struggle in South Africa was a mistake that needed to be rectified. Unlike the other countries in the region, which allowed revolutionaries to openly use their countries to fight the South African apartheid regime, Swaziland restrained them in fear of South Africa's retaliation. This study also recognizes the fact that while in Swaziland, South African revolutionaries contributed

(6) Interview with Solomon Shekwa, (Lwandle Location, East of Manzini) 20 October 2007.

(7) Interview with Elias Simelane, (Ngwane Park Location, Manzini) 15 November 2007.

immensely to Swaziland's economic development as medical doctors, teachers, and other professionals; a fact that has not received much recognition.

In addition to investigating the contributions of Swaziland to the liberation struggle, this study investigates the losses that Swaziland suffered in human resources, physical structures, and other facilities. Swaziland witnessed all these in the course of sheltering the freedom fighters.

The objectives of the study were;

- To investigate the factors that motivated South Africans and Mozambicans to cross the borders to Swaziland after Sharpeville in 1960,
- To investigate the reception that Swaziland gave to the freedom fighters once they were in the country,
- To establish the extent of the Swazi youth support of the struggle after 1976, and
- To investigate the contributions of the revolutionaries to the economic development of Swaziland.

Divergent views on the importance of the South African liberation struggle for countries in the region in terms of the benefits that neighbours realized for supporting the revolutions exist. One view is that the liberation struggle was not meant to benefit South Africans and Mozambicans alone, but that even citizens of neighbouring countries stood to benefit from its success. This study highlights the significance of collective work on any project. That neighbouring countries cooperated with revolutionaries in South Africa and Mozambique is an indication that they identified themselves with the colonial problems of the two neighbouring countries.

It is not easy to pin down the genesis of the South African and Mozambican liberation struggles and the effects they had on neighbouring communities, but for several reasons the study begins with Sharpeville in 1960. Sharpeville is important as a historical watershed for the southern African region in that what affected South Africans at Sharpeville had far reaching effects even for neighbours. Sharpeville raised several concerns about the security and future of South Africans and their neighbours which meant Mozambique was indirectly affected by the Sharpeville Incident. Even though Mozambique became independent in 1975, the chapter stops at the independence of South Africa in 1994. After the Afrikaners and Portuguese were successfully dislodged, the issue that needed attention to complete the struggle was to make every South African and Mozambican feel part of the effort to rebuild their countries after the revolutions.

The study covers a time period which allows the research to be based on written and oral sources, and it extends over a time span that allows those interviewed to recall the events clearly. Since most of the people who participated in the struggle were still alive at the time of field studies and vividly recalled the events of the period, most of the data was drawn from oral interviews with observers of or participants

in the liberation struggle. The approach therefore was qualitative. The choice of the informants was determined by the literature that has been published on the subject of the liberation struggles in South Africa and Mozambique. The most recent of the published material is that of Elias Masilela⁸, whose work draws heavily from witnessing the liberation struggle at Kwa Magogo at 43 Trelawney Park in Manzini in Swaziland. Masilela himself observed the events that were associated with the liberation struggle as they unfolded while he attended school in Manzini. His study is based on the activities of the South African liberation struggle organizations in Swaziland. This combination of approaches facilitated data collection and gave the author access to quality data.

The snowball approach was used for data collection because those interviewed suggested others they thought would add value and quality to the data on the liberation struggle. As a result, extensive travelling around the country could not be avoided. Some of those interviewed were retired members of South African political organizations. Some were South Africans, while some were Swazi nationals. Retired and employed government officials were also interviewed on the domestic and foreign policies of Swaziland, since these policies determined the relationship which thus emerged between the government and the South African freedom fighters in particular, and sometimes with Mozambican refugees. Revolutionaries did not understand some of the domestic and foreign policies, hence their interpretations of them led to serious clashes between the Swaziland police and the freedom fighters. It was the manner of the administration of these policies that led to clashes between the said forces. In order to solve these problems, senior government officials who were custodians of the policies and who monitored their implementation were asked to furnish key information, hence they were interviewed at their remote homes of retirement.

Government officials were conservative in their interpretation of the activities of South African and Mozambican liberation struggles. Any form of cooperation that Swaziland extended to freedom fighters in the country was modest; most of them could not be convinced about the relevance of the data thus sought, especially on sensitive issues. The sensitive issues involved the effects of the liberation struggle on the Swazi and the economic development of the Swaziland economy to which revolutionaries made some immense contributions. In fact, the history of the liberation struggles was a taboo in the 1980s after the demise of King Sobhuza II. Some of the officials had not understood the changes that took place in the region and as such had not seen any reason to rally behind the liberation struggles. The significance of the liberation struggles to the political development of southern Africa necessitates that data be collected on these in order to preserve it for posterity's sake. Some of the government officials were convinced after some persuasion to release the information that was

⁽⁸⁾ Masilela, Elias. *Number 43, Trelawney Park, KwaMagogo: Untold Stories of Ordinary People Caught up in the Struggle Against Apartheid*. David Philip, 2007.

sought. Otherwise, most of the data on which this study rests is oral. Government law declared some of the records on the liberation struggles confidential. Thus, available archival data dealt with the topic in an indirect manner.⁹

The study has revealed several important aspects of the liberation struggles in the region from the 1960s to the end of the 20th century. In several respects, the study clears Swaziland of the blame accorded the country for allegedly throttling the efforts of freedom fighters, especially South African ones. Some government officials were negative about supporting the liberation struggles, while some believed that the liberation struggle had to be supported because it affected even the Swazi. Premier Prince Makhosisini's regime, for instance, appears to have been liberal and assumed a fly on the wall approach, while that of his successor Prince Maphevu seemed to be completely oblivious of the liberation struggle and its significance to the changes that affected the region at that time.¹⁰ Perhaps Prince Maphevu's lack of awareness was made more glaring by his training as a soldier, though some soldiers were keenly alive to the issues of the liberation struggles. Prince Maphevu's successor, Prince Mabandla sympathized with the liberation struggles and became supportive of them though the control that King Sobhuza II had on the administration of the country rendered his desire to assist the liberation struggle futile and unnoticeable. After the demise of King Sobhuza II in August 1982, Prince Bhekimpi, a pro-Liqoqo (the Swazi National Council) Supreme Council of State man, became Prime Minister in the same year. The deposed Prince Mabandla, who was suspicious that he might be executed, escaped to seek asylum in South Africa.¹¹ During Prince Bhekimpi's reign, the Liqoqo and the Supreme Council of State, who enjoyed some secret support from the racist regime in South Africa, stifled freedom of expression and of association in Swaziland. It was during the reign of this council that some of the revolutionaries began to disappear mysteriously and it was rumoured that they were being handed over to the South African police at the Oshoek Border post.¹²

At the coronation King Mswati III in 1986, the role of Former President of Zambia Dr Kenneth Kaunda, as advisor to the king of Swaziland became prominent.¹³ This relationship increased in importance in the late 1980s when King Mswati III replaced Prince Bhekimpi as Prime Minister with a unionist, Obed Mfanyana Dlamini. During Obed Dlamini's reign as Prime Minister, the political climate began to change, but only

(9) Swaziland National Archives files that were consulted included: File Conventions: Mozambique Convention; File N: Natal Rebellion; File N: Nomahasha; File P: Portuguese; File 2116: Pan-African Congress on pre-history; File Rcs 491/28, 270/29: Mozambique Convention (1930); File 949: Conveyance of goods in transit through Portuguese East Africa to Swaziland; File Rcs 557/35: Economic Cooperation with South Africa; File Rcs 435/38: Natives Living on the Swaziland-Mozambique Border; File 2041A: Foreign Natives in Swaziland; Rcs 243/22, 143/32: Extradition – Swaziland-Mozambique; Rcs 429/26: Importation of Natives from Mozambique for Labour.

(10) Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Timbutini, East of Manzini District) 20 October 2007.

(11) Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Sicunusa, Beyond Mankayane) 20 October 2007.

(12) Interview with N. Nyoni, (Lomahasha) 07 August 2007. N. Nyoni was attacked at his home by the assassins of the racist regime at mid-night in July 1989; his older son was killed, while he and a two year old child were kidnapped, but the child was sent back home from a distance of a kilometre. Nyoni was taken to Piet Retief for identification by agents of the regime.

(13) Interview with Abednego Kuseni Hlophe, (Lozitha Location, Manzini) 21 December 2007.

for a while. Prime Minister Obed Dlamini did not impinge directly on the liberation struggle activities; instead, he chose to remain deaf to the pleas to curb the activities of underground political groups.¹⁴ Even though the killings that were suffered by South African freedom fighters, in particular, had increased when Obed became caretaker Prime Minister in 1989, there was a decline in the kidnapping of freedom fighters in the country. It was during his turn as Prime Minister that there was calm in the political arena at a time when decolonization was already imminent in South Africa. It was at this time that rampant assassinations were already being witnessed and the killings had begun before Obed's reign as Prime Minister of Swaziland. These killings were temporarily halted and some calm prevailed in the wake of Obed's reign.¹⁵ Some of the assassinations were carried out in broad day light before Obed's reign, but his appointment as Prime Minister halted the killings, especially during the day. Sporadic attacks and assassinations of freedom fighters were sometimes committed at night, without the knowledge of the Prime Minister, who also headed the police force, a position which enabled him to exercise control over their activities. The Prime Minister's control over the operations of the police was very important, particularly where the betrayal of the efforts of the revolutionaries were concerned. During the reign of caretaker Prime Minister Obed Mfanyana Dlamini, the stifling of the support of freedom fighters was lifted because Dlamini believed in the objectives of the revolutions.¹⁶



*Map of Swaziland*¹⁷

(14) Interview with Elias Simelane, (KoNtshingila, Hlathikhulu) 17 October 2007.

(15) Interview with Elias Simelane, (KoNtshingila, Hlathikhulu) 21 October 2007.

(16) Interview with Elias Simelane, (KoNtshingila, Hlathikhulu) 30 December 2007.

(17) Wikipedia. <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wz-map.gif>.

The Historical Relationships Between Swaziland, South Africa, and Mozambique

When colonial boundaries were drawn between South Africa and Swaziland on the one hand, and Swaziland and Mozambique on the other, a complicated situation was created where some of the Swazi remained in South Africa, while others remained in Mozambique. Those who demarcated the boundary between the different states led the states into an unusual relationship that developed thereafter among the groups in their politically distinct areas.¹⁸ In other words, the drawing up of boundaries caused serious problems for the administrations of the states in terms of the obligation to contain their subjects or citizens within their respective boundaries. Border gates were built to divide the sovereign states and the gates were respected by citizens of both countries. The crossing of the borders to either side was governed by some laws which became the blueprint for border administration.¹⁹

Cross-border movements between Mozambique, South Africa, and Swaziland were known to the officials of the three countries and were tolerated where relatives crossed the fence to the other side without the use of travel documents.²⁰ Border gate officials allowed known persons to cross from one side to the other, even without the use of travel documents, because there were no guerrilla activities. Different types of facilities on either side of the borders attracted the movements of people to and fro. These facilities included hospitals, schools, shops, and others, and those who crossed were not asked to produce travel documents because most of them were already known to the immigration officials at the border gates. Others crossed illegally at hidden points along the fence, and, since the fence was not patrolled, these people crossed without being bothered about travel documents. Immigration officials did not make any threats of arrest because crossing from one side of the border gate to the other had not yet been associated with harm to either side of the fence.²¹

In 1960, cross border movement came under scrutiny and close surveillance was instituted because the regime in South Africa had begun to arrest revolutionaries who were a threat to the regime's survival. Some of the South African revolutionaries had already begun to cross the border seeking asylum in neighbouring countries, which supported the liberation struggles.²² Some neighbouring countries supported guerrilla activities on the soils of their states at first, but when the revolutionary momentum gained strength and intensified with the regime in South Africa retaliating against the freedom fighters, the attitude changed. Even neighbouring countries which had openly supported the revolutions began to act more cautiously and advised the members of revolutionary organizations to carry out their guerrilla

(18) Matsebula, J.S.M. *A History of Swaziland*. Cape Town: Longman Southern Africa, 1986.

(19) Matsebula, J.S.M. *A History of Swaziland*. 1986.

(20) Interview with Solomon Sifundza, (Lomahasha) 12 July 2008.

(21) Interview with Almon Lukhele, (Lavumisa) 24 December 1985.

(22) Interview with Almon Maseko, (Mahamba Locality, Southwestern Swaziland) 23 December 2007.

activities cautiously. In fact, the new message to freedom fighters was that they should avoid using the neighbouring countries as launching pads against the colonial regimes in their home countries.

King Sobhuza II, then ruler of Swaziland until his demise in August 1982, who was still in control of political proceedings in his own country, and who was well aware of the political developments in South Africa and Mozambique, began to prepare for the eventualities of the repercussions of Sharpeville. As a member of the ANC and as a politician interested in the political developments in the region, he invited the leaders of the South African ANC and PAC to a meeting, where he discussed with them the strategies of operation against the regime in South Africa. King Sobhuza II excluded revolutionaries from Mozambique because their presence in Swaziland was a secret compared to that of South Africans in Swaziland. King Sobhuza II was well aware of the consequences of allowing revolutionaries who fought their governments at that time to use Swaziland as a launching pad. Due to the proximity of his country to South Africa and Mozambique and the country's military vulnerability to South Africa and Mozambique, King Sobhuza II suggested the most practical and plausible strategy to handle the volatile revolutionary issue.²³ King Sobhuza II realized that he could not influence the revolutionary strategies of freedom fighters in Swaziland without the cooperation of the fighters.

King Sobhuza II is said to have been willing to play an active role in the revolutionary struggles of his neighbours, but Swaziland's proximity to South Africa and Mozambique forced him to adopt a more pragmatic approach to the realities of the situation. If he had allowed revolutionaries to operate in Swaziland as a military units against the apartheid regimes in South Africa and Mozambique, his country's economy would have been throttled in a short time because it was an economic appendage of South Africa, a position which has remained the same even in contemporary times.²⁴ King Sobhuza II felt that the revolution touched upon the lives of every southern African, while the racist regimes remained in political positions of determining the destiny of South Africa and Mozambique. However, fear of being mauled by the forces of the racist regimes in both countries dictated pragmatic approaches to the liberation struggles.²⁵

Before the Sharpeville Incident of 1960, there were already some South African teachers who worked in some schools in Swaziland. At the same time there were medical doctors, agricultural officers, nurses, and other professionals from South Africa who worked in Swaziland. For instance, the Department of Agriculture had hired South African professionals and these people left a mark of hard work while they served in various positions in Swaziland.²⁶ While some are said to have crossed

(23) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Reaction to the introduction of the research topic by His Excellency Ambassador Hashim Mbita at the Foreign Affairs Ministry Offices, (Mbabane) July 2007.

(24) Halpern, Jack. *South Africa's Hostages*. London: Penguin Books, 1965. Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mathendele Dlamini, (Mbabane) July 2007.

(25) Interview with Prince Mfanasibili, (Mahhala Shopping Complex) 12 June 2008.

(26) Interview with Rev. Philemon Fakudze, (Sibusisweni Area) 20 October 2007.

into Swaziland for employment because they identified a need to go there to help alleviate the problems of the shortage of personnel, the regime in Swaziland was faced with claims that South Africans sought work in the latter country because racism in their country had prompted them to do so.

In their totality, the causes of these events suggest that racism was the major factor that triggered the exodus of trained professionals from South Africa to neighbouring countries. There was a trickle of similar arrivals on the part of Mozambique mainly because their professional orientation was radically different from that of South Africa and even Swaziland. Mozambicans were exposed to more practical professions than the white-collar professions that were prevalent in the countries of South Africa and Swaziland. Racial policies in South Africa dated back to a period which pre-dated Sharpeville in 1960.²⁷ The Sharpeville Incident of 1960 was triggered by an accumulation of racial practices which were aimed at the protection of the interests of Europeans at the expense of Africans. On the other hand, Mozambicans were motivated by the colonial regime's forced labour policies.

Some South Africans had preferred to work in foreign countries in order to realize freedom of expression and enjoyment of work. Non-whites were denied freedom of expression in South Africa during this time.²⁸ South Africa paid comparatively better salaries and wages than most, if not all of its neighbours, despite the fact that it survived on racism. In other words, there were intrinsic reasons for the movement of South African blacks across the borders to work in neighbouring countries. Indeed there was more freedom of expression in the neighbouring countries, when compared to South Africa, which means that there were other factors behind the movements across the borders.²⁹

After the Sharpeville Incident in 1960, more revolutionaries from South Africa crossed into Swaziland because they had noticed that the conditions provided for security and safety. Those interviewed indicated that Sharpeville was anticipated long before 1960 by some members of the two revolutionary organizations. Thus when Sharpeville finally came, the freedom fighters knew exactly where to go to seek asylum. In the case of South Africa, Sharpeville only accelerated the exodus instead of triggering it.³⁰ The pressure for asylum in neighbouring countries determined the rate at which movements across borders took place to escape the onslaught of the racist regime. Contacts across the fence that separated the different countries were established because of the already existing relationships. After Sharpeville, border surveillance increased to ensure that the exodus to neighbouring states was reduced and that revolutionaries were returned to their countries of South Africa and Mozambique.

(27) Davenport, T.R.H. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 4th Ed. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991: See p.264.

(28) Davenport, T.R.H. *South Africa: A Modern History*. 4th ED. Houndmills: Macmillan, 1991: See p.264.

(29) Interview with Fonono Dube, (Zombodze) 20 September 2007.

(30) Interview with Peter Zwane, (Mkhwakhweni Shiselweni east) 20 October 2007.

The Revolutionary Activities in Swaziland, 1960-1976

The events which occurred in Sharpeville in 1960 changed the whole political, social, and economic scenario in southern Africa. The South African regime began to clamp down on revolutionaries in South Africa, hence the rate of border crossings into Swaziland and other neighbouring countries began to increase. Prior to 1960, in order to leave their country, South Africans used the political justification of visiting relatives in Swaziland (and in the other neighbouring countries), and the Swazi did likewise, so that movements across the border were not one-sided. Border traffic had been an on-going process which did not cause any scare at all until 1960, when the rate of border traffic increased.

Identity documents for revolutionaries resident in Swaziland were applied for in the country and the immigrants earned themselves the status of refugees.³¹ Some of the South African revolutionaries who were in Swaziland, especially the youth, forged documents that legalized their residence in Swaziland. These documents opened up opportunities for employment to earn an income, which enabled refugees to pay for the education of their children in Swaziland.³² Income that accrued from employment offered the refugees opportunities for investment. But investments were facilitated by the possession of Swazi documents that contained the nationality and background of each refugee. Refugees in Swaziland possessed quality education that bestowed on them opportunities to offer real services to the Swazi. These services benefited both South Africans and Swazis.

Guerrillas in Swaziland camouflaged themselves in several ways in order to avoid attracting assassins sent by the South African colonial regime. Assassins (who killed guerrillas) and spies (who reported on revolutionary activities to agents of the racist regime in South Africa) were scattered throughout the neighbouring countries. Spies were deployed to identify guerrillas and their hideouts in the neighbouring states and the identification simplified the attacks by the racist regimes, whose activities of assassination were carried out at night. The rate at which the assassins entered Swaziland depended more on the safety of the operations. In Swaziland, different Prime Ministers who were at the helm of government treated the liberation struggles differently one from the other. During the reigns of some Prime Ministers, South African assassins visited Swaziland more frequently without the police stopping them.³³ In most cases, the conduct of Prime Ministers gave the impression that the South African and Swaziland regimes had an agreement to stop guerrillas from launching attacks against South Africa's racist regime.³⁴ People who were suspected

(31) Interview with Mhlangano Matsebula, Former Foreign Affairs Minister, (Opposite Namboard Office (Encabeni), Matsapha) 12 November 2007.

(32) Interview with A. A. Mthembu, (Mkhwakhweni Vicinity) 27 November 2007.

(33) Interview with Nicholas Nyoni, (near Lomahasha High School, Lomahasha) 20 August 2007.

(34) Interview with Brigadier Fonono Dube, (Zombodze Area) 28 September, 2007.

to have helped assassins into Swaziland to kill freedom fighters did not identify themselves with the work of the assassins. Because they headed the police force, Prime Ministers who served as heads of regimes were suspected to have collaborated with assassins.³⁵

In the 1960s, revolutionary activity already had a strong presence in Swaziland and the operations were being improved in terms of organization, especially where the South Africans were concerned. The two South African groups who were opposed to apartheid in their country failed to work together as a united front. King Sobhuza II worked hard to coordinate the work of these freedom fighters in order to augment the attacks on the South African regime.³⁶ In South Africa, organized attacks against the racial policies of Hendrick F. Verwoerd's regime had been made difficult to execute, though Verwoerd did not rule long enough to see his ruthless policies come to fruition. In 1966, Dr H.F. Verwoerd was assassinated and the political policies that had begun to develop and to be implemented were therefore halted.³⁷ John R. Vorster, who had been Minister of Justice, became president of the Republic of South Africa following the demise of Dr Verwoerd. Vorster tightened the laws that were meant to stop guerrilla activity in South Africa and the region in general.³⁸ Since the two political organizations had a common enemy, logic dictated that they unite their efforts against the common enemy but the opposite happened.

South African refugees were accommodated in the urban areas of Manzini, Mbabane, Nhlanguano, and Hlathikhulu, because those were the places that could provide employment for them. Teachers, nurses, agricultural officers, scientists, and doctors were employed in urban and rural areas.³⁹ South African and Mozambican refugees were found in Manzini even though the latter seemed to prefer Msunduzi in Mbabane to Manzini, save in the cases of those who were employed in garages. Freedom fighters who arrived in Swaziland in the early 1970s included Aaron Zwane, whose home was in Johannesburg. Zwane was a strong member of the PAC, but worked well with members of the ANC in Swaziland. Zwane believed that for South Africa to break the political deadlock, freedom fighters needed to overcome the Afrikaners' policies of racial segregation and political exclusion. Zwane crossed into Swaziland in the company of two comrades with whom he had been fighting the racist regime.

Aaron Zwane, Abel Nkosi, and Isaac Khumalo did not have any contacts in Swaziland when they first made their visit, but they were quick to find contacts in whose custody they placed their families. Zwane and his colleagues were later moved from Swaziland to Zambia from where they launched attacks against racist South Africa.⁴⁰ Zwane and his colleagues applied for asylum in Swaziland and resided

(35) Ibid.

(36) Davenport, *South Africa: A Modern History*, 4th Ed. 1991: See p.365-7.

(37) Ibid.

(38) Ibid.

(39) Interview with Petros Mthembu, (Mkhwakhweni Area) 21 December 2007.

(40) Interview with Mrs A. Zwane, (Ngwane Park Location, Manzini) 21 January 2008.

in Manzini where they later built family homes, especially at Ngwane Park. While actively engaged in the revolution, Zwane became unwell and died in the 1980s, leaving his wife and four children. Zwane's family had spent more time in Swaziland than in South Africa at the time of his death, hence, even after his death, the family felt more comfortable in Swaziland than in South Africa, a country with which they had already lost contact. As the family of a freedom fighter, Zwane's family was harassed even after he had died. Agents of the South African racist regime harassed Zwane's family in the hope that the names of Zwane's collaborators would be known.

Manzini had become a popular hunting ground for the assassins of the South African regime because Manzini was a popular residential place for the freedom fighters, who found the town's central position more convenient in comparison to other towns in Swaziland. The cosmopolitan composition of the Manzini population served as an attraction to freedom fighters because this composition rendered the area a fertile ground for the struggle. Manzini gave shelter to both legal and illegal immigrants. Manzini also attracted most of the business people, who were both Swazi and non-Swazi, as they settled in this town for the convenience of accessing commercial centres like Matsapha in the middle of the country.

Agents of the racist regime in South Africa therefore found Manzini to be a holding ground for their targets, the freedom fighters. But assassins who chose to operate at odd hours of the day encountered problems in identifying their targets; hence, they enlisted the services of surrogates, most of whom were alleged freedom fighters. Divisions of this nature worked against the efforts of the freedom fighters at a time when they needed unity in order to achieve a breakthrough in the struggle.⁴¹ Odd hours of attack on behalf of assassins made it hard for them to identify their targets because of the nature of the population. The population in Manzini consisted of immigrants who originated from different countries, and who, while in Manzini, learnt all possible languages to facilitate communication. This linguistic facility made identification of targets by speech alone a nightmare for the South African agents. Until assassins engaged the services of spies, most of whom were members of the freedom fighting organizations, wrong targets were hit and the objectives for which spies were engaged were not being realized.

The racist regime's spies mixed easily with the whole cosmopolitan population of Manzini and could not be identified for some time because they seemed to share the sentiments of members of the liberation struggle from South Africa. On the other hand, history is silent about the same development among those who had originally come from Mozambique; there does not appear to have been any division among the freedom fighters from that country. Most of the informants believe that the Portuguese community in Mozambique did not enjoy as much access to material wealth as their counterparts in South Africa; hence collaboration between Mozambican revolutionaries and Portuguese racists in that country did not emerge.

(41) Interview with Chicks Nkosi, (Matsapha First National Bank) 11 November 2008.

Alternatively, history may be silent on the matter of spies in the Mozambican revolution because history is silent about spies in most revolutions.⁴² Second, money as a means of exchange was growing in importance gradually in the late 1960s and early 1970s, particularly its adulterated version, hence spies who were paid in money were willing to cooperate because of the cash returns.⁴³ Areas of investment for such material wealth were gradually expanding; hence most of the spies for South Africa were attracted by the temptation of material wealth.

At the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, some South African refugees had built homes in Manzini which were often used as homes for hiding the freedom fighters.⁴⁴ Some of these houses belonged to revolutionaries, who were believed by others to have used money from spying for the racist regime. If these allegations are anything to go by, then revolutionaries belonged to two strange worlds. If the money was raised through the alleged wicked ways, whom would the functionaries have housed in the long run? The rate at which assassins killed South African freedom fighters was increasing, hence the feeling that there would soon be nobody to house. Other observations indicate that spies earned their dirty money in order to promote selfish interests as opposed to financing revolutions, as oral research seems to reveal in the case of South African revolutionaries who operated in Swaziland in the late 1970s and sometimes in the late 1980s.⁴⁵ Most of the Swazi members of the liberation struggle in Swaziland came from Manzini, because this region was where most of the liberation struggle was organized and launched against the targets in South Africa.⁴⁶ It has already been indicated that teachers who originated in South Africa were scattered all over Swaziland, but Manzini housed more of these teachers than the other regions. Some of the South African teachers were found in the countryside, though their numbers were smaller than those who taught in urban areas. As an urban village that later grew into a city, Manzini enjoyed better constructed schools compared to those found in the other regions of Swaziland.⁴⁷ By virtue of being a hub of activity, Manzini became the pivotal point from where revolutionary activity was planned and launched against the South African racist regime.⁴⁸ South African teachers who taught in the rural areas, but also supported the revolution, worked very hard for the liberation struggle and some think that they made an even greater impact on the struggle because they were far from the attention of the agents of the racist regime. On the other hand, freedom fighters who taught in urban schools were more likely to be targeted by South African agents because information travelled faster and wider in urban places because of the improved means of communication compared

(42) Interview with Brigadier Fonono Dube, (Zombodze Area) 12 September 2008.

(43) Interview with Elias Simelane, (Ngwane Park, Ludwala, Manzini) 24 February 2008.

(44) Interview with Elias Simelane, (Ngwane Park Location, Manzini) 12 February 2008.

(45) Interview with Dumba Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni Location) 12 September 2007.

(46) Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Timbutini, South West of Manzini) 23 March 2008.

(47) Interview with Dumba Roman Dlamini, (Timbutini, South West of Manzini) 12 July 2008.

(48) Interview with Dumba Roman Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni, South West of Manzini) 20 October 2008.

to rural areas, hence the greater impact rural revolutionaries made on the struggle.⁴⁹ Rural revolutionaries were also responsible for hiding the ammunition that was later transported across the fence to South Africa for use against the racist regime there. Therefore devotion to the struggle did not exist in one zone alone, but was spread out evenly, or more for rural areas than urban ones.⁵⁰

The belief that rural teachers devoted more in terms of resources to the struggle than their urban counterparts might not be an exaggeration. Rural areas were less associated with political activity, hence some of the freedoms fighters might have deliberately opted to go and teach there to dodge the attention of assassins. Those interviewed who claimed to have been part of the revolutions against racism in South Africa and Mozambique indicated that rural areas were used for camouflage against the onslaughts of the forces of the South African regime.⁵¹

Ammunitions were kept in the rural areas for several reasons and these weapons were transported by Swazi insurgents to South Africa. Among the Swazi activists who took part in the liberation struggle and helped leaders of the struggle to identify places where weapons were hidden is Dumba Roman Dlamini.⁵² Most of these Swazi revolutionaries call themselves members of the MK in Swaziland. Their duties were to identify places for hiding ammunition and to move ammunition from Mozambique to several destinations in South Africa. Dumba Dlamini is one of the Swazi revolutionaries who said that, as a Swazi member of the MK, he was stationed in one of the rural areas which thrived on such business as the sale of beef at a butchery, and, like several others, Dlamini had grown up in rural areas in Swaziland, but along the borders with South Africa.⁵³ Dumba himself belonged to both worlds from his youth; hence it was easy for him to identify with the political aspirations of the youth in South Africa, which made him become a member of the MK.⁵⁴ Dumba was influenced by South African cultures from his childhood and considered the revolutionary activity of that country his own because it affected him to the same degree as it affected citizens of that country. While he worked for the liberation, Dumba was assigned to move ammunition across Swaziland to South Africa. Dumba was well aware that the Swaziland government had forbidden the activity he identified himself with, but since Swaziland was the only logical and convenient transit, the plan was used with minimum risk because of the caution they exercised.⁵⁵

Liberation struggles needed the support of regimes in neighbouring countries for several reasons. The revolutionary leaders of political organisations in South Africa and Mozambique could not have executed their plans to decolonize without the

(49) Interview with Dean Ndaba, (Matsapha) 20 October 1979.

(50) Interview with Elias Simelane, (Ngwane Park Location, Manzini) 22 November 2008.

(51) Interview with Gogo Jolwane Dlodlu, (Ngololweni) 20 January 2000.

(52) Interview with Dumba Roman Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni) 20 October 2008.

(53) Interview Henry Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni Southwest of Manzini) 12 October 2007.

(54) Interview with Dumba Roman Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni) 10 February 2008.

(55) Interviews with Dumba Roman Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni, Manzini) 10 February 2008; Solomon Shekwa, (Lwandle) 20 February 2008.

cooperation of neighbours. Prince Makhosini, the first Prime Minister of Swaziland, 1968-1976, dealt with revolutionaries with caution.⁵⁶ The premier exercised caution because even though these freedom fighters knew the foreign policy of Swaziland they could not understand it. However, the dominance of King Sobhuza II promoted calm in the state. Though the king was an executive ruler of his country, the Prime Minister assumed the responsibility of monitoring the affairs and welfare of the police department where the clashes that ensued from time to time between South African revolutionaries and Swaziland police remained his sole responsibility.⁵⁷

When Lt. Colonel Prince Maphevu succeeded Prince Makhosini as premier from 1976 until his death in 1979, clashes between the Swaziland police and the South African organizations, and between the two organizations themselves, subsided. As a soldier, his administration introduced stern rules that were observed widely in the state. But Prince Maphevu's reign suffered from strong resentment between his army and the police. Prince Maphevu headed both security forces by virtue of being premier, but most people felt that he was biased in favour of the army, thus pushing the significance of the police to the background.⁵⁸ The situation placed Prince Maphevu between two major political problems. On the one hand, as a soldier he identified more with soldiers than with the police. His restraining attitude towards freedom fighters curtailed the clashes the organizations had had previously.⁵⁹ Prince Maphevu's successor Prince Mabandla was more liberal than even Prince Makhosini and he indirectly sympathized with revolutionary work in his country.

Prince Makhosini was a chief and his orientation was peculiar in that he was expected to show kindness and benevolence, while Prince Maphevu, who was a soldier, was the opposite of the chief.⁶⁰ Prince Maphevu exhibited a very rough character that was common among soldiers, but the king exercised some restraining influence on him. The restraining influence of the king on Prince Maphevu maintained a cordial relationship between the freedom fighters and the security forces in the country.⁶¹ The short time that Prince Maphevu spent in the office of premier makes it hard to evaluate the impact he had on the political dynamics of Swaziland. It is equally hard to evaluate the impact his administration had on revolutionary activities in Swaziland during his premiership. Some informants believe that it was the fear that was associated with Prince Maphevu that reduced the activities of revolutionaries during his premiership.⁶²

The culture of the Swazi delayed political awareness because Swazi people were naturally slow in doing things. This slowness was worsened by the nature of the Swazi culture, which emphasized meekness and avoiding asking questions on statements

(56) Interview with Brigadier Fonono Dube, (Zombodze) 12 May 2008.

(57) Interview with Brigadier Fonono Dube, (Zombodze) 20 July 2007.

(58) Interview with Make M. Mbhamali, (Zombodze, Mdzimba) 25 July 2007.

(59) Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni Southwest of Manzini) 17 December 2007.

(60) Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni Southwest of Manzini) 10 January 2008.

(61) Interview with Elias Simelane, (Ngwanne Park, Manzini) 11 November 2007.

(62) Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni Southwest of Manzini) 17 May 2008.

that came from adults. Swazi involvement in politics was taboo because it was considered a challenge to the authority of the king.⁶³ The king had founded a political party on behalf of his nation; hence every Swazi was expected to support it. Political affiliation to other parties was equivalent to challenging the political position of the king, hence Swazi political inactivity. All these beliefs contributed to the submissive attitude of the Swazi, who accepted without question everything that came from the king or those who claimed to be his representatives. Since the king did not announce the treatment that freedom fighters ought to receive in Swaziland, the assumption was that he did not like their presence in the country. The king's right hand men exploited this situation to promote their political positions on the liberation struggles, and this position became worse after August 1982 when the king died.⁶⁴

The New Liberation Struggle Strategy, 1976–82

Prince Makhosini's reign as Prime Minister of Swaziland was not characterized by bloody incidents where revolutionaries were confronted by the police force or attacked by the forces of the racist regime in Swaziland. Prince Maphevu succeeded Prince Makhosini to the premiership and he followed in the footsteps of his predecessor. However, Prince Maphevu's regime was associated more with naivety than with understanding the king's stance with regard to the presence of freedom fighters in Swaziland. Both premiers were conservative and believed that the king's decision was final and should not be questioned. At his death in 1979, Prince Maphevu was succeeded by Prince Mabandla whose orientation was slightly different from his two predecessors.⁶⁵ This introduction is important here because it serves as a foundation upon which events that hinged on revolutions in the region came to rest in later years. Political pressure was mounted after 1976 when Swaziland was flooded by students who escaped the wrath of the Afrikaners in South Africa after the Soweto Uprising of 1976. Government policies needed to accommodate these changes in Swaziland, so Prince Maphevu's reign was faced with all these demands. Prince Mabandla too was expected to adjust his foreign policies to the developments of the time.

Mabandla's regime became unpopular with the royal household because of the drastic measures he took to improve the economic situation of Swaziland, and politically he tore the line and did not pay even lip service to the conservative policies of the state.⁶⁶ One of the drastic changes he implemented was a Commission of Inquiry into some alleged corruption in government. After setting up the Commission of Inquiry into corruption in 1980, influential politicians anticipated that their corrupt ways of conducting work might be revealed, so they blocked the work of the commission.⁶⁷ The Commission of Inquiry into corruption implicated some princes

⁽⁶³⁾ Interview with Solomon Mabuza, (Zombodze) 15 May 2008.

⁽⁶⁴⁾ Interview with Solomon Shekwa, (Lwandle) 10 October 2007.

⁽⁶⁵⁾ Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni Southwest of Manzini) 28 October 2007.

⁽⁶⁶⁾ Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni Southwest of Manzini) 10 December 2007.

⁽⁶⁷⁾ Interview with Mmehleli Dlamini, (Magubheleni south, Shiselweni) 29 November 2007.

and influential politicians in the corruption that was being investigated. Among those implicated was Polycarp Masaletiveni Dlamini, who stopped the commission from completing its work after King Sobhuza II died. Prince Mabandla was summoned before a tribunal to address a fabrication of things he was alleged to have committed. The framework of the case was such that Prince Mabandla was being accused of having committed treason. After Prince Mabandla realized the seriousness of the hoax he fled to seek asylum in the Baputatswana Province in South Africa.

Prince Mabandla's sympathy with the objectives of the freedom fighters in Swaziland was yet another cause of his downfall. Prince Mabandla as premier became unpopular after his attempt to expose corrupt officials in the country. When King Sobhuza II died, the Liqoqo, Supreme Council of State, developed a negative attitude to the presence of revolutionaries in Swaziland.⁶⁸ The Liqoqo accused Prince Mabandla of colluding with elements that were against the royal household, which meant that he was against the monarch, hence the plot to replace him with a more loyal candidate.

In 1976 when South African student immigration increased, Swaziland began to expand its security department and developed camps that would hold refugees while they remained in the country, because some of them were only in transit to other countries of their choice. South Africa also became more vigilant about its own security after the Soweto Uprising.⁶⁹ The radicalism that developed after Soweto made some countries in the region revise their policies of relating among themselves and with South Africa and Mozambique. The political developments of the late 1970s demanded that the policies that regulated relationships in the region be given the priority that would minimize the risks citizens were being exposed to in an attempt to accommodate the developments. The ANC and PAC freedom fighters also increased their attacks on the regime to force it to decolonize. The racist regime was well aware of these developments and retaliated with the momentum that would demilitarize freedom fighters, hence the assassination of revolutionaries in neighbouring countries of the region.

The Soweto Uprising of 1976 influenced the United Nations to construct shelters and schools to cater for the education of the children of refugees. In Swaziland, refugees from both South Africa and Mozambique were sheltered at Mpaka and Ndzevane. In order to ensure that children of refugees were educated, two schools were built at these camps namely Mpaka and Ndzevane High Schools.⁷⁰ Initially these schools were meant to educate children of refugees from South Africa, Mozambique, and others as well.⁷¹ Politicians in Swaziland had thought that the separation of refugee schools from those of nationals would minimize the spread of the influence of refugees to national children, but failed to build strong frontiers to stop the influences they

(68) Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni) 20 January 2008.

(69) Interview with A. Mthembu, (Mkhwakhweni Southeast Swaziland) 23 February 2008.

(70) Interview with Solomon Shekwa, (Lwandle) 23 October 2007.

(71) Interview with Solomon Shekwa, (Lwandle) 23 October 2007.

dreaded. The segregation policies of the Swaziland regime failed to separate refugees from Swazi nationals at the schools. For instance, Swazi children were admitted in the two refugee schools because Mpaka and Ndzevane had few schools to meet the needs of the Swazi population that was there before the arrival of refugees.⁷²

The mixture of Swazi, South African, and Mozambican children at school enhanced the political awareness of Swazi students. The meeting points for these young intellectuals in turn led to the birth of a new culture of viewing politics differently and the concept that the king could not be contradicted stopped influencing young Swazis. To most Swazi children, the Soweto Uprising of 1976 began to have an impact on their perceptions of politics and their reaction to affiliation to political organizations. Before Mpaka and Ndzevane High Schools were built, refugee students attended the other schools with Swazi nationals in Swaziland. In 1978 school pupils organized an uprising that shook the country and inflicted a heavy loss after the destruction of buildings that were a symbol of their misery.⁷³ The buildings were pelted with stones and many other missiles that caused damage. Government vehicles were attacked and pelted with stones in order to force social change upon state.⁷⁴

Most Swazi politicians believed that South African students in Swazi schools were a major cause of the disturbances in the schools in 1978. Similar uprisings had taken place in the country and motivated the political leadership to embark on a more organized form of control and administration. The 1978 student insurrection produced strong minded Swazi people who later participated in Swaziland in the revolutionary activities like those which were spearheaded by the ANC and PAC.⁷⁵

In the 1980s, the Swazi youth who joined the liberation struggle increased and apart from Dumba Dlamini, Solomon Shekwa is another youth who joined forces with the liberation struggle. Like Dumba Dlamini, Solomon Shekwa is one of these Swazi who, when he became a member of the MK, helped to distribute ammunition in South Africa. The ammunition was collected from Maputo and sent to South Africa in a sealed car whose dismantling to offload it of the weapons required some skill.⁷⁶ The Swazi youth were trained in these skills because they were expected to distribute the ammunition at different points in South Africa.

The Impact of Sobhuza II's Death on the Liberation Struggle, 1982

King Sobhuza II died in August 1982 and had been the pillar of the South African liberation struggle. His influence as king of his country and especially on the liberation

(72) Interview with Dumba Roman Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni, Manzini) 11 February 2008; *The Times of Swaziland*, September 1978.

(73) Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni Southwest of Manzini) 25 January 2008.

(74) *The Times of Swaziland*, July 1978.

(75) Interview with Henry Dlamini, (Mkhuzweni Southwest of Manzini) 25 January 2008.

(76) Interviews with Solomon Shekwa, (Lwandle) 23 November 2007; Phindile Sukati, (Moneni, a suburb of Manzini City) 27 December 2007.

struggle was immense.⁷⁷ The king attended Lovedale Missionary Institution and it was during his education days in South Africa that he became a member of the ANC. He supported the activities of the organization until his death.⁷⁸

In the early 1980s, the South African police devised a strategy to inflict pain on the freedom fighters to instil fear in them. Most of the attacks on freedom fighters were carried out at night inside Swaziland. South African assassins sometimes targeted Swazi citizens who did not even understand the liberation struggle because they were associated with the activities of South African freedom fighters. One of the victims of the attacks that were carried out at night was N. Nyoni of Lomahasha, who worked for a European businessman in Mbabane as a bar attendant. Nyoni believed that he was confused with one of the South African freedom fighters. The attack was carried out in Mbabane in the middle of the night where his oldest son got killed by the assailants.⁷⁹ Nyoni believed the assailants mistook him for a freedom fighter known M. Maphumulo, whom the assailants finally killed. After his capture on that fateful night, Nyoni was blindfolded and taken to Piet Retief for identification.⁸⁰ He shared the back of a bakkie (truck) with the corpse of Maphumulo. But since he was blindfolded from Swaziland until the destination at Piet Retief he did not recall where Maphumulo's body was loaded in the van that drove him to Piet Retief. Maphumulo was also assassinated even though Nyoni's son who was killed had already paid for the sins of Maphumulo. Nyoni noticed the dead body on the van with him after they arrived in Piet Retief. It was at the Piet Retief destination that the assassins removed the material they had blindfolded him with. Nyoni had been kidnapped wearing pyjamas, but he was given some clothes to wear before he was driven back to his family in Swaziland. At Piet Retief there was a building where captives were kept separately from dead bodies.⁸¹

Conclusion

After his education at Lovedale, King Sobhuza II realized the importance of maintaining a cordial relationship in the southern African region and believed that such a development would not come to fruition while South African Blacks continued to suffer from racial discrimination in their country. This conviction led the king to register as a member of the South African National Congress (ANC). The king sought ways to assist the liberation struggle in South Africa after his country became independent in 1968, but his state's military vulnerability to that of South Africa forced him to compromise his conviction on the liberation struggle. He clarified this position to the leaders of the liberation struggle and advised ANC and Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) leaders against using Swaziland as a launching pad against the South

(77) Interview with Brigadier Fonono Dube, (Zombodze) 17 March 2008.

(78) Interview with Brigadier Fonono Dube, (Zombodze) 17 March 2008.

(79) Interview with Mr and Mrs N. Nyoni, (Lomahasha near Lomahasha High School) 12 October 2007.

(80) Interview with Mr and Mrs N. Nyoni, (Lomahasha near Lomahasha High School) 12 August 2007.

(81) Ibid.

African racist regime on the one hand and against the Portuguese colonial regime in Mozambique on the other. It was finally agreed that Swaziland be used in transit to Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, and other destinations. But heads of government in Swaziland changed from time to time and the changes affected domestic and foreign policies, some of which were unfriendly to the freedom fighters in Swaziland. Some of the political leaders in Swaziland facilitated the arrests and assassinations of freedom fighters, especially after the demise of Sobhuza II. Prince Bhekimpi's regime, which was in power at the same time the Likoqo and Supreme Council of State assumed headship of the state, was particularly inhospitable. During this time the Chief of the Police Force was Majiji Simelane, whose turn of office increased the spate of killings of revolutionaries.

The research has revealed several issues which have not been noted in previous publications. One such issue is the extent to which South Africa's and Mozambique's neighbours contributed to liberation struggle of the two nations. Swaziland, like other neighbouring states in the region, played an important, though circumscribed, role in the liberation struggle of South Africa and Mozambique.

The study has shown several forms of contributions to the liberation struggle. Those who made a contribution did not necessarily all carry the gun to go and fight, but the roles which they played to facilitate the liberation of South Africa and Mozambique were adequately equated to contributions to decolonization in South Africa and Mozambique. For instance, in the 1970s, women were involved in the liberation struggle as nurses who attended to hurt guerrillas. Nursing is a service that the struggle could not come to fruition without hence these roles have been treated and made to stand on their own as important roles that contributed significantly to the liberation struggle, particularly in South Africa. In Swaziland there were women who made a significant contribution to the struggle by assisting South African women, particularly in Manzini, to locate safe accommodation for guerrillas that could not easily be sited by assassins of the racist regime in South Africa. The cases of Phindile Sukati, Mcishi Malaza, and others are among women who assisted other South African women who had arrived in Swaziland as part of the revolution against apartheid in South Africa.

That the South African youth began to enter Swaziland in big numbers in the 1970s is one factor that increased the political awareness of the Swaziland youth. The South African youth attended school in Swaziland together with the Swazi youth and that process started a whole chain of cross breeding of ideas to the extent that by the end of the 1970s already political awareness had been enhanced and these developments led to a student uprising in 1978. The 1978 student uprising had an effect on government structures. Most Swazi politicians believed the mixture of South African students with Swazi students led to the growth of political consciousness which raised the degree of sympathy for South African freedom fighters. Locals featured in the transportation of ammunition to South Africa because the Swazi were not suspected to be linked to the struggle. These are developments which gained strength in the post- Sobhuza II

era, after August 1982. Swazis who were sympathetic to the South African freedom fighters could not openly show sympathy until the demise of King Sobhuza II.

7.8

Swaziland

Personal Stories

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Anonymous

[Mkhuzweni Location; 12 September 2007, etc.]

This anonymous contact was involved with the liberation struggle through the ANC. He tells of very interesting episodes that touch on infiltrations, betrayal by friends, attempted kidnappings and other risks that were being taken by individual Swazis as part of their contribution to the liberation struggle of South Africa. He tells of how for many years he had to move from house to house to avoid being captured by the Boers, and how he had to leave his house so that his family would not be put into risk. Interestingly he shows that the police and the Boers knew the separation between ANC sympathizers and their families and treated them differently.

I had sent a child to go and tell his uncle Maphumulo that he would find me at Salola's home. So he sets out to Maphumulo and I set off too, mind you I was weak at that point but to be exact I was drained by shock. Earlier on while I was looking for my friend Leonard I met a lady who sold vegetables, and I asked her if by any chance she had seen my friend. She told me that yes, she had, and unfortunately he had been captured by the Afrikaners and they had killed him. I nearly collapsed from shock because Leonard was the best ANC cadet I knew and worked with.

Soon after that I took my keys and drove off to a nearby place called Ka-Hlobile and parked my car near the bushes, close to some houses, took my passport and left the car there. After some 40 minutes Maphumulo arrives to a meeting place we had agreed upon. I then related to him what had happened to Leonard and that the whole operation was a failure because our boys died in their mission. Anyway, I decided to go underground to avoid any contact with anyone I knew so as to protect them and myself. I stayed undercover for about three to four days, then I got a chance to go and see one of my friends, Fika. Since I was not getting any news from the ANC comrades, I went about asking other people what the newspapers were saying, and if there was anything about me or my family; and most importantly the operation that had failed, and unfortunately resulted in Leonard's death. Eventually I picked up enough courage to call Leonard's wife to let her know of her husband's death.

The phone rang and a male answered at the end of the receiver, so I asked if Leonard was home, then I hear loud laughter coming from the person who answered the phone and then he said "Hey Mlangeni, hey you chap, man you an old man, what are you doing underground? Come on man let's celebrate, come over to my house." Shocked and jubilant at the same time I took my jacket and got in the car and went straight to my friend's house. Leonard was alive! it was unbelievable. When I arrived there I could not contain myself and cried tears of joy, and soon we were chatting and laughing as he narrated to me what really happened there. He told me that actually the Afrikaners did catch him and they tried to persuade him to work for them as an agent, to infiltrate the ANC. Seeing that there was no way he could escape from them he pretended to agree to their request and thereafter they beat him up so that

people might think he was interrogated and they dropped him off where that old lady had seen him. When I asked about the bruises he told me that it was the result of the beating, and unfortunately when that lady saw him he was unconscious, and as a result people thought he was dead. Leonard was a clever man, so soon after, he talked to the ANC intelligence and told him his story. They organized to get him out of Swaziland as soon as possible and he later became ambassador of the ANC for Angola and some other countries. He left his wife behind since she was a registered refugee and also worked in Swaziland. Well, she lived her life here in Swaziland and was never troubled because she had been registered as a refugee here in Swaziland.

Let me skip and tell about the Natal missionary which was heavily infiltrated at that time; it was probably the most infiltrated missionary in South Africa. What happened is, some cadres came to Swaziland, but the Afrikaners knew that they were going to carry out that operation, they knew the times, and also the cars the cadres were going to use. That information could not have been from anyone else except from the leaders of the Umkhonto in the Natal missionary; two of them were there, and they knew about every operation, as no mission could be carried out without their consent.

Before I go further let me tell you about the mayhem in the Natal. This was the reason why the women from Natal marched to Lusaka; to Oliver Tambo's office at the ANC, and asked Oliver Tambo to stop any ANC operations in the Kwazulu-Natal, because a lot of people had died there, including members of their families. What had really caused this anger from the women was what had happened to a group of 16 women who were traveling by combi; when they came to a roadblock put up by the Boers, they were all shot dead and unfortunately their bodies were only released to family members for identification when they were already in a state of decomposing. That was when the women marched to Lusaka to tell Oliver Tambo to sort out his house, because a lot of young children had also died during that time.

Unfortunately for the arms struggle, the young men who the Boers recruited as agents were high ranking members of the ANC's military wing. They knew exactly what was going to happen in an operation. During those years the ANC took spears from Swaziland and smuggled them to South Africa, they were hidden in the mountains in South Africa and at certain areas, all over South Africa in preparation for the urban guerrilla war-fare. At that time the ANC believed that it was not right for South African people to be left to think that there was no war, so they were preparing for the moment when matters would come to a crunch. The bombing of certain installations like Sasol, Secunda and so on, were for moral boosting to the internal wing of the ANC and the rest of South Africa; to let them know that the war against the Boers was not yet over.

The second phase of the operation was the armed-urban guerrilla war-fare, that required that spears be buried almost everywhere around South Africa, not in the front-liner land, the likes of Swaziland, Botswana, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and

Lesotho. That was because the Boers would have had the courage and mandate to raid the front-line states if they continued to fight on foreign soil.

There was once a Mabhida Mkhize who was the ANC representative in Swaziland, you will have to excuse me because the following information may be a little bit jumbled, but please bear with me, I will jump from one point to another. King Sobhuza II was a strong supporter of the ANC, he took it from Gogo Gwamile, the ANC membership card too, he took it from his grandmother Gwamile who was one of the founders of the ANC. The money that helped in making a paper, called Zoom Africa, came out of Swaziland; she was the greatest ANC member in Swaziland.

On what kind of life I lived, I can say I was ostracized, because I would sleep two days in this house and the next two nights I would sleep in another house and so on. I was sleeping in many different houses, I would go from house to house, and that's if it was owned by an ANC sympathizer, more especially those that were introduced by me in the liberation struggle. I also approached the boys from Ngwane National and some other boy's secretly at their homes. I hid by moving from house to house, as long as the struggle lasted, from 1980 up to the times of CODESA.

The Boers knew everything but they did not bother my family. They knew that I could not be found at home, simply because I was no longer staying there. So I had decided to give my family some relief, because I was the one who had put myself in that situation. So the only way my family could know I was doing fine was by talking to them on the phone. At that time I was not staying at home; I used to go from one place to another, knowing very well that my trail was very clean, no one was following me. At night I did not sleep, instead I transported people from place to place all over Swaziland, especially during the days of the Nkomati Accord.

The ANC Natal missionary team looked after logistics. They were the ones that were responsible for sending food from point A to point B. That food could last more than a week, for that matter. Yes, life was difficult because I did not get to see my wife or my children; it was as if I was one of the boys who had left home to fight for the liberation struggle on foreign soil.

At one time I had to take some boys to the Lubombo region. There was a certain young man who was a teacher and is still alive today as we speak. Well before it got dark I was chatting with one of the boys when all of a sudden there was noise coming from the house. It was Gideon's wife; somehow Gideon had told her who we were and that we were requesting to sleep in their homestead that day. She was hysterical! Shouting at the top of her voice; obviously not siding with her husband concerning our request. Out of security reasons I told the boys to board the car and we decided to go and sleep at one of my farms in Mhlosheni. We arrived there and parked the car in the bushes then slept; the following morning I drove back in the direction to Lubombo, but made a U-turn before we got there, then drove back to my farm, this I did so that I do not raise suspicion in my family about where I was the night before I got here.

Coming back to the Natal missionary, that place had problems; both senior members of that missionary were agents of the Boers. I will not state their names, because not even the ANC came out publicly to state their names, but I know this from the intelligence sources of the ANC. Both of these people died outside of South Africa and Swaziland. There were boys who went to Natal to take orders there for their next mission, but surprisingly none of them made it back alive. What happened was, the buried AK-47 guns were tampered with by the Boers and they were put back where they were buried, after tampering with them. This happened for some time and it irked the ANC members as to why all soldiers were not coming back alive, until the ANC decided to use soldiers who were trained in countries like Russia. Fortunately three soldiers quickly realized that the guns they were using were tampered with, so they quickly retreated before the enemy could close-in, although not all of them made it back home; only one of them survived to tell his story.

The big guns that would be used to destroy the shells would be dug out and the Afrikaners would tamper with them before they were used by the cadres, they would manipulate the sights such that the aiming would never be accurate.

Getting back to how this was discovered, they were a lot of people who were dying. That being the case the ANC was between a rock and a hard place, Oliver Tambo had to determine what to do next. As I had earlier mentioned the before, the ANC had sent three of their special operation soldiers who had been trained almost all over the world, in countries like Angola, Germany, Russia and Cuba, to complete the operation. So these soldiers went there and the same thing happened as with the previous soldiers, but unfortunately for the Boers, of the three soldiers, one managed to survive and escape the Boers. The soldier who escaped made his way to Swaziland. While he was being chased by the Boers, he out-smarted them and vanished in the forests of Swaziland. He managed to make it to one of the senior members in Mbabane, the senior member then called me and informed me of the soldier that had just entered the country and was asking for my help. I then headed off to Mbabane where I met the soldier who also told me about what happened in Natal. I then alerted some senior members of the ANC and arranged for the soldier to cross the border as soon as possible. So I took him and hid him because he was not safe staying in one place. Not long after that, I arranged with people that I trusted in Mozambique to take him and house him. I left him at the border at Lomahasha, where he slept for the night and the following morning he went to the nearest police station where he told them that he was with the ANC. The police then phoned the ANC offices in Maputo and told them of the soldier who was at their station; the ANC sent a car to get the soldier and took him to Jacob Zuma who was in Maputo at that time.

Once there, he informed Jacob Zuma of what befell him when he was in the middle of the operation. Zuma in turn phoned the headquarters in Zambia and told them exactly what the soldier had told him. They ordered Zuma to send the soldier to them at the earliest possible time. The following morning the boy was in Lusaka. Back in Swaziland, the Natal commander was agitated, demanding to know where we have

hid the soldier; his intention was obviously to eliminate the boy. He approached me and told me that he heard rumours that the soldier was in Lusaka, but I told him I had no clue where the soldier was hiding.

Meanwhile in Lusaka the soldier was relating his story of what happened at the battle ground. They summoned the deputy commander to report to Mozambique. When he got there he met Jacob Zuma who told him that there was a directive that he was wanted in Lusaka; he got into the plane and headed off to Lusaka. He was met by the ANC at the airport and was taken to the offices for questioning. They asked him why he was killing the ANC soldiers by sending them off to a trap. To their surprise he bursts out and tells them not to touch him with their hands; he also tells them that he was never a member of the ANC, and that he was a warrant officer at the South African Police, who had been sent to the ANC to infiltrate them. Afterwards he told them everything they wanted to know, and also told them that he was working with Magagula in all that. The ANC then locked him up and decided to debrief him once they had caught Magagula. It was not long after that they found him lying dead in his cell. The Boers, having a good network, made sure that he did not live another

They eventually caught Magagula. The moment he stepped into Mozambique he was met by a troop of soldiers who escorted him to the airport and was flown to Lusaka. In Lusaka he was interrogated and he told them how he infiltrated the ANC, together with his deputy commander. He was locked up. It is alleged that he was HIV positive; therefore he died probably due to the harsh jail conditions he was living in.

Coming to the Nkomati Accord issue, Swaziland signed an agreement with the South African Government and it was hidden from public knowledge. At that time

P. W Botha was the President of South Africa, and he also organized a meeting with Samora Machel and told him that his government had made a decision that they will flash-out all ANC members in his country and furthermore they had come to a decision to declare a conventional war against Mozambique, just because they kept ANC people in their country, they threatened to eradicate his government.

They told him to choose between going to war or maintain their peace. Their request was for him to sign the Non-aggression pact that is the Komati accord deal between Mozambique and South Africa. The Afrikaners ambition was to push the ANC as far as Cairo. Samora Machel had no choice but to sign, to avoid the war

in Mozambique. Okay the Swazis have worked tirelessly for the ANC as individuals and not as a nation. There were so many houses registered under Swazis that were used by the ANC cadres. I for one had a rented house which did not belong to the ANC, but whenever there were cadres that required accommodation I would be seen by neighbours with my full suitcases going far from my home so that I would not raise suspicion and the cadres would come and stay in my house at night,

mind you my family with stay with

them.

I also had three farms and I would take them there to the farms as if they were my employers, whereas they were cadres, and that was mostly during the Komati accord. Now there came time when they said I should call it a day, I had worked

for them for far too long and by the ANC cardinal rule I was supposed to retire. I moved to Sicunusa because the activity was high here in Manzini. At Sicunusa I managed my small butchery business. I think back then that was a mistake moving close to the Boers, because eventually they tracked me down. One day, Mr Mavuso, a friend of mine from long ago came to visit me at the butchery, it was during the sunset and asked me to accompany him in his car; I obliged as friend would, to catch up on lost times. As we were travelling I asked him where exactly we were heading to, but he just told me not to worry, because he was going to bring me back home as soon as possible. Then I had this gut feeling that all was not well. Along the way we were going to go past the Nyatsi Inn, where my brother-in-law was working as a manager. I suggested that we stop there and have a few cold beers before we got to our destination; I thought he would not comply so I thought that should he not slow down I would disturb him so that we crash on the Inn's fence, and luckily there was a police station next to the Inn. I could not believe my luck when he drove in to the Inn; and immediately the car stopped I alighted from the car and made my way to the Inn in full flight and hid in one of the rooms at the Inn. Luckily a waiter entered the room I was in, probably to prepare it for the guests. So I told him who I was and told him to tell my brother-in-law, Mr Ngwenya, that I was there hiding from a friend of mine who had tried to kidnap me. He brought me some food and some brandy to calm down my nerves. I hid there up until midnight till the bar closed for the day, Mavuso seeing that I was nowhere to be found then drove back to Sicunusa instead of heading to Malkerns where he was taking me to.

The following day I went back home, and days passed without Mavuso coming by. Then one day he came by the butchery and we talk and there is no mention of that day I escaped and hid away from him, we talked about something different all together. I decided to take this information to the ANC intelligence to find out more about Mavuso. After some days he came by my house, and it was already night by then, when Fakudze told me that there was a Mr Mavuso at the gate, and I nearly collapsed. He had come to ask to sleep here for the night, but the funny thing was that he lived 2 kilometres from where I lived; and his house was nearer to the border than mine was. He was from South Africa that day, so why did he pass his house to sleep at mine? I was left with no choice but I let him in. I gave Fakudze some meat to roast for us while he took out a bottle of brandy for us to drink. I took it and went to the kitchen to get some glasses and also to inspect it if there was anything suspicious about it but found none. We sat down and drank the contents of the bottle of brandy and then excused myself and went to Fakudze and made sure that Mavuso heard me, but as I was heading back I whispered to Fakudze to open the door to my car and the main gate too. Then went back to Mavuso and told him I would go and get us another full bottle of brandy at the nearest store, since the night was still young. Quickly before he could stop I got in the car and sped off to the main road. Just as I was emerging from my gate, a car that had parked nearby lit up its headlights and was chasing me. Unfortunately for me the car they were in was much faster than the one

I was driving but I managed to get a good head start and somewhere along the way I managed to lose them off my tail for a while. I came by Mahlangatja High School, and I drove in straight into the school to the teacher's houses, got out of the car, climbed the school security fence, went over to climb the RDA security fence and got into the compound. There I was lucky to find refuge in one of the houses. The following morning I woke up, ate some breakfast and thanked the owner of the house for saving my life the previous night. To this day I still do not know who the man's name is.

I went back to where I had left my car, and I noticed the footprints belonging to the Boers all-around my car. I then embarked on inspecting my car taking precaution on every detail to make sure that there was no explosive device planted in my car. After being satisfied I drove back to my butchery. That day the butchery opened at midday. I asked Fakudze what happened to Mavuso, and he told me that he also left just left after I had left, heading in the same direction I had taken. I decided to take the car to the ANC people and while I was there I was informed by the ANC intelligence that the Boers were after me and they wanted me alive, because they wanted to torture me until I told them everything I knew.

Coming to the end of this interview, I had planted boys and girls all over Swaziland because my job was to plant cadres where they were needed. Because the ANC said that Mozambique no longer an alliance, what they did was to push all the boys and girls into South Africa and initiated the urban guerrilla war-fare.

Dlamini, Henry

[Timbutini, East of Manzini District; 20 October 2007, etc...]

Mr Henry Dlamini was born and grew up in Swaziland, but his father was a policeman in Soweto, South Africa. He had a number of South African teachers who interested him in South African politics. Often he acted as courier for South African freedom fighters during his visits to his father. He tells how he continued with his support for the ANC and the liberation struggle of South Africa during his school age, while a student at the University of Swaziland, and until the country attained its independence.

When I got involved in the liberation struggle for South Africa I was very young, it was in 1983. I was born and grew up in Swaziland. I began my primary education at Salesian Primary School in 1973 and most of my teachers were of South African origin. From time to time the liberation used to be a contentious subject in my life. In 1980 when I was in high school I was already well versed with what was going on in South Africa. In 1982 we had a teacher who was a very active member of the ANC and was also a member of the ANC military wing. We used to discuss topical issues. Most of the time, there would be a focus on catholic and non-catholic students. Since I was catholic, I then got more interested in South African politics. So that was where we used to get all the influence and information, such that by the time I was doing Form 4 in 1983, I was already involved. As you are aware the ANC's operations were secretly done, otherwise known as conspiracy work. You needed to be taught how to do conspiracy work not like what you see being done today here in Swaziland; it had to be secret and no demonstrating as is done here.

There was a literature that had to be taken to South Africa from time to time, because at that time we were banned from reading the long struggle of freedom by Nelson Mandela, and we were banned from reading a book by Mirriam Mthlali called AMANDLA. So from time to time, during visits to my father who was a policeman at Orlando police station in Soweto, we used to go with these materials and drop them off to reliable comrades. Mind you, we used Swazi passports to avoid any suspicion.

So then, when I went to university, things started to change dramatically because within the struggle itself, particularly in the ANC, there were people who were traitors. They became agents for the Afrikaners. It was a very critical stage and it became obvious because each time we sent people to South Africa to do a certain mission, those people were either killed or arrested. The ANC then devised a strategy to recruit local people who had a history of loyalty to the liberation struggle, particularly university students and some Swazi locals, who seemed to be liberal but who were also ready to take up some of the tasks that were performed by fully fledged members of the liberation struggle. That is when we started receiving people who were running away from the unrest. I remember very well that by the mid 1980's there was a lot of unrest that was going on in South Africa by way of demonstrations, strikes, PDF and all the guys were involved at that time. The Inkatha as well was busy killing those

people who were showing signs of being for the liberation struggle. We were receiving people from the Kwazulu-Natal and from Tembisa East Rand. There was no security here because some of the guys who came were thought to be genuine freedom fighters from South Africa, and had been with the liberation struggle for a long time, but later the guy is found to be a traitor. So the liberation movements had to rely on us to take these people who were either coming from South Africa or Mozambique, and we had to make sure that they got a safe passage to neighbouring countries. One of the means of transporting them, I can recall very well was that, during those years we used to go to the Ministry of Interior, there used to be a plane that would fly from Matsapha Airport to Tanzania or Zambia. At least in those countries there was the main headquarters of the liberation struggle.

So at one instance I recall very well there were some guys from Zululand and we were just relaxing at Ka-Gogo B. There were study rooms at the university meant for one person, but we had to smuggle these people into the rooms without causing attention. So we smuggled these people in and then got to organize somebody to transport them to either Mozambique or Zambia. During the weekends it was a problem, because we could not communicate with the Ministry of Interior at that time for arrangements to get them transported out of the country. The problem was that once they stay here for a longer time, some of them had childish behaviour, they did crazy things and got into trouble. But at that time we were more matured because we had come from a long way, so we had to maintain our cool with these boys. Most of the time if you let the boys stay longer within the country usually they ended up being arrested. So whenever they came during the weekend, we would organize for them to skip the country through the Lomahasha border gate. There was once this incident when there were about 10 of them, who had slept in my room at school in Room L-4, at UNISWA, so I had to take them out without causing any suspicion. I recall very well that I had to take these guys by bus to Lomahasha. The manner in which we sat in the bus was such that, we had to sit in different seats, not close to one another, but next to a stranger. That was my role during that time, but there are so many things that we used to do, amongst them was to gather information, they called it Intelligence. So we took those guys and dropped them at Simunye and got another transport to Lomahasha and the manner in which we would sit on the bus, we would be scattered, just in case something happened. At Lomahasha there was a safe house located at the Lomahasha High School, and there was a guy who stayed there who let us know when and where it was safe to skip the border. To ensure the safety of the guys, we bribed either the soldiers or someone who could take them through safely. We were once caught while trying to skip the border and had to negotiate with the soldiers. Fortunately for us we had the money at hand, and they demanded we pay them E120,00 for each person. We later confirmed with the Mozambican contact we that our people had arrived safely. In some instances we had to go and receive people coming into the country at Mphiveni towards Mlawula. The guys would cross the

border and we would meet them there at night; to confirm that they were our guys we would flick the car's headlights then wait for the appropriate response from them. Basically these are the things that touched on the Swazi lives, and our people actually died in some of these operations. I remember one of our colleagues, Vubu, who was a student at the university in 1987, was killed in South Africa. Then there was a student who had just completed his final year at university who was shot dead at Dalriach in Mbabane by the Afrikaners.

There are so many factors that caused the infiltration amongst the ANC camp. From what I know, there were people who had been groomed before they had actually joined the ANC and crossed over to Swaziland; these people had been trained by the Afrikaners to infiltrate the ANC operations in Swaziland. Others were disillusioned by the fact that they had been in exile for such a long time without any meaningful progress taking place, and this made them change their minds about the liberation struggle. Then there was defection from the movement; I remember one comrade who was in Mozambique, and he met an American guy who befriended him and gave him almost anything he needed or wanted. That would cause someone to let down his defences, depending on how desperate one was to make the liberation struggle succeed.

Whenever someone was arrested he would be taken to the police station. Let us say you were arrested in Manzini, they would take you to Mawelawela at Luyengo. That setup was very dangerous because what it meant was, when you were transported from Manzini to Luyengo, the Afrikaners would have a much higher chance of making sure you were dead or you did not make it to the jail you were being transported to. Mawelawela was actually a very dangerous place because there were some dirty cops that sold people over to the Afrikaners; one person who comes in mind is DaCosta. Zwelakhe was also shot here at Moneni near by the gum trees; he was with McCfendan from Siteki, this guy was Swazi too. I can also recall that Siphon Nyanda was also handed over to the Afrikaners and there was this one guy who was actually arrested and sentenced to house arrest something that had never existed in Swaziland. I remember the bombings at Mobeni, Zakhele and Ngwane Park.

I totally disagree that the Swazis were the sell-outs in the ANC during the fight for liberation, because there had been a lot of support that had come from the Swazi people; it was either supporting these people materially or providing accommodation for them. I think the Swazis were very accommodating to the liberation struggle comrades, though there were circumstances that otherwise discouraged them from rendering support to these people. So the Swazi people need to be thanked, because during the struggle, people went to the extent of being arrested and some got killed in the process. Both children and parents lost their families.

I am saying only the Swazi public deserves to be praised and not the Swazi government, because I remember Msibi giving a speech stating that Swaziland was not to be used to plot attacks in South Africa during the apartheid era.

After Mandela was voted President, I think the tensions that were created by the liberation struggle disappeared because I remember there were trials here in Swaziland through the tribunals. They were trying to correct internal and the foreign policy towards other countries; that had to be changed because the country was so corrupt that you could take an outsider and give him the role of an ambassador. I was deep undercover, so I was not someone that could get exposed easily; because in our department once you were arrested it was over for you.

On whether my family ever got harassed during those times, it is yes and no, because the only kind of harassment would be that of being disturbed during night and at times have sleepless nights when the cadres went out to field work.

Dube, Fonono

[Zombodze; 20 July 2007, etc.]

Brigadier Fonono Dube was one of the Swazi who witnessed the involvement of Swaziland in the liberation struggle of South Africa. His narrative is mainly on the position that was taken by King Sobhuza II and the government of Swaziland and the reasons for maintaining such a stand with the ANC and the young people who were coming into the country, fleeing from the atrocities of the Afrikaners.

It was in 1976 when the youth of South Africa decided that enough was enough with negotiating with the Afrikaners, and it was high time they took matters in their hands and fight the Afrikaners; the Afrikaners responded by shooting the youth whenever they were found in groups in the streets. What people did not know was that King Sobhuza II was a card carrying member of the ANC, a member of the United Nations and a member of the Non-Allied Movement. By then South Africa was non-existent in the United Nation. One of the United Nations regulations was, if ever a person from a country which is part of the United Nations has run away from his/her original country because of political issues or war to a country which is a member of the United Nations, that individual was to be granted political asylum in that country and live there under certain conditions given by the host country. The Swazi King Sobhuza II then wrote to the United Nations and told them that he was a card-carrying member of the ANC and a co-founder of the ANC. Therefore because of that he would allow the South Africans to stay in his country as their parent.

As an example, St Christopher's which was a school for blacks in South Africa, was removed by the Boers in South Africa and the bishops had to come to Swaziland to ask for permission to build the school in the country; that is how St Christopher's came to Swaziland. It was a school for the South Africans chased away by the Boers and also Swazi children. The former South African President Thabo Mbeki studied at St Christopher's. The Swazi King also built schools in the Shiselweni region so that the South Africans who had escaped could also learn there.

The other factor that allowed King Sobhuza II to help the South Africans was that he was a member of the Non-Allied Movement; therefore as a result he did not care to be involved in the fact that South Africa was non-existent to the United Nations. The King regarded his people first priority compared to politics, he also wrote to the Boers informing them that as a co-founder of the ANC, he would allow the South Africans to go via Swaziland if they needed to, and also provide them political asylum if they needed it. His Majesty King Sobhuza II also promised the Boers that he was not going to allow the South Africans to use Swaziland as a weapon to fight them and also promised them that he would not allow them to enter with guns when they come back from training. If ever they came back with weapons, they would have to find their own ways of entering South Africa. The King had to oblige to that because as a member of the United Nations he had to oblige to the rules of their charter; section

445 which stated thus, whenever two countries fight there should be a neutral state between these countries and that neutral state was not allowed to help either country in destroying or supplying weapons to fight the other country, and if ever these rules were not respected the opposing country had the right to fight the neutral state to defend itself. That is why the King would not allow them to enter his country with guns. He also knew that the Boers were looking for a reason to fight the Swazis in order to take their country as well.

That is why in the 1970's, when the Nkomati accord was signed by Samora Machel, and he chased all ANC cadres from his country to Swaziland, together with their weapons, I had to summon all Swazi soldiers to go and guard around the Swazi forests so that the ANC soldier do not cross over to South Africa with the weapons. This was to prevent any conflict between the Boers and Swazis. In that operation we caught about eighty ANC soldiers and arrested them, but then again remember that the Swazi Government did not meddle in the affairs of the ANC, so when I called for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they did not want to involve themselves, so eventually I called Thabo Mbeki, but he was scared, so instead he sent Mabhida, and Jacob Zuma also came along to the offices of the foreign affairs to talk with us. I asked them why they had allowed the soldiers to cross over in our country with weapons, because I thought we had agreed that they would be welcome here as long as they do not enter with weapons and cross over to South Africa to use them. I also ask them if their executive really does have control over their boys and Mabhida says yes, they do have control over their soldiers. After all the talking I then asked them what I had really called them for, I asked them to give us the destination where we would deport their soldiers, they asked us to deport them to Tanzania, so it was, we deported them to Tanzania in our plane the F100. That is why I say that there is no other country apart from Swaziland that helped the ANC in a great way, why because not only did we accommodate them, we also gave them food; we would send sacks full of food to the soldiers in their different destinations and they schooled here and they were deported to whatever destination they wished to be taken to.

Swaziland sacrificed a lot in helping the ANC during the Liberation struggle, a lot of Swazis died here while hiding the ANC cadres and mind you most of them were not trained in military style unlike the other front-line states. The King Sobhuza II also provided the ANC with money; they would use it to buy their weapons and other important necessities. A lot of people would be surprised about this simply because the Swazi government knows nothing about this, remember earlier I stated that the Swazi Government did not meddle in the ANC affairs. The reason being in a country like ours ruled by a King, the executive powers fall upon the king himself, so he could make decisions without the consent of the government, since the government itself is temporal, it is only in office for five years after that it is dissolved and a new cabinet is formed.

What I am trying to say is that there are lots of things that I could tell you that the government does not know. The ANC's first lawyer was a cousin to Jan Dube, Jan was

based in Natal, our forefathers together with Jan Dube's ran away from Dingane, my forefather came to settle here in Swaziland and Jan Dube's settled in Natal. We are related to them in many ways as history shows us today. Jan Dube got involved with one of the royalty girls and went to study abroad, in that way he was related to royalty.

Gama, Scara

Mr Scara Gama, who had a parental home in Nyanga East in Cape Town, but lived in Swaziland with her grandmother, became involved in the struggle through friends from the ANC. As he explains in his narrative, his role was to hide and assist ANC members in Swaziland. As a football player, he also made use of his football club, the Manzini Wanderers, to hide ANC members who were in the struggle, to keep them away from the police and the Afrikaners. He also tells of the risks they used to be exposed to by being associated with the freedom fighters.

Let me start off by telling you how I came by sympathizing for the ANC. It was in 1976 when I met Zonke Jackson; Zonke was from Nyanga East in Cape Town. My parental home was also in Nyanga East and we lived opposite each other and yet at that time I did not know that he was our neighbour just across our street at M58. This man was very popular and not so long ago he appeared on television in the SABC

1. The day I met Jackson was when they were from Cape Town on a school trip to Swaziland, at that time I was doing my Form 1. We Swazis were proud that there were some people from South Africa that we knew, I went into the bus and asked if there was anyone in the bus who was from Nyanga East and Mr Zonke Jackson stood up; that is how we met and became friends. From there we went to meet my grandmother so that I could introduce Jackson to her. Once we were in Ngwane Park Jackson met my grandmother and they just hit it off. They talked as if they had known each other before that very meeting; Jackson told us about how life had become unbearable back home at Cape Town and that is when I began touring with the ANC, also helping out those living here in Swaziland whenever I could.

While living in Ngwane Park around the 1970's, I met a lady who was one of the trained ANC soldiers operating from Ngwane Park; her name was Thembi, she was short and had hips. She was not living a comfortable life. What with poverty and not to mention that she was always on the run from the Afrikaners. She was usually operating during the night; always sneaking off in the dark night. During that time there were a lot of Afrikaners in the country, and she was lucky they did not catch her. At times this young lady used to disappear for some 2 to 3 weeks with no trace of her around Swaziland; probably she used to go to Mozambique or Zambia to do some of her other operations over there. Whenever she was around, it was usual that whenever there was be a knock on my window around midnight, it would be the young lady; I used to let her in and allow her to spend the night at my house. It went to the extent that she became one of the people that I saved during the liberation struggle.

My grandmother with whom I used to live at Ngwane Park, once lived in Cape Town, and so she knew how life was in Cape Town during apartheid. I also explained the to her the situation in which the young lady was in, and Jackson also told my grandmother how life had changed for the worse in Cape Town since we left for Swaziland. After explaining the situation to her, my grandmother approved that the lady could stay with us in order to protect her.

There was also a situation where there was a young man whose name I do not remember very well; he was from Mpumalanga. I remember one time there was a shoot-out at Ngwane Park, which involved the police and ANC members. During those days the police were arresting anyone suspected of being involved with political movements. It so happened that this boy found us at Zakhele playing football for Manzini Wanderers, so we invited him into our team and he played for us. This was to his advantage because once he was in our team the police would not trouble him because in those days we were famous, and the police were friendly to our team. After some time the young man then decided to move on to live in Zambia. Fortunately, he went away before the famous shoot-out; probably he would have not survived that one. At that time we considered the ANC as our brothers.

The role I played was to try to save them, not to get involved in their policies or be seen carrying guns and fighting. I was not that involved as to abide by their policies; I was just a sympathizer. I did not want to be involved in how they went about their business, because I was too involved in football and besides I was scared too; but whenever a situation arose where my services were required, I never hesitated to help them out.

The ANC activists were aware that if they associated themselves with the Manzini Wanderers team, the police would not trouble them that much. I think it was obvious. Wanderers was just a cover up. There is also an instance that occurred that scared a lot of the Wanderers supporters. One of our known supporters was badly hurt when a letter exploded in his hands. What happened was, one day he was out to get the mail at the post office since he was a messenger of one of the lawyers in Manzini; as he got the letters, one of them exploded in his hands and one of his arms he was badly hurt. It was obviously the Afrikaners who had sent the letter bomb. Who else would place it there? Because at that time there was no fighting among the ANC people and they were working hand in hand with the PAC. Besides, the supporter, who was hurt by the letter bomb, was widely known for hiding ANC members in his home. So that is probably the reason why they sent him the bomb. They must have spied on him, because at that time there were a lot of agents among ourselves working for the Afrikaners; but I would not like to give out names.

I am surprised that you have no clue who Zonke Jackson was; a very close ANC member from Cape Town who was recently killed by the Afrikaners. They killed him about four years ago; he was shot by the Afrikaners. He was my friend, a very close friend from the ANC. Whenever I was in Cape Town, I went with him and visited places around the town, and he showed me some projects that were done by the ANC. The Afrikaners did not know about me because was very careful, and I was always afraid to let out any information that could lead the Afrikaners to me.

If they found out about me maybe they could have shot me. But I would have ran away at that time, because some of my friends went away before me; most of them went for training with the ANC and then came back later.

There are many survivors from Ngwane Park who went to train with the ANC and came back. The people who survived are still around but live in South Africa and hold positions in the ANC, they still visit me at times and one can see that they are living well.

The ANC did not compensate me for all my trouble. The problem was that there would be a lot of people to be compensated. But seriously speaking we did play a part in the struggle.

While I was assisting the ANC members by hiding them, they had their weapons with them, and they also had some other stuff. The lady who was staying with us at my grandmother's house was a trained soldier; she was dangerous as well as very clever. She could live with the weapons in our house with my grandmother living there because at that time everything was about the struggle, and nothing seemed odd to us.

The ANC was providing its members with the basic needs, but it was not that much. I was at that time a football player and in our time we used to get everything from our supporters, so we never struggled that much, and I did not need to be supported by the ANC.

We also used to move around with our Miss Wanderers, she was a girl from the Masilela family, I think she was the second born. She was a very beautiful young woman. The Masilelas were very important here in Swaziland, it is a shame that nobody realizes it nowadays. Sometimes when the team was off to Botswana, and with us was our Miss Wanderers. When we arrived at the border gate we met some South Africans and they took off with her, of course at her own accord. She had found a way of getting out of the Swaziland-South African border as Miss Wanderers. So most of the ANC people got support from the Wanderers in getting them out of Swaziland safely. At that time Mandela had not been freed.

Maphanga, Desmond

Mr Desmond Maphanga was involved with the liberation struggle of South Africa since he was a child of school going age. He got influenced by his teachers. By the time he got into university he was fully involved, and became in charge of money matters, determining how much money was allocated to the different units of ANC. He continued with his involvement in the struggle, supporting freedom fighters in various ways, while staying away from trouble, until South Africa attained independence.

I got involved in the liberation struggle at a very young age. Well, basically since I was a school going child there was always this concern and motivation to know what was happening next to my neighbour. Why? Primarily it happened because our teachers were part of the struggle for liberation. As a Salesian student you would see the struggle happening right before your eyes so you could not ignore it. The period was around 1970–1979. I think you all know that at that time teachers were role models and around 1978 and 1979, the selling out of comrades amongst themselves, to the Afrikaners, was rife within the school. And so it drove one's curiosity as to what was really happening in South Africa. So by the time you were in the university you were fully involved. We did try to run and join the group of boys that had gone to join the M-K, but we were discouraged by Stanley Mabuzela. By that time there had been a request by the Swazi Government to stop Swazis from joining the ANC's M-K, so Stanley Mabuzela advised us to study first and complete school, then if we wanted to join the ANC's military wing, we could choose in the end. In the University I met a girl and we got to know each other very well and to my surprise I found out that at her home they were very active in the liberation struggle. I found myself somewhat fully involved; I do not know how this came to be, but it just did.

By that time I was the one in charge of the finances, and I had to know which units had been allocated how much money for that month. The money came from Zambia. That is where the ANC had its headquarters. I was lucky in that most of the guys that I worked with, namely, Phula Jordan Minister of Arts and Culture once visited my house; Gebhuzanyana once stayed in my house; my best friend Clement who was killed, then Paul the one who was shot in Manzana, including September the notorious September, all of them used to stay with me. Yes, of course they all stayed at my house. One of those who used to live with me is now the head of police at Nelspruit.

The different units got to know each other well. Those who worked with me that I could say were active were Todd Masilela, Mhlongo Frisco who is at the Central Bank, George Green who was at SCOT, and those who lived at House 43, Trelawney Park, kwaMagogo. Many people did not know one another because one only normally knew those who were in his unit. For instance, those of us who worked in the intelligence, only knew those who were from the same department that we were in, like Maphepha and Cassius, who were at the Embassy.

At around 1980 there was a lot of infiltration in the ANC and it was expected. On my part I cannot point fingers and blame anyone for turning his/her back on the fight for liberation. This is solely because when the Afrikaners caught anyone, there used to be so much stress, so much pressure, and as a result one could easily break down. It was not necessarily only infiltration but exhaustion also played a role; there was the tribalisation issue which also played a part in causing infiltration among the ANC. So a lot that Elias Masilela has written in his book has downplayed the fact that friction between the different tribes was also critical at that time.

I was not caught by the South African forces, but well, I was once being hunted down here in Swaziland, at that time I was with Mbhamali. One day, about 300 cops, to be exact, surrounded my house. They had bad luck because they had no clue who they were looking for; I was in the garden doing my chores and they just passed and went straight for my house, they thought I was just a garden boy. They took all the children, arrested them, and they were interrogated, but they were released on that same afternoon. Luckily I was staying inside Government institutions, otherwise if it were not for that, they would have bombed my house, because the ANC boys would drop by, at any time during the night. My extended family never got affected by my involvement in the liberation struggle, because the South Africans security forces would actually look for you, not anyone of your relatives.

There was an arrangement made between me and the ANC boys on suitable time that they could come to my house. This was because the reasoning everyone out there had about the ANC was that they were thieves, but they were not. What I can say is that those were the hazards of a war, because a war is a war there is fighting involved and there would be a time where money was needed and money could not be asked from covert co-operations in an orthodox manner, so it was necessary that banks be raided, not in the intention of hurting civilians. It was done in both countries, it happened in Swaziland and in South Africa. However, the Afrikaners were really out there to diminish any efforts made by the ANC, labelling them as thieves to the Swazi police.

Amongst South Africans there is this perception that Swazis were the ones that caused a major dent in the fight for liberation by being double agents for the Afrikaners. I do not know in what context they could derive such a question about the Swazis, and in any context not everyone would be in one mode of thinking things out. And of course there was a lot of infiltration by the Afrikaners. The ANC people would come with nothing to offer but the Afrikaners would come with money. So people who were in poverty would give in. In the first place it was not their struggle but out of brotherly unity they helped, they had as much right not to interfere just like South Africa today is crying out that the Zimbabweans' are finishing their jobs.

I was in the intelligence department, primarily looking at logistics of which routes were safe to use when something needed to be transported. We had to make sure they got their money, make sure there was enough money and make sure there was a venue to meet at.

After the South Africans independence none of us received any compensation. I got nothing. You see? That is what is most disappointing. After they received their independence they seemed like they were busy people and did not have time. One annoying thing about the struggle is that the South Africans failed to come back and show their appreciation and acknowledgement to the Swazis, for their help during the struggle.

What makes it worse is that it was a risk not only to individuals but also to their families. For instance there was this one time when I had to go and hide my children for some time. What I can say is that the class structure diluted the ANC, because obviously there were those who were seen as being much "holier than thou", and we know that those were the ones who were rewarded and we were left in the shadows. I could say I am one of those but, it is not something that I would make a big issue out of.

I do still maintain contact with the people I worked with. Some of them of course are those who lived in my house, but all of the guys who got big positions we just get to see each other; if by any chance we do, we just greet each other and leave it at that. It's not like you get that satisfactory "Thank-you"!

These activities took place in the semi-urban areas and urban areas, and not in the rural areas. There was this phobia in the rural areas, because there would be people amongst our politicians who would openly state that these were with the Afrikaners.

After the Nkomati Accord, well, it was tough because you never knew what would happen next. We all took precautions because we knew something was wrong, seriously wrong, because the Afrikaners intention was to make sure that they froze the Region, right up to Malawi. It was tense all the time.

It was worth it helping the ANC. My son Africa is worth it, whichever way you look at it, so long as Africa is free. That is why I have no problem with what Mugabe is doing, because yes, it is life. They learn that independence does not mean that you then live happily ever after; there are sacrifices that should be made to avoid neo-colonialism, which is what happened to countries like Swaziland; and also South Africa is still under neo-colonialism, when what we wanted was a Pan-African free country.

The pleasure is mine, to talk to you!

Maseko, Almon

[Mahamba Locality, Southwestern Swaziland; 23 December 2007]

Mr Maseko was born in Orlando, South Africa of Swazi parents. He and his siblings grew up in South Africa, where he attended primary school. He was taken to Swaziland where he completed his primary, high school and college education. He started working in South Africa and later in Swaziland. According to his story he became involved with ANC freedom fighters through his brother in law who was one of them. They used to stay in his house in Matsapha, during their transit from training in Zambia, and their missions to South Africa.

I was born in Orlando in South Africa. We grew up during the apartheid era. My father was a Swazi from Swaziland. He sent us to South Africa to attend primary schools at the beginning of our education. So my primary school education was started and completed at Johannesburg, and at the start of my secondary education my father took me out of school, just like he did to my other siblings. When we passed Grade 6, he had taken us out of school and brought us back to Swaziland. So in 1964 I returned to Swaziland to resume my studies at Salesian Primary school and after I finished primary school there I transferred to Matsapha, Swazi National High School, where I completed high school education. After high school I went to attend UBLs at the Luyengo Campus, where I studied a general diploma in Agriculture.

Upon completion of the programme, I secured a job, and my first job was with the US Embassy in Mbabane as a librarian. Later I was employed by the Ministry of Agriculture and I was stationed at one of the Rural-Urban Development Programmer at Ntfontjeni as a mechanical officer. I worked there for three years and in the middle of the third year they transferred me to Ludzeludze to initiate a rural-urban development programme for the Ludzeludze area. When I was working there, I went on to confront my boss on several issues because I had a hot head politically, when he seemed not to get on well with me I blew up his head. As a senior to me, he also headed the department I was in. He used to kick people around and called them all sorts of names. Then one day he came to my house where I was staying and he told me that he could fire me and throw me out of the house that I occupied. He started doing what he did to the others: He grabbed me by the clothes and started kicking me around, and I decided to hit back, but I did it very hard. After I hit him I went to the Ministry of Agriculture where I found a certain Mr Gamedze from Hlatsi. They then transferred me to Sihhoweni. At that time I read an advert which stated that the company was looking for a tractor salesman at Tracar where the job was advertised. I grabbed this opportunity and applied for the job and they accepted me. I worked for this company for four years after which the company closed down. I had started work at Tracar as an Agricultural Officer and salesman until the franchise was sold.

In 1969/1970 when I completed Ordinary Level I went to Johannesburg in South Africa. There in Johannesburg I met Mbathana who was President of Orlando Pirates Football Club. He was a relative to one of my relatives and friend in Johannesburg that

I had grown up with. Mbathana was the Principal of a school in Johannesburg and at that time his school had a shortage of teachers, so he gave me a job, teaching English. I taught in South Africa until I was summoned by the scholarship Section Board. I left South Africa to resume studies at tertiary level of training. One day while I was in Manzini town I spotted a young man whom I had taught, hiking. So I gave him a ride because I was already mobile then. After he got into the car he recognized me and exclaimed, 'Oh teacher!', At that very moment a number of other people boarded the vehicle I was driving; it was a van. The passengers were all school-age children. They told me that things were not the same at the school anymore, hence they were in Swaziland, instead of in South Africa. They asked to be driven to Mawelawela Youth Camp where refugees were kept. Mawelawela was a Youth Camp then; later it became a Women's Prison. At their destination they complained of hunger and requested that they be supported with food. So I decided to go and report the matter to the Red Cross. At LuSushwana there was somebody who ran a youth camp where he managed a caravan and I asked him for his assistance in giving the children some food since I did not have money to feed the 10-12 children who needed food. A few months later some of the children were airlifted to various countries, including Mozambique and Zambia, by the United Nations. Those that were left behind were stranded so they stayed with my friends at Moberi in Matsapha.

Not long after that I fell in love with a Swazi girl who had a brother who was an ANC soldier training in Zambia. There came a time when he returned back home and at that time I was already living with my girlfriend. Unfortunately for him life was not good, since they lived in a cramped house with the other cadres, so I suggested that he could come and live with us. He agreed and he did come and lived with us; he also invited his friends, and I had no problem with that. Since they were soldiers, they would at times disappear for long periods of time with no word of their whereabouts. During those years the Swazi police intensified their security levels; they would raid houses in the middle of the night or during the early hours of morning. One day the police came looking for my brother-in-law and luckily he had not slept in the house that day, so I told them that I knew nothing of his whereabouts, they left. The following day while I was at work the police came to raid my house and they found a grenade pin, they came to my work place and took me for questioning. they asked why I had a grenade pin in my house, so I told them that I had found a grenade in public and as I was concerned about public safety I threw the grenade and kept the pin. They asked me to show them where I had thrown the grenade, so I took them there. Later they took me to the police station to write down my statement, where fortunately I met a close friend of mine who happened to be a senior police officer, who took my statement and later ordered that I be released. Before I left the police station he told me that all charges against me would be dropped.

My wife said that my brother-in-law was presently in Johannesburg and the rest of his comrades are with the South African Army. The Afrikaners never found out anything to connect me to the ANC; the only person I know that attracted attention

to the Afrikaners was my friend Noxie; during the truth and reconciliation the Afrikaners admitted to have poisoned his beer at a bar and as a result he died. At times the Afrikaners would come to Swaziland on a mission dubbed Hot Pursuit, where the police from South Africa were attacking the refugees;

they would bomb houses in Ngwane-park and Khoza, kidnap people and do all other sorts of things. My cousin was also a victim of that mission they had in Swaziland. Obviously, as you can see now, radicals are mostly found in universities, so when my cousin was seen with her friends, they were suspected to be a part of the ANC.

I do not think the Swazi Government played a role in the harassing of South African people during the apartheid; King Sobhuza II was a sympathizer of the black South Africans, though there were some corrupt police who would sell the blacks to the Afrikaners. One night while I was asleep there was a loud explosion and when we went out to find out what was happening; there were motor vehicle parts scattered all over, the car had belonged to one of the sympathisers who housed ANC members, unfortunately his cover had been blown up, and the Boers had planted explosives in his car, and when he started the car's engine it exploded. These activities mainly occurred at Zakhele and Mobeni, but especially in Mobeni, because a lot of ANC people came to Mobeni at different times. Some got to know each other while they were in drinking spots; however the leaders knew their people and their activities more thoroughly.

Sukati, Phindile

[Moneni, a suburb of Manzini City; 27 December 2007]

Mrs Phindile Sukati started working with the liberation struggle when she was involved with the ANC in 1984. She worked closely with the ANC in Swaziland, providing them accommodation at her house, running errands for them and performing other tasks including taking messages and providing escort for those who were crossing border via Swaziland. Hers is a story of dedication, commitment and sacrifice on the part of individual Swazis, in the liberation struggle of South Africa.

I started working with the ANC back in the year 1984 while living at Mobeni. The onset of my relationship with the ANC was due to the fact that they did not have shelter to sleep in at night, so they approached me and requested to use my house; later they also used it as their office. I agreed to their requests verbally, no papers were signed. From there on I worked with them in their quest for freedom. They also used me as their representative whenever they needed me to go into town to meet various people in the corporate world. Mzwakhe was their senior commander here in Swaziland. We also lived with a girl who happened to work for the ANC; their usual time of work would be at night. My other duty was to look for other suitable places to stay, especially with people I trusted. One example was Make Malaza, she was a friend I had trusted, and for that matter she lived with our commander. Malaza worked at the University of Swaziland as a secretary.

Sometimes there were people from Zambia who went via Mozambique so that they could cross the border into Swaziland. Before they came they telephoned and asked if there would any problem in them coming over here and spending the night. I remember there was a young man who was sent from Zambia to Swaziland, he arrived and stayed with us. He was here to train the young soldiers who were to arrive with my brothers from South Africa in Piet Retief. Afterwards the ANC made a plan to organize for the man from Zambia to cross the border and head to South Africa to train them on their home ground. Fortunately their plan was a success and so most of the soldiers were trained in their country.

Coming back to my duty in Swaziland, there was a time when some of the ANC members were from Oshoek and along the way they were involved in an accident along the Mangwaneni road. They had come across a roadblock and unfortunately they decided to speed-off and the police gave chase, until they came to Mangwaneni and the car they were in overturned. All but one managed to escape; the one who was not fortunate had broken his limbs, as a result he was caught by the police, and was taken to hospital. I got a phone call informing me that and asking for my help. Fortunately there were nurses that I knew who were working at the hospital; and luckily for me, they directed me to a nurse who worked in the ward where the ANC cadre was being treated, so we made a plan so that I would take over from her and work her shifts during the night. The ANC people then organized for me to get

a uniform so that I would not cause an alarm. The first day I went to that ward, I introduced myself to everyone there, one-by-one, I chatted with them making sure I ended up with the ANC cadre; I had to start at the far end of the room because his bed was at the entrance of the ward. When I got to him I signalled to him that I was one of the ANC people and was here to attend to his needs, so we also chatted just like all the other patients. The police soon realized that this man was with the ANC, at that time Swazi police used to arrest the cadres but did not detain them in the country. So they had asked him where he would like to be deported to, and he specifically asked to be taken to Zambia.

During one of my visits he did mention to me that the police were to deport him to Zambia. He asked me to inform his comrades that he would like them to get clothes for him on the day he was leaving for Zambia. Usually his messages were written down. On the eve of the day of departure I brought him his clothes that he had requested for and fortunately the police agreed for me to accompany him to the airport. I travelled with them to the airport to make sure that there were no defaulters, because in many cases like this, one of them could be handed over to the Boers instead of being deported to their country of choice. Everything went well according to plan that day, and I went back to the ANC offices to report that all was well.

One day while sleeping I was woken up by Musa Mndzebele's shouting for help. Musa was one of the people I worked with, and he had a Sotho girlfriend who was a refugee. Apparently when Musa woke up during the night he found his kitchen covered in black smoke. This was done by the police, reason being that when the cadres come back from their missions it was usually night, so that day they probably followed them back to where they stay and waited for them to sleep then tried to burn the house they were in.

Fortunately though, the ANC people had earlier told me that should anything of this nature happen, I should go to Mbabane to see a certain Matsebula lawyer. The police that day arrested everyone except Musa Mndzebele. When I went to see Matsebula and I told him about the issue at hand and also alerted him that there were school-going children who were among those arrested. Fortunately the children were released and the cadres were left behind under custody. The cadres' case was taken to the High court and they were found guilty but they pleaded not guilty, therefore the court found it fit to deport them.

Otherwise, on a daily basis, I used to advise them to use public transport if they wanted to get around, but they thought I was trying to sell them-off to the police; eventually one of them saw the sense in my suggestion. Our relationship with these people was not always smooth; we got along fine on most days and at times we disagreed. One Sunday while I was off to church they came by my house to do some of their work but unfortunately I was not back yet, so they had to wait. When I finally came back they made accusations telling me that I was hindering their progress. I just replied and that the God that I praised would one day take them back to their country, where they were going to live peacefully. They just laughed at me as if I had

no idea as to what I was talking about. After some time Mandela was freed and the black people of South Africa were once again free and I reminded them of what I had been telling them all the time.

I recall that one day, we were on our way to Mahamba to see a certain teacher and leave behind a cadre, so that he would operate from that town. The drivers who were driving the car we were in were tired because they had been driving all night from Piggs Peak, all the way to Mahamba. Unfortunately I was also asleep when we had an accident, just before we were about to reach Nhlanguano. Fortunately for the cadres, they were not hurt, whilst I, on the other end was badly hurt. I sustained bruises and cuts; specifically there was a cut that was on my forehead, which resulted in me losing my eyesight. While we were at the accident scene, a taxi driver stopped and asked to assist us and take me to the hospital in Nhlanguano; when we got there, there was no doctor, so they then took me to Hlathikulu hospital, where I lay unconscious for about two weeks. When I woke up I found that I had lost my eyesight. I stayed for about three weeks at that hospital. I called Dr Nhlanhla Sukati, I asked him to please tell the doctor here in Hlatsi to transfer me to the Mbabane Government Hospital. The doctor was hesitant but he eventually transferred me and advised me to go and see a neurologist. Fortunately those days neurologists were available, so I went to see the neurologist and he said I should go back to see him because he saw something promising with regards to my recovery. He treated me until at the end I got my eyesight back.

The ANC people were alerted by Mrs Malaza that I was back home and alive; they thought that I was dead and were lost as to what they would tell my family since they also did not know them. But in our reunion all was well, let me say that during our working relationship none of the people I worked with were involved in serious accidents such that it would result in death. None of the Swazis I worked with got badly hurt; I worked with the likes of Musa Mndzebele, Victor Fakudze, Solomon and Musa Mdladla. Both Musa's were shields in that they had homes to accommodate the ANC.

I really do not know, the number of people arrested by the Police, because at Musa Mndzebele there were four boys and there were also others who would come and work with them during the night so the number, well I am not be sure of the exact number. I had never been harassed by the South African Security forces. I cannot remember them harassing me. No, there was no instance I remember they harassing me.

Even those who were arrested by the Swazi Police; they never complained of being harassed. The thing is, the police understood that they were here to fight for their country in exile so that one day they can go back home too as free people. The only reason they would keep them was for their trial to be heard at the courts, and then deport them.

Regarding the Swazi police handing over ANC cadres to the Boers instead of deporting them, okay that happened once. Okay, at least not with the people I was working with, but it once happened, not in my camp, before my eyes when September

who was also an ANC cadre sold-out one of us to the Boers; the reason being maybe he was also once a victim of being sold-out to the Boers, and after that he worked for the Boers. He became an informant for the Boers and whenever he was around Swaziland you would pray that he does not set his eyes on you, because you might be next in his list. September was a highly trained officer who was an officer to Nyanda's rank.

I still keep in touch with Nyanda whenever I hear that they are in Swaziland. Like a certain man called Mzwandile who I used to work with; whenever a Swazi died, Mzwandile would make sure to inform everyone. We would then all go and pay our last respects to our fellow comrade. If ever one of us did not attend the funeral, that person would make some time and go to pay his/her last respects. And yes, we still do get in touch.

Jumping to another story, Mr Thabo Mbeki also received help here in Swaziland and if it was not for that, he would probably be dead by now. If it had not been for the Gamedze's at Vuvulane, probably Mbeki would not be alive. The Gamedze family sacrificed and welcomed him as part of the family and it is a shame he does not seem to remember the Gamedze family that saved his life. I really do not know how old he was then, but he was already a strong young man. I guess so because at that time he had lost a child here in Swaziland. I think he got the child when he was already living here, because his wife is a Dlamini. I think that is probably the reason he seems bitter about the Swazis, probably he is still hurting about his lost child. I think that he blames the Swazis for the death of his child. But I also think probably what really troubled Mbeki was, that just like September he was also sold to the Afrikaners by the Swazis, but luckily for him he was able to escape the trap. The Gamedze family took Mbeki and hid him and lived with him all those years. He was welcomed as part of the family. Mbeki was a trained soldier.

The Swazis played a role in helping the South Africans during the struggle, and they helped me a big way. Even though there were some Swazis who betrayed members of ANC to the Afrikaners, the Swazis did a lot to help ANC during the struggle. We contributed a lot, because some of these people were children and they went to school here in Swaziland. Lulu Sisulu was one of my schoolmates at St Michael's. Yes, Swazis helped the ANC to achieve their goal in many other ways, besides giving them asylum.

