

**SADC**

**Hashim Mbita Project**

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**Southern African  
Liberation Struggles**

**1960–1994**

**Contemporaneous Documents**

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**edited by  
Arnold J.  
Temu and  
Joel das N. Tembe**

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**Liberation War Countries**



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# Angola

**Independence on 11th November 1975**

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# 2.1

## **Angola and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa, 1949-1992**

**by Artur da Silva Júlio, Eduardo Ruas de Jesus  
Manuel, and Rosa da Cruz e Silva**

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## Introduction

This work is the result of the research conducted in primary and secondary sources existing in the MPLA's and Angola's historic archives, such as documents related with the organizational, administrative, political, diplomatic and military activity existing at the time both at the colonial regime and the liberation movement. These are embodied in the activities of the first social, cultural and sports groups that formed the basis of the juncture against the nefarious colonial presence that will culminate with the emergence and actions of the first political parties which formed the basis of the underground movement that led to the first claims to Angola's self-determination and independence. The struggle route of the Angolans, the support of neighbouring countries, the African and extra continental solidarity towards the Angolan cause were crucial to victory.

The interviews with the protagonists of the liberating process were very important for the gathering of the information which assisted in clarifying the situations of crisis, social, political and military relationships that occurred throughout the struggle journey for independence. The interviews were conducted with members of other nationalist parties or movements existing at the time.

The perusal and acquisition of copies of legal proceedings and records of the control effected over the protagonists of the Angolan liberation movement, existing at the *Torre do Tombo* archives in Portugal enabled the assessment of the degree of brutal repression carried out by the colonial regime over the Angolans, as well as on the capacity of resistance and upholding of the sacred secret maintained over the organization, leadership, methods of action and future perspectives of the liberation process, even at the sacrifice of their own lives, or those of their relatives and close friends.

The vast bibliographic research of the decolonization process of the Portuguese overseas colonies was the target of our activity towards assessing and cross referencing of information. Thus, we focused our attention on matters that were literarily exposed in works, as well as in articles in magazines, some of which specialized in studies about the liberation process, as well on national and foreign newspaper articles within our reach.

The great limitations of the project's financial resources which, upon application onto research conducted within the vast Angolan territory, with an infrastructure still recently destroyed, such as roads, bridges, villages, even cities, where even hotels were not spared, turned into costly and difficult travelling and accommodation, limiting somehow our expected comprehensive coverage of those who, in the North, East, Centre and South of Angola, had important information on the stay and passage of the liberation movements of Namibia (SWAPO), Zimbabwe (ZAPU and ZANU) and South Africa (ANC).

## Research methodology

The Methodology of work involved the collection, analysis and critical selection of existing documents and bibliography which we were able to gather, the carrying out and selection of interviews and in the cross-referencing of primary sources, testimony of those who experienced some of the facts narrated in the text, secondary sources, published in newspapers and magazines at the time about the struggle for the liberation of Angola, including documents produced by the colonial administration, as well as on legal proceedings and trials of political prisoners. It included the ongoing production of data sheets about bibliographic materials and testimonies obtained, culminating with the arduous task of completing the final text.

The entire relation with the documents produced by the colonial administration deserved our special attention, since the political arguments, and the methods used during interrogation methods were loaded with intentions and conducts in defence of the colonial interests. The conditions of permanent tension under which the prisoners were exposed to, etc., are presumptions that lead the historian to act prudently on the face of the results of the judicial proceedings.

## Structure

As a product therefore, this text is composed of six chapters. In the first chapter we characterize the Portuguese Colonial Society, its implementation within the territory, Development projects, assimilation policies, settlement by the white people, and discriminatory laws. The repressive system: the concentration camps and prisons. The role of the churches in the intellectual development of the Angolan elites.

In the second chapter we describe the events related with the Rising of the Peasants of Baixa do Kassanje; the 4th February, 1961 event, its preparation and execution; the 15<sup>th</sup> March event; the reaction of the colonial forces; the repercussions of the 4<sup>th</sup> February.

In chapter three we describe the vicissitudes experienced during the persecution of Angolan nationalists.

Chapter four contains the matters pertaining to the formation of the political parties and movements, the formation of the MPLA and the 1956 Manifest, the PLUA (United Struggle Party of Angola), the MIA (Movement for the Independence of Angola) the MLA (Movement for the Liberation of Angola), MINA (Movement for the Total Independence of Angola) and the re-organization of the MPLA. The MPLA's expulsion of Leopoldville and its re-organization in Brazzaville, the diplomatic action; the formation of the MAC (Anti-Colonial Movement), the MPLA's London Declaration, the difficulties with the OAU (Organization of African Union). The EPLA (People's National Liberation Army). The opening of the Eastern Front and the widespread Armed Struggle in 1966. The political and military situation in the Northern Front 1966-68.

Chapter five contains the details related with the establishment and development of Unita, as well as on the recruitment and training of its first cadres. Unita's philosophy, its method of struggle, program, structure, immediate purposes and objectives, domestic and foreign policy, constitution, democratic front, ideological principles, founders, act of solidarity, the lumber producers of the East, unity in the liberation movement, unity in the National Liberation movement, the 3<sup>rd</sup> Congress and Resolutions, unity with other National Liberation movements and Unita's development.

Chapter six covers the matters related with FNLA's formation and development; the Historic Journey of Holden Roberto, FNLA's historic Retrospective – Convention and formation, the birth of the GRAE (Revolutionary Government in Exile), the ELNA. –the unity of the Patriotic Angolan Forces. Chapter eight deals with matters related with the 25th April and Angola's decolonization, recognition of the Right to Independence, law 7/74 of the Portuguese Republic, the Spínola-Mobutu meeting, at Ilha do Sal, Cape Verde. The cease-fire agreements: the Lunhameje MPLA and Portugal agreement, the Unita-Portugal Luena Agreement, the FNLA-Portugal Kinshasa Agreement. The Alvor Agreement, the transitional government, the battle of Luanda. The Nakuru agreement, the South African north-south invasions and the proclamation of the National Independence.

The Republic of Angola, liberated in 1975, started to become a liberation front for Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa.

Agostinho Neto, the first President of Angola, in his proclamation speech to Africa and the world, and referring to the independence of Angola, asserted that Angola would not become completely independent while Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa were still subdued by the regimes that were illegally ruling their respective territories.

Angola generously opened its territory to the freedom fighters. The provinces of Kwanza South, Benguela, Huíla and Kuando Kubango harboured key Swapo bases, such as the in the localities of Mutundo, Cassinga, Kuvango, Matala and Humpataundo, Cassinga, Kuvango, Matala e Humpata, inter alia.

The apartheid regime, which had invaded our national territory to avoid MPLA's proclamation of independence, was defeated on the 27th March, 1976.

The increase of SWAPO's guerrilla activities in the North of Namibia led the racist regime to once again invade our country, by invoking the right to pursue SWAPO. With the Massinga massacre, the bombings of Lubango city and SWAPO bases in the municipalities of Humpata and Quipungo in the mid-1970s and early 1980s, a new high intensity cycle of war had begun in the southern region of Angola, a war between the national army, the FAPLA, assisted by the Revolutionary Forces of Cuba and the racist SADF (South African Defence Force).

This cycle of war ended with the withdrawal of the South African troops, defeated in the great battles of Cuito Cuanavale, Cahama and Ruacana and , subsequently, with the commencement, in the early period of 1985, of negotiations between the South African regime and Angola and Cuba which culminated with the New York Agreements and with the United Nations resolutions for the independence of Namibia and the need for negotiations to end apartheid in South Africa.

# Chapter 1 – The Colonial Society (1940–1961)

## 1.1. Consolidation of the Colonial Rule

Noé da Silva Saúde<sup>1</sup> describes the situation of the ‘native’ in the colonial society in the following manner:

*(...) From the 1940s decade we were still very young when we started to notice, not only in Luanda, which is the capital of our country (where we were living), but hinterland as well, a reaction from our people against the colonial system, we saw our parents being sent (from the grasslands) to work on the roads, without cars and without compensation, it was forced labour, we saw at the Luanda port, at the railroads, at the municipality, in Public Works, groups of Angolans, wearing uniforms or denim clothes to work as ‘contratados’ (forced contract) and we also saw, nearby, at Icole and Bengo, despite the cotton fields being at their own farms, where they were forced to work, and punished by the administrator’s ‘cipaios’ (native constables), because they were working for the entrepreneur.*

*In Luanda things were worse, we saw police raids, the blacks, classified as ‘natives’, that is, Angolans were divided into two groups, a minority without great statistical significance, called the ‘Assimilados’ who were bearers of identity documents, and who generally had a primary school grade 4 education and who worked for the private sector, mechanics, electricians, etc, etc, and especially as printers, while others were public servants, nurses, office workers, most of whom clerks, and also rural primary school teachers, who had identity documents, and it was hard to obtain an identity document, not everyone was entitled to have an id, despite having a grade 4 school certificate. The vast majority had no rights and we also begun noticing that in the ‘sanzalas’ (indigenous dwellings) there were no government schools, these were only established where they were justified for the children of the white settlers, no government schools were created unless justified by numbers of learners, so a ‘native’ child had no option but to stay away from school or, if he was lucky enough to have a school at his sanzala, where a school had been established by Protestant missionaries or by some few Catholic churches for the indigenous children.*

The development of colonial policy during the period between 1940 and 1961 was marked by both the pressing need for change, forced by the international context and domestic pressure through the repulsion of Angolans against the arbitrariness of the regime and, on the other hand, by the actions of the economy. On this matter

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(1) **Noé da Silva Saúde** was a founder member of the Communist Party of Angola as well as of other embryonic parties of the MPLA. He served in key positions of the First Republic and in the MPLA Party, he was a member of the leadership of the National Union of the Trade and Industry Workers, also a ‘posteriori’ member of the UNTA secretariat and in November 1976 appointed Minister of Labour of the People’s Republic of Angola. In 1980 he held the position of First Provincial Secretary of the Party and chaired the Provincial Assembly and was the Provincial Commissioner of Cuanza North, he also held various positions in the Party, was the First Secretary of the Party’s Committee. Noé da Silva Saúde holds a degree in Economics, received in Cuba and is currently the Administrator for Social Affairs in the MPLA’s Fund Management.

Agostinho André Mendes de Carvalho<sup>2</sup> described it as follows:

*(...) In the social situation we were living, where the Indígena, that is, the Black person, on the challenges being faced to be admitted into high school, in order to obtain his identity document, to be assimilated, there were so many difficulties I saw in places I had been to, that I started to take notes (...)*

Still on the same matter, Hermínio Joaquim Escórcio<sup>3</sup> stated the following:

*(...) there were always enormous differences. I had come from a society where there was an astonishing social segregation.*

*At Lobito and at the Benguela Railways there were three classes of coaches: the first, the second and third class. Those travelling third class formed the majority, the disadvantaged, those economically weaker and, logically, where all those who were blacks were gathered.*

*Provided a person had money, he /she could travel in second class, and he/she would not be discriminated. The first-class travellers though, would look with despise to anyone person of colour because there was ostensive racism.*

*Luanda was a bigger city and racism was more diluted. Only those who were more daring would, sometimes, proposed to deny admission to people of colour at a bar or restaurant. But then there was reaction and, one day, black public servants went to a restaurant and, as they were not being attended, they smashed everything. The Police arrived and spirits pacified, but the restaurant was entirely smashed. Scenes like this one were repeated everywhere. In public transport as well. We were also having a problem in sports clubs. There were two clubs in Lobito – the Lusitano and the Lobito S.C. – but in none of these clubs were Blacks allowed entry, nor weren't they allowed to play sports. They were not admitted. And, further south, at Huambo, racial discrimination was even more abusive. The FERROVIA,*

(2) **Agostinho André Mendes de Carvalho** (Uanhenga Xito), a quimbundo name, was born in 1924 in Calomboloca, Catete, Province of Bengo, was a member of MPLA since his primary age, a Nurse, he formed part of the underground group called "Espalha Brasas" who was engaged in political awareness work, he was arrested by the PIDE (State Security Police). He was tried in a Military Court and sentenced to 19 years in prison. He was imprisoned in the Sao Paulo (Luanda) and Tarrafal prison (Cape Verde) and released in 1970. After independence he was appointed Minister of Health and ambassador in Germany. He is an MP for the MPLA at the National Assembly. He is a member of the Angolan Writers Union, having published several works.

(3) **HERMÍNIO ESCÓRCIO** was born in 1936, in Lobito, where he studied in primary and secondary schools. He met Amílcar Cabral, Viriato da Cruz and others. At the age of 20 he went to Luanda. He worked at the Weather Office and, later, at the Engineering Laboratory of Angola. In 1957, he joined the MPLA. He was responsible for the drafting and distribution of pamphlets, received from Leopoldville and Brazzaville and reproduced in Newsletters, prepared in a copy machine of ANANGOLA. In 1963, he was arrested by the PIDE. Tortured, he spent some time in Sao Paulo Prison and in Cacuaco Jail. After two years and a half in jail he was tried by a Military Court and sentenced to 5 and a half years prison major sentence and 3 years special security prison. Released in 1968, he was employed as a bookkeeper at SIGA. He resumed his political activities underground, in liaison to the MPLA leadership. In 1969 he was again arrested. After a period spent in prison at the Sao Paulo Jail, he was deported by Angola's governor-general Soares Carneiro to Foz do Cunene (Cunene River Mouth), in terms of administrative rules. He stayed there for 3 years. Established contact with Sao Nicolau Camp prisoners. Released after the 25<sup>th</sup> April. Created the first MPLA's headquarters in Luanda. He organized the reception of the official MPLA's delegation and, later, to Agostinho Neto, of whom he was a secretary and chief of Protocol and Heritage. He was, further, a director of SONANGOL. He was Angolan's ambassador in Germany. He is currently the Ambassador in Egypt.

*but Black people were not allowed to use it. They must have feared Blacks could dirty the pool water! The city of Nova Lisboa was, at the time, one of the most racist in Angola, a new city established by the colonists (by Norton de Matos) (...)*

António Dias Cardoso<sup>4</sup>, the child of a small Portuguese trader, lived and grew up in the Musseque Braga (slum), in Luanda, and in raising this question about the colonial situation he asserted the following:

*(...) My father was a “fubeiro” (colonist shopkeeper), a poor trader in the Musseque Braga. I still remember the measuring weights of palm oil, small seashell scoops tied by a wire to the edge of a can, to attend to customers’ request, who would normally be black children. My mother had a grade 4 qualification, but my father could hardly read. I grew up therefore in Musseque Braga climbing cashew trees and running barefooted.*

*(...) Many of those from my generation went to Coimbra (Portugal). I also dreamed of a Coimbra of the fado and bohemian life. But I ended up working as a clerk at the Bank of Angola. Frustration made me learn all about it and to hate my colleagues, especially the older ones (...)*

*(...) In the then Angola, colonialism was homegrown, as with the exception of thousands and bookkeepers, the “mulatos” (people of mixed descent) and the Blacks with skills were enough to feed the bureaucratic apparatus. They were joining the Post Office, Revenue Office, banks, earning far less than the Portuguese that were arriving. And they didn’t stand much for promotion. I knew of a few “mulatos”, but not a single Black person, who had been promoted to senior clerkship positions, a position under which one was allowed to sign some of the bank’s documents (...)*

João Vieira Lopes<sup>5</sup> refers to the financial difficulties a medium class employee had to face to maintain his children’s studies in Angola and in Portugal:

*(...) There were about three or four more compatriots, otherwise...(.) it was no longer the pure Black, it was now the “mulato”! It was hard, really hard! For those two reasons: because there was the admission to high school exam and then there was that story of the identity document, because it was not easy to obtain; if you were not the child of a public servant, you needed to take many turns. But then we were eventually admitted. When I left, my brother sent me to Portugal and, I remember vividly as if it was today, I sailed off to Portugal, because in those days there was no air travel, but then the ship had various classes: 1st 2<sup>nd</sup>, 3<sup>rd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> supplementary. I travelled in the supplementary 3<sup>rd</sup> class, this class was a ship’s hold adapted with large berths, because the money for the fare wasn’t even enough to pay for a 3<sup>rd</sup> class ticket, it was pretty expensive.*

(4) **António Dias Cardoso** was born in April 1933 in Luanda where he studied for his primary and high school levels. The child of a small shopkeeper, he lived and grew up in Musseque Braga. He wrote for the “Estudante” newsletter (newsletter of the students of Salvador Correia High School) as well as for the “Mensagem” magazine (of the Association of the Angolan Nationals). He published poetry “Poemas de Circunstancias, 21 Poems of the Jail, Political Economy and Pamphlets. He was a clerk at Banco de Angola. Was a management member of the Cultural Society of Angola and was one of the founders of the Cine-Clube of Luanda. Joined the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) in 1958, and soon after resigned to join the MPLA. The PIDE arrested him, for the first time in 1959. Arrested him again in 1961. Spent 3 years in the Sao Paulo Jail in Luanda and about 10 years in the Tarrafal Concentration Camp. Was released on the 1<sup>st</sup> May, 1974. He was arrested again, this time in Luanda by the FNLA.

(5) **João Batista de Castro Vieira Lopes**, a medical doctor and one of the protagonists of the liberation armed struggle of Angola which culminated with the independence in 1975. Born in Luanda on the 8<sup>th</sup> May, 1932 at the Ingombotas. Joined the Salvador Correia High School in 1942. Left to Portugal thanks to the help of his elder brother, who was a public servant. Went to Coimbra in April 1952. Gained direct admission to the University, Faculty of Medicine. He formed part of the CVAAR medical corps of the beginning of the national liberation armed struggle.

*Ah! The others were whites, ‘mulatos’ but then I managed, I remember as if it was today! My travel companion was a guy called Pedro Benje, he went to play football because in those days they were already recruiting our compatriots; he used to play here at the Atlantico, and they were one year older than me, he was going to play for the União de Montemor, in Évora, so we travelled together, he was my berth companion. Upon arrival in Portugal, I stayed for only 2 days in Lisbon, then I went straight to Coimbra. Coimbra was smaller and cheaper.*

The practice dating back to the Republican period, which granted administrative autonomy was changed into a more centralized management model. The doors were closed to foreign capital and preference was given to nationalization. The self-development soon gave place to the imperial economic integration.<sup>6</sup>

This change contemplated the development of projects aimed at affirming the colony, which entailed a stronger commitment from Lisbon in various domains, the outstanding one being the action taken towards the native populations, by adapting and improving the relevant legal statutes.

One saw, therefore, the promulgation of legislation which conformed with the Portuguese colonial policy, then increasingly surrounded on the face of the positions of the international community, particularly of the foreign powers who, in the international arena, were opposing the Portuguese colonial project and proposed its extinction, by granting the autonomy and self-governance to the peoples under their rule. Vieira Lopes asserted:

*Reforms, because there was really the Ministry of the Colonies, which then became the Ministry of Overseas Territories, then he had to effect a lot of reforms and there then, provided you were a university student (...). From 1952, if I'm not mistaken, where international demonstrations started to take place, and pressed Portugal and Salazar then stated that Portugal had no colonies, it rather had **Overseas Provinces**, he had then to effect reforms. [translator's note: In this last sentence the last words make no sense in the original text following the reference to the reforms. The sentence ends with loose words like “Army” and “as officers”]*

Carlos Alberto Van-Dúnem<sup>7</sup>, a former combatant and an integral part of the 50 accused in a trial, reflects the then sentiment of the Angolans:

*(...) I started my political life at a very early age, not because I had political training, I didn't have any at the time, I was a 17 or 18-year-old youngster. But the repression existing at the time in Angola was so strong, we the young people, felt revolted by the manner in which*

(6) See Rui Ferreira, “Sob o Signo do Império”, in Portugal e o Estado Novo, coord. Fernando Rosas, Lisboa, Editorial Presença, 1992, p.363

(7) **Carlos Alberto Van-Dúnem** was born in Luanda on the 28th August, 1935 and studied in Luanda where he graduated in the industrial school and was a finalist at the industrial institute. He militated underground with the nationalists. Was arrested and tried in the famous Trial of the 50, on July 1959 and sentenced to 21 months in prison. He was sent to the Tarrafal Camp, where he spent 4 years, in a total of 6 years prison sentence. After being released from Tarrafal he travelled through Lisbon to be placed on fixed residence in Luanda under the duty to report regularly at the PIDE. He worked as a mechanic at the Health Services and later on, at the Junta Autónoma das Estradas (National Road Agency) and at the Radio Club of Angola. He kept regular contacts with progressive young Portuguese people. With the 25th April he was integrated in the African League Committee responsible for protesting with the MFA on the massacres of the Black population, which were perpetrated by soldiers and settlers. After independence he was attached by the MPLA to a department of mass organization and was Deputy Minister of Trade. He is currently a member of the board of directors of Casa Inglesa.

*The colonial authorities acted against the so-called 'natives'. In Angola there were then two different classes, in a clear attempt to 'divide and rule', as they say: there were the 'assimilados' and the 'natives'.*

*The "assimilados" were persons that had skills and a living like the Whites, eating like the Whites, speaking like the Whites, attended high school like the Whites. The natives were the illiterate, and didn't have skills. The way the natives were treated revolted us. Me and three or four other young guys, General Iko Carreira, Amadeu Amorim, Rafael and others felt revolted, because the authorities carried out raids at night to arrest the so-called natives, to take them to forced contract work. Some of them were even sent to São Tomé. In addition to arresting them they also beat them in a savage way. Now, this used to revolt us. Something had to be done to end such acts. But we didn't absolutely have any experience whatsoever. One of us thought (I don't remember exactly who was he) that, as there were foreign consulates, we should have posted banners in the streets to say:*

*«-We want independence».*

*«Foreign consulates should tell the United Nations we want independence. The United Nations ordered Portugal to grant independence and that's finished" we thought.*

Portugal needed therefore to justify its policy because, set in its idea as the colonial empire as a legacy, there would be nothing that would convince it to change. For this reason, it resorted to all sorts of arguments based on its history of conquerors, as the primary reason that, in their perspective, would legitimate the perpetuation of the colonial enterprise. As to the political thinking of the theorists of colonization, Marcelo Caetano emphasized, in the following way, at the microphones of Radio Clube de Angola, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> July 1945:

*"(...)And I don't want to forget the natives, as representatives of the races we have a duty to assist, protect and educate to associate them to the task of exploration and colonization, according to our old methods of colonizers".<sup>8</sup>*

They therefore have committed themselves into actions that sought to achieve their projects "to assist" and "protect" the natives and placing them, in this way, to serve the colonial project. The colonial economic system then in force was based on the exploitation and exportation of natural resources, a task that demanded clearly cheap labour, due to the technology level that was available. One of the measures to build upon the economic thinking existing at that time was the practice of expropriating land from the native populations which was gradually widening the land space for the big farms of the settlers. This procedure, which dated from the 19th century was enhanced in the light of the economic framework proposed by the "Estado Novo" (New State) which proceeded during the post-war period.

The agriculture activity developed by the native population was aimed at self-consumption initially and depending on the surplus production, supplying the traditional African markets in the various fairs and markets. The presence of the colonizers has disturbed the old economic system because it required

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(8) See Marcelo Caetano, *Alguns Discursos e Relatórios. Viagem Ministerial a África em 1945*, p.

Angolans to be deprived of their land and to grow products of their preference, that is, those products that could provide greater profits to the ruling class who was settling in Angola. On this colonial disruption Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho refers the following

*(...) Do you know that this havoc occurred throughout the country to the point of the authorities and central and district officers complaining and questioning:*

«- But with whom are going to stay?»

*They killed so many people that, for instance, in my region, where there were cotton smallholdings and homesteads, the traders after helping in the killing of some people, were starting to note a lack of labour, and had no workers to work. And they went to the "chefe de posto" (colonial district officer) to say:*

«- Mr. Chefe de Posto, if they continue to kill people very few would be left. And then? From what are going to live from? If our businesses depend on the sale of maize meal, fish and sugar how are we going to live if the "sanzalas" (native quarters) are empty? What are we going to eat?»

*The good sense went to the point of some coming to beg, almost at their knees. After that they then started to create the so-called Peace Sanzalas, where log cabins were being erected to watch the African populations.*

*In these Peace Sanzalas were kept the families of those that were caught, the orphans and widows, to avoid contact with the "terrorists". They have therefore erected well aligned villages with small mud or brick houses. The one that, sometimes is an animal, is not without a human part<sup>9</sup>*

This was thus an additional effort developed by the Angolan peasants with the increased demand by the Europeans, focused on products such as coffee, sugar cane, ground nuts, for the respective concentration of the surplus that could enter into the international market circuit. In the application of this mechanism, the European trader challenged the hinterland of the country and imposed his rules by naturally penalizing the peasants, since the prices were not commensurate to the value of the products. It wasn't enough to have the peasants producing in their own land and to sell their products to the colonists because these, by virtue of the system, built farms to exploit agricultural resources, where the Africans were forced to work. This system claimed labour which was important for the plantations where the tropical products were cultivated for exportation, fishing in the southern coastal areas, for the very few existing industrial sites, as well as servant labour required by the colonists<sup>10</sup>.

With the salaried work system also in force, which aimed the Europeans and "assimilated" Black Africans and Coloureds, another way that also has striven this regime was the forced labour, also commonly referred to as the "contract" work. Essentially practised at the plantations, where Angolans were recruited for such work, or for any other type of activity serving the European masters, for one or more years, according to the needs of the employer. This type of work became more complex

(9) See interview with Mendes de Carvalho.

(10) See CASTRO, Armando, 1980, pp.97-98

because the levels required at each time for this type of cheap labour were frighteningly increasing according to the growth of the economic activities.

## 1.2. The Application of Colonial Law and Its Effects

The colonial ideology redrafted during the 1930s decade after the promulgation of the Colonial Act (1930)<sup>11</sup> was naturally enhanced and improved in the 1940 and 1950 decades, where the issue of the so-called indigenous population was placed with greater acuity. Thus, the Colonial Act (*Acto Colonial*) which was aimed fundamentally at regulating the colonial system, established the political, administrative, economic and financial framework of both the colonies and the African populations. The entire set of its articles reveals the adaptation required by the political times and indicates the innovations in the *modus operandi* of the policy ruling the overseas territories. Above all, a rigorous control was envisaged of the administrative, economic and financial acts, through a policy of imperial unity under a strong dictatorial pressure.

The legislative package promulgated by the *Estado Novo* and aimed at defining the premises that determined the status of the indigenous Angolan population, was the corollary of the most cruel discrimination, because its statutes, were always inspired on an ideology that emphasized, in each clause, the white supremacy over the black populations because, in the vision of the authorities there was an increasing resistance of the Africans against such working conditions<sup>12</sup>. It was deprived at the outset of any signs of civilization and it was undergoing due adaptations throughout the times. An example of such exercise was the Statute of the Native which came to light in 1929 (Decree no. 16473, of the 6<sup>th</sup> February), which was revised and adapted in 1954 (Decree Law no. 39666, of the 20<sup>th</sup> May) within the scope of the overseas areas (Guinea, Angola and Mozambique).

In this Statute, indigenous are deemed to be ‘‘ (...) the Black individuals, or their descendants who, having been born or living habitually therein (i.e. in the overseas territories), do not yet possess the education and the individual and social customs required for the full application of the public and private law of the Portuguese citizens. Indigenous are equally deemed to be the individuals born from indigenous father and mother in a place, other than those overseas provinces, to which their parents have temporarily moved to’’. Thus, and because circumstances so demanded, the legislation shifted into the mechanisms that aimed at applying the process of assimilation, which translated into a gesture of high ‘‘generosity’’ of the colonizers who contemplated the transformation of the native, into an *assimilado*, forcing him into a total denial of his own nature, in adapting the colonizer’s cultural values and

(11) The *Acto Colonial* was promulgated by Decree no. 18570 on the 8th July, 1930. See TOMÉ, Jaime, *Notas às leis Fundamentais do Império Colonial Português*, p.53.

(12) TOMÉ, Jaime, *op cit.*, page.195

beliefs deemed to be valid. On this transformation of the native into an *assimilado*, Noé da Silva Saúde had the following perception:

*(...) It was subjected to a completely different structure, the ‘assimilados’ had various functions, one of which was to act as a liaison unit between the colonists and the native, transformed into a thing, into an object, work force, so much so that we knew the Direcção dos Serviços dos Negócios dos Indígenas, (Directorate of the Native Affairs) which was a structure reporting to the administrative services, where Blacks were a commodity, slaves to be sold to a company, or to be sent to São Tomé. You have already heard about the deportations, you remember the poems, if not of Viriato, they could be of Mário de Andrade, about the thousands and thousands of Angolans that were sent to work at the cocoa plantations in São Tomé, many of whom never returned, and we know all about that, and many that returned only to find that their families had been dissolved, where wives had been left on their own for four, five, six or seven years, there were some women who had taken other husbands, others left abandoned, or returning husbands left homeless.*<sup>13</sup>

The efforts to affirm the colonial policy would require legislation produced to promote the acculturation of the native population. No recognition was conferred upon them in terms of humanity, because everything was to be imposed onto them (culture, new habits, customs) the latter capable of turning them into Portuguese citizens, and thus inserting them into the colonial project. One could therefore see that little had been changed from the previous decades, and because the economic aspect was, at all levels, of capital importance in this process, one can't dissociate it from the working conditions to which the natives were exposed to. The doors that had been opened to the Angolans for their integration within the limits of the assimilation were very discretionary because, even if the candidate to citizenship was in compliance with all the requisites, namely “(...) to be older than 18 years of age, to speak correctly Portuguese, to hold a profession, trade or artisanship earning means to ensure the capacity to maintain him and his dependants, to have a good record of conduct and to manifest the learning, new customs, and the conditions for the full public and private law application of the Portuguese citizens, and with no record of being a conscientious objector or a deserter” (art. 56)<sup>14</sup>. Nonetheless, these requirements were not absolute guarantees for acquiring the new status. If, for any reason, the *assimilado's* financial condition had aggravated, something not difficult to occur, taking into account the economic context of the colony, or if there was any sign of bad behaviour, the return to the native status was immediate. That's how during the 1950s-decade statistics show that the majority of the Black population had not reached the expected levels for their assimilation, having thus retained their indigenous status, placing them down into the bottom of the social scale, with all the consequences arising therefrom. According to Dalila Mateus, the number of

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(13) See interview of Noé Saúde

(14) Quoted in MATEUS, Dalila, *A Luta pela Independência*, 1999, p.22

*assimilados* in 1950 did not exceed 30 000, this revealing that the levels of access to the services and sectors of social promotion, such as access to education, health and employment were hardly representative for this sector of the population.

The inclusion of Angolans into these institutions was effected from the existing legal mechanisms, which can easily explain the barriers created for the access to education and public service institutions. However, Blacks and Coloureds who had acquired the status of *assimilados* were taking some vacant position. However, the Angolan *assimilados* were only allocated junior positions, that is, they could hardly be promoted to senior leadership positions in the public service, as these were solely offered to the Whites, even if they didn't have the right qualifications for such positions.

The majority of the Whites living in Angola was illiterate. They consisted of convicts from Portuguese jails where they were serving sentences, they were the ones selected by the regime to colonize Angola. The establishment of the *indigenato* (indigenoussness) regime was proof that the Portuguese colonial regime, contrary to the theories it was disseminating, such as about the virtues of its "civilizational" mission, had promoted racial discrimination with this status, taking into account the big differences of treatment afforded by the State to the various groups of "citizens" and "natives". Meanwhile, the technical requirements for the economic development in Angola were facing a significant shortage of technology for the operation of any productive sector. The solution for this challenge lied in sending to Angola Europeans that lacked economic and financial means.

In considering getting rid of this complex social situation, Portugal thought this might have been the best option, along with the recruitment of those who would populate the colony. It was in this form that the penal colonization begun which was adapted to the new requirements throughout this process, by opening to the non-convict Portuguese who increasingly became part of the recruitment to participate in the colonial project. The government's appeal to encourage the Portuguese peasants to settle in hinterland Angola up to the early 1950s were not successful. There were indeed Portuguese coming into Angola but, contrary to the Government's wish, they were settling in the major cities or villages, where they were dominating the commercial trade.

The colonial authorities believed in the possibility of empowering the peasants with wealth for those who went to the overseas territories by occupying the lands of Angolans, thinking that they could dispense with the African labour<sup>15</sup> This created the idea of forming White settlements (*colonatos*). The African peasants were not allowed to occupy these new agricultural spaces, except for labour work. This settlement policy was effected through the establishment of White settlements in the rural areas, in spite of Black ownership, who was forced to grant the lands to the new dwellers and owners, in a clear mechanism of land expropriation. Two major agricultural settlements were in this manner created in Angola, the one in Cela, now called Wako Kungo,

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(15) Conf. BENDER, Gerald, 2004, pp.184–185

In the Province of Kwanza South, and the other one in Matala (Capelongo), Huíla Province, in the Kunene River valley <sup>16</sup> The Regulations for the Granting of Government Land in the Continental Colonies of Africa, set out that “the sovereignty of the metropolis over its overseas territories and peoples takes place through the real implementation of the stated rule. To colonize is also (and mostly) to occupy. Military, administrative and economic occupation, therefore the natives are dispossessed of the right to possession.”<sup>17</sup>

From 1940 to 1960, there was an increase in white Portuguese immigration within the following parameters: from 44000 into 173000, accounting for about 3.6% of the total population of 4.8 million. According to the 1950 population census the following was recorded: of the 4 145 266 inhabitants, 4 036 687 were Blacks, 78 826 Whites and 29 648 Coloureds. A segment of the Black population of about 30 089, to whom the system had granted a status different from the majority of the population, would have become *assimilados*, because they were asked in exchange, to abandon their ancestral cultural values, and included *Mestiços* (mixed colour). This demographic base was changing according to the circumstances which were inherent to the process of affirmation of the colony as the measure was imposing the enhancement of the mechanisms ensuring the effectiveness of the system. Looking at the 1960 census, it is easy to note the increase of the White population, as immigration recorded a massive growth. In 1960 there were 4 830 449 inhabitants, 4 604 362 being Blacks, 172 529 Whites and 33 392 Mixed.

<sup>19</sup> On the economic question, it is important to refer that it was envisaged with such pertinence that, in the absence of the *Estado Novo*'s budget capacity <sup>20</sup> to reach the colonization goals a Development Fund for the Colony of Angola (*Fundo de Fomento da Colónia de Angola*) was created. Based on this Fund, various programs were tried with the aim of reversing the situation in the colony of Angola. One can point out the example of action taken in the health sector with the building of hospitals, the efforts to enhance the of the education system with the respective structures in the majority of the districts, especially with the creation and upgrading of the administration structures which were intended to expand throughout the entire territory.

During the 1970s there was an expansion plan for the educational high school institutions, which could mean an increase in the number of Angolan cadres. The statistics of the results from this undertaking were terrifying. According to Bender “ (...) there were only 37 persons fully graduated in high school qualifications across the entire colony, the majority being Whites”<sup>21</sup>. It was precisely through this process, which envisaged the consolidation of the conquered space, through the installation and enhancement of a very strong administrative and police apparatus that forced the indigenous population to participate in the torture of its own souls, by inserting itself in the work of colonization, being deprived therefore of its culture in order to adopt the colonizer's culture.

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(16) Idem.

(17) CRUZ, Elizabeth, 2005, p.53

(18) III Plano de Fomento 1968/73, Quoted in NETO, Ana Maria, 1991, p.17

(19) Conf, BENDER, Gerald, 2004, p.251

(20) This was a new political form of the Portuguese State based on the concept of a unitary Republic, which by means of this principle revived the idea of the Empire and of a new conscience of the colonial things.

(21) Idem, p.251

What changes would effectively take place within the Angolans, in order to become participants in the colony's project, without any demands? It was demonstrated that the civilizational intakes that were attached to the colonial package weren't sufficient to satisfy the Angolan people's claims who were seeking within their possibilities new routes for Angola, beyond the colonial rule. The post-war period had irreversibly affected the economies of the big European powers, who sought henceforth to find new ways to justify colonization. To counteract this tendency the Angolans begun showing a greater commitment seeking alternatives in the realms of the conspiracy and elsewhere, which culminated with the advent of the country's armed struggle for liberation. However, as the system was improving, and in view of its deeply discriminatory character, the seed that fed the Angolan people's national conscience has grown towards the cause of liberation against the colonial yoke. Going back in time, and within this path, it is worth noting the moments of express grievance of the Angolan natives against the violation of their rights and interests, in the last decades of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. They demonstrated both in defence of the African political powers who were at that time advancing their last arguments against the Portuguese occupation, and of the native community within the colony, who was reacting against the colonial policy, within the possible spaces granted by it, such as in the case of the African press. It was during this period that there was the news of the creation of conspiracy spaces against the colonial system, propelled by the Angolan intellectuals, who called themselves the "children of the country" and who announced their ideas about the freedom of the peoples, assuming themselves as their representatives. The testimonies contained in the African press, a privileged space of such conspiracy which they saw both as propagation of indigenous culture, and as political proposals outside the metropole's logic, were: Joaquim Dias Cordeiro da Matta, João Ignacio de Pinho, José de Fontes Pereira, and Mamede Santana e Palma, *inter alia*.<sup>22</sup> If, at that time, the actions occurred under the cover of the policy based on liberal ideals, where freedom of press worked as a gate for protests and grievances, there were moments of absolute conflict between this group of the colonial society and their respective authorities, who saw the proposals of the indigenous people as an obstacle of their policy of occupation. The conviction on their ideals, expressed on the theorization and political stance of this group of intellectuals, which was being shown in the press at that time, and in the pamphlets that were being circulated in Luanda, even if their objectives were not being accomplished, this group of patriots leaves to the next generations a political policy proposal, in which they generated sketches of *Angolarity*, because they are effectively their main mentors.

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(22) See Mário Pinto de Andrade, *Origens do Nacionalismo Africano*, 2000, Rosa Cruz e Silva, *O Nacionalismo Angolano, um projecto em construção no Século XIX? Através de três periódicos da época: O Pharol do Povo, O Tomate, O Desastre*, 2001.

They gave, in this way, the Angola's feature, a space in which the various social and economic contexts. Such political ideals will be pursued in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, albeit with other methods.

The efforts of the African elite, who in the 19th century tried the first attempts towards the liberation of the fatherland, proceeded a century later, by reviving the legacy of that period of History, and in a covert manner in a first occasion and later more explicitly, the new elite which was placed within a colonial context, denounced the system through tougher and more direct actions by preparing plans for its downfall. The colonial power has created and propagated the use of imprisonment as an instrument of control of persons and groups, which it sought to submit the rationale of the exploration. The Indigenous Statute and incarceration were actions sought to obtain cheap labour and in sufficient quantity. And also, to include, in an arbitrary way, the Africans whose behaviour violated the norms considered to be adequate to safeguard of the established order, established in particular in the urban centres. The shock between the desire to affirm the colonial power and the ethical values in force of the African cultures explains the reaction of the first victims of the colonial prison system. However, the African practices aimed at avoiding imprisonment were purely and simply ignored by the colonial authorities. These could not ignore reactions such as the prisoner's suicide, reactions based on the code of honour of the Africans. But. In their view, these reactions only served to legitimize the extra-judicial forms of punishment of the Africans. In return, the colonial power was concerned with the frequency of prison evasions, by considering it as an unacceptable symptom of the prison system's weaknesses. The old repudiation to physical violence and imprisonment was a reflection of an African perspective about the human dignity, both individually and socially, which despite the slave traffic, remained throughout the centuries, as fundamental integral part of the African societies and cultures. So, imprisonment did not gain legitimacy in the eyes of Africans, to whom it represents added act of violence<sup>23</sup>.

### **1.3 The role of the Christian Churches in the formation of the Angolan Elites**

The implantation of Christianity in Angola had the Catholic and Evangelic churches as the key protagonists in their journey in Angola in the formation of the elites that would trigger the entire process of the struggle for national liberation.

#### **1.3.1 The Catholic Church**

Noé Saúde has the following viewpoint regarding the role of the Catholic Church in the colonial system:

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(23) Florence Berdaul (dir.), *Enfermement, prisons et châtements en Afrique (Du 19e. siècle á nos jours)*, passim.

*(...) Let's be clear, apart from any political and ideological organization, the Church... I'm not saying the catholic church, the church brought by the colonists not only to Angola, but also to the rest of Africa, served as an instrument of domination, we must not forget that the history of the Portuguese embodied the expansion of the faith and of the empire – which faith? – this is something I would like to discuss with the comrades, it meant to destroy our culture, the key element in any cultural identity, or the two main elements – Language and Religion.*

*And there we saw that both Catholics and Protestants were charged to destroy our (cultures) in order to impose onto us a foreign religion, to alienate us, to serve their own interest (...)<sup>24</sup>*

The Catholic Church started its implantation in this part of the continent., right after the first contacts were established between the Kongo state and the emissaries of the king of Portugal. One can say that this first Christian penetration was welcomed by the Kongo leadership, between the XV and XVI centuries, the reason why. Within a short period of time there were more than a dozen churches were spread throughout the African kingdom.

However, some sectors of the Congolese leadership did not facilitate the development of the evangelization, a practice that was being followed in other socio-economic contexts, such as in Ndongo, where the first chiefdoms of Ngola approached by the missionaries did not offer the facilities required by such mission. Despite these vicissitudes experienced in the other socio-cultural contexts during this process of the Portuguese settlement in Angola, especially after the XIX century, it was undergoing other developments. Thus, the accession and establishment were intertwined by more or less promising moments. What is a fact is that the Catholic Church, being the oldest in this part of the continent, ended up gaining more supporters, in relation to the religious confessions that followed after. After the Concordat signed between Portugal and the Vatican on the 7th May, 1940, and after the Missionary Agreement, the colonial authorities understood that their territorial expansion had to necessarily supported by religious intervention, that is, by the Catholic Church. Article 45 of the Missionary Agreement (*Acordo Missionário*) sets out that: “(...)The Portuguese catholic missions may freely expand to conduct the activities that pertain to them and especially those of founding and managing schools for the indigenous peoples and Europeans, boarding schools for males and females...(...)”.<sup>25</sup> To better justify this postulate Marcelo Caetano said the following: “While all missions of all religious Christian beliefs are welcome, it is understandable that Portuguese Law should especially protect the Catholics (...). And it was to the catholic missions that the law entrusted the official task of the rudimentary education to be given to the natives.”.<sup>26</sup> Once vested with the mission of reaching the Angolan souls, the Catholic Church set out to the ground and in all directions, making itself present both in the urban and the rural areas.

(24) See interview with Noé Saúde

(25) Conf. TOMÉ, Jaime, 1940, p.888

(26) CAETANO, Marcelo, *Tradições, Princípios e métodos da Colonização portuguesa*, Agência Geral do Ultramar, Lisboa, 1951.p.

Throughout the entire process of evangelization, the catholic missionaries faced a number of challenges in setting up, and only by the 20th century was it possible for them to set up a more visible space of intervention. The reaction to the Church's message that they circulated in each place they tried to settle was not a linear one, between the pure and simple acceptance and rejection, they had to seek alternative solutions, until the context proved to be more enabling. The mission to expand the Church's message across the territory was given to the *Congregação do Espírito Santo* (Holy Spirit Congregation) whose missionaries were inspired by the principles formulated by Father Libermann, founder of this Congregation.<sup>27</sup> The Catholic Church pillars were laid gradually in African territories and would penetrate into the ethnic-linguistic context of the country, by determining this process in creating zones of influence in certain determined geographical spaces. As they benefited from the colonial state, as mentioned above, the catholic missions were tasked to promote the formation of rudimentary schools, i.e. basic level education aimed for the needy sectors of the population, particularly in the rural areas. In such schools, as referred to in article 16 of the Missionary Agreement ‘‘ (...) the teaching of Portuguese is compulsory, and the indigenous idioms may be freely be used for the catholic religion's teachings.’’<sup>28</sup> This practice would counter the performance of the evangelics, who respected the African culture and contributed in this way towards the use of African languages, both in the education system and in the spread of their pastoral activities.

In the education system, where it was expected to produce ecclesiastic agents, there was a group of Angolans who gave up their priesthood, who ended joining the public service where the *assimilado* status offered some guarantee of sustenance. One has to refer to the role this religious faith played in the formation of the elites that would join the liberation movements. The location of the education places that contributed to the education of the children of the poorest people, albeit at a basic level, the catholic missions trained teachers who, on the ground, taught literacy, providing in this way, some possibility of survival to this class of persons. With the establishment of Seminaries in certain parts of the country, and which mission was to train clerics for the expansion of Christianity, these formed the main source for this elite, from where some intellectuals emerged and joined the Liberation Movement.

Important names of the Angolan Nationalism can be noted, who came from the Seminary schools. Of note are canon Joaquim Manuel das Neves, Father Alexandre do Nascimento, Reverend Domingos da Silva, Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, canon Franklin da Costa, Father Martinho Samba, Reverend the Vicar of Vara, Vicente José Rafael, Lino Guimarães, Alfredo Gaspar, these and other names represent the more significant references. One could say that while their object was not the Church, it was from it that leading figures emerged for the cause of the liberation.

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(27) HENDERSON, Lawrence, 1990, pp.37-40.

(28) See-se TOMÉ, Jaime, 1940, p.889

### 1.3.2 The Protestant Church

The Evangelic Church, in turn, would be playing a completely different attitude from that of the Catholic Church, insofar as the relationship with the powers that be, and since the authorities did not welcomed this religious practice, it had a limited field of action. Roberto de Almeida<sup>29</sup> has this to say about the relationship between the then colonial system and the Methodist Church:

*(...) By the very nature of the Methodist Church here and of its confrontation with the colonial Government of Angola at the time, I, for example, and my father from a certain time, were Pastors and teachers, and we saw the efforts my father endeavoured to avoid certain students from being drafted by the administrative authority (the Administrador) into forced labour work, to work at the road, for this and that, my father often hid his students away to avoid them being caught.*

*So, we subsequently became aware that there was a confrontation, there was something wrong going on and whenever the Administrador arrived at the mission, there was a sense of fear, even of terror sometimes, 'is it going to happen?', 'who is he picking this time?', 'what is he coming here for?', there was that feeling.*

*Well, we were small, we were kids, I was very young, yet we were already feeling that atmosphere, the disturbance when these authorities were coming in, it might even not be the Administrador himself, but it could be the Chefe de Posto (colonial district officer) or even the Secretário da Administração (Administration Clerk), etc, but that was always a cause for concern and there was also a certain effort to please such person, one who would bring a pig to offer, another who would pick a chicken, to give eggs, anything, whatever...there was this worry to please the authorities, I understood it as an act of diplomacy because, after all, one was worried about what made the Administrador to come to the church or to the mission, something which might explain the statistics about its insertion into the territory, although we know it was only introduced after the 19<sup>th</sup> century.*

*They settle in themselves, particularly the Protestants, with whom I was connected when I was a child, firstly along the railway, Luanda-Malange, and that's where we started to see many blacks with grade 4 who became a nurse or a rural primary school, those were the ones who helped us a lot on how to read and write.*

*They were so many, as a matter of tradition and family, we would start with Adão Gaspar Domingos, who was a cousin of my grandfather and uncle of Ismael Martins and who was the father-in-law of the MPLA's Vice-President, Domingos da Silva, and his wife Josefa, was the daughter of a primary school teacher in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, who spoke about him, we would talk about Agostinho Neto's father, and then of another one, of Manuel Maria de Almeida, Guilherme Pereira Inglêss, Júlio de Carvalho.*

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(29) **Roberto Victor Francisco de Almeida**, was born in Kaxicane, Icolo, Bengo on the 5th February, 1941, he studied in Luanda where he attended the Evangelic School and at the former Salvador Correia High School. He had his political activities since his university student times, militating in underground cells whose main work was to elucidate and to propagate in the form of pamphlets.

*O Gato (The Cat), his father was a primary school teacher, Deolinda Rodrigues father, and those whom we call the Axis, due to the railway, extended as teachers to the Dembos, to Nambuanguongo, to Uíge, in order to help to train people.*

*There were two centres, Luanda and Kessua, and formerly also Kiongua, many of our parents attended those schools, and ourselves too, I started going to a rural school, and then later in Luanda, at the Escola Energética de Luanda, where the Trópico exists since the 19th century, since 1984, 85, 86, when the American missionaries arrived, they formed the schools, and the church, then they went to Kessua, there were also in the South, we are seeing Chipenda's father, he was a pupil at the Salvador Correia, already under the protection of the protestants.*

*This is a very serious problem, because we all know, particularly our historians, that in 1940 Salazar signed the concordat with the Holy See, so they sent us to Portugal, a country ....., where the Protestants had little space to operate, and in a manner that is well known to us, I don't know if it is still done today, a person registered in a church, baptized in a catholic church had the right to a birth certificate which was valid under the Portuguese state, but if you were baptized in a protestant church the certificate would be null and void, it would be useless, so painful as it may to whoever, we are not here to please anybody, this was the reality and it must be told. We were, in the 50s decade, engaged in the struggle when the MPLA already existed, there was a secret document of the civil administration, alerting people, because this civil administration was the body, or the state Portuguese institution in Angola as naturally in the other colonies, tasked to manage the administrative affairs, especially those dealing with the blacks, the natives, so this document to which we had access, drew the Government's attention in the following terms "we need to be careful about the Protestants, because the Protestants are harming the Portuguese while the Catholics are doing good, in such a way that, it is true, most of the natives schools in the rural areas were not catholic, and when a few existed, these did not last long, while the protestant schools lasted dozens of years and their contribution was real, many people in the field completed their grade 3 and 4 in the protestant schools, the Catholics paid more attention to the students at the seminary, where they completed grade 4 outside and then would continue their studies at the seminary. This draw our attention, to alert us to come to a conclusion, 'what side are we?', we were bound to join one of them, 'it's what we wanted, to be a servant, bricklayer, carpenter, fully exploited....' As a servant, a cook, even our elders when playing football downtown, when making them playing with the whites, the people at the crowd, whenever a black was dribbling a white, would still remain as a servant, cooks, and if you think I'm lying go and ask Dr. Diogenes Boavida, who was a great footballer here in Luanda, he played for Atlético and whenever they played against in particular, and against Benfica, they would be insulted (...)*

The Portuguese Government feared the de-nationalizing influence of the evangelic missions, given that they were foreigners and their religion practically unknown in Portugal<sup>30</sup>. It was exactly because of their hostile attitude towards the Government that they became victims of its oppression. Some of their members were even persecuted. Ana Inglês

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(30) HENDERSON, Lawrence, 1990, p.85

<sup>31</sup> gives us an account of what happened to her father and uncle:

*(...) In the following day, in the morning, my husband met my uncle who was, as my father, a reverend. He was with other pastors and teachers. My father was a superintendent of the United Methodist Church in the district, he was the superior of all of the Methodist churches in the Dembos. He established schools and opened the eyes of the people there. He had already created a second level school and even a third level one in order to educate the people, to take them away from obscurantism. When the war begun, they gave him the nickname of the 'Lion of the Dembos', because it was my father who mobilized the people and opened its eyes. Hence his death, Whenever the colonists and the administratives found someone at the bush, they would ask:*

«- Do you know Guilherme Pereira Inglês?

- *He is my godfather and teacher. He taught me up to high school'*

*He was a most feared man. He was able to dominate all that area, he managed to get young and old people to read and write. He used to teach at night.*

*My husband found, therefore, all of the Methodist Church officers tied up with ropes, some on top of the vans and others to the mudguards. They were killed at the River Danje bridge.*

The Evangelist Church had the welcome that its discourse and practices earned for it, especially the discourse against the colonial policy, which greatly contributed for the elites close to it to receive the influence on the position towards colonial system. The evangelist missions, given the content of the assumptions based on their interpretation of the Bible would have in this way given the intellectuals the healthy nourishment to draw up their political thinking, firstly in the literature and later in their more explicit political text.

The granting of scholarships to the children of the African members of the Evangelic Church was the shortest route for the affirmation of such elite, because the African family's resources could not ensure the continuity of the studies of their children, who would only complete their basic education. This procedure was responsible for the figures that can be shown in this chapter. According to Dalia Mateus, at the end of the 1950s decade there were in Angola some 300 evangelic pastors.<sup>32</sup> Known and well cited are the political leaders that attended the Evangelic Church who not only reached their status of *assimilados* but they also criticised it and naturally fought to support the theories of liberation of the Angolans in general

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(31) ANA INGLÊS was born on the 21st August, 1925, in Luanda, she was the daughter of a senior protestant pastor of the Methodist Churches in the region of the Dembos. Her husband, cousin of Agostinho Neto, was a teacher in the missions and, after his military service, worked as a nurse at a plantation. They were both tortured and butchered by colonists and by the administrative authorities. From 1961 to 1963, she arrested and kept in a cell at the Quibaxe Fort, together with her four children. There she was systematically raped by soldiers. She was then transferred into a cell at the Quibaxe Hospital. Later she was sent to Luanda where she was detained at the Police General Command Headquarters, from where she was transferred to the Vila Clotilde Jail. She was then placed under house arrest. On the eve of the 25th April she was released on parole. After independence she joined the Social Affairs services as a facilitator. She is the sister of Luzia Inglês. **Responsible for the MPLA Angolan Womens organization.**

(32) MATEUS, Dalila, 1999, p.34

Regardless of their social condition. In certain regions of Angola one has in mind the action of the Evangelic Church who contributed to the formation of the Angolan elites who joined the national liberation struggle namely, the Reverends Guilherme Pereira Inglês, Sebastião de Sousa e Santos, António Buta, Teodoro Webba, Job Baltazar Diogo, Júlio João Miguel, Alexandre Rosa Tavares, Raimundo de Sousa e Santos, Filipe Freitas, Manuel Miguel de Morais, Santos Costa Matoso, Pastor Manuel André da Silva, António Miguel da Silva, Falo Domingos, António João de Almeida, António João da Silva, Domingos Mateus Ambrósio, António Gonçalves Neto.

We note the main teaching institutions that acted as training platforms of Angolan elites, such as the Kesua Mission at the Province of Malanje, the Currie Institute in the Huambo Province. Agostinho Neto, himself the son of a pastor and of a teacher of the Methodist school, is one of the paradigmatic examples of this process, where one can see by his literary and political journey. António Agostinho Neto, Ilídio Tomé Alves Machado<sup>33</sup>, Bishop Emílio de Carvalho, Deolinda Rodrigues de Almeida (Languidila), José Mendes de Carvalho<sup>34</sup>, Daniel Chipenda, had their training at the Methodist Church. The Currie Institute, based in Dondi (currently Chikala Choloanga municipality located at Kachiungo) was the training site for the Angolan elites in the center plateau. Names like Jerónimo Wanga, Jonas Savimbi, Jorge Valentim, Jaka Jamba, among others, who studied at this school, until they proceeded to their higher education studies.

We would say that the assumedly patriotic evangelist practices, turned to the values of the African land, had granted a great momentum to the sensitization of the Angolans that had swollen the ranks of the Liberation Movements, benefitting from scholarships from the American Evangelist Mission.

(33) Co-founder of the MPLA, and leader of the embryonic groups of the underground movement of the 1956, 1959, leader of the MPLA. He held high positions, including that of the Honour Vice-President., companion of Agostinho Neto.

(34) **José Mendes de Carvalho** born in Ndalatando (Kwanza-North), on the 29th July, 1941. In 1954 he arrived in Luanda after completing his primary school and with the intention of joining the Colégio da Casa das Beiras and later to the Salvador Correia High School, his colleagues included, inter alia, Ismael Martins., José Eduardo dos Santos, Roberto de Almeida, João Filipe Martins, Rodolfo Bernardo, Pedro de Castro Van-Dúnem (Loy), Inocêncio Maurício, Carlos Rúbio, Mateus João Neto, Eduardo Africano, Enoc de Vasconcelos. Left Angola in 1960 to Congo-Leopoldville to join the armed struggle for national liberation. A survivor of the Fwesse massacre on October, 1961. He received military training in Ghana and in Morocco together with 23 comrades and will become one of the leaders of the various military operations in Cabinda (II Region) and Moxico (III Region) where he was killed on the 14<sup>th</sup> April, 1968 in the attack to the Kari pande base. Cf. Paulo M. Júnior (2001) José Mendes de Carvalho (Commander *Hoji ia Henda*). *Um testemunho à sua memória*, Luanda, Edição do autor.

## Chapter II – The Formation of the Political Parties

### 2.1. The Embryonic Movement of the MPLA

#### 2.1.1. The Communist Party of Angola (PCA)

On the 12th November, 1955, the Communist Party of Angola (PCA) was founded in Luanda, whose founder members included: António Jacinto, Ilídio Machado, Mário António de Oliveira, and Viriato da Cruz, aka Carlos Duarte, Paulo Costa, José Nunes e Mona a Mundu, respectively<sup>35</sup>

According to the founding minutes of the Communist Party of Angola, the meeting that created the Party was preceded by two preparatory meetings which promoted the debate amongst its founder members on the need to create party structure with a Marxist-Leninist ideology, progressist and fighting for the cause for the liberation of the working masses and Angolan people. Viriato da Cruz, assumed as a staunch marxist<sup>36</sup>, for his clear positioning towards the system that was ruling the country, he since 1952<sup>37</sup>, took upon himself to draw up the constitution of the party inspired on the constitution of the Brazilian Communist Party. Of the political activity of the PCA it is to be noted that, according to its leading members, apart from the discussion about the Marxist works, the task of recruitment, did not bear much results. The founding core of the PCA, soon realized the difficulties for the party's growth, from various contacts it made, with a poor adherence to the project as well as an apathy towards communism by the majority of people.

Conscious of the failure of the Communist Party political proposal, whose premises were unable to mobilize the Angolans, they didn't give up and quickly found alternatives that would take up the struggle in new forms of organization.

They have guided, for this fact, their efforts to the creation of other more attractive and more active parties which could culminate with adherence without any constraints. Against the efforts that could counter such tendency, the authors of the theory of liberation drew up a strategy that would be expressed in a guiding document that would mobilize Angolans to the struggle, regardless of their social condition and above all of their political orientation. The struggle for the country's independence could not be tied up to any type of ideology. The meetings and political meetings proceeded at **Ilídio Machado's**<sup>38</sup> home, one of the identified sites,

(35) See Acta da Fundação do Partido Comunista de Angola and relevant constitution, Arquivo português Histórico Militar.

(36) See correspondence addressed to Noémia de Sousa. Mozambican writer with who he shared the same ideas and gives voices to the reviews drafted about the country and the international situation, leaving very clearly his Marxist stance. IAN/TT, PIDE/DGS Pº SR – 1153/51 NT. 2691

(37) A copy of the letter to Noémia de Sousa, is at the Archives of the Political Police who controlled the correspondence of suspect Angolans by opening the mail

(38) As per 'Auto de Perguntas de Miguel de Oliveira Fernandes, AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Proc. nº 40/959, fls. 379v.

including the site of the conspiracy, where ideas were broached and the most important documents related to the call for the struggle were drafted.

The genesis to MPLA begun with the drafting of a political strategy through the ebb and flow which can be explained in the principles contained therein, whose design is the responsibility of the authors of the Manifest that proclaimed the need for the creation of a Wide People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola. Viriato da Cruz is effectively the person responsible for the drafting of such document,<sup>39</sup> but the discussion over its content would count with the participation of the hard core of the PCA. This flow was triggered pursuant to a maximum directive that declared the urgency on proliferating a set of political organizations that would promote the awareness of the Angolans, regardless of their social condition and of their political ideals, for the country's liberation cause. In this way, the document refers that: "(...) nonetheless colonialism will not fall without a struggle: In this way, there is only one way to liberate the Angolan people: that of the revolutionary path. This fight, however, will only reach victory through one single front of all the anti-imperialist forces of Angola, without looking at political colours, the social condition of the individuals, religious beliefs and the philosophical stances, through the WIDEST PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF ANGOLA. This movement however will not be formed through the affiliation of all the Angolan patriots to one single organization or association.

*The Movement shall be the sum of the activities of thousands and thousands of organizations (of three, or more than three dozen of members each one) which might have been created throughout Angola. While the people's organization is made this way, the unification would be made through the efforts spent by each organization to realize the principles and objectives expressed in the Manifesto. The unification of the organizations would be done, therefore, through number of common ideas, principles and objectives, common to all organizations, common to all organized individual Angolans. (...)*<sup>40</sup>

The directive foresaw the dispersion of political organizations and their groups, as a means for better expand its message, but it recognized at the outset the need for its future integration, the latter being based on a sharing of common principles and objectives. This guiding document, for obvious reasons, only circulated between its main authors and didn't therefore have the same wide distribution of many of the documents that were being circulated for the militants. It was thus a guiding document of the struggle which could not, by any means, reach the enemies and detractors.

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(39) See ATTACHED the manuscript of the 1956 Manifest, written by Viriato da Cruz himself. This document contradicts completely the Carlos Pacheco thesis (in *MPLA um Nascimento Polémico*, 1997, p.33), who did not consult the document and preferred to start from the principle that it does not exist, rather describing it in a pejorative way, by calling it "Infamous" as a Manifest of the PLUA.

(40) In *Manuscrito do manifesto do MPLA de Dezembro de 1956*.

Although the "Manifesto" was not propagated amongst the various groups that were being formed, its content was sufficiently interpreted by all those who have taken the responsibility to guide and recruit for the cause of the struggle amid the members of the organizations and groups, by developing and increasing the actions proposed in it. The activists that outright were at the basis of this strategy approached the more assumed patriots for the formation of future or existing groups, provided they fought for the same principles and objectives, looking above all, for a joint action in the fight for the independence of Angola. The circumstances at the time, especially the political context marked by a close police vigilance, would have only been superseded through a strict underground activity. Accordingly, the formation of small groups that would take care of the distribution of pamphlets denouncing the system and to mobilize Angolans to the struggle was the most common practice. It's in this line of action that the slogan of creating "thousands of organizations spread throughout Angola" was enshrined in the December 1956 Manifest.

The internalization of its content to all of those who were inspired in its postulates was the effective answer to the tight police siege which threw a wave of patriots into the PIDE's jails, activists in the various political organizations that were being formed. However, the work of the announced "Manifesto" had proceeded since at this stage it no longer caused fear to the Angolans that were fighting for the liberation of the country.

The December 1956 Manifesto, coming from an anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist and anti-neo-colonialist vision of the Angolan situation and of its people, described the condition of Portugal's urban and rural workers, peasants, middle class, small traders and industrialists to the detriment of the Angolan industrialists, identifying the enemy of the Angolans "The enemy is the colonialism" and pointed to the fundamental objectives of the struggle: "the most unavoidable basic vital needs of our people (...) demand the mobilization and the fight – fighting in all fronts and in all conditions of the Angolan people towards the annihilation of the Portuguese imperialism, colonialism to turn Angola into an independent State, for the establishment of a democratic and people's government. A government of wide coalition of all the forces that fought in a ruthless and uncompromising way, to the end, against the Portuguese colonialism. A Government of all the anti-imperialist forces, led by the working class."

And the *Manifesto* concludes:

*"Europeans residing in Africa who wish to continue to live in this continent, on seeing their appropriate rights respected must, at least, maintain an attitude of neutrality towards the struggle for the freedom of the African peoples.*

*The European workers living in Africa must remember that the oppressors of the colonies form, in the metropolises, the classes that exploit them. They must remember that it is with huge profits plucked from the exploitation of the colonial peoples that the exploiters have been trying to delay and sustain their struggle against themselves. With such huge profits, the metropolitan exploiting classes both have created and reinforced the means of repression and research and have corrupted the leaders of the masses, divided the metropolitan masses and encouraged the opportunism between the workers.*

*The metropolitan oppressed colonial peoples and the exploited workers are natural allies in the common struggle against the exploiters of both. Let the flag of the workers' international solidarity of all countries be raised! Let our just and indestructible world front be raised against our common enemies, the exploiters of the metropolis and the colonies.*

*Let us fight for the coexistence and the peaceful collaboration between the peoples! Angolan people! Fight for your sacred freedom!*

*Black people of Angola! Fight for your survival! For the black race survival which the colonialist wants to kill!*

*Men, women, youth of Angola! You are fighting for your freedom! For a free, joyous and progressive future for all!*

*Everything for the creation, enhancement and proliferation of patriotic*

*organizations across Angola!*

*Long live the united and invincible struggle of the peoples of Africa and Asia against the colonial oppression! LONG LIVE THE INVINCIBLE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF ANGOLA!*

From the *Manifesto* came the slogan that encouraged de formation of political organizations that were fighting for the same objective – the independence of Angola. As the Angolan patriots were guided in their political intervention by a procedure that would not endanger their main objectives, the defence of those forming part of the organizations being formed, against the colonial authorities, was initially based on operation “CLALECLAN”. **Ilídio Machado** better explains its content:

*(...) “The initial MPLA’s activities were condensed into an operation identified by a code name - operation CLALECLAN, such weird word being formed by the first syllables of the word Clara, Legal, Clandestina (Clear, Legal Clandestine) . The operation comprised three types of action which were easy to deduct...In an action of the legal type, for example, in a meeting of LNA (Liga Nacional de Angola), a problem would be put in a certain manner and then, in a private meeting, the question would be put, analysed or criticised in a more open and advanced way. Sometimes a comrade would feel surprised: ...but we’ve just not long ago had approached this matter and you have not advanced that much ! It was also necessary to study a lot....*

*Answering to sabatinas (revision questions), leaving home to get contacts high at night – but then in the following morning to get to work in time (...)<sup>41</sup>.*

It was from this assumption that the political struggle for the country’s independence, and all its developments, was able to get around and overcome the challenges posed by the regime, and police apparatus, through a process of rigorous underground activities, which strategy expressed in the *Manifesto* was affected in the various organizations that emerged in the abovementioned context. In this way

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(41) Ilídio Machado, in an interview, to the magazine Revista Angolana, Ano I-Vol.I, nº 2, 10 de Dezembro de 1976, MPLA 20 Anos de Luta”.

to mention: The *Partido da Luta Unida dos Africanos de Angola (PLUAA)* – (Party of the United Fight of the Angolan Africans) and later, the *Movimento para an Independência de Angola (MIA)* (Movement for the Independence of Angola), the *Movimento para a Libertação de Angola (MLA)* (Movement for the Liberation of Angola), the *Movimento para an Independencia de Angola (MINA)*, *Movimento para a Libertação Nacional de Angola (MLNA)* (Movement for the National Liberation of Angola). But the PCA was not immediately dissolved, its leaders proceeded with their political discussions. And simultaneously pursue the directive of the *Amplio Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* by creating or promoting the formation of other groups and organizations. Aristides Van-Dúnem, Jorge Antunes, Noé Saúde, inter alia, militated in the Communist Party of Angola (PCA) and also for a short period, Manuel dos Santos (Capicua) who ended up deserting the party, remaining in the PLU. In reviewing the political situation and the PCA's capacity of intervention to mobilize patriots to the liberation struggle, its leaders concluded that it was not up to their expectations, after a period of its activities. The main challenge was the communist ideology which was not well accepted by Angolans. This reaction can be better explained taking into account the religious options of the vast majority of the Angolans to which the messages were addressed.

The December 1956 Manifest was the first milestone in the History of the MPLA. It marked the starting point in its process of formation, in that it established many of the foundations of the political-ideological line that will guide the MPLA. It is in this document that the guidelines documents, such as the *Manifesto do Movimento Anti-Colonial (MAC)* (Anti-Colonial Movement), dated the 1<sup>st</sup> January 1960, and the first program of the MPLA, published in July, 1960.

### 2.1.2. *The Partido De Luta Unido De Angola (P L U A)* United Struggle Party of Angola

Pursuant to the efforts for the liberation of the country, in 1956, and in the maximum directive, Ilídio Machado, Viriato da Cruz, António Jacinto, Germano Gomes, Francisco Machado, Liceu Vieira Dias e Matias Migueis<sup>42</sup> founded the PLUA. Manuel dos Santos (Capicua), Adriano Sebastião, amongst others, integrated this Party. Sources refer also to the participation of Amílcar Cabral in their underground meetings that culminated with the drafting of the first document of the formation of the MPLA, as well as in the creation of the PLUA, with his comrades Deolinda Rodrigues and Noé da Silva. This Guinean agronomist was staying in Angola since 1955, integrated in the members of the Agronomy Research Centre, having worked in the agricultural company CADA, at the Sugar Company of Cassequel at Catumbela and at *Fazenda Tentativa* (Plantation) in Caxito. It were exactly the trips to Dande in 1957, to the Tentative Plantation which will give him space to share with his Angolan comrades the underground political work that was aimed at liberating Angola from the colonial rule.

(42) **Matias Migueis**, Vice-Chairman of the MPLA up to the 1963 crisis, was born in the Panda village, Sumbe (Kwanza South) on the 15<sup>th</sup> August, 1917. The son of Joaquim José Migueis and of Rita José Camilo, he was the co-founder with Liceu Vieira Dias, of the musical group Ngola Ritmos and one of the leaders of the National African League. After his studies at the Seminary and at the Escola Comercial, he was a worker at the Benguela Railways and later was a bookkeeper at Mampeza in Luanda. Persecuted by the PIDE he settled in Pointe Noire (Congo Brazzaville) in 1957 to serve as a link between Mário Pinto de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz who used to meet in Paris (France) and later transferred to Leopoldville. Played an important role in the formation of the MPLA in Congo-Leopoldville.

<sup>43</sup> The work developed by the PLUA members was mainly related with awareness of the Angolans towards the cause of liberation. That is, the PLUA members had essentially the task of promoting the creation of new organizations, as a step for both the expansion of the struggle and, above all, as a security measure.

**Ilídio Machado** refers "(...) Although this group had been created for the objectives, it did not fulfil the task and its members were dispersed to join other more active organizations"<sup>44</sup>. The promoters and activists of the PLUAA would not only remain in this organization, and pursuing the clues of the "Manifesto"<sup>44</sup> they would feed the channels that would result in the new organizations, capable therefore of mobilizing the majority of patriots and as such to turn them into more active members.

### 2.1.3. The *Movimento Para A Independência De Angola* (M.I.A) Movement for the Independence of Angola

Pursuant to the initial strategy, the same members of the PLUA (Ilídio Machado), André Franco de Sousa, Higino Aires (nephew of Ilídio Machado), and Matias Miguéis, founded the *Movimento para a Independência de Angola* (M.I.A.) in 1957. This organization had mobilized the Angolan patriots with the distribution of pamphlets which content at the outset begun denouncing the socio-economic situation of the colony as well as all sorts of injustices suffered by the Angolans. The frequency of the underground meetings had contributed to the accession to the Party of many activists who will move in the Luanda suburbs with the distribution of clandestine pamphlets that were placed in backyards, or from door-to-door....Some notable pamphlets that were distributed in the city include, "MANIFESTO AFRICANO" (AFRICAN MANIFEST), "CONTRA AS PREPOTÊNCIAS GOVERNAMENTAIS E IMPERIALISTAS" (AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AND IMPERIALIST PREPOTENCIES), "AOS ANGOLANOS" (TO THE ANGOLANS), some of which signed under the acronym MIA, or ending with the following wordings: Libert, Fraternity and Prosperity.

The "*Manifesto Africano*" denounced the procedures of the campaign for the Portuguese Presidential Elections, taking into account the deliberate apathy seen in the different interventions of the candidates or in the debates promoted thereat, with regard to the living conditions of the Angolans. The *Manifest* was referring to the Conference that took place in Accra, Ghana, in December 1958, since there was in Angola great expectations about the results of this political event, as it was believed that it could contribute to greater pressure from the international community onto the Portuguese authorities, who insisted in maintaining the colonial system. In the final part of this pamphlet, one can see the reference to Queen Njinga Mbande, as well as to Ngola Kiluage, and equally to the slogan taken from the advice of lawyer Amilcar Barca, which were: *Fight until you reach Freedom!*

(43) ANDRADE, Mário, 1997, p.141, e MATEUS, Dalila, 1999, p.57. Ver ainda SEBASTIÃO, Adriano, Dos Campos de Algodão aos dias de hoje, 1993, pp.70-75.

(44) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Proc. 58/59, AUTO DE PERGUNTAS de Ilídio Machado, fls. 90

The document “*Aos Angolanos*” which resumed Amílcar Barça’s wordings, introduced another maxim, from Kwame N’Krumah: “Unite ! You have nothing to lose but your chains !” This pamphlet denounced the oppression seen on October 1958, following a popular revolt, which was severely punished with imprisonment, deportation of Angolans to the south of Angola, to *Moçamedes, Baía dos Tigres, and Porto Alexandre*.<sup>45</sup> From an analysis of the political situation in Angola, resulting from the political performance of the protagonist members in the MIA, one finds that the options of the messages contained in the pamphlets touched deeply into the afflictions and sufferings of the Angolans.

The content of these documents already reveals a high patriotic conscience and its call for the struggle by denouncing the acts of the colonial policy, which mobilized many more people into the ranks of the struggle for liberation. **Hermínio Escórcio, Matias Migueis**, MPLA’s Vice- President until the 1963 crisis, was born in the village of Panda, Sumbe, (Kwanza- South), on the 15<sup>th</sup> August 1917. The son of Joaquim José Migueis and of Rita José Camilo, he was the co-founder jointly with Liceu Vieira Dias of the musical group *Ngola Ritmos* and of the leaders of the National African League. After completing his studies at the Seminary and at the Commercial School, he worked at the Benguela Railways and later as a bookkeeper at Mamepa in Luanda. Persecuted by the PIDE, he settled in Pointe Noire (Congo Brazzaville) in 1957 to act as a link between Mário Pinto de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz who were living in Paris (France) and later was transferred to Leopoldville. He played a leading role in the setting of the MPLA in Congo-Leopoldville.

*(...) Viriato da Cruz, who was working at SINGER, was transferred to Lobito and there he also joined. This on about 1954/55. Viriato was a born leader, he was the engine. At that time, we were already in full development of our nationalist propaganda, in the mobilization of the populations.*

*We were feeling the need to get ourselves organized. After we exchanged ideas with this and that person, we happened to also exchange views with Viriato, Amílcar and several others, unknown, anonymous. With many anonymous people. .*

*In the beginning, we all militate together so hence the ideological orientation from all of us was that of the left and, thus, we were all tagged as communists.*

*In 1957, we had to take a position against such racial and social discriminations. The Benguela Railways was a den of rot, where an Angolan didn’t have the same benefits as a European. There was a numbering system. The numbering of Europeans started from zero up to the hundreds and so forth, five hundred in some cases. In the case of the Angolans the numbering started from five thousand onwards. So, the Africans didn’t have the same benefits of the Europeans. Europeans were entitled to *graciosa*, a special paid leave. The Africans had no rights, they had to pay out of their own pocket if they wanted to enjoy their leave. And when they granted leave it was a 30 day leave anywhere in Angola, in addition to the *graciosa* leave, which gave them the right to enjoy leave in Portugal for three months. Many of them used to arrive in Portugal they would have obtained a sick note by a medical certificate and increase the leave to 6 months. This at a time when there were no airplanes, they would all travel by ship, the*

(45) See-se MEDINA, Maria do Carmo, 2003, pp.56-69 *Moçamedes, actual Namibe Baía dos Tigres e Porto Alexandre, hoje Tombwa*

*«COLONIAL» and the «MOUSINHO» were the first pioneer ships. At that time the youth had already their eyes open and were seeing what was happening around them in Lobito, Benguela, Huambo and Luanda. The circumstances made our minds to develop towards the nationalist struggle. We found that all those things we were seeing were not fair. Once I arrived in Luanda, I started to operate underground operating in small cell groups, generally not more than five members per cell.*

*There were cells organized in the suburbs in which there was one controller, who watched the operation and behaviour of the members, to avoid the police to detect them and to break the network, as it happened many times, because Angolans, by their very nature, can't keep quiet, whatever they know they talk about and get excited. The excitement was such that many people were arrested without knowing how to read and write, without knowing why they have been arrested, just because one wanted the independence of Angola, either because one has heard about it, or because one read it in a pamphlet, or simply because one was handing out a pamphlet. Thousands of people had been arrested and were even killed, without having serving the cause. But there was the organization into cells, ones with only, others with up to five members. They proliferated in the suburbs. And associations were also formed in order to confer some legal status to the actions. There was, for example, the ANANGOLA (Association of those born in Angola), the African League, the Associação dos Naturais do Sul de Angola (Association of Natives of South Angola). The nationalists started to join this associations and to assume the leadership of them, to be able to operate underground. It was there where they could obtain the means they would not be able if underground, such as copy machines, paper and stencil. That's how I got arrested. There were still some years we operated underground, because I was only arrested, for the first time, in 1963. I had meetings, travels for the work of agitation and propaganda, information gathering to send it abroad to the Movement, flags, post cards and badges. And I also distributed pamphlets. But I would do it in bulk. There were others who would propagate them in parts. So, the activity was going on in any place. I was the one who had the means, because I fought and got the means to do it all in bulk., since I was the one who received the materials from Brazzaville and Leopoldville. Then, together with a group of comrades, we would prepare the Internal Bulletin, since it was not possible to copy the pamphlets that were coming and then to distribute them. That's why we did a summary. The smaller ones were distributed just like they were, but the others had to be reduced to a summary, so we would select and then draw the Bulletin. Until we, someday, found that we had to do something that would bind and destroy the arguments Franco Nogueira put at the United Nations, by saying that in Angola there were no nationalists claiming independence for Angola. That's when we issued a Bulletin saying that it was MPLA, the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola Interno who was claiming that.*

*The file is there (referring to the archives of Torre do Tombo). It worked because the prospectus was issued with the MPLA status and produced the expected results. At the UN, Franco Nogueira was immediately exposed because there were effectively nationalists, and that's why there was a prospectus being issued. He then started to use other tricks to hide the reality about what was happening internally in Angola.*

Viriato da Cruz who assumed the greater protagonism, both in the PCA's action and in the strategy that ensued therefrom, was under police surveillance for being an "ostensibly communist element". In a secret operation, Viriato escaped from Angola to Lisbon, taking with him the manuscript of the 1956 *Manifesto*, an important document containing the main strategy against the colonial system, which will serve as a basis in the drafting of other documents determined by the circumstances. With Viriato's exit from Angola into Portugal, on September 1957, and of Matias Migueis to Pointe Noire, at the end of 1958, the leading core of the Movement was reduced, but the action would continue with the members remaining in the country, tasked with the responsibility to give more impetus to the liberation struggle, from other acronyms and by other ways of fighting.

Matias Miguéis was indicated to do the liaison work by the MIA – Movement for the Independence of Angola, who was the conduit of communication with the exterior, given the need to propagate worldwide the exposures against the regime and to propagate the Movement's political proposals.<sup>46</sup> This explains the MIA's entry into the political scenario comprised by Ilídio Machado, André Franco de Sousa and Higinio Aires. Included also in the MIA were Liceu Vieira Dias, Eduardo Correia Mendes, Joaquim Figueiredo, António Rebelo de Sousa, Miguel de Oliveira, António Monteiro, Gabriel Leitão and Carlos Alberto Van-Dúnem (Beto Van-Dúnem), Father Franklin da Costa, Father Alexandre do Nascimento and Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade.

The pamphlets distributed by activists of the MIA were normally drafted by the leaders of the groups. In the case of the MIA, Ilidio Machado attested the task allocated to him, especially in the editing work required for the said texts. The pamphlets signed by the MIA dealt vehemently the topic of the independence. MIA printed various pamphlets that circulated in the main cities of Angola, a task that was carried out thanks to a copy machine sent by the "Lisbon group" (at the request of Luanda) and offered by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) through its liaison officer in a liaison with the nationalists of the Portuguese colonies, professor Gaspar Teixeira. The copy machine was sent to Lobito...via the seamen Mário Alcântara Monteiro and Manuel Gomes and arrived in Luanda, care of André Franco de Sousa. **Carlos Alberto Van-Dúnem**

*(...) Thenceforth we started to be organized by Liceu Vieira Dias and by Higinio Aires. Initially, we were given the task to organize the action groups of 3 persons. Each one of us had to form a group of three persons. And each member of that group had to, then, have another group of three persons. That's what they ordered us to do, for many months, in 1955/1956. From the time we were given this task, me, Amadeu Amorim and Mário Soares de Campos (deceased) had bi-weekly meetings, sometimes, weekly meetings with Liceu a progress report. We were able to set up in Luanda a big structure. Until one day, more or less in 1957, I'm not very good at dates, we had a debriefing. And they told us:*

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(46) As per enquiry proceedings from Ilídio Machado, AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Proc. nº 58/59, fls.87v.

«-If you are telling us that the network is set up, let's now move to the second stage ». *The second stage was for the drafting and distribution of pamphlets to raise the awareness of the population, to talk about the independence of Angola. We moved therefore to the second phase. There was a stencil copier. I came to know later that it was brought by Lúcio Lara. And it was with this copier that we started the pamphlet stage.*

*It was a very primitive copier, a box with a roll for the stencil. We would wax it, the we placed the roll and, for us to print 700 to 1000 pamphlets we had to start on Friday night and, as we didn't work on Saturdays we worked overnight, take a break Saturday morning until midday and afternoon and then we would re-start till Sunday morning, to take a rest in the morning and proceed in the rest of the day. The distribution, normally was done in the following day or four days later, as we could.*

*We had our first test. We were given the first pamphlets for each suburb, depending on their size. As we had our structures, we delivered the pamphlets to those guys we had in each suburb. In some suburbs, we had our own control. And that was how, at the end of 1957 to yearly in 1958, the first distribution took place which, according to Ilidio Machado, was a success. Because we could flood Luanda with pamphlets. The pamphlets were drawing the attention of the population for the oppression existing at the time, for the racial discrimination affecting the Angolans, to what they were doing to the so-called natives, such as sending them to hard work in São Tomé, and urging the people to become aware of the fight for independence of Angola.*

*When I say that we flooded Luanda with pamphlets, note that I am referring to the suburban side, because we stood no chance at the urban side. Luanda was divided. There was the suburban part, the so-called musseques, what is today Avenida Lenine. From Avenida Lenine downwards, it was the city itself, well illuminated, tarred roads and well policed, where there was no chance to distribute the pamphlets. We were therefore distributing them in the suburbs where there was no lighting. At night, we dominated all that, without the Police around. That is whether we could distribute pamphlets which, at that time, were being signed by the MIA. We were doing this job and making people aware. At the end of 1958 we managed, in the same day, to have pamphlets distributed in Luanda, Malanje and Benguela. I stress, on the same day, through Saraiva de Carvalho<sup>47</sup>, who was in Benguela and used to frequently come to Luanda. He knew that there was some activity in Luanda on pamphlets and, as he was involved with a guy, Gabriel Leitão, who was with us, he tried to find out how to do it (...)*

On the MPLA's activity, which consisted mostly in the distribution of pamphlets, it is important to mention that these documents went across Angola via the seafarers abroad. Contacts had been established with the crews of some foreign ships landed in Luanda, to get the propaganda reach other countries, as well as any other message for the militants living abroad, or even to the international bodies, such as the UN.

(47) Gilberto António Saraiva de Carvalho, ex-junior Army officer, born in Catete, whom the Minister of Overseas Territories would transfer to Tarráfal for 8 years.

We can mention the case of the American George Barnett who had been captivated by André Franco de Sousa and by Higinio Aires, and who had been entrusted to take the pamphlets to Matias Migueis.<sup>48</sup> Several meetings were followed with American crew members, at the invitation of the MIA or MLA, through which it was intended to create the contacts to abroad, by the delivery of documents reporting on the situation in the country, namely Gabriel Leitão, Liceu Vieira Dias, Carlos Alberto Van-dúnem, Deolinda Rodrigues, Noé Saúde inter alia,<sup>49</sup> The actions of the other groups were crossed over in the performance of the same objectives.

The efforts for the contacts abroad proceeded in continued meetings with American crew members who, in accepting the Angolan challenge, were willing to deliver the documents to the respective destinations. Following the clues by Gabriel Leitão, who hosted several times at his home the meetings with the foreigners, such as Lawrence Holder, Francisco Hernandez, George Barret, the meetings were attended by André Franco de Sousa, Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, Higinio Aires, Liceu Vieira Dias, Amadeu Amorim, José Maria dos Santos, Manuel António Rodrigues, Belarmino Van-dúnem, Bento Falcão Pinto de Andrade, Jaime de Araújo, Luís Bessa, Aurélio Lopes, Carlos Rosa Lopes, Francisco Machado, João Augusto Gamboa de Campos, aimed always at the same objective of taking abroad the Angolans' call for the liberation of their country.

Before the wave of oppression that fell upon the Angolan patriots that were integrated in the various organizations that were fighting for the independence of Angola, by resonating the struggle as far across Angola as possible, there was a very important discussion about the strategy of the struggle. The task of forming political organizations with the view of achieving independence begun, following the strategy of the 1956 Manifest, where the leaders of the movement created the mechanism leading to the identification of the groups and organizations that were engaged on the ground, though various initiative aimed in the first instance at a greater coordination of the ongoing activities. It was intended, with this procedure, to find the basis for the respective unification. Thus, Ilídio Machado, already an activist in action for the MIA, in the role as coordinator and leader of the "movement", developed and encouraged the task of listing these organizations, as he was one of the main promoters of these organizations, being actively involved with them. This task, according to **Aniceto Vieira Dias (Liceu)**, had been recommended to him by Viriato da Cruz before his departure to Lisbon, and the task was immediately carried out:

*"(...) some three years ago he was linked to Viriato da Cruz, Matias Migueis and Ilídio Machado. The task in this "group" was to discover other active 'groups' in Angola and to contact them. In the performance of this task, he discovered the ELA "group" of the "Movement for the Liberation of Angola" to which the "group" belongs of the music group Ngola Ritmo, of which he was a director, the*

(48) As per proceedings enquiry to Ilídio Machado, AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Proc. n° 58/59, fls.88.

(49) Conf. Auto de Perguntas a Gabriel Leitão, AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Proc. n° 40/959, fls 268–269

*the “Movimento de Libertação Nacional, later called the “Movimento de Libertação Nacional de Angola”... (...)”<sup>50</sup>.*

The expansion of the “*Movimento de Libertação de Angola*” (Movement for the Liberation of Angola) reached in effect the suburbs of the Luanda *musseques*. Liceu Dias had a partnership in the identification of the groups, while Gabriel Leitão was elected for his popular character and henceforth becomes responsible for establishing the contacts in the main suburbs with the other groups.

*Aniceto Vieira Dias “Liceu” (...) to make them forget the prejudices and to show them the need to be united, since there were some “groups” that had been organized which were fighting for the liberation of Angola, and such objective could only be achieved if all stakeholders were united, instead of being distrustful, as was the case.<sup>51</sup>*

Marçal, Rangel and Maianga, inter alia, visited the suburbs leaving the message about the need for the Angolan patriots to adhere to the “Movement” that aimed at achieving independence, and probing the performance of the other groups, with such information being then conveyed to Ilidio Machado, who was engaged in the coordination of the various groups.

#### **2.1.4. The *Movimento de Libertação de Angola* (M.L.A) Movement for the Liberation of Angola**

In his task identifying the other groups that were being announced, **Ilídio Machado** refers the following about the “*Movimento de Libertação de Angola*” (M.L.A)

*(...) it was conceived in a body of opinion existing between the black natives and the mestiços seeking to gain expression, in order to be represented with the Central Government. Some members of greater prestige agreed to such opinion within the African circles...and knew about it because he had consulted them directly, obtaining their agreement...That he was always of the opinion about the need to create such “movement” because, really, amongst the African natives there are no significant numbers of traders; there are no self-employed farmers; there is no elite with expression in society; there is no native Press; there is no social living; there is no one who understands public administration. The natives do not get appropriate education; the assimilados are returning back to the indigenato status when their financial resources reduce; there is not even a carpentry, a shoe shop or a barber shop worth that name and which are owned by Africans; employees have their jobs in jeopardy as soon as they start earning good salaries and one can hardly find a black bookkeeper in a trading company in Luanda. “(.) the feeling of the natives, and from their opinion they have, is it is pursuant to the facts that leads them to be in Angola the poor relatives in the house of a rich family. That’s how in the spirit of the natives a feeling for the creation, initially underground, of the liberation movement of Angola was born, whose main precursor was André Franco de Sousa, followed by canon Manuel das Neves. Canon Franklin da Costa, Father Alexandre do Nascimento, André Mingas, of the Revenue Services and joined the “movement” outright and at the invitation of André Franco de Sousa, who with him drafted the first manifest underground, which condemned the silence of both candidates to the Presidential elections, last year, in regard to the natives’ because which was completely relegated*

(50) ANT/TT., Archives of PIDE, Proc. N° 40/959, Auto de Perguntas de Aniceto Vieira Dias (Liceu) fls.283v-284

(51) AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Proc. N°40/959 Auto de Perguntas de Gabriel Francisco Leitão Pereira, fls 266v/267

*The leadership of the “Movimento de Libertação de Angola” had adopted the designation of “central sector” which consisted of myself, André Franco de Sousa and Higinio Aires de Sousa.*<sup>53</sup>

Its activities, as well as those of the other members of the “Central Sector”, were the leadership, orientation of the struggle, that is, that of simply liberating the Angolans from the social situation they were living in regard to the Portuguese sovereignty. André Franco de Sousa, as a ‘director’ member, was tasked to draft the pamphlets and their printing, work which was done in his own home, as well as the distribution in his own car. As to the distribution of political propaganda across the country namely, pamphlets that were being distributed regularly during the said period, **Miguel de Oliveira Fernandes** adds that his task consisted in the following:

*(...) “To despatch rolls with the pamphlets by postal parcels addressed to Norberto Franco, in Nova Lisboa (today Huambo), Pedro Trindade Palma (Cabinda), Palhares da Costa (Benguela), Mário José Gomes and Santos Rúbeo, (Malanje), Narciso Espírito Santo (Lobito).*<sup>54</sup> One would say that the message was gradually passing not only in the coastal cities but also, in some way, the urban and interior areas. Of Angola.

*The Movimento de Libertação de Angola, (M.L.A.), edited some pamphlets prepared by André Franco de Sousa and Higinio Aires. The supervision was done by Ilídio Machado himself who corrected them and then they were copied in the machine that came from Benguela, sent by Alcântara Monteiro under the responsibility of André Franco de Sousa.*<sup>55</sup>

**Ilídio Machado** refers further that the MLA’s contacts abroad were done

*(...) with the American crew members that were doing the routes between America and the African West Coast. George Barnet was tasked to convey the mail and other documents between Luanda and Ghana with the Prime-Minister of that new Republic. The first mail being sent was a letter written in English by André Franco de Sousa, where he asked for literary works about the way that country had obtained its independence, and of its achievements. In that same letter an account was given of what was being done and what was intended regarding the liberation of Angola in favour of the natives. It also mentioned that George Barnet had carried another correspondence signed by André Franco de Sousa requesting trading relations*

(52) NA/TT, Archives of the PIDE, Auto de Perguntas a Ilídio Machado, Proc. n° 40/959, fls. 367v-368.

(53) NA/TT, Archives of the PIDE, Auto de Pergunta de Ilídio Machado, Procc. N° 40/959, fls 384

(54) AN/TT, Archives of the PIDE, Proc. 40/959, Auto de Perguntas de Miguel Fernandes, fls., 291 e Proc. 58/59, Auto de Perguntas a Ilídio Machado, fls.91v-92.

(55) AN/TT, Archives of the PIDE, Proc. N° 40/959, Auto de Pergunta de Ilídio Machado, fls. 366

*between the two countries, to which there was no reply. The intended, in short, to obtain lessons and examples about what was happening in Ghana, to be able to emulate them in Angola.*<sup>56</sup>

*The Movimento de Libertação de Angola is an extension of the M.I.A., which we believe would not cease its activities, quite on the contrary, some members of the M.I.A., operate at M.L.A., now in development, a practice that can be explained by the need to boost and encourage these organizations during this period.*

Ilídio Machado refers also that there were groups where not more than two persons operated, as in the case of himself, who together with Miguel Oliveira Fernandes or António Marques Monteiro, or himself and António Rebelo de Macedo (of the Catholics Group), operated as propaganda and political agitation groups.

### 2.1.5. The ELA Group

According to **Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho**:

*(...) To the Movimento de Libertação Nacional is equally linked the ELA group, whose leading mentor was João Pedro Benge,<sup>57</sup> and integrates Fernando Pascoal da Costa, Gaspar Domingos, Joaquim Figueiredo, Belarmino Van-dúnem, the nurses Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho and Contreiras. Still according to Ilídio Machado, Joaquim de Figueiredo, Higino Aires, Germano Gomes, Luís Barbosa Bessa formed part of the MLA. Whose main guiding figures were, Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, Eduardo Correia Mendes, António Rebelo de Macedo, e Manuel Bento.*

*The acronym of the E.L.A. group comes from the pseudonyms of their leading members and who were at the origin of its creation namely, Ernesto Guedes (António Pedro Benge), Luzerna Pinto Mendes (Fernando Pascoal da Costa), Arnaldo Goreva (Joaquim de Figueiredo (...)).<sup>58</sup>*

**MARIA DO CARMO MEDINA**, author of the book: *Angola Processos Políticos da Luta pela Independência*,

*(...) From the activities of this group, one would highlight the sending to Accra, at the 1st Conference of the African Peoples which took place on March 1959, of report titled "O NOSSO RELATORIO PARA "A CONFERENCIA A REALIZAR EM ACCRA EM MARÇO DO CORRENTE ANO", with a letter of greetings to the new African States, and other documents to the Curatorship Commission of the UN, wherein the group asked for the tutelage of Angola or even its separation from Portugal. The document to the African Conference was duly signed at the end: "The leaders of the liberation of Angola, with their respective pseudonyms of the members of the group"<sup>59</sup>*

*This group also established the contact with the American crew to whom they delivered the above documents to be delivered at the respective destinations. Of the group that was in the origin of these contacts and who participated in the working sessions for the translation of the documents that were sent to the international institutions such as the United Nations for the Government of Ghana, one should mention*

(56) AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Proc. N° 40/959, Auto de Perguntas de Ilídio Machado fls. 385–385v

(57) We believe it is António Pedro Benge, according to the correct indication in the list of entities AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Proc. N° 40/959, Auto de Pergunta de Ilídio Machado, fls. 366

AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Proc. N° 40/959, Auto de Perguntas de Ilídio Machado fls. 385-385v We believe it refers to António Pedro Benge, as per the correct police indications.

(58) See interview with Mendes de Carvalho

(59) MEDINA, Maria do Carmo, *Angola Processos Políticos da Luta pela Independência*, 2003, pp. 185–192.

**Deolinda de Almeida Rodrigues**<sup>60</sup> and Noé Saúde who were already long connected with the political activities within the Movimento de Libertação de Angola (MINA)

*The echo of the changes that were occurring in Africa, especially in those countries whose colonial powers already in the 1950s had abandoned their imperial desires, was increasingly mobilizing the Angolans who believed they could follow the same steps in the decolonization which was ongoing in those countries.*

*The closest country, from which signs of such change was occurring was the then Belgian Congo, so the leaders of the political organizations in Angola sought at all costs a contact with such reality, and also where there was a knowledge about Angolan organizations fighting for the ideal of independence, such as the UPA.*

**Agostinho André Mendes de Carvalho** a companion of Pedro Bengé, Deolinda Rodrigues, Joaquim de Figueiredo, inter alia, at the ELA Group, and heavily committed and integrated in the underground movement, and guiding his action with some protagonism and autonomy, mobilized the financial resources amid his political and even family circles and travelled to Leopoldville on December 1958, with the express objective to advise abroad about the developments of the colonial policy in Angola and to seek support for the new forms of struggle.

*(...) We were part of a nurse club which we called Espalha Brasas (Flame Spreaders). And there was already another group, of Lopo do Nascimento, called Botafogo (Fire Lighters). As we were close by, we would spread the flames and they would light the fires. They were both recreative and social clubs to attract people. Once inside, we would indoctrinate them.*

*Before I was arrested, I went to Kinshasa, at the time still Leopoldville. We already had the club formed, but we needed a site abroad for the sending of correspondence. I then travelled to Kinshasa to look for some Angolans, because there were some there, from Cabinda and Uíge. I wanted to probe and find a means of meeting with Kasavubu. On December, 1958, I went there and had many meetings with Angolans living there, to see if they could help us. Armando Ferreira, Van-Dúnem, Mingas niece (who was living there long time ago, but then returned home), Capita, Zé Maria and many others, who already had a political view. They had also gone there to seek a means of sustenance while, at the same time, seeking some political exits. As I said, I met Kasavubu, because Lumumba wasn't there. But, when leaving Luanda, in a Sabena flight, I noticed that I was travelling with Amílcar Cabral. I wrote him a note, as I wanted to know to where was he going to.*

(60) **Deolinda de Almeida Rodrigues**, was born in Catete on the 10th February 1939. She, from an early age, participated in the formation of a youth organization within the Methodist Church, which promoted conferences and debates with leading Presentations at the time. Amílcar Cabral, Américo Boavida, Eduardo Mondlane amongst others. She was an activist of the MLA since 1957, forming part of the ELA Group where she played an enormous contribution as an interpreter in the contacts with the foreign crews. While studying for her higher education in Brazil under a scholarship of the Evangelical Mission, she established contacts with international organizations such as the UN to whom she sent the cry of the Angolans for the independence of their country. She formed part of the MAC (Anti Colonialist Movement). To this effect she was in close contact with Lúcio Lara, Amílcar Cabral, and Viriato da Cruz who from Europe were developing intense political activity towards the independence of Angola. After her return to Africa she started via Conakry until 1962 in Leopoldville where she carried various missions for the MPLA until her murder by the UPA in 1966.

*I called the hostess and handed her the note. Amílcar Cabral didn't respond. When we disembarked in the airport of Leopoldville, I approached him, and he told me:*

*«- I received your note. I am on my way to take a Pan American plane which landed from Kenya. But be careful. As I said, I did receive your note. But the air hostess showed it to another person before she handed it to me. Be careful therefore, because you are being followed!»<sup>61</sup>*

*I did take care. Did my paperwork and did a quick visit to Brazzaville. I contacted various people, including a Minister. And made some contacts for an appointment with Father Youlou. But when I was in the room to be received an hour later, because I didn't speak French I was waiting for an interpreter: then came a young military French, well dressed, and charming guy, who told me:*

*«- I'm here Mr. Mendes de Carvalho. They will soon come to fetch you for the interview:»*

*I asked who was this guy and they told me that he was an officer at the service of Father Youlou. A French man? Given that I ended up in the lion's den, I ran away.*

*I crossed the river towards the other side of the river. Well, in December when I arrived in Luanda, I became the victim of constant persecution.*

*But I didn't accept the fact. How could a French person fetch me for the appointment, when the very reason that took me there was to request assistance for Angola and for a chat about my country. A French guy helping me in the meeting? I ran away (...)*

On becoming aware of the realization of the Ghana Conference of the African Countries, Mendes de Carvalho moved for various contacts to get material support for the representative of Angola to be present at that forum, but also in the form of reports, letters and circulars for the African entities present in that meeting. In this respect, and already in Leopoldville, he got the support of other Angolan patriots living in that city and related with the 'movement', such as António Josias and Barros Nekaka, Armando da Conceição, who were there as part of the political campaign for the independence of Angola and further contacted the Congolese government whose support he sought to secure the participation of an Angolan delegation at the Accra Conference. The liberation struggle could secure the mobilization capacity of the leading members of this group, such as, inter alia, André Mendes de Carvalho, the leader of the Nurses Group, Garcia Lourenço Vaz Contreiras, João Lopes Teixeira, Florêncio Gamaliel Gaspar, Adão Domingos Martins, João Fialho da Costa, José Diogo Ventura, Manuel Baptista de Sousa, Manuel Bernardo de Sousa, for the protagonism assumed. It was exactly after this trip, still in December of the same year, when the Nurses Group was founded. His action brought further afield the message of the country's liberation. Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho organized the 'Nurses Group' by allocating tasks to each one of its members who were distributing pamphlets and newspaper clips across the city

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(61) See interview by Mendes de Carvalho

of Luanda, as well as to other parts of the country. On the other hand, this group sought always to contact with the outside world, to which they also would send the political propaganda of the "Liberation Movement of Angola" through Armando da Conceição who, in turn, would forward them to Leopoldville and Accra. The costs of these actions were paid for by the organization's members contributions. Who would take an oath of death and loyalty to the cause and to the integrity of their brothers-in-arms.

The proliferation of political groups and organizations in favour of the country's independence would continue always to be very close to Ilídio Machado and his closest brothers-in-arms. At one stage of his description of the "Movement" he stated that "(...) the André Franco de Sousa Higinio Aires' group and himself used initially the name "Movimento para a Independência de Angola" (*Movement for the Independence of Angola*) having concluded that such change had occurred with the maturing of ideas that were emerging"<sup>62</sup>. Arguing with Joaquim de Figueiredo about the accession and collaboration towards the development of the Liberation Movement of Angola, **Ilídio Machado** maintained that it was growing.<sup>63</sup>

*(...) Thus, later and in the capacity of " (...) as a leader of the 'Movimento de Libertação de Angola", I took upon myself to link the already formed groups with the leadership so that it would incorporate itself as an organization, and to grow gradually. Before that I drafted a questionnaire to ascertain what everybody's thoughts were about what was being proposed, i.e. the organization of the "movement" to liberate Angola and to set an autonomy in favour of the natives in defence of the principles ..."*<sup>64</sup>

The document titled "Questionnaire" referred to the following aspects:

**"Questionnaire; Do you agree with the merger of existing groups? Why? Do you disagree with the merger of such groups? Why? What suggestions do you have?"**<sup>65</sup>

Joaquim de Figueiredo, who was active at the ELA group, of the "Movement", considered that the approach was urgent, which presupposed a larger organization and perhaps a more efficient one in the struggle they were developing. The premise about the group liaison is expressed in the 1956 Manifest, i.e. once the stage of the irradiation of the groups capable of taking the liberation message across the country, and having reached their maturity, it would require a greater organization capable of developing major actions, to address their aspirations and expectations, since the common motto was the urgency in liberating the country from the colonial rule.

*(...) In this respect I met with the leaders of other groups who, at the time, were still small, namely: Eduardo Correia Mendes, António Rebelo de Macedo and Joaquim de Figueiredo. As a result of this meeting a wider leadership was formed and, although there weren't many collective meetings, a plan was drawn about the matters the 'Movement' had in mind to deal initially, which are described for their importance: -*

(62) Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho op cit p 71.

(63) Idem. p 71

(64) Ibidem. p 71

(65) Idem, fls. 361 v.

*- history in the aspect of the relations between the Metropolis and the Province, the trade, its development and position in relation with the Metropolis and foreign countersinking trade; loans; currency; domestic trade; agriculture and main productions; regime of land distribution; the state of industry; industrial conditionalities; labour legislation; African associations and their importance; education and its orientation; school attendance and results; pedagogic skills; the Catholic Church and local citizens; the Protestant churches and local citizens; indigenous languages; indigenous arts and manufactures; problems with the contact with the civilization, etc.*<sup>66</sup>

*The questionnaire was sent to some of the groups, a mission carried out by Joaquim de Figueiredo who promptly responded to and adhered to the merger proposal of the groups, including his own group. This group submitted suggestions, such as the need to gather more funds for the organization. The greatest objective of this operation was that of choosing the path to be followed as well as the leadership to be given to the actions of the "movement"*

Being organized into small groups, who autonomously took their initiatives towards the liberation cause, the leaders of this vast "Movement" deemed it necessary to establish the liaison between the various groups, in order to get some coordination in the activities that were developed. By following strictly this orientation, and as per Ilídio Machado's report, the group of Joaquim de Figueiredo offered to establish the "movement's" contact with the rest of the world, such as with Barroso<sup>67</sup> who was living in the Belgian Congo and had participated in the Conference of the Peoples of Africa in Accra. On the other hand, contact was to be established with Lucio Lara, who was living in Lisbon, so that he could attract the "overseas interests" in Portugal in favour of the "Movement". Equally called upon to intervene in the clearly expanding "Movement", and from abroad, were Mário Pinto and Viriato da Cruz, patriots who were, at the time, in France.<sup>68</sup>

We would say that the act of promoting the multiplication of political organizations and their respective groups, as well as engage those that were already active, fighting for the same cause, was proving to be effective, capable of mobilizing the will and to bring them into the underground paths, despite the constant threat of infiltration within the less informed, which caused some ongoing setbacks.

The city of Luanda hosted an International Labour Conference, an event which didn't happen unnoticed to the patriots engaged in the various organization that were operating in Luanda, and it would serve as another pretext for denouncing the regime. According to Manuel Pedro Pacavira, the African delegates to this Conference questioned the legitimacy of the Angolan delegation, and for this reason they had several contacts with religious entities in order to obtain some more appropriate information about the condition of the Angolan working class, such as the case of Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade and canon Manuel das Neves, as well as other officers that were part of the underground movement.<sup>69</sup>

(66) AN/TT, Archives of Pide, Proc. n° 40/959. Auto de Perguntas a Ilídio Machado, fls. 368–368v.

(67) Refers to Barros Nekaka who features in several testimonies as a member of the Movimento de Libertação de Angola (Liberation Movement of Angola), and from whom support was expected for the cause of the "Movement" but acting nonetheless at the UPA located in Leopoldville

(68) Idem, fls. 362

*(...) Yes, of course, I already spoke about the International Labour Conference who delivered the message, etc and we got their message to get ourselves organized, especially from Seydou and when he spoke the younger one were myself and Rodolfo, he spoke in French and I knew a bit of French also, I had a bit of a command of French and he was addressing to us the young ones, he said: 'that is a task for the young ones, you must continue with your underground movement, you brought to us here in a clandestine manner, we believe the colonial authorities will not know about it' – and this was before the meeting – 'and we are going to use these details in the meeting' – and they used it in the following day, in the inaugural session, they immediately asked 'where are the representatives of the Angolan workers?'; they were whites, there weren't even mestiços, they were all whites because the unions at that time were white, they were the ones leading the unions, whites from the metropolis, because they also didn't trust the Angolan whites, so they asked where were the workers, so they refused to proceed with the meeting and said 'no, we can't have a meeting here, there was a point of order, or we are then going to consider, International Inter African Labour Conference in Angola' so under the United Nations, 'in Angola without the Angolan delegation', those things caused such controversy that they had to fetch some 'coloured' delegates to remain there, I don't remember any more, the meeting was just for political discussion on the condition of the workers in Angola, which they had already control, from the information I had obtained, not only about us, but also of many other people that went to the hotel, including young students, older people going to Hotel Turismo where they were staying, and where the PIDE could not control, how could they control? ! They couldn't expel people and the people took risks at that time, they were going to talk, etc,*

With the Angolans being aware that the Portuguese authorities would not send a legitimate representation of Angolan workers who could highlight the real problems of the Angolan working class, the underground Movement prepared the conditions enabling the contact with that distinguished international organization. A group of underground activists of the Movement contacted the leading members of this organization, namely: "the delegates of Sierra Leone, Mali, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Liberia, Northern Rhodesia and Conakry, including Diallo Seydou<sup>70</sup> Vice-Chairman of the Movement of the Workers of Guinea Conakry" making them to participate in various underground meetings in one of the Luanda shantytown suburbs (*musseques*).

In December 1959, a meeting took place with the group of the ILO, who was taken there by Manuel Pedro Pacavira to Alfaiate António Ramos's home

(69) PACAVIRA, Manuel Pedro, O 4 de Fevereiro pelos próprios, 2003, p.45

(70) Lúcio Lara refers that this person, on returning to his country, was the holder of this important document denouncing the exploitation of the Angolan workers, having arrived in Conakry and met by Hugo de Menezes, he also called at the MAC delegation in Tunis. According to Lúcio Lara, Diallo Seydou "was impressed with the underground movement in Luanda, who was able to contact him in spite of the Portuguese surveillance". See, *Amplio Movimento*, pp.487-490.

where the meeting was to occur. At Estrada da Brigada, where it was then changed to Herbert Inglês' home, said to be for security reasons, to which were present Joaquim Bernardo Manuel, Adriano Sebastião, Joaquim Bernardo Silas, and Ramos Alfaiate, and from our invitees there was Daramy, of Sierra Leone.<sup>71</sup> This meeting where Silas and Adriano Sebastião served as interpreters, served merely for the exchange of information. The second meeting was in the following day which was hosted in Sambizanga at the home of Pacavira, and was attended by José Bernardo Kiosa, Fernando Coelho da Cruz, Cândido Fernandes da Costa, David Bernardo D'Eça Queiroz, Rodolfo da Ressurreição Bernardo, Bernardo Joaquim Silas, and Joaquim Bernardo Manuel, the ILO delegates, Daramy, Dashoord, of Liberia and Diallo Seydu, of Guinea Conacry.<sup>72</sup> Matters discussed in the meeting included "(...) the situation of the Angolans, in general, challenges encountered in the territory, general African policies in general, and the wishes of all to have access to good jobs as well of the need to provide adequate means required for the intellectual preparation of the natives so that they can learn without being forced to pay a lot of money"<sup>73</sup> They have further asked in this meeting for scholarships to be given to young Angolans so that they can proceed with their higher education studies in the African countries represented by the delegates.

The members of the Movement for the Independence of Angola handed to this important delegation a document titled "*ATENÇÃO! SENHORES DELEGADOS AFRICANOS À CONFERÊNCIA DA COMISSÃO AFRICANA DA ORGANIZAÇÃO DO TRABALHO!* (ATTENTION AFRICAN DELEGATES TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE AFRICAN COMMITTEE FOR THE LABOUR ORGANIZATION!). This document went down in history with its French translation: "FAITES ATTENTION, MONSIEURS LES DÉLÈGUES!"<sup>74</sup>

The Angolans present at the meeting received, from the ILO delegation, words of incentive to continue their fight for emmanicipation, which should have not be let down in spite of the difficulties posed by the regime. The success of the meeting served as a good reason for the creation of another political organization that would cover the needs of such a crucial moment for the struggle, given that the police siege was getting tighter. This had then created the premises for the appearance of the MINA (Movimento para a Independência Nacional de Angola (Movement for the National Independence of Angola). Still in December 1959 at Herbert Pereira Inglês' home, and in the presence of Manuel Pedro Pacavira, José Bernardo Domingos (Kiosa), Joaquim Bernardo Manuel, Bernardo Joaquim Silas, David Bernardo d'Eça Queirós, Rudolfo da Ressurreição Bernardo, Fernando Coelho da Cruz and Adriano João Sebastião, it was decided to create the MINA.<sup>75</sup> Its organizational structure included the Press Sections consisting of Pacavira, Silas, José Bernardo Domingos (Kiosa) and David Bernardo. The Treasurer was Herbert Pereira Inglês.

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(71) Op.Cit., 2003, p.46

(72) Idem, pp.46-47.

(73) AN/TT, Archives of the Pide, Cof. Auto de Perguntas de Herbert Inglês, Proc. Nº 45/60-S.INV.fl.s.458

(74) LARA, Lúcio, Um Ampla Movimento...Anexo 16, pp.487-490.

(75) AN/TT, Archives of the Pide, Auto de Perguntas de David Bernardo D'Eça Queiroz, fls. 412.

The aliases used by members of the M.I.N.A., included David Bernardo D'Eça Queirós – KINJINJE; Manuel Pedro Pacavira – PAKASSA; José Bernardo Domingos

– HOLO HIKOTO; Adriano Sebastião – KIUIMA; Cândido da Costa – CAIOTO; Bernardo Joaquim Silas – MBALA; Fernando Coelho da Cruz – KIBUNGO; Herbert Pereira Inglês – KIMBUNDU; Salvado Pereira de Almeida – KANGUADI; Joaquim Bernardo Manuel – KIMAKENDI<sup>76</sup>.

After the creation of the MINA, its political activity commenced immediately and propagating its existence with the proliferation of pamphlets distributed throughout the suburbs of Luanda, such as those titled: “AOS AFRICANOS”(TO THE AFRICANS), “CHEGOU A HORA PARA DESPERTAR” (IT’S TIME TO WAKE UP), “O GRITO DE LUTA PELA LIBERDADE” (THE CRY FOR FREEDOM), “GARANTIAS INSOFISMÁVEIS”(UNQUESTIONABLE GUARANTEES), “AOS ANGOLANOS DE CONSCIÊNCIA” (TO ANGOLANS WITH A CONSCIENCE) , “AO POVO DE ANGOLA”(TO THE PEOPLE OF ANGOLA).

With MINA recognizing the need to join forces for the creation of a more unitary spirit amongst Angolans, the latter pamphlet called for the union of the Angolans in the following terms: “The times we are living require work and struggle. Let us work all united and without distinction of origins, without being *Cattenses* or *Malaginos*, *Bailundos* or *Congueses*, Luandans or *Ambaquistas*, , but all as united Angolans, without fear to achieve our ideal – TOTAL INDEPENDENCE ! Let’s fight against the colonialist oppression and our victory is certain”<sup>77</sup>. In this pamphlet the content of the MPLA’s telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations:

“To Mr. Hammarskjöld Secretary-General of the United Nations, in New York.

ON BEHALF OF THE ANTI-COLONIALIST MOVEMENT, THE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION THAT ENCOMPASSES ALL OF THE AFRICAN COUNTRIES UNDER THE PORTUGUESE COLONIAL REGIME, WE REQUEST YOUR GOOD OFFICES WITH THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT TO END THE ATROCITIES AND CONSTANT SAVAGE ASSASSINATIONS AGAINST THE AFRICAN PEOPLES OF GUINEA AND ANGOLA AND TO FREE THE POLITICAL PRISONERS SUSPEND THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARMED REPRESSION. WE PROTEST AGAINST THE HYPOCRITICAL PORTUGUESE POSITION CONTRARY TO THE UN, THE DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE THE COMMUNICATION OF THIS TELEGRAM TO THE FOURTH COMMISSION. RESPECTFULLY

– LÚCIO LARA and VIRIATO DA CRUZ”<sup>78</sup>.

The development of the liberation struggle during this stage, where the awareness was done via these political texts which entered in the debates at distinct political circles, proving that there was a perfect tuning between the activists of the “Movement” abroad and internally, because the messages were exchanged, despite police infiltration who, at certain times, intercepted correspondence, thus hampering the articulation of the actions to be developed towards the liberation of Angola.

In any of these pamphlets one can note further that the previous thematic was retaken, i.e. the denouncement of the system and its practices, nonetheless in regard to the alternative proposals, and the objectives to achieve, there was no hesitation – we wanted the total independence of Angola. In the list of documents that were published and distributed both in the country and abroad, we can equally highlight the call of MINA, dated 3rd March 1960, signed by its leading members, such as: Adriano João Sebastião, M’benza Silas, David, Quinjine, Cândido Costa, José Bernardo Domingos, Joaquim Bernardo, Nkiakulala de Sousa e Santos, Apolinário de Carvalho, Manuel Pedro Pacavira, Coelho da Cruz, Adolfo João Pedro, Aristides P. Van-dúnem, Rodolfo da R. Bernardo, Simeão A, Manuel, Jaime M. Carn da Costa, Francisco A. C. Mendes, Joaquim Cristiano, Herbert Inglês, José D. Kimbundu, Viking Meskita, Uelela Bartolomeu, João Fuchi Cardoso. This appeal was addressed to the Afro-Asian Committee, signed by the leading members of the organization, where the political and social condition of the Angolans are reviewed,

with special emphasis on the question of land expropriation, the precarious working conditions of the Angolans, forced labour, the absence of freedom of the Press, freedom of association, inter alia. In this document the attention of the leaders of the recently independent countries, with particular attention to the problems faced by the fighting Angolan people, addressing in this way the request for support to the political forces in Angola, so that the independence of Angola be achieved within a short period of time.

*“(...) Messrs. DR. N’KRUMAH and SEKOU\_TOURÉ, specially for you;*

*Be advised directly that, in Angola, we are already awoken from the colonialism sleep. We already rejected the Assimilation policy, we are already doing some activities in various areas of Angola, waking up our people”(...)The entire Angola has raised a call, asking for help from our African brothers, who are already free, to expel the Portuguese’.”<sup>79</sup>*

*The leaders of the Movement for the National Independence of Angola are gradually overcoming the barriers, without ever losing sight of the logo for national independence. We see that the message gradually radicalizes regarding the methods to be used in the struggle for the liberation of the country. The patriots are being bolder in their messages because in it is implicit the rise to use force in order to achieve its objectives.*

*On seeing an increase in the tone of the political discourse of this period, where the problem of the political prisoners is the dominant note.*

*In some of the pamphlets reference is made to the Angolans that collaborate with the political police, by denouncing them by publishing their names, alerting the activists for the required surveillance.*

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(79) LARA, Lúcio, 1997, pp.272–276.

*Concerned with the fate of their comrades incarcerated in the prisons of Luanda, the underground groups express their total solidarity, giving them comfort from the messages included in the texts of the pamphlets and by gathering funds from their own members aimed at alleviating their suffering that is evident in various households.*

*To attend to the needs of the families of the political prisoners, funds were gathered during Xmas by Adriano Sebastião and amongst the members of the organization, funds that were forwarded for the intended objectives.*

### **2.1.6. Frente Popular De Libertação De Angola (Fpla), Movimento De Libertação Nacional (Mln) E Movimento De Libertação Nacional De Angola (Mlna) Peoples Front for the Libeartion of Angola (Fpla) National Liberation Movement (Mln) and National Liberation Movement of Angola (Mlna)**

The diversification of political organizations and associations committed in the struggle for the liberation of the country, as one can see, responded to a strategy drawn from 1956. The FPLA was one of the political organizations that emerged in Luanda at the end of the 1950s, which proposed to achieve the independence of Angola. News of this came forward via Guilherme Tonet, one of its main members, who tried to allure Manuel Pedro Pacavira for his organization, although he was already active in the MIA and declined the invitation therefore.

In the efforts to achieve unity of action at the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which in its expansion phase, approached de other groups to include them in its plan of struggle, the leader of the Peoples Front, when he later was approached by Manuel Pedro Pacavira, didn't make himself available to join.<sup>80</sup> The MLN, to whom Joaquim Pinto Andrade, Miguel de Oliveira Fernandes, Francisco Machado and António Marques Monteiro had joined,<sup>81</sup> was only a political expression responding to the violence of the incumbent regime, as a result of the imprisonment of Angolan patriots fighting for the liberation of Angiola.

This organization signed the pamphlets *AO MUNDO INTEIRO – ANGOLA É DOS ANGOLANOS; LUTEMOS PELA LIBERDADE; O GRITO DE GUERRA,* (TO THE WHOLE WORLD – ANGOLA BELONGS TO THE ANGOLANS; LET'S FIGHT FOR FREEDOM; ~~THECRYFORWAR~~;

Which, in addition to denounce the colonial system in all the aspects, called for the participation of the Angolans in defence of their country, by resorting to the force of arms. In the last pamphlet the following could be read: "It is necessary that all valid and responsible men in the Province be in a condition, if necessary, to take up arms and to use them!"<sup>82</sup> By the mid-1959 the MLNA emerged, showing that the intimidation and all the repression displayed by the authorities against the Angolan patriots do not push them back.

Ilídio Machado believed that Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade and Mário António de Oliveira Fernandes were involved in its origin. He was approached by both of them''(...) in order to comfort the members of the MLA detained by the police, through the publication of a pamphlet intended to comfort the prisoners

(80) AN/TT, Archives of the Pide, Auto de Perguntas de Manuel Pedro Pacavira, Proc. n°45/60-S.INV, fls . 593–593v.

(81) AN/TT, Archives of the Pide, Auto de Perguntas de Ilídio Machado, fls 89

(82) See MEDINA, Maria do Carmo, 2003, p.323

as he was in the merger of the National Liberation Movement with the Movement for the Liberation of Angola”<sup>83</sup> It is therefore understood that although the groups were being dismantled with the wave of arrests, they were, as much as possible, trying to show their vitality and innovative capacity to deal with more adverse conditions of the struggle, with the re-composition and formation of new groups and organizations, displaying a steel will to win and to liberate the country. At the Sociedade Cultural de Angola, the opposition members related with the Portuguese Communist Party tried at the time to introduce in the Angolan political scene a new Communist Party of Angola. With news that this new party was being supported and guided by the Portuguese Communist Party, this didn’t go down well with the Angolans that were contacted, such as António Dias Cardoso and Adolfo Maria Rodrigues, who contemplated their intervention solely to a truly Angolan party, without the intervention of the Portuguese Communist Party<sup>84</sup>

The mobilization for the formation of this new CPA”was developed by José Luciano Corte Real Vieira de Meireles,<sup>85</sup> and by Alexandre Calazans Duarte, engineer. The first one recruited young Adolfo Rodrigues Maria, Hélder Neto and José Vieira Mateus da Graça, for the distributuim of political propaganda of the MLNA, such as “LUTEMOS PELA LIBERDADE; GRITO DE GUERRA”“AMEAÇA PSICOLÓGICA”“NENHUM PRESO POLÍTICO DEVE SAIR DE ANGOLA” (LET’S FIGHTFOR FREEDOM; CALL FOR WAR; PSYCHOLOGICAL THREAT; NO POLITICAL PRISONER SHOULD LEAVE ANGOLA) and requested them to do a survey about the conditions of the Angolan Youth within the scope of the Communist Party of Angola in formation<sup>86</sup>

## 2.2. *Movimento Popular De Libertação De Angola (Mpla)* Peoples

Movement for the Liberation of Angola

From the attempts in clubs and recreational associations the patriots moved underground with the formation of political organizations, in the real sense, without ignoring the context of tight surveillance of the police organizations of the colonial regime, Angolans tried various models of political organization. During the 40s the patriots prepared the political ground, by fertilizing it cautiously so that in due time they would germinate their fruits. Within the associations mentioned above, ideas were being thrown which gradually gain coherence and the power necessary to mobilize wills for the struggle towards independence. In the 50s one could see regular exchange of information between the patriots engaged in the political struggle, which from the country they contacted their cohorts

(83) AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Auto de Perguntas de Ilídio Machado, Proc. n°58/59, fls. 89v–90.

(84) AN/TT, Archives of Pide, Auto de Perguntas de Ilídio Machado, Proc. n° 58/59, fls. 96–97. See also AN/TT, Archives of Pide, Auto de Perguntas de José Luciano C.R.V. Meireles, Proc. 58/59, fls. 13v. “(...) if the ” communist party” to be formed is to depend on the “portuguese communist party”,” he, ( Cardoso), would not be interested to join the “organization”, but rather a local communist party, which had nothing to do with the portuguese communist party)”

(85) AN/TT, Archives of Pide, Auto de Perguntas de José Luciano C. R. V. Meireles, fls 15v. Meireles dizia: “(...) a meeting took place on the twenty-fith of the same month at eng. Calanzas’ home, as previously referred, where the tasks would be decided and allocated to to each one, including the formation of the PCA, which responsibilities had already been discussed in the first meeting held at the road Luanda-Ambrizete, at dr. Julieta Gandar’s home.”

(86) AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Auto de Perguntas de Adolfo Rodrigues Maria, Proc. n° 58/59, fls. 92

abroad. The recourse to Europe in order to pursue the studies of the Africans originated from the so-called overseas provinces was the primary reason for their concentration in European capitals. In the case of Angola, one would refer in particular the correspondence between Luanda – Paris and São Paulo in Brazil.

Contemporary sources made available to us revealed the existing links and the knowledge that existed on the position taken by their illustrious intellectuals, as can be detected in such correspondence. They demonstrate, at the outset, that there was no cut between these intellectuals that provisionally left the country and the main bases of the political struggle, who on the ground manifested in the first instance, only at the cultural associations, nonetheless their political vision and their convictions, showed the way forward and a sound ground for practical action in various organizations or smaller political groups. In this context, one has to highlight the name of António Agostinho Neto,<sup>87</sup> distinguished student and member of the *MUD-Juvenil* (Movement for the Youth Democratic Union), arrested on the 23rd March, 1952, in Lisbon, when he was obtaining signatures for the Peace Pact between the five Big Powers (China, USA, France, UK and the USSR) having been released 3 months later. At the time of this imprisonment, Agostinho Neto had already stated himself as the champion of the just causes in his country, in a struggle path which was followed by his own cohorts, at meeting of the National African League, where he excelled. These also confirm his status gathered in the country about the content of his works in the *Standard*, at *Farolim* and in *Estudante*, publications that gave Angolans the space for expanding their ideas, expectations and aspirations.

Following the debates that proliferated in Luanda, they proceeded in the correspondence forwarded to him,<sup>88</sup> by showing the proposals and new forms of the struggle. One would say that the work proceeded at a distance and within limits not reached by the Police, thus enhancing the innovative capacity of the politicians who did not give up on the fight. This exchange of opinions, and especially of ideas about the difficult moments the country was living, between the patriots living abroad and those living in the country, moving through the literature and politics, in order to seek a solution of the colonial situation, would nourish and enhance its stakeholders. **João Vieira** Lopes reports how the students were organized underground and their liaison with the development of the MPLA.

(87) António Agostinho Neto, was born on the 17th September 1922, at Kaxicane. He studied medicine in Lisbon where, due to his political activities was arrested by the Portuguese political police early in his life. He led the reorganization of the MPLA in 1960, when he was arrested during that same year and was able to escape from prison and later joined his comrades in Leopoldville, where he was elected Chairman of the MPLA in 1962.

(88) See correspondence with Higino Aires, dated the 22nd September and of António Jacintom dated the 23rd December of the same year in LARA, Lúcio, *Um Amplo Movimento. 1997, pp.434 a 443.*

(...) In 1958, to my knowledge the first underground cells were formed just for politicians linked to the Casa dos Estudantes do Império (House of the Empire Students), although they wouldn't talk therein; that's how MAC (Anti-Colonial Movement) was formed, in 1958, where we would meet in very closed underground group cells, with 3 or 4 members at the most; MAC would have people to discuss the more burning political issues of the Movement, always with focus on Angolans, an year later 1959-60 At that time we started to have the presence of Angolans outside Portugal, Mário de Andrade had been a member; there was a Mozambican, Martins dos Santos, who formed part of the underground group, we at the time didn't make any distinction, and they were the ones who would practically agitate the nationalist movement abroad in 1959. A year later, Mário would come to us with indications, in 59-60 we went to a conference, I think it was of the Tunis League and there our nationalist friends told us: 'This thing about the movement ...now it's a Party, you have to form Parties, each country has to for them and then you can join the parties', so they then formed a Party Front of all of the colonies and said: 'you guys of the MAC, it has to be changed'. We in Lisbon received the news that we were going to integrate the Front.

Meanwhile, we got into the 60s, things happen so quickly: 159 to 1960. In the 60s came another one who told us: "' we now need the Party of Angola to come on its own'. And it was in the 60s we started to hear about the MPLA and obviously all those that were activists of the MAC, of the Front, then joined the MPLA, where the recruitment was stricter and the membership of the underground groups would not exceed three members, they were very strictly closed, but we were able to discuss, we passed messages until the 1960 moved to the 1961, and that is when the 4<sup>th</sup> February revolt happened, which made us to feel in panic, and we were already a lot of Angolan students in the underground groups of the MPLA, and had very few news, we would work on what we would receive, the sailors would bring us some more news, another student coming here on holidays would bring more less consistent things, this was all our own initiative, it was all the ideal of the MPLA already existing then. Then it was the 4th February that took place, and that's when we decided: "' we can't continue staying in Portugal', because Portugal had decreed a general military mobilization <sup>89</sup>

**BENIGNO VIEIRA LOPES“INGO”** refers that the *Casa dos Estudantes do Império* played a fundamental role:

(...) Excellent, when I arrived there was a fairlry large number of students, and I went to **Casa dos Estudantes do Império**, that to me was like a school, it was there that I started to have some idea, that is when I started to change from an emotional nationalism into a nationalism based on a better understanding, clarification, the Casa played a crucial role,<sup>90</sup> many students from there later became leaders, like President Neto, Amílcar Cabral, Eduardo dos Santos, I met President Neto there in Portugal, the first time I saw him was at the Casa dos Estudantes do Império, he had just been released from his second term in prison.

(89) See interview of João Vieira Lopes

(90) General **Benigno Vieira Lopes Ingo** – Born in Luanada, at the Ingombotas, at Rua do Carmo, he joined the MPLA at the age of 22. Was involved in the African League, which played an important contribution in the history of the struggle for independence. He went to Portugal to study, at the Casa dos Estudantes do Império, met President Neto, João Vieirra Lopes, Paulo Jorge, Marcelino dos Santod, among others.

*From 1958 to 1960, the Chairman at Casa do Império was Vieira Lopes, a medical doctor, great patriot, together with the First Secretary Paulo Jorge, as well as Marcelino dos Santos and I met them all there, I also met Amílcar Cabral, although they at the time were no longer part of the leadership, the Casa had experienced a revolt, a revolution in the transformation because until then the leadership was only formed by whites. It was the first time that the leadership had been given to a *brunho*, that's how they called us. For us a *mestiço* was a black person, I don't know how Vieira Lopes (...)*

The same procedure was followed with Mário Pinto de Andrade who left the country to pursue his university studies in Lisbon, and later in Paris, where he was receiving mail from his comrades-in-arms about the state of affairs. We resorted to letters from Angolan politicians sent across the world to places where they were forced to exile provisionally, our cause was propagated all over the world where there were Angolans and their friends, for those who would share the same will to fight colonialism. From Luanda to various parts of Europe and America, from Deolinda to Lúcio Lara, for Amílcar Cabral, we would say there was a long niche of mature and profitable conversations to the intellectuals, activist at all circumstances and stages of the political struggle.

*"(...) I always received mail from Angola, from Lisbon, with details to denounce the colonialism – I wrote other articles about the crisis on the Education, etc with details coming directly from Angola. There were emissaries all over, I even received requests for weapons, requests for pistols! I received plenty of correspondence (...)"<sup>91</sup>*

In the early 1950s, once the initial proposals had matured, a plan was set in motion which would drive the formation of political organizations, following the underground meetings which were being promoted and within strict secrecy. The family relationships, the professional relations and others, the meetings of the solidarity groups, the sports clubs, all enabled the proximity which had contributed to the sharing of common ideas, in the expression of revolt, and in the search of solutions for the overthrow of the existing regime. João Vieira Lopes, by his own experience, reports how he would fit as a student abroad and he had his first contact with Agostinho Neto.

*(...) The fact is that, with my anxiety to be involved in political affairs I was contacted by the Youth Movement's comrades, this still in Coimbra, 3 years after stayed there, so I then joined the Youth Movement, where many of our colleagues, and Angolan compatriots did not feel it was right, they told me: "You are going to get yourself into this movement of the *tugas* (nickname given to the Portuguese)", but this was where one could really discuss politics, real politics, at youth level, because the youth movement wasn't exactly communist but it was directly linked to the Communist Party and we knew it was the only place, there were many academic associations, but they were just to discuss academic issues.. If you didn't want to join you might as well forget that sentiment: "I have to return, I'm here but want to return", so the Youth Movement was the place!*

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(91) ANDRADE, Mário, Uma Entrevista a Michel Laban, 1997, p.116.

*When I arrived in Coimbra, Agostinho Neto was no longer there, he had already returned to Lisbon in 1952. In my first holidays in Coimbra, during the long period of holidays, I went to Lisbon, i.e. in 1953; while in Coimbra I received instructions: "You are going to Lisbon, and go to Humberto Machado's home, it's there where Agostinho Neto is, and the whole team", we were sailors, and I indeed landed, timid, they gave me the address, I went to Graça (a suburb of Lisbon) to Humbert Machado's home, they were already expecting me, they knew about me; interrogation backwards and forwards, and there I met Agostinho Neto for the first time, months later he was once again arrested, he already had been arrested twice; I stayed there for 15 days, I met the sailors that were linked with us; Zito Van-Dúnem, Marião Van-Dúnem (...) They were practically the leaders of the Maritime Movement and that's where the african maritime club was also formed, at Humberto Machado's home (...)<sup>92</sup>*

The first signs on the blossoming of a mobilizing awareness which gradually begun to be built taking young Angolans into the underground struggle, were revealed by the impact caused by their action. The ingredients for the emerging revolt were fulfilled, as well as the preparation of political acts that enabled Angolans to lay their claims. The theoretic influences arising from a political literature that was getting into the hands of the Angolans, was making them to become the supporters of ideologies that contributed to their awareness and assumption of positions that will favour the search for the freedom and independence of their country. It was, in this way, that the first manifestations and tendencies aimed at the formation of political organizations aiming at mobilizing Angolans for independence took place.

The correspondence maintained with Brazil, France and Portugal, such as newspapers and other political materials, served to enhance the theoretical arsenal in the debates maintained with the patriots engaged in the liberation cause.

Of note in this process is the correspondence maintained with Miguel Salim, director of the magazine *Revista Sul*, by a group of Angolan patriots who, during the 1952-55 period, during their demonstrations in the cultural associations, such as the National African League, Anangola and Cultural Society of Angola, in preparing for the following stage.<sup>93</sup> The Angolan patriots, Antonio Jacinto, Viriato da Cruz, José Graça (Luandino Vieira), Mário Guerra, among others, under their veil as writers, maintained with Brazilian editors a fruitful exchange of texts (poetry and essays), who at their request were published in the said magazine.

Miguel Salim, in turn, sent to the country, works of Brazilian writers, or other authors of other parts of the world, mostly of political literature. Under this exchange it is of note to highlight the need for the political literature. Viriato da Cruz, in September 1953 supported by the monetary means required to face the expense of acquiring books, said:

(92) See interview of Joao Vieira Lopes

(93) See SALIM, Miguel, *Cartas D'África e alguma Poesia*, Topbooks, Rio de Janeiro, 2005.

*(...) for you my friend to do me a favour of buying at Agência Farroupilha, the following books in order of interest that I have on them: Dialéctica de la Naturaleza, de Engels (Dialectics of Nature- Engels); O marxismo e o problema nacional e colonial, de Stálin ( Marxism and the national and colonialism problem – Stalin); El método dialéctico marxista, de Rosental (Iudin) (The Marxist Dialectics Method, from Rosenthal); Dicionário Filosófico marxista (Marxist Philosophical Dictionary), idem, Sobre Fundamentos de leninismo, de Stálin (on the Leninism Foundations, from Stalin); Lenin e o Leninismo, (Lenin and Leninism) idem; Sobre o problema da China (On the problem of China), idem; Marxismo e Liberalismo, (Marxism and Liberalism) idem; Lenin, Stalin e a Paz (Lenin, Stalin and Peace); idem, and Luta contra o trotskismo (The Struggle Against Trotskyism)", his cohort, António Jacinto, appealed, in September, 1955 to his friend editor "(...I am once again requesting your good services."94*

This material did indeed reach Luanda to enrich the roaming libraries of the patriots that were tasked to propagate the more important works throughout the political circles. The group of intellectuals that had started their political struggle, in the first instance, acting within the legality, with the cultural associations which they themselves had contributed for their formation, had driven towards the necessary development of their activity, having pursued step by step the paths enabling them to propose alternative solutions for the serious problems faced by the majority of the Angolans. The discussions that took place in the cultural associations, aimed at reviewing the real situation of Angola, as a colony, had prepared them for new challenges, and in such a way that they sought new and more active and pragmatic forms of struggle, as confirmed by the emergence of the different political organizations.

Gabriel Leitão<sup>95</sup> (...) We had contacts with foreigners, a Cuban who was living in the USA, *Francisco Xavier Hernandez, was our contact. He was bringing pamphlets and other things too. The PIDE caught him, when we were already detained at Casa de Reclusão. We saw that the MPLA could need our photos and biographies, so we gave everything to Hernandez, who took them to the MPLA. He was a black Cuban, and member of a ship's crew, of the American merchant navy. He was the one who took our photos and biographies to the MPLA, who was able to make a brochure called 'O Processo dos 50' (The Case of the 50)*

*This brochure was published in various languages, such as in Portuguese, French, and English because, when at the UN the problem of Angola was discussed, the Portuguese Ambassador said that there were no political prisoners here, there were only common prisoners. So, the MPLA published this brochure and circulated amongst the ambassadors accredited at the UN except, obviously, the Portuguese ambassador. So, when at the UN meeting the question of Angola was again discussed, when the Portuguese ambassador once again tried to state that there weren't political prisoners*

(94) Idem, pp.27 e 42-43.

(95) Gabriel Leitão former political prisoner, was born in Luanda in 1928. He completed his standard 6 at the Salvador Correia High School and in 1944 he started to work at Casa Americana, as an accountant. In the late 1950s he was earning 15 contos and another 50 contos doing the bookkeeping of other companies. He was a friend of Viriato da Cruz. Accused of having links with the MPLA, he was one of the 50 accused. He was sentenced by the Military Court to 6 years in prison and sent to the Tarafal concentration camp. In total he spent 8 years in jail.

*Before his death, his employer at Casa Americana offered shares to 5 of its employees. He was one of the contemplated, being the only shareholder living in Angola.*

*in Angola, the other ambassadors started to read our biographies, and asking if these were thieves or murderers. It was from there that the Angolan question started to be discussed at the UN.*

### 2.3. The UPNA-UPA and FNLA

During the 1950s, the anti-colonial movement intensified and the political effervescence started to get hold of the Angolan nationalists. Thus., *“in 1954 the UPNA (União das Populações do Norte de Angola) (Union of the Populations of the North of Angola) was founded in the port village of Matadi in the Belgian Congo (now DRC), who would have Manual Sidney Barros Nekaka, as President, João Eduardo Pinocks, as General Advisor, and Borralho Lulendo, as Inspector-General and Treasurer”* (1).

*“One of the major objectives of the UPNA was to restore the Kingdom of Kongo. This would require, inter alia, the change of King D. António III Gama, crowned on the 16th August, 1955 at the premises of the Catholic mission... which caused the wrath of the people who didn't want him as king. The truce between the people's aspirations and the Portuguese desires was short-lived, and aggravated by the lack of response to the letters sent by the nationalists to the authorities in Luanda, Lisbon and the Vatican. Eduardo Pinock, Borralho Lulendo and Manuel Kidito decided to unseat the King”* (2).

*“The Portuguese, who were alerted for such possibility made numerous arrangements by deploying a military contingent aimed at avoiding the Angolan intention who were coming from Matadi at the then Belgian Congo. However, the mastery of Eduardo Pinock completely confused the Portuguese authorities. He led a people's parade of about a dozen of trucks, while agitating Portuguese flags and singing the Portuguese national anthem, accompanied by several choirs. The Portuguese were astonished, without any reason to impede such parade, while the population was participating and celebrating in the parade until they reached S. Salvador”* (3).

*Weakened, the Portuguese appeared to agree, given the fragility of their military apparatus but, soon after, in retaliation they arrested various local leaders, such as Ambrósio Luyanzi, Rosa Ginga and Manuel Kiditu, who would be released in 1956; Eduardo Pinock, who never trusted the goodwill of the Portuguese, managed to avoid imprisonment, fleeing to Matadi in the Belgian Congo, unlike the younger leaders, such as Libório Nefwane and Figueiredo Lello, who were deported to the South of Angola”* (4).

*Thus“the origins of the UPNA, later UPA, date back to the rivalries between Catholics and Protestants, emigrants in Leopoldville, for reasons of the election of the new King of Kongo in 1955. The Protestant majority wanted a King of their own creed, while the others wanted an emigrated Catholic. So they chose Holden Roberto, niece of Barros Nekaka, who had been the candidate put forward by them in the 1955 election...However, a catholic was appointed, D. António III, and resident in Sao Salvador....and who died afterwrads in 1957. The Catholics, being more moderate, wanted a King of theirs and wanted to cooperate with the Portuguese while the Protestants, more radical, wanted a learned, liberal king, with more democratic ideas and were more adverse*

*towards any rapprochement with the Portuguese. The former founded a Mutual Aid Association who, in 1960, was changed into Partido Politico Ngwizako (Political Party Ngwizako)...” (5)*

Under the influence of Franz Fanon, in Accra, **Holden Roberto** recalls the following: “*When fanon knew that I belonged to the UPNA, he criticized the regional character of the designation and asked me to withdraw the name UPNA and to change it to UPA (Union of the Peoples of Angola), like in the case of the Union of the Cameroonian Peoples, giving the acronyms a national character. I wrote to Congo to report on the discussions with Fanon, influencing the UPNA leadership to change, which occurred before the works of the Conference*”<sup>96</sup>

So, the UPNA would then be called UPA where Holden Roberto played a very important role. He was, soon after, made the leader of UPA” (6).

On the 28th November, 1958, in the city of Leopoldville the UPA was founded in succession of the UPNA.

All of the work of information and mobilization on behalf of the UPNA in Luanda was initiated by Manuel Barros Sidney Nekaka during his stay in Luanda in 1954, under the pretext of a renewal of his identity document. His work was continued by Manuel da Costa Limpilolo (Kimpiló), who was a member of the Methodist Church in Luanda.

Other leading drivers on the creation of the UPA were Manuel Barros Sidney Nekaka, John Eduardo Pinock, André do Rosário Neto, Francisco Borrvalho Lulendo, José António Vasco, Francisco Paka Nenganga, Frederico Deves, Garcia Albertino Luvukumuka, Francisco Tove, Pedro Vida Garcia, Pedro Sadi, António Gonçalves Menino; Manuel Bernardo Massobele, Garcia Diasiwa Roberto, Rocha Nefwani, Luís da Costa, António Narciso Carson Nekaka, Mendes Mangwala, Cónego Manuel Joaquim Mendes das Neves, João César Correia; Castro Tadeu, Adão José Kapilango, Jorge Alicerces Valentim, José João Liyahuca, Fernando Pio do Amaral Gourgel, Mário Arsénio, Luísa Domingos Gaspar Gourgel, João Baptista Traves Pereira, Francisco Pianga, Alexandre Claver Taty, Sebastião Lezi Roberto, Manuel da Costa Kimpilolo, Liliana Miguel, Dona Belina de Água Rosada, Pedro Visão, Luís Alfredo Inglês, João Silveira and many others.

Contrary to the UPNA who displayed some form of a regionalist character, harbouring in its midst only members originated from the Northern Districts, such as Zaire, Uíge, Kwanza North and Malange, *according to Holden Roberto,*

*(...) UPA was formed a more national organization involving members from various districts, such as the case of canon Manuel das Neves (when it was discovered, he was arrested and died), Mr. Aníbal de Melo, father of journalist João Melo, Mr. Rogério Neto who was from Malange, Kapilango, deceased, was from Lobito, because the first UPA underground group was formed in Lobito, in 1958. So, it was not a regional organization. It had a national character.” (8)*

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(96) cf. Memórias p.75

*In fact 'all Angolans that fled from forced labour, from the Portuguese colonialism that existed in Zaire, had supported that and took people from various Districts of Angola'' (9).*

Therefore, if the UPNA's intention was aimed at reconstructing the centuries old kingdom of Kongo "the UPA had other intentions, and another objective – To liberate the country, to liberate Angola"). *'In any event, the UPNA was the was the predecessor of the UPA (Union of the Peoples of Angola)*<sup>97</sup>

### *The birth of FNLA*

Nonetheless, Holden Roberto, in his memoirs, says:

*The idea of creating one National Front for the Liberation of Angola, was originally from the MPLA, led by Mário Pinto de Andrade, as a result of his political design and from the demands for the African countries that sustained the creation of unified structures into one front, that would encompass the various policies of just one country, so as to avoid the dispersion of aid being rendered, and in order to maximize all efforts against colonialism. Thus, with the desertion of Marcos Kassanga and Marcos Kassinda we had decided to follow the anticipation and formed the FNLA and deliberating excluding the MPLA...on the 27th March 1962, the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola), in a merger of the UPA with the PDA (Angolan Democratic Party). (p.136 in Memórias). (see Annexures).*

### **2.3.1. The formation of the GRAE**

"While the formation of the FNLA was a product of the political context, the creation of the GRAE was a result of the new stage of the struggle, a restructure of the concept of the nationalism, a real will to assume the governance of our people"<sup>98</sup>

The GRAE (*Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio*) (Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile), was announced for the first time in a press conference at the "Carnegie Endowment International Centre" in New York by Holden Roberto, who announced that an Angolan Provisional Government would soon be formed. Its objective was to operate within the country, with the promise of some African and Asian governments for immediate diplomatic recognition, when it would occur. He also defended the existence of a "War Council" formed by political leaders and by the military command in each region"<sup>99</sup>.

The GRAE was a government formed to encourage the struggle, in the first place, while at the same time was to gather funds to assist the people in its struggle for liberation. This Government was recognized by 32 African countries, but after an enquiry that was made in Kinshasa – because when the GRAE was formed, the OAU had sent a political and military committee to assess the nationalist forces between FNLA, MPLA and others – they found that the MPLA did not practically exist on the ground.

(97) cf. Holden Roberto, in Memórias p.75

(98) Idem, p.136.

(99) Idem.

So they then asked the MPLA to join the FNLA. This was in 1963. The MPLA refused and left Kinshasa.

On November, 1963, the OAU officially recognized the FNLA-GRAE, as the representative movement of Angola. In his capacity as the head of the recognized Angolan Government it sent two GRAE emissaries to the Vatican, the two brothers Rosário Neto, Minister of Information, and Manuel André Miranda, to request the intervention of Pope John XXIII in the release of canon Manuel das Neves and of other cleric nationalists detained by the Portuguese colonialists.

The second time was in 1972 when we tried to form what was called the Supreme Council of the Angolan Revolution, under the sponsorship of four countries: Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania and Congo-Brazzaville, which had equally failed.

The appearance of Jonas Savimbi was recommended by an American journalist who had been in Huambo and met him there...but too late, Savimbi had left Angola to Portugal. And this journalist said: "Look, I know a guy from the South, who is an intelligent person, who said that he is willing to collaborate with you". Well, he said: okay, I would like to see him. "He is in Switzerland at the moment". So I went to Switzerland and met Savimbi. He said he was very happy to meet me and we started to talk. I said: "I received a message to contact you". But he didn't want join the UPA, at that time, because he was a member of the MPLA.. "He was in touch with Mário Pinto de Andrade, Lúcio Lara and others". He was imposing that to me at that time. This was in April 1961, right at the onset of the war.

Three months later, I received a telegram from Savimbi to say that was supporting me, that he wanted to work with me. In 1964, to my surprise, Savimbi left and returned to the MPLA....because, according to him, the struggle was not moving forward and he wanted to step up the fight. In the MPLA, he wanted to be the Vice-Chairman, but Neto refused it. He left to form UNITA to step up the liberation of Angola. Unfortunately, when we went to Alvor" he was under the auspices of the FNLA" – it was through the Alvor Agreements that UNITA appeared. Even Neto himself didn't want the presence of Savimbi. To him Savimbi was linked with the Portuguese. But I, wanting peace for Angola, in seeking consensus, stability, said: "it is better for us to include Savimbi in order to solve the problem of the Angolan context, let's not set him apart because he may, later, create problems for us".

The invitation that was made to me by the UN to speak to the 4th Committee of the XVII Section of the UN was a golden opportunity, no longer as the head of a party, but rather as the head of a Provisional Government, having not only a functional and organizational structure, but above all, a liberation army. In this way, the claims of the Angolans in the international arena were gaining a political and diplomatic form enhanced by the pressure for the armed struggle. <sup>100</sup>

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(100) cf p.142 Memórias

## 2.4. The Colonial Repression

### Persecution of Nationalists

With the movements being monitored, being cheap labour, paying taxes, victim of the discretion of the colonial authorities, subjected to summary trials and to discriminatory and humiliating treatment in the colonial society the Africans were destined to a violent day-to-day.

«We were all fictitiously Portuguese. But there were indigenous and non-indigenous. And the indigenous was a black person, curled hair, whose id was a pass or indigenous booklet with 32 pages»<sup>101</sup>

The colonial authorities were receiving huge amounts of money for each African worker sent for forced labour to work for the agricultural, fishing or mining companies, away from his family, lodged in inappropriate accommodation, malnourished and earning a meagre salary, subject to inhuman conditions and producing enormous wealth not shared with him. To this effect, Henrique Galvão, then a deputy to the Portuguese National Assembly, submitted in 1947, to the Committee of the Colonies the ‘report on the Problems of the Natives in the Portuguese Colonies’ in which he stated:

«In a certain point of view, the situation is more serious than that created by pure slavery. During the latter, the bought negro, acquired like an animal, was a commodity where his master would have an interest in maintaining him healthy and efficient, like he would want for his horse or ox. Currently, the negro is not bought, he is simply hired to the State, albeit carrying a label of a free man. The employer is least interested that he falls sick or if he dies, as he is to work for as long as he exists – because when he becomes disabled or he dies, he will claim for another one. There are employers that have 35% dead within their labour force during the period of forced contract and there is no sign that someone has been deprived of more supplies, whenever needed »<sup>102</sup>.

The Africans, in the occupied territories, i.e. Angola and Mozambique, were liable to pay capitation tax, which was aimed at forcing them to work for the colonists. Up to the early 1960s, this tax would correspond to the work paid by the minimum salary, for a period of two and a half months. Already by the end of the 1960s, the land planning for the populational settlement, under the designation of strategic villages, groups, community planning, fortified villages, ‘*sanzalas da paz*’ (peace settlements), had resulted in a spectacular worsening of the living conditions of the Africans. In Angola, more than a million of people were displaced, pursuant to such policies, which resulted in the dismantling of the traditional agriculture, the occupation of land by the coffee producers and producers of other products with colonial economic interest and formation of labour pockets at the disposal of the colonial companies.<sup>103</sup> In the cities, the African person did not have access to the restaurants, cafés and cinemas attended by the whites; he was only allowed to walk in public sidewalks, provided no whites were waking thereat; in public transport, he would be forced to take the back seats; in government offices, he had to stand infinitely in queues in counters separate from those for whites; at night he could only move under a special permit; he could not perform any activity for lucrative purposes in the cities.

(101) Quoted in MATEUS Dalila Cabrita, A PIDE/DGS na Guerra Colonial 1961–1974 Interviews, Moçambicano Amaral Matos p.45

(102) Archives of the PIDE, Document on the V Congresso sobre o Problema Colonial, *Diário das Sessões*, n°74,17,oi.1947

(103) Mário Moutinho, o indígena no Pensamento Colonial Português, p.104.

«- We wanted to go to the movies but we were not allowed. Any gesture of ours was deemed to be rude<sup>104</sup>. We were to stand head down. Because if I dared look to look with curiosity I could go to prison. And in the buses, we had to sit in the back seats. These seats were reserved for Blacks.<sup>105</sup>

In Lobito, there was a bus route for Whites and another for Blacks<sup>106</sup>. In passenger trains of the CFB (Benguela Railways) no African, even if he had money, as allowed to visit the restaurant carriage or to travel in first class.<sup>107</sup>

«No one born in Angola [Black or White] could be an Army officer or to ascend into higher positions in the public administration. Unwritten laws albeit real, would build the invisible barrier to mark the exclusion»<sup>108</sup>.

«the negro would have standard 4 but it was the white man who would be the head despite holding only standard 2 and being illiterate in Portuguese. And the one with standard 2 would earn 4 000\$00, while the negro with standard 4 would earn 300\$00” - highlights Muheti Mbazima<sup>109</sup>. *The colonists had many difficulties in admitting that a negro or a mestiço could earn the same as a white person.*

The Deputy Director of the PIDE, São José Lopes, could not understand how an African, who was in fact earning a good salary, could engage in politics. Angolan Gabriel Leitão said:

«When I was arrested [1959] I was earning 15 000\$00 (fifteen contos) and had a bonus of 150 000\$00. One day, during interrogation, the PIDE Director, São José Lopes, said to his agents:

- This dog earns 15 contos per month and 150 contos bonus annually, and he gets into a thing like this to give us headaches. There are whites that do not earn what you are earning. I replied to him: - There are whites that did not earn what I earn because they don't have my qualifications. I have the sixth year high-school grade, I can speak and write Portuguese, French fluently, I can speak reasonably English and I am an accountant. But I don't earn 15 contos. You don't earn 15 contos? Do you think we don't know how much you are earning? You earn 15 contos per month, yes you do. - No, I don't, sir, I don't earn 15 contos monthly. I earn 30 contos. At Casa Americana I earn 15 contos.

(104) Archives of PIDE, PCP, Documentos do V congresso «Sobre o Problema Colonial», Diário das Sessões, nº74, 17.01.1947 (pedido de convocação da Comissão das Colónias), Pedro Ramos de Almeida, História do Colonialismo Português em África (Cronologia Século XX), vol. III, pp.268/274. João Morais e Luís Violante, Contribuição para uma Cronologia dos Factos Económicos e Sociais (Portugal 1926- 1985), pp.124/146

(105) Interviews, Amaral Matos, p.46.

(106) Interviews, João Pau Branco, antigo chefe da brigada of PIDE p.274)

(107) Sousa, André Franco de, Angola..., p.129.

(108) Carvalho, Américo de, Angola, anos de esperança, p.25.

(109) Interviews, Muhet Mbazima, p.449.

But I do the books of Eugénio dos Santos, of Dr. Santos and of Castro Freire. And any of these companies pays me 5 contos per month. The Pide agents started to laugh and São José Lopes was furious.<sup>110</sup>

The Africans were frantically exploited by the harmful commercial practices of the *cantineiros* (traders). In the *musseques* of Luanda, for example, sugar was sold in spoons and sewing threads by the metre. Which would translate into profit margins of about 300 to 400 per cent. There are cases known of large numbers of Africans arrested for a demonstration in support to a ruling person. The then deputy (member of parliament) Henrique Galvão said at the National Assembly:

«I was one of many who saw last year in Luanda a demonstration conducted at the airfield, on the occasion of the return of the Governor-General from the South of the colony, for which splendour hundreds if not thousands of natives of the *musseques* had been arrested and enlisted for».

Dr. Almeida Santos, who today is the speaker of the Portuguese National Assembly, recalls that, in 1949, having seen in Mozambique, Africans working steel balls shackled to their ankles and steel wires around their necks being sent to the South African mines. And he mentioned that anyone killing an African in a car accident would pay a fine of 2.5 contos (2500\$00), later increased to 5 contos.

Ana Inglês, daughter of a pastor, stated that the leaders of the Methodist Church had been tortured and burned, and their remains thrown to the River Donge. She says that her father was dismembered while still alive and that, before they pulled his eyes, forced him to read Bible verses. And adds that her husband was killed like her father, for being a teacher in the missions before he was a nurse. As for her, she was arrested and thrown into a two square metre prison cell with her children. At night, the warden would come with buckets with urine and thrown them into the floor to prevent them to sleep on the floor. They didn't have a dry place. And they didn't feed them. The children started to cough. After three days soldiers would come:

«- I was raped there by many soldiers. I left that place with problems in the uterus. And I was raped in front of my own children. At night they would give torches to my daughters so that they could see what they were doing»<sup>111</sup>

She was then taken to hospital. There they could see those coming from the bush under arrest opening ditches where, in the following day, they would be buried. They would sleep in jail and in the following morning the vehicles would drive by the hospital, full, and towards the cemetery, where they would be executed. Some would survive, either because the bullets didn't reach them, or because the shots were nicked. They would then leave the ditch and, although injured, they would run away. It was through these survivors that she came across to know of the death of her father and husband.<sup>112</sup> Luzia Inglês, in turn, states that, after they had killed men and boys, they started to kill children and later even babies.

(110) Interviews, Gabriel Leitão, p.116.

(111) Interview with Ana Inglês

(112) Idem

«- If they came across a woman giving birth, they would first wait to see if it was a boy or a girl. If it was a boy, they would kill him there immediately. This is what happened in there.<sup>113</sup>

Also, in 1973 Dutch missionaries denounced the massacre of 135 African civilians, in Quibaxe, Angola<sup>114</sup>. In December 1973, the General Assembly of the UN, created a Commission of Enquiry to study the massacres and violations of human rights in Africa. The Commission confirmed an extensive and frightening list of war crimes, a common, frequent and generalized practice of actions, translating a 'policy of genocide on the part of the Portuguese government »<sup>115</sup> The terror, brutality associated to the Colonial War was the perfect soup of culture to generate a very violent police repression of masses. Apart from that, the political prisoners themselves recognized that, after the 4th February and the 15th March, the police terror had propagated across the country, starting with arbitrary arrests, enhanced cruelty of torture and increased number of murdered people.<sup>116</sup> Agent Trindade, in turn, told Fathers Valverde and Hernandez :

«Terrorism has to be fought with terrorism (...) In a guerrilla war there is no Justice. A man killed in time can save many lives»<sup>117</sup>.

The legitimacy of torture was equally invoked elsewhere. In his first memoirs of Algeria, general Jacques Massu defended torture with the argument that the particular circumstances would justify it and that it was warranted by military needs. Torture would be aimed, therefore, to avoid new terrorist attacks and to save lives<sup>118</sup>. This same argument would have been repeated recently by general Aussaresses, who would state that

«Torture would be legitimate in the cases imposed by the urgency, in that an information obtained timeously could save dozens of human lives »<sup>119</sup>

However, even in the case of Algeria, this argument holds no water because, as general Massu would himself admit, torture was here a systematic approach. And the argument was less relevant in the case of the Portuguese colonies, especially in regard to the prisoners in the cities, because life there was happening in perfect tranquillity without any bomb attacks that could cause numerous victims, although the Police had said that these were expected. The myth it sustained and tried to justify ideologically about the police terror, torture and crime was that repression was a sacred duty, an essential contribution for the sacred war in defence of homeland security, from Míinho to Timor. And, in that perspective the PIDE/DGS agents would be the best of the crusaders.

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(113) Idem

(114) *Guerra*, João Paulo, Savimbi, Vida e Morte, p.285.

(115) Ribeiro, José, *Marcas da Guerra Colonial*, p.131.

(116) Entrevista, Agostinho Mendes de Carvalho, p.15, e outros.

(117) Archives of PIDE, Processo SC CI (2) GU, Pastas de Moçambique, caixa 25, fls. 586/608, e Adrien Hastings, Wiri Yamu, p.28. Cópia existente no CDIH/CC/MPLA

(118) Edward Peters, *História da Tortura*, p.201.

(119) General Aussaresses, *Services Speciaux (Algérie: 1955-1957)*, p.31.

Given that, in the mind of the Africans, the imprisonment represents an increased violence, it is time for us to speak about some of the prisons and concentration camps existing in the Portuguese colonies.

#### 24.1. The Tarrafal Camp, in Cape Verde

The Tarrafal Camp, in Cape Verde played an important part in the repressive policy strategy of the colonial regime, as a place of permanent detention of *dangerous political* prisoners of the colonies, punished with administrative measures of residence in Concentration Camps, coming from Missombo, São Nicolau<sup>120</sup>, and from Luanda. In this respect **Carlos Alberto Van-Dúnem** said

*(...) We were then sent to the 7th Police Station. And then only later we went to Casa de Reclusão Militar, awaiting trial. At that time. We were referred to the Court, at a civil course stage, but then referred to a military court, where we were tried and convicted. The sentences weren't long. The only thing was that we were condemned with security measures extended three to six years. I got 3 or 4 years, but then I also got those extended measures. I was arrested in 1959 and was only released in 1965. Six years in jail. In 1961, after the 4th February, we were all sent to Tarrafal.*

According to António Dias Cardoso (...) In Tarrafal there were mostly Angolans and Guineans. There were also 3 Cape Verdeans. The majority were Blacks. There was a *mulato* amongst the Cape Verdeans, a number of Muslims and 2 or 3 Catholics. Amongst the Angolans there were 3 Whites, myself and Luandino Vieira and António Jacinto. And various *mulatos*. Amongst them, Ilídio Machado.

*In June or July, 1964 I arrived at Tarrafal, together with António Jacinto and Luandino Vieira. And also found there those who could not escape from the 50 Trial. There were about 60 Angolans. And Guineans, from 200 to 300, many of whom died of scurvy. Imagine! To die of scurvy in the 20th century!*<sup>121</sup>

*The food of the prisoners was paid for by the budget allocated to the Governor-Generals of the colony. The Government-General of Angola had contributed with 20\$00 for each prisoner. Whereas the Government-General of Guinea contributed with 5\$00<sup>122</sup>. Now, with 20\$00 one could get 2 breads (very good bread, by the way, probably from North-American donations for the hunger in Cape Verde), water the colour of coffee (which I think would be of toasted maize, with possibly a bit of coffee), a dish at lunch and another for dinner. The Guineans were only entitled to a quarter of that. They didn't even have bread and were only getting one dish a day. The food was unpalatable but even so better than at the São Paulo Jail of Luanda. António Jacinto almost died in São Paulo. He had a tremendous sensitivity (...). Indeed, they would take the rice and would throw it into an enormous pot, without being washed. The legs and wings of the cockroaches,*

(120) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Campo de Trabalho de Chão Bom, Presos Políticos naturais de Angola sujeitos a medidas de segurança (1965-1972), pp.82 SS.

(121) VSee interview with Carlos A. Van-Dunen

(122) In 1965, the costs of food of the Guinean prisoners was budgeted as 200 contos. By dividing this into 100 e for the 365 days of the year, it would be around 5\$48 per prison/day (IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Campo de Trabalho de Chão Bom, correspondência referente aos presos políticos da Guiné (1962-1965), fl. 4)

*Weevils, the strings of the sisal bags. All that floating around. I had fortunately an enormous resistance. Luandino could also not resist. But António Jacinto at about 12 o'clock, and as soon as he started to feel the smell, started to vomit terribly. It was horrible, he was dying. I could resist the smell. I am a non-suffering person, especially when I am hungry. I then invented a way of removing the crappy stuff. With the scoop I would move the scoop as fast as I could. Now, with the centrifugal movement the crappy stuff would be stuck to the walls of the pot. Then I would remove the scoop from the middle, practically without any dirt. Though also without the fat which we needed so much. When we arrive at the Camp, the Guineans were already there. With the scurvy, some of them would die alive. Their lips were falling. All that due to the lack of food, lack of vitamins. No one mentioned it, but it is true...(...)*

The Tarrafal Concentration Camp in Cape Verde was reopened after the February and March revolts in Angola, based on decree 43600 of the 14th February, 1961 and *Portaria* n° 43 600, of the 14<sup>th</sup> April 1961, and *Portaria* 18 539, of the 17<sup>th</sup> July, 1961. It was a prison establishment aimed at state security jail terms,<sup>123</sup> at *Chão Bom*, municipality of Tarrafal, at the extreme north boundary of the Island of Santiago, it had some 2 000 inhabitants with a very reduced number of public servants and a few traders. It was surrounded by a reasonably deep moat and by barbed wire. In the four corners there were sentry-posts. Inside, in alignment with the only entrance gate, there was the main street separating the prison buildings.

The camp was divided into three parts. The first two parts were for the political prisoners: two small wooden barracks and the other two brick barracks, covered by asbestos roofs, about one hundred metres long. They were built before 1945, by Portuguese political prisoners, and which had never been subjected to improvements. The part to be occupied by Angolan and Guinean political prisoners was located at the right at the entrance<sup>124</sup>, there was a cubicle for the medical post. There was a kitchen, a bathing area and a library, which also served as a chapel.

The camp staff consisted of a warden, chief of the guards and a head of the administrative services. The camp guard force was made of 5 Police guards from Luanda and 32 auxiliary Cape Verdean auxiliary guards. At night, the guard duties were provided by a commissioned military force. The aim of the camp was for "the complete serving of the sentences set by the competent authorities, and in compliance to the guidelines received and psycho-social action over the inmates". To such an effect, it was to use the main instruments' 'labour, discipline, education, religious teaching and patriotic education'.

(123) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Campo de trabalho de Chão Bom, Processo n°9, *Correspondência Diversa* (Setembro 1961 – Agosto 1972), «Telegrama cifrado 915, n° 51/9 secreto», fls. 55

(124) Museum of the Tarrafal Camp, *Elementos sobre o campo*, Chão Bom, Cabo Verde.

Inmates were to feel ‘‘the serenity of the punishment, taking always into account the respect for the order and authorities, the pleasure to work and love to the homeland’’<sup>125</sup>

In September, 1963, another group of Angolan political prisoners arrived at the camp. Nine arrived in 1965, from Missombo, as well as one prisoner from São Nicolau<sup>126</sup>. During the months of October and November 1969, 68 Angolans, detained in Luanda, were punished with compulsory residence in the Tarrafal Concentration Camp and of São Nicolau. In total there were 107 Angolans that spent their time in Tarrafal. Of this total, 40 per cent were aged between 30 and 40 years, 23 per cent between the forties and fifties, and 20 per cent, twenty and thirty, and even one older than seventy years old. As to professions, 29 per cent were labourers, twenty-one per cent clerical employees, fourteen per cent technical and senior cadres, with seven per cent students and four per cent catechists. As to the term of prison, 10 per cent were serving 7 years; fourteen per cent five years; 39 per cent four years and 18 per cent two years, with one inmate with a term of 10 years. As to the entity that sentenced the jail sentences, in 62 % of the cases the sentence was ordered by a Military Court, 25% by the Secretary-General of Angola. In 1968, of the 86 inmates in the camp, 41% were illiterate. 19% knew how to read and write and 12% had the 1st grade, while only 28% had the second degree or higher<sup>127</sup>. And, in 1971, the total number of prisoners was 67, of which 26 were condemned by a Military Court, while 41 were serving sentences of compulsory residence. Gabriel Leitão described the conditions of Angolans in the camp, as follows:

*(...) The Angolans were housed in a long collective cell. They had a bed, sheets and blankets. In a cubicle there was a high potty, for their sanitary needs. They would have their bath at the backyard*<sup>128</sup> The Angolan cell would have housed more than a hundred inmates. And Cape Verdeans. There was also a small cell where António Jacinto, António Cardoso and José Graça would stay. António Jacinto even wrote a poem:

«In the overshadowed  
shack with bars  
In Pavillion D  
Barrack 2  
Of the Angolan political prisoners  
Beyond the bars  
And barbed wire,  
From the pit  
And beyond the  
turret’’

(125) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Regulamento do Campo de Trabalho de Chão Bom, aprovado por despacho do Ministro do Utamar, de 18 de Dezembro de 1961, in «Orgânica Interna do Campo de Trabalho do Chão Bom (1961-1964), Processo nº 3, *Informações, Propostas e Relatórios*, 1ª Pasta, fl. 73.

(126) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Campo de Trabalho de Chão Bom, Presos Políticos naturais de Angola sujeitos a medidas de segurança (1965-1972), pp.82 SS.

(127) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, «Orgânica Interna do Campo de Trabalho do Chão Bom (1961-1964), Processo nº 3, *Informações, Propostas e Relatórios*, 1ª Pasta, fl. 7.

(128) *Annexure 1. Interviews Gabriel 1 Leitão*, p.212.

Para lá do torreão

Dos soldados, das guaritas, das sentinelas...»<sup>129</sup>

*Sometimes the inmates would do the cleaning of the premises, the picking and carrying of stones and the preparation of the land next to the garden. They would do the levelling of the land of the camp, sometimes they would carry the stones to the part occupied by the Cape Verdeans and then back to where they brought*<sup>130</sup>.

Mendes de Carvalho adds: (...) *We were 50 or more so. Later another group of Angolans, it was the Pacavira's group. And then another one. We must have been more or less 80. Of the Guineans, there were more than a hundred. And then they increased. We were tightly kept. Before the arrival of the Guineans, we used to have an hour strolling time. But after the arrival of the Guineans they divided us in shifts; some would leave in the morning, while the others would be in the afternoon. If the Angolans left in the morning the Guineans would do the afternoon shift.*

In the second half of the 60s, the Camp Warden proposed the Governor of Cape Verde the following salaries, subject to the legal deductions: 3\$00 for normal labourers, 5\$00 for the skilled. So, of the 5\$00 the prisoner would have received only 4\$50, \$50 being for the legal deduction<sup>131</sup>. In 1969 poet António Jacinto worked 6 days in the month of May and 3 days in July, having received 10\$00 a day<sup>132</sup>.

No contact of the prisoners with the exterior was allowed. They could only talk with the Police and auxiliary guards. And even with these, the Warden had issued an order prohibiting the guards for excessive familiarity with the inmates<sup>133</sup>. Therefore all contacts with relatives were cut, since no visits were allowed until 1970<sup>134</sup>. Prisoners were only allowed 6 letters a month, on the 10th and 25th days, and each letter would be a maximum of 3 pages and had to be handed open to the chief of the guards who would, in turn, forward them to the Warden. The latter would in turn effect censorship and then send the letters to their destination. António Cardoso gave his account in the following terms:

*(...) I used to write to my parents. 20 to 30 page letters, mentioning my illnesses, some true, others invented. My parents would then send me medicines, which we would then form a fund for the sick. The letters would reach my mother with some parts crossed out or removed by a blade. The prisoner was 'inventing and slandering'. Generally, they would only deliver to me letters with bad news. I received two letters giving me notice of the passing away of my maternal grandparents who were living in a village next to Porto. And I received also a letter about the death of my paternal grandmother. One day I fell sick. I had a very low blood pressure, sudden diarrhoea, deliriums, talking about my mother. I was having strange ideas. I was thinking of committing suicide. In fact, I had tried it before at São Paulo prison. I sliced my veins. I feel good (...)*

(129) António Jacinto, *Sobreviver em Tarrafal de Santiago*.

(130) Annexure 1. Interviews, Gabriel Leitão, p.212.

(131) Annexure 1. Interviews, António Cardoso, p.104.

(132) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Campo de Trabalho de Chão Bom, Folhas de Pagamento de Obras do Presideo e Outras Despesas (1969-1970), fl. 89.

(133) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Campo de Trabalho de Chão Bom, Despachos (1963-1966), fl. 2.

(134) AA VV, Comissão Nacional de Socorro aos Presos Políticos, *Afrontamento*, Porto. 1972.

Of the mail sent to the prisoners, some letters would be apprehended, and the prisoner informed of that. The remainder would be distributed, after they would be censored.<sup>135</sup> Those prisoners released from Tarrafal would be required by the Government of Salazar to sign a statement of undertaking and guaranteeing employment to those wanting to return to Angola. Meanwhile, upon being placed in the colony, they would not be accepted therein.

Mendes de Carvalho had the following situation when he returned home

*‘‘1970/71, I went to Angola. I had no job, the Government refused me. I started to look for a job in private companies but they would not employ me because I was a terrorist. I went to see dr. Andrade, a doctor friend of mine:*

*«- We don't want you. You must first apologise to the Government.’’*

*Some friends got me a position in a small post, there at Rangel. And I started to work. I had then some support from some progressist white doctors. I was already married and 11 children. With the help of many Portuguese progressist and from friends. The Catholic and Protestant churches also helped. Abílio Pais, Diógenes Boavida's wife, Arminda, Cecília Pais, some doctors who, secretly would bring things into my house. My wife and children lived off such help. The ladies used to deal with the assistance. I went to work at a union... Only years later, in 1974, I was advised that I was allowed to work for the State...(..)*

Domingos Pedro Van Dunem said the following about his release from camp S. Nicolau:

*(...): I wanted to return to my nursing studies. When I arrived I contacted mrs. Maria Eduarda Bento Alves, a nursing teacher. When she saw me, she said:*

*«- Oh, you're back. Pedro, you were such a good student ! So now?*

*- Now, I would like to know if you will accept me.*

*- It's going to be difficult. The PIDE is around’’ So she would not let me go back to study.*

*I read, in a newspaper, about a public tender. And I applied for a job that would pay 4 000\$00. They required standard 4, so I had the qualification. I stood at the top 10 applicants. But when they asked for my documents, this was a problem because I had no documents and I had a criminal record. Meanwhile they tried to allure me.*

*«- If you collaborate with the PIDE, you may work without any problem’’ So I said to myself, if that is the condition then I would remain without a job.*

*A cousin of mine, who was a driver at SIGA, who manufactured jute and plastic bags, got me a job as a textile labourer. SIGA had always supported political prisoners released from jail. The owner, Mr. Sousa, is today an aged person. I visit him regularly.*

Echoing the general censorship, PIDE/DGS themselves stated to be ‘‘absurd to demand a letter of invitation to someone who is returning to his own land of birth.

<sup>136</sup>

(135) Annexure 1, Interviews, António Cardoso, p.104.

(136) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Processo 110.00.30, MPLA, pasta 3, fl. 292.

## 2.4.2. The Missombo and São Nicolau Camps

According to Mendes de Carvalho:

*(...) There was a labour camp at Missombo and another one in São Nicolau. They were horrible. Many people died. The Missombo camp was the worst. Amongst those who were at the Missombo Camp, for example, was Pedro Van-dúnem, Minister of the Ex-Combatants, Pacavira and others. Those who inaugurated the camp, poor guys ! I have a cousin of mine, Adriano Sebastião, who was one of the first sent to Missombo.*<sup>137</sup>

**Pedro Van-Dúnem** political prisoner, who was at both concentration camps said the following:

*(...) On the 1st January, 1962, we were called to be transferred to the South, to Cuando-Cubango, for the Missombo Camp. Me, Contreiras and the leaders of the 4th February, those that remained. Paiva Domingos da Silva, the general-commander, Imperial Santana, the second in command, Virgílio S. Sottomayor, the third in command, as well as the assailants like me. We were 80 prisoners and were transported to the jail, now the Operative Unit of Luanda. We left at night, accompanied by two nuns. And from there we left in two trucks, each carrying 40 people, escorted by two guards to Cuando-Cubango. We left on the 2<sup>nd</sup> January. The trucks stopped seventeen km before reaching the concentration camp where we would be spending about six years of forced labour. They were camps of extermination. it rained a lot in that area and we had...at about 20 hours. And we arrived at about three o'clock in the morning of the 6<sup>th</sup> January.*

*In the trip from Luanda to Missombo there were 2 guards in each truck. Now, if the one travelling at the front at the cabin wanted to change with the one travelling at the back of the truck, he would roll over us, trampling over the head of one and the shoulder of the other to reach the place he wanted. And the other would do the same to reach the front. To get out of the truck to walk, after a journey where they would open our legs to allow the others to seat in the middle all along the journey. If we were to write about it, it would all give rise for a terror movie, four days without eating. No one would say they wanted to do a sanitary need (...) We were all empty, because we would not even drink water, they wouldn't give us nothing (...) On the 4<sup>th</sup> February we reached the Penal Camp of Bié where the "Group of the 36" had been posted a year before. That was a jail from Silva Porto. We just drove past them.*

*Sent to the Missombo Concentration Camp on January, they arrived on May (...) Some of them are today leaders of the nation, such as the case of Adriano Sebastião, who was our first ambassador in Portugal, Pacavira and Madaleno da Costa Carneiro, who are somewhere. Some of them died but others are still alive, fortunately. We arrived at Missombo early at dawn on the 6<sup>th</sup>. But then, how to sleep? The houses were made of brick, but the beds made of green grass, purposely cut for us to sleep. We were therefore at Missombo, where we worked hard for six years. It's life! It was four naves. Maybe like two soccer fields. They were naves with compartments of four. The beds were later made by us with sticks. Like berths. Weak blankets, but at least they gave us them.*

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(137) See interview with Mendes de Carvalho

*Freezing cold. Desert. Cuando-Cubango's weather is very hot in Summer, but in cold weather the temperature drops to sub-zero, it's really cold. We used to leave an aluminium cup outside and, in the following morning, it was a frozen block. And early in the morning we would rise up to work the roof was made of zinc sheeting, which is worse.*

*We would take a bath in the river. But here (points to the drawing) there was like a tub which we, in the morning, would take and throw its content into the vegetable gardens. There was no toilet. When I arrived in Missombo they placed me as a nurse. But the warden felt that was too light a work for me, because I was supposed to do hard labour. Therefore, I was always doing hard work.*

*Normally, at 5 o'clock in the morning, a bell would be rung for us to rise. Then, till 6h30 we would have to be ready for work. So at 5h30 we would run to the river to wash ourselves. The real baths would be taken on weekends and later to wash our clothes at the river. But that was only a few years later when, according to them, we would have been "domesticated". You know that, in the last periods, the guards knew less than us, they wouldn't mess with us when we would go to take a bath and then return back to the cells. We were up to 500 men at Missombo. The end of the Missombo Camp was due to the outbreak of the MPLA guerrilla war. They feared an attack which could release us and take us to join the MPLA's ranks. Missombo was then closed. Some of us were sent free to Luanda, while others were sent to São Nicolau. The São Nicolau Camp was only opened in 1968 (...)<sup>138</sup>*

This camp had various official names, such as *Fazenda de São Nicolau* (Sao Nicolau Farm), *Centro de Recuperações de São Nicolau* Rehabilitation Center of Sao Nicolau ) or *Campo de Recuperação de São Nicolau* (São Nicolau Heabilitation Camp). The idea of an internment for political prisoners in São Nicolau would have been, according to Ambassador Albertino Almeida, member of the Sao Nicolau National Commission of Enquiry, was a creation of d. Deodato Coutinho, magistrate of the Public Prosecutor who, at the time was the Secretary-General of the Government of Angola <sup>139</sup>. There was no legal provision giving rise to the camp. There was a portaria (ordinance) appointing the administrative commission that would manage the camp which was made up of three members: including an officer of the PIDE/DGS and another officer from the Finance Department.

According to Pedro Van-Dúnem,

*(...) The camp was situated about 140 km north of Moçamedes near the sea, between the blue sea and the dessert. It consisted of three villages: São Nicolau, the core centre, where the wards lived, the guard's precinct, the house of the administrative staff director, as well as the workshops and prisoners' quarters, built of brick and huts. In the latter case, the accommodation was of a permanent nature, covered by asbestos roofs or by zinc sheets. There were large collective quarters, lodging 40 to 50 people. The sleeping berths were made of wood, on top of which the inmates would place mats. Latrines would be built with septic tanks.*

*Hard labour. Opening ditches and carrying cobbles. We would work for the camp administration, producing maize and tobacco, but not for us. Like in São Nicolau. Because, later we were transferred to São Nicolau. I spent nearly 3 years in São Nicolau. Six years in Missombo and three in São Nicolau, where I was a fisherman in the high seas. I used to be at the sea from the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 15<sup>th</sup> days of the month.*

(138) See interview of Pedro Van-Dúnem.

(139) Annexure 1, Interviews, Albertino de Almeida, p.20.

*Women came later when the PIDE felt that those who had left their wives and daughters outside could take their children there, but they had to stay outside the barbed wire. This is because we lived within the barbed wire boundaries. Those who were married had therefore homes made of mud and grass and that's where they lived. As to us, the bachelors, we would live within the barbed wire. There were nurses, who were mobilized prisoners. I was also a nurse, but didn't last long as a nurse (...). There were casualties, for example, the father of the Minister of Agriculture died there due to ill-treatment and for lack of medical treatment. If a prisoner felt unwell, and if he was really sick and unable to work, he would be abused with ill-treatment. The executioners were always inspecting those that were left. They had to act like nurses to prove that people were really sick. Imagine a certain inmate nurse, very popular and comical, hearing someone telling:*

«- Hey pal! I'm really tired, I'm totally busted, not feeling well, I need to take a rest, see if you can find something for me to warrant a day-off tomorrow»

*At the time of the review, and in the presence of the guards, we all had to be lying down. The said nurse would check, and if he saw a hole in our clothes e would look at us and say to the guards:*

«-Don't get closer to this patient, he's got a serious problem».

*And the guard would ask:*

«- What's his problem?

*- He's got "esburaquite" (holechitis)*

*Since the guards were really illiterate and were clueless, they would stay away thinking it was contagious. With me, he would say I was suffering from "ronhatitis" (from the Portuguese word ronha, meaning cunning), and the frightened guard would go away. But if you were caught without a nurse's sick note, they would really beat your hell! That was big thing. At northeast it was São Nicolau III, south of Sao Nicolau II, being the distance to Sao Nicolau I, which was situated at the centre, four and half km further. When we arrived, we had to go to Sao Nicolau I, where the general administration of the territory was located. There were prisoners working in fisheries and at the salt works. And inside Sao Nicolau there were barracks similar to Missombo. In our case, coming from Missombo, we weren't inside the barbed wire area. We were at the grass houses, in huts. The houses outside were at Sao Nicolau III. When we arrived there, in 1968 there were some who wanted to escape. They escaped from the salt works. They were caught and placed on crosses in front of people, to be executed and crucified, like they did to Jesus Christ. They placed a firing squad pumping bullets into the bodies and would say:*

«- To be set as an example for those who stayed and to avoid them escaping»

*This was the method used. At Missombo, it was different. Firstly, they would beat the fugitives. And when they were nearly dying, one of our inmate cooks would be ordered to boil water in a 200 l drum and with a cup they would wash the inanimate battered bodies. We would see the skins dropping. Then they would be forced to rise and to go to the goal post, to save the ball, and the guards would say:*

«- Watch now this play. The goal-keeper is going to catch the ball».

*Poor guy. With his battered skin how would he rise. The guard would stand in front and would shout:*

«- Come on. Catch it! »

*And this would last until the prisoner's death. Scenes at the Concentration Camp of Missombo.*

*At Sao Nicolau, if a prisoner resisted, he would be brought to Sao Nicolau I, where there were prison cells. Saturnino dos Passos, a young pre-university student was very well educated. He had been a seminarist. At the camp he clashed with a guard on salt making. He was carrying salt in the trough, from the site of salt extraction to the salt dropping, to be later placed in sacks. The guards would stand next to the prisoners doing the work. Saturnino was a new prisoner and living within the barbed wire area. He wasn't like us, who came from Missombo and who were living in our small houses. The guards then begun to tease him and threw stones at him. He complained, said some words and then one of the guards beat him with a few blows with rifle butts. As he had been a non-commissioned officer in the Portuguese Army, he managed to disarm the guard and prepared himself to fire shots towards the guard's positions.*

«- Don't do that, or else we will all be killed.»

*He agreed. They then disarmed the man, held him and took him to Sao Nicolau I. The administrator of Sao Nicolau was João José Baltazar de Lima, an executioner, a real torturer. Compared to him only the Gestapo men. He received Saturnino and said to him (imitating the administrator with his nasal accent):*

«- Well Saturnino, go inside now. And I'm going to forget you are there.»

*They didn't give him water or food. And, when they went to give him his first coffee, five days later, the water was poisoned. He drunk the coffee and died. He remained there in Sao Nicolau.*

*I. These were things that happened more than thirty years ago, but which marked my life. There are many stories about Sao Nicolau. We had, for instance, soccer games. Matches at the salt works, at Sao Nicolau III and Sao Nicolau I. Our goal-keeper was a young guy who had also been in Missombo, where there were 2 soccer fields. His name was Filiberto and he had been a Benfica' or a FC Porto's goalie. He died after they beat him with a thousand ruler hits, imagine ..(..). Now, Lima, when he ordered beatings with palmatória as punishment, started to count them 1,2,3,4...but if the prisoner would cry, the guard would say:*

«- You've interrupted my counting. I'm going to start again.»

*Even if it had reached the 100th beating, he would start all over again. The ruler hits were being given in the presence of Lima and, every time the blood was expelling out of the prisoner's hand, spewing into the walls, but Lima wasn't bothered and would not even escape from the blood dirtying his shirt. The prisoner would no longer cry. Until he eventually died. Contreiras was also punished with 100 ruler hits, but onto his feet. I suffered a lot but at Missombo, because I belonged to the so-called 'shit group', forgive the pun. The 'shit group' was the group formed by one of the torturers. The chief arrived at the parade and would say:*

«- Today, we are going to form a shit group'»

*No one knew about what was it all about. So, he called:*

«- Pedro, Velasco, Paixão Franco and Augusto».

*Augusto was a UPA member.*

«'Move here. From now on you are the 'shit group'. What to do?

Star by picking the 100 litre drums».

*These were drums armed with barbed wire, serving as buckets. The pits were leaky all over the camp. We were to remove the faeces from the pits into the drums and then throw them as fertilizers into the vegetable gardens. I was therefore in this group. I was the one who entered dep into the pits, breast high, with a plastic bucket at the head. There were four of us. And two of us would then also carry them for about 2 km away, and through terrible trails. I would remove from the bottom of the pit upwards.*

*On the second day, the guard would call for the 'shit group' (..)*

*«-Yes, I'm with you. I'm coming with you».*

*He felt flattered. The waste would dirt his feet, but he felt flattered just to watch us from up there. At Sao Nicolau almost, all of us were beaten with cane strokes. I was an exception. I wasn't beaten. The Cuando-Cubango Governor was Sousa Machado, an excellent person, they said that he was even killed at Uíge by the PIDE. But the camp's administrator was Galo, more or less in the same style of Lima. Then came David Campos. There was also Fernandes, a deputy-chief of Police. Then there were the executioners, whom we nick-named them according to their manner of being: Cantiflas, Nascimento, o Cinco Litros (Five Litre), Quinino and the Barber (whose name was in fact Barbosa). These were the ones who caused blood. Some were also transferred to Sao Nicolau. I was released in 1970. And went to Luanda, on parole. I had to report to PIDE, every two weeks. I continued to be involved in politics. Even at Missombo, all documents we could grab would be sent to the MPLA. One of the bearers was a Spanish priest, Father Teodoro. And I did the same at Sao Nicolau.*

*Dona Ângela! She was the one who invented a fishermen's championship, where I was fishing. One would swim towards the other side of the island and return back, it was about 2000 metres. The first to arrive would win the prize which consisted of a banana and a cold drink. It was Dona Ângela's creation. She would mock people (laughs).*

*At Missombo there were loading and off-loading of sand, stones, wood. As well as at Sao Nicolau.*

*The Sao Nicolau I Camp appeared to have been opened for Tocoists (followers of prophet Simao Toco). Only after came the politicians and ordinary criminals. Something that even today is causing us problems, because they are also claiming the right to a political prisoner's pension.*

*They remained intact. They were converted into the PIM (Riot Military Police). The Police tried to resist, like the traders, with deaths having occurred at the musseques. I got involved with urban guerrilla, at Cazenga, but was caught. The MPLA underground cell group took me and sent me to the 1<sup>st</sup> Military Region, where they would carry out military arrangements. I left Luanda but got lost in the bush for a month, because the Portuguese troops invaded the area and we had to disperse, and that's why I got lost. I returned to Luanda, where Pacavira, Escórcio and I think Rei also, sent me to Cabinda, from where I would proceed with credentials to Pointe Noire, where I received a seven month military training at the CIR of Congo. I returned in 1975, at the time of the triumphal return as well as with junior commanders whom I met in Congo. We were already wearing our military uniforms and actively participated in the proclamation of independence. In December 1975 we were the first to leave. We were fifteen, including Paiva and myself. Virgilio had already been killed, the first public execution was for this comrade, as well as for others who had survived the 4<sup>th</sup> February. This unfortunately in a very troubled and unclear process..<sup>140</sup>*

### **243. The São Paulo Jail**

The São Paulo Jail was located in Luanda, close to the city's stadium and to the administrative jail. When space was short in the Sao Paulo Jail, prisoners, at the stage of interrogation, would be sent to the administrative jail by the PIDE. The jail consisted of two buildings with cells, a canteen, a kitchen and a courtyard.

(140) See interviews of Pedro Van-Dúinem.

All being surrounded by a 3m high wall. It had 2 square metre individual cells, a toilet seat at the top of the bed, but no water. Prisoners would wash their face and drink water from the toilet. The collective cells had berths and straw mattresses, and could accommodate two or more dozen of people. There were also women's cells, with a shower and a bidet. According to the International Red Cross, there were, in 1973, <sup>141</sup> inmates, while 99 were under detention for interrogation, distributed as follows: In Pavilion 1, 29; in Cell 1, twenty; in Cell 2, thirteen; in cell 3, eighteen; six at the kitchen; in Pavilion 2 there were 13 inmates. According to António Cardoso, <sup>142</sup> in the early 1960s, food was very bad, they would take the rice and throw it into a big pot. Legs and wings of cockroaches, weevils, sisal threads, everything floating. Years later, another prisoner, Hermínio Escórcio <sup>143</sup>, was talking about the stew with paprika that his stomach wouldn't bear. But at that stage they would allow food coming from the inmates' own households. According to the International Red Cross, the prisoners did not always have the opportunity to medical consultation. And, in general, the guards would refuse to take them to the dentist <sup>144</sup>. In the cells visited by the Red Cross there were penetrating smells, the floors were wet, and only one tap was functioning. They reported the existence of fleas and bugs <sup>145</sup>. As usually with the PIDE, visits were only allowed upon the termination of the interrogations, so that the families could not see the precarious condition of the prisoners. The Red Cross delegates mentioned that the majority of the prisoners complained about being physically ill-treated during the interrogation. They reported being beaten and tortured. The Red Cross delegates had noticed signs of scars. <sup>146</sup>

Now, as mentioned <sup>147</sup>, the very few prisoners seen by the Red Cross were not displaying visible scars. And all international groups spoke through an interpreter so that the prisoners could not tell the truth, in fear of the consequences.

## Chapter III – The National Liberation Armed Struggle

### 3.1. The Formation of the Anti-Colonial Movement (MAC)

From the consultative meeting of the Paris group which could count with the participation of Amílcar Cabral and Eduardo dos Santos, a delegation from the Democratic Movement of the Portuguese Colonies of Paris left for Lisbon and in the first quarter of 1957 met to form the Anti-Colonial Movement (MAC) which would integrate all the political organizations of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé e Príncipe and Mozambique, which representatives were the following at the time of its creation:

(141) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Serviços Centrais, Processo 3390-SR, pasta 2, *Visitas de Delegados da Cruz Vermelha Internacional a Cadeia da Machava*, 1973, «Relatório Medico», fls. 1-11.

(142) Interviews, António Cardoso.

(143) Interviews, Hermínio Escórcio.

(144) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Serviços Centrais, Processo 3390-SR, pasta 2, *Visitas de Delegados da Cruz Vermelha Internacional a Cadeia da Machava*, 1973, «Relatório Medico», fls. 1-11.

(145) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Serviços Centrais, Processo 3390-SR, pasta 2, *Visitas de Delegados da Cruz Vermelha Internacional a Cadeia da Machava*, 1973, «Relatório Medico», fls. 1-11.

(146) IAN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Serviços Centrais, Processo 3390-SR, pasta 2, *Visitas de Delegados da Cruz Vermelha Internacional a Cadeia da Machava*, 1973, «Relatório Medico», fls. 1-11.

(147) John Paul, *Mozambique ...*, 224.

Agostinho Neto, Amílcar Cabral, Marcelino dos Santos, Humberto Machado, Eduardo dos Santos, Noémia de Sousa, and Lúcio Lara. The principles governing the organization were adopted. A Directorate was formed which in Lisbon was constituted by Agostinho Neto, Amílcar Cabral, Eduardo dos Santos, Lúcio Lara and Noémia de Sousa. The leaders also decided that all of the MAC organization abroad would necessarily subordinate to the leadership in the respective countries. The most significant figures of the African Intellectuality had moved to Europe, from the capital of the colony, to the other countries with the main reason being to pursue its studies and also to escape the persecution of the Police, having coupled such mission to the political struggle, with the latter being the fundamental cause for their presence in Europe.

The concentration of the academic institutions, especially in Lisbon and Coimbra, would turn them into adherents of the Portuguese opposition democratic organizations, motivated by the literary and political streams in the world through a varied bibliography based on the principles of socialism, coupled by the Marxist theories. Amongst the same the need for the organizations to fight for the national liberation was promoted and to start in their own countries. In the case of Angola, one would refer the cases relevant in accordance with the role played in the formation of such organizations. Mário Pinto de Andrade, who moved himself firstly in Lisbon in the 1956-1957 years by participating in literary meetings and of the struggle with a production expressed in revealing and denouncing the situation in the colonies (the oppressive practices of the colonial regime), the condition of the peasants always and increasingly the victims of such oppression. In this respect Noé Saúde says what he lived in the following terms:

*(...) We saw that all, I was from the native neighbourhood and lived there for 30 years, from 1943 to 1973, and the jail was there, the cries on Saturday nights, from 10 pm, a black person would not be allowed to move freely at Marçal, or at Bairro Operário subjected to raids, taken as drunk, even if he wasn't drunk, and to be released from prison the family would have pay 275\$00 fine, otherwise he would remain in jail and sent to São Tomé, or to Moçamedes, to the fisheries, to the railways – CFB – or to Diamang, where the salary would be less than 70\$00, just to give an example, within our struggle, because we fought willy-nilly, without a foundation, we had first to learn, the negro under forced contract, caught in the sanzala by an Administrator or Chefe de Posto, the Chefe de Posto would generally be the one who would start, for the money he would be entitled while working as a contratado, the money would be divided between the Chefe de Posto and the Administrator where the native would be raided, the chefe de posto would be entitled to 20 centavos, eighty for the administrator, because it was native business, they would be like a commodity for sale, like labour force... (...)*<sup>148</sup>

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(148) See interview of Noé Saúde

In Paris a small, but active group was formed where Mário Pinto de Andrade was giving his contribution within the scope of the African policy that was prevalent in that capital, thus enjoying the knowledge on the cream of African politics, which capital would prove to be of extreme importance to the various political actions with regard to the propagation abroad of the Angolan struggle. Viriato da Cruz would join him by the end of 1957, who was coming from Angola, with a short stay in Lisbon, becoming his companion working both for the same objective. During this period, it is of note to refer the correspondence between these two patriots and Lucio Lara, firstly from Lisbon and then afterwards from Germany to where the circumstances forced him to. Marcelino dos Santos would join them, and later on Amílcar Cabral. From Brazil, by the writings of Deolinda de Almeida Rodrigues there was news of the political activity, both in Luanda and across the world, in favour of the Angolan cause. Deolinda Rodrigues appears in this group that communicates, as regularly as possible, in favour of the Angolan cause, by its active participation underground since the PUA to the MPLA, within the ELA Group.<sup>149</sup>

### 3.2. The London Declaration of the MPLA (December, 1960)

Following the campaign triggered by the Angolan patriots residing abroad, up until the formation of the MPLA's Executive Committee in Conakry, an intensive diplomatic campaign was developed against the colonial regime and its institutions. On the 5<sup>th</sup> December, at one the rooms of the House of Commons in London, a press conference was given by the representatives from Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Cape Verde and Goa. Angola was represented by Mário Pinto de Andrade, Viriato da Cruz and Américo Boavida, for the MPLA; from Mozambique, Marcelino dos Santos and two more representatives of the then "Moçambique Maconde Union", from Guinea-Bissau was Alfred Bangoura, pseudonym of Aristides Pereira, from Goa, Drs. Dinis and João Cabral representing "*Convenção Política de Goa*". This conference exposed a dossier about the Portuguese colonialism, and the delegates from Angola announced to the world that "as Portugal refused all proposals for peaceful discussion of the colonial problem, the MPLA had decided to move to the 'DIRECT ACTION'".

### 3.3. The 1961 Revolts

#### 3.3.1. The 4th January at *Baixa De Kassanje*

On December, 1960, the first signs of resistance to the exploitation of the peasants of Baixa de Cassanje emerged. They refused to report to work and to pay tax, in a protest against the absolutely inhuman conditions imposed onto them to produce cotton for COTONANG, the Cotton Company. This gesture was a direct challenge to the colonial authorities. The independence of Congo was a fact that contributed equally for enhanced awareness and greater mobilizing capacity of the neighbouring communities of Angola, and it would have an impact on the developments in Angola.

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(149) See RODRIGUES, Deolinda, *Cartas de Langidila e outros documentos*, Editorial Nzila, Luanda, 2004.

The Congolese achievements made the Angolans believe in the brevity of its victory against the Portuguese exploiters. The rural communities victims of the most cruel oppression attempted, on the face of the conditions imposed on them, combat actions which expressed in initial movements, since they believed in the immune response of their sticks for the open and direct challenges against the owners of the cotton plantations at Baixa de Cassanje. Shops and administrative premises became the target of the combative action of the peasants.

### 3.3.2. The 4<sup>th</sup> February in Luanda

On the 4th February 1961 the Casa de Reclusion Military, which was the administrative jail of Sao Paulo and the 4th Police Precinct were attacked, as the significant symbols of the ruling power, where Angolan patriots were imprisoned for political reasons. It was a high-risk operation for the patriots who were determined to face the system and all its apparatus, as this action was the culmination of claims made by the Angolans in appropriate forums to the colonial authorities, who never welcomed the call to emancipation and independence of this people. In the order of the day, in the MPLA meetings, was the need to give young Angolans military training which could address the Portuguese police violence. That is, to have in its structure a military wing which would initiate its activity in seeking support for the preparation of some young people who had joined the Movement. Within the cell groups who would meet regularly under the leadership of Agostinho Neto, the idea of sustaining a direct struggle was triggered. The controversy that was created with the postponement of the trials of those arrested belonging to political organizations who were fighting against the regime, as well as the news about the departure of such prisoners from the country, would accelerate the ongoing training process which was happening in the musseques of Luanda. In this respect Mario Alcantara Monteiro states:

*(...) The 4th February happened at a time Henrique Galvão hijacked the «Santa Maria» ship and there were rumours he would land in Luanda. Thus, the city was full of foreign journalists. It would appear that, Mendes de Carvalho would have sent a message home asking for clothes and something else I don't know. Obviously, by adding up in a simple manner and without further investigation, people started to think that the inmates could be deported. That's why the 4<sup>th</sup> February, which had not been expected for that date, was anticipated. And it was anticipated so that the Movement could benefit from the fact that there were foreign journalists in Luanda, who would then give the events the intended international repercussions. Militarily, the event was a failure, because we knew that it was impossible to fight military forces with machetes, no one ever thought that the cities would be taken. But, once again, the problem would arise. Before that, Agostinho Neto, Marcelino dos Santos and Amílcar Cabral had been at the House of Commons and had made a statement. There was, therefore, an enabling environment for something to be done, no matter what (...). It's there where the major issues started to happen. We never said that it was only MPLA's people. Although those that were at the front of this action, such as Paiva Domingos da Silva, Imperial Santana and Sotto-Mayor were, clearly, members of the*

MPLA <sup>150</sup>. *And canon Manuel das Neves (who was not an MPLA member, and we never deemed him as such), gave a great contribution, at the time, for the event to happen. Then, the UPA, thinking that we wanted to call ourselves the movement, came to state that it wasn't us but rather them. But we all did it.*

*The genesis of the event continues therefore to be very contradictory because it was a white stone at that time, and everybody wants to claim the ownership. That's not of any interest. What matters is that it was done>*

After an intense preparation, following underground meetings at the musseques of Luanda, and under a cohesive leadership which, in addition to mobilizing the patriots that had been subjected to psychological sessions, and some military training, was able to create the conditions for direct action. Meetings were organized in the suburbs under strict secrecy, in consecutive sessions, since it had been decided that this action would be taken with the means at our disposal: machetes and other stabbing weapons. On the leadership of the "Movement" which guided the "confusion", expression used by its members, it is relevant to highlight the reference made by Adão Neves Bendinha, one of the persons involved in the attacks that occurred in February 1961, namely:

*"(...) amongst the membership were men of value, such as LARA, son, Father Nascimento, Bento Ribeiro, employee of the Banco de Angola, Father Manuel das Neves, Anibal de Melo, dr. Pinto de Andrade, Manuel Pereira do Nascimento, President of the National African League, and Francisco Roseira, mayor of the Municipality of Luanda, who would pay a very high monthly membership fee".<sup>151</sup>*

After the dismantling of David's (Kinjinje) group, the work being done under its coordination would proceed and the members would be grouped into increasingly larger groups until the decision about the date of insurrection, in the main suburbs of the Musseques, where the MPLA would distribute the more inflammatory pamphlets, and through that the idea about the armed struggle would be expanded into the areas where the more active members were operating, such as Imperial Santana, Raul Deão and Domingos Paiva da Silva in whose homes the last preparatory meetings took place. According to Neves Bendinha

*"(...) the formation of each 'group' was done according to the nature of the site to be attacked, that is, the groups weren't uniform in their composition, because the number of persons would vary according to the target site. Thus, where greater resistance was expected a larger group would be sent. Once the five groups were formed, a leader and a deputy leader would be appointed, being former military*

(150) One could see, as a constant point in the interview given by Lourenço Contreiras Neto, that "a foreign entity with political responsibilities attributes the 4<sup>th</sup> February to members of the MPLA, or pro-MPLA» (in AOS/CO/UL – 50, pasta 2, fl.505).

(151) AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Auto de Perguntas de Neves Adão Bendinha, Proc. N° 31/61-3, fls. 538v.

*persons, and then the objective for each group to take a rocket to be blown next to the site to be attacked was set out and then to strike a few times on the ground with a stick prepared by Augusto, a mission attributed to the leader of each group....The members of the same group did not know each other ...*<sup>152</sup>

The sites to which the 5 groups had to go were: Casa da Reclusão, Administrative Jail of São Paulo, the Mobile Unit of the Police, in order to free the inmate natives kept there.<sup>153</sup>

*"(...) that on the 3rd February pp the more responsible persons and who were supposed to take care of the attacks, had concentrated at about ten o'clock at the house behind the workshops for the Railways, where August was together with his queen. So, Bendinha, Paiva Domingos, Raul Agostinho, Domingos Manuel Virgílio Francisco, Asão Mateus, and Bento António and others met there"*<sup>154</sup>

The Group referred to by Neves Bendinha, whose task was to attack the airport, consisted of thirty-five to forty men including the following:

Salvador Sebastião; Lourenço Fortunato Paulo da Silva; Pascoal António Fialho; Jorge da Costa; Domingos Manuel; Virgílio Francisco; Raul Agostinho Cristóvão; Paiva Domingos; Bento António; João Bento; Marcos Domingos Sebastião; Eduardo Manuel Francisco; Adão Mateus; Domingos Manuel; Dias de Moraes; Ventura; Domingos Manuel Agostinho; Moisés Ambrósio; Leal; Silvestre Seres; Gonçalves Adão; João Francisco; Imperial Francisco; Domingos Lemos; Ferreira Gonçalves; Humberto; Paulo Lourenço; Amadeu Pimentel;<sup>155</sup> Lourenço Diogo Contreiras Neto said the following about the 4th and 11th February:

*(...) on the 4th February, we attacked the jails to free the comrades of the 'Case of the 50'. At that time the MPLA's underground group cells were proliferating, particularly in Luanda. But one must not forget that the UPA already existed. It was dominating the nationalist spirit. There was indeed unity amongst the nationalists, between the young members.*

*Here in Luanda, the MPLA was deep rooted. The 4th February developed into various fronts. One group went to the Casa da Reclusão, under the command of Imperial Santana. Another group was at the Catete Police Station, I don't know under whose command, but Pedro Van- Dúnem was there. Yet another group was at the Post Office of Rangel, under the command of Virgílio Sottomayor. For his part, Paiva Domingos da Silva, the general-commander, had been detached to attack the airport, to avoid the exit of any aircraft. Other groups were further sent to other fronts. The Portuguese Colonial Army was indeed caught by surprise. But by the 11th February the Portuguese colonialists were already alerted and well organized, so we no longer caught out. So, we had therefore a lot of casualties. Many young Angolans died.*

(152) Idem, fls., 546v.

(153) AN/TT, Archives of PIDE, Auto de Perguntas de Adão Neves Bendinha, Proc. Nº 31/61-3, fls. 538v-539.

(154) Idem, fls. 544.

(155) Idem, fls. 547-547v.

### 3.3.3. The 15th March in the North of Angola

The year of 1961 was a year of bitterness for the Government of António de Oliveira Salazar. Right in the first month the cotton workers strike at Baixa de Kissange erupted, then in the following month it was the 4th February in Luanda, all because there were political prisoners in jail and the Portuguese government wanted to tackle and kill them, or to make them disappear, so to free them we did the 4<sup>th</sup> February.<sup>156</sup>

As a consequence of the colonial political and administrative system set up in the North of Angola, coupled with the corporate coffee production of the colony and the massive settlement of colonists to ensure the export production, on the morning of the 15th March, 1961 and subsequent months, a resistance led by the peoples in the region, under the command of the UPA, with the Messianic Movements (Tocoists, Kimbanguists and others), protestant churches (Baptist, Methodist, Evangelical of the North of Angola, etc)erupted in the District of the Portuguese Congo, from the Belgian Congo and by mobilizing the populations of the interior, aimed at the main plantations.

“When the 4th the 4th February happened, nobody already could open the mouth.....because the PIDE was acting accurately... President Holden, sent, from America, a message saying that everything must be done to ensure the 15th March was the date where the United Nations were to meet and where matters about Angola were to be discussed.

“When I arrived in Congo, they asked me to request to the Canon a report on the 4th February, about everything that happened for the United Nations to do it. President Holden insisted. The Canon was the top responsible person. I can say that the 4th February was guided by him also...if there were other movements he would have not be in contact with abroad”.

The infiltration into the Angolan territory begun between November 1960 and January 1961, with the objective of pushing the attacks inwards as much as possible. Four hundred men, divided into groups of twenty, armed with machetes, automatic weapons and grenades, trained by Tunisian military officers based in Kinshasa, penetrated the Angolan forests so that the insurrection could happen at the same time and hour. The password could have not been more enigmatic:“Mr. Nogueira’s daughter is going to get married on the 15<sup>th</sup> March”.<sup>157</sup>

On the 13th March I met a group that was already coming prepared to set up a fire, to start on the 15<sup>th</sup> March”. (p.161 interview of Joao) . As confirmed recently, Pedro Benga Lima (Foguetão), in his book,“Percursos Espinhosos (Memorias),”We saw the preparations for the attack. I personally, couldn’t understand what was going on; these preparations were accompanied by chanting, prayers and even in some rituals...”.<sup>158</sup>

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(156) p.160, interview of Joao

(157) Cf pag. In Memorias

(158) (cf. p.32)

UPA however, “with the support of the messianic movements and protestant missions launched the call that mobilized the populations in the northern region for the 15<sup>th</sup> March 1961, to force Portugal to change its attitude. Thus, the UPA with string bases abroad (Belgian Congo) essentially, and in the interior (North of Angola) launched the first attacks in the coffee plantations, with relevance at the Loge Valley, particular in the Bembe-Carmona-Nambuanguo triangle, using the slogan MAZA, LUMUMBA, UPA, when it initiated the 15<sup>th</sup> March 1961 resistance.<sup>159</sup>

There is consideration that MAZA (holy water would be capable of shielding against the enemy bullets, to protect and immunize men against the bullets. As emphasized by Pedro Benga Lima (Foguetão), “At that time there was a certain leader that appeared in Bembe, who was said to have come from Congo, bringing instructions from the *mais velho* (elder) (supposedly Holden Roberto or someone tasked by him). He was saying that in this war one need not run away from the bullets shot by the Portuguese colonists because such bullets would not be deadly. Anyone fallen would have to immediately shout: UPA-MAZA, i.e. UPA-WATER...The concentration would have preferably be done at the cemeteries. At the time of the attack, all along the way people would sing: “Ana ba dyanga ye mindele, ntyama myau mpasy, ke numony kwenu wonga kó”, which means: “to all those who were eating with the Whites, your hearts are perturbed, but do not be afraid”<sup>160</sup>

On the 15<sup>th</sup> March 1961, the UPA led the national resistance against the Portuguese colonial power, through various coordinated military actions against the coffee plantations and others, within a vast area of the national territory that encompassed the old Districts of Cabinda, Zaire, Uíge, Kwanza North, Malange and Luanda, which repercussions can be felt in the city of Luanda itself, as well as in the centre and south districts, given its magnitude.

**Pedro Benga Lima**, confirms,

“On the month of March 1961, when the insurrection begun in Nambuanguo, Bembe (similarly with the other regions of the District of the Portuguese Congo and others) also responded to the call. It was in this way that the people have organized itself on March, by arming itself with rudimentary weapons: rifles, traditional rifles such as *canhangulos*, machetes, batons and others’<sup>161</sup>

The 15<sup>th</sup> March 1961 was the beginning of the real total fight to liberate the country. After the 15<sup>th</sup> March the war was not made in one day, or a month, it took years, more exactly 14 years of struggle.<sup>162</sup>

In fact Commander Foguetão, says: “...many people went to the bush and did not return, they remained there”<sup>163</sup> obviously to give continuity to the armed struggle until the proclamation of the independence.

(159) cf Veloso, Tese, p.25, citando Eduardo Santos, Maza, p.353.

(160) cf. P.32

(161) Idem

(162) p.161 interview with João.

(163) cf. P.33

Holden Roberto recognizes in Franz Fanon, his main inspiration when he states that: “*Franz Fanon was the architect of the 15th March 1961*”. And says:<sup>164</sup>

“So, it was the labourers of the coffee plantations that begun the 15th March resistance under the military command of the UPA, supported by the Protestant and Messianic Missions who, with scarce firearms, inflicted considerable casualties to the Portuguese forcing the sending of a strong military contingent to the North of Angola with sophisticated means of combat in order to repress the resistance. Portugal used the means at its disposal, as a NATO member. But it was only possible to contain the fury of the natives by September/October 1961, when the guerillas took refuge in the bush to continue the struggle that would culminate with the independence on the 11<sup>th</sup> November, 1975”.

That’s why the 15th March represents another very important milestone in the history of the struggle against the Portuguese colonialism in Angola and in Africa in general.

### 3.4. The Repercussion of the Revolts

Following the combating action developed by the patriots on the 4th February, the Police reacted violently against the population and its action reached the religious leaders of the Evangelical Church in the realm of the Methodists that were barbarically murdered. Such were the cases of reverends and pastors Agostinho João Mendes, Moisés Domingos Kafala, Domingos Manuel João de Almeida, Reverend Sebastião João Domingos, Domingos Nogueira, Cristóvão de Carvalho, Francisco Manuel da Silva, who were murdered as a result of the February and March 1961 events. Jaime Araújo<sup>165</sup> who was jailed, tells how Imperial Santana was in the jail cell, after the combats

*(...) As a result of the clashes of what was named the 4th February, Imperial Santana formed part of the group that went down to the penitentiary where there were political prisoners, Casa de Reclusão. As a result of the reaction of the Portuguese forces, some were killed. And Imperial ran away. After the 4th February (...) the jail was a terrible thing, they were killing people. During the interrogation, and I’m not a person who defames, I saw people being clubbed to death.*

*Imperial had a bullet that completely fractured his arm, he had a dressing but was bleeding. We were five in a room, which had a maximum of 2.5 by 2 metres. WE slept in a mattress. And they allowed me to bring my sheets. So, when Imperial arrived I, being as I was a nurse, that he had a haemorrhage. On the first night he didn’t shout much, but in the second night he was moaning. Obviously, we wanted to give him*

(164) cf Memórias, p.128

(165) **JAIME ARAÚJO**, was born in the municipality of Dande, Province of Bengo, on the 14<sup>th</sup> October, 1920. He studied in Luanda, at the Salvador Correia High School. He completed a Nursing course, which he practised for various years hinterland in Angola. He was a friend of Agostinho Neto, then an aspirant to the health services. Joined the African League of which he was the first secretary in 1957/1958. Member of the UPA, he formed the FULA (United Liberation Front of Angola). Was arrested on various occasions and always released and accordingly accused of being a PIDE informer. In 1972 he led the African League magazine. In 1975 he was an advisor for Holden Roberto, of the FNLA.. At the invitation of Jonas Savimbi he visited Jamba, at the same occasion when Joao Soares, a leading member of the PS (Portuguese Socialist Party) was the victim of an aircraft accident. He stated that at the request of Savimbi he established contacts with the President of Angola, from which would result the Bicesse Accord. He returned to Angola in the mid-1990, and today he is a leader of the African League.

*some spiritual help, nothing else. Three days later, the wound was inflamed and with a green colour. So, we told the guards that this man wouldn't let us sleep on the past three days, and that we would look at him and couldn't do nothing and he might die of septicaemia. We were five or six men in the jail cell and needed to sleep. So, what now? So then there was a riot*

*Sabino came.*

«- Look, this man may end up dying, he has an open fracture, if he develops gangrene he will die' ».

*Was pressed also by a French nun. Five days later, what could have been the release of political prisoners, the result of this operation was a total of 5 victims suffered by the Police. Imperial Santana was out. I never saw him again until ten years later.*

Although from a military viewpoint, the jail attacks did not produce the expected results, nothing would be the same ever again. The government authorities organized the funeral arrangements of their police officers with a dramatic tribute to its own victims. However, during these ceremonies some new disturbances took place, the patriots attacked again on the 5th February, so the agitation caused changed profoundly the social being in the Luanda capital.

Inside the *musseques* daily patrols were being seen which triggered raids in the homes of Angolans, which were often detained without a formal charge. A curfew was imposed from the 20h00 and any gathering of Angolans was subjected to a most cruel and ruthless repression. Numerous Angolans during this period ended in the PIDE's dungeons without committing any crime and whose final destination was to date still unknown. This situation was generalized across the entire country, and since then Angolans began to believe that the state of affairs could be changed in Angola. There were internal repercussions of the 4<sup>th</sup> February events, such as with the underground groups which, not being caught, were not intimidated with all the repressive apparatus set up in Luanda and in the entire country. This act would mobilize more young people who would pursue the underground activities in order to join the patriots abroad in order to continue with the overthrowing of the colonial regime as quickly as possible.

Through some mechanisms, we could see the mobilization of the young people who, inspired by the highest patriotic level, had abdicated from their studies and families to join their guerrilla comrades in Leopoldville. One can refer the case of seven students of the Salvador Correia High School who, using the highest secret rules, gradually entered the "Zaire" ship to leave in a clandestine way to that country.

The Sambizanga suburb which had for a long time attracted the attention of underground organizations, such as the MPLA, hosted young patriots who decided to leave the country to follow the guerrilla ways, such as José Pedro Van-Dúnem coordinator of the underground group cell, as well as José Eduardo dos Santos, Mário Afonso

Santiago, Pedro de Castro Van-Dúnem (Loy), Brito Sozinho, Afonso Van-Dúnem (Mbinda) and Tomás Sebastião dos Santos.

According to Manuel Pedro Pacavira (...) *these young people had already been mobilized on the occasion of the preparation of the jail attacks. However, it had been decided not to use them. According to some Police records we can verify that although the escape had been spectacular and successful for the MPLA, the attention of the police organs led to the imprisonment of another group of patriots. These were the seamen who were carrying the stowaway young people aboard the ship “Zaire”. The school absence of these youngsters drew the attention of the Portuguese police authorities who ended up arresting the entire ship’s crew, namely: António Franco, Joaquim Pedro Franco, Eduardo Carneiro, Gabriel and Américo da Fonseca.*

In addition to the escape from Angola abroad, Angolan students in Portugal had also featured also an escape, according to Filomeno Vieira Lopes:

*(...) In 1961, when the 4th February had erupted, it appeared that the nationalist sentiment of those living in Portugal had been rekindled, but some had their fears: ‘ what is going to happen now?’ – news had arrived there: ‘they are cutting heads, they killed!’. And the Portuguese army was recruiting people, so the guys said: ‘Let’s get away from here, if we don’t leave Portugal, these guys are going to conscript us all and will send us to Angola, and we will have to fight our own brothers...’. We began to foster this idea, immediately after the 4th February because our escape happened in June 1961. It took us 4 months to organize it but we had mobilized always in underground cells, so we then sent some people out of Portugal, like Desidério, our Desidério, who were related with the Protestant churches, where the Protestants had an underground network. We talked to them and in Lisbon, at that time, there was Pedro Filipe, who was a Law graduate who had spent some time at the OAU, In Brazzaville. In this group of ours, who prepared the students’ escape, Pedro Filipe was the only Protestant and he was the link with the Protestants, who had that underground network, which was a French network who worked during the Algerian war. This network, called the SIMAD, had closed some years before and there had been many members they had helped to move people away from Algeria to France. So it was through Pedro Filipe and Desidério, who was already abroad, we managed to contact with them and they sent to Portugal 3 white Pastors but we didn’t know about that. They spoke in English and we didn’t know if they were North-Americans, nor did we know that they were pastors because they were well uniformed and sent their chief (...)*

General Santos França N’Dalu<sup>166</sup> reports how he became aware of Agostinho Neto’s escape, as well as that of the 3 groups of students, as well as his own escape to Morocco, where he joined the CONCP:

(166) António dos Santos França, better known as General N’Dalu, of the Armed Forces, was born on the 9th April 1938, in Mupa, Cunene. He completed his primary school at Colégio João de Deus, at Kahala, Robert Williams, 25 km off Huambo. At the age of 15 he started playing soccer at the Recreativo da Kahala, as he had some skill and played for the Huambo regional team in 1954/55, and Sporting (club) signed him in exchange of paying his school fees. – ‘ much to the disappointment of my father, I went to play for Sporting because they accepted to pay for my studies, while at the same time playing soccer’.

*(...) At that time Agostinho Neto was our leader and we were glad to have the news that he had also escaped. The news was brought to me by Chipenda and he said to me: 'Hey, he arrived, he arrived in Morocco' (I don't know if that was true, because I never had it confirmed).. 'He arrived in Morocco !'. so that meant he managed to escape. This gave us some more strength to also escape....So we then had decided to escape. .... (we were an organization of those who were studying in Portugal, where Kabulo was), including Jorge Valentim...those who were in Coimbra had decided to leave in three groups, three big groups but the last group had to be the sportsmen group, to avoid drawing any attention. The first group left without any problems. At that time we were being supported by French, by Protestant missions, who had a lot of influence and it appears that there was also some help from the CIA ( according to non-confirmed sources), because I remember at that time the Americans weren't happy with the Portuguese, as well as . They were against the Portuguese, they were voting against Portugal, against the colonialism, etc, etc. There were some interests that were at play and Salazar was slightly blocking the Americans in Angola, so they were upset. Later we received the information that the first group had crossed without any problems across the Portugal-Spain-France borders The second group of Iko Carreira was arrested in Spain and that was our first worry. To be arrested in Spain by Franco would be to be handed over to Salazar and they could even be executed, but we then got news that they were released by intervention of the President of the USA, John Kennedy. They let them proceed to Europe, that's why it appeared that no one had been handed to Franco and they even said that that it was a CIA agent who released them. The third group was stuck because they closed the border and there was more surveillance. The third group was the sportsmen group, which was my group. We were more than a hundred but, as you know (we were young) the enthusiasm sometimes overcomes the mind, so everyone wanted to escape, but as the group was experiencing problems with disagreements. Some thought it might be dangerous to leave, then there were PIDE agents infiltrated, reports to the Police, etc and the group ended reduced to 17 people, or even less. I know that in the day of the escape three guys didn't pitch up at the agreed place. We then managed to get a boat to sail to Morocco. By the end of 1962 we managed to reach Morocco, from the south of Portugal by crossing Gibraltar and we reached Casablanca. That's when I officially considered to be a militant, when I received my first membership card at the CONCP, in Morocco because before that I was underground. We had formed cell groups in Coimbra, Lisbon, etc and we worked there and then we were now officially militants.*

After this first setback to the Portuguese authorities, thanks to the armed action of the Angolan patriots following the attack to the jails to free the political prisoners, the discourse of the Portuguese officials had to undergo major changes. To Lourenço Diogo Contreiras Neto, the 11th February was the response of the nationalists to Portugal's denials at the United Nations. :

*...) In 1961, I and my brother and many others participated in the 11<sup>th</sup> February, in consequence to the 4<sup>th</sup> February.*

*At that time, Portugal's Foreign minister, if I'm not mistaken, was Franco Nogueira. And when the 4<sup>th</sup> February erupted, they were saying at the UN that what happened in Angola was due to some forces coming from the Congo, not from Angolans who had triggered the attack, because the Angolans wanted to continue to live under the Portuguese flag. As you know, on the 4<sup>th</sup> February we attacked the jails to free the comrades that part of the "Case of the 50" accused. Now, being confronted with Portugal's denials at the UN, we launched a campaign which caught them off-guard. Nevertheless, this action exposed Portugal at the UN, since Portugal's allegations had not been confirmed. There was no one from Patrice Lumumba from Congo-Kinshasa launching such attacks and nothing about the Angolans not wanting their independence (...)*

If, until then, at the General-Assembly of the UN, Portugal was asserting loudly that there was social peace in its overseas territories, Angola responded in an absolute contradiction to such a discourse. The 4<sup>th</sup> February was heralded the start of the armed struggle of the nationalist forces against the Portuguese colonial regime and this major event in the Angolan contemporaneous history had a wide coverage in the international media, by putting Angola in the forefront of the debates at the UN. In this way, the international media denounced the oppressive action of the Salazar regime with the publication of pictures of the heinous crimes that were being committed in Angola, in response to the Angolans' refusal to uphold the colonial rule. These were shown across the world, amongst which those published in the weekly Tunisian magazine "Afrique Action".

### **3.5. The MPLA Reorganization Abroad**

One of the recommendations from the meetings of the Tunis Conference included After the Conference, Viriato da Cruz travelled to Guinea-Conakry, where Mário de Andrade managed to obtain from Sékou Touré the permission to issue passports to Angolan nationalists. They would have to acquire different names, for example, Viriato da Cruz was Alfred Sylla, Hugo de Menezes adopted the name Seydo Sylla, Eduardo dos Santos the name Marcel Camara and Matias Miguéis was Amadou Bangoura and they gathered funds and settled in that country. The concentration of this group in Conakry led to the formation of the Steering committee of the MPLA. According to Viriato da Cruz and Lúcio Lara, we gleaned the following:

*(...) "It was decided to set up a provisional structure to the MPLA. The final structure would be formed shortly in a wider meeting, probably in Leo, where a great number of us would have to attend shortly (...)"<sup>167</sup>.*

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(167) LARA, LÚCIO, 1997, P.364-365.

The first MPLA Steering Committee was formed in Conakry on the 9th July 1960. Upon its formation, the MPLA's political activity was intensified which, having enjoyed the support of the Conakry's government in regard to its re-entry in Africa, had set up its base in this African capital and it would be from there that the main documents expressing the way forward would be drafted for the Movement. From there, the MPLA's activities had not faced the obstacles experienced in Europe, either from those countries that had or did not have African colonies. It then started to have a close relationship with the various countries that were supporting the cause for the liberation of Africa, in particular through the embassies accredited in that country. Arising out of the contacts with the Chinese Embassy in Conakry, an invitation was sent to the MPLA, from the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, which was extended to the PAIGC, who had carried out a study and friendship visit China. The MPLA delegation included the following militants: Viriato da Cruz, as the Secretary-General and dr. Eduardo dos Santos.<sup>168</sup>

### 3.5.1. The MPLA's expulsion from Leopoldville

The Leopoldville incidents which involved MPLA militants were a pretext used by the Zairean government to close down the offices of the Movement. The incidents started when the Viriato da Cruz supporters stormed into the MPLA's headquarters in Leopoldville and detained various leaders, such as Lúcio Lara and Iko Carreira. General Benigno Vieira Lopes INGO<sup>169</sup> refers in the narrative below the facts about the environment Dr. Agostinho Neto had found within the MPLA in Leopoldville which culminated in the first major dissent in the Movement

*(...) I think Viriato had really an ardent temper, he was a member that knew a lot about the liberation struggle but he was a bit temperamental and at one stage he felt almost as if he was all-mighty and we all recognized that, including the MPLA's highly intellectual. Our medical doctors Américo, Eduardo Santos, Vieira Lopes, Hugo de Meneses, Cassessa when they arrived and dealt with Viriato were impressed with him. He was a man who was on the ground, and when refer on the ground I mean the freedom to military action. The MPLA only arrived in Leopoldville nine months after the armed uprising of the 4<sup>th</sup> February and later the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> March. Viriato was very dedicated and we all had a special veneration for Viriato (...)*

*With the coming of Agostinho Neto I would say that such admiration then moved towards Neto as he had come with an enormous international stature. He left Portugal and arrived in Africa, in Leopoldville, during the aforesaid events while the world's focus was in Leopoldville-Congo. So, one of the first actions by President Neto was to convene a press conference which mobilized the world's attention. (...) After the National Conference a leadership was elected which put an end to the General-Secretariat, so Viriato would be set aside while Neto remains President, Matias Miguéis, the First vice-President, and Reverend Luís da Silva, the Second Vice-President.*

(168) Idem, p.377-379.

(169) See interview of Benigno Vieira Lopes

*This was the top leadership of the Movement followed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, led by Mário de Andrade, Department of Information, led by Aníbal de Melo, Security by Iko Carreira; Social Affairs by Deolinda Rodrigues; Finance by Desidério da Costa, Department of War by Manual Lima. Shortly after Matias resigned and joined Viriato's ranks because he was really pro-Viriato and that's why he disagreed with what was happening and felt he had been pushed aside and resigned. Then both started the campaign of opposition led by Viriato and I think that the death of Matias was the turning point which spoilt everything. Matias died in 1964 when we were in Brazzaville. This is important, as the three of them were leading the MPLA, at different moments, though the real leadership consisted of Mário, Neto and Viriato, assisted by other members with the same capacity and political intellectuality.*

*I had great admiration for Viriato, as well as obviously Deolinda who formed part of the squadron under my command, she being a cousin of President Neto, close relatives, but she supported Viriato and drifted away from the leadership. Vieira Lopes, a close friend of the President since Portugal, remained a Viriato's supporter.*

*Then there was an OAU committee that was divided by different left and right lines of thought. The neo-colonialism feeling was very strong; there were countries that had their own policy and sought a policy that would be the most nationalistic possible. Egypt, Algeria were the dominant ones and at the top of the African revolution. Algeria was the one who decided and the others would follow. So the OAU decided to recognize the UPA and sent a leadership committee to investigate *in loco* with the committee forming all the existing nine countries. At that time they frequently used the term reactionary government and recognized the UPA, with it being presented as a Front. This was somehow done rather hastily, a front was created with the MPLA and the FDLA (...) President Neto stood up and wanted to speak with the other Front, something of a *fait accompli* which led to Mário's backing away and he was in Egypt at the time. It was very complicated, and Mário would shy away from Congo like the devil ran away from the Cross. It was part of his nature, they would call him, he would come quick, because without Mário, he was the brain, they wouldn't decide, but because he was delayed they ended up forming a front and took that responsibility of forming a front that was not yet formalized, was not recognized and was rather a bluff. It neither worked nor it existed. So they said they didn't know and neither them nor the OAU recognized the FDLA. We had been sent to listen to the UPA who had a front while the other front was that of the MPLA. Viriato was there at the time and asked for the floor and stood up and talked on behalf of the MPLA. This put the MPLA in disarray, then the Committee of 9 arrived and submitted a position maintaining that the OAU should recognize solely the FNLA.*

*The mere fact that the MPLA was divided was sufficient and him and Viriato told the MPLA who should speak. And Viriato stood with a great following, with strong support, so they ended up recognizing. (...) Viriato then said: 'look, we've been expelled because this is coming from the OAU who recognizes the FNLA and not the MPLA'.*

*The Prime-Minister called Neto of the MPLA leadership and said to him: 'From now on, all that happened there was from the OUA but here this is our territory and we the Congolese are in charge here where only one front is recognized here. You must in finish the MPLA and each one of you personally must integrate into the Front. You have 48 hours to leave, otherwise we will issue a declaration ending the MPLA and if you don't integrate with the FNLA I will expel you.'*

*(...) We had to cross the Congo River 9km wide in a canoe which we called "Vitória ou Morte" (Victory or Death) and we turned underground in Zairean territory.*

*Viriato told us that, with our expulsion the possibility of advancing to the north of the country hinterland was over, so he felt we had to use a tactic and a strategy. As he had some acceptance amid certain senior members of the UPA, as well as Rosário Neto, the GRAE's Minister of Information. They had been always good friends and Viriato had been a great master of Rosário and it is then that Viriato with Rosário Neto tried to join the FNLA and once inside they would attempt a coup and grab the power at the FNLA and then return back and find a way to advance towards the north of the country, which was our main objective in military terms. Viriato stayed in Leopoldville because Holden Roberto couldn't stand Viriato and would kill him if he could, so Viriato started to guide things. Viriato never went to Congo after that and it was Matias who was attending as he was the facilitator. Viriato went to Algeria seeking for support and went to China after the death of Matias he went to China, with the same objective.*

*(...) But the President was saying in Brazzaville that we were not to go to join any party, we were departing to Brazil who recognized us and that we were to stay as the MPLA to continue the struggle and not to integrate and that was the difference although we would both want to advance to hinterland, for the armed struggle*

*Congo-Brazzaville did provide us with great support with the fall of Flober Yolu, with Massamba in power who said we could stay but not to use weapons just because he had also gain power using weapons..*

To manifest his dislike, as he had always expressed, to the MPLA, the Leopoldville Congolese government took advantage of these incidents to expel the MPLA. This happened in July 1963 with the expulsion decree signed by President Kasavubu and His Prime-Minister, Cyril Adoula, prohibiting all political, administrative, cultural, social, philanthropic and diplomatic activities of the MPLA. Following these events, the head office of the CVAAR (Angolan Volunteer Corps for Refugee Aid) was closed on the 28<sup>th</sup> October. The expulsion was only possible thanks to the instigation of the GRAE who was being supported by the American government. Thus, numerous MPLA militants that were spread across the Congolese territory were targeted by a ruthless persecution. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> November 1963, Daniel Chipenda and António de Carvalho "Toca" were arrested by the Congolese Police at the instigation of the FNLA. That immediately triggered a campaign to free the jailed militants. This campaign was joined by members of the Evangelical Church of Jesus Christ in Angola. In a letter dated the 29<sup>th</sup> November 1963 addressed to the Prime-Minister of the Republic of Congo-Leopoldville, the members of this Church

Denounced the arbitrariness of the Congolese authorities. We transcribe below the following text of the content of such letter:

“We deem further to inform our brother believers in Jesus Christ that such arrests are being done at the instigation and *defamation done with the Congolese authorities by certain members of the UPA (Union of the Peoples of Angola) under the command of Mr. Holden Roberto who purports himself to be a Protestant with the connivance of Mr. José Lihuca*”.<sup>170</sup>

The members of the Evangelical Church demanded from the Prime-Minister the release of the MPLA militants Chipenda and Toka, drawing attention to the fact that such actions had constituted an incentive to the division of Angolans. The persecution was ruthless and some militants that managed to escape from the FNLA’s claws turned underground, while others had been physically eliminated at the Kimkuzu base. Others had to cross the river Zaire during the night to avoid being intercepted by the Congo-Leopoldville police. Given the flow of the river, with a width of approximately 10 km, some have of those that attempted to cross were washed away by the water. Hence the slogan “*Vitória ou Morte*” (Victory or Death), Victory if one was able to cross the river, Death if not, by being washed away or shot by the Police.<sup>171</sup> The total number of militants persecuted and killed by the FNLA in 1963-1966 was a heavy toll for the MPLA.

Julião Mateus Paulo Dino Matrosse<sup>172</sup>: (...) after the events of the 7th July 1963, which formed the first deep political crisis of the MPLA, and hence its division, the alternative to living in Kinshasa was very remote for the Movement. So we, shall we say, *driven out, perhaps this is too harsh to say, we were taken as inconvenient in that country, so the MPLA had to look for another solution, which was to negotiate with the Government of Brazzaville at the time, Republic of Brazzaville, where Youlou, Flaubert Youlou, who was a priest, to leave in an organized manner, the Congo-Leopoldville to Brazzaville, where we found shelter and understanding on the part of the Government, which had not been very peaceful, but had given us shelter on the face of the events.....(????)....moving to the other side sometimes at night, sometimes during the day, and this was not easy because we had many households in Kinshasa where our militants were residing, with some awaiting to go abroad to study, to have military training, civilian courses, Medicine, Engineering, etc. So then we had to decide at that moment, forcing the exit of many of our militants not only to Brazzaville but to abroad.*

(170) See, in this respect, the letter of the Evangelical Church of Jesus Christ addressed to missionary Clifford Parsons where it advises him not to encourage a political group against another. Estante, Cx, CDIH. Cf. RODRIGUES, Deolinda (2003) *Diário de um Exílio sem Regresso*, Luanda, Nzila, p.46.

(171) See interview by Mawete João Baptista

(172) Julião Mateus Paulo –Dino Matrosse: was born in the municipality of Graduated in Electrical Engineering in Bulgaria and in Law at the University Agostinho Neto in Luanda. He soon in his life embraced the revolution by joining the MPLA in Leopoldville. Participated in the national liberation on the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> Political and military Regions. He is a military by profession and a politician holding the position of Secretary-General of the MPLA, Deputy Speaker of the National assembly. He wrote his memories of the war for national liberation.

*It was in this way that, regardless of the movements for the withdrawal of our militants and structures to Brazzaville, at the same time some comrades obtained some study bursaries in socialist countries who were assisting us (...)*

*(...) There was some panic amongst many of us, some remained almost in hiding with our families, having moved underground, and as the structures were not officially known we worked underground, many had gone to far away to the border with Kinshasa, Congo Leopoldville with Angola, in order to enter into our country where some already such tasks, where many comrades who were in the cities, especially in the capital, were moved hinterland, while others were going to Brazzaville, and others abroad (...)*

*Following the events of Leopoldville, the MPLA's leadership moved to Brazzaville. This event coincided with the revolution of the three glorious (three days of demonstrations, 13th, 14th and 15th August) which enabled the imposition of leftist Marxist regime at the right banks of the Congo River, which facilitated a better hosting of the MPLA in that country (...)*

Brazzaville would be like that, at the rear-guard of the national armed struggle and point of arrival of most of the logistics support and materials the Movement was receiving from African, European socialist countries, Cuba and philanthropic organizations of the western countries. The set-up in Congo-Brazzaville enabled the re-organization of the MPLA into a new stage of our struggle.

### **3.5.2. Reorganization in Brazzaville**

According to General Benigno Vieira Lopes (Ingo)

*(...) Mário de Andrade had his own idea about the struggle (...) Mário had a different opinion: about the type of struggle, a fight at the borders, but there was an enormous propaganda machine which had a lot of money and in the border fighting was a shot here, an explosion there and we would undertake a big military struggle – that was Mário's idea...and that other more stronger would have to surrender (...). In a meeting President Neto overruled the MPLA's constitution...he was a great patriot, a man who loved his people, his motherland. I'm not making comparisons with anyone, I just wanted to provide the profile I know about President Neto, I had great admiration for him and the fact that he advanced to the 1st Region under the circumstances I had been motivated by the struggle, by our dignity, by the honour, for our independence...we might have spoken about three currents of opinion: the President's, Viriato's and Mário's - I already mentioned that to you;<sup>173</sup>*

One of the essential features of the Movement's reorganization was the convening of a wider participation meeting of the militants to debate the future of the organization and to draw up a program of revival of the political, military, diplomatic and social activity of the MPLA. This process begun with the organization of a Conference of Cadres in 1964.

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(173) See interviews de Benigno V. Lopes.

Many militants had contributed to this event, and who believed in an autonomous program of the Movement, which could develop the armed struggle, cooperate with other political groups without destroying the Movement ou integrating the GRAE (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile).

Lúcio Lara was one of the MPLA and refers to the importance of such expanded meeting in Brazzaville:

(...) This meeting had some importance, important decisions were taken, for example there were members representing the steering committee of the 1st and 2nd Regions, leaders and commanders of the 2nd Region and of Zone B, our first CIR, revolutionary training centre, the schools, Youth and OMA, medical services, action committees, various collaborators of the *Steering Committee*, that is, *comrades that were in this expanded meeting*. Well! This meeting dealt with various issues and also adopted important resolutions. Resolutions about the political organization, at the time we have decided that the provisional head-quarters would be sited in Congo-Brazzaville but for conditions to be created to move it to hinterland (as happened later) and many other decisions about the departments, their organization, problems about subscriptions, etc; on issues related with the cadres, which had always been a problem, prevailing in all meetings of the movement., including the drawing up of regulations applicable to bursary scholarships for those studying abroad, a problem which remained until the end of the war because there was some anarchy in the deployment of comrades. We dealt with the issue of the primary schools, as we were already dealing with the costs of improvement and revolutionary framework for the primary education teachers; we paid attention to the work done by the OMA and it was the first time a woman comrade had been co-opted from the OMA to the Steering Committee. We also dealt with the problems of the Youth, Labour Movement organization. About the latter, I would like the comrades to see what was decided at that time, it was very realistic: -“whereas the impossibility of the working masses of organizing themselves abroad, whereas the possibility of them organizing themselves underground inside the country, the expanded meeting recommends that a campaign should be undertaken, via our Radio, Press and other means aimed at organizing the working masses inside the country” – in other words, the action towards the working masses hinterland of the country. At that time we approved a draft constitution and internal regulation, various resolutions were adopted about the military organization for the 1<sup>st</sup> Region; about the 1<sup>st</sup> Region the problem there was that of taking materials to this region; on the 2nd Region the issue was of increasing the armed struggle, about the counter-revolution, which was almost inexistent hinterland, according to what the meeting was able to find out, though there some signs of it; operational commands were formed, the guide for political commissars was approved, which to this date is still printed in the FAPLAs, save for some two or three words that were amended; coordination at the three fronts; medical services, economy and finance; finally, it was decided to convene the National Conference with the appointment of the organizing committee, which never took place for the same reasons as always and, in continuation of such meeting, steering committees were formed for the different regions; the 1<sup>st</sup> Region Steering Committee was formed and led by comrade Gonçalves Mundito.

*The 2nd region's Steering Committee was formed led by Reverend Domingos da Silva, while the 3rd Region's Steering Committee, on the East, was formed and led by comrade Aníbal de Melo. For the first time the military committee within the Steering Committee was formed which was led by comrade Henrique Carreira. Comrade José Mendes Carreira was already a member of this political committee of which he would become who would become the commander-in-chief and there was also a special committee, this committee being the one responsible for the traffic of arms between Brazzaville and Leopoldville. It had some collaborators who would dismantle the vehicles, remove the linings – you know comrades, that in the doors of the cars there were some linings under which we could hide one or two weapons, pistols, ammunition all would pass perfectly within the four doors; we would also create false bottoms within the vehicles. So, this meeting had its importance – we can provide all the documents in the appendices. Still in February, there was once again one of these chronic ministerial meetings of the OAU and, once again, the MPLA in its memorandum defended the issue of freedom of action at the base under the banner “Without freedom of action there is no unity” – i.e. we, at the time, were not fighting against unity, but to rather put the issue of unity in its context because we had been, till then, the champions of unity, we were always ready to be at unitary meetings, attended to all notices convening meetings for heads of state, we would go left and right, north and south, everywhere but then putting the issue in its context.*

The MPLA's reorganization in Brazzaville was only made possible thanks to the tenacity, determination and persistence of comrade Neto and of those remaining members of the former leadership (Lúcio Lara, Iko Carreira, Hoji ya Henda *inter alia*). Benigno Vieira Lopes refers in the following manner the performance of President Agostinho Neto:

*(...) In Brazzaville, at one stage, we had challenges and the hopes were lost about us endeavouring the armed struggle against Portugal and it was when the MPLA was divided, almost everything diluted and here we have to acknowledge that for this and other things President Neto was a hero and a great man for the MPLA because, you know, as the leadership was divided with Viriato, on the one side, Mário on the other and Neto in turn in another side, members were divided in their support and that's when President Neto eventually won the position and today we are here for the independence, for power and in a well done manner, where the MPLA exists, victorious, absolutely victorious.*

### **3.5.3. The EPLA (Exército Popular de Libertação de Angola) People's Army for the Liberation of Angola**

In the I MPLA National Conference, the People's Army for the Liberation of Angola (EPLA) as born, which was formed from the first guerrilla fighters trained within the scope of the political and military plan drafted by the MPLA's Steering Committee, with the assistance of friendly countries such as Algeria, the Kingdom of Morocco and the then Republic of Czechoslovakia. According to the General Paulo Miguel Júnior's statement, he revealed that:

(...) In June 1962, the group of trainees which included : *Borges Bamba, Luís Miguel, José Marques Pimentel, Ciel da Conceição (Gato), Filipe Floribert (Monimambo)* and other comrades was transferred to the *El Kissiba camp*. The deployment of this group to this camp was due to the fact that this region displaying a territory which was appropriate for a military training which was more compatible with the reality of the struggle in Angolan territory with the execution of various military exercises in accordance to the military actions to be developed in the battle fields in Angola, such as ambushes, surprise raids, incursions in enemy lines, river crossing and other guerrilla warfare actions (...)<sup>174</sup>

At that time, in Morocco, there was Africano Neto, in his capacity as the senior officer representative of the MPLA in Rabat, who was monitoring on the ground, from beginning to end, all of the military training of militants that would go to Morocco. He was highly esteemed by the trainees. The majority would see him as the person indicated to lead the EPLA, in spite of his impulsive and demanding temper albeit humane and without complex.

In mid-August, when the preparations were being made for the pledge of allegiance ceremony, a committee coordinated by Africano Neto, which included Hoji ya Henda, worked with the Moroccans with a view to work out the details such as the military parade, general housekeeping of the barracks and a whole lot of other ceremonial activities. Everything pointed towards a pompous ceremony linked to an extraordinary surprise. To the trainees' amazement, commander Hoji Ya Henda, in presenting the troops in parade to the visiting delegation announced the presence of Agostinho Neto, who was accompanied by Mário Pinto de Andrade. This act filled the more than 91 trainees with pride and joy, 56 of which trained in Kasbatadla (Morocco) and 35 in the FLN (National Algerian Liberation Front), in transit to Leopoldville.<sup>175</sup> The MPLA's leadership deemed the military action hinterland as the main factor for the development of the struggle, as the only one capable of being the catalytic for the necessary logistics and to catalyse the countries and peoples that were supporting the revolutionary struggle in Angola.

So it was in this way that a detachment formed only by a small group of guerrilla fighters under the command of Manuel Lima penetrated hinterland of Cabinda, via Massabi, which borders with the Pointe Noire region. At the Congolese locality of Kimongo, at the border with Cabinda, there was already a CVAAR dispensary, led by Gelim Paim-Kubindama. From this border locality made up mostly by Angolans, a small reconnaissance detachment,

(174) Paulo Miguel Júnior, general, author of '*Lembranças da Vida*' and other works, was born in Luanda on the 26th May 1940 and completed his primary school education. He worked underground in the 50s and joined MPLA, being one of the first cadres trained in Morocco. He participated in the national liberation armed struggle, a career military, who held high senior posts in the hierarchy of the MPLA after independence

(175) Paulo Miguel Júnior, op.cit pp 64-65.

which commander was Veríssimo da Costa, better known as commander Nzaji,<sup>176</sup> crossed the Congolese border and penetrated through Kimongo taking advantage that it was an Angolan village, i.e. a village inhabited mostly by Angolans, despite its location in Congolese territory. The Portuguese were already expecting MPLA attacks from the Kimongo. Manuel Lima, in his capacity as a commander, decided to operate with the small group of guerrilla fighters. It was in Massabi that Manuel Lima entered with the aim of executing a small operation in the Cabinda road.

The Portuguese, who had a good network of spies in Congo-Brazzaville, knew in advance of this attack, and immediately surrounded and attacked the detachment. Although ill armed, the detachment has reacted well, with some Portuguese soldiers being killed and some fatalities by EPLA. According to primary sources contacted, comrade Joaquim Domingos,<sup>177</sup> Inácio João Sakala, Simão António Faria and some other comrades, when they checked they were out of the range of the Portuguese firing power, had reacted rapidly by concentrating the firing of their machine-guns towards the enemy thus enabling the withdrawal of most of the detachment. The casualties in the detachment were the following: one dead, his name was Santos Tshivale, a prisoner, his name was Mateus André Swamy, and various injured, including Roque Tchiendo and Zau. The Portuguese, to avoid problems of the kind, and knowing about a deserter officer of their army, at the forefront of the MPLA guerrilla fighters, reinforced Cabinda with men and means.

Aimed at guiding the EPLA, the MPLA leadership approved the law of discipline of the EPLA, made up of 40 articles and provisions on military honours and execution by firing squad.

The events of 1961 made the Portuguese oppressive machine to enhance its military apparatus and to trigger a violent war against the defenceless Angolan people at the north of Angola. Meanwhile the MPLA felt that a victory of the Angolans over the Portuguese colonization was dependent on the organization of an ample popular movement, as well as through a united front of all Angolan anti-colonial organizations. The UPA claimed to be the sole and legitimate Angolan anti-colonial force, seeking in that way to have the monopoly of the liberation movement of Angola.

The two movements were experiencing the same problem of shortage of weapons. And because the UPA wanted to stop such a hegemony in the north of Angola, it was preventing the MPLA guerrilla fighters from performing their military actions in that region, which was one of the greatest mistakes throughout the entire period. The EPLA was dissolved after the Cadres Conference, which took place in January 1964, giving rise to the Guerrilla Detachment.

(176) Costa, Commander Nzaji died on the 27th May 1977 during an aborted coup d'état, known historically as the "Fraccionism".

(177) Joaquim Domingos is Commander Valódia who died in Luanda on the eve of the independence in 1975.

### 3.5.4. The Formation of the ELNA

The FNLA structure was completed with the proclamation ELNA. On the 26th August 1962, the FNLA's armed wing, the ELNA, was formed, the EPLA (p.p.138/9). The ELNA had its epicentre in the base of Kinkusu, located in the southeast of the Republic of Zaire (now DRC). The first Chief-of-Staff of ELNA was José Kalundungo, trained in the Algerian FLN's maquis in 1962 with many others. The Kinkouso base was the most important military stronghold during the national liberation period and was doubtless a symbol of the struggle for the freedom of the African peoples. ....To be noted is the desire to create micro-uprisings in the colonialist countries by the training of cadres and soldiers which was performed in Kinkouso. It was a strategy devised by Franz Fanon. (p.p.138/9).

“The Kinkouzu base, surrounded by bush, forests and deep valleys had an area of 30 Km<sup>2</sup>, with 25 km in length, and was located next to Thysville, about 10 km of this city, which some 100 km off Kinshasa. The concession happened on the 20th March 1962. ....thanks to the solidarity of Cyrille Adoula towards the Angolan people”.<sup>179</sup>

### 3.6. The Founding of UNITA

The formation of UNITA, in March 1966, resulted from a split in UPA between Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi who, at the time of the OAU Conference, at the level of Heads of State, announced his split with FNLA in July 1964, in Cairo, where there was a Conference of Heads of State. He resigned from the GRAE in his capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs.

According to **Chiwale**<sup>180</sup>...

*“he dropped out because he disagreed with the philosophy of struggle of the President who maintained that the leaders of the Front should remain abroad and, on the other hand, Savimbi held that in order to understand the war dynamics in order to bring it beyond the North”, as, “year after year the intensity was diminishing, which has triggered the strategic contradictions between one another in the leadership of the Front”*

The formation of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) was decided early in 1965, in Chamaix (Switzerland) between Jonas Savimbi

(178) José Kalundungo, first Chief-of-Staff of the ELNA, armed wing of the FNLA deserted the FNLA in the Jonas Savimbi group integrating the group of 12 membe. José Kalundungo is a retired General and lives in Bailundo Huambo, his place of birth.

(179) p.138 in *Memórias*

(180) José Samuel Chiwale, born in Sandjilutulo, Kipeio, Huambo. Studies in the evangelic churches at the Centro Evangélico do Belombe. He is a retired General.

and António da Costa Fernandes (Tony), to give a new course of direction to the liberation of Angola. They drafted the first constitution of this Party which was called the *Movimento Revolucionário de Massas* (Revolutionary Mass Movement) which enshrined the principle that every leader of the future organization must undertake to participate in the struggle hinterland in the country. Such commitment intended to fight with the soldiers and the people in the country in the perspective that it was the only real philosophy and a form of mobilizing the peasants towards a common fight.

However, Chiwale said that, in better conditions, it was in Nanquim that

*“the foundations were laid from which the UNITA Party would be erected, as well as its Armed Forces”.*

*This general recalls that,*

*“the reasons Jonas Malheiro Savimbi would form this Party resulted, as Savimbi would himself say, in addition to what was said before, from the fact that “UPA came out of UPNA (Union of the Peoples of the North of Angola)”, with Eduardo Pinoque as its head. The MPLA is no exception; it is a Party confined to the people in Luanda. What we now need is a Party to the national scale where the youth, men and women would firstly be Angolans above all, and not as bakongos, kimbundus, umbundus, whatever. It would be a big mistake to create a Party that would refer to the centre and the east of Angola, or to a particular ethnic. Hence the UNITA.”<sup>181</sup>*

Before the creation of UNITA, the members that came to constitute the party were in Zambia under the guise of refugees, and after the Jonas Savimbi exit from the FNLA, when we convince ourselves to form another movement for the liberation of Angola, armed himself with these members to form it. Chiwale said:

*“...proposed that we enter Angola in small groups in order to reduce the risks. The idea was vindicated: we formed groups of 3 or 4 members. The plan to return to Angola was subjected to a careful assessment. After intense debates, the first group was formed by the following members: Isaiás Mussumba, Nicolau Bianco Tchiuka and Jeremias Kussia. The second group, headed by Samuimbila, constituted by the following: Isaiás Massumba, Nicolau Bianco, ngo, Muanangola, Samuel Piedoso Chingunji e Mateus Bandua. Dr. Savimbi deemed appropriate to send them to reinforce the areas of Lukusse, Lewa, Boma and Lumeje, where Isaiás Mussumba was located. They were also instructed to reach closer to the Benguela Railways. The third group under my command, left Tanzania towards Zambia some time later. The group included Tiago Sachilombo, Francisco Mau, Salomão Mukiza, Canuela, Francisco Mahaho and Dinis and had two distinct missions: to open the Chiúme-Ninda corridor; the latter two, jointly with some colleagues, would go to the Rivungo, descending the Luiana region, west of Mavinga”<sup>182</sup>*

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(181) See interview with Chiwale.

(182) Idem.

After its formation, UNITA included members of ATCAR (Association of the Tchokwes of the Congo, Angola and Rhodesia) and changed its ephemeral structures into small combat units.

General Samuel Chiwale further stated:

“...at that time in the North of the country the situation was hot after the 15th March with the uprisings in the farms, etc. and also in the centre *there was already talk about the UPA. We didn't have much influence with regard to the MPLA in the centre and in the south. The party that had some dimension inside the country was the UPA because those who were working in the coffee plantations were from Huambo, Bié, Lubango and Cunene. These were the ones that escaped to their areas of origin, who were talking about the UPA and were saying that things were heating because the UPA was attacking*”<sup>183</sup>.

Meanwhile he also asserted that...” It was moving towards the tribalism/regionalism where the southern people were being openly incriminated and it wouldn't be necessary to go there”.

Such initiative was supported by Nasser, Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Ben Bella, inter alia, who disagreed with the lack of efficiency noted in the fight against the colonialism. With the support of Nasser, who maintained that without support of a big power no combat genuinely revolutionary could be achieved, he visited Moscow, Berlin, Prague, Budapest and Warsaw.

“Later, in early March, dr. Savimbi entered into Angola from Zambia, in early March 1966 he arrived in Muangai, through Lungué- Bungo and Lukusse. He ordered on the 7th March for all commanders dispersed in various areas to proceed to that locality. The I Congress constitutive of the UNITA took place in Muangai, in the heart of the forest, from the 11th to the 13th March 1966.....pleno coração da floresta, de 11 a 13 de Março de 1966... where some 170 delegates were present who discussed and approved the constitution, the program, as well as the draft about the formation of the Unita's armed forces. UNITA's ideology was presented which was named “Project of the Conspirators of the Movement of the 13th March” The following were the founders and co-founders<sup>184</sup>:

Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, Dr. José João Lihauka, Dr. António da Costa Fernandes, David Jonatão Chingunji, José Samuel Chiwale, Samuel Piedoso Chingunji (Kafundanga)\* and Miguel Nzau Puna, Ernesto Joaquim Mulato, Alexandre Magno Chinguto, Pedro Paulino Moisés, José Kalundungu, Jacob Hossi Inácio, Jeremias Kussia, Nicolau Chiyuka Bianco, Isaiás Massumba, Mateus Banda, Samuel Chavala Muanangola e Tiago Sachilombo. On the second day, the Party Statute was approved by acclamation under the title *Foi aprovado, no segundo dia, por aclamação, o Estatuto do Partido com a designação de « Project of the Conspirators of the Movement of the 13th March”*

The above were later joined by Gaston Chatta, Salomão Njolomba Moisés Kaniumbu and others

(183) Interview granted within the scope of the Interviews of this project.

(184) According to Chiwale, the co-founders were absent

(185) The son of Eduardo Jonatão Chingunji, one of the PIDE's victims in Tarrafal

### 3.7. The Diplomatic Action

#### 3.7.1. MPLA

##### THE TUNIS CONFERENCE (JANUARY 1960).

Although the efforts to return to the African continent had met with numerous challenges, such as in the case of Ghana, whose Government had not replied to Lúcio Lara's correspondence, in its failed attempt to set up an MPLA Office in that country, the Movement's leadership sought other routes in the continent to pursue its objectives. The preparations for the 2nd Conference of the African Peoples mobilized Lúcio Lara who travelled to that country where he and Viriato da Cruz would represent the "People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola". According to Lúcio Lara, the decision about the trip to Tunis became historic for this group, and it was providential, since it was from then that supports would come forward need by the Movement. The Steering Committee of the Movement redoubled its contacts in order to capture interest to the Angolan cause, which was facing at the time a shortage of resources to consolidate its presence in Africa. Despite the failure to reach the Accra's leadership via correspondence means, in order to seek the required support towards the return to Africa, the direct contacts with African senior officials meeting in Tunis changed substantially the course followed thereon. From the easing of immigration issues that existed at the time (Viriato da Cruz was holding an expired passport), or even of Amílcar Cabral that had to return to Portugal and could have not recorded his trip to that African country, or the financial support obtained for Viriato's airfare at the end of the Conference on his way back to Conakry, they got a positive response. One would say that the doors had been opened towards African support to the Angolan cause, which was facing challenges in setting up the respective political organizations.

The Angolan participation in the Tunis Conference, through the voice of Lúcio Lara, submitted at that international forum a text titled "Aspects of the Struggle Against the Portuguese Colonialism", wherein the details about the arrests in 1959 were provided, as well as the distribution of messages calling for the release of the prisoners and the list of the arrested persons awaiting trial in Luanda in three cases. A document was also circulated which was denouncing "Aspects of the São Tomé Massacre".<sup>186</sup> Following this participation, the delegation headed by Lúcio Lara approved in an African conference on the territories occupied by Portugal<sup>187</sup>. It was therefore a great opportunity to propagate the Angolan cause and on the objectives of its leaders.

According to Lúcio Lara, the presence in Tunis has enhanced links with the delegates of the African National Congress – ANC (Makiwane), the Union

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(186) Idem, p.240.

(187) Conf. LARA, Lúcio, 1997, pp.239-240

des Populations du Cameroun – UPC (Félix Riland Moumié), with the liberation movements of the Congo, as well as with the socialist countries who were represented at the African Conference. In this Conference, Holden Roberto was also present, using the alias of José Gilmore. Lúcio Lara took the initiative for a conversation, during which Holden confirmed the receipt of the correspondence sent by Viriato da Cruz, where the efforts by the MPLA towards the unification of the nationalist forces fighting for the independence of Angola was highlighted. Viriato would, in his letter of the 29th April 1959, refer:

*“(...) Are there any organizations formed and led by Angolans which aim at this common objective for the freedom we all aspire?*

*Isn't it desirable, more than desirable: rather essential –that we form a single anti-colonial Front in Angola? (...)”*<sup>188</sup>

The presence of Amílcar Cabral, which was expected to happen at any moment, was only made possible in the last day of the Conference, and upon joining his comrades in arms it was followed by a debate for the solution for the problems of unity of the nationalist forces. To embody such a concept a meeting was organized incorporating the members of the FRAIN, (MPLA and PAI), with the participation of Holden Roberto who, though not very much interested in the unifying proposal, has signed the Declaration of Commitment pursuant this brief African conclave, signed by Abel Djassi (PAI and FRAIN); Hugo Menezes (FRAIN); José Gilmore (UPA), Lúcio Lara (FRAIN e MPLA), Viriato da Cruz (FRAIN & MPLA). This Declaration of Commitment highlighted the fact that the patriotic organizations: MPLA, UPA, PAI and the FRAIN (African Revolutionary Front for the National Independence of the Portuguese Colonies).

*(...) In these letters in which we strongly insisted in wanting to indulge towards the Congo, we wanted in many respects.....Mobuto was talking about the need to unity, because he didn't want to sponsor bloody confrontations, in fact that was Mobuto's pretext used by Mobuto to the end, about not wanting to sponsor fratricidal wars in his territory, fights between brothers in his soil «thus, yes, it's ok for the MPLA to come but, firstly let's get unity”, and we, with our position sought really to find a platform, which was never achieved.*

In this respect Lúcio Lara commented on Holden Roberto's conduct in regard to the Tunis Conference, the signing of the unity agreement, the reaction of the media and the arrest of Commander Benedito

*(...) At he last minute, the Holden's friends in Tunisia, Senegal and others alerted Holden on the need to be reprinted at the Tripartite Conference and, in the last moments of the meeting (which was in Cairo) a FNLA's delegation was rushed into the Tripartite Commission meeting, appologizing for their delay because they had missed their flights and that there were problems. But the session was already closed. The meeting reconvened thanks to the good willingness of all in an attempt to find a platform and the meeting closed with the signing of an accord, another one, between the MPLA and the GRAE about the reconciliation between the two movements.*

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(188) Idem, p.46

*The agreement was signed by the MPLA (naturally!) by Lúcio Azevedo Júnior and Daniel Chipenda, Paulo Jorge, Francisco Ramos Pinto, and for the GRAE by each one of the members of the so-called Tripartite Commission, a certain person from RAU (....) one from Ghana and another from the Congo Brazzaville.*

*(...) It was a signed agreement, referred by the Press, the whole world as the "agreement between the MPLA and the GRAE", two or three days later after the accord, Holden arrested us, some of our comrades, in Kinshasa, in other words, the agreement was over once again, and amongst such comrades was comrade Commander Benedito; the accord was dated 13<sup>th</sup> October 1966, comrade Benedito was arrested on the 1<sup>st</sup> November 1966, i.e. practically 2 weeks after the accord, this was an arrest for ever, comrade Benedito never..... But I had here a document I want to donate to the Benedito School, because it is the only document (well, it's a document!) where the Congolese newspaper, **Courier d'Afrique**, of the 3rd November 1966 reports the arrest of Monsieur João Benedito, member of the Political Bureau of the MPLA, kidnapped by Holden Roberto's soldiers. This is Holden Roberto's way, he signs an agreement and two or three days later violates the agreement, this was persistent, therefore the arrest of Benedito violates the agreement, and whenever there was an arrest like this one, we would set up a campaign «to denounce to the whole world, that they arrested comrade x and x and that his life is in danger, United Nations, OAU, Red Cross, High Commissariat, Governments all African countries, ...". The campaign would be done everywhere but, generally, Joseph Desiré Mobutu would remain mute, saying nothing, saying he would ignore this and that, while the comrades would be disappearing, rare, very rare! They escaped from the Kinkuso prison, he was arrested and, as the newspaper refers, he was transferred to Kinkuso with other Angolan prisoners. «It is believed by Angolan political sources that Mr. João Benedito will proceed tonight, under military escort, to the Kinkuso base where he will join Kassinda, Dialo, who are already there.*

*We, on the 16th November, issued a declaration on the unity. This declaration must have had some importance (I will search for it) because it is a declaration made, we signed the agreement in October, on the 1st November they arrested João Benedito, and we issued a declaration, that is the declaration was to that effect (I couldn't find the document), in the sense that the Comrade President has always defended, that unity is unity, we have to choose between the journey to unity.*

### 3.7.2. UPA/FNLA

Álvaro Holden Roberto was living in Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), in the Belgian Congo (now DRC) and asserts that

*"it was through a contact with sailors from ships that we were able to contact the Lobito cell, and later with Father Manuel, here, through messengers, people who would travel from Luanda to Leopoldville. This is how we established contact with Father Manuel"<sup>189</sup>*

João César Correia, a former UPA freedom fighter "...went to work as a nurse in Ambriz in 1957-59 and found the fire already burning .... the situation was agitated....with that thing about the existence of a movement in the Belgian-

(189) 16 Drummond Jaime and Hélder Barber, "Angola: depoimentos para a História recente 1950-1976", s/l, s/d, p.16.

Congo (now DRC). At that time one would only hear about UPA.... Later I infiltrate in 1960 and went straight into Congo... taken by *soba* (chief) Pinheiro... I found there an already organized service so there was a great need to contact Luanda so that we could drop some pamphlets in full. This task was given to Matias Migueis, but when he arrived in Matadi he heard on the radio in Luanda that the PIDE was looking for him..... so I did it myself... I received the letters and pamphlets and brought them here in Angola ... delivering by hand, moving without a car, walking. From there to Ambrizete, where I took a lift to contact Father Manuel das Neves. The trip lasted 2 weeks”<sup>190</sup>

The contacts with President Holden and Father Manuel already existed through Mr. Rosário Neto. On the return João brought the priest's replies to Leopoldville.<sup>191</sup>

The role of the mariners of various nationalities conscious of the nationalist embryo marks one of the most beautiful pages of the Angolan nationalism. In addition, “the location of Matadi (a river port), situated on one of the largest African rivers, the Congo River, had favoured the expansion of the UPA's propaganda hinterland in Angola, via the Afro-American sailors.... one of them was George Barnett, who perfectly knew Lobito, as well as those persons who would form the UPA's cell in that city. Barnett was the holder of such materials, and received by nationalists such as Jorge Valentim, ... George Kayaya, Tadeu, Adão Kapilango, Lourenço (father of João Lourenço, ex Secretary-General of the MPLA) and others”<sup>192</sup>

“A delegation from Ghana that was going to Luanda, via Leopoldville to participate in an ILO meeting, met with the leadership of the UPNA acting as a courier for the deepening of its links with the brothers in Luanda, Pedro Bengue and Father Manuel das Neves. Thereafter, such links were expanded via Kimpiololó and João César Correia, with Nobre Pereira Dias, Aníbal de Melo and Neves Bendinha, who will later lead to arrival of Aníbal de Melo in Leopoldville, where he became the editor and member of the Political Bureau of the UPA”.

According to Holden Roberto, “uncle Barros organized, with the support of João Eduardo Pinock, a gigantic Angolan conference in Leopoldville. In order to contradict the Portuguese allegations that they were anti-Catholic, the meetings took place at the Saint Pierre Catholic Mission. The meeting was attended by several hundreds of Angolans, coming from all over the Lower-Congo. To avoid the Belgian rally prohibition, they met under the legal pretext of organizing a non-political gathering on ethnic and cultural matters”.” One of the decisions in this meeting was to send a letter to the Secretary-General of the UN, the Swedish Trygve Lie, condemning forced labour, the lack of educational opportunities and medical facilities in Angola and demanding an enquiry by the United Nations”. (20).

(190) Drummond, Jaime e Barber, Hélder, op.cit., p159.

(191) Ibidem.

(192) NGANGA, João Paulo, “O pai do Nacionalismo angolano. As memórias de Holden Roberto”, I vol, (1923-1974), ed. Of the author , p.55.

“Barros Nekaka, a man full of influences, in a visit to Congo of the Pastor from the United Church of American Canada, who was fighting against racial discrimination, Homer Jack, who was saying he had never heard about the situation in Angola, except from other African countries such as South Africa, South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Tanganyika, etc., having anticipated the trip to Congo, by George Houser, President of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, who also dealt with such matters....but more in depth...shortly after he arrived in Leopoldville.....uncle Barros, who spoke fluent English, went along with him very well. He was a friend of Kaunda and was already supporting the emancipation of the entire Western Africa.

It would be through George Houser, who knew George Padmore, that he will inform Kwame Nkrumah about the UPNA's interest in making the world know about the slavery in Angola. The Nkrumah's invitation to attend the 'All African People's Conference' would follow suit immediately” (21) .

João César Correia, a former UPA's freedom fighter, “... went to work as a nurse in Ambriz in 1957-59 and found that the fire was already burning.... the situation was agitated....with that thing about the existence of a movement in the Belgian- Congo (now DRC). At that time one would only hear about UPA.....Later I infiltrate in 1960 and went straight into Congo...taken by soba (chief)Pinheiro... I found there an already organized service so there was a great need to contact Luanda so that we could drop some pamphlets in full. This task was given to Matias Migueis, but when he arrived in Matadi he heard on the radio in Luanda that the PIDE was looking for him..... so I did it myself...I received the letters and pamphlets and brought them here in Angola ...delivering by hand, moving without a car, walking. From there to Ambrizete, where I took a lift to contact Father Manuel das Neves. The trip lasted 2 weeks”.

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(193) (14) Drummond Jaime and Helder Barber, *ibidem*, p.16

A delegation from Ghana that was going to Luanda, via Leopoldville to participate in an ILO meeting, met with the leadership of the UPNA acting as a courier for the deepening of its links with the brothers in Luanda, Pedro Bengé and Father Manuel das Neves. Thereafter such links were expanded via Kimpiololó and João César Correia, with Nobre Pereira Dias, Aníbal de Melo and Neves Bendinha, who will later lead the arrival of Aníbal de Melo in Leopoldville, where he became the editor and member of the Political Bureau of the UPA”

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In the memories of Holden Roberto, he says:

*...Barros Nekaka, a man full of influences, in a visit to Congo of the Pastor from the United Church of American Canada, who was fighting against racial discrimination, Homer Jack, who was saying he had never heard about the situation in Angola, except from other African countries such as South Africa, South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), Tanganyika, etc., having anticipated the trip to Congo, by George Houser, President of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, who also dealt with such matters.....but more in depth...shortly after he arrived in Leopoldville.....uncle Barros, who spoke fluent English, went along with him very well. He was a friend of Kaunda and was already supporting the emancipation of the entire Western Africa.*

*It would be through George Houser, who knew George Padmore, that he will inform Kwame Nkrumah about the UPNA's interest in making the world know about the slavery in Angola. The Nkrumah's invitation to attend the 'All African People's Conference' would follow suit immediately' .*

*Julius Kambarage Nyerere, elected in 1953 President of the Tanganyika African National Union" (TANU), founded in 1929...holding various positions until the independence...on the 9th December 1961...he arrived in Leopoldville, in March 1957.....". I will meet uncle Barros.*

*Julius Nyerere listened to us very carefully.....his argument met the UPNA's guidelines and to uncle Barros heartbeats: it is important to let the rest of the world know about the Angolan people's dilemma' .*

It was crucial for someone to go abroad to create an élan with the world. The destination was to be the UN, but the first step would have to be the participation at the “All African People’s Conference”, which would take place in the following year in Accra.

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(194) 12) Op cit, p.16.

Uncle Barros convened a meeting with the leadership of the UPNA, and I was chosen to complete such arduous task, being accountable for its success or failure. He couldn't leave without raising suspicions from the colonial authorities, due to his special status as an *assimilado* officer enjoyed at "Casa Nogueira" where he was employed. The UPNA accredited me to such an important mission which would end with the delivery of a memorandum to the UN where the Portuguese colonialism atrocities in Angola would be denounced.

There were two major reasons beyond our control that affected the trip: the absence of a passport and the high cost of the same, which required a lot of money. The acquisition of the passport was a bit of a hard task. All because of the infamous "Colonial Act" which was forbidding, at that time, the issue of passports to indigenous people. Worse still, the sinister PIDE had just been set up in Angola, extending its tentacles to the Congo. We launched a campaign to raise funds amongst the Angolan refugees in Congo, who gave their massive support by understanding the importance of making people aware of the drama of the Angolan people. However, there was major obstacle: Joseph Kasavubu, i.e. the ABAKO, Party of the Congolese Bakongo, led by him. This was because the Angolans hinterland and abroad were sending a lot of money to the leader of ABAKO, because he had promised that Angola would be independent when Congo was independent. Now, UPNA's intention to raise funds for my trip as well as its purposes, were not well accepted by Kasavubu, as it would make us a competitor for a niche he was dominating. Kasavubu, elected me and the UPNA as targets to be eliminated. In any way....a year and a few months later after my meeting with Nyerere they each contributed for the trip, about 100 000 Franc (Hundred thousand Francs), nearly US\$5000 (five thousand dollars). At that time this was an enormous amount, indicative of their commitment. , faith and goodwill of the Angolans...it was the time of awaiting.

On the way to Accra Holden said:"Before I left Brazzaville I maintain a contact with a Cameroonian called Maurice Kwame, a collaborator of the Governor of the city of Brazzaville, Father Fulbert Youlou who gave me a letter of recommendation to be produced in Douala, at a certain house I would find support.

"on the 10th September 1958 I left Leopoldville to Brazzaville...from there to Pointe Noire where I could obtain a ticket with the help of a friend...the said identity document said I was from Cabinda so that I could take a bus that would take us to the Port where we would take the boat to Douala (Cameroon)...There was there a tight control...and they granted me a visa for 3 months....though I was detained later". Later, in spite of the *bitterness he left for Accra*.

" At the Accra airport they were waiting for me, as a result of the communication of the High Commissioner in Lagos. There was a big board with the following wording: "*Welcome Mr. Holden Roberto*". This was on the 25th September 1958, 13 days after I left Pointe Noire, I was landing in Accra (Ghana) "

*And he adds that:*

(...) by mid-November 1958, the African delegations were arriving in Accra to commence the “All African People’s Conference” which started on the 5<sup>th</sup> December of the same year.

It was the greatest and most important forum of African agglutination, up until then, marking an unprecedented turning point in the fight against colonialism and in the positioning of the African nationalism. An era of real discovery. The agitation was total. The continent was overjoyed. Kwame Nkrumah would be the first African leader to achieve independence and tried to propagate, at all costs, the new flavour that invaded his soul – freedom!

Africa was awakening at the flavour of the young altruists in search of independence. For the first time, Africa and the world would hear about the will of the Angolan people to rise to independence and heard about the serious violations of the human rights committed by the Portuguese colonists, such as forced labour, land expropriation, beatings and banishments. The UPA’s message was thus lunched, with its hunger for freedom being contagious to numerous political and diplomatic supports to the peace and justice loving peoples. The fantastic Pan-American hive enabled me to meet, for the first time, Franz Fanon, mystified in the world by his famous book “Peau Noire, Masques Blancs” and his anti-colonial posture. Fanon was worried with Angola. He knew Lúcio Lara, Mário Pinto de Andrade and Viriato da Cruz in Tashkent, Russia, in 1958 in the first meeting of Afro-Asian writers.

But it was the intransigence of António Oliveira Salazar in maintaining the overseas territories and refusing the dialogue towards a peaceful transition that led the UPA in various diplomatic contacts, participating in international platforms to seek supports. Thus, Holden Roberto says: “ I left Congo in 1958, during September, to go to Ghana where I attended the I Conference of the Colonized African Peoples at that time...from there I was informing the Portuguese Government. “Some letters I wrote to Salazar and, at the same time, articles in newspapers to really explain the real Angolan situation. But there was no reply” ().

*“On the 22nd November 1961, I submitted to the 4th Committee of the General assembly of the UN a memorandum wherein I placed Portugal’s recognition of the right to self-determination of Angola as a condition sine qua non for any solution in Angola. In this diplomatic undertaking I brought with me the UPA’s General-Secretary, the young Jonas Savimbi who, for the first time was visiting New York and would come across the corridors of high politics.”*<sup>195</sup>

### 3.7.3. UNITA

UNITA’s foreign policy, according to the decisions in its congresses, would have been guided by the following principles:

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(195) cf. Memórias p124

To eliminate all the foreign military bases in national territory; non participation in any military alliance or pact; to conduct a progressive policy that would ensure our independence and national sovereignty; to revoke all unfair and irregular treaties created by the Portuguese colonial regime in favour of Angola; to unreservedly support all movements fighting genuinely for the liberation of Africa; to support completely and entirely the struggle of all brothers of African ascendancy, both in the motherland and abroad.

Tanzania and Zambia, after their independence, were the two African countries harbouring and providing material and diplomatic support to various refugees young members of various political organizations of Southern Africa, such as Angola, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

Before the foundation of UNITA,

*“... Dr. Savimbi redoubled himself in Zambia, in various contacts with persons who could join the new cause: Gaston Xaka, Moisés Camimbo, Daniel Muliata, Roal Kanguende Mbunda, Muataipi, Jakanjila and Sambambi. They were all of older age, with a lot of experience and cognizant of the situation in Angola. In this way, a working group was formed to analyse the various issues related with the way forward. It was in this way, as wise as spectacular, that we created, in Lusaka our centre of operations”*<sup>196</sup>

As regards Zambia, “... President Kaunda told the UNITA leadership:

(...) I am going to politically close my eyes, I don't know if Unita exists or not, just do your work, I have to support all those who are fighting for their country, be it the UPA, MPLA or UNITA, whoever wants to do its work you may do so, but the movements that are recognized by the OAU are the FNLA and the MPLA. Now comes UNITA, therefore do your work, but just don't sabotage the railway because it's through it that our copper flows towards Lobito”<sup>197</sup>.

Martinho Epalanga added another information stating that:

*“We counted also with the invaluable support of certain members of the Government of Tanzania. They were mostly personal friends of Dr. Savimbi, such as Oscar Kambona and Hanga, then Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, respectively; Kalume, another friend of Dr. Savimbi and a very important person in Dar-es-Salaam, so joined in this venture in our favour”*<sup>198</sup>.

*In respect to the diplomatic action it was found that:*

*“...the international context weighed immensely so that the precursors of the national liberation struggle, the old Jonas, Agostinho Neto and Holden, would had assumed the position they assumed in 1975. I always say that each one of them came to Alvor accompanied by an allied: the North Americans, the Soviets, the Chinese, in a way, and the foreign component weighed heavily”*<sup>199</sup>.

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(196) Samuel Chiwale

(197) Samuel Martinho Epalanga

(198) Samuel Chiwale

(199) Paulo Lukamba “Gato” former Secretary-General of UNITA

*The political, ideological and military preparation of the key UNITA leaders were offered and sponsored by CHINA*

*"... China had stimulated the liberation movement, gave its moral support, more than material support, it inspired some of the leaders. Old Jonas, for example, his project, when one speaks so often of Muangai, it's none else than a socialist model project inspired by the Chinese where old Jonas has given his retouch so as to adopt it to the reality of Africa and Angola at that time"<sup>200</sup>.*

*Taking into account the geographic position of Angola, Mao Tse Tung said once to Savimbi that "...by the frailty of the political institutions and their leaders, often the aid we are going to grant will not be enough, but we will go to fight, do the fighting"<sup>201</sup>. Later, UNITA effectively "received boats, the Chinese had sent boats with war materials that went to Tanzania, but they never reached UNITA"<sup>202</sup>.*

*"However, the foreign missions of the movement were being done by others such as, for example the old Puna, who is in Canada as an ambassador, the late Samuel Chingunji and old Chiwale. These were the ones who were travelling to Zambia for political and diplomatic contacts"<sup>203</sup>.*

In 1967 the region that extends from Cuando Cubango, more exactly from the border of Angola with South West Africa, south of Malanje, was declared a liberated area. Samuel Chiwale stated:

*"they helped to publicise UNITA's struggle in countries where it had no representation". In December that year the President went abroad seeking diplomatic support, weapons and medicines. Abroad it was supported by the diplomatic representations made up by Jorge Ornelas Sangumba and Tony da Costa Fernandes, in London; Ruben Tchiakumbi Sanjolo and José Ndele, in Switzerland; Jeremias Chitunda and Joaquim Ernesto Mulato, in the USA; Ester Makanga, in Zâmbia and the High Congo (Katanga). SWAPO, the ANC and ZANU, of Zimbabwe*

*Jorge Ornelas Sangumba, is taken by Jorge Valentim as "...an ideological combatant doctrine and pragmatic and a great diplomat, with gestures of courtesy typically British"<sup>204</sup>*

When in dr. Savimbi's exile in Cairo,

*"...he created the High Council Abroad under his leadership, assisted by Tony da Costa Fernandes, Ornelas Sangumba, Estela Makunga, N'Zau Puna and other companions related with the the organization. This Council was crucial in organizing the return of Savimbi to Angola"<sup>205</sup>*

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(200) Idem

(201) Interview with General Abílio Kamalata Numa, Secretary-General of UNITA

(202) Idem

(203) Samuel Martinho Epalanga

(204) Op.Cit. p.209

(205) Samuel Chiwale

### 3.8. Difficulties with the OAU (Organization of African Unity)

The leaders of the MPLA were expecting that the creation of the OAU would enhance the support required to accelerate the liberation struggle against the Portuguese colonialism and to assist in uniting the actors of the liberation process. However, the position of some member states had made the relationship difficult with the recently created continental organization. The OAU was, in some occasions, accused by the MPLA for having acted with partiality in the issues of unity of the liberation movements, such as between the MPLA and the FNLA. These deviations had a lot to do with the issues of unity of the Angolan liberation movements, such as with the FNLA. The OAU's Liberation Committee, recently created, came immediately into action and on the 5th July 1963 drafted a special resolution which created a Mission of Good Offices to resolve the problem of unity. Such mission, which travelled to Leopoldville, had the following objectives:

- (i) To insist, firstly, in the creation of a common front between the MPLA and the FNLA;
- (ii) To decide on who from the FNLA and the MPLA would receive the OAU's support, as the Committee had such a prerogative
- (iii) To adopt the criteria of selection which would be based on the presence on the ground with the populations.
- (iv) Unfortunately, this mission failed. After listening the input of the FNLA leaders and of Viriato Cruz, who was already in dissidence with the new MPLA leadership, and under the influence of the Congolese Government, the mission failed to promote the desired unity, recognizing solely the FNLA and the GRAE. It also demanded the MPLA and the other organizations to be integrated into the GRAE.

This failure had to do with the fact that the mission was made up of countries sympathetic to the GRAE, such as Algeria, Guinea-Conakry, Congo- Leopoldville, Nigeria, Uganda and Senegal. As a result of such a recognition, some African countries who had not yet recognized the GRAE, did it forthwith, with the consequent MPLA's isolation.

The MPLA's leadership reacted immediately by drafting a memorandum<sup>206</sup> addressed to the OAU Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in Dakar, Senegal. In this memorandum, the MPLA accused the Mission of Good Offices of the OAU of dividing the Angolan nationalist movement and denounced the North-American meddling which pressure over the GRAE would not allow its leader Holden Roberto to have any unity actions with the MPLA. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the OAU noted the memorandum and have decided that the matter be again taken up in the following Summit

(206) Cf. *Aide-Mémoire sur la Question Angolaise à l'intention de la Conférence de L'OUA au niveau des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères Présenté par le Mouvement Populaire de Libération de L'Angola* – M.P.L.A. Lagos, 24 th February 1964. CDIH bookcase 1, folder n°5.

of Heads of State of the OAU, to take place in Cairo, Egypt in February 1964. This Summit enabled the MPLA to submit its viewpoints on the issues of unity of the Angolan nationalism, and to raise the support of some African countries.

The Ghanaian delegation to the Summit criticised the action of the Mission of Good Offices and the new President of the Congo-Brazzaville, Massamba-Debat informed his counterparts that his country was harbouring Angolan combatants from the MPLA. These two delegations pressed towards a review of the OAU's position in regard to the unity of the liberation movements. In view of its failure and inability to resolve this issue, the Committee of Good Offices was dissolved.

The Summit had then decided to form a Committee, composed by Ghana, Egypt and Congo-Brazzaville to examine the military situation in Angola. The decision at issue did not obtain the agreement of the Presidents of Tunisia, Habib Bourgiba, the Guinea-Conakry, Sekou Toure, of Algeria, Ben Bella and of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Committee was proposing, once again, to reconcile the MPLA and the FNLA, and then to create a military-political Front in order to coordinate the military and diplomatic actions against the Portuguese colonialism. Jonas Savimbi (1934-2002)<sup>207</sup>, till then the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GRAE, taking advantage of the OAU Summit of Heads of State and Government being held in Cairo at the time, criticised Holden Roberto's policies and thus resigned on the 16<sup>th</sup> July 1964. Savimbi left the FNLA and went to Brazzaville to contact the MPLA and made an agreement. Under the terms of this agreement, the MPLA would take some FNLA's freedom fighters, about 30 or 40, amongst which Nzau Puna, while Savimbi himself, Lihauca, Kalundungu (who was the UPA's Chief of Staff), totalling some 5 members, would still remain outside taking into account the vision of the West. Once the agreement was obtained, many of the freedom fighters that were hosted would prove to be excellent MPLA's combatants and militants. The other resignation was that of João Lihauca, Director of the Angolan Refugees' Assistance (SARA) in protest against the disorganization and impediments against the struggle for the liberation of Angola under the responsibility of Holden Roberto.

The above events were brought to the attention of the OAU and in its II Summit, the continental organization has decided to create a Tripartite Committee whose mission was to re-examine the Angolan question, in p Regions. This report convinced the members of the Committee to visit the MPLA's headquarters in Brazzaville.

The members of the Tripartite Committee (Ghana, Egypt and Congo-Brazzaville) met, separately in Cairo on the 12<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> October 1964 with the delegations of the two liberation movements. In this meeting, the MPLA delegation made itself available to cooperate with the Committee, for the immediate creation of a single front. It submitted a presentation about its military activities in the I and II military Regions. This report convinced the members of the Committee to visit the MPLA's headquarters in Brazzaville.

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(207) See **Declaration de Monsieur Jonas Savimbi Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du GRAE, estante 1, pasta n° 5, CDIH**. Cf. Bookcase I Lihauca, folder n° CDIH.

As well as its bases hinterland in the country, such as the recently created II Region in Cabinda. Referring to the MPLA's diplomacy, Lúcio Lara made the following comments:

*(...) As I said, there was great diplomatic activity, and at that time then came the decolonization committee of the UN, and the MPLA made a major presentation to such a committee on the different areas it visited. It visited parts of Cabinda, i.e. it did not go to Cabinda, rather the Congo-Brazzaville, and it also visited the East and in the 2 fronts the MPLA had the opportunity of, through these committees (I don't know if the comrades were aware of this)...work in this fashion – they met and the liberation movements would make presentations. Then they request all the countries represented in the committee. Generally all the major powers were represented in the committee, the socialist countries were generally also represented and, in general some African countries, of both progressive and reactionary countries, Tunisia was always there (...) (reactionary) but Algeria was almost always there, this time in a more progressive position (...)*

With the FNLA, the Committee encountered some challenges. After the meeting in Cairo, the FNLA representatives didn't show their availability to receive, in Kinshasa, the OAU delegation. This immediately led the OAU delegation to conclude that the FNLA's military activity was inactive so it then recognized the MPLA, having proposed to the African Heads of State the granting of full financial, diplomatic support to the MPLA. In spite of all promises of support, the MPLA had not received a substantial aid capable of ending its logistical problems. All such diplomatic activity did not enable reconciliation, nor the formation of a political and military front. Unfortunately, the military action of the FNLA against the MPLA had intensified to such an extent that the desired unity was, at the outset, doomed to be compromised. The Committee had preferred to create the Neutral Military Committee composed by Senegal, Ethiopia and Cameroon. This committee was charged to assess the results of the armed struggle in Angola and to monitor the guerrilla action. Even so, the MPLA was willing to negotiate another agreement. The meeting took place in Cairo, Egypt, on the 10<sup>th</sup>-13<sup>th</sup> October 1966<sup>208</sup>. Once again, the FNLA broke the agreement and cancelled it on the 15<sup>th</sup> October. Holden Roberto, in a Press conference, in Kinshasa, stated that their delegates had no mandate to take decisions on behalf of the FNLA. The MPLA, who had at the time, the I, II and III military Regions, reaffirmed the legitimacy of the agreement and was expecting the Government of Congo-Leopoldville to allow the transit of its logistics and of its freedom fighters to the I political and military region.

### 3.8.1. The Afro-Asian Countries

The exit of Viriato da Cruz and his companions from the MPLA's leadership caused a deep crisis in the dynamics of the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonialism, in that, as a result of that there was a decrease in the international support

(208) The meeting was mediated by OAU delegates and of the Tripartite Committee, such as Naguib El Sadir (Egypt), Quashie (Ghana), Albert Elenga (Congo- Brazzaville), Olufolabi ( Deputy Secretary-General of the OUA) and Sammy Sadik (Deputy Secretary-General of the OAU Liberation Committee). Cf. MBATH, Martial in the said communication, p.15.

It was receiving, especially from China, Algeria and Czechoslovakia. This detraction was aggravated with the diplomatic activity developed by Viriato da Cruz in the African capitals and in various European embassies in Africa, especially those countries identified with the national liberation struggle. The MPLA's leadership had to redouble its efforts to reverse the unfavourable situation. At that time all the attention of the supporters of the Angolan liberating cause were turned to the FNLA which, in 1963, had created the GRAE. Such Government had been recognized by various African States who had a considerable weight in the decision making of various regional organisms such as the OAU. The GRAE's recognition by Congo-Leopoldville, Algeria, Tunisia and other African countries slowed down the MPLA's affirmation in the African arena. That was the reason why the leadership of the movement conducted contacts at the OAU in order to have such recognition revoked because it lacked the political realism by not taking into account the other Angolan political forces fighting the Portuguese colonialism. The diplomatic efforts developed during the Constitutive Conference of the OAU, organized in Addis-Ababa, by the MPLA's delegation were able to result in the continental organization sending to Leopoldville of a mission of good offices in order to study the situation which was affecting in a great manner the efforts of the Angolan liberation struggle.

Lúcio Lara (...) *The tripartite committee had played a great role, and in October 1966, meeting for the 5th time, had the mission to join the two movements together to finally seek to reach such platform, and Holden Roberto wasn't present. We did our propaganda, we started to request the review of Holden's recognition. Holden had been recognized by a number of African countries and it was then, at the time, that we started to launch the slogan "it's necessary to stop recognizing Holden", and that was a very difficult task, as no African country wanted to be the first to withdraw its recognition, because that was tantamount to admit having committed a mistake. And we then, at the tripartite committee this time launched the slogan "it's necessary to withdraw Holden's recognition", because such recognition by African countries was delaying the liberation movement of Angola, in that it wasn't favouring us, it was forcing Congo-Kinshasa to support Holden and we could not therefore advance the real liberation struggle. So, on that basis, we started to commence a major campaign while, at the same time, we were demanding the release of Holden's political prisoners. We even published a list with the names of hundreds of comrades who were in prison, those who had been murdered by Holden, and a report.*

Before the OAU's landing in Leopoldville on the 10th July 1963 the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Angola (FDLA) was formed by the MPLA, UNTA and MNA. As well as the

The Portuguese Expression Congolese Association (Ngwizako), the Movement in Defence of Angolan Interests (MDIA) and the Bakongo Association of Angola (Nto-Abako).

The parties and associations that joined the MPLA were those that were opposed to the FNLA's performance. During the act of the formation of the FDLA, Agostinho Neto stated that the organizations was "ready to negotiate immediately and without prejudice with the FNLA with the aim of forming a Single Front". With the arrival of the OAU's Committee of Good Offices to Leopoldville, Agostinho Neto introduced himself as the leader of the FDLA, and this was immediately rejected by the leader of the delegation, alleging that it had been mandated to speak to the MPLA and the FNLA and none else. Agostinho Neto, committed to the agreements made with the other political forces, refused to talk on behalf of the MPLA. With such refusal, the mission received Viriato da Cruz. Before the members of the said mission, Viriato da Cruz held that the MPLA, following its internal crisis, was undone, divided, without a military component and without any structure hinterland Angola and was confined to developing propaganda and diplomatic activities in the international arena. Such Viriato da Cruz' positioning had deeply influenced the report produced at the end of the visit, which was only made public on the 13<sup>th</sup> July. As expected, in such report the Committee has subscribed Viriato da Cruz' statements and has recommended that:

- a) The FNLA was to be deemed the sole Front fighting for the liberation and that all the aid to the liberation struggle of Angola was to be supplied via the Government of the Republic of Congo-Leopoldville.
- b) The establishment of other fronts in Angola was to be discouraged;
- c) The MPLA forces were to join the FNLA<sup>209</sup>.

This decision has galvanized Viriato da Cruz and his colleagues who were seeing in it the materialization of their old aspiration to integrate the GRAE and the FNLA, a fact that came to occur. Holden Roberto appointed Viriato da Cruz as Minister of Foreign Affairs. However, such alliance would not last for long due to the ideological incompatibility of the two leaders (Viriato and Holden Roberto). The Portuguese journalist João Paulo Guerra quotes an article of the Deputy-President of the PDA, Antoine Matumoma, published in the *Courier d'Afrique*, of the 5<sup>th</sup> February 1962. In this article, this leader explains the reasons that lead the FNLA not to form a wide front with the MPLA.

*"Almost all of the material and financial aid to UPA come from the USA or, more specifically, from the North American Committee for Africa. Such financial aid is granted on condition that the UPA will not join the MPLA or with any other front integrating the MPLA".*<sup>145</sup>

(209) Pursuant to this report the FNLA and the GRAE were, between August and October 1963, recognized by 32 African States and even maintained conversations with sectors of the Portuguese opposition represented by General Humberto Delgado. Cf. GUERRA, João Paulo, *Memórias das Guerras Coloniais*, Porto, Afrontamento, p.150.

The entire FNLA's route from the start of the armed struggle in Angola was to fight against another nationalist movement, in this case being the MPLA and Holden Roberto admitted this behaviour in an interview granted to the magazine *Revolution Africaine*, of 24th August 1964 where he implicitly assumed such hostility towards the MPLA, forgetting that the main enemy was the Portuguese colonialism. Here are some extracts of the interview:

*“Question: They say you gave orders to intercept and annihilate the MPLA's columns attempting to infiltrate into Angola.*

*Holden Roberto's answer: It's true.*

*Question: And was the order executed?*

*Answer: Yes*

*Question: May I know the reason for such step?*

*Answer: These columns tried to cross a territory controlled by us, without requesting our permission.*

*Question: And what if these Angolans had asked for a free pass? Would you grant it?*

*Answer: No.*

In this part of the interview it is clear that the hostility towards the MPLA wasn't a mere chance.

The GRAE's support increased and the MPLA's isolation as a fact. In fact, the MPLA's delegation headed by Agostinho Neto, who travelled to Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) to participate in the OAU Ministerial Conference was received with a cold shoulder. With such international recognition being enhanced, the GRAE begun developing acts of persecution and arrest of MPLA's militants who would not adhere to such Government, thus creating a climate of insecurity that would not allow the movement in Leopoldville <sup>210</sup>. The dispersion of some militants became a fact. The intellectuals of the MPLA were the first to abandon Congo. Some went to Algeria while others dispersed into Europe and America. Those left started to transfer gradually and underground to Brazzaville at a time when there was a military coup d'état that ousted President Florbert Youlou. However, in spite of these internal crisis, the difficulties in the relationship with the FNLA, and with the Congo-Leopoldville Government, which influenced other African Governments to stop supporting the MPLA, its leadership developed a diplomatic action towards renewing the good relationship with some African governments, such as the Algerian of Ben Bella. The Algerian Government granted the military camp of Chateau Dun where MPLA and FRELIMO freedom fighters were trained. It also offered migration facilities with the issue of passports, travel airfares, weapons and logistical support. Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana and Sekou Touré's Guinea assisted with the issue of passports, offices, financial support and military training to guerrilla fighters, essentially in Accra.

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(210) The MPLA's militants arrested by the Congolese authorities included Daniel Chipenda and António Condesse de Carvalho (Toca), retired Admiral in the Angolan Navy who is currently Angola's Ambassador in the Republic of Cuba and formerly Mozambique. Cf. RODRIGUES, Deolinda *Diário de um exílio sem regresso*, Luanda, Nzila, p.46.

One should not forget the aid received by the MPLA from the Moroccan Government. It was in the Moroccan city of El Kasbatala where the first contingent of freedom fighters was formed. In this group were Agostinho Neto and Mário Pinto de Andrade, José Mendes Carvalho “Hoji Ya Henda”. In addition, too military training Morocco granted financial and logistic support, passports to facilitate travels of leaders and freedom fighters. It should be remembered that Morocco was the country of destination when comrade President Agostinho Neto escaped from prison in Lisbon in 1962<sup>211</sup>. Sudan and Egypt and Egypt also offered some support, such as military training, weapons, transit facilities, logistics and other materials essential for the armed struggle for the national liberation.

### 3.8.2. Western Europe

The MPLA relationships with Western countries were not very intense, with the exception of the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Finland). The MPLA’s diplomatic representation coordinating the entire operation in Northern Europe was based in Sweden headed by Alberto Neto. These countries have supplied some materials to the MPLA, such as propaganda, medicines and diplomatic support at the UN and in other international forums. Belgium, Holland and Italy supplied some logistical support, propaganda, medicines, medical assistance to freedom fighters, facility for the movement of MPLA leaders in their countries. The MPLA’s diplomatic representation in Rome was headed by comrade Manuel Jorge.

It was in Italy where most vivid interest was shown for the literary works of Agostinho Neto. A woman, Joyce Lussu, the wife of an Italian political leader, Emilio Lusso who, having lived for some time in Portugal, became familiar with the Portuguese language and became interested in Agostinho Neto’s poetry. After reading some of his poems and becoming interested in translating them for publication in Italy, Joyce Lussu tried to contact Neto in prison. She went to the PIDE’s headquarters, in Lisbon, with a contract from an Italian publisher with whom she was connected, with a proof of her intended visit. PIDE refused her request. And that’s how she then sought comrade Eugénia Neto and Joyce was able to compile the poems, translate and publish them in Rome, in 1963 under the title *Com Ochi Ascitt (Com os Olhos Secos)*, in a bilingual edition<sup>212</sup>. This enabled a greater opening to the MPLA in Western Europe.

In England various members of the British Labour Party expressed their solidarity to the MPLA by facilitating contacts with local humanitarian organizations, such as the *War on Want*, whose support enabled the creation of the CVAAR.

(211) See in this respect CARREIRA, Iko (2005) *Memórias*, Luanda, Nzila; JÚNIOR, Paulo M. (1999), Luanda, INALD; BARRADAS (2005) *Neto Vida e Obra*, Lisbon; MPLA *Agostinho Neto Ensaio Biográfico*, Luanda;

(212) See in this respect the important testimony about Agostinho Neto from Acácio Barradas included in the works *Agostinho Neto: Uma Vida sem Tréguas 1922–1979*, Lisboa/Luanda, 2005, pp.62–79.

It supplied medicines, medical equipment used in the assistance to refugee populations in the Congo-Leopoldville.

In Western Germany (FRG) the Free Angola Committee was formed and led by Irmgard Bouvrier, an employee of the Frankfurt City Library. According to Edmundo Rocha (2002): “she translated into the German language the book of Mário Pinto de Andrade “*Poesia Negra de Expressão Portuguesa*” and developed an intense fund raising to support some leaders such as Viriato da Cruz, Luís de Almeida, Mário de Andrade, Lúcio Lara, as well as Angolan students such as Desidério Costa, Luísa Gaspar, Alberto Passos, inter alia<sup>213</sup>. In Belgium, the chief support to the MPLA was Prof. Pierre Legrève, editor of the magazine *La Gauche Socialiste*. He supported Viriato da Cruz, Mário Pinto de Andrade. In both Brussels and in Liège many MPLA propaganda materials were published. In France it was the leftist political organizations who enhanced the activities in support to the MPLA with fund raising, hosting of militants, transport facilities, inter alia.

### 3.9. Non-Alignment Policies and the International Solidarity

The success of any national liberation or revolutionary struggle, in spite of determinant internal factors, depends very often on external factors that play an equally important role, which can very much influence the correlation of forces on the ground. In its journey as a nationalist organization, and in its forward and backward moves, the MPLA has felt once again, during the period under review, the effects of international tension, conflicts in African politics and of the interests of the leaders of Angola’s neighbouring countries. At international level, the policy of “peaceful coexistence” between the USA and the USSR was not hiding the often-violent competition elsewhere in the world. As to the USA, this was an era where they did not only cooperate with Portugal (a NATO member and owners of the Azores, where the USA had an important military base) but also supported the survival of the white minority regimes in Southern Africa, thus curbing their support to the liberation movements.

The MPLA upheld the non-alignment movement as its foreign policy and actively sought to be present in all important events of the Non-Alignment Movement since its creation. The alliances were being formed according to the anti-imperialist perspective. During this phase the anti-American Vietnamese struggle gained relevance. In addition to Vietnam and Southern Africa the Palestinian struggle led by the PLO was also a dominant reference. The MPLA and sister organizations of the CONCP were considering themselves allies of the “progressive forces” of the world – which included, at the time, then socialist countries, the Third World revolutionary forces, as well as parties and groups which were defending, in the capitalist countries, the emancipation rights of the peoples, as well as social justice.

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(213) ROCHA, Edmundo (2002) *Angola Contribuição ao Estudo do Nacionalismo Moderno Angolano (período de 1950-1964. Testemunho e Estudo Documental*, Luanda, Kilombelombe, p. 203.

The spectrum of friendly countries and sympathetic organizations included, therefore, from members of Christian churches and Communist parties, groups of progressive students to social-democratic parties, which was reflected in the political and diplomatic of the MPLA, who sought to take advantage of the doors that were opening to create awareness onto the struggle of the Angolan people and to seek concrete support. At this stage of the struggle, there were three issues that occurred frequently in the MPLA's declarations,<sup>214</sup> as warning call to the international public opinion for the plight of the Angolan people.

1. To denounce the collaboration between the Portuguese capitalism and the racist regimes of Southern Africa (South Africa and Rhodesia), including the direct South African direct military intervention in Angola and Mozambique;
2. To alert the persistent manoeuvres of the Portuguese regime and its diplomacy namely, the false promises of reforms to the colonial regime in force (such as the idea of the Lusitan or lusiad community of Marcelo Caetano), the pressure or even attempts to blackmail some African countries using, for such purposes, the economic interests (such as the use of the CFB railway and the Port of Lobito) and certain political triumphs (such as the case of the Katangese refugees in Angola, and others).
3. The criticism to the Portuguese opposition, by the manner it was referring to the colonial issue. As to the 3rd alert, Lúcio Lara, in his testimony, made the following comments:

*(...) Regardless of these features about the FNLA, our struggle in the 1st Region, Portugal lived at that time a certain euphoria of international support, that is, the imperialist countries were investing massively in Portugal, such as the case of Federal Germany, who, since the 1960s had agreements with Portugal for the granting of military bases in Portugal in Beja and to erect assembly plants for weapons. These agreements were being renewed every year, the presence of German troops, especially air force troops was becoming important, where a military airfield was built, an experimental field for a certain type of aircraft of the Federal Germany that were systematically falling, airplanes that had a certain failure. There were more than hundred aircraft of the type, Sky Master. The important thing was that Germany was investing massively in the arms field. What they're doing in Zaire, the comrades must have heard, that in Zaire there's a major German missile launching base. We should have no doubts that it's a major military base, very dangerous, there's little in the form of experimental work, far from it, that's when there was this agreement to grant a major portion of land for the airfield, air force facilities, where the Germans set up a real military base for the defence of Germany, not of Portugal. In return the Germans would send weapons, ammunition which were being used in Angola and Mozambique, NATO weapons, a hospital for the mutilated of the colonial wars, that is, those soldiers that were injured by in our landmines, where they would lose their limbs, etc and evacuated straight into Germany where they would be treated in special military hospitals for the Portuguese.*

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(214) See for example, press conferences and speeches of Agostinho Neto in *Angola. Documentos do MPLA* – 1<sup>o</sup> vol., Lisboa, 1977.

*So, in exchange for a military presence and also a financial one, Germany has set in Portugal and at that time we published a very good document which was very successful and today is history. A nearly economic history, not very important, about the German investment in the Portuguese colonies and specially in Angola. It's relevant in that it shows Germany had its tentacles to grab a number of industrial sectors in Angola, from the iron to .....calcine. (?), being exploited by German capitals, that is the iron mining in Lobito. The railway was built for the iron minerals; the Porto de Saco was built in Moçamedes for the iron, all that thanks to German capital, so there was this important note showing that Portugal was favouring imperialist investments, particularly from Federal Germany. Well, from the USA, Portugal is also benefitting in that it is a NATO member, and America is the boss of NATO, and to ensure its security it will do anything.*

### **3.9.1. The Meeting of the OAU Liberation Committee**

The issue of the Angolan Nationalism was not just a concern for the Angolans but also to the already independent African countries and institutions. On the face of the challenges posed by the FNLA in what concerns the Angolan unity in the struggle against the Portuguese colonialism, who were the real common enemy, the OAU Liberation Committee convened a meeting in Kinshasa in January 1967, in an attempt to once again unify the nationalist actions between the national liberation movements. However, the MPLA refused to participate in such a meeting, since the ban to act in Congo-Leopoldville was still standing and the FNLA persecutions were ongoing, with arrests and executions of its militants, with no security guarantee for the MPLA delegation.

*Meanwhile, in January 1967, a meeting of the so-called Africa Liberation Committee took place in Congo-Kinshasa, that OAU Committee in which meeting we should have been attending, because we would have to attend all meetings, at that time we (...) advised we would not be present because, well, in November comrade Commander Benedito had been arrested, and there were no guarantees of security for the members of the MPLA, who were being persecuted and couldn't go to Kinshasa (...) we wrote a letter (...) to Diallo Tello, who was the OAU Secretary-General (...) and to Joseph Desiré Mobutu, and to the Secretariat (...) of the Liberation Committee, and in that letter we raised several points, especially the following: - "We were saying that since 1963 we have been banned from acting in Kinshasa, and since then our militants have been consistently been subjected to arrests and we mentioned who were them.*

*We then spoke about the problem about unity, about the Cairo agreement (the one Cairo agreement I spoke about) which was sabotaged days later with the arrest of Benedito, as well as other militants that were being arrested”.*

*We had asked (and were granted) for a military committee to be sent to the ground to investigate the fighting capacity of the FNLA and MPLA, and we were waiting for such committee which was approved by the OAU, but which had not yet come. So, we stated we could not go to Kinshasa until these issues were to be resolved, as well as the guarantee of our security in Kinshasa and for unity to be stopped from being trampled by Holden. So, this is how we therefore justified our refusal to go to Kinshasa.*

In the letter sent to the OAU Secretary-General, Diallo Telli, to President Mobutu and to the Liberation Committee, which dealt with the issue of security and the arrests of MPLA militants, we reiterated the issue of the unity and to the Cairo accords that had been sabotaged. Following the diplomatic efforts, the MPLA was invited to participate in the meeting of the UN Decolonization Committee in Kinshasa, in May the same year. Given that the situation about the prisoners was still remaining, as well as the question about the lack of security, the MPLA's leadership refused to attend the meeting.

In the inaugural session of the meeting, the Chairman of the Decolonization Committee conveyed to the Government of Congo-Kinshasa that the absence of the MPLA was prejudicing the works, as the MPLA was internationally recognized as a major political force in the struggle for the liberation of Angola. Mobutu, under pressure, sent his Minister of Foreign Affairs Justin Bomboko to approach the President of Congo-Brazzaville to persuade the MPLA to go to Kinshasa thus giving assurances about the required security. Thus, the MPLA delegation went to the meeting and made an intervention whereupon it submitted all the issues, including the problem of the prisoners and the ban on freedom of action in Congo-Kinshasa. At the end of the meeting the MPLA delegation sought Mr. Justin Bomboko to negotiate the release of the prisoners. He denied having any knowledge about the matter and meanwhile asked the MPLA to identify the number and names of the detainees by photographs, in order to intervene with the FNLA. A list was then organized with full identification and photos. The list was delivered to Bomboko who ensured would deal with the matter urgently, something that did not happen. In 1968, with all attempts being exhausted for a deal, in the same Press conference (Brazzaville, 3rd January) where he launched the slogan “*Todos para o Interior*” (All to the Hinterland), the President of the MPLA accused, for the first time in public, Congo-Kinshasa of delaying the liberation struggle for Angola. Proof of that, was in the fact that the MPLA had not been permitted to re-supply and reinforce his freedom fighters in hinterland Angola. On the other hand, the case of the Bomboko Squadron and the seizure of weapons by the Congolese army in June 1967 was still pending and connivant with the murders of MPLA militants and freedom fighters.

Amongst the “more than hundred MPLA members” arrested in Kinkuzu, the case of commander Benedito is a case in point. And he asked the OAU to acknowledge and review the “historic error” and the “wrong and calamitous decision” that led to the recognition of the GRAE.<sup>215</sup>

In this same year, at the occasion of the OAU Ministers of Foreign Affairs Meeting (Addis Ababa), the MPLA’s diplomatic campaign was intensified where the President, in February 1968, sent a letter to the Heads of State, while a file had been drafted to the Ministerial Conference, with the following main documents:

*“Apropos the unity”, a history of the MPLA’s attempts and UPA/FNLA’s refusals; “A hateful stock-taking” of arrests, murders, persecution...*

*The evolution of the correlation of forces in Angola, comparing charts of the situation of the guerrilla warfare in 1961 (UPA/FNLA in most of the areas), in 1964 (with the MPLA forces already in Cabinda, beyond the 1<sup>st</sup> RPM) and in 1967, where the MPLA already features in parts of the 3<sup>rd</sup> RPM and an expanded 1<sup>st</sup> RPM towards Kwanza-North and Malanje, whereas the FNLA is featured as controlling only the areas close to the border. The case of commander Benedito, member of the MPLA leadership, who was still detained in Kinshasa.*

“The meddling of foreign forces in conjunction with the Portuguese colonialism”. “What MPLA expects from the OAU” – above all “freedom of movement” in Congo-Leopoldville, review of the recognition of the GRAE, release of prisoners, return of weapons seized and exclusive support to the MPLA by the OAU. The Ministerial Conference criticised the Committee of 5 (Congo-Brazza, Congo-Leo, Egypt, Ghana and Algeria) for not producing results – and the committee explained that the MPLA had imposed the condition for negotiations for the release of prisoners in Kinshasa and the return of weapons. The Conference recommended the review of the GRAE status and for the creation of a climate favourable to the FNLA-MPLA negotiations. And in August 1968 (Algiers), the OAU Council of Ministers recommended the withdrawal of the GRAE’s recognition. From the 22<sup>nd</sup> April to the 3<sup>rd</sup> May 1969, an OAU Military Committee, made up by Algeria, Congo-Brazza, Egypt and Zambia visited the MPLA liberated areas at its invitation. Due to the intransigence of the Government of Kinshasa, who refused MPLA’s transit in its territory, the Committee was unable to visit the 1<sup>st</sup> region but did visit the various detachments and localities of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Political and Military region of the Eastern Front. This Committee, who was accompanied by the MPLA’s President himself, was able to understand and confirm the struggle led by the MPLA and the achievements obtained at the area of operations shown in the liberated areas. By mid-1971, the MPLA’s diplomatic action experienced one of its good moments: in its annual Summit in June that year, the OAU withdrew its recognition of the GRAE (not to the FNLA) and mandated Kaunda, Mobutu, Nyerere and Ngouabi to seek a reconciliation between the FNLA and the MPLA.

(215) For this paragraph and the following, see \*Marcum, pp. 140-1] [LARA Palestras], [cf.também TALI, I: 328-330]

The situation in 1971 and 1972 brought many difficulties on the ground to the MPLA, as we shall see further, along with subsequent internal problems. The FNLA, in turn, after serious incidents that occurred in its Kinkuzu camp in 1972, had received substantial reinforcements from the Mobutu government, who had even permitted it the generalized “recruitment” of young people amongst the exiled or emigrant Angolans. It also attempted closer links with China, from which it received some aid. In this context, and on the face of the need to open the space in neighbouring Zaire to the MPLA freedom fighters, it became necessary to compromise for unity, though not everybody agreed to such decision. Some feared the MPLA might become weakened, and lose its revolutionary character in such alliance.

Others felt that the MPLA might shift to the Northern front many of its human and material resources it had in the Eastern Front. Daniel Chipenda, in turn, took advantage of the climate of doubt to propagate the idea that it might be an alliance “of those of the North” to the detriment of “those of the South” (yet, he and his supporters would later join the FNLA in 1974 (...)). Presidents Mobutu and Nguabi promoted on the 31<sup>st</sup> May and from the 4<sup>th</sup>-6<sup>th</sup> June 1972, in Brazzaville, meetings between the MPLA and the FNLA. The MPLA delegation included President Neto, Lúcio Lara, Jacob Caetano (Immortal Monster) and Inácio Baptista. The FNLA was represented by Holden Roberto, Johnny Eduardo, Ngola Kabangu, André Massaki, inter alia. The outcome was “an agreement of principle” and the commitment to work towards unity. The discussions re-commenced in November in Kinshasa. After delicate negotiations, on the 13th December, under the auspices of the OAU, Agostinho Neto and Holden Roberto signed an agreement to join nationalist forces in the struggle against colonialism. In addition to Mobutu, there were the Ministers of Foreign Affairs from Zambia, Tanzania, Congo and Zaire. The agreement contemplated a Supreme Council for the Liberation of Angola (CSLA) to be presided by the FNLA, with the MPLA to be heading the Military Council and the Unified Command. The GRAE (till then still recognized by Zaire) ceased to exist. The first meeting of the structures was expected to take place in February 1973. But, once again, the agreement got no further than the drawing board.

## Chapter IV – The Generalization of the Armed Struggle

**Lúcio Lara** show how difficult the hurdles proved to overcome in order to supply the MPLA 3<sup>rd</sup> Region, which was located in the East of Angola, with weapons and supplies;

*On the 18th May 1966, the Eastern Front was opened (...) there was the first battle in which a good combatant died (...) a good MPLA militant, which was comrade Cuidado, I think his name was Chiringueno, who is more or less forgotten by those who were there, there is one survivor from such battle, who is Major Kanhangulo, who is in Malanje, and he gets very upset when he tells us “ you forgot about Cuidado, because Cuidado was the first comrade to fall in the Eastern Front”. That’s why I’m speaking here about him, we must not really forget some of these comrades whom we don’t talk about and who have had some role in our history (...) didn’t convince anybody, and so it required a lot of work for us to impose our presence (...)*

*As the only ones who really accepted our presence, with our weapons in hand, were Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa were fighting against us, Zambia and Tanzania were tolerating us until the end. Suffice it to say that when we did the war at the 3rd region, our weapons were being landed (...) in the Port of Tanzania. We would move them underground (...) to Zambia, in drums full of petrol and weapons, i.e. we would weld the top of the drums, put the guns inside, closed the drums, fill them with petrol and, like in Zambia,(...) there was no petrol, petrol was coming all from Tanzania, our trucks would pass as they would be carrying petrol but they were full of guns, practically to the end of the struggle (...) only by the last part of the armed struggle would Zambia ordered the guns to be brought from Tanzania to be delivered to us at the border (of Angola). Obviously, we can today say that more than 50% of these guns were being delivered slowly, they didn't give them all (...) So you can see that it wasn't easy, everything was hard but we were the only movement that would have all the characteristics of the MPLA, to go from one front into the other, from Cabinda to the 3rd region, the front with the border with Zambia, we had to move thousands of km, partly by aircraft or by boat, others by trucks, from Cabinda to Brazzaville, by train or trucks. In Brazzaville one would take a flight to Dar-es-Salaam. Sometimes to go to Dar-es-Salaam we had to go via Nigeria, and from Nigeria to Ethiopia, from Ethiopia to Kenya and from Kenya to Dar-es-salaam. In Dar-es-Salaam we finally had our trucking system (our own!) which would take 3, 4 or 5 days, depending on the route to Lusaka. From Lusaka there would be another 3- or 4-days travel, with truckloads, and we always had trouble with the Zambian Police and with the Zambian armed forces (always!). Not one single truckload would arrive without trouble.*

LUZIA INGLÊS who managed to survive during all that time, was in the 1st Military Region with his relatives and she compares the life conditions of the freedom fighters of this and the 3<sup>rd</sup> Region where she fought:

*(...) In 1963, before we left to the bush to seek refuge in Kinshasa. The attack lasted, more or less, three months. It started in September and ended by the end of the year. My sister was going with the three children who could not run as us. They went to the tight forests, where the families were hiding. And the people who could run away more easily were in the open areas. The enemy started the attack by the tighter areas. They launched there the para-bats. The troops moved by the routes used by the populations. And the people were surprised by dawn when they were sleeping. My sister was surprised with the 3 children. The people who were nearby managed to escape. She grabbed the younger one to escape but remembered the other 2, who were weakened and could not escape and started to shout:*

*«-Mom, mom, mom»*

*She was a mother so she got back. And when she turned back, she was shot by machine gun bullets.*

*One soldier approached and said:*

*«- This one is dead. Let's take the kids»*

*We went together to Kinshasa, to the boarding school, in Brazzaville. We had our military training and went to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Region, in the Moxico area. There the guerrilla warfare was more advanced and organized. The MPLA already had automatic weapons, military boots, uniforms, soap, hygienic and sanitary conditions that were different than those at the 1<sup>st</sup> region, where we lived like savages. Not here where we would now have supplies sent by friendly countries, food, milk, clothes, batteries, we had radios when we could listen to the news. This was in 1968, I was 20 years old.*

*On the 22nd October 1968, in the 3rd Military Region, at the Moxico Province, at the Mandume base, the enemy had a major attack, which lasted 3 months, with constant bombing, pursuits, even the para-bats. It was meant to finish the MPLA. They did a long job, they knew it. The invasion and bombing started in October and only ended in December. In this invasion, in October, the bombing started at about mid-day and finished at the end of the day. It involved more than 10 aircraft. But only 5 people died. Our tactics stood, we had underground shelters. The people escaped, but it was difficult to use the underground shelters because, we understood that the invasion was to be accompanied by the Infantry and by para-troops. And when there were para-troops, as the aircraft was bombing, they would surround us and then advance to see if they could catch people alive. We were able to evacuate a base where there were more than three hundred people, with families, women, children, military, as well as the boarding school with young people studying some of whom studying in their second year of the high school. With the practice we had, with our daily training against attacks we were able to save ourselves. But five people died, such as my brother, a nurse and two military men. And one child was kidnapped, where he was still to date with his godfather, who is a Portuguese general.*

During this period the diplomatic activity was marked by a winding and steep roadmap, as a result of the parallel activity of those who opposed the movement. Additional blockages to the MPLA's diplomatic activity included the recognition of the GRAE by the OAU and the Congo-Leopoldville's hostility. In this respect the diplomatic front of the MPLA was personally led by comrade Agostinho Neto who, between the 17<sup>th</sup> and the 23<sup>rd</sup> January 1963 visited the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The visit was prepared by the MPLA's representative office in Bonn, made up by Luís de Almeida, Desidério da Graça, Maria Luzia Gaspar and Ivette Aragão e Sousa. The President had contacts with various organizations such as the Brot Fur Die Welt (Bread for the World), a juvenile Protestant organization, the German and Angolan Students Association and visited the University of Freiburg. He further had contacts with the delegation of the Social-Democratic Party headed by Vice-President Karl-Schmidt.

In May 1965, President Agostinho Neto attended the IV Conference for the Solidarity to the African Asian Peoples, in Accra, Ghana. This was a sovereign opportunity to clarify the participants about the results of the internal crisis of the MPLA and to request material support for the continuation of the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonialism as to the internal situation, comrade Neto stated that:

“the Angolan patriots led by the MPLA did not give in to the obstacles and, after a period of tactical setback, where it became necessary to adapt the organization to the new conditions, there were new successes and the colonial troops were suffering major losses in both men and weapons”<sup>216</sup>.

General Ouro de Angola tells how he knew about the MPLA, his incorporation and military and political training, on the 3<sup>rd</sup> Region of the Easter Angola:

*(...) one would hear about the MPLA underground. In the city of Luso there was a lot of people who knew about it, but not expanded. When the course was completed and when we returned to our commune, things were looking different. Those coming from the forced contract were saying that there was war in the North. Meanwhile the troops were conducting patrols, reinforcements in the commune police, who would take care of the administration in our locality. There was a boy who was going to Tchikului and there were MPLA freedom fighters from the MPLA to mobilize people and explaining why they were there. This was in December 1965. He returned and alerted his friends that there were troops and that the country was going to have a war. He said he saw uniformed men with new weapons and that it would be best to take care because there was going to be fighting. So, from then we were more or less being kept abreast and we were anxious to join immediately those men, where the hope was Zambia and the Congo who were already independent and we wanted also to be independent. The guerrilla war existed for the past 5 years, all done underground, some who knew that there were liberation movements that were fighting. We became suspicious when some people were starting to be arrested, some who had some knowledge, who were arrested, tortured and murdered without justification (...) they would say they had links with the terrorists, and several other accusations and so it was in the side-lines that the MPLA was around, a movement with guerrilla fighters.*

*In December, the Chefe de Posto escaped from an ambush. A tailor from Mr. Gonçalves who had a small farm in Tchikului, went to Mr. Gonçalves shop and bought a bag of salt. The shopkeeper noted that the man had bought coarse salt while normally it would have been a retail salt, so he went to report it to the Chefe de Posto (...) the only decision being taken was to leave the soba at the post and to leave to the bush at night. At 18h30, everybody, tighten here, tighten there, when at dawn on the 15th only the grass was left at the mission, as well as goats...because no one had the capacity, the corn was nearly giving the kernel, but we had to abandon everything. That's how it happened in 1966, we left on the night of the 14th (...) a week later I had made contact directly with the freedom fighters. Chief Mucongo was the one who received us then, he was from Moxico and the deputy-chief was Viriato, who died in the war, and the commander was Armando Nzinda Luaza, who died a year ago.....(...) The first freedom fighters I had contact with were from the East and I met commander Mapeada, the Political Commissar Dino Matrosse and Real World, commanders that were from the North. When we arrived at the base they thanked us for our presence, they explained us who they were, their objectives. If the white Portuguese were telling us that the freedom fighters were bandits, we were then also bandits, but for us to note who were really the bandits. Their objective was the independence of our country, to lead our country because it was already something weary (...) we had no access to schools, hospitals and were all forced to work for the masters, who were not dignifying us (...)*

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(216) DIP (1987) Agostinho Neto Textos Políticos Escolhidos, Luanda, Edições DIP, p.21.

The Portuguese didn't want to give the independence, so the MPLA thought that the only solution was to go to war. Everyone wondered how long this would take, because our intention was that it would be 2, 3, at least 4 days, 5 months because nobody really thought that this war was a protracted war. When we joined our enthusiasm was to take arms and go kill all that people, but ultimately it was necessary to comply with certain formalities, so our contact with the rebels began to give us a different vision of this country, because after all Angola was a big country, people thought that Angola was their country. We didn't know what it was and from 5th May 66 I joined the ranks of the rebels and a new a new path begun (...) We went to build the Dengue base, which was the command post, the CIR, and SAM, where we built houses, trenches, everything was beautiful. Dr. Américo Boavida participated in the meeting of the Assembly, the late commander Zaukinda, all those who participated came to the new base, a great part of them had already arrived and Dr. Américo Boavida had inaugurated the first responders course, we were preparing our trainee period but we *but we had a base a little more advanced, so one of the freedom fighters, Kantchatcha, who had come as a scout in the group of commanders left and went to his base bota-fogo and close to his base he was captured by a Portuguese patrol and brought and revealed to PIDE where the commanders and Vila Real and others were located and he was then taken to the Mué post in Cangamba. So then PIDE organized a raid and on the morning of the 25th September, SAM had already left and we also had left as well as CIR. Generally, in the morning we had a parade for the distribution of tasks.*

*(...) Faced with this new scenario the President was convinced of the colonial domination in regard to the liberation: "The arduous desire to liberate our country as soon as possible did not make us forget the nature of our struggle and our patience enables us to envisage it with optimism, but without any rush, the victorious results of our struggle"<sup>217</sup> (idem). He thanked the support of Congo-Brazzaville, who hosted the MPLA after its expulsion from Congo-Leopoldville, in finding in this country the freedom of action so essential to the enhancement of our armed struggle. "The freedom of action granted to the Angolan combatants in Congo-Brazzaville enabled our struggle, within a period of time, to progress four times more successful than in Congo-Léopoldville. This reveals the urgent need for a coordination of efforts of the revolutionary organizations in Southern Africa, to which our Solidarity Organization should give support"<sup>218</sup>. In the vision of President Neto the international solidarity was essential in order to obtain the desired liberation. Under this conviction he addressed in December 1965 a letter to all African Heads of State denouncing the unilateral declaration of independence of South Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) by the white minority headed by Ian Smith, which was contrary to the aspirations of the African peoples and a blatant challenge to the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council of the UN. This unilateral proclamation was a danger for the liberation struggles of both Angola, Mozambique, South Africa and Namibia, who were facing a colonial crusade.*

(217) DIP Agostinho Neto Textos Políticos Escolhidos, Luanda, Edições DIP, p.21

(218) Op.Cit. P.23.

#### **4.1. The First and second Detachment under the Command of Tomás Ferreira and the Nfwese massacre**

LÚCIO LARA refers to the performance of the *Sien Fuegos* Squadron and the results of its first mission in the 1<sup>st</sup> Region of the MPLA:

*(...) Meanwhile, it's exactly during this period that the Squadron "Sien Fuegos" pulled its march, more or less, at the end of 1966, moving forward to the 1st Region, where one could say it was a great success, i.e. it proved the doctrine we sustained with "Operation Macaco" that a massive operation could have results in the 1<sup>st</sup> Region, instead of sending small groups, but rather to attack in large groups. The Sien Fuegos Squadron was precisely the one we sent; in addition to the military, there were also many civilians because when the military arrived at the border there were many refugees volunteering to join the squadron; they were feeling confident and were then accepted to help carrying the ammunition, food, as these were difficult to carry, as it was too much to carry. It was then at this time the Sien Fuegos began its victorious and glorious entry.*

As to the second squadron, it wasn't so successful. In his testimony, Lucio Lara narrates the sad and uphill march by the "Kami Squadron"

*(...) it was at this time that the "Kami" started its pull, this squadron was less successful. It left at a very bad time, i.e. it left in February when the rivers were full, their guide was lost and the comrades walked for about 15 days, instead of heading south, where they thought so, they were headed east, alongside the river, which they thought it was River Loge. It was rather the Lué River, Lué the first Lué the second, because there were several up there. The comrades then changed their course and soon they found they were running out of food, so they had to correct their course until they realized there was no food left. Imagine what that was! A squadron of 200 men, with heavy stuff, where, for the first time, they were carrying rockets, ammunition for the rockets, which are heavy, their muzzles, bases and where, for the first time, they were carrying radios, and signal men, to set up a radio station in the 1st Region and to establish contact with us. Well, it was really drama in all that. To date there are still comrades who survived that Squadron. "many", there aren't many – at least a dozen of them, one being comrade Ludi, who didn't reach his destination because he was ordered to withdraw with the "weak". There were comrades who weakened to such an extent that they stayed back, they could hardly walk and were not even able to cross the river. The squadron stopped at the river and wasn't able to cross the river. They needed rafts to cross the river but there were no logs around. They had to cut logs some two, three km away, but there was no strength to even cut trees.*

*The 1st military detachment was led by Tomás Ferreira made up by MPLA militants in Matadi, of the MPLA group in Leopoldville. When coming across the existence in Matadi of a considerable number of young students and workers who fled from Angola, Tomás Ferreira travelled from Leopoldville to that locality where he mustered these young people. The purpose of his meeting was to sensitize and awaken the youngsters towards the continuity of the struggle that had begun on the 4<sup>th</sup> February 1961.*

*This was happening at the end of March of the same year. Having noticed the revolutionary enthusiasm and determination of the Youth, in the increasingly greater protest action against the Portuguese colonialism, coupled with the willingness to participate directly in the liberation of the country, a group formed by commander Tomás Ferreira, João Garcia Bires, Simão Pedro Augusto, Fernando António Brica, Manuel Augusto Borges, Francisco Alberto Carlos Mendes, some volunteers, supported by a leading and experienced guide, left Matadi at the end of March, or during the first 7 days of April 1961. Upon arrival to Tomboco, it acted within the surroundings of Lufico. The village of Tomboco was completely uninhabited. The group had two factors against it: the brutal of the tugas (nickname for the Portuguese) and equally of the UPA. The detachment didn't have a lot of war materials. At the time the war had not yet assumed a major proportion while the enemy preferred not to leave the barracks. The group as a group and in well-known places and pre-established. UPA was confined to control the most salient points in the villages and municipalities and was mounting advanced posts in the plantations, while preventing any other initiatives taken without its permission. The explosives not used by the detachment were buried somewhere next to the common border. The only weapon was a shotgun which was also used for hunting and was offered to the chief guide, who was effectively the second in command in the group. He would determine when to start the marches, where to take a rest and which path to follow. He was, doubtless, the person who best knew the terrain. The group didn't have any more ammunition and in the totally empty localities there was no food. In addition, even if there was some food, it could be a risk, as the Portuguese had the tactics to poison everything that could be used for the sustenance of the people. So wild fruits, some levees, plants, water from the rivers were the only means of sustenance of the group.*

This is how the group was formed, a group that would begin the formation of the MPLA groups and detachments of guerrilla fighters, who would later form the basis of the EPLA in Congo-Leopoldville. The military actions of these groups consisted of ambushes to Portuguese military columns when isolated, attacks to small Portuguese businesses and acts of sabotage, since these forces were still not trained to effect attacks to military bases, as would happen later. After August 1961, the struggle in Angola assumed different features. The Portuguese had triggered an offensive against Angolan patriots using large numbers of men equipped with modern equipment and well supported by the air force, which resulted in the loss of all positions conquered by the Angolan patriots, due to the violent combats. By the end of September, the MPLA Defence Department met in Brazzaville and in Leopoldville with two of its commanders (Tomás Ferreira and Benedito), who had left the operational area to inform the leadership about the military situation in Angola. The MPLA leadership decided that commander Tomás Ferreira would have to return to Angola with some weapons and ammunition purchased in Brazzaville, with political propaganda pamphlets and a strategic plan in order to face the military situation.

Accompanied by 21 freedom fighters, Tomás Ferreira left for another mission hinterland of Angola. Some days before the target, still within the District of Zaire, UPA groups of guerrillas heckled the MPLA detachment and arrested all men and the means they were carrying to Fuesse. A few days after commander Tomás Ferreira and his men were barbarically murdered by the UPA guerrillas after they had been severely maltreated.<sup>219</sup>

*Lúcio Lara (...) Well, when they entered in the Fuesse area, they found UPA agents and asked for their leader. They said the chief wasn't there, they didn't know where he was. "Go, and call him, we want to speak to him".*

*They didn't, rather they went to get reinforcements and let the comrades there at night (they made them wait until late at night) and then caught them distracted (eating Funge (maze meal), then pointed them their guns, tighten them and took them to Fuesse, which was where their headquarters was located i the area and, in Fuesse, redemption they killed them all. The only one who survived was Mendes de Carvalho, comrade Henda, the only survivor of such massacre. We had all the names of the comrades, who were combatants, carrying weapons and were in a communique, to inform about the UPA's murdering of the squadron in the Klukano area, on the 9th October 1961 in Angolan territory, where the squadron was decimated. The communique was released, with all that wording, which was drafted some religious person because it said: "bowing to the immortal memory of the said children of the Angolan people, the Steering Committee of the MPLA conveys its most profound condolences to the families and friends of the slaughtered patriots. We trust in God's justice and of the sovereign people; eternal glory to the cherished sons of the Angolan people, murdered in the field of honour, ...(...) the executioners of their brothers".*

*But it is therefore a document that still exists with the names of Daniel Gomes de Castro, Tomas Ferreira, Daniel Gomes de Castro, Manuel Belo Guimarães, João Gomes, Rui Victor Pinheiro de Melo, nicknamed "Panchito", who was a great fighter, Domingos Francisco, Sebastião Hugo Gomes, João Domingos, Joaquim dos Santos Francisco, Jacinto Mahomba, Almeida da Silva Miguel, Augusto Maringo, António Kimana, António Baixo, José Bumba Gomes, Mendes Velada, Domingos Miguel, Sebastião Gaiadungo, João Simão e Miguel Zoé Mateus. These were the comrades murdered by UPA, whose names we had. This was the first UPA's feat against our movement and others would follow.*

*This fact was known in the history of Angola as the Nfuese Massacre.*

*On the 10th October 1961, the Steering Committee of the MPLA addressed the UPA Executive a letter signed by Mário Pinto de Andrade, Viriato da Cruz, Matias Miguéis, Hugo de Menezes and Eduardo Macedo dos Santos, denouncing the fratricidal actions by the UPA freedom fighters at the Angola-Congo-Leopoldville border, with particular emphasis to the Nfuese massacre, marked by the murder of Tomás Ferreira and his men, which reads as follows: "...Since that date until today,*

(219) In accordance with the MPLA's document titled: **Relatório sobre a situação em Angola**, drafted in Conakry on the 28<sup>th</sup> November 1961.

*Remaining nevertheless vigilant and having knowledge, not without revolt, of the ill treatment inflicted by UPA members onto our compatriots, the MPLA Steering Committee waited to see what was the behaviour of the leaders of the UPA on account of this crime against the motherland that stains the dignified patriotic movement of the Angolan people. The MPLA Steering Committee protests most emphatically against such anti-patriotic act which aims to weaken the armed resistance of the Angolan people and introduces, by the UPA's initiative, the fratricide fighting in the battlefields of Angola. At the risk of this affair being immediately brought to the public knowledge, as well as of the international organizations, the Steering Committee demands the immediate release of all our compatriots. It demands the return of all weapons, ammunition and other luggage removed from our squadron and holds the UPA accountable for the lives of all of these valiant compatriots .”<sup>220</sup>*

In this context, the Steering Committee of the MPLA addressed the.....for the crimes committed in Nfuese against the MPLA freedom fighters.

## 42. UNITA

### According to General José Kalundungo,

*“The first group that left Tanzania to Zambia was the one of Massumba, Mateus Banda, Nicolau Chiukae Jeremias Kussias. They arrived in Zambia and Dr. Savimbi was also there and moved them inside. Nicolau Chiuka had been sent to Teixeira de Sousa to mobilize the people and then to proceed with the armed uprising, but he didn't apply correctly what we had learnt in China. He arrived there, organized a rally, saw all that people that witnessed what happened in independent Congo and put aside what Mao Tsé Tung had taught us, i.e. to first mobilize, then make things ripe and then to proceed with the uprising. He thought that was delaying too much. With that rally, he thought he had already prepared the armed uprising. Massumba and Banda had been sent to the 2nd Front. These had indeed mobilized a vast area from the border and Karipande, Lumbala Kakengue, Lukusse, Lumay up to the proximity of Luso. There the revolutionary seed bore fruit and then he started to attack. With good effects”<sup>221</sup>*  
Alluding to the period when he was getting politically integrated general Chiwale said that before...

*“There was no UNITA at the time. When we started with our adventures there was no UNITA. Him (Savimbi) left me in Dar-es-Salaam and left to Lusaka with instructions that he would go to Zambia to recruit young persons because he needed to recruit young Angolans for training in Cuba in order to form a Party later, in addition to the MPLA and the FNLA.....which was going to bring new blood in the patriotic sentiment of Angolans.”*

Samuel Martinho Epalanga stated that

(220) Letter of the Steering Committee addressed to the Executive of the UPA, dated October 1961, signed by members of the then SC of the MPLA.

(221) José Soma Kalundungo

*“...we learnt that Dr. Savimbi had really left the UPA and that he was based in Zambia, where he was mobilizing the people, especially the young people for training. I think that at that time the old Chiwale group, Kussia had left to China with others. So he then sent us Maria Caetano for us to go to Lusaka to find about our destination: either hinterland or abroad”.*

The following priority in the political structure of UNITA was the recruitment and training of the first military cadres for the armed combat. For this training, various countries were approached, including Algeria, Tanzania, UAR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Eastern Germany, Hungary, Soviet Union who, with the exception of the Peoples Republic of China, refused the plan for the creation of a new organization, to avoid increasing the reigning division amongst the Angolan nationalism.

With the support of China, the problem of the preparation of the first military cadres was resolved. In 1965 there was military and political training in the Political and Military Academies of Nanquim, for Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, and for Beijing Academy for messrs. José Samuel Chiwale, José Kalundungo, David Jonatão Chingunji, Tiago Sachilombo, Paulino Moisés, Jacob Inácio, Jeremias Kussia Chinyundu, Nicolau Bianco Chiuka, Isaías Massumba, Mateus Banda and Samuel Chavala Muanangola.

*“All documentation was dealt with by SWAPO. When we arrived in the Dar-es-Salaam Airport to catch the airplane we received the tickets and it was through the tickets and documents we understood we were travelling to China. We departed in a an East African Airways airplane”<sup>222</sup>.*

The understanding and involvement between SWAPO and UNITA were such that General José Soma Kalundungo said that,

*“...after the training in China, to return to Africa the eleven had to travel to Tanzania where we stayed as SWAPO members. Dr. Savimbi had a n agreement with Sam Nujoma, Kaukungua and Nelingany, who at the time was the Vice-Chairman, and Peter Nanhemba who was the Secretary, as to when we were to leave China we would travel as SWAPO members, but we would actually be UNITA, who at the time had no fame”<sup>223</sup>.*

Once in Lusaka, the UNITA cadres left secretly to Beijing via Tanzania and Kenya and in the same way returned to Angola under a particularly difficult situation, as they weren't enjoying the support of Zambia or Zaire. In the return the first eleven UNITA members to be trained in Nanquim followed different destinations, However, general Kalundungo stated:

*“The liberation struggle started with the recruitment and training of the first soldiers. UNITA's armed struggle begun on the 18th September 1966: the first attack was led by Samuimbila (Political Coordinator of the 4<sup>th</sup> Region)*

(222) See interview of Samuel Chiwale.

(223) He was the first ELNA commander, related with the FNLA and later co-founder of UNITA

*With the Kaungula attack. Thereafter was Samuel Chiwale with the Mussuma attack, which Administrative Post was Mitete, located along the river with the same name, some 12 km from Zambia”.*

*Some were captured right in the beginning of their action in Angola others gave up due to the difficulties encountered. Tony da Costa Fernandes was instructed by the Party to represent it abroad (London, Cairo and Lusaka), during the first war of liberation and all others were able to perform a very important role during the distinct stages of the movement’s struggle. .*

#### Kalundungo confirmed:

*“The first group that left Tanzania to Zambia was the one of Massumba, Mateus Banda, Nicolau Chiukae Jeremias Kussias. They arrived in Zambia and Dr. Savimbi was also there and moved them inside. Nicolau Chiuka had been sent to Teixeira de Sousa to mobilize the people and then to proceed with the armed uprising, but he didn’t apply correctly what we had learnt in China. He arrived there, organized a rally, saw all that people that witnessed what happened in independent Congo and put aside what Mao Tsé Tung had taught us, i.e. to first mobilize, then make things ripe and then to proceed with the uprising. He thought that was delaying too much. With that rally, he thought he had already prepared the armed uprising. Massumba and Banda had been sent to the 2nd Front. These had indeed mobilized a vast area from the border and Kari pande, Lumbala Kakengue, Lukusse, Lumay up to the proximity of Luso. It was in this front that Dr. Savimbi had his first entry”. Jeremias Kussia had been assigned to open the third front in Kalunda, but was arrested by the PIDE. I was deployed to correct the First Front when they told me that Dr. Savimbi was leaving Zambia to enter Angola through the Lunguebungo area. It’s the place where those men going into the mines in Rhodesia used to pass. That’s where we met Dr. Savimbi and I was part and parcel of the first triumphal entry of the President for the first time in the liberated areas of UNITA”.*

General Kalundungo, one of the co-participants of the Teixeira de Sousa attack stated that,

*“...on the 4th December, under the command of Savimbi, the administrative post of Cassamba was attacked and on the 25<sup>th</sup> of the same month he participated in the attack to Teixeira de Sousa. After these attacks the colonial authorities reacted in a violent manner with ground and aerial means in the region, causing the flight of the population to Zambia and Zaire. Major attacks were being undertaken a little everywhere such as in Leua, Chiunda, Chinganga, Buçaco and extended throughout the entire Moxico and Lunda Provinces. In the Alto Chicapa region there was Kafundanga and his brother Samuimbila in the Nova Naía areas”.*

*And 1974 against the Portuguese colonialism until the 25th April, general Kalundungo replied:*

*“Well, I was first in the Lukusse, Leua parts and moving forward I was in the areas of Muangai where the I Congress was organized. Then, in the Tchatuika, Lumbala Guimbo, I was involved in all those areas. We, at the beginning were the ones training the soldiers, as there were no schools. Wherever we were, we would get the people together, trained them and when the weapons would arrive, they would be deployed to form combat groups. I have also participated in many battles, but small battles. In the attack to Kassamba, I was with dr. Savimbi with Kafundanga Capexe, with Samuimbila. There we have even entered the barracks, we attacked, but although we did not recover any weapons, I had an emotional feeling about entering for the first time in a barracks. As to the rest, there were ambushes on the roads to Menongue, Luso and Bié..”*

The repercussions of the UNITA combats was also referred to by John de St. Jorre, correspondent of «The *Observer*» in Lusaka, on the 4th September 1966, who wrote the following: “The Zambian Government has sent a paramilitary police mobile unit to the border with Angola today, after reports about the insecurity in the area – said today spokesperson from the Government. Tensions had been increased after the death of a Portuguese couple was killed with their servant, by the freedom fighters on the Portuguese side of the border. It is believed that those who killed them were from UNITA, a recently formed nationalist organization based in Lusaka, though not recognized by the Zambian Government. UNITA, who operates along the border with Katanga and Zambia, was responsible for the attack that forced the Portuguese army to bomb and destroy a Zambian village in the past month of July. Zambia has protested to the UN”<sup>224</sup>.

*“We entered in Massumba, which was the border area between Lucusse and Lumbala Nguimbo. We found a good base for mobilization. The people had adhered, we wandered in various villages but without information leaks. The cipaios were all our militants, and even some of the corporals working in the administration were also our supporters, so it was difficult for PIDE to know that we were around”*<sup>225</sup>. After these actions, the UNITA leadership deemed that in December 1966, in Lumege, it was important for the President to travel abroad to seek support.

According to Samuel Chiwale,

*“In March 1967, the UNITA President arrived in Zambia, where he obtained the support and cooperation of the authorities, including a passport for travels to other countries where he would obtain material aid, understanding and sympathy, such as from the UAR and Republic of China. However, upon return to Zambia, on the 1st July of the same year, he was arrested and deported to Cairo due to the UNITA attacks to the CFB (Benguela Railways). CFB was the backbone of the economies in the area of Africa and its stoppage would cause serious problems to Zambia, Congo and South Rhodesia, inter alia”*.

The absence of the President of a recently formed organization disturbed the actions that should have been performed and constituted, to many, a fatal stroke. This thus created a political crisis in the movement that was emerging.

“...after nine months of Dr. Savimbi’s exile in Cairo, upon his return on the 28th July 1968, “ (...one of the first tasks was that of re-organizing the Party, specially its armed forces. To this effect, in September, the first Conference of Cadres was organized in Chatiuka, with the aim of restoring the Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FALA)”<sup>226</sup>.

Without following a chronological order of the UNITA combats against the Portuguese colonialism, Jorge Valentim, “after a long and vast reading of the communiques from both UNITA and the Portuguese Government, as well as the international Press, he mentions, not in an exhaustive way, the following attacks:

(224) In VALENTIM, Jorge, 1954-1975, *Esperança, Época de Ideias da Independência e Dignidade*, Luanda, Ed. Nzila, 2005, PP.194-195

(225) Samuel Martinho Epalanga

(226) Samuel Chiwale

:

*Districts: Moxico, Kuando Kubango, Lunda, Bié and Malanje.*

*Localities: Teixeira de Sousa, Lumege, Luso, Camgumbe, Léua, Buçaco, Sandando, Chafinda, Chavunda, Caianda, Mussuege, Gago Coutinho, Mouculo, Massongue, Cassoma, Chimbaranda, Muachinga, Cafuese, Catuama-Luando, Tapa, Santa Cruz, Alto Chicapa, Ninda, Calunda, Luiana, Quimbo do Rio Lucombo, Nharea and Kassapa*<sup>227</sup>.

According to Chiwale,

*“...in 1970, UNITA had practically consolidated its territory divided into regions. It could also afford to hit the enemy in its key points. It was at that point that we started to put into practice the principle of bringing the enemy into its knees by destroying its economic and social bases and other type of structures. This was the result of our definition on who to throw our javelins; on who was our enemy. It wasn't the white man but rather the Portuguese colonial system”.*

During this period, one of the major objectives pursued was to continue to develop the FALA's structures, starting with the freedom fighters, who were the children of the peasants and workers, formed in the heat of the battle. To maintain in them the spirit of the struggle of classes, as the sole guarantee for the pursuit of the revolution and victory over the Portuguese colonialism. Furthermore, UNITA was to continue its mobilization of all Angolans, especially the revolutionary peasants, workers and intellectuals, so as to establish a solid base for the national liberation struggle; to vigorously fight against tribalism, which could be the latent enemy of national unity; to fight illiteracy and to develop a political conscience of the Angolan people; to unite all Angolan forces capable of being as such in a relentless fight against the colonial rule; to educate permanently the Angolan people in understanding a protracted and cruel fight to reach a true national independence; to intensify the process of reconstruction of the liberated areas towards the moral and material well-being of the inhabitants until the national reconstruction. According to distinct documents, UNITA also aimed at educating its militants about the need for the class struggle towards the process of Democratic revolution so as to:

- a) Maintain the direction of the struggle in the hands of the members ideologically more advanced in our society.
- b) Ensure the continuity of the National Democratic Revolution with a Socialist Revolution to safeguard the interests of the more oppressed classes in the country, as only a socialist revolution would ensure the fair distribution of the means of production.

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(227) Idem, pp154-155

### 4.3. The case of the Lumbermen of the East

One of the episodes of UNITA's activities in the Angolan bush, which was much referred to after the 25<sup>th</sup> April, is related to its attitude regarding the lumbermen in Eastern Angola. They were cutting and selling timber under the protection of the Portuguese army, PIDE and the rural guards.

In this respect general Chiwale informed:

*"In the end of the 1970s we noticed the presence of a group of timber traders in the corridor between Lungué-Bungo and the Benguela Railways (CFB), i.e. within our territory. It's a region covering the East of Lume to Cangamba...not to mention other areas from Caminhanga to Munhango. The fact that they had infiltrated into our areas displeased the Party's leadership, firstly because in our territory we were the bosses and, secondly, because we feared that behind these traders there could be militias or members of the colonial army.*

*As we were upset, in August 1970, we decided to put an end to such a situation: the leadership ordered a detachment of guerrillas to attack a column of the Sacassange, Chicala lumbermen who were extracting timber between Salutar and the Lungue-Bungo River. The column made up of 8 vehicles escorted by the rural guards and by GEs, the militiamen serving the colonial authorities, was completely dismantled. The attack, where we captured large quantities of weapons alarmed, as expected, both the lumbermen and the authorities located in Moxico. The colonial authorities, including PIDE and the Army, were completely perturbed because, the timber trade, as the railway, were part of the lungs that sustained the economy of the colonial regime. From that date onwards, no other lumberman dared cross our territories".*

*The East of Angola is very rich in forest resources. There are plenty of invaluable trees, especially for the furniture business, such as the girossonde and the massive. The potential to outflow of timber from hinterland to abroad was excellent due to proximity to the railway.*

*"The sudden stoppage of this activity due to our attacks led to the dozens of Portuguese living of this activity to be without means of subsistence. This also affected a great part of Angolans working in sawmills and many of them had relatives in our territories. One day we had information that some lumbermen wanted to contact Dr. Savimbi. Both these lumbermen and UNITA were experiencing problems so we sought to obtain agreement without prejudice to each one's interests. In order to continue to work the lumbermen of the East, who had already lost 18 trucks in less than 5 years, they endeavoured negotiations with UNITA. The President, along with N'Zau Puna and Samuel Chiwale, under such request, met to decide, since it could be one way for PIDE and the colonial authorities to infiltrate us. We sought to explore the weak points of the colonial structure in Cangumbe, Luso and Léua<sup>3228</sup>.*

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(228) See interview with Samuel Chiwale

In a context where there was no external support, including from the OAU, the matter was approached during the Annual Conference of 1970 with the chairmen of the regional, sectorial, zone committees, political commissars and commanders. It was decided that in terms of benefits, these would have to be channelled to Region 2, Massave and Samussengue, where the High Command of the Armed Forces was located. The products coming from Cangumbe were being sent to the Sakalemba base, where lieutenant Sabino Sandele was serving as the only link between UNITA and the lumbermen.

*“Four lumbermen, José Duarte, Acácio de Oliveira, Zeca de Oliveira, from Cangumbe, and João, from Nhonga, in Munhango, signed the contract with Evaristo Ekolelo, sent from UNITA. This movement started to supply the lumbermen bush meat, cassava flour, corn, beans, fish and honey in exchange of salt, soap, medicines and clothing (fabric sheets for the women, blankets for the freedom fighters.”<sup>229</sup>*

During this period, one of the major objectives pursued was to continue to develop the FALA's structures, starting with the freedom fighters, who were the children of the peasants and workers, formed in the heat of the battle. To maintain in them the spirit of the struggle of classes, as the sole guarantee for the pursuit of the revolution and victory over the Portuguese colonialism. These actions were being effected by confining to the knowledge of its protagonists, both the guerrillas and the Portuguese. Chiwale, in talking about this matter, recalls that Jonas Savimbi had said that the struggle should not be confined to what they were doing, and he said: “ We can be good guerrilla fighters, including mobilizing the people of the East or across the entire country, but that is worthless if we don't bring it to the international community's attention and, even more seriously, they will never recognize us as a force that is also fighting for the liberation of Angola”.

For this reason....

*“Still in 1971, Dr. Savimbi entrusted me to bring to the bush an internationally recognised journalist to witness to the world what we are doing. He alerted me, however, to the need to be a journalist with war experience....”<sup>230</sup>*

Under extremely difficult conditions, as a gesture of UNITA's solidarity to Zambia he remarked his guerrilla fighters which was recalled by Chiwale in the following terms:

*“It was the year of 1971 and, despite the intensification of the Portuguese army attacks against UNITA positions, it sought to achieve some progress socially by implementing an agrarian project in liberated areas, which surplus enabled some autonomy. Ian Smith was proclaiming the independence of Southern Rhodesia with some serious consequences for Zambia which, due to geographic imperatives, was supporting the national liberation of neighbour countries and, as a result of that, it could not flow its products by that country's port. It then became a victim of the*

(229) Veríssimo Sabino Sandele was charged to contact the Portuguese in the manner it happened.

(230) See interview of Samuel Chiwale.

*Ian Smith's regime. This caused a crisis to the populations with disastrous results. The UNITA leadership met with the aim of assessing the situation and because the corn harvest had been good, it was decided to send three tons which were loaded to the coast by four hundred and fifty freedom fighters by resorting to relay systems which was facilitated by the position of our bases from hinterland to the border with Zambia. Thus, the freedom fighters when arriving to a base, they would drop the bags of corn and then would return back; the others would pick them to the next base where they were being expected by the column for such purpose"*

UNITA lived with difficulties especially on weapons that required different solutions. In this respect Chiwale referred in the following terms:

*"In 1972, in addition to the experience accumulated, there was still a shortage of weapons; the sources for its supply were practically the same: SWAPO, who would furnish the famous AK (Kalashnikov) and the PPK; the capture of weapons to the colonials (FN and G3) and the purchase of weapons in Zaire ...was Oseas Chinhama who had that task. What facilitated us was the fact that Zaire, after some golden years, was converted into one of the most corrupt regimes of the world in Africa".<sup>231</sup>*

To confirm some of the difficulties arising out of the lack of understanding with other political and military forces who were also fighting the Portuguese colonial regime Chiwale said

*"In 1972 a reduction of military action was noticed in both the Portuguese army and the MPLA but, in general terms, the 1969 to 1972 period was particularly difficult for UNITA in the military field because of the fact that there were 2 fronts".<sup>232</sup>*

From September 1973, UNITA launched a military offensive against the Portuguese positions of Saiesea, Kuando, Alto Cuito, Kassamba and Munhango. In January 1974, the Portuguese Armed Forces, in response to actions against them, violently triggered attacks against the FALA positions. In spite of that, the UNITA actions covered, as operational areas, the Provinces of Cubango, Bié, Malange, Lunda and Moxico

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(231) See interview with Samuel Chiwale

(232) See interview with Samuel Chiwale

## Chapter V – The Decolonization of Angola

### 5.1. Recognition to the right to Independence

The change in the political regime in Portugal did not change the issue of the granting of independence to the colonies. There was some undefinition on the part of the Portuguese authorities on this question. The discussions on the decolonization both at the Security Council and at the UN Assembly General had created the proper international context that forced the Portuguese leaders to rethink the decolonization issue in Africa. On the 7th May 1974, the Chairmen of the Special Committee for the Decolonization and the Special Committee against Apartheid and the UN Council for Namibia formulated a recommendation to Portugal, given the change occurred on the 25<sup>th</sup> April. In this recommendation Portugal was to recognize the right of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique and Cape Verde to self-determination and for negotiations to be pursued with the liberation movements.

With these recommendations and with the dramatic events that occurred in Luanda, the Portuguese Government adopted certain steps. On the 25th July 1974, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, member of the National Salvation Board was appointed to lead the Joint Council of Angola replacing Franco Pinheiro. On the same day he arrived in Angola and took steps to curb the wave of violence in Luanda.

It was under this climate that the Portuguese State Council approved a new constitutional law that contemplated the decolonization of the territories under Portuguese rule. In his speech on the 27th July 1974, the Portuguese President, general António de Spínola acknowledged the law as the best legal framework for the decolonization.

*“The Constitutional Law no. 7/74, decreed by the State Council and promulgated yesterday, creates a framework of constitutional legitimacy required to initiate immediately the process of decolonization of the Portuguese overseas territories. Thus, and in the most perfect coherence with the line of action of my Government in Guinea, it is time the President of the Republic to solemnly reiterate the recognition of the right of the overseas territories to self-determination, including the immediate recognition to their right to independence”<sup>233</sup>.*

With this declaration, the Portuguese Government began a new process of relationship with the colonies and liberation movements.

Consequently, the General-Secretary of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, visited Portugal on the 2nd to the 4th August. This occasion was taken by the new Portuguese authorities to inform the SG about the recognition of the Guinea-Bissau independence and reaffirmed the willingness to collaborate with the UN in order to accelerate the decolonization of Cape Verde, Mozambique and Angola.

(233) Cf. “Declaração Histórica. Independência da Guiné, Angola e Moçambique. Portugal está pronto, a partir de agora, para iniciar o processo da transferência de poderes”, in **Província de Angola**, 28th July 1974.

On the 8th August 1974, the Portuguese Government issued a declaration on the process of decolonization of Angola where it stated that: upon the cease-fire agreement, the Portuguese Government shall forthwith form a Provisional Government where the liberation movements, in parallel with the more expressive ethnic groups of the State of Angola, shall be represented, which would obviously include the white minority<sup>234</sup>. To the MPLA this type of decolonization wasn't making any sense. In a reaction dated the 12th October 1974 from Lusaka, Zambia, President Neto reaffirmed that "the decolonization of Angola could not in consequence be affected by processes that claim the agreement of any race or ethnicity, by inserting in this way a racial and tribalistic line, out of the true context tending to divide the Angolan people in racial terms, not accepting that white Angolans must have the status of a minority. To the MPLA there are no minorities, nor special status for any part of the People.: ONE SOLE PEOPLE, ONE SOLE NATION, all Angolans with rights and duties"<sup>235</sup>. With this standing the MPLA pursued with its contacts until the Portuguese Government initiated the cease-fire process with the liberation movements to discuss the modalities for achieving independence of Angola.

## 5.2. The Law N° 7/74 of 26th July of the Portuguese Republic

With the taking of office of the II Provisional Government in Portugal, law n° 7/74 was published and President Spínola pronounced a speech on the 27th July, and early in August, the UN Secretary-General visited Portugal and in his final communique about his visit the commitment of Portugal to the recognition of the right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence was made public.

With these events and acts, it appeared the situation of the process of Angola was clear. It was a false appearance, it was still very early and there were still many hurdles to overcome.

On the 9th August 1974, the National Salvation Board issued a communique in which it defined, unilaterally, a program for the decolonization of Angola, which definition in its design and wording the representatives of Angola did not play any part. The program established the steps to be taken after the cease-fire. One of such steps consisted in the continuation of a Provisional Government of Coalition with representatives of the liberation movements in equal status with the representatives of the more expressive ethnicities of the State of Angola, including obviously, the whites. The following actions were also included: drafting of an electoral law, voter registration on the basis of one man, one vote and the election of a Constitutive Assembly within a period of 2 years, which would establish the levels

(234) Communique of the National Salvation Board, the 8th August 1974.

(235) Cf. Declaração do MPLA sobre a Posição Portuguesa no Processo de Descolonização de Angola, Lusaka, 12.10.1974.

and types of relations with Portugal. In the latter clause there was implicitly the possibility of other solutions other than the independence of Angola.

This program pointed ostensibly to solutions which had to be contemplated in a sovereign constitution, the state organs and the form of their election, which would be to be solely defined by the constitutive organs.

The same program also contemplated a phased and very slow evolution which would be dragged for a period of 3 to 5 years. The program lacked seriously and appeared to ignore some of the points which lacked the negotiations with the liberation movements of Angola, such as the most representative, the MPLA, such as the cease-fire for the execution of the proposed steps. The program appeared at the outset to be already flawed.

On the 12th September, the Chairman of the Board of Governing Board had sworn in the Provisional Government made up of Secretaries of State. During the ceremony Admiral Rosa Coutinho stated in his speech: "On the face of the studies, the Honourable Secretaries of State shall soon become Ministers".

As contemplated by the Governing Board, Mr. Fernando Falcão will participate in this Provisional Government with the functions of a Deputy Secretary of State, and in this way the spirits of the white community were pacified and the climate, still provisional, was created for the pursuit of the process of decolonization. Rosa Coutinho travelled to Lisbon on the 20th September for consultations with his superiors and returned to Luanda on the 23rd and made the following statements: "From His Excellency the State President I bring the declaration, which he decided to take directly in his own hands all the international negotiations he has to undertake about the future development of Angola and further, that in such negotiations shall be present an Angolan representative »<sup>236</sup>.

From this declaration it can be seen that Spínola had drawn the attention of the Governing Board of Angola on the issues of decolonization this organ was carrying out in Angola. At the time it would have a greater control by the President so the process would not favour the left and its political adversaries amongst the National Liberation Movements, the MPLA. Meanwhile in Lisbon there was a demonstration being convened by the "silent majority" in favour of Spínola and against the Revolutionary Government of Vasco Gonçalves. In Angola the FRA and the FDCA had proposed also to effect conspiracies that would lead to the formation of a white minority regime in Angola, like the one installed in South Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, with Ian Smith.

At the end of September, at the level of the MFA there was talk of possible supports to the FRA coming from South Rhodesia, South Africa, US and other countries<sup>237</sup>.

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(236) Cardoso, Silva, a Rotura p.51

(237) Cardoso, Silva, a Rotura p.415

These were the reflections of the white community's agitation who was dreaming of reinforcements in defence of its cause against the "Communist threat".

### 5.3. The Spínola-Mobutu meeting at Ilha do Sal

The fall of the fascism in Portugal triggered an interest in the neighbouring countries and not only for the colonies of the Portuguese Empire for geo-political and economic reasons. The Portuguese colony drew more interest and it was not just for importance this country could play in the future in both Central and Southern Africa. The various countries with interests in Angola were also paying attention. One of those countries most interested in the situation in Angola was Mobutu's Zaire which served the base of support to the liberation movements, especially the FNLA. The rise to independence was a concern to the Zairean Government to know who was going to power in Angola.

It was in this context that the Zairean diplomacy had unfolded into various contacts for this country to enjoy a greater role in the decolonization process and that would mean a dialogue with the new Portuguese Government coming out of the coup d'état of the 25<sup>th</sup> April and led by General Spínola. A meeting was thus arranged to this effect in Ilha do Sal, Cape Verde, between the Presidents of Portugal and Zaire, António de Spínola and Mobutu Sesse Seko respectively. According to Pezarat Correia "this meeting ended up in a greater mystery than the one Spínola had with Nixon, with no communique being issued about this meeting. They have never published a report or summary"<sup>238</sup>. Scheduled to review the decolonization of Angola, the meeting ended up to be a serious precedent in the future political and economic stabilization during the transitional period in Angola, because it only perked the Mobutu supporters. According to Witney Schneidman:

"By mid-September Spínola met Mobutu at Ilha do Sal, in Cape Verde. Together with Holden Roberto and Savimbi, Mobutu and Spínola had agreed *that Agostinho Neto and the Marxist factions of the MPLA "could and should have" been eliminated from the Angolan political scene in a democratic transition for independence. One of Spínola's key objectives was that of ensuring the MPLA to be represented by Daniel Chipenda and by the 'Honourable President' of the MPLA, Joaquim Pinto de Andrade.*"<sup>239</sup>.

With this agreement, which excluded one of the parts in the decolonization process, it would trigger in the future a conflicting process in Angolan territory which, after the Alvor, would result in the FNLA launching several military attacks against the MPLA in the Angolan capital, in an attempt to exclude it from the process of independence. By irony of fate, the FNLA was defeated militarily and expelled from Luanda.

(238) CORREIA, Pedro Pezarat *Descolonização de Angola. A jóia da coroa do Império*, Luanda, Ler & Escrever, 1991, p.87.

(239) SCHNEIDMAN, Witney W. *Confronto em África. Washington e a Queda do Império Colonial Português*, Lisboa, Tribuna da História, 2005, p.253.

## **Chapter VI – The Transition to Independence, 1974-1975**

### **6.1. The Cease-Fire Agreements**

#### **6.1.1 The Luena Agreement between UNITA and the Portuguese**

##### **Government**

In spite of the coup d'état in Portugal, on the 25th April 1974, having been a consequence of the vents of the battlefields in Africa, where the liberation movements were seeking, with arms, to liberate themselves from the colonial yoke and to rise to independence, UNITA on the 26<sup>th</sup> had attacked a military column between Dueja and Kuate in Moxico. Anticipating an irreversible framework of the end of the armed struggle against the Portuguese Government, UNITA appointed a commission to set a dialogue with the military Junta or Movement of the Armed Forces. The contacts undertaken enabled that on the 14th July 1974 a cease-fire agreement was signed suspending all hostilities between the Portuguese Army and the FALA. The following officers signed on behalf of the Portuguese side: Lt-coronel Fernando Passos Ramos, major Pedro Pezarat Correia, captain Manuel Moreira Dias and Captain Benjamim Almeida. From UNITA the following signed the agreements: Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, major Chata, captain Eduardo André, captain Samuel Martinho Epalanga and lieutenant Veríssimo Sabino.

#### **6.1.2. The Kinshasa Agreement between the FNLA and the Portuguese**

##### **Government**

Nevertheless, the FNLA continued the armed struggle until the signature on the 12th October 1974 of the case-fire agreement which occurred on board the yacht of the then President of the Republic of Zaire, General Mobutu. Three days after the signing of the agreement, Holden Roberto, in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of the ELNA, had decreed on behalf of the FNLA the cessation of all military actions developed against the Portuguese colonial Government since 1961.

#### **6.1.3. The Lunhameji Agreement between the MPLA and the Portuguese**

##### **Government**

The MPLA was the last national liberation movement to sign a cease-fire with the Portuguese Government, because the latter was proposing first to sign the case-fire but only after the promulgation of the law. But the MPLA demanded a law first that would declare the total and unconditional independence of the Angolan people and only afterwards the cease-fire. The MPLA's position prevailed with the publication of Law 07/74. Thus, on the 21st October 1974, at 11h00, at the Lunyameji grasslands in the Province of Moxico, a formal meeting took place between a Portuguese delegation headed by Commodore Leonel Cardoso and integrated by the following dignitaries: Pezarat Correia, Emílio da Silva, Ferreira Machado a headed by various members of the Government headed by Rosa Coutinho and a MPLA delegation led by its President comrade Agostinho Neto, with, inter alia, comrades Lúcio Lara, Iko Carreira, Filomeno de Sá Dibala, Pedro Maria Tonha "Pedale", Carlos Rocha

Dilolwa, Jorge Barros Tchimpanuati, Francisco Magalhães Paiva “Nvunda”, Joaquim Kapango, Aristides Van-Dúnem, Ludy Kissassunda, Zacarias Pinto “Bolingó” and Hermínio Escórcio. On the 22nd October 1974 the 13 year liberation war was put to an end. The security in the site was set up by both Portuguese soldiers and the MPLA guerrilla warriors led by Commander António dos Santos França “Ndalú”. The meeting lasted for 2 hours at the end of which the parties agreed to lay down the weapons, with the Portuguese Government assuming the responsibility to allow the MPLA the opening of its delegations and to propagate its political program in the entire Angolan territory.

*General França N’Dalú (...)* at that time we knew that the Portuguese really wanted the cease-fire and that they had even already signed with the FNLA and UNITA and it was just us left. So we went there but imposing conditions. Now, about the Conference, I can’t speak much. You know where I was at the Conference. I was with the unit ready to intervene, if there was any.... it was the distrust, so I was with the unit, in case something could happen, to protect our delegation.<sup>240</sup>

On the 22nd October 1974, the MPLA leadership released a communique where the following was highlighted: «The Steering Committee of the MPLA informs the Angolan people that at 17h30 of the 21st October, in Angolan territory of the Moxico region an agreement was signed between the President of the MPLA, Agostinho Neto, and Commodore Leonel Cardoso, representing the MFA, to formalise the truce to end the armed struggle.<sup>241</sup>». These agreements have put an end to the Active revolts and of Chipenda who fought so hard to be recognized by Portugal in order to participate in the negotiations for independence. The Portuguese Government ended up recognizing the MPLA leadership, led by President Agostinho Neto as the only representative of this movement for the conversations for the independence of Angola.

This thus completed the cycle of conversations between Portugal and the National Liberation Movements. It now remained to resolve the issues about the various attempts of approach by the MPLA in regard to the FNLA without any results during the struggle and the exploratory meetings on the 8th July 1974 in Kinshasa between the MPLA and the FNLA and in the first week of August, in Lusaka, between the two movements and UNITA, and once again without success. The historic significance of the cease-fire in Lunyameji in Moxico had several consequences of which the following are highlighted:

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(240) See interview with General Ndalú

(241) Communique of the MPLA Steering Committee, 22 nd October 1974, CDIH.

1. End of the combat actions between the MPLA and the Portuguese Colonial Army that had developed since the 4<sup>th</sup> February 1961 to the 21<sup>st</sup> October 1974;
2. End of the hard and long underground journey gloriously by the MPLA for 18 years;
3. The MPLA earned the right achieved throughout many years of struggle and to freely arrive in Luanda on the 8th November, with its first official delegation opening in this way new perspectives of action in all spheres of political, ideological and organizing activity, including the building of the FNLA structure.

#### **6.1.4. The Luena Agreement between the MPLA and UNITA**

Throughout its national liberation struggle the MPLA has always stood for a united front with the other movements in the fight against the common enemy. In spite of the political and military constraints between UNITA and the MPLA during the conflict with the colonial regime, it has always maintained the spirit of finding some unity. It was in this spirit that the MPLA, in attendance to the Angolan people's aspirations, met with the UNITA leadership in the city of Luso (now Luena) on the 17<sup>th</sup> December 1974. In this meeting, the MPLA recognized UNITA as one of the national liberation movements, while UNITA committed to fight by all means for the real independence of the Country. Savimbi, euphoric, stated to the journalists that the journey to unity had been found while, at the same time, he took the agreement to alert the Chipenda forces that his organization would not tolerate that this unity with the MPLA would be destroyed, which in practice and within a few months, would prove to be to the contrary with the violation of such agreement. On behalf of the two organizations President Agostinho Neto, in addressing the journalists, highlighted the importance of the agreement and the need for all Angolans to close ranks around the liberation movements towards the independence. The MPLA delegation, headed by its President, was integrated by Dack Doy, Lúcio Lara, Iko Carreira, Monstro Imortal and Ludi Kissassunda, while UNITA was represented by its President and messrs. Nzau Puna, Jaka Jamba and Tchiwale. Rosa Coutinho, then President of the Governing Board attended the negotiations and the signing of the agreement.

#### **6.1.5. The Agreements between UNITA and the FNLA**

Using his stay in visit in Kinshasa, the UNITA delegation, headed by Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, its President, met with a FNLA delegation, equally headed by its President, Holden Roberto. The two liberation movements had examined in detail all the issues related with the decolonization of Angola in general, and the transition phase in particular. The FNLA delegation reaffirmed with UNITA its resolute will to overcome everything that could delay the long-awaited approach between the liberation movements of Angola.

The UNITA delegation reiterated, in turn, the previously adopted positions in favour of the need to join efforts of all Angolan freedom fighters in order to accelerate the liberation process of the motherland. The two delegations examined the issues that were undermining the brother liberation movement, the MPLA, and looked forward towards the existence of a single leadership, which would undeniably represent such political entity. After the meeting the two delegations published the following communique: Conscious of the role performed in the armed struggle and in the liberating combat of the Angolan people against the Portuguese colonialism

Conscious of the role performed in the armed struggle and in the liberating combat of the Angolan people against the Portuguese colonialism; *conscious that the relationship of the Angolan people and its historical power will lead Angola to its national independence; conscious that it is incumbent upon them the responsibility for the reconstruction of an Angola truly Angolan, free and independent; conscious that the approach of the liberation movements corresponds to the deepest aspirations of the Angolan people and the supreme interest of the nation which supersedes hates, grudges, suspicions and divergences of all sorts, in that the persistent divisions within the liberation movements represent a threat to peace, security, order and even to the independence of Angola. And meeting the need and urgency to end the imperialist and neo-colonialist manoeuvres of any sort against the unity of the liberation movements;*

It is decided:

1. To end any form of attack or propaganda capable of affecting one of the signatory parts;
2. To set up, upon publication of this communique, a cooperation and military mutual assistance aimed at facing any eventuality from extremists of all sorts threatening the achievements of the Revolution and the normal process of total independence of our country;
3. to establish a joint committee charged to draft a platform that will regulate the political tasks that refer to the reconstruction of an independent Angola.

Kinshasa, 25 th November 1974

### **6.1.6. The Agreements between the MPLA and the FNLA**

During the meeting between the three Liberation Movements in Mombasa, the MPLA and the FNLA delegations, headed by presidents Agostinho Neto and Holden Roberto, reviewed the country's situation and have agreed some basis of cooperation in order to avoid the aggravation of the issues that were being raised to the two Movements during the phase of decolonization. Taking into account that the unity of the Liberation Movements of Angola was a factor of prime importance in the fight against the colonialism, an instrument to safeguard and consolidate the independence of Angola. Recognizing that the intrusion of foreign interests into the national political life, the existence

of an internal reaction in Angola was a threat to the independence to the harmonious development of the Angolan society, and concerned with the aggravation of the economic and social conditions of the Angolan people and the economic expression of the country, the two Movements have agreed on the following:

1. *To end any sort of hostility and hostile propaganda that will hamper the frank and sincere collaboration between the MPLA and the FNLA.*
2. *To create a climate favourable to the close cooperation between the two Movements, from the base to the top, in all sectors, as well as on the mutual respect between them. The two parties agree in appealing to the Press and to their friends to avoid any problems that may compromise the spirit of this agreement.*
3. *To constantly uphold the interests of the Angolan people, and in particular of its most exploited segments, by fighting in common for the removal of all races of colonialism.*
4. *To cooperate in common bodies for the solution of the problems of the populations.*
5. *Not to meddle into the internal affairs of each one of the signatory Movements to this agreement.*
6. *To oppose by all means to the reactionary manoeuvres that aim at perpetuating the unfair relations inherited from colonialism and to thus fight against all manoeuvres attempting against the national unity or are aimed at the country's secession.*

*Mombasa, the 4th January 1975.*

## **6.2. The Agreement Between the Three National Liberation Movements**

Under the good offices of Jomo Kenyatta, President of Kenya, on the 2nd to the 5th January 1975, at the State House of Mombasa, negotiations were held between the three Angolan movements. Although Kenyatta had mentioned in his official speech about "unity" everybody knew that no one was seeking unity but rather for a minimum basis of understanding, that would take them to negotiate with Portugal. It wasn't easy to find a platform of understanding. While the MPLA sustained a real engagement of the three movements to the benefit of the Angolan people, the other two organizations were there to defend the positions of Zaire, United States and South Africa. It was almost impossible to conciliate the opposing forces. There was, nevertheless, the obligation to achieve in Mombasa an agreement between the three organizations. They were to avoid a possible failure of such conversations. The MPLA was really conscious of such a situation. It was under these circumstances that, once again, Jonas Savimbi was allowed to play its role as a conciliator. Indeed, both the MPLA and the FNLA, at the State House in Mombasa, have signed an agreement between themselves. It was the missing link which was absolutely necessary. If this agreement was not made feasible, the MPLA would be favouring the UNITA's position. It should be mentioned that the understanding between the MPLA and the FNLA was a pretext for, once again, Savimbi to proclaim itself as a mediator of conversations.

At the end of the three-day conversations, Lúcio Lara has read the Portuguese version of the text of the agreement between the three liberation movements. The agreement between the MPLA and the FNLA closed another chapter in the process that would take to the decolonization. At the State House, perhaps for the first time in life, Agostinho Neto and Holden Roberto, embraced each other. The text of the agreement was clearly of the FNLA and UNITA's influence. There the MPLA had merely achieved a victory: it forced these two organizations to declare that Cabinda was an integral part of Angola. Oddly enough, UNITA at that time was supporting 's FLEC, based in the Peoples' Republic of Congo and steered by the French, while the FNLA was supporting Tati's FLEC, based in Zaire and at the CIA's service. The MPLA was forced to enter into another agreement with organizations that were openly serving the interests of the imperialism. But it also forced them to concede in the case of Cabinda. In fact, no agreement between the MPLA and the other organizations had any effect. The agreements could, at any moment, be violated by them. It all depended on the specific interests of the imperialism. It should be noted that the FNLA and UNITA, in addition to have broken the agreements with the MPLA, they ended up violating the Alvor agreements. To the extent that suited them and the imperialism had the need to send, later to Angola, the regular armies of South Africa and Zaire.....

The "Mombasa Agreements" must be analysed in a different angle. What happened in the second largest city of Kenya shows clearly what Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi were prepared to respect the rules with the MPLA and even with the Portuguese party. The site of the conversations was selected by UNITA and with the enthusiastic support of the FNLA. The MPLA was confined to agree what the other organizations had already agreed. But then this is when the siege was started around the only organization that was upholding the real interests of the Angolan people. As it is known, Kenya had never supported the MPLA, quite to the contrary, it was one of the OAU's member states that was hostile to the MPLA, quite obviously for it being a revolutionary. Thus, the support of the Kenyan Government was totally for Holden Roberto's UPA until the end, and after the 25<sup>th</sup> April to UNITA. After all, it was a country with whom the MPLA never had contacts or representations of any kind.

### **6.2.1. The Alvor Agreement**

The Alvor-Portugal agreement, which occurred from the 10th to the 15th January 1975, was the extension of the principles agreed in Mombasa under the auspices of President Jomo Kenyatta. There were four delegations attending the Alvor summit: the MPLA, FNLA, UNITA and the Portuguese Government, the latter being headed by the Minister Without Portfolio, Major Melo Antunes, who had just experienced a similar event in the Mozambican process and had started to coordinate the Angolan process. It also included the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mário Soares, the Minister of the Inter-Territorial Coordination, Almeida Santos, the Governor of the Governing Board of Angola, Brigadier Silva Cardoso; Lieutenant-Coronel Gonçalves Ribeiro, of the Provisional Government of Angola; Major Pedro Pezarat-Correia, representing the MFA of Angola and dr. Fernando Reino and Lieutenant-Coronel Passos Ramos, of the National Decolonization Committee.

The delegations of the national liberation movements MPLA, FNLA and UNITA were headed by the respective Presidents and integrated by members of their leadership. All the delegations were lodged in the hotel, where the conditions were created for the conversations. "This fact, by providing the common use of living and lounge rooms, atriums and gardens, bars and restaurants, has enabled an easier relationship and knowledge of the different delegations in the plenaries, which has greatly contributed for the success of the works and for the climate of collaboration that occurred."<sup>242</sup> The delegations of the three liberation movements used the platform approved in Mombasa to negotiate the modalities for the independence of the country after many years of the armed struggle. The conversations were complex as, despite all steps being taken towards the realization of this summit, there was some distrust between the delegations of the liberation movements. This led to a lack of consensus about the choice of a single interlocutor, despite the existence of a common negotiation platform. In any event, the summit ended with the signing of the agreement, from which the ways, forms and targets had been defined for the National Independence. A quadripartite Transitional Government was formed, which assumed the administration during this period. The process had contemplated the carrying out of elections and the institution of a multiparty regime. The MPLA formed part of this Government by taking representation in the Presidential Collegium and in the National Defence Commission, as well as some Ministerial and State Secretary positions. Other principles were also agreed to which were of prime importance, namely:

- a) *The Portuguese State recognized the FNLA, MPLA and UNITA as the sole representatives of the Angolan people, the proclamation of the right of the Angolan people to independence, the affirmation of an Angola formed into one entity, united and indivisible, within its geographic and political limits, current and in this context, Cabinda is an integral and inseparable part of the Angolan territory;*
- b) *Marked the 11th November 1975 as the date of the proclamation of independence by the President of the Portuguese Republic, defining as the organs of power for the transitional period a High-Commissioner and a Transitional Government. The three movements formalized the cease-fire already observed by the pact.*
- c) *The competences and the constitution of the transitional organs of power were defined. The President of the Portuguese Republic was to appoint and recognize the High-Commissioner who would represent the Portuguese Presidency and the respective Government in Angola. The competences of this Portuguese high dignitary were to promote the compliance of the agreement and to ensure the facilitation of the decolonization process of Angola. To this effect he would assist and participate in the legislative acts of the Government, ensure the functioning and management of the National Defence Committee, jointly with the Presidential Collegium.*

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(242) Correia, Pedro Pazarat, *Descolonização de Angola*, p.122

- d) *The Government was to be presided by a Presidential Collegium, consisting of 3 members, from each of the liberation movements, with the chairmanship performed on a rotational basis by each one of them. The deliberations were to be by a two thirds majority and the remainder of the Government would be on a quadripartite basis: Ministers would be appointed in equal numbers by each of the movements and Portugal. The secretaries of state were to be appointed by the liberation movements in equal numbers.*

The Government powers were related to the legislation and execution and it could not be dismissed by Portugal's initiative, such as the High-Commissioner. The latter was to join efforts with the Presidential Collegium to resolve within the spirit of friendship and by reciprocal consultation all the issues arising out of governance. y of votes, with the High Commissioner holding the casting vote. The National Defence Commission, contemplated in Chapter IV of the agreement, was to consist of the High Commissioner, the Presidential Collegium and by the unified Chief-of-Staff attached to the HC, and integrating the commanders of the branches of the Portuguese Armed Forces and by the three liberation movements. In this important sector of the Angolan defence the decisions would be taken by a simple majority of votes, with the High Commissioner having the casting vote. The Defence Commission was to form the unified or mixed Armed Forces consisting of some 24 00 Portuguese men and 8 000 from each of the movements. The liberation movements would accept a majority of the Portuguese contingent with a bipartite composition, in relation to a bipartisan composition in the governance which was quadripartite. The MPLA leadership nominated Commander Monstro Imortal to form part of the Unified Military Command. In parallel, mixed forces were to be organized in the National Police Force Corps under a unified command consisting of three members from each of the movements, being presided by a rotational system under the authority of the National High Commissioner of Defence. Also, in this case, the MPLA leadership André Pitra "Petrof" for the police force.

As to the citizenship of the future nation, the agreement attributed to all Angolans born in Angola, provided they did not declare, within the terms and deadlines to be defined in the future, that they wanted to maintain their current Portuguese nationality. On the other hand: citizenship could be granted to "individuals not born in Angola and based in this country, if they requested the Angolan citizenship". The problems of Angolan citizenship of the Portuguese resident in Angola, and the status of the Portuguese citizens in Angola and Angolan citizens in Portugal would be subject to specific treatment. Equally contemplated in the agreement were aspects related to the economic and financial sphere, to the creation of the Bank of Angola and the cooperation between Angola and Portugal, based on the formation of mixed committees, nominated by the legal parties and appointed by the High Commissioner to study and propose solutions in the various domains and specially in the technical fields arising out of the decolonization process.

### 6.3. Transitional Government for Independence

The Transitional Government was not operating and didn't exist in practice, as the UNITA and FNLA members in the Government had pulled out of their posts following their respective movements. Equally, the same with the members of the National Commission of Defence were never formed. The Angolan economy was paralysed. The major principles contained in the Alvor Accord were abandoned by their protagonists. The Transitional Government during its short living had only approved the Transitional Fundamental Law, on the 13th July and promulgated in the Gazette (*Boletim Oficial*) on the 30th June, which had no other role but by publication of decree no. 458/A-75 of the 22<sup>nd</sup> August partially suspending the Alvor Accord. This decree contained steps to fill the gap left by the Transitional Government.

The text contained, in general terms, the following: The effect of the Alvor accord is deemed to be provisionally suspended, in what concerns the organs of governance of Angola, with the High Commissioner noting the de facto absence of its functions by any member of the transitional government, he shall appoint a Director-General who will ensure the management of the respective Department, deciding only on day to day matters considered to be urgent. The Ministries whose holders are appointed by the President of the Portuguese Republic shall be run by the Director-Generals.

By analysing the defining features that led to the publication of this decree, it is to be noted that the essential objective of the Portuguese authorities was confined to the need to reinforce the powers of the High-Commissioner, the only organ in force, to force the Portuguese withdrawal from the Government, leaving notice of the Portuguese intention of not featuring next to the MPLA, the victor of the battle of Luanda and, as such, not to be forced to abandon the Transitional Government. The transitional suspension of the Alvor Accord did not touch in very important aspects of its text, such as the one concerning the recognition of the right of the Angolan people to independence: the principle of territorial unity and Angolan policy, date of proclamation of the independence on the 11<sup>th</sup> November 1975 and the recognition of the three liberation movements, as the sole and legitimate representatives of the Angolan people. To justify the Portuguese decision its National Decolonization Committee issued an extensive communique, giving an historic detail on the origins of the reason for the publication of the Decree. To inform the international community, Portugal carried out an intensive diplomatic activity, by convening the diplomatic corps accredited in the country. Envoys were sent with letters by Costa Gomes to the Secretary-General of the UN, Security Council and to the Chairman of the Decolonization Committee. To the OAU emissaries were sent with similar objectives regarding the heads of state that were monitoring the decolonization of Angola. Equally informed were the NATO, Warsaw Pact countries, Brazil and Australia, the latter as allies of Portugal.

Portugal was also interested in displaying its exaggerated role of a neutral referee when it had no longer control of the political power, and least it was exercising the defence of the Portuguese sovereignty in Angola. The presence of the Zairean army, camouflaged by the FNLA, was a fact that would lead to the possibility of an internationalization of the Angolan conflict.

### **6.3.1. The end of the Alvor Accord and the Angolan Civil War – The Nakuru Summit**

On the 3rd June 1975, the High-Commissioner of Angola, General Silva Cardoso, wrote in his personal notes that *“definitively, the Alvor accord and all others we have been signing in order to find the journey to peace, have all been torn. Instead, it is only the ruthless and criminal law of the guns that is prevailing...”*. The idea of a summit then emerged which would take place in Nakuru from the 15<sup>th</sup> June under the sponsorship of Jomo Kenyatta. It appeared at the time to be the only solution for the wave of violence reigning in Angola. Meanwhile, for some: *“the movements would be signing another document to gain time”*. In the perspective of everybody, whatever would be decided in Nakuru, like in Alvor, would be inapplicable. In reality, according to Silva Cardoso, it was a phase where the movements had already decided their strategy for taking power by force. In spite the advantage obtained and of the favourable situation it enjoyed, the MPLA agreed to participate in the Summit, being the only movement to insist that Portugal be present for not being marginalized in everything related with the decolonization, including the transfer of power. Meanwhile, neither the FNLA nor the UNITA wanted the Portuguese presence in Nakuru. Before his departure to Nakuru, President Neto has declared:

*“it was important to find solutions that would culminate with the formation of non-party structures, capable of ensuring the good functioning of the country”*. Shortly before in an attempt to yet gain some protagonism, the *“Viana Faction”* issued a *communiqué* in which it pronounced in favour of *“other bodies of opinion inside the country other than those arising out of the force of arms”*,

Surely, having the MPLA leadership as its target! Thus, the Nakuru summit would take place from the 15<sup>th</sup> to the 20<sup>th</sup> June, with the liberation movements, Agostinho Neto, Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi signing on the 21<sup>st</sup> June, in Kenya, an agreement aimed at *“creating a climate of political tolerance and national unity”* in Angola. To be highlighted, that for the first time, the need for the formation of *“National Armed Forces”* was broached, to be made up of an initial force of 30 000 men. At the same time, the territorial integrity of Angola was reaffirmed, including Cabinda, as well as the principle of the holding of elections, having decided on the convening of a new summit in Angola to find alternative solutions, in case of failure to hold elections. At the end of the summit a text was drafted containing positive aspects contained in an exhaustive analysis of the situation and a serious self-criticism. In it, the aspects that led to the deterioration of the political, military and social environment were the following:

The introduction of large quantities of weapons by the liberation movements. The lack of political tolerance expressed by the violent acting of the liberation movements. The existence of 'zones of influence' and regions of alleged superiority. The arming of the civil population. The military clashes between the liberation movements and their regionalization. The tendency to enhance tribalism, regionalism and racism. On the face of all that was found, the three movements have decided to: create a climate of tolerance and national unity; to put an end to all forms of violence; to immediately release all prisoners of the conflict; to ensure to all liberation movements the right to free political activity; to accelerate the formation of a national army; to disarm the civil population.

In these decisions one could see some innovations in regard to what had been agreed in Alvor, namely: the formation of a national army, instead of combined forces. Measures of support to the Transitional Government were taken, discouraging the radicalisms, to overcome inoperativeness. The desire to hold elections was reaffirmed and in the case of difficulties, to organize a summit for the adoption of alternative steps for the transfer of power. The three Presidents undertook to solemnly renounce the use of force as a means to solve the problems and to honour the commitments arising out of the accord.

#### **6.4. The Proclamation of Independence**

The political activity developed towards the total liberation of Angola from the colonial yoke, after the MPLA's leadership entry in the country, was reaching its decisive stage, since the ongoing process was tending to its conclusion, in the light of the premises set out in the Alvor accords, signed by the Portuguese authorities and the liberation movements, which aimed at the independence of Angola.

The mobilization effected on the various sectors of the Angolan society, up to the eve of independence, revealed a considerable increase of militants operating in the different committees and cells of the Movement, in rural and urban areas. Thus, one would refer in this process the political positioning of the MPLA based on different postulates about what was intended for the future of Angola. The regular holding of political acts with the population, such as rallies, political sessions, which served to clarify the risks Angola was living on the face of the international context, where backward oriented forces of the internationalism were being placed against the ongoing political process, favourable to the progressive forces such as the MPLA that were fighting for the total liberation of Angola. All of the MPLA's political action was being held across the country with particular emphasis on Luanda, had found major obstacles placed by the leaders of the FNLA who, related with its mainly authoritative behaviour was frequently experiencing critical moments of conflict, even leading to the death of numerous MPLA militants. The exacerbation of the conflict has caused not only threats being made, as well as direct acts that in different parts of the city and, given the ample support of the population to the MPLA the FNLA was forced to abandon Luanda.

With the support received from the western countries, such as from Zaire, the USA and from sectors of the Portuguese right, the FNLA felt strongly and militarily supported and prepared for a major military action aimed at ousting the MPLA from the capital and to settle therein with a view to the proclamation of independence. The MPLA, in turn, reacted to all such movement and had also prepared its forces for a new military front which was approaching from the North. As the military front was stopping the advancement of the enemy forces which were progressing towards the capital, the preparations for the proclamation were happening at dramatic pace. Following the exacerbation of the conflict that was affecting the Liberation Movements, the position of the Portuguese authorities then in Luanda wasn't favourable to the holding of the proclamation of the independence of Angola, without the presence of the other movements, so they decided to withdraw on the eve of the date set for the proclamation.

To this effect the Portuguese authorities prepared their withdrawal by issuing a unilateral declaration of independence at the Governmental Palace on the 10th November 1975. In this declaration the Portuguese sought to justify themselves by alleging the main reason for their act, the fact that moved by some political naivety, they were unable to object some clauses of the Alvor accord which, in their understanding, had contributed to the massive entry of arms for the Liberation Movements, and originated from the big powers.

*"(...) Portugal never placed, nor could it ever place at issue, the date of the 11th November set for the proclamation of independence, which it is not incumbent on it to grant, but simply to declare it. Under these terms, on behalf of the President of the Portuguese republic, I solemnly proclaim – with effect from the 0h00 of the 11th November 1975, the independence of Angola and its solemn sovereignty, seeded on the Angolan People, to whom it is incumbent to decide on the forms of its exercise."*

It was followed by the ceremony of the lowering of the Portuguese flag by a joint force of marines, horsemen and paratroopers and with the presence of Admiral Leonel Cardoso, flanked by General Heitor Almendra, Brigadier Telo, Navy captain Gabor Patoswski, Coronel Pil Ferreira de Almeida and Lt. Coronel, paratrooper Ramos Gonçalves. This ceremony ended with the leaving of the ship "Niassa" of the last representatives of Portugal in Angola. The Portuguese didn't assume in fact their responsibilities and left the Angolans alone to their destiny who, under the leadership of the MPLA were preparing for the proclamation of independence. Mobilized to this effect, the militants who were busy with the practical aspects of the ceremony that was conspicuous in the design of the symbols of the Republic (Flag, insignia and National Anthem), the members of the MPLA membership worked for the drafting of the political text that would announce to the Angolans and to the world the effective end of the colonial system. The Flag had two colours, the black and red that spread out into two horizontal bands.

The top band represents the blood spilt by the Angolans during the colonial oppression, the national liberation struggle and the defence of the motherland. In the lower band there is the black colour that represents the African continent. In the centre we have a composition that integrates the sprocket wheel, the symbol of the workers and industrial production, by a machete, the symbol of the peasants and agricultural production and the armed struggle and by a star, symbol of the international solidarity. The wheel, the machete and the star are yellow coloured, which represents the wealth of the country. The insignia of the Peoples Republic of Angola are formed by a section of the sprocket wheel and by branches of corn, coffee and cotton, representing the workers, industrial production, the peasants and agricultural production.

At the base of this set is an open book, symbol of education and culture and the rising sun, meaning of the new country. At the centre there is a machete and a hoe, to symbolize the labour and the commencement of the armed struggle. At the top is the star symbolizing the international solidarity and progress. At the bottom of the emblem there is a golden band with the wordings "Peoples Republic of Angola". The National Anthem is called: "Angola Avante" (Angola Ahead). The entire material was designed with an intense revolutionary fervour by the MPLA militants.<sup>243</sup>

The proclamation ceremony took place at the *Praça da Liberdade* where a platform was erected from which the MPLA President, dr. António Agostino Neto made his official speech.

Representative because, following the exacerbation of the conflict, they have withdrawn on the eve of the event. In this respect the text of President Neto would inspire the final document.

According to the speech of the proclamation of independence of Angola, the development of the country would be characterized taking into account:

*"The principles that have guided the MPLA in the recovery of the dignity of the Angolans, the desire for freedom and independence, constant premises of its long trajectory.*

President Neto was recalling in his reflection, the set of victorious actions developed by the Angolan people for the building of a new Angola, by reviewing the great events of the 4<sup>th</sup> February, the MPLA crisis in 1963 and in 1973. Difficult moments that were wisely being overcome. He was referring to the solidarity expressed in the common struggle of all those exploited by the colonialism.

From the above presumptions, the text of the proclamation of National Independence clearly expressed the guiding lines of the Movement for the future of Angola, including the following:

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(243) Amongst those who attended this important task that preceded the Proclamation ceremony, were comrades Manuel Rui Monteiro in the drafting of the text, Rui Mingas in the music part and Carlos Lamartine who prepared and rehearsed the band for the National Anthem.

*The evocation of the violations of the Alvor Accords, by the other liberation movements and the Portuguese Government, who silenced the invasion of foreign regular armies and mercenary forces;*

*The institutionalization of the national army of the FAPLA; the erection of a State of Social Justice; the struggle for the economic independence;*

*International Relations defined by the reciprocity of advantages;*

*The litigation with Portugal will be dealt with serenity so as to not to poison our future relations;*

*The training of Cadres;*

*The struggle for the integrity of the territory, opposing any attempt to divide the country, presupposing the expulsion of the Zairean and South African armies, Portuguese fascists, mercenaries of various origins which constitute the combined forces of the imperialism in its aggression to our country;*

*Establishment of the Peoples Power at national level;*

*Special attention and care to the war orphans, disabled and mutilated for their sacrifices in the national liberation struggle;*

*Establish at national level a vigorous combat against illiteracy across the entire country and propagation of a free education rooted in the culture of the Angolan People;*

*The establishment at national level of medical and sanitary assistance directed mainly to the peasant masses until now deprived of such right by the colonialism;*

*Abolishment of all forms of discrimination (sex, age, ethnic origin or racial and religious) and the rigorous establishment of the fair principle – “equal work, equal pay”.*

*Emancipation of the Angolan Women a right obtained through the participation in the national liberation struggle and in the production for the generalized resistance;*

*Secular State with a complete separation of the Church and the State, respecting all the religion, protecting the churches, sites, places of worship and institutions equally recognized. Reiterates its solidarity with all the oppressed peoples of the world, especially those of Zimbabwe and Namibia, against the racist domination. Expresses its solidarity with the people of South Africa, in its struggle against the racist regime oppressing it;*

*Militant solidarity with the peoples of Mozambique, Cape Verde, Sao Tomé e Príncipe and the respective revolutionary vanguards, FRELIMO, PAIGC and MLSTP*

*As an independent and free state, expresses its accession to the principles of the Charter of African Unity and the UN Charter;*

*Its foreign policy is based on the principles of total independence, followed always by the MPLA, il be of the non-alignment.*

*Finally, it proposes to pursue the Peoples Generalized Resistance and to build a new Democratic and Popular State”*

Read in the voice of President Agostinho Neto and on behalf of the Central Committee of the MPLA, this text served to proclaim solemnly before Africa and the World the Independence of Angola and the constitution of the Peoples Republic of Angola. This fact occurred within a climate of euphoria and enthusiasm, although a few km away there were combats to sustain the military front organized by the FNLA supported by Portuguese and Zairean forces and under the pressure in the south by South African forces.

General França N'Dalu spent in the following way the Proclamation of National Independence at the combat front:

*(...)I was here, I didn't attend, I was in Kifagondo, still involved in the attack the day before, then we remained under alert because there was the first attack, there could be a second, and we heard the speech...in that day I was upset, our guys when the President Neto said: "we proclaim the independence of Angola!", our comrades started to spend the ammunition by shooting to the air, so I didn't see certain things, as I said, I was more linked to the military action and I can now admit sincerely that I sometimes would stay away from politics, but rather minding on my military duties.<sup>244</sup>*

On the 12th November law no.1/75 creating the Ministries and Secretaries of State and Decree no.1 /75 appointing the members of the PRA Government were promulgated.

## **6.5. The internationalization of the Civil War**

### **6.5.1. The Invasion of the Zairean Army**

A military column of the FNLA, reinforced by Zairean and Portuguese mercenary troops led by Coronel Gilberto Santos e Castro crossed the border of Zaire with Angola and was advancing towards Caxito aimed at taking the capital on the 22<sup>nd</sup> July 1975. In a perfect line with South Africa, it reinforced the military supplies to UNITA while Portugal was initiating an airlift between Luanda and Lisbon on the 17<sup>th</sup> of the same month, still under the framework of the supply of military equipment to the invaders.

The military column that invaded Angola from Zaire was stopped by the FAPLA in Caxito, 60 km from Luanda on the 22<sup>nd</sup> July. From Kinshasa, Holden Roberto, on behalf of the FNLA, declared total war to the MPLA. Such warmonger attitude of the FNLA led Angola to a generalized war. The armed conflicts between the two movements spread into all the Kwanza-North, Malange, Huambo, Moxico and Cabinda districts, turning them into a stage of violent confrontations.

Accordingly, the cease-fire that had been signed on the 7th June, by initiative of the MPLA, was violated by the FNLA on the 9<sup>th</sup> July, with heavy rocket bombings that shook Luanda again. After several days of violent fighting, on the 20th July, upon the impotence of the Transitional Government, the MPLA troops launched an attack to the last FNLA stronghold in Luanda dislodging it from Luanda.

It was the downfall of the ELNA, which was hitherto glorified by its leaders for its alleged force and discipline. According to the daily *Jornal Novo...* "the MPLA men, who were enjoying enormous popular support, had the capacity and motivation

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(244) See interview of General António dos Santos França NDALU, *Centro de documentação e Investiga ção Histórica CC MPLA*

That was lacking amongst the ELNA soldiers, who had good weapons and precious uniforms, but that was all they had, none else”.<sup>245</sup>

### 6.5.2. The Invasion of the South African Army

Operation Savannah emerged from the efforts of the USA who, within the framework of the Cold War, was seeking to contain at all costs, the Russian presence in any parts of the world, aiming to obtain more spaces for geo-strategic and geo-political intervention. Angola on the verge of independence was a treasure and was one of the key parts of the world where the Americans wanted to be alone. It was also within this framework that “Spínola was alarmed with the Soviet attempts to expand its influence in Central Africa, especially in Angola”.<sup>81</sup>

However, despite the divergences between Portugal and the USA in regard to the liberation of the Portuguese colonies, Angola’s independence was for the US a relief for its expansionist policies since, with Portugal out of the deck of cards, Washington would have the possibility of coupling itself with the peoples of the ex-Portuguese colonies. In this respect, from the Middle East, the American President Nixon met Spínola on the 19th June 1974, a meeting for about 2 hours, at the Officers Dining Room at the Lajes Base, Azores. To this effect, there was the need to find allies in the region to facilitate the manoeuvres that would lead to the achievement of its targets. The Republic of South Africa, which was occupying and ruling Southwest Africa (now Namibia) by default of the League of Nations, was receptive the American project:

There were four reasons behind this aperture for an alliance with the American Government:

1. Its opposition to the decolonization of Namibia, even despite the UN Resolutions;
2. Wanted to turn Southern Africa into a region under the white minority rule;
3. Was also convinced that if the MPLA, assisted by the Soviets and internationalist Cubans took the power, such wish would not be more than a project on paper;
4. Was avoiding to have a socialist neighbour preventing its racial segregation of the peoples of South Africa, Namibia and South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe)

It was in this context that the apartheid regime would easily become a secret ally of the Americans, but didn’t want to be known that it had forces combating in Angola; it thus started its military action named “Operation Savannah”. On the 9th October 1975 coronel Koos van Heerden was appointed to head the Zulu Special Forces which comprised 2 Battalions:

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(245) Gleijese, Op.Cit., pp.290-291

The Battle Group Alfa and the Battle Group Bravo, each one equipped with 81mm rocket mortars and Vickers machine guns. The Alfa comprised two companies of Bushmen led by commander Linford while the Bravo group had 3 FNLA troops led by commanders Jan Breytenbach and Boy du Toit.

Meanwhile, on the 12th October, the Alfa Battalion had experienced a slight problem with the Bushmen refusing to fight with the FNLA and UNITA whom they considered to be long-time enemies. To this effect Kwamama, commander of the Bushmen, noted with Linford that him and his troops had never fought against SWAPO or the MPLA. But Linford convinced him. Overcoming the challenge, the two battalions (Bravo and Alfa) joined together at Katwiti where all were equipped with Portuguese materials, such as uniforms, boots, belts, canvass, automatic weapons type G3, ubiquitous trucks, vegetables, which were characteristic during the Savannah Operation. On commencement of the march hinterland, the special force of Battalion Alfa took the city of Serpa Pinto (now Menongue) and upon its return to the South, on the 19<sup>th</sup> October it reached Pereira de Eça (now Ondjiva), before the ridiculous presence of 150 men of the FAPLA. In the following day it was the turn of the Chibia, of Sá da Bandeira (now Lubango) taken between the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> October and Moçamedes (Namibe) between the 27<sup>th</sup> and 28<sup>th</sup>. On the 30th, Group Alfa proceeded to Kabula where it was confronted with the FAPLA forces who, due to lack of men, were forced to withdraw.

On the month of November, the incursion of South African troops continued inside Angola. Thus, on the 1st, Kilenge fell into the hands of the Alfa battalion who had also reached Chongorou, an abandoned village by the FAPLA who, for strategic reasons had withdrawn 20 km further, on the bridge of River Koporolo. Recognising the presence of FAPLA troops at the bridge, the Alfa group manoeuvred its troops and reached, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> November, the Benguela-Katengue road where it confronted a FAPLA platoon. On the 4<sup>th</sup> November, upon being re-supplied, the Zulu column met Alfa near Paito, 30 km south of Benguela. On the following day, the Alfa group attacked Benguela which it could only take on the afternoon of the 6<sup>th</sup>, however its presence was short-lived as the city was quickly recovered; General Beto Traça accompanied the South African occupation of Benguela and Sumbe in the Centre-West of Angola

*"(...) we had to take a squadron from Cela in order to rescue Benguela, because we were on the verge of losing Benguela we didn't send reinforcements..."<sup>246</sup> However, the city did not escape from the invading paws and then returned, when I reached*

(246) General Beto Monteiro Traça, was one of the protagonists of the armed struggle which culminated in 1975. Born on the 8<sup>th</sup> May 1941, he studied in Luanda where he completed his primary school and was in boarding school at Liceu Diogo Cão, in Lubango, went to Benguela and then to Luanda in 56-57 to Salvador Correia High School,

*Morro do Chimbo where I met Arguei, saw a column of smoke at the gardens, we didn't know what was it, and it was only upon return we knew what was the smoke for, with the cars..... I spoke.....(...) and the Unimog, which fell in the ambush, because the South Africans were already at the top of the hills, the car stood there for a while, as the car was carrying fuel the bodies.....left the bones, the car.....and there was a lot of people that saw me passing and then that car thought it was me, only after I returned from Sumbe did they know, because many people thought I had died there, but no I didn't, I was in a Mercedes, and when I watched with binoculars, the smoke column was of that car, when I turned to speak to Arguei.*

The neighbouring Lobito town had fallen in the hands of Alfa on the 7<sup>th</sup> November and on the 10<sup>th</sup> column Zulu headed North aiming at Novo Redondo (Sumbe). The Alfa and Bravo Battalions moved further but Alfa suffered an ambush at the River Kikombo on the 11<sup>th</sup> November suffering 20 casualties.

On the 14th November the undercover involvement of the South Africans was blown up when a British journalist reported for the first time their participation on the Angolan civil war.

### **6.5.3. The Participation of the Cuban Army**

The aid requested by Angola at the end of 1974 was formally introduced by the Cuban delegation originated from Mozambique, to the competent party and government organizations only on the 21<sup>st</sup> March. It was in this way that a Plan of Technical and Military Assistance to the MPLA was approved for the period of 1975 to 1976, as well as the creation of a military mission, without any concrete thing having happened. In May the MPLA would insist again with Cuba, reiterating the request formerly formulated. Meanwhile, the financial assistance for the transport of weapons from Dar-es-Salaam had been secured by Yugoslavia with the operation being performed under the supervisions of Commander Dangereux, member of the Chief of Staff of FAPLA.

After the MPLA had reiterated the request for assistance in May 1975, on the occasion of the meeting of Agostinho Neto with the Deputy Prime-Minister of Cuba Flávio Bravo, in Brazzaville, and on the face of the decision of Cuba to delay the request by moving it to end of July, the MPLA President decided to renew the issue on the occasion of the celebration of the Mozambican independence, using the presence of Cadelo in Maputo. The Cuban response was delayed again. Only on the second part of July had Habana finally decided favourably taking into account the more than visible Zairean and South African aggression.

Meanwhile, on the 24th July the FNLA took Capito and Holden Roberto, encouraged by this victory, entered Angola for the first time on the 27<sup>th</sup> after 14 years of exile in Zaire. Meanwhile, a few days later, his troops were held up by the FAPLA. Savimbi, who already had secret conversations with Holden Roberto, South Africa and Mobutu, allied himself with the FNLA, early in August, and the war was extended to the whole of Angola, although the lack of military preparation of the majority of the new recruits was clearly visible in combat. Indeed, until the end of August, no foreign instructor had penetrated in Angola: the Chinese

Continued to train the FNLA in Zaire, while a hundred of the MPLA's military cadres were continuing their training in the Soviet Union.<sup>247</sup>

The presence of Zairean troops and of a group of Portuguese mercenaries in the FNLA granted its forces a sensible superiority in the handling of heavy weapons they were receiving. According to the *Washington Post*, by the end of August "Zaire forms practically part of the fighting" despite the aggravated internal situation, both politically and economically thus making it difficult its aid to the FNLA. What saved it was the financial aid that from the 18<sup>th</sup> July President Ford of the USA was granting secretly to Holden Roberto and J. Savimbi. This aid would be extended to the military domain from the 29<sup>th</sup> July with consignments of weapons and war equipment of all types sent to the two movements, shipped by C-41 aircraft flown from the US to Kinshasa and which would land directly in Negage from the 30<sup>th</sup> August 1975. The Portuguese had withdrawn all their troops from Carmona (now Uíge) and Negage on the 4<sup>th</sup> August leaving the entire North of Angola to the FNLA, although there were still in Angolan territory some 25 000 soldiers confined to protect the white population.

When the South African military column called "Zulu" was approaching Benguela, the Political Bureau of the MPLA convened an urgent meeting and listened to President Neto who was proposing the request for international aid to Cuba, which proposal was immediately accepted by the MPLA leadership. In this meeting the task to convey the request was given to comrade Onambwe, member of the Central committee. The request was to be made to that Caribbean country, Cuba.<sup>248</sup> It was never requested that the Cuban troops be directly involved. But under the circumstances it was formally conveyed to the Cuban Military Mission in Angola, on the need for military reinforcements. In its opinion "to mount an efficient resistance we need a lot more assistance". From Habana, from the High Command of the Armed Forces to the Cuban Military Mission in Angola was received an order to defend the main access to the Capital (Luanda) and to continue the military preparation in the CIR (Centres for revolutionary Instruction), while the possibility of sending reinforcements was being studied.

After the Battle of Catengue, commander Diaz Arguelles asked President Fidel Castro to send Cuban troops to Angola.<sup>249</sup> But the Cuban President wanted to send troops after the independence of Angola. But given the complications in the operational fields, and mainly after Catengue, he changed his ideas. To this effect Jorge Risquet, member of the secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba said: "It was then when we understood that the South Africans had invaded Angola".

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(247) Gleijeses, Op.Cit., p 295.

(248) Wolfers e Bergeral, Angola, p.30.

(249) Quotes from Interviews of comrade Lúcio Lara. Henrique de Carvalho Santos "Onambwe" in Gleijeses, Piero, Misiones en Confliito, p 352.

The Cuban President, faced with this situation, acted by sending special forces and an Artillery regiment. Fidel Castro asked the Military Mission in Angola to inform the Angolans to take control of the airport. “We had to choose; either we remove the instructors and we would abandon Angola, or we would send our special forces”. The decision to send special forces was the decision that was taken by the Cuban Government. President Fidel Castro was convinced that the invasion of the Angolan territory wasn’t just an exclusive work of the racist regime of South Africa but that the US was behind that invasion. So, the decision was a sovereign one without the pressure of the Soviet Union.

It was under these circumstances that on the 4th November 1975 the Cuban President Fidel Castro has decided to send to Angola a battalion of some 652 men from the special forces of the Ministry of Interior of Cuba by air means and an Artillery regiment by maritime means.<sup>250</sup> On the 4th November, a few hours after the decision of the Cuban Government to support the MPLA, the turbo propelled aircraft Britannia left Habana to Brazzaville with some 100 Cubans on board, specialists in heavy weapons requested by the MPLA in September. In the same airplane Major Lucas Molina was also travelling, the first analysis officer sent to Angola.<sup>251</sup> The aircraft landed in Brazzaville at 7h30 on the 6th November. The Cuban Ambassador in Brazzaville had orders to send of the recently arrived Cubans to Pointe Noire where they would receive instructions on the new Soviet weapons, the Arrows C-2M, upgraded version of the ground-air missiles Cubans were using in Guinea-Bissau in 1973-74.

The training should have been done in Pointe Noire, Congo-Brazzaville because the Soviets didn’t want to send troops to Angola before the independence on the 11<sup>th</sup> November 1975.

The specialist Molina and the reminder 158 military Cubans dressed as civilians<sup>252</sup> went to Luanda on the same day the MPLA started to control the Airport of Luanda. René Hernández recalls that Fidel Castro had told them before they left to Angola: “He spoke to us mainly about the South African invasion. He told us that some of the Cuban instructors had been killed, that the situation was difficult, that we had to sustain the South Africans before they reached Luanda and that many of us would not return. He said that it was hard to say that and not to accompany us”. Fidel Castro told the special forces that if Luanda was to fall, they would have to fight as guerrilla fighters alongside the MPLA. If the MPLA was to cease fighting, they would probably withdraw to Zambia where Cuba just had opened an embassy and that such withdrawal would be very difficult.<sup>253</sup>

(250) “Informação”, p.5; Min iFAR, “Batalhão de Tropas Especiais” s.p.

(251) Informação do cumprimento da missão em Luanda nos dias 4 a 18 de Novembro de 1975, Havana, S.F., pp 1-4.

(252) MINFAR, “Batalhão de Tropas Especiais”, S. F.

(253) Quotes from interviews with Hernandez Gattorno e Padrón and more witnesses of Veliz, Suaréz e Hechevarria Cuban Special Forces and one of the doctors that accompanied them, in Piero Gleyjeses Missões em conflito, p 555.

The Cuban special forces were lodged at the Grafanil barracks, where the Cuban military mission was stationed and received the uniforms and the military equipment 1975.<sup>254</sup>

## 6.6. The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale

By the mid-1980s the war in Angola had reached its final stages. The situation of the peasant populations was tumultuous due to the war constraints that were stalling the production and flow of people and goods. This had caused an exodus from the countryside to the cities, especially to the coastal towns, never experienced before in the whole of Southern Africa. With the economic activity almost paralyzed, the country was living basically of the oil revenues and from the agricultural activity of the green belts of the cities. Militarily, the South African air force activity had increased with bombings and sabotage of economic targets. At the same time, there was a second ground invasion from the northern territory of Namibia, illegally occupied, into Angolan territory with the occupation of Ondjiva, the capital of the Cunene Province, advancing dangerously to the North, where they were stopped in the Battle of Cahama, municipality with the same name, by the Angolan Armed Forces. Unable to defeat the Angolan Forces in this direction, they sought to maintain under pressure and concentrate their forces in coalition with UNITA towards the Cuando Cubango Province. General Sanjar<sup>255</sup> describes the military action that preceded the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale:

*“Before this operation we had various South African onslaughts, both in bombings and by sabotage, and that’s how they at dawn sabotaged the Cuanavale River bridge, with divers climbing, with chopper drops at night, north of the river using plastic canoes, rowing on the river, down the river to a certain position, then they left the canoes, dived with masks next to the bridge; we had fences and were expecting that to happen, we fenced with barbed wire 100m around the bridge, so they crashed against the fence, they lowered down... left at night, it must have been at 4 am, lowered the net and jumped, in the jumping the guards noticed the noise and started to shoot into the water, shots, shots, throwing grenades, as how we ordered, and at that time one of them was carrying four backpacks with explosives to detonate the bridge completely, but only one managed, in that business of shootings, grenade explosions, only one managed to stick them into a pillar, a backpack and then they managed to leave which exploded, the others remained, we caught them, but the bridge was damaged, but then we continue to work for the recovery of the bridge, logistics continued there*

(254) Interview with Padrón and Vélizz;

(255) Agostinho Fernando Nelumba (Sanjar) was born in the Dundo village, Province of Lunda North. In 1952 very early fled with his parents and brothers to Congo Léopoldville and joined the military ranks of the MPLA had military training in Russia and participated in the national liberation struggle in the 3rd military and political region of the MPLA. Professional military, was one of the commanders in the Cuito Cuanavale Battle. Was Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of Angola.

*The most difficult stages were those of the Menongue, Huambo, Cuito, Bié supplies where UNITA were ambushing our columns, in Huambo they burnt a column inside the city of Huambo that was stationed there, it was going to Menongue but in Menongue had to very careful....all the columns I think from Menongue, Cuito, must be some 200 km, the comrades would do it by walking, outside the vehicles, in barriers, they would walk like that to clear the ambushes, it was the only way of avoiding ambushes, but they would bash us from far away, when there would be a place where ambushes were discovered the Mig 21 would bump them, the MIGs were based in Menongue to shoot with rockets, so we ....., four or five columns, the last column that was carrying supplies, as they couldn't stop the column, the South Africans brought the air force, a major column that was carrying fuel was attacked by 2 Mirage aircraft, they were flying on valleys, I think from the river....I forgot the name of the river, they flew at low altitude (close to the ground) when they arrived next to the column, climbed and then shot the column, firstly to the fuel tankers, that stuff started to explode, nobody stays next, when our radars detected the aircraft, sounded the alarm for our planes to take off, the MIGs would come but then they were out of range.*

At this stage of the war there was a turning point, the battle for the small but strategic village of Cuito Cuanavale. On the 1986-87 the South African and UNITA forces were forced by the Angolan Armed Forces and the Cuban forces to withdraw after a long siege.

General Sanjar, one of those responsible for the Angolan forces tells the following:

*- (...) I was appointed as the Chief of Staff on the "Operation Saudemos Outubro" in 1987... and I stayed to lead the operation, it was the first time I was at the front, shall we say, to lead a large group of forces, but we could do it....we had academic knowledge, but we lacked the practice, thanks to the intervention, if it wasn't the South African intervention it would have had more success, but we were confronted by the intervention of the South African Air Force, of Battalion 32 and Battalion 503, if I'm not mistaken, being all South African. Well, the South Africans were the equivalent to our brigades, maybe a little more, they called them battalion, but our brigades included administrative staff and all some 1500, they were only some 800, 800 to 900 men, a battalion, not to mention the administrative and logistics support, we had to withdraw from the point we were located, because after that the Cuando Kubango was an area without rear-guard as the Front is expanded, a vacuum is left and infiltrated by the guerrilla, which cuts the supply, so it was causing us difficulties, until we had to withdraw closer to Cuito Cuanavale. This operation preceded some polemics in its organization (...)this operation named "Invasão" was to put the control of the south border back..(..) comrade Pedale decided that we FAPLA should have had this operation, it was that during the discussions of planning the operation that there were some disagreements because the Cubans wanted us to go and occupy a certain line, so that from...meantime they would go to convince the Soviets to deliver material they needed later*

*Moved to the southern border( ...) we would only go as far as the Lomba River, therefore to wear down the UNITA's main units and then to take a line more at the rear (...) we decided to do this operation like that, the units were prepared (...) in the main line where it had the missile anti-aircraft defence and everything to protect the position and the unit which was, shall we say, the 18th Brigade of landing and assault that had a weak direction (...), the 18th Brigade was completely crushed, we had later to withdraw the brigades closer to the Cuito Cuanavale where the defence was formed (...) another direction replaced, but then the South African started to attack with G5, G6 to bring down the Command Post at Cuito Cuanavale, we then removed the command post into another area, I left the area of range of artillery fire, because they had infiltrated personnel even with radios into our ranks, then the Cubans also went, they came to rescue us and we could establish the situation, that's when we caught a Olifant tank and another....that vehicle that is now at the Armed Forces museum, it was a first responder*

In this battle the best techniques and men was used by both parties in the conflict, and it was a memorable one. The South Africans admitted that there was no military solution for the defence and security of their northern border.

## **6.7. The solution of the Internal Conflict and Regional Solidarity**

The Government of Angola spared no efforts towards contributing to the resolution of the problems of peace and security in Southern and western Africa. Its active participation in the negotiation process that culminated with the signing of the Brazzaville Protocol on the 13th December 1988 and of the New York Accords on the 22<sup>nd</sup> December were the most evident proof of its loyalty to the commitments assumed before the international community in general and in Africa in particular. As a result of this action, it started, on the 1st April 1989, despite the vicissitudes, the process of implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the UN Security Council for the independence of Namibia. In this context, although there was no parallelism between the implementation of Resolution no. 435/78 on Namibia and the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola, upon the withdrawal of the South African troops, the Cuban Government then agreed to withdraw its troops from Angola. Complying with the commitments freely assumed, in the global platform of the negotiations of the 17th November 1984, or in the Geneva Protocol of the 5th August 1988, as in the Bilateral Agreement Angola/Cuba of the 22<sup>nd</sup> December 1988, the international Cuban troops started to withdraw from the Angolan territory within the agreed terms and deadlines.

For the Angolan Government a true peace in Angola would only be possible upon the reconciliation of the entire Angolan family.

In this scope, the declarations of (dr. *Agostinho Neto.*) of José Eduardo dos Santos, President of the Republic of Angola, according to which the UNITA issue would become an internal problem susceptible to be resolved by the Angolans themselves provided the elements that were distorting it. In this respect and referring to the ambiguities of Jonas Savimbi in regard to the peace process for Angola at African summits, such as the Gbadolite Summit.

His Excellency the President of the Republic of Angola referred it into the following terms:

*I think that you mr. Journalist was in the Press conference given yesterday (Tuesday) by President Kenneth Kaunda, in the presence of the other Heads of State. I wouldn't be the best person to say if Savimbi had accepted or not its temporary removal. Various Heads of State that were in Gbadolite already confirmed such removal. What I can add is that indeed President Kenneth Kaunda made the conclusions of the Gbadolite Summit in the presence of Jonas Savimbi and Savimbi declared at the time that he would cooperate with all the countries present in the completion of such ideas. In these conclusions there was a point about its voluntary and temporary removal of the political scene...(..) This means he rejects Gbadolite. Savimbi was in Gbadolite and a fundamental principle for me to enter into agreements is the good faith, credibility. If he now rejects the Gbadolite agreements he accepted, what credibility he has to continue to discuss, what trust can he inspire? It is necessary to respect the agreements, to respect the word given (..) We will continue in search of peace. Our people want peace and we will use all the means at our reach. So it is stated in the declaration of our Parliament published on the 18<sup>th</sup> August: to employ all the resources of the Nation, whether political, economic and military to reach peace.<sup>256</sup>*

Angola through the informed voice of its Head of State undertook various diplomatic and legal initiatives tending to give execution to its policy of clemency and national harmonization with regard to national reconciliation. The Franceville Summit of the 1st October 1988, the approval of the Law of Amnesty approved by the People's Assembly of the Republic of Angola on the 24th December 1988, the latest Brazzaville Summit of the 5th May 1989 are a testimony of the unshakeable will of the MPLA – Party of the Labour and of the Government of the RPA to see , within the shortest time possible, the solution of the problems that are still impeding the unity of the entire Angolan family.

In this context the Government of Angola has reiterated its determination to solve, by peaceful means, its internal problems to which it has taken significant steps: the meddling in.

*(...) Continues deluded and still thinks he can destroy the Angolan State supported by foreign allies. But history has shown that such way will not lead Savimbi to the objectives he wants. His failure, his defeat, according to such way, will be ensured (..) We consider that the traditional allies of Savimbi have not ceased to meddle in the internal affairs of Angola and they are the USA and South Africa (...) An important point of our plan – actually, the first point – is that all foreign interference should cease and taking into account that we are in a peace process, the supply of weapons to Jonas Savimbi does not favour such peace process*

(256) Interview given on the 23rd August 1989, in Harare by the President of the PRA, comrade Jose Eduardo dos Santos to journalists Kenneth Noble, chief of the West Africa Desk of The New York Times, Pascal Fletcher, Reuter News Agency

*quite to the contrary (...) once such principles are satisfied the Angolan Government, loyal to its commitments, will define the practical modalities of the integration (...) operation and the support of the African countries and specially of the Frontline States, Angola's neighbours, Gabon and Sao Tome e Principe would be indispensable and would greatly contribute towards the materialization of the plan*  
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## CONCLUSION

Based on the details used in the study we submitted, we are to conclude that the Angolan liberating project was a long journey, the march a painful, heroic and victorious process with courage and determination.

The colonialism was set politically and structurally in Africa. But the Portuguese colonialism was more aggressive by the structures and organisms of repression it set in all territories it called Overseas Provinces.

The first sign of intolerance against the colonial system occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s for the prisons and political of political prisoners and the massacres of the 4th January, the insurrection of the 4th February and of the 15th March 1961 at the Baixa de Cassanje, in Luanda and North of Angola, respectively.

The struggle fought during 14 years for the liberation of Angola was a hard one, with fratricidal fighting between the two Angolan movements who should have joined together for the freedom of the motherland. It is here that the foreign meddling started to be reflected during the 1974-75 years.

The presence of three armies at the time of the proclamation of Angola was the element that weakened the birth of the independent Angola.

The Government of the MPLA was able to perform the tasks related with the maintenance of the independence, the regional solidarity, hosting in its soil the brothers of Southern Africa which, during the 80s have intensified the fight against apartheid installed in Namibia and South Africa.

The victories achieved at the battles against the Zairean and racist armies since the invasion of Angola to the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale were decisive to the political turning point in Southern Africa and for the consolidation of democracy with the building of SADC and enabled the Angolans to seek the routes for the internal peace, despite the ambiguities in the compliance of the agreements signed between the MPLA and the UNITA under the observation of the United Nations in its UNAVEM II and III missions.

With the holding of elections in 1992 the multiparty system was initiate despite the rejection of the results by UNITA and it returning to war.

The UNITA's armed opposition led the Government to draw a military strategy with the objective to neutralize it militarily and to politically to force it again into the table of negotiations. To achieve that the Government based it in the legitimate powers in that the international community was the guarantee of the legality of such accords.

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(257) Idem.

## ACRONYMS

ANC :	Congresso Nacional Africano (África do Sul) (African National Congress – South Africa))
BA :	Base Aérea (Air Base)
CAPA :	Centro Angolano de Formação (Centre for Advanced Training)
CAPA :	Comité de Acção Política de Angola (Committee for Political Action in Angola)
CCPM :	Comité de Coordenação Político Militar (Committee for Political and Military Coordination)
CDIH :	Centro de Documentação e Investigação Histórica do MPLA (Centre of Documentation and Historical Research of the MPLA)
CEMFA :	Chefe do Estado Maior das Forças Armadas (Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces)
CFB :	Caminho de Ferro de Benguela (Benguela Railways)
CIA :	Central de Inteligência Americana (Central Intelligence Agency)
CIR :	Centro de Instrução Revolucionária (Centre of Revolutionary Training)
CITA :	Centro de Informação e Turismo de Angola (Tourism Centre of Angola)
CMP :	Conselho Mundial da Paz (World Peace Council)
CMU :	Conselho Militar Unificado (Unified Military Council)
CND :	Comissão Nacional de Defesa (National Defence Committee)
CONCP :	Conferencia das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas (Conference of the National Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies)
COPLAD :	Comando Operacional de Luanda (Luanda Operational Command)
COREMO :	Comité de Resistência de Moçambique (Committee of National Resistance of Mozambique)
CPA :	Conselho Político Angolano (Angolan Political Council)
CPR/FN :	Comissão Provisória do Reajustamento da Frente (Provisional Committee of the Readjustment of the Northern Front)
CPRFL :	Comissão Provisória de Reajustamento da Frente (Provisional Committee of the Readjustment of the Eastern Front)
CSLA :	Conselho Supremo da Libertação de Angola (Supreme Council for the Liberation of Angola)
CVAAR :	Corpo de Voluntários de Apoio aos Angolanos (Volunteer Support Corps for Angolans)
DGS :	Direcção Geral de Segurança (State Security Police)
DOR :	Departamento de Orientação (Department of Orientation)
DTA :	Direcção de Transportes Aéreos (Colonial Airline)
ELNA :	Exército de Libertação Nacional de Angola (Angolan National Liberation Army)
EMFL :	Estado Maior da Frente Leste (Eastern Front Chief of Staff)
EMGFA :	Estado Maior General das Forças

Armadas (General Chief of Staff)

EPLA : Exército Popular de Libertação de Angola  
(Peoples Liberation Army of Angola)

FA : Forças Armadas (Armed Forces)

FALA : Forças Armadas de Libertação de Angola (braço armado da UNITA)  
(Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola – Armed Wing of  
UNITA)

FAO : Fundo das Nações Unidas para Agricultura e Alimentação (Un  
Fund for Food and Agriculture)

FAP : Forças Armadas Portuguesas (Portuguese Armed Forces)

FAPLA : Forças Armadas Populares de Libertação de Angola (braço armado  
do MPLA)(Peoples Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola –  
armed wing of the MPLA)

FARP : Forças Armadas Revolucionárias Populares

(Peoples Revolutionary Armed Forces)

FLEC :	Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (Front for the Liberation of Cabinda)
FNLA :	Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FRA :	Frente Revolucionária de Angola (Revolutionary Front of Angola)
FRELIMO :	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
FUA :	Frente de Unidade de Angola (Front for thr Unity of Angola)
GE :	Grupos Especiais (Special Groups)
GRAE :	Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile)
JGA :	Junta Governativa de Angola (Government Council of Angola)
MAC :	Movimento Anticolonial (Anti-Colonial Movement)
MDA :	Movimento Democrático Angolano (Democratic Movement of Angola)
MDB :	Movimento Democrático de Benguela (Democratic Movement of Benguela)
MDH :	Movimento Democrático do Huambo (Democratic Movement of Huambo)
MDIA :	Movimento Defesa dos Interesses de Angola (Movement for the Defence of Angolan Interests)
MFA :	Movimento das Forças Armadas (Movement of the Armed Forces)
MINA :	Movimento para a Independência Nacional de Angola (Movement for the National Independence of Angola)
MLSTP :	Movimento de Libertação de São Tomé e Príncipe (Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome e Principe)
MOPUA :	Movimento Popular de Unificação de Angola (Peoples Movement for the Unification of Angola)
MPLA :	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NT :	Nossas Tropas (Our Troops)
OCA :	Organização Comunista de Angola (Communist Organization of Angola)
OIT :	Organização Internacional do Trabalho (International Labour Organization)
OMA :	Organização da Mulher Angolana (Angolan Womens Organization)
OMS :	Organização Mundial da Saúde (World Health Organization)
ONU :	Organização das Nações Unidas (United Nations)
OPVDCA :	Organização Provincial dos Voluntários da Defesa Civil de Angola (Volunteer Civil Defence of Angola)
OSPAA :	Organização de Solidariedade dos Povos Afro-asiáticos (Organization of the Solidarity to Asian and African Peoples)
OTAN :	Organização do Tratado do Atlântico (NATO -North Atlantic Treaty Organization)
OUA :	Organização de Unidade Africana (Organization of African Union)
PAC :	Congresso Panafricano (África do Sul)

	(Pan African Congress – South Africa)
PADC :	Partido Angolano Democrático Cristão (Angolan Christian Democratic Party)
PAIGC :	Partido Africano para Independência da Guiné e Cabo-Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PC :	Posto de Comando (Command Post)
PCC :	Partido Comunista de Cuba (Communist Party of Cuba)
PCDA :	Partido Cristão Democrático Angolano (Christian Democratic Party of Angola)
PCP :	Partido Comunista Português (Portuguese Communist Party)
PCT :	Partido Congolês Democrático do Trabalho (Democratic Congolese Labour Party)
PDA :	Partido Democrático de Angola (Democratic Party of Angola)
PDH :	Partido Democrático do Huambo (Huambo Democratic Party)
PDN :	Partido Democrático Nto-Abako de Angola (Democratic Nto-Abako Party of Angola)
PFA :	Partido Federalista Angolano (Fedrealist Party of Angola)
PIDE:	Polícia Internacional e de Defesa de Estado/Direcção Geral de Segurança (Portuguese State Security Police)

PIFAS :	Programa de Informação das Forças Armadas (Information Program of the Armed Forces)
PRDA :	Partido do Reagrupamento Democrático Angolano (Party for the Democratic Angolan Regrouping)
PRO-AEESL :	Pro-Associação dos Estudantes do Ensino Secundário de Luanda (Pro-Association of Luanda Secondary School Students)
PSD :	Partido Social Democrático (Social Democratic Party)
PSP :	Polícia de Segurança Pública (Public Safety Police)
PTA :	Partido Trabalhista Angolano (Angolan Labour Party)
PU :	Províncias Ultramarinas (Overseas Provinces)
PUA :	Partido de Unidade Angolana (Angolan Unity Party)
RDA :	República Democrática Alemã (Democratic German Republic)
RMA :	Região Militar de Angola (Military Region of Angola)
RPM :	Região Político Militar (Political Military Region)
SAM :	Serviços de Assistência Médica (Medical Services)
SGDN :	Secretário-Geral da Defesa (Secretary-General for Defence)
SIDA :	Agência Sueca de Desenvolvimento Internacional (Swedish Aid Agency)
SRT :	Serviços de Rádio e Telecomunicações (Radio and Telecommunication Services)
STM :	Serviços de Telecomunicações Militares (Military Communication Services)
TE :	Tropas Especiais (Special Forces)
UEA :	União dos Estudantes Angolanos (Union of Angolan Students)
UNA :	União Nacional de Angola (National Union of Angola)
UNDENAMO :	União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique (National Democratic Union of Mozambique)
UNEA :	União Nacional dos Estados Africanos (National Union of African States)
UNESCO :	Organismo das Nações Unidas para Educação Ciência e Cultura (UNESCO)
UNITA :	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA – National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
URSS :	União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (USSR – Union of the Soviet and Socialist Republics)
VC :	Vitória Certa (Victory is Certain)
ZANU :	União Nacional Africana do Zimbabué (ZANU – Zimbabwe African National Union)
ZAPU :	União Popular Africana do Zimbabué (ZAPU- Zimbabwe African Peoples Union)
ZIL :	Zona de Intervenção Leste (Eastern Intervention Zone)
ZIN :	Zona de Intervenção Norte (Northern Intervention Zone)
ZML :	Zona Militar Leste (Eastern Military Zone)
ZMN :	Zona Militar Norte (Northern Military Zone)

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### GLOSSARY

Administrador	Colonial administration district officer.
Aldeamentos	Protected villages created by the colonial authorities during the liberation war.
Assimilado	Africans who had acquired Portuguese citizenship rights.
Capulana	Mozambican women traditional cloth.
Chefe de Posto	Lowest ranking administration officer. Reported to the Administrador.
Chibalo/xibalo	Forced labour imposed by colonial authorities.
Indígena	African persons classified as natives and not enjoying Portuguese citizenship rights.
Indigenato	Legal framework regulating the rights and obligations of natives.
Machamba	Small/Medium cultivating fields/gardens.
Mestiço/Mulato	Person of mixed colour, usually of creole origin.
Palmatória	Wooden paddle with holes used in beatings as a punishment .
Prazos	Form of land concession during the colonial rule.
Régulo	

# 2.2

# Angola

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## Chiwale, José Samuel

[Luanda; May 2007]

*General José Samuel Chiwale was born in Sandjilotulo, Kipeio, Concelho da Caála, Huambo, and Republic of Angola. He studied in the evangelical schools from 1952-1960. The ill-treatment inflicted on his father and others, gave rise to a feeling of rebellion against the Portuguese colonialists. He went to Kunene and with the help of his father's friends he joined SWAPO. At that time SWAPO had a clandestine network where he assumed the post of Deputy Secretary of the SWAPO Youth, at the level of Ovamboland from 1962 to 1964. After meeting Dr Savimbi, he joined him and they left for China where they were trained in guerrilla warfare. After sometime General Chiwale was nominated as Deputy Commander, of UNITA military forces.*

He is a general in the army, born in Sandjilotulo, Kipeio, Concelho da Caála, Huambo, in the Republic of Angola. His father was a “regedor” (administrator) and his mother was a peasant farmer. He studied in the evangelical schools of the Evangelic Centre in Galambe, Bonga and Bailundo, from 1952–1960. The ill-treatment inflicted on his father and others, by the Portuguese who accused them of having contacts with Lumumba, who were later on taken to Huambo. This gave rise to a feeling of rebellion against the Portuguese colonialists.

They were told that in the North of Angola a war was raging that had been launched by UPA, on the 15th of March 1961, mainly in the coffee plantations where cheap labour was used from the Huambo, Bié, Huíla and Cunene Provinces. Those workers who had fled the regions where the war was raging disseminated the message of rebellion through the regions and fuelled a feeling of rebellion amongst the populations against the colonialists in their respective areas.

Some associations of an anti-colonial character were already established in Huambo, Dondi, Bailundo, Elende and other regions whose actions resulted in the arrest of various administrative officials and the flight of various leaders. Having gone many times with his father to the regions of Huíla, Kunene and Namíbia where they acquired cattle to sell in Huambo he understood how the Namibians related to the Boers, being treated in a very cruel way and this strengthened the feeling of rebellion. Having decided to pursue his desire to join UPA in Angola and to give his contribution against the colonialism, he went to Kunene and with the help of his father's friends he joined SWAPO. At that time SWAPO had a clandestine network where he assumed the post of Deputy Secretary of the SWAPO Youth, at the level of Ovamboland from 1962 to 1964.

He moved to Dar es Salaam with that organization using the migrant workers who went to the mines in South Africa having experienced some sacrifices and difficulties in Botswana, Ovamboland, Ondângua, Kuvango, Caprivi, Sakawe, Zâmbia, etc., and passing as a refugee under the auspices of the United Nations. In Zambia he met other elderly Angolans from Lobito and from other areas, who had been officials

of the Benguela's Railways, who encouraged him to carry on although there were serious problems within UPA, since Dr. Jonas Savimbi had left, as well as Dr. Liahuca, Alexandre Pedro Mário, Kamutungo and many others in Léopoldville, having tried to join MPLA in Congo Brazzaville.

His initial meeting with Dr Savimbi was arranged through messages from Dr. Liahuca in Congo Brazzaville. After meeting Dr Savimbi, he joined him and others with the help of SWAPO, who dealt with the documentation. They left for China where they were trained in guerrilla warfare which included the political, military and technical-military aspects with his different branches.

The training addressed ideological issues, methods and methodologies in the organization of the struggle against colonialism and, eventually, ethnic issues, which led to the UNITA Movement in Muangai, in 1966. It was not an easy task being strengthened by clandestine activities which spread from Luso (Lwena) to Lobito, involving people from all social strata and services extending afterwards to Luanda.

China was looked upon as the Republic who understood the revolutionary fervour which had reached the Angolan People. China did not stop at anything and offered all the support during the first years of the struggle, including the training of cadres, medicines and logistic support and Money. The arrest of its leader in Zambia, after his passage through some countries in Africa sympathising with this cause, was justified as being the result of various attacks carried out by UNITA, along the Benguela Railway Line which damaged not only Zambian economic interests but mainly those of the British, Belgian, Portuguese and other parties. Zambia, a country which supported us, transported copper and other goods received from Europe through that railway line was blackmailed to perform the arrest.

He recalled all the attempts to surrender Dr. Savimbi to the Portuguese, an event which did not take place due to the quick and efficient intervention of Nasser, the president of Egypt. Having fled to Cairo, UNITA enters into a crisis, but through some old Angolan emigrants in Zambia, although their acculturation of English way of life, Dr. Savimbi's message was delivered to the members in the interior of the country focussing on the need to restructure the party. One of these actions was the deployment of intelligent youth and the strong spirit of initiative to take up the responsibilities within and outside the movement and the national territory in order to facilitate the communication between the interior and the outside world. For the first time General Chiwale was nominated as Deputy Commander, and then of UNITA military forces and in general the restructuring was done.

He recalled that Mr. Castro Bango, who led the movement underground from Huambo, caused one of the major setbacks to UNITA when he offered to PIDE all the information about the underground network of UNITA he had collected from the party's administration. The political police had no difficulty arresting all the members of the movement in various urban centres and throughout the country. The leaders were arrested and taken to S. Nicolau and Tarrafal. In December 1968, Dr. Savimbi proceeded with the restructuring of the armed forces in different

patents and the military actions gained another dimension having acquired weapons from outside the country. The problem of the timber merchants which had caused many misunderstandings was referred to as a relationship requested by the timber merchants who needed timber for their economic activities. UNITA had to guarantee the security of the timber merchants, but by doing that UNITA could meet many of its logistic requirements, otherwise met with many sacrifices.

He referred to the crisis in Zâmbia in the 70s with Ian Smith, when Zâmbia had lots of food shortages. Dr. Savimbi knew that food production by the armed forces was well organized, and agreed that a guerrilla movement like UNITA had to assist in solidarity the Zambian people and its government. He offered three tonnes of maize without any constraints. This was an example in the history of the National Liberation Movements all over the world. He focussed on the egocentrism experienced amongst the National Liberation Movements which did not help to build unity and contributed to the situation of civil war after independence. He appealed to the need to have all the leaders of political parties, known as traditional, who had launched the war against colonization and afterwards the civil war, to stop and reflect to make a history without any constraints and to build one Angola where everybody would have the same opportunities in its development.

## Coutinho, Rosa

*Rosa Coutinho was an Admiral in the Portuguese Navy. He joined the navy in 1944, when he was 18 years old and his first trip with "Sagres" was to Luanda, Angola, as a naval cadet. He was the first Portuguese Admiral at the hands of FNLA. For some time he was also a Portuguese High Commissioner in Angola. During his interview he started by identifying himself as an officer of the Portuguese Navy.*

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Rosa Coutinho, an Admiral in the Portuguese Navy, was the first Portuguese Admiral at the hands of FNLA. He was also for some time the High Commissioner in Angola. In 1959, he visited S. Tomé e Príncipe during a hydrographical mission from Angola, for two years in the ship called "Carvalho Araújo". He said that many people in Luanda would recall this name. In 1961, he was captured by the then UPA, later on FNLA, having spent almost 4 months in jail in Kinshasa, being accused of being a spy. His case was solved in Angola and he went to Lisbon, terminating his mission in Angola. From there he went to Asia for two years in Macau and Timor, afterwards to Mozambique where he led the dredging services. As the Director of the Services he got to know Mozambique well. On his return, he was appointed commander of a frigate "Almirante Pereira da Silva" when the 25th of April took place. He was selected to be part of the National Salvation Council (*Junta de Salvação Nacional*) and was

sent to Angola.

Admiral Rosa Coutinho mentions that he was not in Angola at the time of the events on the 4th of February 1961, the official date of the beginning of the armed struggle for the liberation of Angola. The 15th of March is the date with impact on the Portuguese conscience; it shook the Portuguese and led to Salazar's reaction due to the massacres by UPA.

There was a need to start the decolonization process in Angola. When he went to Angola he did not know MPLA. He always fought for Angola not to be taken by Zaire. During the six months he was in Angola he recognised that the only political force amongst the so called liberation movements was the MPLA. MPLA was the one who had fought for independence of Angola, the one who had suffered the most. MPLA had declared itself as a Marxist party; he thought it to be totally unfair to marginalize MPLA from the independence of Angola, because Marxists had the same rights as other parties. And he mentioned that the reality was that MPLA was weak militarily but it was the only political force in Angola.

He speaks of the correlation of forces, strongly in favour of FNLA, totally dependent on Zaire and, through Zaire, the Americans and a racist movement. During the six months he was in Angola, the Admiral said that MPLA was the last movement to sign a cease-fire agreement. And when he arrived in Angola UNITA had already signed the cease-fire agreement. FNLA only signed after the SAL agreement, where Spínola and Mobutu, under the sponsorship of the Americans, tried to recognise the hegemony of the FNLA in the independence of Angola. This would have been a disaster; it would mean to transform Angola into a province of Zaire. From then on, after the cease-

fire signed by the three movements, the conditions were created for ME to authorize the establishment of official delegations of the three movements in Luanda. Besides these three movements, another four appeared; and before the elections more than twenty parties appeared. Authorization was not given for the establishment of these delegations because they had not participated in the war for liberation; they had no legitimacy to be in power. They were reactionaries.

On the type of independence to Angola, he said it had to be true independence. It had to be independence where all the Angolan people could feel totally independent from the colonial regime, including the Portuguese themselves living there. He considered that the fact that the majority of the Portuguese left the country had been bad for an independent Angola.

Another negative thing was the international reaction and the foreign interference in the independence of Angola, South Africa and other countries. Everybody wanted to interfere. Amongst other issues related to independence of Angola he spoke about the United States with his own race horse, the FNLA. The signed agreements were systematically violated by the Angolan representatives of the liberation movements. On 11 November, I was happy; I felt the Angolans had understood that they wanted to be independent and not simply a province of Mobutu. On what he thought of the Cuban presence in Angola he said the Cubans came after a request by the MPLA. The Cubans saved the MPLA from the guillotine; they helped to save the MPLA.

Admiral Rosa Coutinho states that in his opinion, both the FNLA and UNITA had a desire for racial and tribal supremacy within the Angolan territory.

After 20 years many people have not forgotten – he referred to the Portuguese who left Angola. After the 11 November, he came to Angola many times at the invitation of Dr. António Agostinho Neto, and he went to Luena to support an alliance between MPLA and UNITA, without which the Alvor Agreement could not have taken place. Recalling the issue of the Angolan decolonization, after World War II, Admiral Rosa Coutinho stated that the general decolonization world wide was a consequence of the World War II. Portugal was stubborn, did not follow the logical path and postponed the decolonization process which became more difficult when there was a revolution taking place in Portugal. Regarding the influence of some countries in the decolonization process in Angola, he said that all the neighbouring countries had interfered.

During the period he stayed in Angola, September 1974 left a deep mark on him as president of the governing council and the pleasant thing he recalls is the fact that he avoided the genocide of the black population in muceques. He defended that Cabinda, should have been given independence at the same time. But reiterates that once again, on the events of 11th of November 1975, stating that the South Africans were not able to arrive in Luanda on time because the bridge over River Keve had broken down. He speaks of a battle to gain time and says that the battle of Benguela, around 5th, 6th of November, stopped a column from South Africa. Many men were killed from the MPLA side, many men from an African war. Zaire, FNLA with Holden

Roberto thought that they were not required, that he would go to Luanda by himself; they tried and were defeated in Kifagondo. The Americans betrayed them and did not agree to the landing in the Luanda Island which would have been done by the South Africans, to avoid the internationalization of the conflict.

He left Angola on 27th January, when as a result of the Alvor Agreement, the post of High Commissioner was created, or better, it was recognised. Regarding the future of Angola and the relations between Angola and Portugal, he predicts that they would be the best. He carries on thinking about the reconstruction, not speaking of independence. Angola needs everything, the reconstruction of Angola will take time, I am sorry to say, and forgive me for saying so, but it was not something for the next 10 years.

## Epalanga, Samuel Martinho

*Samuel Martinho Epalanga, was born in the village of Kanjungue in the municipal area of TchicalaTcholoanga, Huambo province. By the end of 1950s, he went to Huambo, with his brother. In November, 1965, he left the country for Zambia, via Lubumbashi, because in February 1966 he was to join the colonial army. He joined UNITA and was later trained in China. From 1968 to 1972 Samuel Epalanga operated at the border between Angola and Zâmbia, which was a corridor for UNITA.*

Samuel Martinho Epalanga was born in the village of Kanjungue in the municipal area of TchicalaTcholoanga, Huambo province. He is the son of a public servant who held various administrative posts, amongst them Vila Nova Chiumbo, Chinhama, Sambo e Catabola. Due to the constant transfers of his father, in order to continue his studies he lived with his brother Tiago Epalanga, a nurse in the Mission Hospital of Dondi, in Kachiungo. By the end of 50's, he went to Huambo, with his brother had moved there to work in the Institute of Medical Research, where he worked in sample preparation. In Huambo, he studied in the Technical-Vocational School of the Caminho-de Ferro-Benguela (CFB) which operated from the General Workshop of the Mechanical Division from 1960 to 1964. This was where he finished his apprenticeship as a turner. He worked for one year in the CFB, but thinking of leaving the country, he left CFB, not to be traced when leaving. He went to work in a private joinery workshop. In November, 1965, he left the country, because in February 1966 he was to join the colonial army. To avoid that, he joined the nationalists outside the country. His flight was a bit adventurous because PIDE – DSG had to redouble its vigilance, particularly in Luau which was a border and the city of Luena.

He left Huambo in the company of two comrades, Mateus Catalaio, late, and Severino, today a retired General, by train. They spent two days in Kuito, Bié province, and left again by train towards Luau, via Luena (Moxico). In Mucussueje, a small railway stop about 30 or 40 km from the border, they faced something that they had not foreseen. There was a control post, usually in Luau or in Luena. There was a thorough search, but we were lucky because one of the officers had been a colleague of Mateus in Colégio Adamastor, and after a long talk I think he forgot to identify us.” My uncle (Mário Satongle) lived in Luau. We went to his house. My uncle knew that his nephew was arriving but not with two friends. He was concerned because others had already left the country from his house, old Chicueca, Carlos Gonçalves, João Macondekua.

That same night he got us a guide to take us to the border, Samuel Epalanga, recalls that they arrived at the border between Angola and Congo, on the 25th of November 1965. They found the other side in turmoil because the coup d'état by Mobutu had taken place. They arrived at Dilolo Town where an uncle of mine (Francisco Lui) a former member of the União das Populações de Angola (UPA), but at the time contacted by another organization the National Union for the Independence of

Angola (UNITA). They were questioned because there was always a doubt in case they had been sent by the Portuguese security police.

The following day a large flag of UPA was shown to them and they were told "this is our flag, the Angolan flag, which is the flag of UPA. But this UPA nowadays is divided, because the leaders do not agree amongst themselves and now we think that we should follow the other one because he is one of us". For Samuel Epalanga, "at that stage, one of us, meant Dr. Savimbi, a man from the south like those old men we meet there." Later, when there were only a few people the UNITA flag was shown to them and they were invited to join UNITA. And this is how Samuel Epalanga and his companions joined UNITA. They stayed there for one month, in the company of Dr. Saldanha who is in Luanda, had left the colonial army, and the elderly Isaiás Chinhama, Castro Tadeu and the old Bândua. "This was our small group, and after some discussions we decided we should go to Elizabethville, today Lumbumbashi."

From Lubumbashi, in the company of the others he left to the Republic of Zâmbia. In Lusaka, they met Dr. Savimbi, who explained the situation under colonial rule in Angola to them, colonialism and the reasons he had left UPA, what had been done and what would be done in future. Having been selected to be part of a second group for military training in China, the group did not leave for China because of problems which emerged and culminated with the expulsion of Dr. Savimbi from Lusaka to Cairo. He went to the border area of Mussumba, between Lukusse Lumbala Nguimbo, an area of strong support to the movement.

He was following the cooperation between UNITA and SWAPO, in the person of their respective Presidents. Sometimes they received weapons from SWAPO, which had been given to that movement by the OAU Liberation Committee. The weapons and the ammunition were transported and hidden because the Liberation Committee, the Portuguese and even were not supposed to know about their presence. In 1968, Dr. Savimbi returned to Moxico and we continued the struggle which, before his return was practically led by Commander Chiwale, who at the time had spread the war up to Bié.

The struggle carried out by UNITA had survived because it had support from the population. "The mobilization had taken place at different levels, for example, in Lumbala Nguimbo, Lutembue, where the guerrilla warfare had begun was very strong but there was also the clandestine mobilization in the cities which were in contact with us. There was a group in Huambo, from which old Enoque de Oliveira was part, the old Edith in Moxico, the late César Calbiengue, the old Jonatão Chingungi.

From 1968 to 1972 Samuel Epalanga operated at the border between Angola and Zâmbia, between Lumbala Nguimbo and Lutembue, which was a corridor for UNITA. He was the commander in the area which was designated as Zone zero. He was the first man from UNITA to enter the city after the cease fire agreement between UNITA and the Portuguese authorities. In Huambo he was a link between UNITA and the local Portuguese authorities and he was responsible for establishing UNITA in the Huambo province.

## Gomes, Costa

*General Costa Gomes was the leader of the Portuguese troops in Angola and he became the President of Portugal after 25 April 1974. During this interview he spoke of some events related to Angola, during the time of Portuguese occupation up to decolonization.*

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A Portuguese military officer, he was the leader of the Portuguese troops in Angola. He was President of Portugal after the 25th of April 1974.

The reasons for his mission in Angola were simply to organize the colonial forces, believing that a III World War was about to start in Europe. Portugal had a commitment to OTAN to raise two military divisions, one in Mozambique and another one in Angola to fight the forces of the Warsaw Pact. In 1958, when he arrived in Angola there were political parties for the independence of the territory, but Portugal did not believe in that.

In his opinion, the overall decolonization process begun immediately after the II World War and it affected Angola. He emphasises the uprising of the 4th of February 1961 and said that there was no impact on the Portuguese army, but affected the prison guards. He carried on saying that the event that had repercussions in Portugal was the event of 15th March 1961. Besides this event he recalled the bombing of Kassanje, and pointed fingers at the Portuguese government for not having taken precautionary measures. And said that such actions were not known in Portugal and many leaders did not even know the much about the overseas colonies under their administration. Furthermore, he recalled that the designation of Province was adopted in 1961, by Adriano Moreira.

He recalled further, the year of 1961, speaking of the settlement policies promoted by the Portuguese government. He compares that year with 1958, saying that in '61 the military presence in Angola increased from 7 thousand to 60 thousand and that with this personnel the Portuguese were able to attack UPA, FNLA and to expel them from some localities they were occupying in Dembos. When he became the commander of the Portuguese army in Angola, in April 1970, Angola was dangerous in the Eastern and Northern areas, more in the eastern areas than in the northern areas, in his opinion.

He recalled the presence of MPLA and UNITA in the eastern areas, mainly UNITA because this one did a lot of harm to the Portuguese, as a result of the attacks to the railway line in Benguela, the main route to transport the troops and food to the army. The relationship with UNITA was strengthened with the Timber Merchants Agreement, although he only knew by name. He also referred to the fact that UNITA had contact and assistance from Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. But returning to the agreement with the Portuguese, led by himself, he emphasised that the agreement established that UNITA should not attack the Portuguese and vice-versa, and should exchange some information about MPLA, information gathered by PIDE. On the other hand, that information helped to control MPLA and FNLA actions. And

referred that they did not stop their actions voluntarily but because Mobutu had cut his assistance.

General Costa Gomes states that chemical weapons were never used during his mandate, and considered the Portuguese as the best colonizers in the world in comparison with the Belgians, the British and the Dutch who were not able to treat the local people with humanity. And he was part of the group of Portuguese who mixed and treated the local population with respect and that is the reason he never made war to kill anybody. Those biological weapons, after the exodus of the Portuguese from Angola were buried very close to Luanda and maybe in Luanda.

He recalls the rural development Project, as the most wonderful of all imaginable projects, taking place here in Andulo, one of the most populated regions in Angola and the wise man of the Project is "Po-se singer" (as in the Portuguese version) a German scientist. This project blocked the guerrilla warfare, gave the populations the possibility to settle without the need to emigrate.

The Movement of the Armed Forces can be summarised in three D's: Decolonization, Democratization and Development. The main mistake of decolonization was, exactly to allow the movements to fight each other. He emphasised that that was the main mistake of decolonization. It was the fault of the Angolans themselves, of the movements existing in Angola, because each of them wanted power not only in the region belonging to it. The weakest movement from the military point of view was MPLA. But politically and administratively it was the strongest one, spreading throughout Angola because it had cadres.

Speaking about Portugal and its doubt in recognising the independence of Angola, he recalls again saying there was also a mistake, the fault of Portuguese politicians, Portuguese parties who took the Angolan side, and MPLA was considered a communist party.

## Kalundingo, José Soma

*General José Soma Kalundingo was born on the 25 April 1933 in Bailundo. In 1960 he joined the colonial army, training in Nova Lisboa, and later transferred to the infantry column. He was part of a group of 25 men sent by Holden Roberto to train as guerrillas in an Algerian base in Meleque. Holden Roberto nominated him Chief of Staff and established the base of Kinkuso where men from Angola were trained until Dr. Savimbi and Dr. Liahuka were released.*

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Better known as Kalundingo, he was born on the 25th of April 1933 in Bailundo. With the difficulties of survival in his youth, he went to Luanda. They were recruited to work in a coffee plantation in Caxito but they fled once again to Luanda and obtained the money to pay taxes. Later on he worked as an attendant in the Liceu Salvador Correia. In 1959 he applied to become a nurse and was placed in the regional hospital of Malange as an external student. He integrated the colonial army, training in Nova Lisboa and later transferred to the infantry column in Nova Lisboa in 1960, being transferred to the Battalion no 3 in Uíge.

It was in this region and in that Company that he first met an individual from UPA who provided him with propaganda material and incited him to join UPA. The radio which was informing them what was going on with Lumumba and Tshombe in the Congo also sensitized them. During his leave he went to S. Salvador (Mbanza Congo) where earlier contacts allowed him to be part of a group of salesmen of dried meat. He went to Congo. He presented himself to Holden Roberto under a proposal of Rosário Neto.

After some time and already with UPA, he was designated as the Chief of Staff of ELNA. UPA, at that time, had elements of various ethnical groups and social strata in Angola. After the formation of FNLA some disputes took place concerning the leadership of Holden Roberto, and AMANGOLA was established as the building block of UNITA.

He was part of a group of 25 men sent by Holden Roberto to train as guerrillas in an Algerian base in Meleque. Upon his return to Leopoldville, Holden Roberto nominated him Chief of Staff and established the base of Kinkuso where men from Angola were trained until Dr. Savimbi and Dr. Liahuka were released. He joined them and went to Brazzaville. Following the teachings of the Chinese they started mobilizing the masses from Luau, Léua and other regions.

The attack to Teixeira de Sousa by UNITA was carried out by Angolan refugees based in the former Republic of Zaire, who were dissidents from the former UPA/FNLA. Those dissidents were led by Dr. Jonas Malheiro Savimbi, and launched the first phase of the AMANGOLA (Amigos do Manifesto Angolano em Brazzaville). Eleven fighters had received military training in the People's Republic of China. When the eleven arrived to the present day Democratic Republic of Congo the creation of military fronts against the Portuguese colonialists had been decided along the borders between Zambia and Zaire. Teixeira de Sousa was the first front.

The event in itself did not have a military impact, but it had a symbolic impact because after that the people of the region, from Angola and the world knew the name of UNITA. The attack was carried out at midnight and the weapons had been brought from Congo, former Belgian Congo, and others like pangas, knives, blades, arrows and bicycle chains, etc. When the attack took place, the president of the movement, Jonas Savimbi, came into Angola from the Leuva region, in a village called Chinganga. In the morning of the same day, Portuguese airplanes flew over the Railways of Benguela (CFB). The following day there was an ambush on the Lusa Dala road and some cars in that area were attacked but it was said in the news that the action had been carried out by MPLA; afterwards by FNLA; and only later the Governor Rebocho Vaz mentioned UNITA, as the new terrorist movement. President Savimbi's group decided to go to the suburbs of Teixeira de Sousa, having been followed by the Portuguese military through some villages where they had been.

It was during this lengthy walk that the decision to establish the General Staff of FALA (Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola). They decided to go to Lumai passing through Lukusse where they received news that the border between Zambia and Angola had been closed to stop the departure of Savimbi to contact friendly countries to support UNITA and FALA. The trip ended with his arrest in Zambia.

## Kasandola, Brigadier

*Brigadier Kasandola was born in Huambo, in 1943. He and some colleagues got involved in political life and were arrested on 4 February 1965, in Luanda, but he was released. Before the 25th of April he operated in Moxico where he met some comrades from Huambo. He was a connection between the DRC and Moxico where some clandestine members from Huambo were established. as recognition for his work to the motherland he was given the post of brigadier in the reserve forces.*

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Brigadier Kasandola was born in Huambo, in 1943. At a very young age he went to Luanda to look for a job. He and some colleagues got involved in political life and were arrested on the 4th of February 1965. PIDE already had his details from Sambizanga where he was a member of a cell. As he was a minor and from a region where there were no defiance he was released. He went to his birth place but returned planning to go to Congo, from where he used to listen to the programmes of the liberation movements. As a tailor he went from town to town until he reached Makela of Zombo from where he was able to leave to the Belgium Congo and later to Congo-Brazzaville.

After the 25th of April 1974, Mr. Lúcio Lara invited him as a photographer, in Huambo to film the communal places, towns and even the city of Huambo within the Framework of MPLA publicity. One of the major points of this activity was the film Sambizanga. Before the 25th of April he operated in Moxico where he met some comrades from Huambo to whom he delivered some leaflets. He was an element of the connection between the DRC and Moxico where some clandestine members from Huambo were established.

He feels it was important to have dedicated his youth to this process and he is happy because, as recognition for his work to the motherland he was given the post of brigadier in the reserve forces.

## **ANNEXURE 1:**

### **Summary of the Testimony by Eduardo Kuangana (President of the Social Renovation Party)**

#### **Kuangana, Eduardo**

He started by referring to the colonial framework, when Africa was under the dominance of European powers and the actions of the first movements which led the liberation war. They started with political actions which evolved, in some cases, into the armed struggle to give birth to the first independences in 1957 (Ghana) and later to others in the 60s.

Also referred to the countries already independent, to the formation of OAU in Addis Ababa, on the 25th May 1963, giving support to the National Liberation Movements in Africa, with specific characteristics, according to their own conditions. In this context, Angola started the armed struggle against the Portuguese colonialism on the 4th of February followed by the 15th of March 1961, by MPLA and FNLA, with some discussions to achieve a consensus regarding their organization. He recalled that the most important point is that the struggle started in the North and then spread to the East and to the interior of Angola, starting with sensitization, mobilization and the recruitment of the youth to join the FNLA and MPLA and later UNITA with the same objectives.

Regarding the period post-coup d'état in Portugal, on the 25th of April 1974, he referred to the Alvor Agreements and many others, which gave rise to the Transitional Government, and to the civil war before the 11th of November 1975, and in his opinion this had to do with the so called cold war, that was going on and the interest of the super-powers in the world – and the leaders of those National Liberation Movements. He emphasised the role that the independent Angola had played in the Region, if we consider the support it gave to SWAPO (Namibia), ANC (South Africa), ZANU and ZAPU (Zimbabwe), since all of them had greater support from this country and achieved their independence or changed their racist administrative regimes in the respective territories, with many losses, both human and infrastructural in Angola.

The lack of understanding and coordination amongst the Angolans leading the struggle was given as the reason for the exacerbation of the civil war between men who before wanted to live in peace, tranquillity and to work for the future development of the country, regions and for the well-being of all in the unified and indivisible context. He considered the fratricide conflicts between Angolans as useless and that the efforts should be directed to the struggle against underdevelopment, hunger, illiteracy, nakedness, disease affecting the country. He recalled the year of 1991, when law 15/91 came into effect, on the 11th of May, creating a multiparty system leaving behind a one party state and from then the various political parties, including the PRS and the called historical parties, FNLA, MPLA e UNITA.

With the end of the civil war, welcomed by the Angolan People on the 4th of April 2002, another scenario takes place for national reconciliation and reconstruction. Meanwhile, he recalled that reconciliation has costs, since Angolans have to discuss their problems as they are, forgetting the past but registering it in history as it happened and we have to think that others are not here but we are to answer to the tasks imposed by the process.

Appealing to the application of law calling for rights, duties and penalties, he considers that problems can be minimized and overcome, and, in this way, there will not be deep differences in opportunities and difficulties in society.

## **ANNEX 2:**

### **Summary of the Interview with Eng. Ernesto Mulato UNITA's Vice President**

## **Mulato, Ernesto**

**[Luanda; 2007]**

Ernesto J. Mulato, UNITA's co-founder, Diplomat and nowadays Vice President of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was born in Bembe, Uíge province. In the 50s came to Luanda, to carry on with his studies in the company of other young men from the north of Angola, namely from Zaire province.

The independence of Congo in 1960, encouraged many youngsters to leave Angola to that country. Ernesto Mulato, who developed some underground activity in Luanda left Bembe to go to Congo, on the 11th November 1960.

The son of a political activist member of the Union of the People of Northern Angola (UPNA) and a clandestine link between Angola and Congo and a friend of Barros Nekaka and Pynok Eduardo, both member of the leadership of the Movement, once arrived in Kinshasa, Ernesto Mulato contacted UPA becoming a member of this movement.

He defended the idea that the movement had to implement more activism, more dynamism, a more revolutionary spirit in the struggle, as was the thesis of Jonas Savimbi, then a member of UPA himself, that the struggle required more academic cadres inside Angola to guide the populations both at the social and administrative level. According to them there was a need to contact the Angolan cadres outside the country, in Europe and the United States of America to join UPA in order to support the populations in case of bombardments by the Portuguese army.

Jonas Savimbi's ideas were not accepted by Holden Roberto, the Movement's President. Differences emerged between Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, UPA General-Secretary and later Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), founded in 1962, as a product of the Union of the Peoples of Angola (UPA) and the Angolan Democratic Party (PDA) 1. It was then created the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), as the military

wing of GRAE, the government, led by Holden Roberto and recognized by various African and Asian countries.

Inside Angola, time was running short. The war started in 1961, with an enormous increase after 1963 started to decrease in its impact. That led Dr. Savimbi to pressurize the leadership although without any results. He thought of an alternative since he could not reform anything without the possibility of being reformed, because to carry on as it was the situation would jeopardise the future of Angola and even the liberation struggle.

Countries like Egypt, Ghana and the meeting between Dr. Savimbi and Che Guevara encouraged him to carry forward the contacts with the Chinese authorities and to request their support. The first twelve elements, including Dr. Savimbi went to the Republic of China for military training. At the same time in Europe and the USA other young people were working for a new political force, such as Mr. Ernesto Mulato and Jorge Sangumba in the USA and Tony Fernandes and José Ndele in Switzerland, besides others in Zambia, Tanzania etc. 'PDA is the fruit of the transformation of the party of the Bazombo Alliance'.

Then, on the 13th of March 1966, the organization was formally launched with the name of National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)). The Movement was launched inside Angola, in Moangai, Moxico Province.

UNITA, defended a number of fundamental political, economic and social principles. One of the main aspects was that those who became members of the movement or of its leadership, had to be settled inside the country. And why? Because Angola did not have a proletariat to support the struggle. The peasant was the support and there was the need to build the trust of the populations, and the militants could not remain in the "golden" exile, while the sons of others were fighting. They had to be close to the populations to help them in some areas like education, health, administration, production, in summary, to organize anything dismantled by the war itself.

The creation of a new movement, was a challenge in the international political arena, because the world had already opted in terms of the struggle in Angola. This is why we had to be allied to the Republic of China, from whom we got support. As the struggle was inside the country, we gave priority to the attacks inside the country to show that we existed and we had our own areas from where we carried forward our political activities. In 1968, with the return of Dr. Savimbi, after his imprisonment in Zambia and a short exile in Egypt, the true reorganization both inside and outside the movement took place. UNITA was divided in three main areas, controlled by Dr. Savimbi, Nzau Puna (General Secretary) and Samuel Chiwale (FALA Commander). To disseminate its actions UNITA, between 1970 and 1973 introduced journalists clandestinely, who had contacts with the political, military and social reality of UNITA inside Angola. This was the case of the Zambian journalist Cachoto who visited our areas between 1970- 1971 Journalist Fritz, Austrian, who was with us in 1972, whose

material the Portuguese tried to buy without success. We also had the visit of a group of afro American journalists, one from Washington Post who published a long report. Between 1972 and 1973, the OAU became confused about the reality of UNITA, because being considered a smaller and weaker liberation movement, with its leadership inside Angola it was presenting itself as more organized and more aggressive. People like Leopoldo Senghor of Senegal, sympathised with UNITA. OAU invited UNITA to participate in some of its meetings.

Internal crisis. Few due to the dynamics of the internal struggle. There was the case of Moanagola, who cooperated with the Portuguese and FNLA, but a true crisis did not take place because the problems were solved in meetings, annual conferences, congresses, et. We founded the organization in 1966 and by 1977 we had had 4 or 5 congresses.

By the time the Portuguese coup d'état takes place, UNITA was the first movement to try to unite the liberation movements against the international manoeuvres. The east wanted to promote MPLA, the West FNLA and UNITA had to fight "alone" not to be left outside because its allies were always temporary ones, never had secure ones, and even the temporary ones did not trust UNITA's independent thinking and actions. There was always mistrust because those who help want our hand also and UNITA was never 100% an advocate of that principle. It had to have provisional friends .

But, unfortunately, the Portuguese who wanted to transfer power to MPLA instead of giving a fair decolonization in Angola made the process very complex. Everything agreed in Alvor meant nothing, it was a blank document, and allowed the entry of foreign forces in Angola. South Africans, Cubans, Russians, Marian Nguabi troops, Mobutu troops. Portugal allowed everything because Portugal had the military and moral force to have a smooth transition up to the independence. That power had been conceded in Alvor. Only after the election, after a president had been elected there would be transfer of power, but the "small communists in Portugal cooked everything" (Translation of the words in Portuguese) and allowed the Soviet Union to take hold and that is why the cold war open a path to the civil war, which began in 1975.

Some days ago, when Professor Jerónimo Wanga died, "someone" sent me some newspapers about the visit of Dr. Savimbi to Luanda, on the 26th of April 1975. The newspaper reported: Savimbi and UNITA win Luanda. MPLA becomes confused. This is why the war started. The newspapers say it all. But then Dr. Savimbi used to say that he did not believe in weapons to get peace, because peace it is only reached with peace. That is why it is utopia when we say, to make war to achieve peace. I have been saying in conferences, in meetings and even talking to friends from MPLA, that if someone tells me that we have peace because the man who was an obstacle to peace is dead, that person is lying. We have peace because of the man who was feared by MPLA, Dr. Savimbi, as they always said, peace only with Savimbi's death. When he dies, then MPLA said, we have eliminated the obstacle and without him there will be no UNITA, because with him UNITA dies also.

That is how it was, because in their minds Dr. Savimbi was the obstacle. He was not for Angola. But they were surprised, after two, three years the UNITA they wanted to divide and finish and reduced to nothing. Why? Because (they thought) UNITA had a project of a society for Angola, of *Marian Nguabi, of Mobutu*. *All that happened because Portugal allowed that, because Portugal had the military and moral power to impose the transition to independence, empowered by the Alvor accord. The transfer of power would only take place upon the elections, the election of a President, but the minority Communists in Portugal had everything cooked up, enabling the rise of the Soviet Union, a mainstay of the Cold War and for the civil war which had begun in 1975.*

He speaks about the decolonization process that started before the 25th of April. In the case of Angola the war started as planned in 1961, in Luanda, on the 4th of February.

He speaks about the influence of the United States in the person of Kennedy, the policies opening to the Third World, and about the so called Coup of Botelho Moniz, who intended to throw out Salazar to bring new perspectives to Africa. He considered that the Americans wanted a neo-colonial independence for Angola and the same throughout Africa. Amongst other matters he emphasises the reasons which made MPLA to establish basis in the eastern part of the country, because Mobutu stopped assisting MPLA and support FNLA and this one attacked MPLA. But he says that the problems will remain in the East since UNITA had signed an agreement with the Portuguese army, a non-aggression pact, the "Operação Madeira" so MPLA had to face UNITA in the Eastern areas of the country.

According to Pezarat there was an objective for that agreement. Savimbi was ready to accept a post as an administrator within the Portuguese administrative framework. He states that the most difficult region was the region of Dembos. Because the Portuguese could not control the whole territory. On the other hand, there were other factors favouring Portugal. The borders with neighbouring countries with ties with Portugal, like South Africa, a country giving air support to the Portuguese troops, because it was the way to neutralize SWAPO fighting in Namibia from the South of Angola. There was another factor. The economic "boom" in Angola with more settlers. He speaks of the cooperation between the Portuguese and Katanga, of Tshombe, of Zambia with Kenneth Kaunda and the links with South Africa. He says that there was a plan called "Arnecor", associating the interests of Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa. It was a plan, he said, for that area of Southern Africa, with the blessings of Henry Kissinger. But the coup on the 25th of April fast tracked this situation and reversed it.

After 1968, Marcelo Caetano was the Portuguese Prime-minister, after Salazar. HE defended a federation type system for Angola. The solution was not accepted. Pezarat

says that from the positions taken by Marcelo Caetano, it was easy to conclude that a federation was not in a basis of an association of a number of States with Portugal. He also states that the protagonist in these actions, for him, it is not the general-governor of Angola, Eng. Santos e Castro, or the vice-president or president. This agreement involved the participation of the Angolan liberation movement, they counted on UNITA, because this movement had alliances with Portugal, and they counted on other Portuguese troops in Angola, as João Fernandes recalls, but Pezarat says he never saw any declaration from Savimbi or UNITA with the Portuguese government, but he agrees that if the Portuguese think of this coup they can count with UNITA. On the role of South Africa, this was a project South Africa agrees with, because it was a project similar to the one in Southern Rhodesia with Ian Smith and this one always had the support of South Africa.

Speaking about the behaviour of the Movement of the Armed Forces in the colonies, he goes to the origins, to the previous movement called the Movement of the Captains which evolved to the Movement of Armed Forces. The Movement of the Captains had some impact in Angola, there was an important nucleus of the Movement of the Captains linked with Portugal. The Movement had some political dynamism through himself and there is a need to change the regime in Portugal, there is the need of freedom. Of democracy in Portugal. In Angola, these problems appear for the first time in a meeting, on the 20th of September of 1973. Amongst a number of actions by the Movement in Angola, there was the role to impede that from Angola there would be a military attempt against the Movement of the Armed Forces. And to avoid that the colonies would serve as a base of resistance against a Movement of the Armed Forces in Portugal. And in Angola the movement had to be strengthened and at that moment Pezarat took the responsibility for the Movement in Angola. First he had to introduce the Movement in Angola amongst our officers.

From May 1974, we were having problems with the Armed Forces, states Pezarat. After some attempts by the white minorities, who tried to carry out some coup d'état against the MFA in Angola to maintain the colonial situation. These plans had the support of Portugal, in the silenced majority, on the 28th of September. They were the forces of General Spínola who also reacted negatively to the possibility of independence in Angola with the liberation movements.

In Angola the case was a special one since there was a greater economic potential. General Spínola, at some stage, when he accept the agreement for Mozambique and accepted the agreement for Guinea, said: "But Angola is with me, I am the one to guide the challenge of Angola", because General Spínola thought of Angola as being Portuguese, and he wanted to make of Angola a new Brazil, as he used to say. All this story is told in my book, "Jóia da Coroa". On the other hand, we had to start the contacts, says Pezarat, the direct contacts in Angola and only afterwards the Government in Portugal start coordinating, but the first contacts take place in Angola. On the favouritism towards MPLA, in detriment of the FNLA, he says this favouritism was more towards UNITA. We did not favour MPLA and even after

we left. On the 11th of November, Portugal had assumed the commitment to leave and left.

## **ANNEXURE 3:**

### **Summary of the Dino Matrosse Work: Under PIDE/DGS, Published by Nzila, 1963–1974, LUANDA, 2005**

Dino Matrosse's work: *UNDER PIDE/DGS, 1963–1974*, publishes a number of documents related to the Portuguese political police, from 1963–1974 and his life, due to his departure from Angola, with the objective of joining the national liberation movement, more concretely the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).

The book presents a set of confidential information, received by the Portuguese colonial government, through reports, letters, operational instructions from fighters and other documents collected or produced by PIDE/DGS on the activities of the writer and other compatriots during the first war of National liberation in Angola. The writer intends to show the reader how PIDE/DGS, established in the colonies after 1957, worked and infiltrated the liberation movements, as the central organ of state intelligence, although the mission of centralization never had been conceded. On the other hand, the book gives to the reader some of the documents which can contribute for a insight on PIDE/DGS activity, although partial and incomplete, since the documents reflect the dramatic context of the liberation struggle in Angola, during the period from 1963 to 1974.

The decade of the 60s was a period of great upheaval for the African nationalist movements, in general, and in Angola in particular not forgetting that since the beginning of that decade Angola had been the victim of a strong repression, due to the political events which occurred in the country.

The active political process by the author begins when he leaves the country, in December 1962, through Cabinda to Congo Leopoldville. By the beginning of January 1973, he is able to cross the border to Cabinda, being considered by the colonial regime as a deserter since he did not present himself to military duty, having being called in October the previous year.

From intelligence collected by the political police, through the traditional secret networks, he also used other sources, such as the diplomatic missions in Western Europe, América, África, and many times through similar services in these countries, and also through elements or documents collected or captured during surprise attacks and from the informers some of them having infiltrated the nationalists despite the vigilance. Julião Mateus Paulo "Dino Matrosse" states that this is a work focussing the need to diversify the sources, to put down to eternity the acts of the fighters, guerrillas, former pioneers, peasants and anonymous Angolans who with the weapons in their hands, dedicated to the sacrifices of the struggle, defended the fundamental rights of

Liberty, Self-determination and Independence, a dream which came to existence on the 11th of November 1975.

## **Pezarat Correia, Pedro Júlio de**

Pedro Júlio de Pezarat Correia, is a Portuguese military that has been in Angola during the colonial war. Later was a member of the Armed Forces Movement. He was born in Porto in 1932.

His interest for Angola began when he was still a child because his father spoke several times about that territory for having been and worked there. The first time he goes to Angola is in 1966 in a military mission, in the North, at Dembos. He took part in several military operations against the guerrillas of FNLA and of MPLA.

He took part in the construction of roads, that was an important activity of the armed forces, and he stresses the relationship they had with the population. The population that was under Portuguese control was concentrated in small villages inside the farms or near the military barracks; those who were not controlled were refugees in Congo at the northern border. Due to the expropriation of land the population refused to work for the colonialists owners of the farms, and ran away. Because of those facts the majority of the workers, “cheap labour”, were “bailundos” from the south of Angola. From a certain moment the coffee was controlled by the army in order to reduce the exploitation of the black workers and producers, on the prices, on the weight, in the quality.

And because of that fact he remembers the revindication at Baixa de Cassange in January 1961. But speaking again about the small villages, he says that those populations had a double collaboration, it means they had relations with the Portuguese troops and with the guerrillas. But in the case of “Bailundos” that were under control of Portuguese army, they were considered as guerrilla enemies by UPA, and when the massacre of March 1961 happened the majority of the victims were the workers of the farms, and the majority of them were “Bailundos”. This massacre was condemned by Dr. Agostinho Neto and other Angolan and African political leaders.

In his opinion the decolonization process begins before the 25th of April, 1974. In the case of Angola the war begins in Luanda on the 4th of February 1961.

He speaks about the US influence trough Kennedy with his policy of political opening towards the third world defending the independence of the colonies, and about the so called Botelho Moniz coup d'état, that attempted to overthrow Salazar with the aim of looking for new perspectives for Africa. He referred too, that the Americans wanted to implement a neo-colonial independence in Angola and in the whole Africa.

He speaks also about the reasons that obliged MPLA to create military bases in the eastern part of the country, because Mobutu expelled MPLA from Zaire, and gave all the support to FNLA, and FNLA was attacking MPLA. But MPLA will face the same problems in the east because UNITA signed a non aggression agreement with

the Portuguese army, the famous “Timber Operation”, and MPLA was obliged to fight against UNITA in the Eastern part of Angola.

UNITA had an objective when they signed that agreement. Savimbi was ready to accept a post as Administrator of one of the Municipalities in the east, and he would become an employee of the Portuguese administration.

He referred that the most difficult region was Dembos, because Portuguese were unable to control all the territory.

There were some aspects that favoured Portugal, as the case of the neighbouring countries, all of them had some cooperation with Portugal. For instance South African Air Force gave aerial support to the Portuguese troops, and took advantage of that cooperation to neutralize the SWAPO activities that was operating in Namibia from the south of Angola. Another important factor favouring Portugal was the economic “boom” in Angola that allowed a better penetration and occupation of the territory by Portuguese settlers.

He referred the cooperation between the Portuguese and the Katanga gendarmes of Moïse Tchombé, and with Zambia of Kenneth Kaunda. Concerning South Africa, there was a strategic plan called “Arnekor” that putted together interests from Portugal, Rhodesia and South Africa for the all Southern African region and had the approval of Henry Kissinger.

In 1968 Marcelo Caetano became Prime Minister of Portugal, after Salazar fell down from a chair. Caetano proposed to the Cooperative Chamber, the then Portuguese Parliament, a federal solution for Angola. That proposal was not accepted. When they better knew the political opinions of Marcelo Caetano, they concluded that the federal solution wasn’t based on the association of several states with Portugal. The then General Governor of Angola, Engineer Santos e Castro would become the President or Vice President. This treaty included the participation of a nationalist Angolan movement, UNITA, which was a Portuguese allied.

Pezarat Correia declares that he never saw any declaration signed between Savimbi, or UNITA and the Portuguese Government in this cense, but he assumes that when the Portuguese were preparing this coup UNITA was aware of it and the Portuguese relied on UNITA.

It was a project that pleased South Africa, because it was similar to the Ian Smith’s Rhodesia, and Smith was always supported by South Africa.

Speaking about the Armed Forces Movement in Angola, he explains its genesis, the antecedent is the called Captains Movement, that was a movement of corporative nature that later became the Armed Forces Movement.

The Captains Movement had some strength in Angola; there was an important nucleus that was linked to Portugal. He was the leader of that nucleus, and the Movement began to look for political solutions for the necessity to change the regime in Portugal to allow a favourable evolution of the situation towards freedom and democracy in Portugal.

In Angola they discussed these problems for the first time in a meeting held on the 20th September 1973. One of the most important activities of the Movement in Angola was to prevent an eventual military attempt against the Armed Forces Movement, and to avoid that the colonies could become resistance bases against an Armed Forces Movement victorious in Portugal.

In Angola there was a need to strengthen the Movement structures among the Portuguese troops, and since that period he assumed special responsibilities in the Movement.

Since May 1974 they began facing some important problems with the troops. Some time later they faced some attempts from the white minorities that tried to organize a coup d'états against the Armed Forces Movement in Angola in order to maintain the colonial status. All these plans had support from Portugal, from the "silent majority of the 28 of September". These were forces connected with General Spínola, then Portuguese Head of State, that was against the possibility of the independence of Angola with the liberation movements.

For the General and his supporters, Angola was a special case, the colony with the greater economic potential. When he accepted the agreement for the independence of Mozambique, and the one for the recognition of the independence of Guinea Bissau, the General said: "But Angola is with me, I'll lead personally the solution of the problem of Angola", because he thought that Angola belonged to Portugal and he wanted to transform Angola in a new Brazil, as he used to say. All these events are described in the book "The Crown Jewell" written by Pizarat Correia.

Because of that situation the Armed Forces Movement began directly the contacts with the liberation movements, and only later the Government was involved in these contacts and took the coordination.

Concerning the preference of MPLA against FNLA and UNITA, he says that the favouritism was for UNITA. They never favoured MPLA, even after leaving Angola. Portugal had assumed the compromise that they would withdraw from Angola on the 11th November, and they withdrew.

## Almeida, Roberto Victor de

Roberto Victor de Almeida has an important historical trajectory, he joined MPLA in 1958, he carried out in Party and in Government outstanding duties (tasks), and he is son of a teacher and minister of the Methodist Church, born in Kaxicane village in 1941, in Bengo Province. Actually he is the Speaker of Angolan National Assembly.

In his interview he highlights the following aspects: His father as a Minister and Teacher of the Methodist Church developed big efforts to avoid that the pupils of the school should be enrolled by the colonial administration for the forced labour, for the contract (slave labour) to work in the construction of roads, and so on. He hid his pupils to avoid them to be kept by the colonial repressive agents.

His father's behavior demonstrated to young people that there was something that was not going well in the society. Every time the colonial Administrator came to the Methodist Mission was a motive for a kind of terror.

He lived in the house of Agostinho Neto's mother, and by this fact he knew about Neto's imprisonment in 1952 and 1953 and took part in the signing of a petition to request for his release. Although he was still very young, himself, his relatives and classmates acknowledge and became conscious of the colonial problem and of the situation Angola was facing. At the lyceum in Luanda he knew about the attempts of Indian Union to occupy Goa, Damão and Dio, because that attempt originated a great international movement, mainly at UN level. The Lyceum students were obliged to attend solidarity activities with Portugal in front of the colonial General Governor's Palace.

He also highlights the role played by the Youth Evangelic Centre integrated by Methodists youths that developed sportive and recreative activities, in which Agostinho Neto took part before his departure to Portugal and his imprisonment.

The "Estandarte" (The banner), was a newspaper published by the Evangelic Mission, a religious newspaper that published that demonstrated some political and mainly social concerns. That newspaper was also read by the Youths and survived until 1961.

The role played by the youth organization inside the Church, that created a spirit of unity among the youths that was useful for the political activity.

The first clandestine activities he took part were in his own home where his elder sister, Deolinda Rodrigues, used to meet people to discuss issues concerning the clandestine struggle and the activity of the American sailors, mainly George Barnett, who was arrested later and was part of the Process of the 50's, Lawrence Holder and Francisco Xavier Hernandez that of Cuban origin. Some Angolans used to attend these meetings, as Joaquim de Figueiredo, the father of Elísio de Figueiredo, who died in prison at Casa da Reclusão. Roberto de Almeida and the other youths kept watch and ward at the entrance of the house, while the elders discussed about the struggle against the colonial system. Besides vigilance the youths distributed pamphlets in town, produced by Adolfo João Pedro, that was a teacher at the Mission of the

Evangelic Church and was the owner of a small school of typewriting, and Roberto de Almeida used to participate in the production of the pamphlets.

The majority of the pamphlets they produced and distributed didn't have any party label. This pamphlets only expressed the nationalist feelings. Only after the 4 of February the names of some political organizations started to be known. Until that date they were not much concerned with the names of political parties or organizations.

Roberto de Almeida explains how he traveled abroad in March 1961 through an excursion of the finalists students of the Lyceum and of the Industrial School. He tried to run away during the stop over in Kanu, Nigeria, but Nigeria was still under British rule. They had to proceed to Lisbon, accomplishing the program of the students excursion, and came back to Angola.

Another way to run away was the Bishop Ralph Edward Dodge that was sending students to study abroad. Later they knew that CIA was behind this plan. Through this way the first group integrated by José Mendes, Ismael Martins and Elísio de Figueiredo was sent. Roberto de Almeida and other Youths were supposed to integrate the second group, but the situation became difficult with the activity of PIDE, and they could no more cross the borders of Congo. They tried to use another way, taking a plane from Luanda to Lisbon, via Kanu, Nigeria. In Kanu they were arrested while trying to go out from the airport, and they were handed over by the airport authorities to PIDE agents that were traveling in the same plane. In Lisbon they were interrogated and arrested in Aljube prison on 11th June 1961, and sent back to Luanda via S.Tomé on 17th October 1961. At Luanda airport, although all the precautions taken by PIDE, Roberto de Almeida and his friends were recognized by Deolinda Bebiana de Almeida who was traveling to South Rhodesia, were she worked with Bishop Ralph Edward Hodge. Deolinda Bebiana and Marcos Caricoco that worked at airport informed his mother and aunty about his imprisonment by PIDE. This group remained in prison until February 1963, and was arrested again at 28 June 1963 with Lopo do Nascimento (who was the first Prime Minister of the People's Republic of Angola in 1975).

The production of pamphlets and the political agitation was going on in Luanda, Roberto de Almeida explains how the clandestine activity was organized and how the repressive PIDE used to act, such as the legal frauds to extend the imprisonment of Angolans without trial, the lost of political rights renewed every year, and so on.

It was difficult for PIDE maintain in secrecy the imprisonment of white people, or of people belonging to families with social status. The Process of the 50's had a wide international repercussion. At UN level Portugal started to be criticized because of its repressive policy and by the violation of human rights.

The psycho-social activity and the editorial line of "Radio Voz de Angola", the "Portuguese Non racism" and "the brotherhood" were proclaimed at both national and international levels from a multiracial and pluricontinental Portugal.

PIDE makes use of double agents that infiltrated the clandestine groups, while working for PIDE. The double agents were infiltrated in the companies, public services and in the suburban residential areas.

The clandestine organization remains until the signing of Lunhamege Agreements, between MPLA and the Portuguese Authorities (Moxico Province, October 21st, 1974). Roberto de Almeida attends this meeting as a "journalist" from Angola Review, but his aim was to meet Dr. António Agostinho Neto, President of MPLA.

During the clandestine period they were always in contact with the leadership of MPLA, with Dr. Neto, keeping the link between the clandestine groups in towns and the guerilla (leadership of the Movement).

In 1974, even before the Lunhamege Agreements, the clandestine MPLA had already offices in Luanda at the building called "Dona Amália", where Roberto de Almeida and his Comrades worked dealing with Information and Propaganda. There was a reprography in the ground floor of "Dona Amália" where they printed pamphlets that were produced at "Liga Nacional Africana" under the cover of Angola Review. Later on at 8th November 1974 MPLA started broadcasting a radio program at "Emissora Oficial de Angola".

Concerning the date of the foundation of MPLA, Roberto de Almeida thinks that there wasn't a much publicity in the moment, and it is understandable, because of the conditions prevailing in that period, it was a clandestine political organization, and also by the fact that the majority of the founding members traveled abroad. Because of this the majority of the population was not aware about what happened in 1956.

The existence of a large quantity of cells is part of the clandestine organization system. If 1, 2, or 3 members were arrested the organization continued, because with this system the organization protected itself, it allowed them to work wider with the population informing them about the objectives of the Movement. That was the reason for the existence of a large number of cells.

## Roberto, Holden

Holden Roberto, former President of UPA, later FNLA (Union of the Peoples of the North of Angola, later National Front for Liberation of Angola).

In his interview, he narrates the steps of the appearance of his organization in 1958 in the city of Lobito where existed the first cell that maintained contacts with Kinshasa and Luanda through couriers that used boats.

The reasons which took him to struggle against the colonial presence in Angola, as the contract for the work in the coffee plantations, the almost exclusive occupation of the small trade system by the white people, leaving the autochthonous population without any alternatives, the illiteracy of the population. In 1958 he leaves Congo for Ghana, where he attends the first Conference of the African Peoples under colonization. From Ghana he went on writing for Salazar, then Prime Minister of the Portuguese Fascist regime and for Portuguese newspapers explaining the true situation of Angola. Because in Angola existed the empire of the silence, abroad nothing was known about what was really happening in Angola.

Having noticed silence to the letters and the articles he wrote were not published in the newspapers, his organization started the armed struggle on 15 of March 1961.

He emphasizes the role of Tunisia in training the combatants and in the supply of weapons. Tunisia was also the country that organized a conference in which participated Lúcio Lara, Pinto de Andrade, Viriato da Cruz of Angola and Amílcar Cabral of Guinea.

According to Mr. Holden Roberto, at the end of the 60s, his movement introduced weapons sent from Tunisia in the Republic of Congo through UN blue helmets which have been operating there during the disturbances occurred in that country.

He considers as an historical point of reference the uprising of the Kassanje's area in the Melange province at January, 4th, 1961, as the beginning of the armed struggle against colonialism.

The colonialism needed a visible sign to wake up, for them the independence of Angola was impossible. Armed struggle have been launched on the 15th of March 1961, when UPA was renamed FNLA, and starts the armed action in the north of Angola.

He speaks about the assistance from two Americans from the American Committee on Africa to the Liberation Struggle, namely Frank Monteiro and Paul Shearman sent by him to contact Canon Manuel das Neves who was aware of the clandestine activities of the nationalist forces. The Canon acted as an individual and as representative of the Catholic Church that in that period was supporting the colonial authorities.

Mr Holden Roberto speaks in his interview on issues related to the right of the Angolan citizenship. His relationship with the leaders of Congo Government, namely Lumumba and Mobutu of Zaire in 1965. His relationship with some leaders of MPLA, Viriato da Cruz, Agostinho Neto, Mario Pinto de Andrade among others. The Alvor's agreements, the presence of Cubans in Brazzaville in 1964 and the intervention of

Belgian parachutists in Kinshasa. The presence of military forces from FRELIMO, Congo Brazzaville, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry that came to help MPLA during the confrontations at the North of Angola in 1975. The Agreements that FNLA reached with apartheid South Africa. However, he retreats and speaks about GRAE (Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile) and Jonas Savimbi's integration in this government, the reasons of his entrance and exit in FNLA. The foundation of UNITA in 1966 and its connections with the Portuguese. The process about the independence of Angola, the presence of mercenaries in the war among the Angolan liberation movements. The sale of petroleum by FNLA in the province of Zaire. The proclamation of the independence in Luanda and the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Angola in Huambo and the alliance FNLA-UNITA against MPLA.

## Makapa, Bernardo Pinto

Bernardo Pinto Makapa, son of Samuel Chingonga and Maria Chipoco, born in 1929 in Gamba, Municipality of Andulo, Bié Province, protagonist of the 15th March insurrection.

Until the age of 14 years old he worked with his parents as farmer, cultivating rice and beans. In 1943 his parents started working for the Portuguese, cultivating rice, maize and ricinus. In 1944 he worked in coffee plantations in Porto Amboim as “contratado” where the working conditions were very hard, working from 6 am up to 6pm during 14 months.

At the age of 15 years old he went back to Gamba and got married. The wives of the “contratados” worked in coffee selection and peeling. In 1953 he went to Quibaxe, via Luanda where he worked during one year at Companhia Sousa Leal. In 1954 he is enrolled in the Portuguese army, sent to Huambo for six months.

When he leaves the army he went to Uíge to work in a coffee plantation at Dumbuela (Caipemba), named Fazenda Nundongo property of a Portuguese citizen whose name was Silva.

In the beginning of March 1961 he received a pamphlet that was circulating in the area between black people, sent from Kinshasa written in kikongo that read: “on the 15th of March at 6 o’clock in the morning, you must kill all the white people”. Mobilized by a UPA envoy, named Manuel Bernardo, in order to take part in the killing of the white people on the 15th of March, Bernardo Makapa killed the manager of the plantation with a machete.

After this, says Bernardo Makapa, with the help of three youths during this day, they killed and decapitated 15 whites, between women and children. In the afternoon they put the dead people in one car and drop and threw them in Loge River.

In the end of the day, around five o’clock in the afternoon, the owner of the plantation, Silva, escorted by the police from Toto and some indigenous soldiers arrived, shooting and killed all those who were at the plantation. Bernardo Makapa managed to escape. In the following day the survivors were interrogated, killed and thrown into the river in the same place where some white bodies were found.

The survival African population took refuge in the jungle, running away from the land and aerial offensive of the colonial troops. In the jungle, Bernardo Makapa met a group of men who took him to Inga central base, belonging to UPA, whose responsible were Manuel, Pedro Rita and Sales. He remained there as military instructor. During almost three months the whole region remained under control of Inga central base, because the white people abandoned their farms.

When the colons recuperated their farms, Bernardo Makapa started organizing and leading assault groups to the goods transportation military columns. Later on, escorted by five colleagues he goes to Leopoldville, where he is appointed by the FNLA leadership to open the Kinkuso military base at Matadi. At Kinkuso military base he received for military training a group of 150 people from Mozambique, but

he doesn't know if they belonged to FRELIMO or not. Bernardo Makapa was the founder of the main military training base of FNLA in the North, Northeast and East of Angola.

In 1975, he is in Kinkuso military base, and by orders from Holden Roberto he remains there. When the first President of Angola, Agostinho Neto, visits the Republic of Zaire, after the negotiations between the two Governments that culminated with the cessation of the support from the Republic of Zaire to FNLA Bernardo Makapa was in Mukaka military base, an FNLA military base inside the Zairean territory.

With the closing of the FNLA office in the Republic of Zaire, Mukaka integrated himself in the Zairean society where he remained until 1992, when he returned to Angola.

## Castro Viera Lopes, João de

Born in Luanda, on May 8, 1932, João Baptista de Castro Viera Lopes, belongs to a family of the called Luanda “small bourgeoisie”, that while colonialism was consolidating the system of oppression realised that his financial economical situation was worsening. His childhood was passed in the suburban neighbourhoods of Luanda (Vila Clotilde, Bairro Operario); he studied in the famous nr. 8 School, his primary school, and secondary in Liceu Nacional Salvador Correia from 11 to 19 years old.

With his older brother’s support, Antonio de Castro Viera Lopes, he went to Coimbra (Portugal) to study medicine. He explains to us the difficulties he had to face to adapt to the academic atmosphere in Portugal, the difficulties that the Africans face to study in Angola because of the lack of identity cards and of economical resources mainly when their progenitors were not employees or public servants.

Between Coimbra and Lisbon he graduated in medicine and took advantage of the student atmosphere to start his initial steps in politics, joining clandestine groups and sharing experiences with students from other territories controlled by Portugal (Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and S. Tome e Principe). The initial steps in politics were characterized by the enrolment in youth associations, participation in meetings to discuss ideas for the emancipation of the colonized territories, participation in the socio-cultural valorisation of the Africans through the House of the Students of the Empire (CEI), and were consolidated by sharing moments with Agostinho Neto, Humberto Machado, Zito Van-Dunem, Mario Van-Dunem among others.

While student he was arrested by PIDE accused of participating in subversive activities, participates as defendant’s witness in Agostinho Neto’s trial and avoids complying in the Portuguese military service. In 1961 he escapes from Portugal to France, through Spain helped by a French protestant institution named SIMAD. With the support of the authorities from Ghana, he travels to Accra and later to Leopoldville, where after his arrival was appointed member of the MPLA Director Committee.

His trajectory between Leopoldville and Brazzaville is characterized by his participation in the CVAAR (Voluntary Corp for Medical Assistance to the Angolan Refugees), by the exiting problems in the leadership of MPLA and by the rivalry between MPLA and UPA/FNLA. He speaks about the professional capacity of medical doctors and nurses of CVAAR, the rivalry between Agostinho Neto and Viriato Cruz for the control of MPLA and of the great influence that Holden Roberto and UPA/FNLA had at level of Leopoldville authorities that expelled MPLA from their territory. About the rivalry between Neto and Viriato he says that in his opinion it was due to the fact that both were personalities with very strong character, they didn’t had the opportunity to know each other very well and to the existent difficulties the MPLA was facing with racial problems, mainly about the role that the blacks and coloured people would play in the movement and, of the groups formed around each one of them.

## **ANNEXURE 4:**

### **Summary of the Testimony of General Veríssimo Ermitério Sabino**

## **Sabino, Veríssimo Ermitério**

**[Luanda; 2008]**

An army General called Veríssimo Ermitério Sabino, but during the war he was known as Sabino Sandele, keeping the name of the grandfather Sabino and his mother's mother name Sandele. His father was a business man, relatively prosperous, José da Conceição Sabino and his mother was Francisca Chipina Sandele.

He grew up in an environment where politics were discussed when he was very young. He was friends with people of the economic and military and that gave him the opportunity to grow with a feeling of deep analysis of events taking place at the social, economic and political sphere.

Within a relatively small society where the wealthier had influence on all the matters taking place or to be taking place, he was able to see Angola as an adolescent surrounded by adults who discussed political, military, economic and other issues.

First cousin, from his mother side, of the first Commander of FALA, Samuel Piedoso Chingunji, he was in the infantry in the Portuguese army having dealt with many progressive Portuguese officers who did not share the ideas of the Portuguese colonialism. With his cousin he shared the idea of participating in the struggle either in the FNLA or the MPLA. UNITA had not been founded.

His family decided that he should leave the country. He left Luanda to meet his cousin in Chissamba, Bié, but he had already left Lubango. Then he tried to meet his uncle Eduardo Jonatão Chingunji who stayed in Moxico and tried to find his cousin. However, he soon understood that his uncle had contacts with UNITA. This took place in 1967. His uncle arranged for him to meet two commanders in the area, Samuel, Chief of Staff, and his brother David known as Sawimbila and Samuel was known as Capechi Kafundanga. They decided that Sabino should not go to the bush. He should stay and organize underground actions in Moxico to obtain military and political information from the enemy.

Having organized a meeting with an underground group in Sangodo, and having identified the interest in the information, he is appointed the Secretary for Political-Military Information in Luso. He organized the underground services amongst the Portuguese Armed Forces, the army headquarters, the police where he could get most of the intelligence.

In each one of those sectors they had individuals who contributed greatly and many of them are in posts of great responsibility, both in the party and in government. Amongst the capitalists he developed friendships to get information from the regions where there was war. He established networks to communicate the information gathered making use of the knowledge he had about the Portuguese army and the

books on the organization of underground services like the TCs in the guerrilla war in Malaysia.

In the city of Luena, through Mr. Acácio de Oliveira, a timber merchant with obvious interests in that area, he obtained the right military information, as well from the police and he watched the movement of vehicles to the suburbs of Luso, nowadays, municipalities and Communes. The elements in the armed forces contributed with material like ammunition, grenades, uniforms, etc., taken from the army. This is how attacks were launched against military targets in the province.

There were so many military actions that PIDE understood that the information was coming from within and, in 1969, UNITA decided to expand its activities of the services of the commanders who were Samuel, Chief of Staff and his brother David, known as Sawimibilia and Samuel known as *Capechi Kafundanga*. *They suggested Sabino wouldn't go to the bush but to rather organize the underground work in Moxico to obtain political-military information from the enemy.*

He then referred to the presence of Iko Carreira, in the regional, in 1968, to the contacts he had with some groups who were later arrested, he spoke of the need for reconciliation which has to go through honesty without hegemony of political, racial, economic, religious, cultural, ethnic nature, or any other.

UNITA militants and sympathizers ended up in jail in Tarrafal, Missombo, S. Nicolau and were in Capolo, like many others from other parties or National Liberation Movements and there is no need to promote lies with which we cannot make a pact.

Regarding Pe. Oliveira, a person talked about, he referred that he had never met Dr. Savimbi although he had insisted on that. He had had a meeting with the interviewed who had asked what were the objectives for such a meeting and he found out that they were of a spiritual nature and to provide medicines if possible. UNITA only contacted him after the coup d'état in Portugal to serve as a link with the representatives of the Portuguese government in Luso and to find out the true situation regarding the colonies, such as Angola. This was the only truth.

# Mozambique

**Independent on the 25th June 1975**

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# 2.3

## **Mozambique and the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa, 1960–1994**

**By Joel das Neves Tembe and Alda Romão Saúte Saíde**

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## Introduction

Mozambique became independent in 1975, after ten years of armed struggle against the Portuguese colonial rule. The Lusaka Accords, signed in September 1974 recognized the FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) as the sole representative of the Mozambican people to take power following the fall of the colonial regime.

In taking power, FRELIMO opened the path for the establishment of a Socialist regime and for the revolutionary transformation of the society. Following the steps taken by Tanzania, the revolutionary Government declared Mozambique as a liberated zone and safe rear-guard in the liberation of Zimbabwe and South Africa. FRELIMO made these statements taking into account that the peace that had been achieved with independence would become senseless and unsustainable for as long as the region, as a whole, would not become free. In challenging the powerful minority colonial regimes to which the Mozambican colonial economy was so closely linked, through the railway and port networks and migrant work revenue, Mozambique was practically committing an economic suicide. The South African *apartheid* regime was committed to destabilize the country, by supporting RENAMO in the war which had almost paralysed the country. Despite the Nkomati Peace Accord, signed in 1984 between South Africa and Mozambique, the destabilizing campaigns did not stop. The aviation incident which in 1986 killed Samora Machel, the first President of Mozambique, was planned, meaning the destabilization process was continuing. The painful experiences of the Mozambican economic crisis did not overcome, in any way, the pride and glory of the emancipation of the entire region, which would reach its highest point with the dismantling of the *apartheid* regime in 1994.

The history of the national armed struggle is still to be written. Unlike the considerable volume of work published about countries such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, the existing literature about the liberation of Mozambique is very scarce. The liberation struggle of Mozambique is rooted on the common struggles of the working classes, students, intellectuals and peasants.

This study is based, principally, on oral interviews conducted with participants in the liberation struggle, including former guerrilla fighters, with people who lived in liberated areas and in refugee camps, missionaries and a selected group of Tanzanian leaders. The field of work was conducted from 2007 to 2008, in almost all Provinces, such as Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete, Nampula, Manica, Sofala, Zambézia, Gaza and Maputo.

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(1) The research team was led by Dr. Joel das Neves Tembe (Project Coordinator), by Dr Alda Romão Saúde Saíde (Associate Researcher), by Dr. Laudemiro Francisco, Dr. Julieta Massimbe, Dr. Victorino Sambo and Dr. Liazzat Bonate as Research Advisors. The team included 12 researchers and two document officers based in Maputo, working part-time, and six additional junior researchers. In total, six men and six women were involved, including nine junior assistants in the Provinces, in addition to the group in Maputo.

These provinces were selected according to their geographical importance in the development of the armed struggle, as well as of the solidarity of neighbouring countries. These are provinces that experienced the brutal impact of the colonial oppression, which influenced the emergence of the liberation movements and the underground cells that led the popular uprisings.

This chapter is a loose translation<sup>2</sup> of the original version written in English and is divided into four sections. The first section deals with the emergence of FRELIMO and with the struggles for the legitimization of power within and between the liberation movements, during the period of formation of the liberation front. The second section deals with the process of preparation in the launching of the armed struggle, the dynamics of the struggle, including the conflicts that occurred throughout the process which would eventually culminate with the triumph of the revolutionary line within FRELIMO, as a condition for social change in the liberated areas. In this section, contradictions caused by the integration of this social group in the national liberation armed struggle. The fourth and last section is focused on the role and contribution of Mozambique in the liberation struggle of Southern Africa, and discusses the complex relationships that had developed as a result of the Mozambican solidarity with the liberation struggles of Zimbabwe and South Africa.

## The Emergence of FRELIMO

### The Period of the Formation of FRELIMO

As elsewhere in Southern Africa, in Mozambique the modern nationalism is rooted in the long traditions of anti-colonial resistance. The mass movements that included the cultural, sports, student organizations, religious sects, revolts in rural areas and demonstrations in urban areas, were important factors in the political awareness of the people. Another factor of political mobilization was due to the way the Portuguese authorities were pointing openly about the incapacity of the new independent African countries for a peaceful self-determination, by using the examples of the revolts and assassinations that occurred in Congo and Nigeria.<sup>3</sup> The media, such as the radio and newspapers were determinant in enabling certain Mozambican sectors, especially the emerging nationalists, to be informed about the ongoing political activities in

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(2) Translation by Julieta Machimuassane Langa.

(3) The local newspapers, as well as the pro-government daily *Noúcias*, despite articulating the colonial discourse have, paradoxically, have elevated the political conscience of people, through reports and news articles about the political events elsewhere in Africa, India and even on the Mueda massacre, in the North of Mozambique, in June 1960. Writers such as José Craveirinha and Malangatana Valente Ngwenha had also contributed for the rising of the political conscience. It should be noted that there were newspapers coming from South Africa, such as the *Sunday Times*, *Sunday Express* and the *Daily Mail*.

neighbouring countries, though secretly, in churches and in private homes, at night. This was common in the main cities such as Beira, Tete and Lourenço Marques, as well as in resident communities in border areas next to Zambia, Malawi, Tanganyika and Zimbabwe. Alberto Chipande, then a teacher in Mueda, Province of Cabo Delgado, recalls that his political conscience developed through radio programs about the political events in Congo. The events in Cabo Delgado, including the Mueda Massacre, from which he escaped on the 16th June 1960, had also helped him to sharpen his political conscience, and he ended up fleeing from Mozambique to join FRELIMO in Tanganyika. The social media have also served as a source of information about the political activities of Nkomo and Sithole, in Zimbabwe, of Kaunda, in Zambia, and about the political developments in Congo and in Ghana in the 1960s decade.<sup>4</sup>

The Mueda Massacre was preceded by various petitions by the local population, particularly of those that had already migrated to Tanganyika, demanding an autonomous administration of Mueda, by Africans. There were people from the North of Mozambique that already had a high political conscience because of their previous exposure to the political changes in Tanganyika, through the associations to which they were associated, especially the MANU (initially designated *União Nacional Makonde* and later, the *União Nacional Africana de Moçambique*). After successive failures in the attempt to negotiate with the Portuguese Government, in 1959 a group led by Faustino Vanombe and Kibiriti Diwane (third group) went to the Mueda Administration on the 12<sup>th</sup> June 1960, to meet with the local Portuguese authorities. Upon receiving the petition, the Administrator sent them back to their homes, with instructions to return two days later, alleging that he needed to consult the local traditional chiefs, heads of villages and the population at large, to ask them if they shared the same demand for political autonomy (independence). However, as the population did not appear on the 14th June, the meeting was postponed for the 16<sup>th</sup> and the local chiefs were forced to convene the population to be present. Believing this to be the day of independence, many people came to the meeting and gathered in front of the administration building. The Administrator then ordered the chiefs to be separated from the people who were being controlled by the local Police (*sipaïos*). The Catholic priests of the local missions had also been invited while the Portuguese army was on alert. The meeting, initially convened for 10h00 am, was postponed for 3h00 pm, because they were waiting for the arrival of the District Governor of Cabo Delgado. It was a rainy day, but people were waiting patiently. When the Governor arrived, the population was invited to stand-up as a sign of greeting to the Portuguese authority and flag, but the local population gathered thereat refused to do it and demanded a reply to their request for independence submitted by Kibiriti, Vanombe and Modesta. The Governor called the leaders of the revolt for a brief consultation and asked them what they wanted, to which they replied: "The independence.". The Governor wasn't happy and then told them that, from that moment on, he wanted peace and that everybody ought to feel Portuguese.

(4) Interview with General Alberto Chipande (Maputo, 24th September 2008).

(5) The Portuguese had accused them, on various occasions, of being influenced by Julius Nyerere on their demands for independence.

He added that henceforth, both blacks and whites could marry each other without any barrier and that the salaries and that the prices of products bought to the peasants would increase. The Governor's promises didn't convince the petitioners. While the three leaders were being arrested, he addressed the crowd and repeated the same promise. The crowd was furious and hit the Governor and he, henceforth ordered the Army to shoot the population causing hundreds of deaths! <sup>6</sup> The survivors of this massacre fled to Tanganyika and, through MANU, undertook to form FRELIMO, the Front for the United Liberation.<sup>7</sup>

The cross-border movement of people in Southern Africa, specially, for the migrant culminated with the formation of networks that helped to raise the political conscience of the people. The migrant workers in neighbouring countries, particularly in South Africa, <sup>8</sup> Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Tanganyika and Zanzibar had created their own political conscience, by fighting for their lives, side by side with their working colleagues, as well as through the ethnic and regional associations. Since the late 1950s, the Protestant churches, through their activities geared towards the Youth, had created juvenile associations and groups in urban areas, in which political topics were being discussed and where the escape from the country to safer places in exile was also being planned, to develop their political activities.<sup>9</sup>

The political repression launched the basis for many Mozambicans to understand the importance of unity and regional solidarity in the process of developing the struggle for liberation. Solidarity was crucial to counteract the combined violence of the secret services and the repressive regime in Mozambique.

The interviews hitherto conducted enabled the recording of the various individual and collective experiences about the brutalities inflicted upon by the Portuguese colonial bosses, in the workplace, and in the urban and rural communities which caused the massive exodus of Mozambicans. The interviewees have also conveyed their experiences of violence perpetrated by the PIDE (Portuguese State Security Police) in the neighbouring countries, such

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(6) See Interviews with Daniel Muilundo, Cornélio Mandanda, Rachide Katame, and Jacinto Omar em Yussuf Adam and Hilário Dyuti. "Massacre de Mueda: Falam testemunhas." Archives, vol.14. Maputo (October 1993): See pp.117-128. See also a testimony by Alberto Chipande in Eduardo Mondlane. *Lutar Por Moçambique*. Lisboa: Sá da Costa, 1977: See pp.125-126. In his interview, Raimundo Pachinuapa (Maputo 2nd September 2008), who like Chipande also survived the massacre, estimated that some 600 persons of those that were there had been killed.

(7) After this massacre, MANU, who formerly was called União Nacional Makonde and later União Nacional Africana de Moçambique and, finally FRELIMO, intensified the political mobilization activities along the border and started to contact peasants, teachers and students of local missionary schools, to convince them to leave the country into Tanganyika, to join the liberation movement.

(8) José Moiane, who became a distinguished commander and General of the Mozambican Army, is the living example of this experience, as he himself recalls that his political conscience had been stimulated by the political environment existing in the mines and by the contact with the neighbouring communities, in Johannesburg in the late 1950s, when he was working in the gold mines.

(9) There were several religious networks: the Catholic, Protestant, Islamic and others who operated towards covering the political activities described by our interviewees from Beira, Lourenço Marques, Cabo delgado and from the Muslim community in the northern coast of Mozambique.

in Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe, countries that were used as main entry points in search of safer places, particularly in Zambia and Tanzania.<sup>10</sup> The interviewees hold in their memories the solidarity that they were exposed to by common people, religious organizations and political movements from whom they got support during their long journeys to join the liberation movement.<sup>11</sup> The African nationalists, in particular the Simango family had played a crucial role in the link with the Zimbabwean nationalists, through the Methodist Church and the National Democratic Party – NDP. The Protestant Church, the *Mozambique Association Club* and the National Democratic Union of Mozambique (UDENAMO), in 1960, played an important role in the growth of the Mozambican community that was living in Salisbury and in Bulawayo.<sup>12</sup> The experience of Feliciano Gundana<sup>13</sup> provides us a wider framework regarding the information given by other interviewees. Gundana was born in Machanga, a village in the Province of Sofala, he studied in Beira and later worked as a contract worker in the *Railways Moçambique* company. In February 1962, he left Beira to Tanzania, through Zimbabwe and Malawi and arrived in Dar-es-Salaam in March the same year. The decision to join the armed struggle was due to the difficulties he had been exposed to, arising from the colonial repression and racism that was reigning in the city of Beira. Indeed, Beira was the city that hosted the most racist white community in colonial Mozambique, through the influence of the then white minority of Southern Rhodesia. Despite this, a long tradition of nationalist activities had flourished there under the aegis of the Protestant churches and African cultural and sports associations. The same happened in the cities of Lourenço Marques and Tete.<sup>14</sup> The most illustrative example is that of the *Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique* (Associative Centre of Black Mozambicans). In 1948, a youth section of this association was founded under the name of *Núcleo Associativo dos Estudantes Secundários Negros de Moçambique* (NESAM) which included Black students of the high schools of the capital city.

(10) Amongst other bitter experiences, there was the attempted escape of Armando Guebuza and his close friends to Tanganyika via neighbouring countries. On the 29th May 1963, they crossed Swaziland and South Africa and, when they entered Southern Rhodesia, more precisely in Victoria Falls, were arrested by the local Police and by PIDE, the Portuguese state security Police, and sent back to Lourenço Marques, where they were repressed and arrested for five months.

(11) Our interviewees shared their experiences in regard to the role played by the Mozambicans who were working or were in exile in Swaziland. They have articulated their political activities with the Progressive Party of Swaziland. For example, Mr. Abdul Carimo Varzina, former PIDE political prisoner, recalls that when Samora Machel crossed Swaziland towards Tanganyika, in March 1963, together with Matias Mboa, they arranged for travel documents, five pounds and showed them the route to follow, via Transvaal and Botswana. Interview with Abdul Varzina (Maputo, 4th December 2008).

(12) Another Party founded by Mozambicans in Southern Rhodesia in the late 1950s and which did not progress due to the imprisonment of its leadership by PIDE, was the MANC (Mozambican National African Congress).

(13) Former Minister of the Ex-Combatants of the Liberation Struggle, Feliciano Gundana, was one of the first nationalists to undertake efforts for the establishment of FRELIMO. Interview with Feliciano Gundana (Maputo, May 2007).

(14) In Beira there was the *Núcleo Negrófilo de Manica e Sofala* and in Tete, the *Clube Desportivo de Tete* (Sports Club of Tete).

This Group was a true political hotbed for many students and for its own founders, amongst which was Eduardo Mondlane, Stephan Matsolo, Georgete Libombo, Mateus Mabote, Joaquim Chissano, Mariano Matsinha, Armando Guebuza.

Gundana was exposed to this environment in the city of Beira. He partook in the small groups of debate about the political developments in Diu and Damão, in 1960, which led to the persecution and arrest of various people by PIDE in that city. With the onset of the nationalist armed struggle in Angola, on the 4<sup>th</sup> February 1961, PIDE intensified its persecution and arrest of people in Beira. Gundana was arrested for four days, under the suspicion of participating in political activities. In December 1961 he accompanied a friend in a train trip to Mutare. His friend left Beira to join the liberation movement in Tanganyika, but Gundana was intercepted by PIDE in Mutare, arrested and interrogated for a day. In fact, he didn't know that in that day there was a meeting organized by a branch of the *Zimbabwe African People's Union* (ZAPU). The bitter experience he had gone through, bearing witness of the persecution and arrest of people by the PIDE, almost every day, accelerated his decision to leave the country.<sup>15</sup>

In being able to escape PIDE's surveillance, Gundana left by train from Beira to Mutare, in Machipanda. From there he travelled to Salisbury<sup>16</sup> where he bought an air ticket that would take him to Blantyre, Malawi, remaining in this city at the home of an UDENAMO representative<sup>17</sup> waiting to finally travel by ship to Tanganyika.<sup>18</sup> Feliciano Gundana travelled from Blantyre to Dar-es-Salaam in the company of Filipe Samuel Magaia,<sup>19</sup> who also lived in Beira and had participated with Gundana and others in underground meetings in small groups, listening to news from international radio stations, and in the establishment of contacts with Mozambican nationalists in Zimbabwe.<sup>20</sup> While in Malawi they joined Magaia with two Mozambicans who, equally, wanted to reach Tanganyika: Joseph Sithole and Nkomo. Due to the constant presence of PIDE, they had to leave Blantyre towards Limbe, to take a bus there to

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(15) Interview with Feliciano Gundana (Maputo, May 2007). This situation was also typical in Lourenço Marques, where various nationalists had been arrested. It's important to highlight that the jail has become an important underground unit (*celula*), since political prisoners, especially in Lourenço Marques, were coming from different places. Amongst these prisoners there were those who had witnessed and survived the Mueda Massacre, and those that had participated in political activities in neighbouring countries, such as Swaziland and Southern Rhodesia. In prison, this group of nationalist could exchange viewpoints and convey crucial information for the political mobilization.

(16) Interview with Feliciano Gundana (Maputo, May 2007). In this city, Gundana met other UDENAMO Mozambican members: Silvério Nungo and Gabriel Machava.

(17) The UDENAMO representative was Chico Lourenço who later was murdered by PIDE agents.

(18) He had to stay longer because the boat was broken down.

(19) Filipe Magaia was the first FRELIMO's Head of the Department of Defence and Security. He was deployed to Algeria together with Marcelino dos Santos to negotiate the granting of training facilities to FRELIMO in January 1963.

(20) In Beira they used to meet in small groups at the train station to read newspapers, discuss the internal political situation in Mozambique and to plan escape strategies for joining the liberation struggle.

Mbeya and from there, finally, they left by train to Dar-es-Salaam, where they were received by Lopes Tembe and João Mungwambe of UDENAMO.<sup>21</sup>

Another group of nationalists emerged in Portugal, France and Algeria where they were studying or were exiled. The interviews with Marcelino do Santos, Joaquim Chissano, Mariano Matsinha, Óscar Monteiro and Sérgio Vieira provide an excellent representation of this group. The experience of the colonial repression and the exposure to the European political environment raised the political conscience of these nationalists who, along with other students and other politicians in exile<sup>22</sup> began to challenge the colonial power, expressing the need for liberation and independence.<sup>23</sup> However, in Portugal, the students involved in political activities were operating underground to deter PIDE's attention. Even the young men who were forcefully conscripted into the army were challenging the system and escaping into safe places in Europe (for example, France) and into the North of Africa (for example, to Algeria).

The Interviews demonstrate that the experiences and the degree of political conscience vary according to age, level of education and geographic location. The impact of the colonial repression in Mozambique had varied from province to province. Furthermore, it was noticed that some Mozambicans had been influenced by regional and international events that were occurring in India and in Goa; by the independence of Ghana, by the liberation struggle in Algeria; and, especially, by the revolt and onset of the Angolan armed struggle.

The Mueda Massacre, which occurred in 1960, in Cabo Delgado, marked a radical turning point in the fight of the Mozambicans against the Portuguese colonialism. As the underground activities and the political mobilization intensified, more young people, men and women were joining the liberation movement, particularly FRELIMO, through the various cells set up in neighbouring countries, especially in Zambia, Malawi and Tanganyika. Despite the surveillance and intensive patrolling of the border by PIDE, many Mozambicans continued to seek ways of participating in the liberation struggle. In this regard, they had to confront PIDE and the border police patrols, being

(21) In Tanganyika there was another political organization, MANU, formed by people who were living in the North of Mozambique and former migrant workers in Tanganyika.

(22) Amongst other African nationalists there was Agostinho Neto, of Angola and Amílcar Cabral of Guinea-Bissau.

(23) Initially, the demands had to do with equality of rights within the policy of assimilation in the colonies. But, with the rising of their political conscience, they started to demand independence. Eduardo Mondlane, who had to leave Portugal to the USA because of the PIDE, formed part of the first group of Mozambican students. The second group of students included Marcelino dos Santos and Noémia de Sousa, who were very active as writers predominantly of nationalist poetry. Meanwhile, they were joined by other students from other Portuguese colonies, mainly from Angola and Cape Verde, who would become key players in the formation of the CONCP (Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies) in 1961. The third group of students in Portugal, (Joaquim Chissano, Pascoal Mocumbi, Sérgio Vieira, Óscar Monteiro, Jeremias Nhambire, Ana Simião, Mariano Matsinha, etc.) had already been influenced by the events in Africa and Asia (defeat of the Portuguese army in Goa) and, again, by the Un Resolution 15/14 on the Decolonization of the Portuguese Colonies, and by the role played by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP). See Interview with Marcelino dos Santos (Sommerschield, Maputo, 11th November 2007).

forced to travel long journeys, for many weeks, and sometimes subjected to imprisonment. In the initial stages of the formation of the Liberation Front of Mozambique, Ghana and Tanganyika were the main destinations for Mozambicans seeking exile. It is understandable, from here, that the rising of many ex-colonies to independence, in the late 1950s and early 1960s had favoured the formation of independence movements in exile. With the independence of Tanganyika, in 1961, new possibilities were opened for Mozambique. That is why, henceforth, the three movements established their headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam.

Joaquim Chissano and Lopes Tembe recall, with precision, the moments of the formation of the Front. While Lopes Tembe was involved with UDENAMO, since the times he was in Southern Rhodesia until he moved to Dar-es-Salaam, Joaquim Chissano represented the experience of ex-students in Europe, playing a fundamental role in the formation of UNEMO (Organization of Mozambican Students in Europe). In Paris, Chissano could create links between the students and other Mozambican political groups spread across Africa, such as the UDENAMO and MANU, seeking to form FRELIMO – Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.<sup>24</sup>

In the following testimony, Joaquim Chissano recalls his contribution for the unification of the nationalist movements in the following terms:

My (our) small group of Mozambican students was very active towards the unification of the Mozambican nationalist movements, that is, UDENAMO and MANU into one single front. Within this activity, I went to Dar-es-Salaam during my Easter holidays, in 1962, where I met the two movements. However, before this trip, we (students) had meetings with Dr. Eduardo Mondlane who, at that time, was a Professor at the University of Syracuse, in New York. The first meeting took place in Paris, in 1961. After the Dar-es-Salaam meeting I travelled to Washington to meet Eduardo Mondlane and submit to him a report on the meetings we had with the Mozambican nationalists. The meetings between our group of UNEMO member students, in Paris, and later in Dar-es-Salaam. This group of students included Pascoal Mocumbi, Ana Simião (Neto) and João Nhambire.<sup>25</sup>

Eduardo Mondlane, then a UN officer, was behind this entire process. He had already been in Lourenço Marques and in his native village, Nwadjahane, Province of Gaza. In 1961, in a visit he made to Mozambique, accompanied by his wife, Janet R. Johnson, Mondlane reviewed the social and political situation in Mozambique, holding meetings with various Mozambicans and at the Presbyterian Mission Switzerland.<sup>26</sup> It was in these meetings that Mondlane spoke about the importance of unity against social injustice and all forms of

(24) Interview with Joaquim Chissano and Lopes Tembe (Malehice and Maputo, 2007).

(25) Interview with Joaquim Chissano (Malehice, 2007).

(26) Mondlane also had been working with Portuguese functionaries in the diplomatic corridors, especially those working at the UN, such as Adriano Moreira, hoping for a peaceful transition of power and the granting of autonomy to the Mozambicans by the Portuguese Government. However, his visit to Mozambique

repression perpetrated by the Portuguese colonial system. After this visit to Mozambique, Eduardo Mondlane went to Southern Rhodesia where he met Mozambican nationalists, including Uria Simango and Adelino Gwambe. The following report is from him:

When I visited Salisbury, from Mozambique, early in 1961, I found various working groups who, sometimes, would cooperate amongst themselves, and other times would distance themselves. In talking to some of these groups I suggested they organize themselves into a unified movement, which would be linked to the nationalist forces in Mozambique and with the groups working in exile. One of the UDENAMO officers, Mr. Adelino Gwambe, aged 23, decided to take his chance with the nationalists and agreed to be sent to Dar-es-Salaam, Tanganyika, to contact the members of UNAMO and explore the possibilities of forming a common front. Later, Baltazar Chagonga, Chairman of another Mozambican Party joined them as the representative of a group established in Nyasaland (Malawi) which name was *Mozambique National Independence Party* (UNAMI). For many years, Mr. Chagonga worked as a nurse in Mozambique but was forced to retire because of his nationalists' sentiments which the Portuguese Government would not tolerate. When the situation became worse, Chagonga left Mozambique and he settled, for a while, in Blantyre, Malawi. But, as the Portuguese Police had the freedom to act and arrest Mozambicans within Malawian territory, he had to seek a path to take him to Tanganyika, from where he wrote to me when I was working at the UN, asking me to help him form a united front.<sup>27</sup>

In his works *Lutar por Moçambique*, Mondlane recognized the importance of external events, in particular, of the CONCP, of the conferences organized in Ghana and the contribution they gave for the enhancement of the political conscience within the Mozambican nationalist movement.

The external conditions had also contributed to unity: The Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies, held in Casablanca in 1961, with the participation of the UDENAMO, launched a strong call for the unity of the nationalist movements against the Portuguese colonialism. The conference of all the African nationalist movements, convened by the President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, has also stimulated the formation of united fronts and, in Tanganyika, President Nyerere, personally, exerted an influence for the movements based in that territory to be united.<sup>28</sup>

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 may have helped to change his approach, given the big difference between the Portuguese discourse on reforms and the harsh social and economic reality faced by the Mozambicans. According to José Duarte, a retired Portuguese diplomat, this situation might have contributed for Mondlane to refuse the offer of the Portuguese authorities, for a position as a Professor at the Tropical Medicine Institute of the University of Lisbon, to teach Social and Medical Anthropology. See "Mondlane, Uma Estratégia Para a África", submitted in Maputo: University Eduardo Mondlane. Simpósio Internacional sobre Eduardo Mondlane, 18-19th June 2009.

(27) Mondlane, Eduardo. "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique". Mimeographed text, dated 1966. Maputo: Museum of the Revolution.

(28) Mondlane, Eduardo. *The Struggle for Mozambique*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969: p.118.

Dr. Mondlane also highlighted the efforts made by Mozambicans and by other African leaders, such as Julius Nyerere, to convince him to return to Africa, to organize the liberation movement in Mozambique, a return he had already planned in his mind. Lopes Tembe recalls that members of the UDENAMO and other nationalists meeting in Dar-es-Salaam also gathered some funds to send a telegram to New York inviting Eduardo Mondlane to travel to Tanganyika to unite the liberation movement. Of Mozambique.<sup>29</sup> Mondlane has, indeed, arrived in Dar-es-Salaam in May 1962; he met the political movements and urged them to unite<sup>30</sup> and a conference for June that year had been planned.

On the 25th June 1962, various groups of Mozambicans coming from different parts of the country met in Dar-es-Salaam and formed a United Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO). Amongst the participants were refugees, some recently arrivals from the North of Mozambique who had crossed the Rovuma River and other neighbouring countries and from Europe. They had the personal support of the PAFMECSA (Pan-African Movement for the Liberation of Eastern, Central and Southern Africa – Pan African Movement), staff, from Ghana, Kenya and, in particular, from TANU (Tanzanian African National Union) and from local authorities. They elected Dr. Eduardo Mondlane and Uria Simango as President and Vice-President, respectively.

Eduardo Mondlane was a scholar with a long experience of the nationalist struggle in Mozambique, having served in the UN and taught at the University of Syracuse.<sup>31</sup> Simango was a cleric and a seasoned politician who had already developed nationalist activities, particularly in Southern Rhodesia, where he had been persecuted by PIDE until he fled to Tanganyika. Eduardo Mondlane described this achievement in the following terms:

The Front is the only political party that represents the interests of the people of Mozambique. The union of the various parts represents the determination of our people to achieve independence within the shortest time possible. The most important political parties formed in exile and, now merged into FRELIMO are: MANU and UDENAMO.

(29) Ndelana, Lopes Tembe, "Eduardo Mondlane's role in the unification of the Mozambican nationalist movements around FRELIMO". Presentation at the International Symposium on Eduardo Mondlane. Maputo 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> June 2009.

(30) Refused to identify himself with any of the three movements, despite the invitation made to him by each one of the movements in that regard. Mondlane insisted he could only join a united front of the three groups with other Mozambicans. In this way, Mondlane placed himself above the ethnic and regional affinities.

(31) Dr. Mondlane was a scientist of great social prestige. He worked as a research officer at the UN and had a vast experience on issues of African decolonization, particularly in West Africa and Tanganyika, which provided him the opportunity to meet Julius Nyerere. He also had some political experience in South Africa and Lisbon where he spent some time in the pursuit of his university studies after he left Mozambique. In the then city of Lourenço Marques, the capital, he had already established an organization of Mozambican students (NESAM) within the Centro Associativo dos Negros de Moçambique (Associative Centre of the Mozambican Blacks).

MANU was originally formed by Mozambicans working in Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda. Some of its leaders were members of political parties in such countries during the respective periods of development and growth. Consequently, when it became evident that the political power in East Africa was going to be granted to the black majority, these Mozambicans felt obliged to focus their energies in the preparation of their own people towards the independence. This was the case of Mr. Mateus Mmole, who was President of the MANU. MANU's former Secretary-General, M.M. Malinga, who lived many years in East Africa, where he worked in the unions of Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. In Kenya, he worked as an officer of the port workers organization in Mombasa and in Uganda at the organization of cotton workers. Malinga worked with Mr. Tom Mboya for a while, during a period where the latter was in Kenya.<sup>32</sup>

After the merger of the three movements into one single front – FRELIMO – preparations were started for the congress that would take place in the following month of September. In this event, the objectives and structure of the Front were established, as well as the program of action. However, the conference which gave rise to the creation of FRELIMO was not exempt from conflicts. The interviews enabled the capture of reports of the difficult times that followed the creation of FRELIMO. The then leaders of UDENAMO, Adelino Gwambe, and of MANU, Paulo Mmole, refused to accept the new leadership and had consequently abandoned the movement.<sup>33</sup> The dissident groups had the support of countries like Malawi, Ghana, Egypt, Uganda, Kenya and Zambia where they had offices and from which they could mobilize international aid, including from certain members of the Cuban army led by Che Guevara, who were competing directly with FRELIMO.<sup>34</sup> Given its political and ideological consistency, FRELIMO was able to mobilize more people hinterland in Mozambique and in the neighbouring countries and has earned more international support. The strong internal organization of FRELIMO, the work of mobilization in the hinterland of the country, the diplomatic efforts and support it was receiving from Tanganyika had helped to consolidate and legitimize its position as the sole liberation movement of Mozambique, recognized by the OAU. The evidence of such FRELIMO force is contained in the reports of Lopes Tembe, Jeremias Nhambire, Feliciano Gundana and Joaquim Chissano. The I FRELIMO Congress, which took place on the 23rd to 28th September 1962, in Dar-es-Salaam, gathered representatives from the interior of Mozambique

(32) Mondlane, Eduardo. "The Struggle for Independence in Mozambique". Mimeographed text, dated 1966. Maputo: Museu da Revolução (Museum of the Revolution).

(33) Later on, the UNAMI leader, Baltazar Chagonga also left FRELIMO. In the beginning, the dissidents had alleged that the vision they had about the participation in the front would imply the maintenance of their original groups, as base organizations, but the other nationalists (especially the young ones) maintained the abolition of these groups. In 1965 a coalition movement was created of dissident groups and forces opposed to FRELIMO named *Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique* (COREMO), under the leadership of Paulo Gumane and later Adelino Gwambe.

(34) Joaquim Chissano. Comments made during the Symposium: *Simpósio Internacional sobre Eduardo Mondlane*. Maputo: 18-19 June 2009.

and from Mozambican communities in Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Kenya, Zambia and Malawi. Despite the fact that it was the first event of this kind in the history of Mozambique, this congress was considered very representative. The number of participants, delegates and invitees was estimated to be 80 and more than 500 respectively. Amongst the invitees were representatives of the Government of Tanganyika, i.e. Prime-Minister Rashid Kawawa and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and National Defence,<sup>35</sup> Oscar Cambona. The congress defined FRELIMO's policy internally and externally, the objectives and methods of action to reach such objectives. The objectives of the congress included the consolidation, mobilization, preparation for the war, education and diplomacy. In fact, the priority was to consolidate FRELIMO's structure, and to promote and accelerate the training of cadres for the political mobilization of the people and the military training for the armed struggle. The key objective of the liberation struggle was then defined as a national liberation, which meant defeating the Portuguese colonial rule. The common denominator was the oppression and exploitation, regardless of race, ethnicity or regional origin. In the international arena, the congress highlighted the importance of solidarity with the other peoples of Africa in their fight against colonialism and, specially, the concerted action with all other Portuguese colonies against colonialism, through CONCP. FRELIMO had subscribed the resolutions of the Bandung Conference and of the Conference for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa and Asia, as well as urging the UN and all other countries to force Portugal to implement the Resolution of the 14<sup>th</sup> December 1960 on the decolonization of Portuguese Africa.

FRELIMO had Eduardo Mondlane as its head and President and Uria Simango as the Vice-President and the Central Committee, as the supreme Organ. The cell, made up of members of a locality was the basic unit. Although the organ responsible for the policies was the Central Committee, there was no conflict in the military wing, since the members of the Army were also members of the CC. The CC, integrating some 20 people was indeed the leading organ of FRELIMO. The organizational structure was then completed and adjusted according to the progress of the struggle and of the new challenges.<sup>36</sup> Thus, the Department of Defence and Security was led by Filipe Samuel Magaia, with the Political Commissar being Raul Casal Ribeiro. With the assassination of Magaia, in 1966, this position was then occupied by Samora Machel. At that time the Department was divided into two, with the Department of Security under the leadership of Joaquim Chissano. Initially, the Department of Foreign affairs was led by Marcelino dos Santos e, later, passed to the Vice-President Uria Simango, while the Health Department

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(35) These two leaders highlighted the importance of unity at the Congress.

(36) It should be stressed that FRELIMO built its leadership with people that already had some degree of experience within the scope of political, economic and socio-economic associations, as well as professional, religious associations and mutual assistance groups.

Was led by Baltazar Chagonga.<sup>37</sup> The Departments of Security and Organization were controlled by the top of the leadership, i.e. Mondlane and Simango respectively. For Mondlane education was the highest priority and in such a way that him and his wife, Janet Johnson were concentrated in this area, having worked towards the establishment of a secondary education school and for training at the *Instituto Moçambicano* (Mozambican Institute), while Tunduru and Bagamoyo had been converted into a primary school and Teacher Training Centre,<sup>38</sup> respectively. Both, Tunduru and Bagamoyo became very important educational centres. By the mid-1960s, Armando Guebuza was nominated as the new Head of the Department of Education and Culture, with the task of supervising all educational and sanitary centres, including those operating in the liberated and semi-liberated areas, hinterland Mozambique.

There were other important departments, such as Finance, Information and Propaganda and the Department of Social Action. The Department of Information and Propaganda was led by Pascoal Mocumbi and, later this position was given to Jorge Rebelo. This Department played a crucial role in the gathering and dissemination of information about FRELIMO's activities onto Mozambicans and the rest of the world. The magazine *A Voz da Revolução* or *Mozambique Revolution* became an instrument of mobilization and politicization of Mozambicans abroad and hinterland of Mozambique for them to join the struggle and in search of all types of international support and solidarity, including the call for the isolation of Portugal. Another important instrument under the responsibility of this Department was Radio which was playing its role through the interaction with local institutions in Dar-es-Salaam and Lusaka, and other cities. The Department of Finance was led by Silvério Nungu who was supposed to be replaced by Lourenço Mutaca before Manuel dos Santos held this position. The Department of Social Affairs was created in 1963 under the leadership of Vice-President Uria Simango and later by J. Namashulua. This Department became very active under Josina Machel during the 1970 decade. In the initial stage, it focused on the thousands of Mozambican refugees in Tanzania,<sup>39</sup> Zanzibar, Mombasa and Zâmbia, working in partnership with international NGOs, particularly those related with the Catholic and Protestant Churches, as well as with the UNHCR. Hinterland Mozambique the Department was focusing its attention on women and children, especially the orphans. To enhance its foreign relations, FRELIMO had representatives in Dar-es-Salaam, Cairo, Lusaka, Algeria, New York, Moscow and Stockholm, inter alia, as well as focal points charged with the contacts with neighbouring countries and with the dissemination of information on the needs and progress experienced by the liberation struggle.

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(37) Francisco Sumbana and Hélder Martins would have assumed the leadership in the following years.

(38) Initially, the Bagamoyo camp was operating as a Political and Military Centre before it was converted into a secondary level school in the mid-60s. It has also operated as a Teacher Training Centre of the FRELIMO's schools.

(39) Indeed, with the intensification of the Portuguese authorities' repression many Mozambicans had crossed the Rovuma River, fleeing to the region between this river and M'twara. They needed protection, shelter, food and medicines.

With the mobilization work that followed, more Mozambicans managed to reach Tanganyika and, from 1962 onwards, new groups of nationalists coming from various parts of Mozambique sought routes to reach Dar-es-Salaam, including Samora Machel, Sebastião Mabote, Cândido Mondlane, José Mioana, Bonifácio Gruveta, Eduardo da Silva Nihia, Mariano Matsinha, Miguel Ambrósio, and Salésio Teodoro who would become leading military leaders of the guerrilla fighting launched in 1964. Generally, people fleeing from the south of Mozambique, especially from the Province of Maputo, would use a route that would go through Mbabane, in Swaziland, Francistown and Lobatse, in Botswana, and Malvernia (today Chicualacuala), Bulawayo and Victoria Falls, in Zimbabwe. Those leaving from Sofala, Province of central Mozambique, would follow their route via Mutare, Marondera and Salisbury, in Zimbabwe, while those coming from Zambézia would follow the route via Limbe, Lilongwe, Blantyre, Milange border with Malawi, Tunduma and Lusaka, in Zambia; these were the link points to reach Tanganyika. In addition to the crossing of the Rovuma River to M'twara and Dodoma, Mbeya was the more common point of entry, as well as the Nyasa Lake which constituted an important gate of entry into Malawi.

In 1962, Mariano Matsinha, a young Tete student who had just returned from Portugal, where he was studying, had decided to visit his parents at the remote village of Cazula, Province of Tete. The colonial policy used for the development of this village had disappointed him. In addition to the political influence received from Portugal, he became aware of the affiliation of Mozambicans in nationalist movements. So, he then decided to flee from Tete into Malawi in August 1962 and, in January in the following year he joined FRELIMO in Tanganyika.<sup>40</sup>

Eduardo Nihia was working at the local administration since 1961, as a supervisor of tobacco production in the village of Mandimba, Province of Niassa, next to the border with Malawi. In 1962, he was attracted allured to attend political rallies led by Chipembere or Kamuzu Banda, at the Mangoche village, in Malawi. Every weekend, Nihia would cross the border to meet his friends in Malawi and to participate with them in political activities. With this experience, he started to develop a feeling of nationalism and to question the colonial situation in Mozambique. At a certain stage, in 1963, after a conversation with his friends about the presence of FRELIMO representatives in Limbe, he decided to leave Mozambique by crossing the Limbe border with Malawi, where he was received by Lourenço Mutaca. From there, he left to Dar-es-Salaam.<sup>41</sup>

Salésio Teodoro, a young pupil of the Nangololo Catholic Mission, in Cabo Delgado, became aware of the political activities in northern Mozambique through his father, who explained to him the developments around the Mueda Massacre.

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(40) Interview with Mariano Matsinha (Maputo, 30th October 2008).

(41) Interview with Eduardo Nihia (Maputo, August 2007).

He still remembers that, in 1963, Raimundo Pachinuapa, Alberto Chipande and an old man, Clementino, went to the Nangololo Mission to mobilize the Youth, amongst the students and teachers, to join FRELIMO.

Miguel Ambrósio, Ernesto Cuvelo, Inácio Rufino and myself escaped to Tanzania,<sup>42</sup> by crossing the Rovuma River on the 17th July 1963, and we reached Dar-es-Salaam on the 20th July. During our trip we passed through Newala and joined Eduardo Tomé and Jeremias Namashulua and proceeded to Dar-es-Salaam. From there we were sent to Kurasini where we spent two weeks taking English lessons before we were sent to the Bagamoyo training camp. There we were trained by Filipe Magaia, who had just returned from Algeria. In October 1963, a group was sent to Israel to undergo nursing training and another for military training. I was part of this group.<sup>43</sup>

The interviewees clearly recall their first contacts in Tanganyika, such as the meeting with Mondlane and other founders of FRELIMO, such as Uria Simango, Marcelino dos Santos, Lopes Tembe, Feliciano Gundana, Filipe Magaia and Joaquim Chissano, in Dar-es-Salaam. Marcelino dos Santos combined his active political activity at FRELIMO, which gave him the department of foreign affairs, with the CONCP activities in Morocco and, later in Algeria.

In the following years, Eduardo Mondlane focused his activity in denouncing the Portuguese oppression and of the alliance between the fascist Portuguese Government and the racist powers of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; he was seeking assistance by all means in order to consolidate the liberation movement and to prepare for the armed struggle, in the light of the failure of the negotiations seeking a peaceful transition towards the independence of Mozambique with the Government of Salazar. Furthermore, at the political level Mondlane continued to challenge Portugal with discussions and proposals for the decolonization of Africa behind the scenes of the US Government and of the UN.

Apropos the decolonization, Mondlane already had a direct contact with the Kennedy Administration. He felt that the USA were, apparently, in a good position to persuade Portugal, given that this country was heavily dependent on the USA. But, despite such efforts and the progressive voices raised within his own government in favour of political reform conducive to decolonization,<sup>44</sup> Salazar refused to collaborate. Even so, Mondlane was able to conduct a dialogue with the world, using all international forums, of the UN and Non-Aligned Movement, churches and NGOs and, obviously, with the OAU. He managed to meet the NATO countries that supported the Portuguese Government, attempting to persuade them to condemn Portugal, while he was mobilizing support for the cause of the liberation struggle, via local activist movements, unions and groups of the Socialist International.<sup>45</sup> the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, England, West Germany, Italy and Eastern Block, including the two rivals, China and the Soviet Union. All were approached.

(42) Interview with Salésio Teodoro (Maputo, 9th December 2008).

(43) Interview with Salésio Teodoro (Maputo, 9th December 2008).

(44) This was the case of Adriano Moreira.

(45) This combination of efforts has contributed to mobilizer volunteers who gave their collaboration in activities in the areas of education and health in Kurasini, Bagamoyo and M'twara, as well as distribution of clothes, school materials, medicines, etc.

To FRELIMO, China and the Soviet Union were the closest friends and, consequently the support from these two countries, despite the Sino-Soviet animosities.<sup>46</sup> Consequently, the support from these two countries grew considerably, while other friendly countries were providing humanitarian assistance, specially from the Red Cross and were doing propaganda work and organized diplomatic efforts to isolate the fascist Portuguese government. LIFEMO, the Mozambican Women's League<sup>47</sup> made up in the majority by the spouses of the FRELIMO leaders organized visits abroad seeking support for the social and humanitarian assistance, such as in Education and child care.

The key institution for the mobilization of human and material resources for the different social activities was the *Instituto Moçambicano*, founded by Eduardo Mondlane and his wife Janet Mondlane. They both met each other and married when they were leaving in the USA. The couple developed strong international links and they both worked together for the liberation of Mozambique. In addition to providing secondary education, through the Institute, Janet Mondlane played a key role in the creation of the Tunduru Centre and in the support for the women and children in the south of Tanzania, which key activity was Education, and to the FRELIMO Hospital in M'twara, also in the south of Tanzania. However, the devotion of Janet Mondlane towards the education of the Mozambicans was encouraged by Eduardo Mondlane, in the early 1960s, before the foundation of FRELIMO, as can be inferred from his statement about these dynamics.

The belief in Education as an instrument for social change was the cornerstone of Mondlane's ideas. In particular, he kept an unshakable belief in Education as an instrument to improve the life of his people.<sup>48</sup>

After their visit to Lourenço Marques, in 1960–1961, the Mondlane couple created a scholarship fund for Mozambicans (Edelweiss Scholarships) in New York, with the support of Peter and Cora Weiss and administered by André-Daniel Clerc, in Mozambique. After visiting Dar-es-Salaam in 1962, Eduardo and Janet Mondlane have decided to initiate a process of education for Mozambican refugees who wanted to proceed with their studies. The *Instituto Moçambicano*, which, at the time of its foundation had Janet Mondlane as its director, has resulted from a long process of drawing up of needs. Legally, the *Instituto* was separate from FRELIMO, which facilitated the receipt of resources channelled by support groups and by Western governments.

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 (46) Ideologically, Mondlane was very independent and would not align himself with this or that country for ideological reasons. All he wanted was support to reach the independence of Mozambique, despite the great difficulties placed by the interests within the context of the Cold War.

(47) LIFEMO was led by Celina Simango, wife of Vice-President Uria Simango. Janet Mondlane was extremely engaged with the *Instituto de Moçambique*, which operated as an NGO, mobilizing resources for schools and social assistance activities.

(48) See the notes supplied to the authors by Janet Rae Mondlane (Maputo July 2009).

The initial support came from the Ford Foundation<sup>49</sup> but thereafter this funding was cancelled for political reasons, with funds being made available by the World Council of Churches<sup>50</sup> (at the time led by Z. K. Matthews of South Africa). The commitment of the Mondlane family for the eradication of illiteracy in Mozambique was demonstrated by a permanent international campaign in search for new funding for educational programs and other social undertakings. That's why Janet would travel across the world with her husband to promote permanent campaigns for the gathering of supports for the *Instituto*. Janet Mondlane confirmed:

The first major funding came from the Swedish Government after we visited Stockholm. Gradually, other governments from the Nordic countries and from support groups started to contribute with funds and material aid. When in 1967 there was a major agitation in the *Instituto* instigated by Uria Simango and by Father Gwenjere, the school was transferred to Bagamoyo (in the coast of Tanzania), but the support of Western governments and friends continued.<sup>51</sup>

According to Janet Mondlane, an interesting result of the gathering of funds by Eduardo Mondlane and from herself, was the development of personal links with members of the Nordic countries governments and The Netherlands. Janet also stated that, under the leadership of Eduardo Mondlane, FRELIMO was seen as a liberation movement with a strong social program tending to set up a democratic governance. Indeed, such links were extended to the political and financial relationships between an independent Mozambique and the Nordic countries.<sup>52</sup>

### **Preparation for the Armed Struggle**

Already in 1963, it became quite clear to FRELIMO that the only way to challenge the colonial government against its continuous repression against the people and against the refusal to grant independence to Mozambique, was the engagement in the armed struggle. Thus, the armed struggle became the key means for the liberation and so the first preparations for training had begun. Mondlane, Marcelino dos Santos, Simango, Joaquim Chissano and Filipe Magaia (Head of the Defence and Security Department) conducted successful diplomatic missions in order to muster supports in money and in kind originated from various sources in Africa, Europe, America and Asia. With the failure of a diplomatic solution with Portugal in the corridors of the USA, especially after the USA had signed the Azores Accord for the establishment of a military base in Portugal, and after President Kennedy's assassination, Mondlane turned his attention to Zhu en Lai's

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(49) According to José Duarte (2009), McGeorge Bundy, ex-Rector of Harvard University was a Director of the Ford Foundation after he left the Kennedy Administration. He said that it was by a decision of President J.F. Kennedy that FRELIMO was receiving financial aid. Indeed, these contacts had been established by Mondlane when he was still working at the academy in the USA and at the UN.

(50) See the notes supplied to the authors by Janet Rae Mondlane (Maputo 2009).

(51) Ibid.

(52) Ibid.

China and to the Western European countries, such as West Germany, Holland and the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Finland).

Mondlane was received in the embassies of the western countries in Dar-es-Salaam, including Israel's and in the embassies of African countries such as Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia<sup>53</sup> of Bourguiba. There were some positive replies particularly from Africa and, in this way, FRELIMO was in a condition to send the first men for military training in Egypt and Algeria<sup>54</sup> and other groups to Israel, China and the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, more support was being sought in order to cover the needs in terms of transport of the freedom fighters and weapons for the maintenance of the training camps and for assistance to the trainees abroad. Other funding needs were related with the support to the combatants of the armed struggle in underground missions hinterland of Mozambique and administrative operations at FRELIMO offices in Dar-es-Salaam and abroad and for the operation of social institutions such as schools and sanitary units. Israel supplied radio and telecommunication equipment of high quality and performance, capable of capturing news from Lourenço Marques and from the Portuguese News agency (*Agência Lusa*) as well as funds for its maintenance. Such equipment was well handled and managed by Mateus Sansão Muthemba. In addition, Israel also provided training for nurses operating at the FRELIMO Hospital; and some combatants received training in first aid skills.

The first contingent to undergo training abroad clearly recalls the experiences they lived, such as in the installation of the FRELIMO training centres in Tanganyika with the support of local authorities. The authorities in Tanganyika had granted spaces for military training to FRELIMO in Bagamoyo, Kongwa and Tunduru. The *Instituto Moçambicano* in Kurasini, Dar-es-Salaam was complementing the training and education programs for the recently arrived. Later, Nachingwea became the FRELIMO's Military Command, while M'twara was hosting the Central Hospital of FRELIMO (Américo Boavida Hospital), the Nursing Training Centre and for other health professionals. Jeremias Nhambire, João Chauúque and Francisco Sumbanawere the first pioneers in this Hospital which also providing assistance in medicines and curative care hinterland of Mozambique. The testimonies of the interviewees systematically describe all such achievements and the way the centres were established, including the crucial role played by Samora Machel in Kongwa and Nachingwea. Lopes

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(53) Tunisia also played an important role as regards financial assistance.

(54) Filipe Magaia was the leader of the first group. He had already served in the Portuguese Army before joining FRELIMO. With his experience, right after the I Congress, in 1962, Mondlane sent him to Algeria for training and preparation of the ground for the training of other Mozambican cadres in 1963. Mondlane and Marcelino played a crucial role in the negotiations with the Government of Ben Bella, aimed at including Mozambicans in military training by Colonel Boumedienne. In the following year, some 18 cadres were deployed to Algeria, followed by two other groups of about 70 men. In June 1963, some returned while others only completed in 1964.

Tembe, who joined the first group sent for training in Egypt, in 1962 and who later worked in Kongwa as a Samora Machel assistant expressed his memories as follows:

At the end of 1962, the first group made up of 15 cadres was sent to Egypt for a six-month training. *Inter alia*, it included Anfal Chilengue, Manuel dos Santos and Zenga Zenga. We were selected because our proficiency in the English language. At that time, I was already learning French in preparation to our stay in Algeria. Our training took place at the Enchasse Military Academy, where we were joined by other comrades from Zimbabwe and South Africa, such as Eric Mujale, Joe Modise, Jack Dliwaho, *inter alia*. We felt ourselves as a group of mutual assistance. When I returned to Dar-es-Salaam, the Kongwa camp was being set up and had been designed to host three movements: FRELIMO, SWAPO and the ANC. There was great solidarity between the movements. Every Friday we would organize cultural activities, including our national dances, poetry, etc. I remember the comrades from the ANC telling us that after liberation they would also help Mozambique to achieve its liberation. As a member of FRELIMO, I was an assistant of Samora Machel, the Commander-in-Chief of the Centre, while Macário LINDOLONDOLO was his Assistant CiC. I was assisting Samora in linguistic terms (English and Swahili) and sometimes I would act as his interpreter. In this way we developed some family links. I even learnt how to cook with Samora. He was a good cook!<sup>55</sup>

Cândido Mondlane, who later became a member of the Central Command and had distinguished himself as a General in Battle against Kaúlza de Arriaga, recalls the experience he shared when FRELIMO set up the bases for the armed struggle:

The first group sent for military training to Algeria was led by Filipe Magaia. But the second group was already formed by people that just arrived from the interior of Mozambique and went to Algeria under the leadership of Samora Machel. A third group was sent to Algeria. Later, a small group of 5 people, led by {Daniel} Xavier Machaheie,<sup>56</sup> was sent to the Soviet Union. In 1964, Filipe Samuel Magaia led a group of eleven people who went to China for military training, myself included [Cândido Mondlane]<sup>57</sup>. In 1964, the three groups sent to Algeria returned to Tanganyika and were charged to open a new training camp in Kongwa. With all the groups having returned to Tanganyika, including the one that had been sent to China in 1964<sup>58</sup> the Party [FRELIMO] decided to launch the armed struggle in that same year. In the beginning, the group consisted of 250 trained men. The decision taken was that the armed struggle was to commence simultaneously on the 25<sup>th</sup> September, in

(55) Interview with Ambassador Lopes Tembe (Maputo, 15th September 2008).

(56) This group included Joaquim Chissano, Wehia Ripua, Fernando Mungaca, amongst others.

(57) Although it had returned after the launching of the armed struggle, in September 1964, the group that had been sent to China played a crucial role in the structuring of the army and in the guerrilla warfare conducted with scientific methods they had learnt in China. The group trained in Nanjing from May to October 1964 included José Moiane, Samuel Paulo Kankhomba, Maria Alfredo Manuel, Francisco Kufa, Sebastião Mabote, Matias Victor, Enoque Muster and Francisco Madengo. During training, the group interacted with groups coming from Latin America and Africa namely, Laurent Khabila, Pierre Mulele and Jonas Savimbi. See Interview with José Moiane (Maputo, 27th August 2007).

(58) Correction: The group that went to China has returned immediately after the launching of the armed struggle. See José Moiane.

Four provinces: Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Zambézia and Tete. The armed struggle had started on the 25th September, 1964.

The work of underground mobilization and of infiltration of weapons had preceded the launching of the armed struggle.<sup>59</sup> Weapons were transported and hidden in fish baskets or petrol jerry cans, mattresses, maize sacs and even bread, and taken to the other side of the border with Tanganyika through Zambia and Malawi. Heavy equipment was transported in trucks from Tanganyika, via Mbeya and Tunduma, in Zambia, and then from there to the border with Mozambique, or via Malawi. Interviews with the freedom fighters reveal the complexity of strategies and mechanisms used to reach the target areas hinterland, through the neighbouring countries, where social networks had been established with common people of the population and through the FRELIMO cells. Bonifácio Gruveta recalls:

When we returned from Algeria, in 1964, we were deployed to Kongwa. A few days later I was chosen for an underground mission in Zambézia (centre of Mozambique). Here, I was then nominated to mobilize and recruit young people. I was also tasked to identify Portuguese positions and the number of Portuguese soldiers and military equipment. In the first mission I was carrying a letter from Eduardo Mondlane to a teacher in Quelimane, a task I accomplished for three times in the same province. At the same time, other colleagues were carrying arms and were infiltrating into strategic positions without my knowledge.

The transport of arms was being done through the borders with Zambia and Malawi, with the support of local communities and FRELIMO networks. In Malawi, the Government had forbidden us to cross the country with weapons. There were several episodes of colleagues that had been arrested in Malawi. Gouveia, Fernando Mungaca and Raul Guezimane arrested right at their first mission.<sup>60</sup> I was also arrested for six months in my first mission. There were various members of the Presidential security services with whom we had maintained some relations and who collaborated with us, by helping us to cross the border into Mozambique. I remember that one of them was married to a Cape-Verdean lady, who was fluent in Portuguese and with whom we would communicate; she influenced her husband to protect us. In fact, he was able to deploy some security agents to protect us while we were crossing with our luggage which consisted of fish bags to cover the AK47s and, generally, carried in bikes. We would act as if we were local suppliers of fish and, sometimes, we would even sell fish to the local population.<sup>61</sup>

The Department of Defence and Security was structured when the first group consisting of Filipe Magaia, Feliciano Gundana and Jeremias Nhambire, returned from their training. But the military structure would have only be set up at national level, to respond to the demands of the armed struggle

(59) These activities were carried out in all provinces, including in the south of Mozambique, by Lopes Tembe. The work of mobilization in Lourenço Marques was very critical.

(60) Jeremias Nhambire (Maputo, 2007) provides a lengthy review about the action that took Mondlane to approach President Kamuzu Banda on this issue, including discussions under the auspices of the UN.

(61) Interview with Bonifácio Gruveta (Maputo, 2008).

developments.<sup>62</sup>

Although Bagamoyo was the first training camp, in 1963, it was in Kongwa that the first military centre would be established in 1964.<sup>63</sup> Kongwa is situated in the central part of Tanzania, far away from the border with Mozambique. With the progress of the armed struggle FRELIMO had asked for a site closer to the border. In 1966, an old farm (Fazenda 17) in Nachingwea located some 100 to 200 km from the Rovuma border was allocated to be used as a military camp. Nachingwea soon became a military fort and a laboratory for the armed struggle of Mozambique with Samora Machel emerging as the charismatic military leader. In addition to military training the combatants would also receive political training, mainly about the importance of unity and definition of enemy. With the increase of the needs for water and food, the military training was combined with the production of vegetables and fruits, fishing and bore drilling. Nachingwea would no longer just be a bush area but it would become a military village having experienced a vibrant development with barracks, bunkers and production fields. Here, for logistical purposes, FRELIMO had the collaboration of Chinese military experts and Tanzanian officers related with the OAU Liberation Committee.

According to the interviewees, cooperation with China was crucial for the training of new cadres, most of whom were illiterate peasants with a strong spirit of the struggle. Compared with the Russian methodology, the Chinese was simple and could easily be understood by illiterate people, given its practical training methods. The Chinese specialists emphasized the mobilization of the masses and the need for a close relation with the people. Within months, the number of trainees had increased from 500 to 5000, which required new strategies to face such demand. However, the military training for women<sup>64</sup> would only be approached from 1967. The Womens' Detachment was created in 1968, consisting of women from Niassa and Cabo Delgado, with Filomena Nachaque as its Commander-in-Chief and Marina Pachinuapa as the Political Commissar.<sup>65</sup>

At the same time, the High Military Command of FRELIMO adopted Chinese strategies and tactics of revolutionary war which emphasized a strong alliance between the action in rural zones and a close alliance with the people. Although FRELIMO had recognized the force of the Portuguese Army, the guerrilla warfare tactics and mass mobilization had given a hope of success, considering that, from the vast territory already opened for the operations, a reasonable part was still

(62) Until 1966, all military issues were treated by the Head of the Department of Defence and Security. Filipe Magaia who, initially, was also responsible for the Bagamoyo Training Camp in coordination with the Tanzanian Army.

(63) While Nachingwea became a FRELIMO stronghold, Kongwa is considered to be the cradle of the SADC. (Southern African Development Community), given the concentration of all the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

(64) The initial steps to encourage women participation were initially taken by the then Head of the Department of Defence and Security, Filipe Magaia. See presentation by Raimundo Pachinuapa (Maputo, 2 nd September 2008). See discussion below.

(65) See further the discussion on the role of women in the liberation struggle.

Under the control of the Portuguese authorities. Thus, given that the preparations for the armed struggle were progressing and training camps had already been set up in Tanzania, the Department of Defence and Security was restructured to face the new challenges.

## The Liberation Struggle in Mozambique

### Dynamics of the Struggle

The armed struggle was launched on the 25th September 1964. Far from the strategy of attacking the Portuguese forces and fleeing away, FRELIMO has organized a large-scale war of the people against the Portuguese armed forces. FRELIMO's Central Committee had given instructions to the guerrilla forces to mount operations in various parts of the country simultaneously. Thus, the armed struggle was launched in four provinces namely, in Niassa, Cabo Delgado, Zambézia and Tete. The official history of the liberation struggle has nominated Joaquim Alberto Chipande as the first commander to commence the struggle in launching the armed struggle in Chai, Province of Cabo Delgado, on the 25th September 1964. Recently, this fact has been challenged within certain sectors of the freedom fighters of the armed struggle who would also want to be recognized. The claim from these former combatants lies on the fact that, for the commencement of the armed struggle, all commanders had received orders to fire the first shots at mid-night of that day in the four provinces that had been selected. In the memories obtained within the scope of this project these issues have been revisited and we explain how these events have occurred, as well as on the difficulties faced on the ground. For example, there were serious organizational and logistical obstacles that have affected the beginning of the armed struggle in the provinces of Zambézia and Tete<sup>66</sup>. The provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado had benefitted better facilities for the execution of guerrilla tactics. That was due to the underground activities of mobilization that took place before the war; to the dense forestry existing in these provinces, which was ideal for the soldiers to hide themselves; to the relatively lower presence of the colonial administration authorities, and to the safe rear-guard in neighbouring countries. The contribution of Algeria with Mauser rifles was determinant for the initial armed struggle. The war equipment supplied by Russia also included Mauser rifles and Thompson machine-guns. Other weapons included Bazooka guns (rocket propelled grenades), heavy artillery, machine-guns and land-mines which complimented FRELIMO's arsenal, offering guarantees for more military victories.

The works *The Struggle for Mozambique* describes the war and its subsequent guerrilla activities in the first three months, as follows:

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(66) Tete and Zambézia could only resume the guerrilla activities much later. Tete, in 1968 and Zambézia, only in 1974. The main reason for such delay was the difficulties in the traffic of arms and logistical support through Zambia and Malawi.

They (the freedom fighters) launched a series of actions on the 25th September, by attacking various administrative and military posts in the Province of Cabo Delgado. In November, the struggle had extended to the provinces of Niassa, Zambézia and Tete, forcing the Portuguese to disperse their troops and to seek to avoid the possibility of a counter-attack. Meanwhile the guerrilla in four provinces at the same time showed that the Portuguese army was not in conditions to organize attacks without leaving its vital positions unprotected. The result of that was that FRELIMO was able to consolidate its strategic position in Niassa and Cabo Delgado, achieving the objective of this first stage of the war. The operational units in Zambézia and in Tete were then withdrawn and regrouped, provisionally, in Niassa and Cabo Delgado in order to increase the offensive capacity of FRELIMO, and ensure the consolidation of the victories obtained in these provinces and to establish a solid base for political and military action. On the other hand, the Portuguese could not withdraw their forces in Tete and Zambézia because, in doing so, they would run the risk of facing a new offensive in these same areas. In this way, the enemy was forced to maintain major contingent immobilized, while all the FRELIMO forces were being put into action.<sup>67</sup>

The Interviews granted by Raimundo Pachinuapa and Alberto Chipande, two distinguished commanders of the liberation struggle, have provided valuable clarification about the launching of the armed struggle in Cabo Delgado. Other testimonies about the armed struggle in other fronts were given by various commanders. They had given detailed information on the dynamics of the struggle, including the description of some battles, the mobilization for the support of the civil population, the discipline within the liberation movement and, naturally, the internal conflicts, misfortunes and setbacks<sup>68</sup> that occurred. Amongst the interviewed commanders there were the names of Daniel Polela (Niassa and Cabo Delgado fronts), Eduardo da Silva Nihia (Niassa, Manica, and Zambézia fronts), José Moiane (Niassa and Tete fronts), Bonifácio Gruveta (Zambézia front), Cândido Mondlane<sup>69</sup> (Military High Command and Commander of Cabo Delgado), Amândio Chongo (Cabo Delgado Front), Johane Jeová (Manica Front), Miguel Ambrósio (Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Zambézia Fronts).

However, the 25th September 1964, the preparations for the guerrilla activities in the South of Mozambique (Inhambane, Gaza and Lourenço Marques) were already ongoing but had eventually failed. Lopes Tembe still recalls having been nominated as the Commander of Lourenço Marques, while the responsibility for the South of Save had been attributed to Joel Maduna Xinana, jointly with Jossefate Machel, Bombarda Matata Tembe, Manjore and Mulhangulo.

(67) Mondlane, Eduardo. *The Struggle for Mozambique*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969: See pp.138-139.

(68) Interviews with Raimundo Pachinuapa Maputo, 2nd September 2008; Alberto Chipande, Maputo, 2th September 2008; Daniel Polela, Nampula, 3rd November 2007; Eduardo da Silva Nihia, Sommerschild, Maputo, 9 – 11th August and 6th September 2007; José Moiane, Maputo, 31st August 2007; Bonifácio Gruveta, (Maputo) 27th May 2007; Cândido Mondlane, Maputo, September 2007; Amândio Chongo, Maputo, 11<sup>th</sup> November 2008; Johane Jeová, Maputo and Manica, 2008 and Miguel Ambrósio Chokwé, Gaza, 21<sup>st</sup> February 2008.

(69) Cândido Mondlane has earned a great reputation within the High Command, due to his tactics and strategies that contributed to defeat Kaúlza de Arriaga, in 1970 during operation “Nó Górdio”.

Unfortunately, this group was arrested by the Portuguese police. Jossefate Machel, who had left Mozambique to Dar-es-Salaam, in 1963, to join FRELIMO was deployed to Algeria and Israel for training. He still recalls the bitter experience that led to the abortion of this mission:

On the 25th September 1964, a group of guerrilla fighters, including Lopes Tembe and myself, was sent to the city of Lourenço Marques (Maputo) with the mission of mobilizing the people and recruit young people for the armed struggle and to open the 4<sup>th</sup> Military Region.<sup>70</sup> In their route the group was in Zambia where it spent some 3 days to join Joel Maduna Xinana, his commander. From Zambia, the group crossed Zimbabwe and entered Mozambique via Espungabera, in the centre of the province of Manica. It was here that this group was arrested by PIDE and taken to the Central Prison of Lourenço Marques.<sup>71</sup>

After its return from training, in China, in October 1964 General José Moiane<sup>72</sup> was appointed sabotage instructor in the military camp of Kongwa, jointly with Daniel Polela and José Macamo. His report on the military operations in Niassa illustrate the experience of the first times of the armed struggle in the north of Mozambique:

After our recovery from an incident with explosives we left the Mpwapwa Hospital in Dodoma, in January 1965, and they deployed us again to Kongwa. In February of the same year we received instructions to prepare to integrate the guerrilla forces at the Niassa Front. On the 1<sup>st</sup> March 1965 we left to Kongwa to Niassa with Sebastião Mabote, Francisco Madengo and another group of about seven men. We were accompanied by the Chief of Defence, Filipe Magaia and by the Chief of the Kongwa camp, Samora Machel. We left Kongwa towards Songwea; we spent 2 days at the Tanzanian Defence Force base (TDF) before we reached the Mbamba Bay, in Lake Nyassa towards Chiwinde, at the border between Tanzania and Mozambique. At that time, the armed struggle already had started under the command of Oswaldo Tazama.

In Chiwinde we were received by the Provincial Commander-in-Chief Oswaldo Tazama and his team. At that time the Portuguese forces had started to intensify their military actions and to bomb villages. That's why our group was going to reinforce the military capacity of our FRELIMO forces. After three days of discussions and assessment of the situation a new Provincial Command was formed. Oswaldo Tazama was the Region Commander of Niassa, António Silva the Chief of Operations and I (José Moiane) became the Assistant-Chief of Operations and Chief of Sabotage, while Fernando Napulula, became the Chief of Logistics and Sebastião Mabote, the Provincial Political Commissar with Jaime Dique as his Assistant.

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(70) The 4th Region covered Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane, southern provinces of Mozambique.

(71) Interview with Jossefate Machel (Maputo, 2007).

(72) Moiane was born in the Gaza Province. He left to Lourenço Marques where he spent his youth seeking for employment and a better education. WE worked in the South African mines where he became familiarized with politics via the political activities of the ANC and of the labour unions. With such experience he returned to Mozambique and worked as a driver and joined the motorists association. It was through this association and from meetings at the Swiss Presbyterian Church that he grew his political conscience until he decided to join FRELIMO in 1963. See Interview with José Moiane (Maputo, 27th August 2009).

Three companies were created: the first one was under the command of Alfredo Maria, the second was under the command of Lambert Laisse, while the third was by Paulo Ngucu. Each company had 30 soldiers. On the fourth day we left to Wikiki by crossing the river and from there Machel and Magaia returned to Kongwa. The following three days were spent to get in touch with members of our underground cells who were providing precise information about the Portuguese military situation in the region, while the population was providing us food. On the 13<sup>th</sup> March we arrived in Mandambuzi, the war zone. Here we were received by the local authorities and by the respective chief with whom our Political Commissar had gone to the local community to get some food. We positioned our military base behind the Mbembe mountain. It was from here that our Chief of Operations, António Silva crossed with a group of Portuguese soldiers who were walking in single file; he could still fire some shots with his Thompson machine-gun and killed a Portuguese soldier while the rest had fled. The Portuguese reaction was quick; they went to bomb the villages and to slaughter the population.

From then, the command of our military operations was sub-divided into three directions: one at the Central Base, next to Lake Niassa, under the command of Tazama; the second, in Mipoxi, under the command of Mabote, and the third in Mandambuzi under my own command (José Moiane). The Mipoxi leadership proved to be a key front since the Portuguese were concentrating their massive military action onto four of our strong military positions (Metangula, Xia, Messumba and Nova Coimbra). My position was also critical, since I had to face the Portuguese ground forces on the administrative post of Kobue as well as the air force and navy. Our recce work had to be done carefully because there were a lot of PIDE agents recruited amongst the population. Rafael Romoja, Sebastião Carataci and Valentim Site were in our recce team.

My first military action was on the 31st March and the 1st April. From the 8th May 1965 we intensified our operations in the three directions. We destroyed many positions and killed Portuguese soldiers using our Thompson machine-guns. We also ambushed them with landmines causing several victims. With Mabote we were able to plant mines along the main routes in Kobue to Mandambuzi, from Mandambuzi to Nova Coimbra and from Kobue to Nova Olivença. The bridge over River Luavissi was also destroyed by the sabotage team of Milagre Mabote, Francisco Matange and Chingamuca. With these actions the Portuguese were confined and prevented from advancing to the areas under our control. Unfortunately, our brave soldiers António Silva, Milagre Mabote and Francisco Matange were killed or captured and tortured to death. With the death of Silva, I assumed the position of Chief of Operations.

After the killing of Filipe Magaia, during a military visit to the Military Region of Niassa, in October 1966, major changes were introduced that led to Samora Machel's appointment as the Chief of Defence, while Joaquim Chissano would become the National Commander-in-Chief of the Army. In the Province of Niassa, the changes in the military structure had been minor changes. Tazama continued to perform the function as Chief of Defence, assisted by Armando Panguene, Sebastião Mabote remained as Political Commissar and I as the Chief of Military Operations. João Alfredo Mutamangue and Maria Manuel completed the structure as the Assistant Chief of Military Operations and Assistant Political Commissar respectively.

The Province of Niassa was then divided into three military regions, the southern one being under the command of Sebastião Mabote, the eastern by Eduardo da Silva Nihia, and the western by Fernando Matavele.<sup>73</sup>

With the development of military action in Niassa, in 1968, it was possible to open the way to the neighbouring provinces of Tete and Zambézia. The success of the first operations in the north of Mozambique this favoured the intensification of recruitment and improvement in the organization of the underground cells and policies of FRELIMO in the hinterland of the country and in neighbouring territories. Indeed, as the war was progressing, the underground political activities in the Centre and in the South were further intensified, jointly with the armed struggle. Many young people were mobilised to FRELIMO, including women. For example, Saia Gaven, born in Mopeia, Zambézia Province, gathered some friends and formed an underground FRELIMO cell. In Harare, where she was working, Gaven had already some exposure to politics, through contacts with Uria Simango in 1960. The two, Simango and Gaven, met by chance at the school where Simango was teaching his compatriots at the night course. In the following year, Gaven had joined ZAPU, Joshua Nkomo's Party. He recalls the time when Simango left Zimbabwe to Tanganyika and later in 1962 was receiving news about the formation of FRELIMO. From then henceforth he would see people who had left Zimbabwe reappearing with news about FRELIMO, mobilizing Mozambicans to set up underground cells. At that time, he started to receive people who were moving from Zimbabwe to Zambia in transit to Tanzania. People in these conditions would be granted shelter, food and other facilities to get to their destinations. It's in this context that he recalls receiving Munhepe, but he decided to leave Zimbabwe to Tanzania only in 1964, as he reports below:

The safe way to travel by train from Bulawayo to Zambia and for us to outsmart PIDE, we used faked documents. From Zambia we proceeded to Mbeya, in Tanzania, where we met a group of young Mozambicans, such as António Palange, José Carlos Lobo, *inter alia*, and we continued our journey with them to Dar-es-Salaam, where we received by Marcelino dos Santos and afterwards transferred to Bagamoyo.<sup>74</sup>

Manuel António studied at the Protestant Church of the American *Mission Board* in the city of Beira. He recalls that it was Uria Simango who instilled in him nationalist ideas before he left for Rhodesia. He stated having met Arão Ngwenya, another nationalist who would talk secretly with people about the armed struggle and the role played by Mondlane, after the Sunday mass.

(73) Interview with José Moiane (Maputo, 27th August 2009) and his autobiography (2009). See also Interview with Rafael José Romodja (Maputo, 24th July 2007).

(74) Interview with Saia Gaven (Nampula, 2007).

In one of such occasions, Manuel António met Pedro Simango who was in Beira in a mission of mobilization of young people to go to Tanzania. It was these circumstances that he decided to leave Mozambique in November 1965. Antonio narrates his departure in the following terms:

I left to Murraça with my wife, guided by Pedro Simango, on the 2<sup>nd</sup> November. In Murraça we were joined by Alfredo Brito Simango and Victorino Simango, their spouses, children and other youngsters. We travelled the whole night until we reached Malawi where we were confronted by PIDE agents. Pedro Simango was able to bribe them to let us go. Thus, we escaped and entered in the train to Blantyre where we were received by Bonifácio Gruveta and Ernesto Celestino. We spent two weeks in Blantyre and, before we restarted our trip, we were again intercepted by PIDE agents but this time the railway station officer didn't even bother to talk to us. From there we left to Chileca and we travelled by boat to Chapala at the border at the border to Tanzania and then we were escorted to Mbeya where Filipe Magaia, Uria Simango and Jaime Sigaúque were awaiting for us to take us to the Bagamoyo Camp. It took us two days to do the trip. In January 1966 we were transferred to Nachingwea, but my wife remained in Bagamoyo. Once the training program was over in Nachingwea in June of the same year, I was deployed to the East of Niassa and integrated in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Company as the Deputy-Commander and, later, I became a Political Commissar.

In June 1968, I returned to Nachingwea to undergo political and military training. The military training was conducted by Chinese instructors, while the political component was done by Francisco Manvanga. After the training I was sent once again to Bagamoyo to proceed with my studies up to standard 4. That was before my departure to continue my specialist recce training in Russia.

In 1970 I returned to Dar-es-Salaam to go back to the East of Niassa, accompanied by wife, and assumed my duties as Chief of Reconnaissance. At that time, the National Chief of Recce Operations was Pedro Odallah.<sup>75</sup>

Another experience which was reported dates back to the year of 1964 and it involves Armando Emílio Guebuza, the current Head of State of Mozambique. During the liberation struggle,<sup>76</sup> Guebuza the Head of the Education and Culture Department and, later he became a Political Commissar. In 1963 he couldn't reach Tanganyika because he was arrested in Victoria Falls by the Rhodesian Forces and PIDE agents. In December 1964 he left Lourenço Marques with Angelo Chichava and Sidónio Bila, managing to cross Swaziland, South Africa, Botswana and Zambia before he reached Dar-es-Salaam. In Swaziland, nurses Aurélio Manave and Francisco Langa joined Guebuza and travelled to Dar-es-salaam. Guebuza had been an active member of NESAM and participated in the formation of FRELIMO underground cells in the early 1960s. He also interacted with Mozambicans who were exiled in Swaziland with whom he formed important networks which facilitated the passage of Mozambicans in

(75) Interview with Manuel António, former Minister of Home Affairs Beira 2007)

(76) Interview with Armando Emílio Guebuza (Maputo, 2nd August 2007).

neighbouring countries en route to Tanganyika. Amongst this group of Mozambicans were António Sumbana, Amós Mahanjane, Fabião Siteo, Milagre Muthemba, Muheti Mbazima, inter alia. When Guebuza was arrested by the PIDE in his attempt to escape in 1963, he was accompanied by Josina Muthemba (Machel), Milagre Mazuze, Angelo Chichava, Mariana Isabel Fumo and Elizabeth Cristina Tembe.

In the period between 1964 and 1974, many combatants were incorporated in the new FRELIMO training camps, in Tanganyika and hinterland of Mozambique. The training was very intensive and there was a lot of activity at the bases. In Cabo Delgado the mobilization of people was conducted by *Chairmen* supported by political commissars. With the progress of the armed struggle in the hinterland of Mozambique the military action was combined with the political mobilization with the objective of ensuring the support of the local communities including that of the chiefs of the villages. We interviewed various persons who joined FRELIMO after the launching of the armed struggle who told us that they had been recruited by freedom fighters of the liberation struggle within the scope of the mobilization campaigns for new members<sup>77</sup>. During such campaigns chiefs, teachers and missionaries were deeply politicised and, in turn, they would play the role of mobilizers of more people to join FRELIMO, mainly through the Catholic missions of Murraça (Sofala), Nangololo (Cabo Delgado) and Zobwè (Tete). The Catholic Mission of M'twara hosted and cared for the students who had fled from Mozambique via the border with Tanganyika.<sup>78</sup> During this period the production and education were operating in parallel as activities conceived and integrated in the political and ideological training for the armed struggle. The production activities were carried out in the Tunduru and Bagamoyo centres, while the educational one was being done in both centres and at the Instituto Moçambicano, in Dar-es-Salaam, where there were many young people that joined FRELIMO.

As a result of the progress in the armed struggle, in 1966, at a meeting of the Central Committee, it was decided that the Army had to be re-organized, with the creation of a High Command of the Army who would operate from a headquarter centre. Accordingly, FRELIMO decided to create the National Command Council headed by the Secretary of the Defence Department (DD) consisting of fourteen people, including the Chief of the Defence Department and respective Deputy-Chief who would accumulate this function with that of a Political Commissar of the Army and twelve other chiefs of army sectors, namely: Military Operations; Recruitment and Training of cadres; Logistics (Supplies); Reconnaissance; Communications and Signals; Information and Publications (which was publishing the military journal: *25 de Setembro*);

(77) Several interviews were obtained expressing such opinions, mostly, in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa, Tete, Manica e Sofala.

(78) See Interview with Roque Vicente Chooly, current Secretary-General of the Association of Former Combatants of the Liberation Struggle (Maputo) 14<sup>th</sup> March, 2008).

Administration; Finance; Health, Political Commissariat; Personnel; Military Security. The National Army Command was based in Nachingwea and the meetings of the National Council of the Military Command took place in two weeks headed by the President and Vice-President of FRELIMO. In the absence of these two figures, the Defence Secretary would preside at the meetings and had to ensure a close coordination between the political and military activities, in the intervals of the meetings of the Central Committee.<sup>79</sup>

The seat of the National Army Command was in Tanzania but all the members of the National Army worked in close collaboration with the guerrilla commanders and regularly visited the combat sites in the interior of Mozambique. As the struggle was progressing, in each province, the army was being structured into three areas with a Provincial Chief of Military Operations who was also replacing the Provincial Secretary of FRELIMO, the Provincial Political Commissar who would accumulate the Deputy Chief of MO with that of Head of the Womens' Detachment. The Peoples Militias were complementing the Army. Indeed, FRELIMO did not distinguish the army from the militias in that the latter constituted a vital link between the people and the guerrilla fighters. The position of political commissar was indispensable as a guarantee for the mobilization of the people towards the revolutionary war and for the political awareness of the guerrilla forces. In the process of building the Army, FRELIMO's fundamental principle consisted in placing it under the leadership of the Party. Therefore, the Party was at the same time organizing and educating the Army and the latter became the school of the people, by organizing several specific programs for the training of the population on subjects guided towards the armed struggle. In fact, by becoming an important part of the people, the Army was participating in its social activities, including the production and enhancement of the political conscience.<sup>80</sup> in addition to the departments of Education, Health, Agriculture and Trade which were an integral part of the provincial structure.

With the advancement of the armed struggle, FRELIMO was increasingly gaining international recognition thanks to the strategies of propaganda and diplomacy adopted by it in the local mobilization and to earn foreign support. In the execution of these efforts the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies set up the Communication Office in Algeria via the CONCP,<sup>81</sup> in 1967. In Tanzania, FRELIMO had created four branches of the Information Bureau in Dar-es-Salaam, Mbeya, Songea and M'twara led by Joaquim Chissano.<sup>82</sup>

(79) It is important to note that, like in various other departments, the Army was operating in conformity with the decisions of the Central Committee (CC). The leaders of the Army were also members of the CC who contributed with decision making.

(80) In fact, Mondlane was conscious of the Chinese experience about the relationship between the Army, the Party and the People, and applied some good experiences as long as they would fit the concrete reality of Mozambique. See also: Anonymous. *Eduardo Mondlane*. London: Panaf Books, 1972: See pp.52-63.

(81) The CONCP acted as a platform of consultations of African nationalists from the Portuguese colonies in order to mobilize international support towards the isolation of the Portuguese colonial regime and for the creation of a safe rear-guard for the liberation struggle.

The magazine *Mozambique Revolution*, the newspaper *25 de Setembro* the radio stations in Dar-es-Salaam, Lusaka and Moscow, and even in Accra, have contributed to the propagation of the activities of the liberation struggle in Mozambique. Amour Zacarias Kupela, the current High-Commissioner of Mozambique in Tanzania, recalls his contribution in the *Voz da Revolução* and in the magazine *Mozambique Revolution*, coordinated by Jorge Rebelo. Initially, Kupela was doing his work in representation of FRELIMO in Zanzibar since 1964, responsible for the reproduction of FRELIMO news to the militants in that region, in Swahili. From 1969, already in Dar-es-Salaam, his task included the drafting and translation into English and Swahili, as well as the printing of the newspaper. In the work process Kupela had to hear the international news broadcast by the *Voice of America*, *BBC*, Chinese and Soviet radio stations, amongst other news agencies of the world. In 1971, Kupela worked at the Political Commissariat in Nachingwea to propagate news about the FRELIMO achievements, through wall newspapers<sup>83</sup> (*Jornal de Parede*). The difficulties the Portuguese had faced as the struggle progressed in the first three years of the struggle can be assessed in the following terms:

By the mid-1965, the FRELIMO forces were already operating with units of a company size and, in 1966, the companies were already organized in battalions. In 1967, the FRELIMO Army already had some 8000 men trained and equipped, excluding the people's militias and the trained recruits that weren't yet armed. (...) within 3 years FRELIMO increased by 32 times the size of its combat forces. On the Portuguese side, the constant increase in the size of their Army and military budget proved the impact of the war they were facing. In 1964, there were some 35 000 Portuguese soldiers in Mozambique and, by the late 1967, there were some 65 000 to 70 000 men. By the mid-1967, the National Assembly, in Lisbon, approved a law reducing the age of conscription to 18 years and expanded the military service to three years, or even to four, in "special cases". In the beginning of 19668, even those that previously had been deemed inapt for military service, such as the deaf, dumb and physically disabled would be mobilized, and women could also be admitted for such service.<sup>84</sup>

Despite all the support Portugal received from NATO in terms of military equipment, FRELIMO inflicted serious blows to the Portuguese soldiers. During the period between 1965 and a good part of 1966, FRELIMO was already controlling most of the villages and localities in the North of Mozambique, while the Portuguese presence was confined to the cities and to a small number of fortified bases. The main roads were the object of clashes between FRELIMO and the Portuguese, who were using them to transport soldiers and supplies, while FRELIMO was laying landmines and mounting ambushes. In addition, with the consolidation of FRELIMO military actions in the second half of 1966, the guerrilla

(82) Interview with Joaquim Chissano (Malehice, 15th August 2007).

(83) Interview with Amour Zacarias Kupela (Dar-es-Salaam, 22nd June 2007).

(84) Mondlane, Eduardo. *The Struggle for Mozambique*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1969: See pp.139-140.

forces were already capable of attacking Portuguese military bases. By the end of 1967 the guerrilla forces had attacked some forty bases in the Provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, captured military weapons of the MG type, grenades and other equipment, forcing the Portuguese to withdraw. For example, in September 1967, FRELIMO launched an attack with rockets and bombed heavily the Mueda air force base in Cabo Delgado, which had been considered an extremely important target and, as such, under strong surveillance by the Portuguese forces, with five airplanes completely destroyed on the ground.<sup>85</sup>

Amândio Chongo, Commander of Artillery recalls that in 1967, his team shot down eight aircraft at the Portuguese base of Ngungunyana.<sup>86</sup> It is estimated that some 10 000 Portuguese soldiers had died or been injured in 1967, thus confirming the FRELIMO successes on the battle ground. Some other 7000 Portuguese soldiers had fled or abandoned the Army, while some would have directly deserted to the FRELIMO forces because of their opposition to the Salazar regime. Furthermore, others would also challenge their superiors by refusing to patrol places where they knew were under the strong influence of FRELIMO. A communique about the action of FRELIMO, dated the 2nd August 1967, as confirmed by a Portuguese radio station stated:

Three aircraft and an ammunition magazine totally destroyed; the fuel depot was burnt out, almost all houses near the airfield in ruins; dozens of Portuguese soldiers killed or injured; this happened in Mueda in a rocket attack launched by the FRELIMO forces on the 2<sup>nd</sup> August. The fire lasted two days.<sup>87</sup>

In 1967, the Province of Cabo Delgado was completely under the control of FRELIMO and the capital city, Porto Amélia, was surrounded. In addition, the war progress in the Province of Niassa and towards the region between Tete and Zambézia, particularly in the Catur area, under the control of FRELIMO, favoured the advancement of the struggle in 1968 and, in Tete, eventually the Zambézia province, two important economic regions in terms of agricultural and mineral resources.

It is important to highlight that these victories would have not been achieved without the participation of the population and without the unity of the People and the guerrilla forces. This was also emphasized by Amândio Chongo in stating that: “despite the efforts of the Portuguese to divide the People of Cabo Delgado on ethnic lines, FRELIMO was able to mobilize the people on the importance of unity”. Chong also highlighted that in Cabo Delgado there were commanders of all regions and who played an important role in the liberation struggle, of which

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(85) For further details about the attacks see Eduardo Mondlane *The Struggle for Mozambique*: See p.155.

(86) Interview with Amândio Chongo, (Maputo, the 4th November 2008).

(87) Mondlane, Eduardo. *The Struggle for Mozambique*: See p.151.

one could mention Daniel Polela of Niassa, Enoque Mavota of Maputo, Cândido Mondlane and Fernando Matavele, both from Gaza.<sup>88</sup>

The armed struggle was seen as a wide scale struggle of the popular masses. In fact, the political mobilization on the objectives and importance of the armed struggle was crucial in attracting young people to FRELIMO and, more importantly, to foster the unity of the combatants from different regions and ethnic groups in the country, fighting in a common ground, regardless of their origin, place of birth and provenance. This approach was important in combating the psychological war driven by the Portuguese with the chief objective of forcing or persuading the population to abandon their support to FRELIMO, or even to leave the areas under its control to be moved to the so-called *aldeias protegidas*,<sup>89</sup> as named by the Portuguese. Indeed, in 1966 and 1967, the Portuguese had organized intense propaganda campaigns through the radio and through pamphlets in Portuguese and local languages. The propaganda in the pamphlets described “the conditions of hunger and misery existing in the FRELIMO areas, and the prosperous and comfortable life in territories controlled by the Portuguese.”<sup>90</sup> However, via the political mobilization, the population was able to understand and opt for the best part of the conflict. The following declaration is from the Central Committee issued on the 25th September 1967, as quoted in *The Struggle for Mozambique*:

There are many difficulties. The guerrilla fighters, sometimes, have to spend the whole day without eating, sleeping and in the cold and, sometimes, they have to walk for days, even weeks, to effect an attack to a target, or to set up an ambush....The people have also suffered during this stage of the struggle, because the enemy had intensified their repression, seeking to terrorize the population and to stop their support to the guerrillas. There are many difficulties. The battle for liberation is not an easy one. But for the freedom we want to achieve this sacrifice is worthwhile.<sup>91</sup>

FRELIMO was always aware of the challenges in a protracted war and that this was the only way to improve the social conditions in order to reach for a better life. Women and the guerrilla forces had joined together for the efforts for mobilization, including their participation in the education and production with the population. As discussed further on, the women played an active role in politics and in the management of the popular militias, as well as in the guerrilla units, including the performance of women military instructors of men. During this period, the role of the political commissars in the military fronts proved vital for the political and awareness mobilization of the populations and guerrillas. In 1970, Armando Guebuza, then Inspector for Education, replaced Raimundo Pachinuapa in the position of National Political Commissar.

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(88) Interview with Amândio Chongo (Maputo, 4th November 2008).

(89) These villages were surrounded by barbed wire and protected by the Portuguese troops, following the example of the French resettlement camps in Algeria and in the US villages in Vietnam.

(90) See further in Eduardo Mondlane. *The Struggle for Mozambique*: See pp.156-157.

(91) *Idem*: See p.157.

In assuming the combined functions of National Political Commissar and that of Education Inspector, Gebuza could develop strong links between the soldiers and the population and contributing, in this way, for the progress of the liberation struggle until the defeat of the Portuguese. The armed struggle lasted nearly ten years and was marked by various experiences and difficulties, some of which due to the personal ambitions of the leaders. In 1970, the defeat of the Portuguese in the “Nó Górdio” battle has enhanced the morale of the FRELIMO guerrillas and has given them more confidence in the victory and recapture of the independence of Mozambique.

### **Liberated Zones, Conflicts and the Emergence of a New Society**

In 1968, FRELIMO had already liberated some villages and communities in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Liberated Zones (*Zonas Libertadas*) were deemed those areas where operations and administrative structures of the enemy were practically paralyzed. FRELIMO was creating new forms of living in accordance to its ideology. In these areas, the Portuguese ground troops did not have any form of moving around because the guerrilla fighters were making their access impossible and the security network of the communities was alerting FRELIMO of any presence of the Portuguese. Semi-Liberated Zones (*Zonas Semi-Libertadas*) was the name given to those areas where the enemy was losing ground despite some of its military operations being continued on the ground. New political structures were introduced, acting as the rear-guard for the armed struggle and for the building of a new society free from colonialism. Lopes Tembe underlines that almost all localities on the border with Zambia and Malawi were under the control of FRELIMO and where the Portuguese would only pass these areas by flying past them.<sup>92</sup>

The liberated zones operated as a military government, taking care of the administrative tasks and military obligations. The commander acted as a Governor and as a Political Commissar. *Estudar, Produzir e Combater* (To Study, Produce and Combat) were the key words of the day for the political mobilization in the liberated communities. The liberated villages were being progressively used as a laboratory for the functioning of the future democratic and socialist State that would be established following independence. Education, agriculture, health and political mobilization became the ingredients for the development of a revolutionary society, depicted by the creation of the *Homem Novo* (New Man). In fact, in the liberated areas FRELIMO was a free government operating in Mozambican territory and not in exile. The colonial administration and its practices had to be replaced, meaning that there was no longer a repressive administration, heavy taxes and forced labour. The capitalist regime had to be replaced by a new one, consistent to the ideals of the revolution in which the power was devolved to the People. Thus, soon the liberated zones were infested by internal conflicts between the political leadership, especially from those that were advocating the social revolutionary change and those that were resisting against such change.

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(92) Interview with Ambassador Lopes Tembe, (Maputo, 15th October 2008).

From 1966, the Portuguese authorities intensified the infiltration of spies through PIDE and began instigating the internal conflicts within FRELIMO and between the Makwas and the Makondes, especially in the liberated areas; and promoted anti-communist propaganda addressed to the Makonde Catholic community. While at the same time introducing some social reforms, the Portuguese government was also intensifying the recruitment of Mozambican soldiers for their Army and was introducing African spies at PIDE, to be infiltrated in FRELIMO in the cities, villages and neighbouring countries. This effort has resulted in assassin activities within the movement, as witnessed by the killing of Filipe Magaia in 1966.

As a consequence of external and internal factors, FRELIMO was being continuously afflicted by conflicts, especially between the civilian politicians and the freedom fighters. The “politicians” wanted to control the liberated areas, but they were losing ground in favour of the guerrilla fighters.<sup>93</sup> Nationalists such as Lázaro Kavandame and Father Gwenjere, allied to the political ambiguity of Simango were committed to plant internal divisions. From the interior of Mozambique the conflicts had expanded up to the *Instituto Moçambicano* coupled by the political ambiguity of Simango, where several hundred students were forced to abandon their studies, fleeing to Kenya and other places.<sup>94</sup> These conflicts fanned racism and tribalism, having culminated with the expulsion of white militants and the killing of various nationalists, including Francisco Manyanga, in 1968 and of the First FRELIMO President, Eduardo Mondlane, in 1969. Although it was a painful setback, the killing of Mondlane gave strength to the guerrilla fighters to emulate his commitment to liberate Mozambique, continuing with the armed struggle until the expulsion of the Portuguese colonial authorities.<sup>69</sup> According to Raimundo Pachinuapa,

During the period of 1966/68 the PIDE had intensified the infiltration of spies within FRELIMO, instigating conflicts between the guerrilla fighters and those that were merely dealing with political matters. The “politicians” were claiming the administration of the liberated villages not linked with the armed struggle. Some had even suggested the claiming of independence of these areas. Lázaro Kavandame, who played a key role in the mobilization of people to the armed struggle in Cabo Delgado, was already supporting the idea of Cabo Delgado declaring its independence from Portugal in order, from there, to launch a conventional war against the Portuguese. Given its unrealistic nature, Mondlane could not agree with such proposition. Disappointed because his idea had not been entertained, Kavandame started to mobilizing some members of his team against the FRELIMO’s leadership position. Shortly before the II Congress, Mondlane had visited various liberated villages when Kavandame accused him of manipulating the militants to vote for him during the Congress and told the FRELIMO President that such procedure was dishonest. Following such accusation, he insinuated that I (Pachinuapa) had been instructed by Mondlane to kill him.

(93) This point was highlighted by General Raimundo Pachinuapa, Military Commander at the Cabo Delgado Front.; See interview (Maputo, 3<sup>rd</sup> September 2008).

(94) Roque Chooly and Bonifácio Gruveta have provided a very detailed report of these events; See the Interviews given by them (Maputo, 2008).

(95) Mondlane is remembered for being the precursor of the Mozambican units and the key actor of the political consistency of FRELIMO.

It was in this context that Father Gwenjere used the *Instituto Moçambicano*, in Dar-es-Salaam, where he was teaching, to disseminate his sentiments against the whites. Contrary to the anti-racist policy of FRELIMO, to Gwenjere the white people were Portuguese and, thus, they should have not been permitted to join FRELIMO, because they were agents of the Portuguese colonialism. Gwenjere instigated the students not to join the armed struggle because they had been trained to rule the country and not to fight in the bush as peasants. The conflict was worsening and has culminated with a major agitation within the student community, to the point of threatening the white teachers, urging them to leave school. The confusion remained and the attacks reached the FRELIMO offices in Dar-es-Salaam. The white teachers, such as Jacinto Veloso, Helder Martins and Fernando Ganhão were then expelled from Tanzania in 1966.<sup>96</sup>

This explanation demonstrates the point at which the progress of the armed struggle and the emergence of liberated zones brought ideological conflicts and stimulated the debate about the struggle of classes as the new society was being planned where the people's power would be exercised against the elitist and exploitative society. Thus, the liberated areas were at the centre of the crystalizing the liberation struggle. The II Congress solved these issues and defined the way forward.

### The II Congress of 1968

The II Congress took place between the 25th to 28th July 1968, hinterland of Mozambique at the village of Matchedge, Province of Niassa, a few km from the border of the Rovuma, tried to solve these conflicts. In fact, before the holding of the II Congress, President Eduardo Mondlane visited the liberated areas and discussed the developments of the war with the combatants and populations of Niassa and Cabo Delgado. At the end of his visit he was convinced about the progress of the armed struggle and stated: "even if I die, the revolution will triumph".<sup>97</sup> So, he then has decided that the II Congress would have to take place hinterland of Mozambique, not only for a demonstration of FRELIMO's strength, but also to publish the progress at the international level.<sup>98</sup> However, it was Samora Machel, then Chief of the Defence Department, to decide to organize the II Congress at Niassa,<sup>99</sup> after an assessment on the security situation he made with Oswaldo Tazama, Commander of Niassa and Pachinuapa, Commander of Cabo Delgado.

The Congress was attended by some 150 participants and almost all of the Mozambican provinces were represented. The three provinces in which the struggle was already intense (Tete, Niassa and Cabo Delgado) had to be represented by 18 delegates, nine of which civilians and the other nine military members.

(96) Presentation by Raimundo Pachinuapa (Maputo, 24th September 2008).

(97) This expression often served to enhance the combat readiness of the guerrilla fighters.

(98) Indeed, the coverage of the II Congress by foreign journalists from the Nordic countries and from the UK gave visibility and notoriety to FRELIMO's struggle before the international public opinion, contributing for greater solidarity in favour of the struggle and for the isolation of the Portuguese government. Exceptional coverage was given, for example, by Basil Davidson.

(99) Presentation by Raimundo Pachinuapa (Maputo, 24 the September 2008).

In addition to Cabo Delgado, the other two provinces were represented by designated delegates. The Province of Cabo Delgado, where the armed struggle was at a more advanced stage was represented solely by military people, as the civilians had placed themselves as separatists or opposition politicians by planting divisions. Meanwhile, the Congress re-elected Eduardo Mondlane as President of FRELIMO and Uria Simango as his Vice-President; it created new structures with clear directives for the continuation of the political mobilization and of the armed struggle. Samora Machel was confirmed as the Chief of the Department of Defence and the Commander-in-Chief of the guerrilla forces. Machel's leadership was emerging through his military and political skills in Nachingwea and in the hinterland of Mozambique. The interviewees still recall with pride the role played by Samora Machel during the liberation struggle.

Amongst the decisions that came out of the Congress, one should highlight the election of the new members of the Central Committee which included some members of Kavandame's group of opposition, to ensure unity.<sup>100</sup> This event restored the movement's credibility and was considered to be the "Congress of Victory" by the revolutionary group. It also contributed to raise the morale of the freedom fighters of the liberation struggle and, at the same time, identified the internal enemy and the strategy to deal with the prevailing situation. In order to re-establish the unity with all parties, Mondlane convened an emergency meeting with the Kavandame dissident group in August 1968, in M'Twara, with the help of TANU. This meeting lasted four days and uncovered Kavandame's ambition to declare the independence of Cabo Delgado and to break up from FRELIMO as, apparently, he wasn't happy with Mondlane's leadership. In fact, he was losing ground in opposing the guerrillas led by young commanders such as Raimundo Pachinuapa and Alberto Chipande. But TANU's intervention led to Kavandame's giving up his unrealistic ambitions and to accept the decisions taken at the conference, but he then immediately after abandoned the liberation struggle and joined the Portuguese ranks.<sup>101</sup>

### **The Progress of the Struggle after the II Congress**

After the death of Mondlane, in 1969, a triumvirate made up by Uria Simango, Marcelino dos Santos and Samora Machel was elected to lead FRELIMO. At that time, Samora was simultaneously the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and the virtual leader of the movement. With the advancement of the struggle, the conflicts within the movement increased and two ideological currents began demarcating and competing amongst themselves to gain followers in the interior of Mozambique. It became equally and increasingly clear that Simango was playing an ambiguous role and was accused of favouring the Kavandame group to the prejudice of the revolutionary changes that were underway. The revolutionary line, led by Samora Machel, had a great support amongst the guerrilla fighters.

(100) Presentation by Raimundo Pachinuapa (Maputo, 24th September 2008).

(101) Moiane, Armando Pedro. *Datas e Documentos da História da FRELIMO: de 1960 a 1975*. 3<sup>rd</sup> Edition. Maputo: 2006: See pp.96-97.

The revolutionary changes became sources of conflict because they challenged the ruling power and the traditional customs such as in regard to the position of women in the struggle. So, both Kavandame and Simango were increasingly being isolated from the revolutionary line and from the freedom fighters in the interior of Mozambique. The conflicts reached the highest point when leading members such as Kavandame, Gwenjere and Simango left FRELIMO in the early 1970, Kavandame decided to collaborate with the Portuguese and Simango left for Cairo, in Egypt. After Simango left FRELIMO, Samora Machel was appointed Chairman of the movement with Marcelino dos Santos as his Vice-Chairman.

The successes achieved through the political and armed struggle contributed to COREMO's isolation (also MORECO), a coalition of dissident parties based in Zambia, but barely without any effect<sup>102</sup> in Mozambique. The diplomatic actions in the region and at international level helped to identify FRELIMO as the sole liberation movement to be recognized as such. The humanitarian manner in which FRELIMO treated its Portuguese prisoners and injured, the cooperation maintained with international humanitarian institutions such as the Red Cross helped to improve the image of the movement internationally, in contrast with the massacres of the people in the villages, as well as the execution of the FRELIMO fighters by the Portuguese, including civilians linked to the churches, such as the case of Zedequias Manganhela

On May, 1968, a group of FRELIMO soldiers, led by José Moiane<sup>103</sup> was sent to North Korea (Democratic Republic of Korea) to be trained in new tactics and strategies to face the challenges of the advancement of the armed struggle, especially in the region of Tete. As mentioned above, the war in Tete had to be interrupted immediately after it started, on September 1964, due to lack of logistics.<sup>104</sup> However, with the progress obtained in the provinces of Niassa and Cabo Delgado, and with the ongoing support and available from Zambia regarding the traffic of military equipment, the conditions were created for the military action to be resumed. Tete was, and still is, a strategic region, given the abundance of its mineral resources and because of the Cahora Bassa power dam, in addition to its agriculture and the vast Zambezi valley. Tete was also a Portuguese stronghold, perceived to be a barrier against FRELIMO's armed incursions towards the South. The preparations for the launching of armed actions were already ongoing since 1967. Francisco Manyanga had been appointed as the Provincial Secretary of FRELIMO, Andre Moyo the Political Commissar and Pascoal Nhampule the Chief of Operations. In 1968, another group led by Eduardo Tomé was dispatched to Tete, including Aleixo Malunga, Cara Alegre Tembe, amongst others.

(102) Apart from some sporadic attacks to the Portuguese, COREMO proved to be too weak to challenge FRELIMO which was better organized. Furthermore, its military activity aimed Portuguese civilians and not Portuguese soldiers or institutions. Once, in the early 1960, COREMO men killed five Portuguese civilians close to the border with Zambia, and this caused problems. The Portuguese complained and threatened to retaliate against Zambia. The Zambian authorities were upset with the attitude of this movement to kill civilians.

(103) The description that follows was extracted from an interview with José Moiane 31<sup>st</sup> August, 20017) and from his autobiography (2009).

(104) This operation was led by Lemos Gouveia.

In 1969, immediately after the assassination of Mondlane, Samora Machel, in his capacity as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, appointed José Moiane as the new Chief of Military Operations in the Province of Tete, given his experience and military skills. His company entered Tete, in May 1969, through Lusaka and coming from Tunduru. They spent some time in Zambia, for preparations with the Zambian Defence Force. Moiane arrived in Tete with some 80 men and joined the group of soldiers already operating therein, with Pascoal Nhampule as Chief of Defence, Tomé Eduardo and João Aleixo Malunga, as Chief of Security and Reconnaissance respectively. José Moiane had decided to move his squadron, by establishing his base next to the Cahora Bassa Dam, at the Chibueta village, where there were 5 Portuguese military posts. These posts were attacked in Macuio, Chipera, Chiringa and Cantina de Oliveira. Here, he established the provincial base, from where military incursions were organized for other fronts. The Province was divided into four military sectors: three to the north of the Zambezi River and another, the 4<sup>th</sup> sector, south of the same river. In Tete there were also freedom fighters from the ANC and ZANU, who were mostly concentrated in the 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Military Sectors.

The 4th Sector was decisive in the Portuguese soldiers defeat in conjunction with the Rhodesian army. Under these conditions, the Zimbabwean fighters could already use this strategic position for their own training and then from there to launch armed actions hinterland in Zimbabwe. It was also noted that the Mozambican activists were arriving at the areas dominated by FRELIMO in increasing numbers. There were young courageous guerrilla fighters who had already their advanced military training, recruited amongst students. Amongst them was António Hama Thay, who joined the movement in 1969.<sup>105</sup> He left the city of Beira along with 14 other comrades, including Diniz Goto, Daniel Gundana, Jaime Matare, Jossefate Mulhanga, José Simango, inter alia. This group received training in Nachingwea by Fernando Matavele, before undergoing training Artillery in Arusha in 1972. In Tete, the Portuguese Army was very well equipped with modern artillery, 60 to 80 mm rockets, while the Air Force had Fiat and Dakota aircraft, helicopters and *Berliet* trucks, as well as navy forces.

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(105) Hama Thay left Beira and entered in Malawi with 14 people who joined Agostinho Madimba, who had come from Malawi to take his family and to recruit more youngsters. In Malawi they operated FRELIMO underground cells. They were received by Pedro Chipene and Lambrósio Chabuquene, in Bangue, and had the protection of Canhamachume, a local security agent from Malawi who collaborated with FRELIMO. See interview with Antonio Hama Thay (Maputo, 18<sup>th</sup> May, 2007).

Despite all that equipment and the forcing people to live in confined settlements, FRELIMO was able to inflict serious defeats to the Portuguese and by placing landmines on the roads. When, in 197, the Portuguese army launched Operation “*Nó Górdio*”, some tough battles were fought with many casualties for either side, specially caused by landmines. It was during this period that Armando Tivane, a national hero, then Political Commissar, was killed in Tete. In the following years the guerrilla fighting progressed and expanded which almost ended with the military operation prompted by the Portuguese General Kaulza de Arriaga. But thanks to its acute guerrilla tactics, FRELIMO was able to defeat the Portuguese army.<sup>106</sup>

### **Kaulza de Arriaga’s Operation “*Nó Górdio*” and the turning point**

Kaulza de Aguiar’s military offensive, in 1970, was the turning point in the liberation struggle in Mozambique<sup>107</sup>. In that period, FRELIMO had many cadres with a high combative spirit trained in Russia and other countries. However, Tanzania’s military support in the form of military equipment, weapons and other facilities had to be enhanced. It was during this period that Samora Machel requested the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, for more support in weapons and ammunition. Nyerere undertook to render the necessary support and, in this respect, nominated General Miricho Sarakika to coordinate FRELIMO. Thus, Sarakika, Mafuda, and Hashim Mbita of the Liberation Committee of the OAU were invited to visit the battle grounds in Mozambique’s territory, in Cabo Delgado, in order to assess the military equipment requirements.<sup>108</sup>

The Portuguese made a massive military investment in the ‘*Nó Górdio*’ Battle; they used all the means to eliminate FRELIMO, including heavy artillery, air force and chemical weapons such as napalm. The fighting lasted nearly 7 months, from May to November, 1970, and reached their climax in June and July. Operation ‘*Nó Górdio*’ comprised various military plans with different names, such as *Doninha*, *Rodovia*, *Dureza*, and *Limpeza*, inter alia. After the Kavandame dissent, the situation at Cabo Delgado became very tense. However, the FRELIMO informers within the Portuguese army supplied intelligence about the enemy’s plans and capacity, which enabled the planning of defensive and military actions. FRELIMO intensified the training of gunmen by Tanzanian and Russian instructors in Arusha. Miguel Ambrósio<sup>109</sup> and António Hama Thay formed part of such trainees on the ground, a strategy that proved crucial to victory.

(106) Cândido Mondlane is a living legend of this battle; he died in 2010 and his memoirs were recorded in this project.

(107) It is interesting to note that the Portuguese defeat was also seen as a NATO defeat in African soil.

(108) Amour Zacarias Kupela recalls having met these high-ranking Tanzanian officers, when he was with Samora Machel at Beira Base, in Cabo Delgado. They travelled long distances hinterland in Mozambique, from Mueda to Mocímboa da Praia. Interview with Amour Zacarias Kupela (Dar-es-Salaam, 22th June, 2007).

(109) Interview with Miguel Ambrósio (Chókwè, 21st February, 2008).

FRELIMO would abandon its military bases leading the enemy to fall in ambushes and attacking by the rear-guard. The guerrillas would be distributed into small groups throughout mined roads and trails; they would open big holes which were then covered by green plants to ambush the Portuguese military trucks. This military strategy, combined with popular mobilization, enabled FRELIMO to inflict heavy losses on the Portuguese army.

The interviewed share the viewpoint that the victory in this battle rescue them from an imminent collapse. The Portuguese government was believing that it would eliminate FRELIMO through a massive military intervention and PIDE's infiltration during the moments of relative weakness, after the desertion of some leaders of the movement, such as Simango. However, the period during Samora Machel's leadership following the expulsion of Simango was considered important because the political activity and the armed struggle were combined with a consistent leadership and, in this respect, FRELIMO has consolidated its unity and "vanguardism".

The defeat of General Kaulza de Arriaga's military operation created the conditions necessary for the propagation of the armed struggle beyond the other banks of the Zambezi River, in spite of the increasing military alliance with Rhodesia, South Africa and Portugal. The erection of the Cahora Bassa Dam represented a great challenge for the freedom fighters because FRELIMO had taken the decision of not destroying such development. The concentration of Portuguese forces with the aim of forcing the displacement of populations into resettlement camps, also known as "protected villages" presented an additional risk.

The main theatre of war was gradually moving increasingly towards the south of Tete, a geographically strategic province. Such advancement helped to expand the guerrilla attacks to the provinces south of the Zambezi, such as Manica, Sofala and Zambézia, and also represented an important platform for the armed struggle conducted by ZANU in Zimbabwe. José Moiane, Military Commander who operated in the war front of Tete described the relation established with the ZANU's freedom fighters since 1971. He recognized the presence of the ANC fighters who wanted to use this province as a base for armed incursions into South Africa. It was during this period that brutal massacres were perpetrated by the Portuguese in Wiriamu, Chaola, Inhaminga and elsewhere in the centre of Mozambique. In an attitude of despair, the Portuguese poisoned the water with cholera. But, with such practices, Portugal became the target of condemnation of the international community. In the diplomatic front, it suffered a severe blow, when the Pope received the FRELIMO's leadership in the Vatican, a clear signal of solidarity towards the liberation struggle.

Since 1971, in Tete, the Portuguese colonial army was suffering heavy casualties caused by FRELIMO forces. The social and economic reforms Portugal introduced in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the construction of the large Cahora Bassa hydro-power station, as a strategic means to detain the expansion of the liberation struggle into the south of the Zambezi River, could not stop the revolutionary war. After nearly eight years of armed struggle FRELIMO had built a determined a combat force equipped with advanced methods of the guerrilla war, with weathered men who were maintaining an interaction with the people. In spite of the increasing intensity of the Portuguese propaganda, FRELIMO had defeated the Portuguese army in various battles and the casualties were so numerous the soldiers were becoming demoralized. Thus, the fighting spirit of the Portuguese forces and of their own command had waned and the soldiers were refusing to go to the front.

Lopes Tembe, who fought at the Tete Front and was Head of the Department of Agriculture and Trade, says the following:

Between 1970 and 1972, the Portuguese forces, at least in Tete, where I operated, did not go out to fight; they would look for the FRELIMO forces to talk.<sup>110</sup> In certain military positions of the Tete front, particularly during the commemorative dates of the 25th June and 25th September, the Portuguese forces would fly in helicopters to visit our positions. They would land and leave some food, drinks and messages of praise to Frelimo. At the outset, we feared eating the food they brought us. We didn't trust them, so after they left the base, we would first give the food to dogs and cats to make sure they weren't poisoned. FRELIMO didn't ill-treat the injured Portuguese soldiers, it would render them to the Red Cross; and would inform the international community that its fight wasn't against the white civilian population, nor against the Portuguese people.

Captured soldiers were rendered to the Red Cross, some would be sent to Portugal, while others, according to their choice, would be sent to the rest of Europe or Canada. The soldiers who were sent back to Portugal would mobilize the Portuguese community in favour of FRELIMO's struggle and convince the young men not to enlist for the colonial war. From 1972 onwards, the fight was mainly against the Selous Scouts of Southern Rhodesia, who joined forces with the Portuguese against FRELIMO, under the pretext that it was aiding ZANU forces. At least in Fingoê and Tete, we downed various helicopters and aircraft. With these developments Samora Machel encouraged the ZANU fighters to move inwards in Zimbabwe, instead of fighting only along the border. Thus, some of our comrades volunteered to continue to fight alongside ZANU. Amongst some of the ZANU comrades under the command of Josiah Tongogara, there were Rex Nhongo (Mujuro), Gava (Zwinavachi), Tungamirai, Danganana and the great Commander Chauke, of Chipinge. There was, in this way, a turning point in our fight. The Selous Scouts, who were part of the Rhodesian forces, were confined to the Zimbabwean territory and this gave us space to advance towards the south of Mozambique. Consequently, we were able to introduce military equipment in the provinces of Manica and Sofala, and to further infiltrate in the provinces of Inhambane and Gaza.<sup>111</sup>

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(110) Most of these soldiers were members of the Portuguese Communist Party and clandestine members of the group

*Acção Revolucionária Armada (ARA)* within the Army.

(111) Interview of Ambassador Lopes Tembe (Maputo, 9th October, 2008).

Between 1972 and 1973, Tete was literally under FRELIMO's control, with all of the Portuguese positions being attacked. The FRELIMO's forces had been reinforced by new artillery experts: António Hama Thay and João Américo Mpfumu, amongst others. In 1973, FRELIMO forces under the command of José Moiane and Eduardo Tomé destroyed the Tete airport and dismantled the last Portuguese stronghold in Malovera, liberating many people from the forced protected settlements (*aldeamentos*). In 1974 the combined air forces of Portugal and Rhodesia were defeated by FRELIMO who had also seized various aircraft.

In July, 1972 the war reached the Manica and Sofala fronts under the command of Fernando Matavele, Eduardo Nihia and Cara Alegre Tembe. At the same time, ZANU fighters were affecting military incursions hinterland in Zimbabwe. Later on, the way was clear towards Zambézia for the advance of FRELIMO forces, under the command of Bonifácio Gruveta.<sup>112</sup> By the mid-1972, the military expansion was directed to the centre of Mozambique. Fernando Matavele (Dick Tongande) who was operating in the 4th Sector, led the military incursions towards the centre of Manica and Sofala with Cara Alegre Tembe and Eduardo Nihia. The expansion of the guerrilla activity towards this region of Mozambique had a great impact over the Portuguese citizens, who were already convinced that Portugal had lost the war and so, desperately, decided to mobilize the militia force in Sofala, particularly from the city of Beira, with the collaboration of Jorge Jardim,<sup>113</sup> seeking to neutralize the FRELIMO attacks. Despite those efforts, the Portuguese forces suffered more losses. From 1972 to 1973, the war focused on the Manica Province, which attracted many young people to the liberation movement. The oral interviews conducted in Tete and Manica revealed the internal experiences of the liberation struggle and the relationship created between the local communities and FRELIMO.<sup>114</sup>

With the intensification of military operations in the Manica provinces the Portuguese forces suffered more losses which were reflected in the settlements of the colonial population. Indeed, the war had struck a blow in the "enemy's stomach" (popular expression amongst the freedom fighters of Mozambique) and it was spreading across all provinces. Many white colonists abandoned their farms and properties, fearing for their lives, despite FRELIMO's call for them to stay, because the war wasn't against the Portuguese people.

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(112) See interview with José Moiane, Eduardo Nihia and Bonifácio Gruveta.

(113) Jardim was a very influential business man in the Sofala province and had strong links with the governments of Malawi and South Rhodesia.

(114) Johane Jehova, FRELIMO's local commander in Manica, was considered by the freedom fighters operating in the region, as the personification of the courage of a military leader and was feared by the Portuguese forces. Interview with Johane Jehova (Maputo, 2008).

## The Journey to Independence

The military coup d'état which occurred on the 25th April, 1974, in Lisbon, has precipitated Portugal's defeat, at a time when FRELIMO was leading and had infiltrated its forces almost everywhere, in the centre and south of Mozambique. The peace negotiations towards the transfer of power commenced in June, in Lusaka; in August, in Dar-es-Salam and later proceeded in Lusaka. Here, the negotiations were speedier and more favourable to FRELIMO, and the agreement would be reached by the 7<sup>th</sup> September, 1974. The winner's position of FRELIMO had contributed to the imposition of its 'avant-gardism' as the sole representative of Mozambique, in spite of the presence of other small parties, including FRELIMO's dissident groups and recently created parties claiming their participation in an electoral referendum.

The transition to independence in Mozambique was not exempt from conflicts. The white minority linked to the colonial regime and the dissident groups, who had joined the insurgents supported by Southern Rhodesia and South Africa's resisted the FRELIMO government. While FRELIMO and the Portuguese authorities were concluding the signature of a Peace Agreement and the Terms of Transfer of Power in Lusaka, on the 7th September, 1974, the radio station in Lourenço Marques was attacked and occupied by the white conservative minority in the capital, in collaboration with the dissident groups. This attack, as well as other political animosity in the closest and urban neighbourhoods caused confrontations and conflicts between the white minority and the black majority who, at that time, was already seeing victory and independence as a certainty. FRELIMO's leadership was still in Lusaka when it decided to send two of its commanders, Alberto Chipande and Salésio Teodoro<sup>115</sup> to Lourenço Marques, with the mission of assessing the situation on the ground, prior to sending military personnel. With the aid of Tanzania, military contingents were being sent to Lourenço Marques for the preparation of a safe transition of power. These military personnel were lodged at Hotel Cardoso, it being the first time Blacks had been lodged at such a hotel in Lourenço Marques.

On the 20th September, 1974, the Transitional Government, headed by Joaquim Alberto Chissano, as Prime-Minister, was sworn in. Led by FRELIMO, Mozambique became independent on the 25th June, 1975 and Samora Moisés Machel elected as the first President of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique. While it was busy preparing for the building of an independent State, for the establishment of a national structured Army, security services and political and administrative structures, FRELIMO was confronted with hostilities in the region. The hostile environment was due to Rhodesia's resistance to accept the granting of independence to Zimbabwe and to transfer power to the Black majority, and to the intensification of the anti-communist repression and propaganda against the FRELIMO's government, driven by the apartheid regime of South Africa, through their intelligence services.

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(115) Interviews with Henrique Madebe (Maputo, 13th July, 2007) and João Facitela Pelembe (Maputo, 24th July, 2007).

The process of building scientific socialism and a peoples State which FRELIMO was undertaking was being challenged by the anti-communist propaganda, to the extent of causing unease in the white civilian population and the white business community in the main cities, such as Maputo and Beira who fled the country. In spite of this propaganda, FRELIMO continued its project of building a socialist State and Government without overlooking the support to the liberation movements in the region, specially of Zimbabwe and South Africa. The structuring of the army, security and police services was of an urgent necessity for both the State and people and also to face a foreign enemy represented by the neighbouring white minority governments. It was in this context that a group of young recruits was sent to Tanzania for police and security training. The university students were also mobilized to participate in the national reconstruction in various social and economic sectors, while the country was seeking aid from the international community.

## **Women and the Liberation Struggle**

The life memories that will be narrated hereinafter were obtained during 2 years, from 2007 to 2008, consisting of a recollection that reflects both the diversity of the Mozambican society and how such diversity marked the liberation struggle, causing social conflicts and driving the predisposition to unity.

Every woman that told her history in this research belongs to a generation of nationalists that left a lasting impression in the fight for the independence of Mozambique. They are women born in the 1940s, attended school in the 1950s and who became activists and guerrilla fighters against the Portuguese colonialist domination during the 1960-1970s.

These women were born within a system of colonial rule that prevailed as a boulder over their infancy, like in the case of their ancestors. Political news, books and information of all types were strictly censored by the PIDE-DGS. There was neither tv nor newspapers in the local languages and radio stations were rigidly controlled by the colonial authorities. Even information about events elsewhere in Mozambique would hardly appear.

The winds of change that were blowing on the African continent and the rumours about recently independent nations inspired women to seek to reach a different world. They dreamt of freedom and independence, but that dream would require the breaking of mental and political barriers of submission to the Portuguese authorities; to submission to exploitation, oppression and racial discrimination.

Mozambique is not the only place where the political conscience of women was shaped through active resistance. In Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa women played a very important role in the liberation.

In these societies' women would live very much tied to the land and, thus, extremely submissive to the patriarchal society. The political participation of women was a turning point in History and, for the first time, they became actors with equal rights and left a lasting impression in the History of their respective countries.

### **Women and the Liberation Struggle of Mozambique**

Contextualized in the current debates about nationalism and the re-thinking of the resistance against colonial rule, this section will focus on the initiatives and experiences of the women, a feature about the anti-colonial struggles that has not duly studied. Contrary than in the case of their male counterparts, women in nationalist movements were scarce in terms of their provenance from Christian elites, with western education and influenced by the European Enlightenment in terms of individual rights and freedoms. They weren't even conscious of the nationalist uprisings that occurred in Europe during the 19th century, that is, the grass-roots resistance against the empire which resulted in the creation of numerous new States-Nation. The majority had little or no formal schooling and practically any direct contact with the westerners. Therefore, the female activists of Mozambique had many similarities with their Angolan, Guinean-Bissau and Cape Verdean counterparts, as well as the community-based activists in Southern Africa. The involvement of women was crucial to the anti-colonial struggle throughout the entire period, which started in 1964, in the initial armed struggle up to the declaration of independence on the 25th June, 1975. Indeed, the women's courage and their commitment to freedom was recognized by their male leaders of FRELIMO who, for that reason, recruited them for the nationalist movement.

#### *The emergence of nationalism and membership of FRELIMO*

Like men, women were involved in the resistance strategies of the resistance of the peasants and nationalist demonstrations during the 1950s and early 1960s.<sup>116</sup> In her testimony about the participation of the women in the liberation of Mozambique, Paulina Mateus Nkunda, aka Paulina Mateus, of Muidumbe, Cabo Delgado she gave a wonderful account of the rural areas illiterate women in the general demonstration of Mueda, on the 16<sup>th</sup> June, 1960. She said that, hand in hand with the men, illiterate women participated in public and with excitement, to demand independence. Mateus gave the following example: "Modesta was one of the women that was there and later arrested and died at Ilha Ibo. But this story was not investigated".<sup>117</sup> The interviews with women that joined and were recruited by FRELIMO during the liberation, revealed that they had no intention to

(116) Isaacman and Stephen refer that the women and men who participated in the resistance against the Portuguese regime. For example, in 1947, 7000 women in Búzi refused to work in cotton fields. They burnt the seeds and participated in other actions against the cotton company. See Isaacman, Barbara & Stephen, June. *Moçambique: A Mulher, a Lei e a Reforma Agrária*. Maputo: Comissão Económica das Nações Unidas para a África, 1980: See p.22.

(117) Interview with Paulina Mateus Nkunda (Bairro Sommerschild, Maputo, 11th October 2007). On the commemoration day of the 16th June, day of the Mueda Massacre, it was recalled that "their only crime was

break the role of gender or to overturn the male powers. They wanted to liberate Mozambique from the Portuguese authority and that was the fruit of various conversations amongst their parents, brothers, adult relatives, or from those men that were selling illegal FRELIMO membership cards and who supplied information about the political situation in Tanganyika. Others had reiterated the experiences of oppression and humiliation inflicted upon by the Portuguese authorities. They felt proud of taking care of the children, to sustain the family and to be the guardians of the social order.

Many of the women interviewed in Cabo Delgado recall vividly the brutalities of the Portuguese. For example, Paulina Coveque de Macomia, of Cabo Delgado, spoke of how the Portuguese authorities used the *Chibalo* (forced labour for the State) to force women and men to open and clean roads without pay. Coveque told us: “If anyone asked to take a rest during the journey, the Police would hit us hard and violently. It was because of this suffering that illiterate people like me started to think about freedom”.<sup>118</sup> Bassaliza Jonas Mwitikile, of Mueda, Cabo Delgado, did not directly experience the brutalities of the Portuguese, but describes how did she happen to acquire political conscience through conversations amongst her parents and neighbours about extortion, heavy taxes, forced labour, humiliation and about the Mueda Massacre.<sup>119</sup> Contrary to Bassaliza’s testimony, Paulina Mateus recalled:

In various occasions, my father told me and my sisters that “this land doesn’t belong to the whites. One day, the whites will leave. This is our land”; and I clearly understood such message in 1960, when I was studying at the Catholic mission of Nangololo. One morning I heard some shootings. About 10 o’clock, the mission’s priest came and called my colleague Maria Rita to inform her that her father had been killed in Mueda, told her not to cry because one day she would meet him in the house of Jesus. Maria Rita cried and left the mission. Hours later, we saw the arrival of Portuguese soldiers at the village of Nangololo with the task of looking for injured rebels. The soldiers moved around for a month in Nangololo and used to go to church. During holidays I went home and my father explained that: “In Mueda the Portuguese killed our people because we demanded independence. Now, we are conscious that the Portuguese will never grant us independence in a peaceful way”. At that time, MANU was mobilizing the villagers explaining them about issues of freedom and sovereignty. My father was a militant and a salesman of card (membership of FRELIMO). All these facts had opened my mind to politics and, during my holidays, I started to accompany my father to the political meetings”.<sup>120</sup>

Likewise, Modesta Daniel, of Muidumbe, told us that she begun to hate the Portuguese when studying at Mariri, where, secretly, she received information that in Mueda, the Portuguese Police and soldiers had killed people and that her uncle had been arrested.

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That of demanding independence of their country. They sent a delegation made up of the Faustino Vanombe brothers, Kibiriti and Modesta to the Administration”. *Mozambican Revolution*. n° 25 (1966): 3.

(118) Interview with Paulina João Coveque (Bairro Militar, Maputo, 7 th March 2007).

(119) Interview with Bassaliza Jonas Mwitikile (Bairro Militar, Maputo, 10<sup>th</sup> March 2007).

(120) Interview with Paulina Mateus Nkunda (Bairro Sommerschild, Maputo, 11<sup>th</sup> October 2007).

Upon her return home, as a primary teacher at the Nangololo mission she acted as an underground guerrilla informer.<sup>121</sup>

The Mozambicans were subjected to oppression and humiliation in the entire country. For example, Lúcia Tazama, of Niassa, told us that she came across to know the Portuguese brutalities when, in 1965, the soldiers set fire to the entire village, killing the *Chairman* and three civilians. She and her sister fled to the bush. After this attack she has decided to join FRELIMO because she wanted freedom.<sup>122</sup> Isabel Yotamo, of Tete stated that the obstacles posed by the Portuguese system<sup>123</sup> had determined her decision to join the struggle in 1970.

### **FRELIMO's recruitment and membership**

Men, as well as women, may have been recruited according to the same methods, and the factors that led them to join FRELIMO might have been common, though translated into different experiences for men and women, with other variables such as the age, economic context of the recruits and the level of formal education.

The way many women describe their stance, upon recruitment, has a lot to do with the way of life and the environment from which they came from. Girls rarely would have a clear and firm political opinion before they were recruited and might have embarked into this adventure to satisfy their parents' wishes, or by curiosity. What the older women might have sought in war would have been something already shaped, largely, by the nature of difficulties experienced, depending on their specific place in their societies.

Most of the women who joined FRELIMO were young aged about sixteen or seventeen years, or even less, 10 or 12 years old, an age at which many would become married. Maria Nkavandeka acknowledges that the recruitment effected in the early 1960s, in Mueda, was often far from being volunteered. The political situation in the region wasn't good and her mother and other inhabitants of Muidumbe had to flee from their villages and had to live in the bush. One day, she met Josefina, who told her she should go to the *Branch*.<sup>124</sup> "In those days, no one could refuse to go", say Nkavandeka.<sup>125</sup> Likewise, Geraldina Mwitu, a primary school teacher and resident at the Catholic mission of Nangololo told us that in 1964, during the 4 o'clock mass, the mission's priest advised that all Mozambicans living in the mission should abandon the site. He recalled that the situation wasn't good.: "In the following day, my mother, sisters, younger brother and myself abandoned the mission and we went to the bush under the influence of the guerrilla fighters.

(121) Interview with Modesta Daniel (Bairro Central, Maputo, 12<sup>th</sup> May 2007).

(122) Interview with Lúcia Tazama (Bairro Central, Maputo, 7<sup>th</sup> February 2007).

(123) Interview with Isabel Yotamo (Chiúta, Tete, 15<sup>th</sup> September 2007).

(124) *Branch* refers to a geographic administrative space equivalent to what today is referred to as a locality, under the leadership of a *Chairman*

(125) Interview with Maria Nkavandeka (Bairro Central, Maputo, 26<sup>th</sup> May 2007).

During that year, life was very difficult because we had no food and it was unsafe to go to our *machambas* (agricultural gardens or fields)”.<sup>126</sup> Maria Francisca Dlakhama mentioned that she joined FRELIMO by following her parents, because she was a minor. But Eduardo da Silva Nihia, Commander of the Eastern Front of Niassa stated that many girls went to the bases to flee from the brutality of the Portuguese and were seeking protection and security.<sup>127</sup>

Some young women joined the liberation struggle as part of their parents’ contribution to the nationalist cause, when requested to do it for the guerrilla struggle:

When my father was working in Zimbabwe he was arrested because the Rhodesian police had been informed that he was selling ZAPU’s membership cards. They invaded and searched our home. When they released him, we returned to Mágoè, in Tete (1970).. In that area the Portuguese army was building roads and dropping anti-FRELIMO pamphlets by aircraft. When the freedom fighters came and wanted girls, I agreed and tried to mobilize other girls. I was the first girl in the village to join FRELIMO.<sup>128</sup>

Likewise, Marina Pachinuapa recalls the political situation in Mueda, in the late 1963 and early 1964, when she was still a teenager and was working at the Nangololo Catholic mission:

*The Portuguese soldiers used to appear by car or by aircraft seeking for rebels in Nangololo. Weary of this situation, me and three other girls fled from the mission to our parents’ homes. In the second week we were visited by the guerrillas inviting us to join FRELIMO, to act as political commissars. We asked what was the meaning of a political commissar. The guerrillas then explained that since the war had begun, they needed people to mobilize and explain the objectives of the war in the communities. We promised to give them a reply by the following morning. But, as I was a lazy one and didn’t like to do domestic work my parents asked me if I knew where I was going to and the conditions I would be encountering: “ if you are asked to do something, you have to obey?” I told them I was going with my colleagues (Manuela Salamantino, Bibiana Ringudo and Joana Adriano).<sup>129</sup>*

Many parents showed some reluctance to see their children go to war. But it was far more difficult to see their daughters joining the struggle. For example, Modesta told that, although her father was a FRELIMO militant and mobilizer, he tried hard to avoid his daughter going to the guerrilla bases, because he didn’t accept giving his daughter to live with the freedom fighters in unknown territory and moreover to think that his daughter could have children without being married.<sup>130</sup>

(126) Interview with Geraldina Mwito (Bairro Central, Maputo, 22 de Abril de 2007).

(127) Interviews com Francisca Dlakhama, (Maputo); Eduardo da Silva Nihia (Sommerschild, Maputo, 06 de Setembro de 2007).

(128) Interviews with Elizabeth Matope (Bairro Guava, Maputo, 13 de Maio de 2007).

(129) Presentation with Marina Pachinuapa (Matola, Maputo, 06 de Junho de 2007).

(130) Interview with Modesta Daniel (Bairro Central, Maputo, 12 Maio de 2007).

Meanwhile a group of girls and boys, in the majority coming from the South of Mozambique met in Lourenço Marques, in 1960. They represented the finest of the young educated Mozambicans. After a brief period of organization against the Portuguese regime, these activists decided to leave Mozambique (Lourenço Marques) to Tanganyika, travelling through Swaziland, South Africa, Botswana and Zambia in an attempt to join FRELIMO, in Dar-es-Salam, in the year of 1964. Rosalia Vicente Macamo (aka Rosália Tembe), one of the very few of this group able to reach Dar-es-Salam, recalls the following:

It was on the 6th March, 1965 (end of 1964) when I took the bus to Namaacha, for the long journey to Tanzania. In Namaacha, I met Josina Muthemba and five other Mozambicans. We jumped the border fence at night and, in a group, walked to Manzini and travelled by bus to Mbambane. When we arrived there, Guebuza and other Mozambicans received us and showed the place we would stay over. It was a small house in the mountains and with restricted movement. After two months, Adelina Paindane [now Mocumbi], Josina Muthemba, the Muiambo couple and their two children and myself left to Mbambane, walking from early in the morning. Later we took a bus and then later a train to Bechuanaland (Botswana) by entering, in some cases, into South Africa. During our journey we were questioned and they asked us: "where are going to?" and Muiambo promptly responded: 'this is my family. We are going to church.'" Then the Police would let us continue with our journey. When we reached Gaborone, we found Guebuza, Manave and Langa who were travelling in the same train. In a group, we went to the police station; the men entered and, after a while, they sent us to a refugee shelter, while they {the men} remained in the police station. They were arrested but two weeks later were released and later told us that we could proceed to our destination. This happened following a political complaint from Mondlane at the United Nations. We travelled in a Land Rover up to Zambia, where we had a brief pause to greet Mariano Matsinha, Head of FRELIMO in that region; from there we proceeded to Mbeya, in Tanzania. After two or three days we went to Dar-es-Salam, where we had a meeting with Chairman Mondlane and Marcelino dos Santos at the FRELIMO headquarters.<sup>131</sup>

Unfortunately, the other members of the group of students never reached Tanganyika because they were arrested by the South African Police and then deported to Lourenço Marques, at the request of the PIDE. Maria da Conceição Chissano Vilankulos, who attempted to flee to Tanganyika (at the end of 1964) with other Mozambican students but ended up being arrested, as she explains:

When my husband was transferred from Quelimane to Lourenço Marques we used to be visited by some old friends of ours (Alberto Massavanhane, Milagre and Eulália Muthemba) frequently in our house. Although in those days' women were not allowed to discuss politics, I began to hear about politics since 1960, when my father and brothers used to talk and comment about the repression, exploitation and political conscience in Mozambique.

(131) Interview with Rosália Tembe (Matola Rio, 06de Setembro de 2007). This report is corroborated by Domingos Vicente Muiambo, the son of the Muiambo couple who was in the group. Interview with Domingos Vicente Muiambo (Maputo, 17 de Maio de 2007).

Although I would not participate in my husband's conversation with friends during the meetings at night at our home, I was conscious they were discussing the political situation in Mozambique. During a week-end I went to visit my in-laws in Chibuto and, back home to Lourenço Marques I found that my husband was missing. Sometime later, a man called Pascoal, who claimed to have been sent by Alfeia (my husband) to take both me and our two children (a girl and a boy). In effect, what I wanted was to join my husband and was confident that what he had chosen was good for all of us. Accompanied by Pascoal, I crossed the Namaacha border and reached Swaziland, where my husband and other compatriots were in hiding, while preparing the escape.<sup>132</sup>

It is important to note that this was the second attempted escape of Josina Muthemba, Armando Guebuza and Adelina Páindane. In March 1964, Josina Muthemba, accompanied by Armando Guebuza, Ângelo Chichava, Isabel Mariana Mpfumo, Elizabeth Cristina Tembe and Milagre Mazuze had already tried to join FRELIMO, but unfortunately, they were arrested in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and sent to prison in Lourenço Marques. It was there when Josina Muthemba joined Adelina Páindane. This group was released in August, 1964, as a result of FRELIMO and Chairman's Eduardo Mondlane's campaign with the international community.<sup>133</sup>

FRELIMO's male leadership has consciously articulated the specific needs of the women, in order to attract this social group to its cause. For example, for the FRELIMO's Central Committee the revolution would have not been complete without a transformation in the social roles of men and women, and that women had to fight to achieve equality with men. In October, 1966, the Central Committee "ensured the principle of women emancipation as an integral part of FRELIMO's policy".<sup>134</sup> Thus, FRELIMO decided to organize the women's political and military training, so that they, at all levels, could play a more active role in the fight for national liberation. They received political education and military training and were sent to military missions, but also charged to carry out the more traditional tasks in a western perspective, such as organizing FRELIMO's orphanages, food production and literacy courses, as a means of combating the prejudices prohibiting girls education. Maria Nkavandeka, in agreement with FRELIMO's discourse, stated:

(132) Interview with Maria da Conceição Chissano Vilankulos (Bairro da Liberdade, Maputo, 19 de Maio de 2007). The names of these women are the following: Alice Tomás Hlongo, Aurora Moisés Hanguana, Celeste Moiana, Claudina Ivete Salomão Chambale, Eulália Sansão Muthemba, Habiba Irachande, Juvenália Abiatar Muthemba, Leonor da Assunção Chichava, Lúcia Morgado Mbalate, Maria da Conceição Chissano Vilankulos, Maria Isabel Saraiva Mpfumo, Rita Caldina Bucuane, Rufina Mateus Muthemba and Virgínia Tembe.

(133) Matusse, Renato e Malique, Josina. *Josina Machel: Ícone da emancipação da mulher Moçambicana*. Maputo: 2008: See pp.45-48.

(134) Muiuane, Armando Pedro. *Datas e Documentos da História da FRELIMO: de 1960 a 1975*. Maputo: 2006: See p.78.

In the Educational Centre of FRELIMO, in Tunduru, all men and women, young and adults, guerrilla fighters and students were required to share the burden, including the kitchen duties, child care, sowing and harvesting and housekeeping.<sup>135</sup>

The evidence above refers to the early 1960s. However, the women who joined during the last years of the war submitted the same reasons for joining FRELIMO. More than anybody else in the communities, women had a better understanding of the worse effects of the colonial regime's policies-imposed on Mozambicans.

### *Women's experiences at the bases of FRELIMO branches*

The participation of women in the liberation struggle marked the beginning their long journey in a process that was not peaceful. Women had to prove their capacity at the military front, not only to their journey companions but also for the entire world which was seeing them as a useful object, exclusively for domestic work.

Prior to 1966, FRELIMO's liberation forces at the operational fronts were predominantly male. Most of the females remained at the branches and villages under the influence of FRELIMO. In 1967, FRELIMO stated it had taken steps to improve the participation of women as revolutionary combatants in their own right. However, as mentioned, there were still myths to be dissipated about such steps and their timing. The time to proclaim such changes of attitude regarding women's participation in combat tasks was intimately related with the creation of the Women's Detachment (*Destacamento Feminino*) in 1968.

The women recall that FRELIMO had its own nomenclature to name its operational areas. "*Áreas impugnadas*" (contested areas) were those areas where the enemy's operations were still intense and its administrative structures still operational. "*Zonas libertadas*", (Liberated Areas) were the areas where the Portuguese operations and administrative structures had been eliminated. FRELIMO was building a "new society" and the "new man" consistent to its ideology. The "semi-liberated" zones were the areas where the Portuguese were starting to lose control, but where they could still carry out military operations. In this case, the guerrilla activity had to be underground in its relations with the local communities. Thus, it was in these operational areas where women, members of the Women Detachment, would politicize and mobilize the population, would fight and produce food, carry war equipment, render child care and open the minds of illiterates. Women would also work as journalists, security officers and secretaries.

### **Politicization and mobilization of the populations**

Amongst the crucial tasks to be undertaken by women were the politicization and mobilization of the populations. Marina Pachinuapa said that when they arrived at the base, she and eight other girls

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(135) Interview with Maria Manuel Nkavandeka (Bairro Central, Maputo, 26 de Maio de 2007).

(Manuela Salmantino, Bibiana Ringudo, Joana Adriano, Bibina Lathimbo, Bernardina Paulo e Filomena Nachaque, Henriqueta João and Paulina Maneta) had a meeting with Paulo Samuel Kankhomba, Political Commissar of the Cabo Delgado Front, who told them they had to undergo a political course, so they could mobilize and politicize the population. Marina told clearly:

For two months, morning and afternoon, we learnt how to mobilize and to gain the people politically. Kankhomba used to tell us that we had to explain [to the people] that FRELIMO had decided to fight because we (Mozambicans) were trying to demand peaceful independence, but the Portuguese had refused. We thus had decided to fight and the task of the population was to produce food to feed the guerrilla fighters, carry war material from the border and to supply the freedom fighters, because FRELIMO didn't have aircraft, motor vehicles. The cars and motor vehicles would have to be the people. The freedom fighters lived with the masses and therefore freedom fighters and the community had to be united. Kankhomba explained also that, although the men had been trained in Algeria, for this task, they need to be assisted by the village girls, because they could move easily around the Portuguese soldiers' barracks and the villages. The task didn't just comprise the politicization and mobilization, but also to perform surveillance. Once the course was completed, we would return to our villages and, through the *Chairmen* we would guide the meetings with the people, explaining the cause and duration of the liberation war, the war risks and the importance of unity.<sup>136</sup>

In corroboration to Marina's report, Bassaliza Jonas Mwitikile recalled that when Biti Mwanunu, of N'gapa, mobilized women that lived in the bush to join FRELIMO.<sup>137</sup> Teresa Njasse, who lived at Base Maputo, Cabo Delgado's Front, stated that, in 1965, after completing a two-month political course, led by Paulo Kankhomba, they proceeded to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Sector to mobilize the population. The group with military attire explained "the participation of women in the war is important". The population had challenged this viewpoint, arguing that "women were not capable, because they were fearful". The commander informed that there were two women in the group dressed with military uniforms and holding firearms. The population remain sceptical, arguing that they were all men. Njasse continues:

So, me and my colleague, accompanied by four aged women went to the bush, where we stripped off our uniforms. The old women confirmed that we were women, but the population still challenged our capacity to handle weapons. The commander ordered us to do a demonstration. Using my weapon, I was the first to shoot to the air and then my colleague shot three times with her *Mauser* rifle. After this demonstration, the women (girls) of the 3rd Sector voluntarily joined FRELIMO.<sup>138</sup>

(136) Presentation by Marina Pachinuapa (Matola, Maputo, 06 de Junho de 2007).

(137) Interview with Bassaliza Jonas Mwitikile (Bairro Central, Maputo, Março de 2007).

(138) Interview with Teresa Njasse (Maputo, 11 Outubro de 2007).

Doubtless, the presence of women in the liberation struggle was a challenge calling everybody to give their contribution. Teresa's experience proved that they were women and soldiers and this made FRELIMO a different movement, in terms of the traditional perspective about the tasks women could or could not be involved with. The participation of women guerrilla fighters in hard and traditionally male functions made the work to which people were required to do, to look a lighter task. In doing so, the myths were being challenged around the women participation in the struggle (see more details next section). This innovation had a special effect in the population, particularly amongst the women. Indeed, women were effective in the task of politicization of the peoples.

### **Military Training and Combats**

Although some initiatives of a female nature would have been conceived and presented to the women by the male leaders, there were others that were clearly created by women themselves, particularly after they have been mobilized to FRELIMO branches or bases. By the end of 1964, for example, a group of Cabo Delgado girls, who had been trained as political mobilizers of the people, realized by their experience that they required military training for their own defence, because they were living and working in war zones. With a mixed sentiment Marina Pachinuapa reported:

One day in February [1966], Kankhomba ordered me to site X, to deliver a letter to the First Secretary. I asked the comrade Commissar if that wasn't faraway because, if it was, then I would like to be accompanied by the militias. He agreed. During the journeys we found a girl and a militia man who were returning from a mission. I decided to change the militia men because the latter was from the village I was going to. Along the way, I asked him how was the area, how was the enemy and what the people were doing to fight the enemy. Kankhomba had warned me of the risk of the Portuguese being in the area. In fact, shortly after we were ambushed and I quickly gave Kankhoba's letter to the militia man, who fled while I stayed trembling and dizzy. I heard a lot of shots and saw a girl with a maze basket at her head falling dead. She had been shot with a bullet at her head and was bleeding like a tap. I was captured and interrogated by the Portuguese. I told them I knew nothing about FRELIMO, and that I was a pupil at the Nangololo Catholic Mission and if they had found me at that place it was because I was coming from my parents' home towards the mission. They put me in the Land Rover and when we arrived at the mission, the Head of the Company ordered them to tell me to leave the vehicle. I then walked, crossed the place where students would raise the flag and when I reached close to the nuns' house I ran to the bush and returned to the base.<sup>139</sup>

Lúcia Tazama wasn't so lucky, because she was surprised in a Portuguese attack to the women's base and was injured. According to her, when the Central Mepotche Base was having a considerable number of girls (about 95), Chief Mabote decided to create a base for women only and attached five armed men to protect them. One day, the base was attacked by the Portuguese and the girls fled to the river.

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(139) Presentation by Marina Pachinuapa (Matola, Maputo, 06 de Junho de 2007).

Fortunately, no one died, although she was injured. After this attack the base was transferred to Tissindo near the River M'singe.<sup>140</sup>

With this evidence, the male commanders in the military fronts begun training girls and they then started to organize their own security and self-defence. Although the commanders had accepted and even encouraged the military training of women, the soldiers accused them of dressing themselves with nice uniforms just to do surveillance work and not to participate in combat work. The wives of the guerrilla fighters looked upon these girls as prostitutes, simply because they were living in the bases and were wearing trousers. In effect, Marina Pachinuapa stated that, instead of developing a sentiment of inferiority and humiliation because of such backward perceptions, the girls requested Commander Nathimbo to take them to combat. Marina Pachinuapa proudly describes such moments:

It was in 1966, when Commander Nathimbo ordered us to a military mission. The group was formed by Matias Lingone, as the head, Marina, Clementino, Henriqueta and João. Our task was to protect the area of the Nangololo-Muidumbe Catholic Mission, as there were orange and tangerine groves and the population used to collect fruit there. We went there and in the second week we saw Portuguese soldiers arriving and going past us: *tchwa, tchwa* [sound of walking in the bush]. Matias, the chief, told us we should shoot immediately after and that is what we did. After the attack, the male guerrilla fighters took us on their arms to the village, where we were received with *Olô, Olô, olô* [euphoria]. In this manner we proved to the male fighters that men and women are equal.<sup>141</sup>

In another interview, Teresa Njasse revealed that in 1966, she participated in a combat in Mitumba and she recalled clearly what happened:

In those days, the Portuguese soldiers were opening roads; at the same time, they were bombarding the neighbouring area with helicopters and, consequently people couldn't go to their *machambas*. It was in response to this situation that we were ordered to contain the Portuguese movements. The commander informed us that, as we didn't have bazookas, we should use landmines, firstly, and firearms after. Women like Susana and myself were the "specialists" in landmines but when we arrived to the zone, the men coerced us to leave the task of laying landmines for them. So, we then saw five Portuguese vehicles driving towards us and we took positions for the attack. Unfortunately, the vehicles passed without activating the mines and we therefore could not attack the vehicles. When the commander received the information that the Portuguese passed and nothing happened on our side, he sent comrade Timóteo Chilaúle to the site to take us back to the Central Base. Because of the distance, Timóteo did not arrive on the same day. In the following day we went to the zone and our colleagues let us (the women) to do the work. After a while, the Portuguese were returning back in the same track of road. When they reached the mined area, we could witness the explosion and, in a group, we got back and begun shooting.

(140) Interview with Lúcia Tazama (Bairro Central, Maputo 7 Fevereiro de 2007).

(141) Presentation by Marina Pachinuapa (Matola, Maputo, 6 Junho de 2007).

using a helicopter, the Portuguese launched grenades towards our direction. Comrade Faustina Nangoka fainted, partly, due to a lack of water. She was left behind but kept her weapon. Unbeknown to what was happening the group continued and crossed the River Muatide. That's when my weapon fell into the river. I stood there crying because I couldn't proceed without my weapon. When the group arrived at the village it noticed that Arthur, my *nom de guerre* (because in those days we were using male names), was missing. They began searching for me and found me crying at the river bank. The comrades asked if I had searched in the river, but I told them I was afraid of the water, so they then asked me: "how can you be afraid of water and not fear the war?". They jumped into the river and within minutes found the weapon. They then noticed that Faustina was missing. They returned back looking for her. Meanwhile the Portuguese were intensifying their bombing. The comrades found Faustina frail and mute and took her to the village where they her warm water and she then recovered. We then left singing in our return journey to the base, without knowing that the commander had prepared a *chamboca* (punishment) for our failing to ambush the Portuguese.<sup>142</sup>

Bassaliza Jonas Mwitikile, who fled from the Portuguese soldiers incursions and was living in FRELIMO controlled areas, in Cabo Delgado, recalled having seen the women fighters who came from Lidjanga, a place where the guerrilla fighters were living. The women had been trained there, using batons as weapons. "The women fighters were not from Nachingwea",<sup>143</sup> she said. Likewise, Eduardo da Silva Nihia, Commander of the Niassa Eastern Front, stated:

It was in 1968, when the FRELIMO Central Committee formed the Women's Detachment and sent guiding notes on the women recruitment procedures to Nachingwea, but there were already women in the bases with some idea of military training !!<sup>144</sup>

Although the activities in the war front continued to be segregated in gender terms, the interviewed women spoke about their action on the ground, about the moments they lived in equality with the men. In order not to call the enemy's attention about the presence of women in the combats, they would male aliases such as Raul Paulino (Paulina Mateus), Mário Manguede (Marina Pachinuapa), Luís Nachaque (Filomena Nachaque e Arthur (Teresa Njasse). Women had proved to be courageous, firm and persistent.

At the end of 1966 (October), Filipe Samuel Magaia, Chief of Defence visited the Central Base in Cabo Delgado. He was surprised with the amount and work done by women at that site, i.e. at Ibo Base. The commanders furnished a detailed report on the work performed by women and Filipe Samuel Magaia expressed his interest in integrating them in the military training at Nachingwea. In Dar-es-Salem, Magaia explained to Mondlane, Chairman of FRELIMO what he witnessed in Cabo Delgado and

(142) Interview with Teresa Njasse (Maputo, 11 de Outubro de 2007).

(143) Interview with Bassaliza Jonas Mwitikile (Bairro Militar, Maputo, 10 de Março de 2007).

(144) Interview with Eduardo da Silva Nihia (Sommerschild, Maputo, 06 de Setembro de 2007).

presented his proposal. After a while, the girls were informed by Kankhomba that the leadership had agreed with Filipe Samuel Magaia and, therefore, it was time to go to Nachingwea for military training. Paulina Mateus and Marina Pachinuapa, members of the group, proudly said:

We were 24 girls from Cabo Delgado and the majority was illiterate, who didn't know how to write A or B, or to speak Portuguese. Paulina Mateus, secretary of the female group of Base Ibo, was the only one who was literate. Our group left the base in February, 1967, and although Tanzania was close to Cabo Delgado, we only arrived in Nachingwea on the 4th March. The delay was caused by the then ongoing discussions between the Government of Tanzania and FRELIMO and within FRELIMO's cadres about the participation of women in the liberation movement. The Government of Tanzania was hard to accept the integration of women in the war, arguing that it would bring conflicts between the comrades, because men could pay more attention to the girls rather than to pursue their main objective. Some of the FRELIMO's leaders and freedom fighters argued that it wouldn't be good to bring 25 women in a base with one thousand men. "Where do you ever see grass and fire together?". The place of women is in the household, according to our tradition. Women can't deal with a pistol or with a flag, not even to join in battle. They sent messengers to recruit us for the factories in M'twara., Tanzania, as a means of gaining skills for a future independent Mozambique. We refused this suggestion and told them we would prefer to return to hinterland Mozambique. After immense discussion, Eduardo Mondlane ordered Samora Machel to send trucks. Actually, on the evening of the 3rd March we were taken to Nachingwea, arriving there in the following morning. After that Chairman Mondlane visited the base and Samora introduced us to the Chairman. He was surprised because he thought the girls that were sent for training were big and tall. These were children and Mondlane deemed appropriate to send them to the Education Centre. On hearing the interpreter we promptly replied: "no, no, no !". We refused and told him we were there to receive military training.<sup>145</sup>

The transformation of the gender roles (and change of mentalities) did not occur peacefully. Although the FRELIMO leadership had decided to engage women in political activities in the liberation struggle, and had even encouraged them, a discrepancy between theory and practice persisted. Recalling this period, Eduardo da Silva Nihia explained: "Some members of the FRELIMO's Central Committee, such as Kavandame, Kadawele and others disagreed with the military training and weapons handling by women. Nachingwea with its 700, 800, or 1000 men could not live together with a dozen of women! That was not correct! ""<sup>146</sup> According to Maria Francisca Dlakhama, within the Central Committee there were leaders and comrades that disagreed with women's military training, because of the prejudice that the women's detachment would be used to attend "to the sexual needs of males, that women would become the lovers of the commanders

(145) Presentation by Marina Pachinuapa (Matola, Maputo, 6 de Junho de 2007); Interview with Paulina Mateus (Sommerschild, Maputo, 11 Outubro de 2007).

(146) Interview with Eduardo da Silva Nihia, (Sommerschild Maputo, 6 Setembro de 2007).

The majority of the men was not ready to see women performing the same war activities as them". It was a tough discussion within FRELIMO and the decision was not taken lightly. It was necessary for women to prove their capacity and that was a difficult task.<sup>147</sup> Looking at this question from a different angle (because of her Catholic education) Geraldina Mwito noted: "when I went to the liberated areas and then selected for military training, I had difficulty in accepting to wear trousers. But, because it was a duty in the training process and it was required by the situation, I did it."<sup>148</sup>

The battles around the gender roles during the liberation struggle had deepened the political conscience of women who understood that their participation "was not just to liberate Mozambique from colonial rule, but also to liberate women from men's domination produced by traditional values that humiliated female spouses and children", said Geraldina Mwito, Paulina Mateus, and Marina Pachinuapa.<sup>149</sup>

Paulina Mateus stated that when she completed her first military training course for 25 girls from Cabo Delgado, they arrived in Tunduru (in July 1967) 45 of the Niassa Front towards Nachingwea for military training. Paulina added that Filomena Loconi, Mónica/Manuela Clementina and herself were ordered to go to Tunduru to give the first lessons of the course and then to take the girls to Nachingwea.<sup>150</sup> Lúcia Tazama, a girl living in the Niassa Western Front stated that, in July 1967, her comrades went to military training in Nachingwea, but she remained in the base because she was Commander Tazama's girlfriend.<sup>151</sup> Other reports made by women have described, not only the experiences of military training in Nachingwea, but also the combats, after learning new tactics and the experiences as military trainers. For example, Teresa Njasse belonged to the second group of the Cabo Delgado girls, who went to the Nachingwea training camp. She explained:

After the theory classes we were sent to the bush for practice. So, one day, when we were preparing to go to the bush to practice throwing hand grenades, Samora Machel and Chairman Mondlane, who were visiting the camp, asked to join us and to participate in the demonstration. On site the commander chose me to be the first to demonstrate while explaining us how to lie down in the trench. Mondlane asked the instructor why did he choose a little girl. The instructor said that the girl was the eldest and because she was the most courageous one. "Did you see how she handled the grenade, without trembling?" asked the instructor. Then comrade Mondlane walked and stood next to me on the right and both Mondlane and Samora held the grenades. The commander ordered us to fire, and

(147) Interview with Maria Francisca Dlakhamá (Maputo, 2007).

(148) Interview with Geraldina Mwito (Bairro Central, Maputo, 22 Abril de 2007).

(149) Interview with Geraldina Mwito, (Bairro Central, Maputo) 22 de Abril de 2007; presentation/discussion with Marina Pachinuapa (Matola, Maputo, 06 de Junho de 2007); Interview with Paulina Mateus (Sommerschield, Maputo, 11 de Outubro de 2007).

(150) Interview with Paulina Mateus (Sommerschield, Maputo, 11 de Outubro de 2007).

(151) Interview with Lúcia Tazama (Bairro Central, Maputo (Fevereiro de 2007)).

we obeyed. Comrade Mondlane, a tall and a handsome man, raised me and asked for my name. Then, he told me: “from now on your name shall be Arthur, the name of a white courageous American, who used to fight alone”. On return to Cabo Delgado and duly trained in the handling of Russian machine guns, we were sent to the Mele operational zone, considered to be a Portuguese stronghold, because they had a high concentration of troops and landmines all around. For this battle, joined by guerrilla fighters from the 1<sup>st</sup>, 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> sectors, the plan consisted of attacking the Portuguese at dawn, but comrade Bassalissa Massalanende was spotted by the Portuguese guard and died before she could give the signal, but fortunately she had also shot the guard. We started the shooting by using the entire heavy artillery attempting to destroy the Portuguese base, though cautiously, as we knew there were some infiltrated within the population. The fight lasted two hours and when we retreated the population fled into our side showing that the houses were also destroyed (casualties, goods and military equipment).<sup>152</sup>

Isabel Yotamo, from Tete, joined FRELIMO on October, 1970. In her narrative she said she was trained by Maria Makala, in Nachingwea for six months. Upon return to Kassuende base, in Tete, was integrated in a combat in Maloera, Marávia. Firstly, she went with the Chief of Surveillance to explore the Portuguese positions. Unfortunately, that chief deserted FRELIMO and joined the Portuguese Army, informing them that FRELIMO had a plan to attack them. The freedom fighters were surprised when the enemy attacked them so they retreated to the 1<sup>st</sup> Sector. It was only at the second attempt FRELIMO attacked with success the Maloera barracks. Meanwhile, Isabel Yotamo moved to the 1st Sector with a group that had attacked the Portuguese barracks of Mphangula. Later, they fought the Portuguese in Chidzolomondo, Macanga, Manje and Chiuta. These groups of freedom fighters had a considerable number of women from the Women’s Detachment led by commanders Sebastião Mabote, Canhembra, José Moiane and Lisboa Andissen.<sup>153</sup>

Contrary to what Isabel said, when Maria Francisca Dlakhama joined FRELIMO she was still a child under her parents’ care. She was enrolled at a primary school in Tanzania and later on at FRELIMO’s Educational Centre in Tunduru, where she concluded her primary school studies. In 1971, with 15 years of age, she went for military training in Nachingwea. There, Francisca and Boldina Cristóvão were selected for a political-military trainers’ course. In the following year, she attended a nursing course, in M’twara but ended up being included in an operational commanders course. Indeed, she was well prepared for any military operation mission hinterland Mozambique, but stayed in Nachingwea as a trainer of men and women, in addition to being the Head of the Women’s Detachment.<sup>154</sup>

The active participation of the Women’s Detachment in combat work was very important because it helped women to change their own viewpoint on their own capacities and challenged the fallacious traditional attitudes of men in regard to women.

(152) Interview with Teresa Njasse (Maputo, 11 th October 2007).

(153) Interview with Isabel Yotamo (Chiúta, Tete, 15 th September 2007).

(154) Interview with Maria Francisca Dlakhama (Maputo).

By fighting side by side with men, and by participating in all aspects of the liberation struggle, women proved that, given the opportunity, they can well perform all the activities reserved for men. Therefore, the participation in new activities represented a challenge to the traditional concept that women could only perform specific tasks (domestic work) that were traditionally reserved to them.

### *Transport of war equipment*

The reports describe how women (both of the Women's Detachment and of others) were covering long distances of hundreds of km walking and carrying ammunition and other items for their colleagues in the fighting field. Some women that joined and became members of this detachment reported that they frequently were ordered to carry materials immediately upon their arrival.

Paulina Coveque joined FRELIMO in the beginning of the war. She said she started by carrying goods from the border to hinterland of Mueda before undergoing their training.<sup>155</sup>

Eduardo da Silva Nihia, Commander of the Niassa Eastern Front, acknowledged the importance of women in his front and he stated:

The girls who had indeed joined us at the bases in the early years of the war did not carry war equipment only. While the commander would attribute war tasks to men, the girls would be entrusted to tasks such as: to provide the water supplies (specially in Cabo Delgado due to the shortage of this liquid), wood and food for the sustenance who were living in the bases, to carry war materials and food for the guerrilla fighters during the fighting. In many cases, they would perform work without military training.<sup>156</sup>

Agreeing with Nihia's description, Teresa Njasse recalled that during the "Nó Górdio" operation she was in a group of freedom fighters designated to open a new base at the Cabo Delgado Front and reports it in the following manner:

After walking for a long time, we decided to establish the base. It was in a depopulated area. Because we were dying of thirst and hunger, a group of the Women's Detachment went looking for water and food. We found a water spring and we began filling the water buckets. On our way to the base, I saw some green leaves which I thought they could be -edible, I cooked them, tasted them and I felt they weren't sour. I hid the rest and when we arrived at the base, I cooked some of them and gave them only to the women, for an experiment. As no one felt bad after eating the leaves we informed the Commander Mapulula and he took the food and ate it with his assistant, comrade Domingos Estevão. After eating, the assistant asked if we had a little more and wanted to know who had found the leaves. The other girls said that it was Arthur (Teresa).

(155) Interview with Paulina João Coveque (Bairro Militar, Maputo, 7 Março de 2007).

(156) Interview with Eduardo da Silva Nihia (Sommerschild, Maputo, 6 Setembro de 2007).

Equally, Paulina Mateus recalled having been transferred to the 3rd Sector at the Cabo Delgado Front, as the Head of the Women's Detachment in 1971. The objective was to expand the liberation struggle to the Province of Maputo. Her base was called Manica. She said that "There, we (Women's Detachment) carried war materials and food to the 4th Sector, even during the fighting". Later, after FRELIMO had consolidated its control of the area,<sup>158</sup> the people were involved in the transport of war materials and food. Although initially the Women's Detachment's carriers were not duly armed, they had grasped the basic rule that "everything you carry, no matter how heavy, will be liberating Mozambique".

### *Health*

Since its formation, the FRELIMO's leadership had stated that for the liberation struggle to succeed, apart from the existence of strong and well politicized warriors, it was crucial for a medical service to be well organized. Thus, a group of members was selected for medic training in Israel, from February to July 1964. These men, together with those nurses that already had been trained by the colonial regime (who joined FRELIMO) rendered assistance to the liberation fighters, which began in September 1964.<sup>159</sup> Meanwhile, FRELIMO's leadership had created health centres in Dar-es-Salam, Kongwa, Mbeya, Tunduru, M'twara, Songea and Bagamoyo to serve both the freedom fighters in training centres and the population that had fled from Mozambique into Tanzania.<sup>160</sup> In the early days of the struggle FRELIMO established provincial hospitals in Cabo Delgado and in Niassa to look after the freedom fighters and the population living near the bases and who no longer used the colonial health facilities.<sup>161</sup> Thus, Janet Mondlane, as Director of the Mozambique Institute, raised resources for both appropriate medical services and equipment and for the establishment of a hospital and basic training personnel for the rudimentary clinics of the liberated areas.<sup>162</sup> In fact, FRELIMO assumed the nursing services as part of a wide re-organization plan of civil society in the liberated and semi-liberated areas. The FRELIMO's Department of Health played an important role in addressing the health needs of both its combatants and local communities in the areas under its control, as well as in the quality of life of the population. In this way. This Department gained greater popular support.

(157) Interview with Teresa Njasse (Maputo, 11 th October 2007).

(158) Interview with Paulina Mateus (Sommerschield, Maputo, 11 th October 2007).

(159) Martins, Helder. *A frente da saúde na luta de libertação nacional*. Primeiro Seminário Nacional dos Comandantes da Luta de Libertação Nacional. Maputo. Março de 2002: Ver p.4.

(160) Martins, Helder. *Porquê Sakrani? Memórias dum médico duma guerrilha esquecida*. Maputo: 2001: Ver p. 205.

(161) Ibid.

(162) Martins, Helder. *A Frente de Saúde na Luta de Libertação Nacional*: Ver p.5.

Although such women had played a significant role, there is scarce documentation about them. Maria Manuel Nkavandeka, who joined FRELIMO in 1962, but remained in the *Branch* she explained that, in 1966, she was transferred to the provincial base in Muidumbe, where she attended a first aid course. Nkavandeka recalls these moments:

For six months, I learnt by practice how to deal with the injured, to give injections and to handle nursing instruments. The lecturers were Sansão Cambaco, David Siteo and Zacarias Lourenço. As the course was a practical one, whenever we admitted a patient, they would tell us to do this and that, such as to stretch his foot, place a splint, etc. It was important to stretch (his foot) at that particular moment because, later it might not be possible to do so. It was difficult for me because I didn't feel the vocation for that, so what could I do? I did all that because I felt sorry for the injured, it was hard but I was able to adapt. Myself. In the morning I would put bandages on the injured. We would remove the bandages, cleaned the wounds and washed the bandages with warm water and then let them sun dry. Once dry then they would be used again to treat wounds. We would do all this without wearing gloves. That situation caused me some impression but it had to be like that because we didn't have enough quantities and we were getting many ill and injured people from different parts of the Cabo Delgado Front (Nambudi – Mocímboa da Praia, Mueda). We didn't have what we would call a hospital; we called hospital to huts that were located in the bush and with medicines in our backpacks. When we had a case that was beyond our treatment conditions, the patient would be transferred to the Mozambican Hospital (Hospital Américo Boavida) situated in Tanzania. The journey would be done by foot, that is, the patients were carried in stretchers by the freedom fighters and accompanied by the paramedics to the border with Tanzania. After completing my first aid course, I remained to work there till the early 1968.<sup>163</sup>

Hélder Martins, the medical doctor responsible for the medical services during the liberation struggle, stated: at that time, we didn't have personnel, we didn't have materials. We were forced to seek new solutions to our problems.<sup>164</sup> To face the serious medical problems, FRELIMO was forced to improvise”.

Elizabeth Matope describes her first aid experience at the Tete Front. She bluntly said: “After completing the military training, in 1971, early 1972, I went to do a first aid course in Nachingwea, led by Leonardo Cumbe. When I returned to Tete I worked as a paramedic for a while at the Kassuende base and then I was sent to the Chimamba Base Hospital, a site isolated from the population. My work was, really, to assist the freedom fighters and to train new first aiders. As we didn't have many patients, we used to cook some food also. If we had any cases of illness or

(163) Interview with Maria Manuel Nkavandeka (Bairro Central, Maputo, 26th May 2007).

(164) Martins, Hélder. “Interview with Dr. Helder Martins.” *World Medicine*. 2. 26<sup>th</sup> January 1977:22.

injuries beyond our capabilities, patients would be transferred to Kassuende and thereafter to Zambia.<sup>165</sup>

FRELIMO cared about the health of the populations, so it opened the primary care health centres and district centres where the illnesses and war injuries of the population were treated, and also would send nurses to visit the villages periodically, to discuss issues related with adequate nutrition, breastfeeding and hygiene campaigns in the liberated areas. Deolinda Lobengula, who joined the FRELIMO guerrillas in Manica, in April 1974, explained that after some period of military training, her task consisted in rendering first aid to the freedom fighters and to the population in general.<sup>166</sup>

### *The orphanage*

Another task of a female nature, clearly designed by the women themselves, was FRELIMO's care for the children for example, Marina Pachinuapa said that, since the early days of the liberation struggle at the Cabo Delgado Front, the bases started to receive children non-accompanied by their parents and they were under the care of the Women's Detachment.<sup>167</sup> Indeed, the orphanage work was developed with excitement by Josina Muthemba (later Machel) after her appointment to head the Department of Social Affairs of FRELIMO. Her main concern was towards the children whose parents had been killed, injured or disabled as a result of their participation in the liberation struggle; with the refugees, people with disabilities and the population. For example, in December 1970 and February 1971, Josina Machel travelled to Niassa and to Cabo Delgado to organize the orphanages and carry out social assistance activities.<sup>168</sup>

José Sululu, former Commander of the Niassa Front, reported: "After the building of the Matchedge orphanage, there were women fighters that looked after children. Maria Matola was in charge of the orphanage".<sup>169</sup> In support of Sululu's narrative, Mónica Chitupila, of the Women's Detachment, explained that "one part of the Women's Detachment, in Niassa, was responsible for collecting, feeding and educating the children".<sup>170</sup>

Elizabeth Matope recalled that, in 1971 she was transferred from the Chimamba Base to the Africa Orphanage Centre, at the Tete Front, located in the 2<sup>nd</sup> Sector, to help the orphans, combatants' children or of the population in general. Although their main task was of first aid, they would help in housekeeping, farming and cooking. She still recalls that "the infants' feeding was not milk because there was none.

(165) Interview with Elizabeth Matope (Bairro Guava, Maputo, 13th May 2007).

(166) Interview with Deolinda Lobengula (Manica, 3rd February 2008).

(167) Interview with Marina Pachinuapa, (Matola, Maputo, 6th June 2007).

(168) Matusse, Renato e Malique, Josina. *Josina Machel: Ícone da emancipação da mulher moçambicana*. Maputo: 2008: See page 110.

(169) Interview with José Sululu (Maputo, 13th September 2008).

(170) Interview with Mónica Chitupila (Maputo, 12 th December 2008).

We would use *maçanica* (wild deciduous fruit), fruit pulp to make milk or porridge and we would spoon-feed new-borns. Surprisingly these ‘‘new-borns’’ today are adults, tall and strong’’.<sup>171</sup>

Although Bassaliza Jonas Mwitikile had not lived or visited Tunduru, she told us that the orphan children of hinterland Mozambique (war zones) were accepted and placed under the care of the Women’s Detachment in Tunduru. She described the detachment’s work as being related with feeding, washing, cleaning of sleeping quarters, child care and monitoring of schooling.<sup>172</sup> In agreement with Bassaliza’s description Mariana Pachinuapa recalled that Josina had dedicated her life caring for the children at the Tunduru Centre and in the liberated areas.<sup>173</sup>

### *Food Production*

Despite the challenges caused by the deplorable conditions and the situation created by the war, members of the Women’s Detachment were responsible for providing food to the liberation fighters, the orphans and new arrivals to the FRELIMO’s areas. Teresa Njasse, member of the Women’s Detachment told us that when she went to the Mele Front, after combat, the Detachment was instructed to open the fields for the growing of cassava and maize to help the populations that had fled from the Portuguese areas. This was creating the conditions favourable for the population and when the situation was stabilized the combatants would return the land to the Committee.<sup>174</sup> On the same line, Elizabeth Matope referred that, apart from her paramedic work, she works on the fields (*machamba*) as a means to solving the shortage of food at the Chamamba Base Hospital and at the Africa Orphanage Centre at the Tete frontline.<sup>175</sup>

### *Women in the villages in times of war*

In the type of guerrilla war fought in Mozambique, the civilian and military structures of the Portuguese colonial regime acknowledged that the conquest and fidelity of the Mozambican people constituted an effective barrier that prevented the propagation of the subversion. So they had to develop the so-called ‘‘Military Anthropology,’’ which is the study of ethnic and linguistic groups of Mozambique and the organization village settlements for the re-settlement of the Mozambican population.<sup>176</sup>

(171) Interview with Elizabeth Matope (Maputo, 12 th December 2008).

(172) Interview with Jonas Bassaliza Mwitikile (Bairro Militar, Maputo, 10 th March 2007).

(173) Interview with Marina Pachinuapa (Matola, Maputo, 6 th June 2007).

(174) Interview with Teresa Njasse (Maputo, 11 th October 2007).

(175) Interview with Elizabeth Matope (Bairro Guava, Maputo, 13 th May 2007).

(176) Coelho, João Paulo Borges. *O início da luta armada em Tete, 1968-1969: A primeira fase da guerra e a reacção colonial*. Maputo: 1989; Souto, Amélia Neves. *Caetano e o caso do Império: Administração e Guerra Colonial em Moçambique durante o Marcelismo*. Porto: 2007.

According to Isaacman e Isaacman, in 1965, Portugal begun putting in practice the ‘scorched earth’ policy along the border with Tanzania, in Cabo Delgado and, at the same time, concentrating thousands of peasants in villages surrounded by barbed-wire. In 1966, the colonial state started a similar forced re-settlement program in the province of Niassa which was expanded to Tete two years later. In the early 1970, in Niassa, 160 000 peasants were resettled and, in Cabo Delgado, the total would be more than 270 000, nearly 50% of the Mozambican population in each province. In Tete, the main combat zone, after 1968, nearly 60% of the population, more than 250 000 people.<sup>177</sup>

For FRELIMO the integration of common people into the liberation struggle was a key characteristic of its strategy. FRELIMO’s leadership maintained that “people are for the guerrilla like water for the fish. Fish can’t live out of the water. Without people, that is, without the people’s support, freedom fighters cannot survive”.<sup>178</sup> To materialize such union FRELIMO had mobilized, protected and involved the population in the political and military struggle and also improved the quality of their lives.

The integration of common people in the political process and the institutionalization of the principles of the participation of the masses proved more difficult than to obtain new recruits. The majority of the people intimidated by the colonial regime initially was reluctant to join or support FRELIMO. But after a while many accepted to move into the liberated areas, to support the guerrilla, and some had even taken up arms, as explained by Modesta:

We could gain the collaboration of women through the mobilization, done by me and other women who had political training at the FRELIMO’s *Branch*, women were urged to take their social duties seriously and understand that, without their cooperation as producers, carriers and mothers there would be no nationalist fighters and, by extension, no freedom at all. Without freedom, the oppression and exploitation resulting from colonialism would continue.<sup>179</sup>

Maria Nkavandeka added: “Very often, women, escorted by the Youth League, would bring food for the delegation or base of the freedom fighters, hideouts in the bush and in the mountains.”<sup>180</sup> As the guerrillas would soon more time in the operational zones (combat fields), women would carry the war equipment and food (weapons, ammunition, mines) hidden in their clothes into these areas. Elizabeth Matope recalls very well:

(177) Isaacman, Allen F. e Isaacman, Barbara. Moçambique: *Do Colonialismo à Revolução*. 1900–1982. Colorado: Westview Press, 1983: See pp.100-101.

(178) Departamento do Trabalho Ideológico da FRELIMO. *O processo revolucionário da guerra popular de libertação*. Maputo. 1977: See p. 101.

(179) Interview with Modesta Daniel (Bairro Central, Maputo, 12th May 2007).

(180) Interview with Maria Manuel Nkavandeka (Bairro Central, Maputo, 12 th May 2007).

In November 1972, I was operating as a first aider when I was incorporated into combat action in Chingoze – 3rd Sector of Tete, led by [Sebastião] Marcos Mabote, José Moiane, Américo Fumo, Machanguane e Cambanje. The women from the village and the Women’s Detachment – 2nd Sector, were carrying war materials, food and medicines. This group remain in the rear-guard to ensure supplies. It was the first time I was at the front, I was scared, but the guerrillas defeated the enemy.<sup>181</sup>

In support of Elizabeth’s report, Lucia Tazama said:

When the war begun west of Niassa, women had to walk long distances; there were no roads and vehicles, they carried tons of war materials at their heads, from Mutomoni (a village in Tanzania near Mozambique) to West or Southern Niassa.<sup>182</sup>

As “mothers”, one of the key tasks of women was to ensure “their brothers”, the guerrillas, wouldn’t go fighting with empty stomachs. Women in the village not only had the obligation to supply the bases, but also to treat the freedom fighters in a maternal manner who were living in the bush. Bassaliza Jonas Mwitikile joined FRELIMO in the early stages of the war but lived in the liberated areas. She explained that the civilians carried war materials and food, but also produced and cooked food, and mobilized and organized the populations. As per the memories of a village leader contained in the following testimony:

In the beginning of the liberation struggle, the people were asked to cook and supply food to the freedom fighters. More or less three years later, the guerrillas met with the people asking them to carry war materials from Tanzania. It was in the implementation of this call that I became a leader in the recruitment of women to carry such materials. I mobilized the women. That’s why I used to tell them: “Sister, I’m inviting you to carry war materials”. And they would answer:” No I can’t because I have a lot of work to do in my farming fields (*machamba*)”. And I insisted: “No, my sister, no. If you think that way, how can our freedom fighters fight with weapons without bullets? Without bullets the war will stop. This is our struggle. So, my sister, stand up and come with me. Look, this is my eldest sister but she belongs to my working group”. In order to fetch weapons from Tanzania, we would strategically use different trails such as the Chilido road, the N’gapa road, but then after a while the Portuguese ambushed us at those roads and part of the population died trying to accomplish their tasks.<sup>183</sup>

To corroborate Bassaliza’s testimony, Teresa Njasse, a fighter at the Cabo Delgado Front recalled proudly:

The guerrillas’ food hinterland Mozambique did not come from Tanzania. It was being produced by the populations who worked the whole day in their small farms (*machambas*) to sufficiently feed their families and the freedom fighters. In this war, those who worked harder weren’t those that were doing the shooting

(181) Interview with Elizabeth Matope (Bairro Guava, Maputo, 12 de Maio de 2007).

(182) Interview with Lúcia Tazama (Bairro Central, Maputo, 7 de Fevereiro de 2007).

(183) Interview with Bassaliza Jonas Mwitikile (Bairro Central, Maputo, 10 de Março de 2007).

but rather those people who were feeding them: the people who were carrying the war materials. It wasn't the comrades, but rather the population with their children at their backs, without eating. It was the population that worked hard to feed the freedom fighters until the end of the war. It was the people who would go to Tanzania to sell the surplus of their production, such as maize, cashew nuts and sunflower, in order to buy other goods such as salt. Back at home, whoever had bought salt would give some to the comrades. Anyone living far away from the comrades would donate the proceeds to the Committee, so that the latter would have it delivered to the guerrilla bases.<sup>184</sup>

Peter Spacek, a journalist from the People's Democratic Republic of Germany, was impressed with the life in liberated areas. He said:

“of the many impressions I can mention a few, in general terms: I already knew that FRELIMO had extensive liberated areas and that it helped the peoples to build a new life. But I never expected to find such a high and efficient level of development to the smallest detail: the agricultural production in the fields with corn, rice, cassava on such incredible dimensions under guerrilla conditions (...) The transport system – everything was carried on the shoulders or at the head, throughout hundreds of km – not only war materials but mainly for the export of cashew and peanut nuts to be exchanged for clothing, shoes, etc. necessary for the people”.<sup>185</sup>

It is important to mention that, in October 1966, the Central Committee of FRELIMO had reviewed issues related with production and the economy in the liberated areas and acknowledged some progress and “the liberated zones it became necessary to develop the agriculture and industry – even the handicraft – and trade as a means to produce essential goods”.<sup>186</sup>

### Women's Organizations

As described in this chapter, women had participated in various forms of resistance against the Portuguese colonial domination. The I FRELIMO Congress, organized in June 1962, approved a resolution in which it undertook to promote the social and cultural development of the Mozambican women and to encourage the formation and consolidation of trade unions and student, youth and women's organizations.<sup>187</sup> Thus, Mozambican women from different origins and life experiences, hinterland or abroad trusted FRELIMO. The testimonies recorded further on in this chapter, demonstrate that some already had a developed political conscience, through observation, accounts by their parents, or personal experience on the Portuguese oppression and exploitation.; some had followed their husbands while others accompanied their parents or relatives.

The daily life in Tanzania and in war zones in Mozambican soil required organization with the involvement of the women. At their own initiative, women were actively involved in the mobilization of the population

(184) Interview with Teresa Njasse (Maputo, 11 de Outubro de 2007).

(185) *Mozambican Revolution*. n°42 (1970): See p.15-16.

(186) Martins, Hélder. *Porquê Sakrani*: See p.321-322.

(187) Muiuane, Armando Pedro. *Datas e Documentos*: See p.20-21.

for the liberation struggle, supporting the integration of refugees, selling FRELIMO cards, providing food for the fighters, cloth making, food production for the military bases, transport of war materials, caring for orphans, sick and injured and participating in the combats. The histories of the women's lives and existing records reveal that during the liberation struggle 3 women's organizations were created, i.e. LIFEMO – FRELIMO's Women's League (Mozambican Women's League), DF – Women's Detachment and the OMM – Organization of the Mozambican Women.

*LIFEMO – Liga das Mulheres Moçambicanas / Liga Feminina de Moçambique*

LIFEMO – Mozambican Women's League was born immediately after FRELIMO's creation, in Tanzania in 1962. At that time the Mozambican women that had fled from Mozambique “try to organize themselves to participate in the liberation struggle”.<sup>188</sup> Initially, the objective of these women was to support the families of those joining FRELIMO and to mobilize the people for the liberation struggle. The League also represented the Mozambican women in international conferences, for example, in Dar-es-Salam, Cairo, Beijing and Moscow. In 1966 (31<sup>st</sup> May to 4th June) the 1st LIFEMO Congress was organized in Mbeya, Tanzania.

The Congress analysed the work performed, established new plans and reviewed the League's structure, culminating with the drafting of the new constitution, work expansion into the hinterland of Mozambique, the cooperation between the League and FRELIMO and the cooperation with other women's organizations in Africa and elsewhere in the world. The Chairperson, Celina Simango, reaffirmed that LIFEMO would work with FRELIMO in the struggle, in general, and in the tasks of national reconstruction.<sup>189</sup> Addressing the Congress participants, Eduardo Mondlane, Chairman of FRELIMO, highlighted the key areas requiring women's work, such as: the integration of women in the struggle, in the militias, as messengers of intelligence services, in underground work, assistance in the transport of war materials, food and clothing for the combatants, in production and administration.<sup>190</sup>

Once the war had begun, in 1964, it became necessary for the League to become aware of the political, social and military reality of Mozambique, that is, of all the areas mentioned in Mondlane's speech, but unfortunately, LIFEMO was unable to carry out its intents. For example, Marina Pachinuapa argued that “LIFEMO had not been established in the interior of Mozambique (...). It was formed by ladies coming from Dar-es-Salam and M'twana to Mbeya who had

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(188) Muiuane, Armando Pedro. *Datas e Documentos*. See p.20-21.

(189) *Mozambican Revolution*. n°25 (1966): See pp.4-5.

(190) *Ibid*.

never worked in Mozambique (hinterland)”.<sup>191</sup> Likewise, Paulina Mateus explained:

After our military training in Nachingwea, the Central Committee of FRELIMO summoned Uria Simango’s wife (Celina Simango), head of LIFEMO to inform her that in Mozambique there were women fighters that were doing an excellent work for the women’s liberation struggle. It was necessary to establish some link with this group of women and LIFEMO should have started to do the same. LIFEMO’s leader did not accept this new role for her organization. LIFEMO was an association of housewives, an organization formed by women residing mostly in Dar-es-Salaam, wives of FRELIMO’s leaders, and others that frequently attended the Instituto Moçambicano (...). In response to the LIFEMO’s position, FRELIMO started to support the work that was being done by women hinterland Mozambique, because that was the work FRELIMO needed (...). Later, comrade Josina Muthemba (Machel) was appointed as the Head of the Department of Women’s Affairs.<sup>192</sup>

In corroboration to Paulina’s narrative, Maria Francisca Dlakhama stated that Samora Machel disagreed with the existence of LIFEMO because, for him, this organization should have been doing its work hinterland Mozambique, which was where the war was happening.<sup>193</sup>

These reports show, in part, the challenges faced by LIFEMO to adapt itself to the new war conditions without being integrated both in the military bases and in the liberated areas. However, Samora Machel, Chairman of FRELIMO, in his speech at the 1st Congress of the Organization of the Mozambican Women, eloquently made the following description:

LIFEMO was created in Mbeya, in June 1966. In that meeting there were only participants that were marginal members to the struggle. Women that were not elected leaders were ignorant in matters related to the struggle and the country and that selected some tasks alien to the objectives of the struggle. And, few months after the 1st LIFEMO congress only the names of its leaders remained. LIFE has disintegrated and has disappeared as rotten fruit. Why?

When LIFEMO was established, the revolutionary process was in its beginning. In this context, the challenge of the struggle for the emancipation of women was understandable. It is nearly impossible to separate women’s emancipation from the development of the revolution.

Accordingly, for LIFEMO to talk on behalf of women’s emancipation it was merely an empty oral exercise. That was the problem. In this particular moment, women in general were not involved in the struggle. More importantly, it’s that the women that were involved in the war were discriminated; they weren’t invited to participate in the Congress (1st LIFEMO Congress in 1966). Deprived of tasks and sense of duty, LIFEMO was destined to disappear and to become anaemic and to die. And that’s what happened.<sup>194</sup>

(191) Interview with Marina Pachinuapa (Matola, Maputo, 6th June 2007).

(192) Interview with Paulina Mateus (Sommerschield, Maputo, 11 th October 2007).

(193) Interview with Maria Francisca Dlakhama (Maputo).

(194) Organização da Mulher Moçambicana. *Samora Machel e a Mulher Moçambicana*. Maputo: 2008: VSee pp.21-23.

In April 1969, the Central Committee of FRELIMO decided to merge LIFEMO with the Women's Detachment.<sup>195</sup> In fact, when LIFEMO was established, the FRELIMO's structures had not yet been consolidated, the leadership was still in a process of learning and the war was still at an embryonic stage, and the members of LIFEMO were urbanized, with difficulties to adapt their activities to the new demands of the war and to work closely with the peasant women and the members of the WD hinterland of Mozambique. All these factors led to the failure of this organization.

### *Women's Detachment*

The Women's Detachment (WD) – an integral part of FRELIMO's army and of the People's Forces of Liberation of Mozambique, an armed political brigade – was formed by women combatants for the liberation struggle. Contrary to the official discourse, the WD was created by women, who were initially challenged by the need for self-defence, mobilization and population defence in the liberated or war zones and, later, challenged by the need to liberate women from male domination, which had been inherited from traditional values. According to previous reports, in 1965 a group of girls from Cabo Delgado, who were living in Base Maputo and were working as political mobilizers, had asked the commander to provide them with military training. The commander agreed. In 1966, due to the insistence of these women in wanting to join the fighting, Commander Nhatimbo granted them a military mission which they completed with success. It was also at the end of 1966 when Filipe Samuel Magaia, when visiting Cabo Delgado was surprised by the number of women and by the work of the girls at that base. Later, Paulo Kankhomba informed that the leadership had agreed with Magaia's idea and, therefore, it was time for them to undergo military training, in Nachingwea. In February 1967, 25 girls left Cabo Delgado to Nachingwea, on the 4th March.<sup>196</sup> Other studies, such as those of Casimiro, of the Mozambican Women's Organization, from Matusse and Maluque, refer that these women had relentlessly fought for their recognition as an integral part of the liberation struggle of Mozambique.<sup>197</sup>

In available documentation it is stated that, in October 1966, the Central Committee declared the principle of the emancipation of women, as an integral part of FRELIMO's political line. On the 4<sup>th</sup> March 1968, the WD was created, which represented a great victory of the revolutionary popular stance, towards

(195) Muiuane, Armando Pedro. *Datas e Documentos*. See p. 20-21.

(196) This is a summary of the key aspects extracted from the testimonies contained in Section: *Experiências de mulheres nos "branches" e bases da FRELIMO*.

(197) Casimiro, Isabel Maria. "Paz na Terra, Guerra em Casa". *Feminismo e Organizações das Mulheres em Moçambique*. Maputo: 2004: See pp.172-173; Organização da Mulher Moçambicana. *Samora Machel*: See p.10; Matusse, Renato e Malique, Josina. *Josina Machel*: See: p.81.

the full emancipation of the Mozambican women<sup>198</sup> In fact, by analysing the verbal and written reports it is clear that the establishment of the WD was a “work by women”, as well as the fact that the decision of the CC to integrate women in the struggle had faced resistance from the men and from women in FRELIMO itself. For example, in October 1966, the CC condemned the tendency of most FRELIMO’s men of systematically excluding women from discussions related with the course of the national liberation struggle.

*Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (OMM)* Mozambican Women’s Organization

The title of Chairman Samora Machel’s speech at the opening ceremony of the I Congress of the OMM was: “Women’s liberation is a task of the revolution, a guarantee of its continuation and a condition for its triumph”.<sup>199</sup>

Since 1962, FRELIMO had identified the need to promote the social and cultural development of Mozambican women and to encourage and support the creation and consolidation of trade unions and student, youth and women’s organizations. FRELIMO wanted women’s emancipation to occur simultaneously with the liberation struggle and with the building of a new society.

AS mentioned elsewhere in this section, LIFEMO was the first experience in women’s organization in the process of national liberation. But it didn’t last long because, in April 1969, the Central Committee (CC) had abolished it. Indeed, a few days after the II FRELIMO’s Congress, in July 1968, Josina Muthemba was nominated to lead the Women’s Bureau in the Department of Foreign Affairs.<sup>200</sup> Josina Muthemba travelled to various countries to participate in women’s meetings and took the opportunity to request financial support as well as support for propagating information about the course of the liberation struggle in Mozambique.

In March 1969, Josina was appointed Chairperson of the Social Affairs Department. Her duties was to foster the well-being of the FRELIMO’s liberation combatants, which meant travelling and working in close cooperation with the people hinterland in Mozambique, as well as with the Mozambican refugees at the bases in neighbouring countries. In other words, before the official decision to end LIFEMO, FRELIMO had created the conditions for the active participation

(198) Muiwane, Armando Pedro. *Datas e Documentos*: See pp.78 e 91.

(199) *Organização da Mulher Moçambicana. Samora Machel*: See p.16.

(200) Josina Muthemba was one of the Mozambican students from the south of Mozambique who fled and joined FRELIMO at the end of 1964. Upon arrival, she worked with Janet Mondlane at the Instituto Moçambicano. Later, she and Adelina Paindane (later Mocumbi) and Judite Tembe (later Mutaca) helped Dr. Helder Martins in the book typing process for the nursing course. In 1967, she was offered a scholarship to study abroad, but she refused, rather preferring to undergo military training. In July 1968, she was a delegate to the II Congress and shortly after, nominated Chair of the Women’s Bureau at the Department of Foreign Affairs. In May 1969, she married Samora Machel who, at that time, was already the Chairman of FRELIMO. Thereafter, she became Mrs. Josina Machel. *Revista Tempo*. n.º 236 (1975): See p.18; Martins, Helder. *A Frente de Saúde na Luta de Libertação Nacional*: See p.7.

of women in the struggle which, in effect, had been well defined by Chairman Mondlane in his speech to LIFEMO in 1966.

Without a formal women's organization led by Josina Muthemba it would have not been possible to develop a relevant social and political collaboration with the populations and the Women's Detachment. For example, Muthemba had focused her attention on issues related with the children's care whose parents had died in the struggle or that were at the fronts, or that were sick or disabled as a result of the war. She also attended to supporting the refugees, the production, hygiene and medical assistance to the populations and in improving the necessary conditions for the women's participation in the war. In this manner, the orphanages flourished and encouraged Mozambicans to remain hinterland of Mozambique and for those members of the WD to perform their duties within the scope of the liberation struggle. The injured and disabled freedom fighters could discuss and submit their problems and be promptly attended to.<sup>201</sup> Unfortunately, Josina Muthemba died young on the 7<sup>th</sup> April 1971, leaving her mission undone.

In response to the proposal by the provinces and Mozambican women, in December 1972, the Central Committee declared the date of comrade's Josina Machel death on the 7<sup>th</sup> April, as the date to celebrate the Mozambican Women's Day. The celebration of this date was a form of recognition of the revolutionary militancy, sacrifice and involvement of Josina in the underground liberation struggle, for the work she developed for the revolution and for the women's emancipation, representing an example for all revolutionary activists.<sup>202</sup>

Paulina Mateus, member of the Women's Detachment described how the 7th April became the OMM's day, as follows:

After the death of Josina Machel, a group of the WD met at the Nachingwea Political-Military Training Centre to discuss the need for the existence of Mozambican Women's Organization in the movement, given that the WD was made of women fighters that were doing political and military work and, with the expansion of the war, they (WD) didn't have enough time to cover all areas. They came into an agreement and decided to propose to FRELIMO the formation of a Women's Organization and the consecration of the 7th April as the day of the organization. The Central Committee approved the proposal and we started to prepare the congress.<sup>203</sup>

(201) *Revista Tempo*. n° 236 (1975): See pp. 2-16; Matusse, Renato e Malique, Josina. *Josina Machel*: See pp.112-120.

(202) *Revista Tempo*. n° 236 (1975): See pp. 2-16; Matusse, Renato e Malique, *Josina Machel*: See pp.112-120.

(203) Interview with Paulina Mateus (Sommerschild, Maputo, 11<sup>th</sup> October 2007).

Marina Pachinuapa said, also, that it was the women who felt the need to form the women's organization and had chosen the 7th April day as the OMM's day because it was the day, they lost their dearest comrade Josina Machel.<sup>204</sup>

However, according to Casimiro's study, some women members of the WD had opposed the creation of the OMM because they couldn't understand the need to form a new organization if the WD existed, who was performing appropriately the tasks prescribed by FRELIMO (health, mobilization, education, production and defence of the populations).<sup>205</sup>

The 1st Congress of the Mozambican Women that created the OMM took place in Tunduru – Tanzania, in March 1973. In his speech, President Samora Machel defined the tasks of the new organization, to be guided:

To involve all Mozambican women in the fight for the emancipation and in the revolution. Therefore, it must achieve the mobilization, organization and unity of all the women (young and adult, unmarried and married, educated and illiterate, activists and non-activists) who, hitherto, continue outside the process of transformation for a new society. The OMM must organize the Mozambican women wherever they are: in the workplace, in the schools, in the hospitals, in the military units, in the cooperatives and in the orphanages; it must organize the women at the bases, in the communities and in each village.

Because the Women's Detachment frames the women in the key task of the current stage – the fight against colonialism and imperialism – it is a structure in the forefront of the women's participation in the struggle, a structure that plays a very important role in the transformation of society. Thus, it forms the driving centre of the OMM, its main source of cadres.

However, the WD is not the OMM, and this organization is not the WD. The WD forms an integral part of our army, of the people's forces of liberation of Mozambique, it is an armed political brigade. The OMM involves all the women, from those not yet in the struggle to those that are already fighting at the health, education, production and army fronts, etc.<sup>206</sup>

In this Congress there were more than 80 delegates from personnel working at the operational military fronts (Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete) to activists working abroad (Hospital Américo Boavida and the Political and Military Centre). Deolinda Guezimane was elected General-Secretary of the OMM.<sup>207</sup>

(204) Interview with Marina Pachinuapa (Matola, Maputo, 6 th June 2007).

(205) Casimiro, Isabel Maria. *"Paz na Terra, Guerra em Casa"*: See p.175.

(206) Organização da Mulher Moçambicana. *Samora Machel*: See p.31.

(207) Ibid: 16-17.

In cooperation with the OMM, the latter carried out the following activities: Mobilization and organization of the population and the militias, transport of war materials to ensure the liberation struggle of Mozambique and Zimbabwe; Transport of food, medicines and school materials for the various fronts; food production and food supplies for the freedom fighters; care of the sick, children and the aged; and defence of the villages. Of particular importance was the participation of the WD in the ideological battle against feudal and bourgeois concepts and practices in the liberated areas; and the mobilization not only of the women but also of men. This was the struggle for the transformation of society.<sup>208</sup>

During the II Congress in November 1976, President Samora acknowledged that the OMM had not yet completed the task of mobilizing and organizing all women in the fight for national liberation, emancipation of the working class and emancipation of women. Amongst the various reasons that contributed to the OMM's failure, President Machel pointed out that: (i) the leadership was unable to create the structures and instruments to perform its task; (ii) The OMM did not assume, in practice, the defined objectives; (iii) the leadership did not integrate the WD's cadres, and did not understand the importance of forming new cadres; and (iv) within the OMM wrong conceptions about women's work still persisted – women were still considered as a support for men and not an integral and fundamental parts of the revolutionary forces.<sup>209</sup>

This analysis is confirmed by Francisca Dlakama: “the decision to create the OMM was a product of FRELIMO”.<sup>210</sup> And by Casimiro, to whom, although OMM was formed by members of the WD, information confirms that the organization was in the hands of women who had no role in the liberation movement, who were living in neighbouring countries and had no experience of the life hinterland Mozambique, or as women fighters..<sup>211</sup>

## FRELIMO and the Regional Solidarity

### Sharing Common Challenges

The struggle for the liberation of Mozambique would have not succeeded without the regional and international solidarity, particularly of Tanzania and Zambia. Tanzania played a vital role by creating refugee camps, granting refuge to the Mozambican nationalists, providing military training, education, logistics, diplomatic and political support for the establishment of FRELIMO and the space for the launching of political and military activities against the Portuguese colonial administration. In addition, the international solidarity reached FRELIMO via Tanzania. FRELIMO's headquarters, schools, production fields and military training centres

(208) Organização da Mulher Moçambicana. *Samora Machel*: See pp.16, 38.

(209) Ibid: See p.37.

(210) Interview with Maria Francisca Dhlakama (Maputo).

(211) Casimiro, Isabel Maria. “*Paz na Terra, Guerra em Casa*”: See p.175.

were also based in Tanzanian territory. The interviewees acknowledged the importance of Nachingwea, Bagamoyo, Tunduru and Kongwa as key centres for those activities.

As mentioned before, Bagamoyo was crucial as a place accommodating the training centre, while Kongwa and Nachingwea hosted the military training centres. The Tanzanian military staff helped in the installation of military training centres and provided the necessary logistics, as well as played an indispensable role in the coordination of the military assistance coming from abroad with the FRELIMO leadership.

Generals Miricho Sarakika, Mossoguri, Likwendo and Mawengo were fundamental figures within the scope of support of the Liberation Committee of the OAU to the Nachingwea centre. Furthermore, there were soldiers who joined FRELIMO in the battle fields for short periods of time, especially immediately after their graduation. Mzee Kawawa told us that “the students wanted to cross the river to join FRELIMO, but we had to contain them in order to organize them properly. They would go hinterland of Mozambique from time to time. The entire people developed a high sense of the country’s defence and was prepared to die for Mozambique”.<sup>212</sup> When FRELIMO was confronted with the political conflicts caused by Kavandame and his Makonde followers, the negotiations for the settlement of disputes were managed in M’twara under the auspices of TANU and the Government of Tanzania. Eduardo Mondlane and Nyerere shared common viewpoints about the importance of unity. After his death there were serious conflicts instigated specially by Uria Simango. Once again, Julius Nyerere was crucial in promoting unity. Samora Machel also maintained close contacts with Nyerere having played an indispensable role in the consolidation of unity within FRELIMO. In 1970, Tanzania’s military support was crucial when Kaulza de Arriaga launched a massive military action against FRELIMO.

Hashim Mbita, then Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee of the OAU is well remembered by the FRELIMO members by virtue of his contribution for the success of the liberation of Mozambique. His presence in Mozambique, in the Cabo Delgado area, in 1970, was a testimony for the great appreciation the Liberation Committee had to FRELIMO’s fight against the colonial forces and against PORTUGAL. Lopes Tembe, while head of the Department of Agriculture and Trade of the Province of Tete, reports the visit of the Executive Secretary of the LC of the OAU, Brigadier Hashim Mbita, in 1974, aimed at assessing the needs of the populations that were living in the liberated areas.

When Hashim Mbita arrived in June or July 1974, he had little time to spend with us. We took him in our 4x4 Jeep through about 10 to 20 km hinterland in our liberated areas and showed him the fields grown by the guerrillas or by the local communities, who needed seeds or corn, beans and ground nuts.

(212) Interview with Mzee Rashidi Kawawa (Dar-es-Salaam, 16 th June 2007). Kawawa played an active role in the support to FRELIMO, he visited Nachingwea twice, and went on several occasions to the border areas with Samora Machel. He also acted as an intermediary between Samora and Nyerere.

Mbita got excited by what he saw hinterland of Mozambique. When he returned to Lusaka, he ordered the supply of corn for us. He then went to Dar-es-Salaam and reported his visit to Samora Machel.<sup>213</sup>

The contributions of Tanzania expanded also to Zanzibar and to President Karume. In both places, in mainland and in the island of Zanzibar, people greatly supported the liberation struggle and had demonstrated it through various forms of solidarity. However, it was more from the south of Tanzania where people directly felt the impact of Mozambique's liberation struggle. Here, in spite of having to bear the bombing of its villages by the Portuguese army, the people received and provided shelter and food to the Mozambican refugees and activists. The suffering of the populations in border areas enhanced the traditional links between the two countries. Mozambicans and Tanzanians also shared cemeteries in Kinondoni, M'twara and elsewhere. Another valuable contribution came from the women, such as from TANU's Women League. Deolinda Guezimane still recalls the contribution from Tanzanian women in clothing and blankets. She also recalls the meeting she had with Mama Nyerere with whom she spoke about the progress in the struggle and of the women's participation. Mamma Nyerere became very excited in giving support and donated blankets, clothing and other goods to be distributed to women and children.<sup>214</sup>

Equally important was Zambia's contribution. The people and authorities of this country provided protection to Mozambicans so that they could reach Tanzania via Tunduma and Mbyeya. Even before independence, the UNIP – National United Party for Independence, worked in solidarity with the Mozambican nationalists. But, being in a difficult position because the country depended of the railway system of Mozambique, which was controlled by the Portuguese colonial government, its contribution had to be done carefully. Zambia hosted also the coalition of opposition to FRELIMO, but the local authorities understood the lack of capacity to achieve liberation so it favoured FRELIMO. Since the early 1960s, Lusaka became FRELIMO's household and it held there its offices whose representatives were Alberto Sithole, Mariano Matsinha, Jaime Rivaz Sigauque and Francisco Langa. They often interacted with the local authorities to obtain logistical support and to make military equipment to be infiltrated into the interior of Mozambique through Zambian territory.<sup>215</sup> Other offices were located in Ndola, Mufulira and the Copperbelt. The border of the province of Tete, from Kassuende to Luangwa were

(213) Interview with Ambassador Lopes Tembe (Maputo, 2007).

(214) See: Talk between Hashim Mbita and Deolinda Guezimane at FRELIMO's headquarters (Maputo, 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2007).

(215) Although initially Zambia's support was doubtful, after its independence it provided great support to FRELIMO. In fact, Francisco Langa, who was responsible for logistics and transport, enjoyed a good collaboration from the local authorities, especially from customs officials. Interview with Francisco Langa (Maputo, August 2007).

very active and, through them, the local population was supporting the clandestine infiltration. It was from these offices that the Liberation Committee of the OAU, in Lusaka, coordinated the raising of support to FRELIMO in Dar-es-Salaam, by all means. It should also be noted that the FRELIMO's radio communications system was broadcast via the Zambia National Broadcasting services where Rosália Macamo and Rafael Maguni worked; and, as mentioned above, the negotiations for the peace agreement with Portugal took place in Zambia, in September 1974, with great support from President Kenneth Kaunda.

Zambia's role became priceless for the underground political and recruitment activities of new nationalists for the guerrilla action, as well as for the transport of military equipment, as the liberation struggle advanced and expanded to the rural areas of Mozambique, particularly in the province of Tete. The border communities of Mozambique and Zambia, specially Kassinga, in Tete, where FRELIMO already had liberated areas, have also developed close relations with Zambia, which was indispensable for the advancement of the struggle in the 1970s. It was during this period that Grey Zulu, of the Zambian Army, visited the province of Tete, and he was so impressed with the progress achieved that he helped to gather more support. The liberated areas located throughout the border developed educational, agricultural and trade activities with great support from the Zambian side.

By contrast, Malawi proved to be the weakest link in terms of solidarity, which affected the progress of the struggle in the centre of Mozambique, with the arrest of FRELIMO activists and the political support to dissidents. However, there were members of the Party of the Malawi Congress that helped to channel the logistical support to the struggle, especially in the Niassa Front. FRELIMO's position was always cooperating; thus, the leadership never allowed the guerrillas to destroy the Nacala railway system or the Tete railway corridor that were serving the supplies to Malawi from the Mozambican ports and was linking this country to its neighbours, such as the Southern Rhodesia.

Joaquim Chissano described the dynamics of the relations between FRELIMO and other political movements in Dar-es-Salaam, such as the PAC, SWAPO, ANC, ZAPU, PAIGC and the MPLA.<sup>216</sup> In regard to the Zimbabwean nationalists he highlighted that, initially, FRELIMO was very close to ZAPU but, because of the inactivity of this party, it then turned to ZANU of Herbert Chitepo, whose cooperation proved to be more useful. Chissano emphasized also the division of these movements into two groups: those that were the authentic and those that were not authentic. FRELIMO belonged to the so-called authentic which included the ANC, SWAPO, MPLA, PAIGC and ZAPU. Meanwhile from 1968, FRELIMO established a strong cooperation

(216) These are the Pan African Congress (PAC), the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia the Partido Africano para a Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), o Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union, of Zimbabwe (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU).

with ZANU, not necessarily meaning that it had been completely abandoned before.<sup>217</sup> It appears the progress occurred in political and military programs of ZANU were more interesting to FRELIMO than those of the ANC and ZAPU. The latter preferred to launch armed actions from the western part of the province of Tete.<sup>218</sup> That is why from 1969 until the Zimbabwe's independence in 1980, FRELIMO was allied to ZANU, although maintaining relations with Joshua Nkhomo's ZAPU, to whom FRELIMO had a lot of respect and consideration. Chissano pointed to the importance of the Tete province for the advancement 'both of the FRELIMO's and ZANU's liberation struggles, including the sharing of logistical facilities in bases located in Zambia. Being in Dar-es-Salaam he supervised the military activities in this province through Zambia and would often move to the interior of Mozambique up to Cahora Bassa'<sup>219</sup>

Further on, Chissano emphasized that FRELIMO was probably the only movement that was able to cooperate with China and the Soviet Union, as well as Yugoslavia and Cuba. So, FRELIMO helped to bridge the divisions caused by these alignments. It also helped Agostinho Neto, Chairman of the MPLA to seek China's support. He added that ZANU was cooperating with China and North Korea while ZAPU was doing it with the Soviet Union.<sup>220</sup> The solidarity with the ANC was also evident, not only because it contributed to the sharing of political views about South Africa, but also because the ANC helped FRELIMO in terms of contacts abroad, particularly with the Commonwealth countries, while FRELIMO provided space for military training in the Tete Front. With the MPLA, FRELIMO shared common political strategies to denounce the Portuguese government in international forums, but also provided logistical support by supplying weapons from Zambia. Mariano Matsinha gave an account of how he was arrested in Lusaka after being caught driving a vehicle with weapons destined for the MPLA.<sup>221</sup>

Furthermore, the solidarity from people, churches and political associations in the region, as well as from African countries, such as Algeria,<sup>222</sup> Ghana,<sup>223</sup> Tunisia,

(217) Chissano explained that Mondlane and Chitepo were academics that met and planned the future of the common struggle. They didn't have any ideological contradictions. It was just a problem of trust and caution.

(218) However, FRELIMO proceeded with its policy of cooperation with the movements within the context of the authentic ones, who had to remain vigilant in regard to those that were easily manipulated by the enemy as was the case of UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) and COREMO (Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique). FRELIMO had developed relations with other political organizations, such as MOLINACO (National Movement for the Liberation of the Comoros) and the National Movement for the Liberation of Seychelles.

(219) Interview with Joaquim Chissano (Maputo, 2007).

(220) Ibid.

(221) See Interview with Mariano Matsinha (Maputo, 22 th June 2009).

(222) In addition to political and diplomatic support, Algeria also offered military training.

(223) Ghana was also very important, both in providing political support and making available radio broadcasting facilities. The *Ghana Broadcasting, in* Accra, had a Portuguese section led by Khamba Simango, a Mozambican nationalist. There were also FRELIMO representatives (Orlando Dourado), MPLA (Domingos dos Santos), and PAIGC representatives (Lina Tavares). Interview with Orlando Dourado, (Maputo, May 2007).

Morocco and Egypt, which were very important. These countries have provided the conditions for training and diplomatic facilities, while other countries within the OAU and the UN denounced the Portuguese oppression. It became clear to FRELIMO that the success of the armed struggle had to rely on diplomatic support.<sup>224</sup> Furthermore, the reports remind us of the international community's contribution: China, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Democratic Republic of Germany, People's Democratic Republic of Korea, Bulgaria, Vietnam, the Scandinavian countries and the Vatican, *inter alia*. The interviewees have highlighted these aspects of solidarity to FRELIMO which they themselves had witnessed, received or enjoyed.

## *A Luta Continua* (The Struggle Goes On)

After the independence, the colonial borders of Southern Africa moved to Mozambique, who started to support many liberation movements in the region and in Timor. Mozambique's spirit of solidarity has its roots in the early days of FRELIMO's struggle. The mutual collaboration between Samora Machel and Julius Nyerere during the fight for liberation continued after independence. Once independent, Mozambique joined the efforts of the Frontline States in search for peace in Angola, in the support for the liberation of Zimbabwe and the anti-apartheid fight against South Africa; in addition to being opposed to Uganda's Idi Amin fight against Tanzania, Mozambique contributed with troops and weapons (BM 21) for the combats inside Uganda.

### *The Liberation Struggle for Zimbabwe*

Mozambique's struggle for liberation was perceived as part of the fight for the entire Southern African liberation. Consequently, Mozambique became an active member of the Frontline States (Botswana, Zambia, Tanzania and later Angola) and had actively supported the rest of the countries in the region. During the armed struggle period, FRELIMO promoted the solidarity with the Zimbabwe nationalists, by sharing the training centres and guerrilla strongholds and participating with Zimbabwe nationalists in political and underground military activities in Southern Rhodesia. Feliciano Gundana recalls his memories of such times:

When we were in Tanzania, our offices were located next to those of the MPLA, ZAPU and the ANC and our relationship began during the liberation struggle. We've supported ZANU, who had split from ZAPU, because they had a clear program about the liberation armed struggle. There was need for mutual support between FRELIMO and ZANU. That was an important way to weaken the Portuguese colonial and Rhodesian regimes, to avoid them performing a combined military action against us. To reach their country, the Zimbabweans had, in the first place, cross Mozambique.

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(224) During the initial periods, Eduardo Mondlane and his colleagues Marcelin dos Santos, Óscar Monteiro, Shafurdine Khan, Simango, amongst others, played an important role in emphasizing this dimension.

With our independence, we declared that we would not be free while Zimbabwe was not free. So, we joined them, we crossed the border and fought inside Zimbabwe.<sup>225</sup>

José Moiane, Commander of the Tete Military Front reported his experience in working with the Zimbabwe's nationalists in that province and has provided a precise description about the relationship between the two liberation movements. He recalls having received a group that was preparing the ground for armed actions inside Zimbabwe: Chimurenga, Ndangane, Josias Tongogara, Jansen "Meya Ulimbu" and Chauke in 1971/1972.<sup>226</sup> Another testimony is provided by Hama Thay which refers to the cooperation between the ZANU combatants in Tete in 1972. He crossed, with them, the border in Darwin, near Mukumbura and advanced to Chinhoyi. With FRELIMO's assistance, ZANU was able to open a new and important front in the northeast which ensured the success against the forces of the Smith's regime. <sup>227</sup> In 1973, the two parts met in Chifombo to discuss issues of organization regarding certain animosities between the freedom fighters, including the ZANU rebels under the command of hari.<sup>228</sup>

After independence and until the Ian Smith's minority regime defeat, FRELIMO remained in solidarity with Zimbabwe's liberation struggle. Joaquim Chissano, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, recalls a meeting with Ian Smith at the Zambezi River bridge, in Victoria Falls, about the independence of Zimbabwe. Mozambique made it clear that if Smith would not cooperate, it would support the armed struggle of the nationalists from Mozambican territory.<sup>229</sup> ~~The meeting took place after the manipulating detente exercise~~ of John Voster, Ian Smith and their allies who wanted to establish a moderate nationalist government to protect their interests in 1974. As Smith was stubborn, in March 1976 Mozambique closed the Machipanda border and the port of Beira in response and in support of international sanctions decreed by the United Nations.<sup>230</sup>

It is useful to acknowledge the role played by Samora Machel, Chairman of FRELIMO before the independence of Mozambique,<sup>231</sup> from 1974 to 1975. Jointly with his colleagues of the Frontline States, such as President Kaunda, of Zambia, and President Julius Nyerere, of Tanzania, they were involved in diplomatic discussions with both Smith and Vorster's apartheid regimes, in search of a democratic transition for Zimbabwe, which included the release of detainees. However, the setbacks of the liberation movements culminated with the assassination

(225) Interview with Feliciano Gundana, former Minister of Former Combatants Affairs (Maputo, 25th May 2007).

(226) Interview with o General José Moiane (Maputo, 31 st August 2007).

(227) See Interview with Hama Thay, former Minister of Former Combatants Affairs (Maputo, 2007).

(228) See also the discussion in Bhebe, Ngwabi. *Simon Vengayi Muzenda and the Struggle for and Liberation of Zimbabwe*. Gweru: Mambo Press, 2004: See Chapter 7.

(229) Interview with Joaquim Chissano, former President of Mozambique, (Malehice, 15th August 2007).

(230) The cost of the application of sanctions was estimated in five thousand million US Dollars.

(231) At that time, the Lusaka Peace Agreement of the 7th September 1974 underway, Mozambique was quite certain of reaching independence.

of Herbert Chitepo, in Lusaka, on the 18th March 1975 and a rebellion inside ZANU, followed by armed confrontations at the Mboroma base, in Zambia. These events led to the failure of the discussions and have frustrated all efforts to get the return of the dissident groups. In the process, Samora Machel suggested that the involved parts change to Mozambique, where the political parties and the freedom fighters were involved in discussions about unity. They were also enjoying logistical support including the protection and humanitarian aid that was being directed to the refugees in Mozambique. In addition, ZANU had been granted space for military activity in the provinces of Manica, Tete and Gaza as well as other logistical facilities in the capital city of Maputo. Nearly all Zimbabwean nationalist leaders<sup>232</sup> were being supported by Mozambique and all of them came to Mozambique, including Abel Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole, Edgar Tekere and Robert Mugabe who had settled in Chimoio, in the border province of Manica, to maintain contact with the refugees. At that stage, Robert Mugabe was marginalized so, for that reason, he was enjoying special protection and had to be confined to the city of Quelimane, where he was teaching at a local secondary school.

FRELIMO urged the Zimbabwean nationalists to be united and, as a result, the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and ZIPA (Zimbabwe People's Army) were formed in the course of negotiations conducted by Joseph Moyo and George Silundika, of ZAPU and by Josiah Tongogara, of ZANU. After a while, the Patriotic Front was dismantled giving rise to the formation of ZAPU and ZANU Patriotic Front. The People's Army of Zimbabwe could only count on ZANU combatants because those of ZAPU did not integrate. ZANU's Patriotic Front invited Mugabe to replace Sithole in the leadership, since they no longer trusted him and deemed him as puppet of the western countries.<sup>233</sup>

Mozambique contributed with training facilities and made troops available to fight side by side with the Zimbabwean nationalists. In reaction, Smith intensified the bombings and attacked villages in the central and southern regions of Mozambique. Despite that, as Jacinto Veloso has stated, there was a very good cooperation between the military and the Mozambican security forces and the Zimbabwean guerrillas on the other hand; the key person in Zimbabwe was Emmerson Munangwa<sup>234</sup>. A significant number of Zimbabweans were seeking refuge in Mozambique and the assistance they needed was made available in cooperation with the international organizations. Mateus Kida who, at that time, was the Provincial Commander and Political Commissar in the province of Manica, played a crucial role in the coordination of the daily activities of the Zimbabwean guerrilla forces, jointly with their commander, Rex Nhongo and the Mozambican Commander-in-Chief Sebastião Mabote.

(232) However, the presence of these leaders in Maputo was ephemeral. Muzorewa aligned himself with the Smith regime in the neo-colonialist changes of Southern Rhodesia. Sithole was fired by the freedom fighters as they distrusted him.

(233) President Samora Machel met with the nationalist fighters of Zimbabwe, in Bilene, Gaza province.

(234) Veloso, Jacinto. *Memórias em vôo rasante*. Maputo: 2006.

Kida also organized the refugees, providing them shelter and health services, in cooperation with the National Committee for Refugees. The refugee camps of Chigodole and Nyazonia hosted about 600 people protected by FRELIMO. With the infiltration of Rhodesian agents, the Smith regime was able to perpetrate a massive attack onto the refugee camp causing numerous dead and injured. Many bodies were thrown into the Pungue River which, unfortunately changed into a river of blood. The Rhodesian forces continued to perpetrate attacks against refugees in Chimoi, Chioco and other sites south of the Gaza province, with particular emphasis for Chicualacuala and Mapai, causing death and injuries amongst the refugees. However, hinterland Zimbabwe the Smith's forces suffered various defeats and ambushes by landmines laid in the main roads and bombing of bridges. The struggle of the Zimbabwean nationalists allied to Mozambican forces had defined that the farmers were not to be attacked, which caused some of them in their military incursions.<sup>235</sup> The Mozambican people, generally, rendered assistance to the Zimbabweans by contributing voluntarily for the solidarity fund with a day's salary on a monthly basis from December 1975 until independence of Zimbabwe, at Lancaster House, London and Geneva, between 1976 and 1978.<sup>237</sup>

#### *Anti-Apartheid Solidarity*

The independence brought a lot of responsibility and problems for Mozambique, which had to face the most sophisticated power in Southern Africa – South Africa. For nearly a century, Mozambique and South Africa maintained economic links through the migrant work of Mozambican workers in the mining industry and in the use of the Maputo corridor (railways and ports) by South Africa; a great percentage of the Mozambican revenue was generated by the economic relations and, basically, Maputo depended on the offer of manufactured goods and food from South Africa.

Despite this economic dependence, Mozambique courageously revitalized the Front Line States by offering its territory to serve as the rearguard for the ANC and the SACP – South African Communist Party. Therefore, it expressed its commitment to the struggle for the liberation of the region. The Government of Mozambique established a strong cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc countries.

(235) See Interview with Mateus Kida (Maputo, 25 th July de 2007).

(236) This contribution started with Samora Machel's exhortation to the people to provide material and financial support to MPLA in 1975-76. The Solidarity Bank was thus created and lasted until 1980.

(237) According to Jacinto Veloso, former Minister of Security, from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s Samora Machel appointed key persons, such as Fernando Honwana, Luís Honwana, Salésio Teodoro, Lagos Lidimo, Fernandes Baptista, and himself to begin contacts with Margaret Thatcher, British PM. See his autobiography, *Memórias em voo rasante*. Maputo: 2006: See pp. 125-6.

This created suspicions from the Pretoria regime and its allies. The South African regime became more violent, both internally and against Mozambique.<sup>238</sup> However, the people and the FRELIMO Party did not falter in its efforts and solidarity to the struggle of the liberation movements of Southern Africa.

In their narratives, the interviewees recalled experiences that describe the complexity of this process. Since Mozambique was already bearing the economic consequences of its direct intervention in Zimbabwe, the same approach could not obtain a similar impact in the case of South Africa<sup>239</sup> and, in addition, the conditions for an armed struggle were different. However, FRELIMO continued to be a safe port for the military traffic or infiltration via Swaziland, for the activists and political leaders and refugees were receiving protection, shelter and other social services in Mozambican territory. In the early 1980, South Africa intensified its aggression against Mozambique via a direct military intervention, or through RENAMO. Indeed, the military attacks were part of a wider policy of the western countries against the expansion of the soviet influence in Mozambique and Southern Africa<sup>240</sup> and not just because FRELIMO was supporting the ANC.

On the 30th January 1981, the South African forces launched a military operation against Mozambique. They crossed the Ressano Garcia border area, 100 km from Maputo and entered the city of Matola, 15 km off Maputo,<sup>241</sup> with trucks loaded with heavy weapons and vehicles, targeting ANC residences, causing various victims amongst ANC members and refugees, while kidnapping others and taking them to South Africa. Fortunately, the ANC leaders had been alerted by the Mozambican security forces and they managed to escape before the attack. In February, President Machel presided a rally in the City of Maputo in which ANC leaders participated, including Oliver Tambo; Samora explained that the nature of the aggression by the South African regime and ensured the continued support and solidarity towards the ANC and anti-apartheid struggle; he exhorted the people to resist and said: “We are 35 million, 12 million Mozambicans and 23 million South-Africans, so we can’t be defeated by a minority”.<sup>242</sup>

The military aggression against Mozambique intensified with the bombing of residences, spy infiltrations and agents in the city of Maputo and its surroundings, with networks in Swaziland and in South Africa itself. At the same time, South African forces

(238) It is obvious the expansion of the MNR/RENAMO (Resistência Nacional de Moçambique) military activities since 1977 was supported by both Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The preparation seemed to have started in 1972/1973, including the support of Banda from Malawi.

(239) When Mozambique supported the international sanctions against Rhodesia, the compensation that had been promised was about US\$ 500 million, but only a meagre US\$ 50 million had been made available and only in the early 1980.

(240) It is irrefutable that the USSR and the soviet Communist Party enhanced their presence in Southern Africa through an alliance with FRELIMO, MPLA and especially with the ANC and the SACP.

(241) This attack was condemned by the international community and by the UN. With that the South African regime exposed itself, while Mozambique and the ANC earned greater solidarity.

(242) Despite this public declaration it became clear that from then that the rapprochement with South Africa would have to be based on peaceful negotiations. Indeed, Jacinto Veloso recalls Fernando Honwana advising President Machel, in 1981, to consider peace negotiations with South Africa. See Veloso, p.158.

were being concentrated along the border, in a clear signal of war against Mozambique.<sup>243</sup> Various military attacks were perpetrated with submarines and aircraft. The security situation of the ANC had worsened with intense attacks between 1982 and 1983. On the 7th August 1982, the target of the attacks was a distinct intellectual and member of the SACP, wife of Joe Slovo, Ruth First who was killed with bomb letter in her office, located at the Campus of the Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM).

Ruth First and her companions had formed a strong research team on social and socio-political sciences at the African Studies Centre at UEM and they were using research as an important weapon against the apartheid regime. In fact, it is correct to consider the Centre as a political and ideological laboratory of the ANC and the SACP. It should be noted that the South African regime represented a direct threat against Mozambique, since it imposed unilateral economic sanctions which included a reduction in the use of the Maputo Port services, restrictions in the traffic of goods via the Maputo railway system – via Ressano Garcia, a suspension of the deferred payment of the salaries of Mozambican migrant workers working in gold mines, inter alia.

#### *The Nkomati Accord and its consequences*

Mozambique faced serious problems because of its economic dependence to South Africa, chiefly because the railway system, port services and migrant work were contributing largely to the national economy. Despite that, various forms were found to infiltrate Mozambicans to fight side by side with the guerrillas hinterland in South Africa. However, the collapse of the economy had determined the need for a peaceful coexistence with the South African regime and, for that reason, almost three years after the independence of Zimbabwe, Mozambique sought to reach a peace agreement with Pretoria, while planning new strategies to avoid compromising its independence and the fight of the South African nationalists. Thus, the Nkomati Accord was signed on the 16th March 1984 which was an important political and diplomatic victory of Mozambique and South Africa. The Agreement caused different reactions across the world,<sup>244</sup> including the disappointment within the ANC and of some African countries.<sup>244</sup> In any event, the Agreement served to uncover e

(243) Jacinto Veloso referred to “Operation Bumper” in the early 1980 as one of the major military operations of support to the direct intervention of RENAMO in the interior of Mozambique. Seep. 144.

(244) It should be noted that some radical communists left Mozambique in protest against the Nkomati Accord. Others, including members of the ANC, had considered it to be a FRELIMO’s treason to the struggle. However, Samora Machel had convened a meeting with Oliver Tambo before the agreement was signed, in order to explain him the reasons behind it and the strategic importance for the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. Furthermore he assured him of the continued support from Mozambique and asked him to start preparing for the negotiations between the ANC and the Pretoria regime.

the continuation of Pretoria's attacks against Mozambique through RENAMO (National Resistance of Mozambique).<sup>245</sup>

In his recently published autobiography, the former Minister of Security and a key member of the negotiations team that led to the signing of the Nkomati Accord, Jacinto Veloso, describes the complex process of negotiations, highlighting that the Accord was the only solution to save the Mozambican State from collapse. Mozambique continued to provide political and logistical support to the ANC, in spite of it becoming necessary to reduce the physical presence of its members in Maputo.

The interviewees recalled the serious economic conditions existing in Mozambique, after the RENAMO forces were transferred to South Africa; the war that took place and the armed incursions, across the border, that extended to all parts of Mozambique, from South to the North. It became quite clear that Pretoria was preparing a military attack against the capital Maputo, which could cause a bloody war, destroy the revolution and even the deimination of the ANC forces.

The Nkomati Accord was an integral part of our fight against apartheid, because it exposed and conditioned the apartheid regime not to attack Mozambique because the war was at the time confined to its borders and that enabled to accelerate the nationalist struggle.<sup>246</sup>

Indeed, the Nkomati Accord have restricted the military activity from Mozambique, although some clandestine activities had still been tolerated. But, as the Pretoria's regime didn't stop supporting RENAMO, FRELIMO has decided to give more space to the activities of *Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) from Maputo*<sup>247</sup> The evidence of the direct involvement of South African agents in Mozambique were demonstrated by the car bomb attack that injured Albie Sachs, in a Maputo suburb next to the presidential palace in 1988.<sup>248</sup>

In the 1980s decade, Mozambique played an important diplomatic role in search of the regional peace, such as in the resolution of the Angolan war and in the independence of Namibia. In such efforts, Mozambique had to deal with the Pretoria regime and with the USA<sup>249</sup> and, in this context, it had significantly

(245) The Nkomati Accord was equally important for the South African diplomatic propaganda in a bid to show its concern for regional peace, in spite of the dissatisfaction of its military sector.

(246) Interview with Feliciano Gundana (Maputo, 2007). This opinion is shared by many FRELIMO senior officials. The reality was different at the time. The South African Army never stopped supporting RENAMO until the cease fire and peace agreement reached on the 4<sup>th</sup> October 1992.

(247) From the the documents captured during the Gorongosa attack, the main RENAMO base in the centre of Mozambique, it is known that the South African army was still supporting the war of destabilization in Mozambique. Coincidentally, at the same time, *Umkhonto we Sizwe was infiltrating heavy weapons inside South Africa, via Mozambique.*

(248) Albie Sachs, a prominent anti-apartheid activist, lived in Maputo and officially worked as a lecturer in Law at the Mondlane University.

(249) In his biography, *Memórias em vôo rasante*, Jacinto Veloso describes the meetings conducted in various cities, including Paris and Washington, with Kito Rodrigues, Minister of Defence of Angola

contributed for the negotiations for the release of Nelson Mandela, thus opening the path for the democratic elections in South Africa, as well as for the cease-fire with RENAMO in Mozambique on the 4th October 1992.

## Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the complexity of the struggle for the liberation of Mozambique, which confirmed the FRELIMO's legitimacy as the sole representative of the Mozambican people in the negotiations with the colonial administration for the transfer of power in 1974/75. There were dissident voices, reminiscences of unfinished conflicts which occurred during the struggle that culminated with the imposition of the revolutionary line. The oral history and documentary sources have furnished a rich source of information and have contributed for the understanding of the dynamics of the struggle that produced the platform for the social dramatic changes. These changes have occurred in the liberated areas during the armed struggle, having propagated the ideology of the liberation struggle up to liberation.

The fight for liberation was a fight of the people, for the people and anchored in the alliance between peasants, workers and intellectuals, regardless of gender. However, the "avant-gardism" of FRELIMO led to the raising of opposition voices that felt marginalized or excluded, once depicted as reactionaries. The liberation struggle in Mozambique was more than just a nationalist movement aimed at reaching independence from colonial rule through the armed struggle. It was, above all, a war for the cultural change against capitalism and other conservative forces of the traditional society.

The activist women of the 1950 and 1960s could have not accomplish the tasks reserved for the following generation, not even ensure the emancipation of Mozambican women. But they have propagated the realization of the need to liberate from colonialism and for the ideals of equality and dignity. The liberation struggle brought many changes in the daily life of the Mozambican people, particularly of the women. While some had left their homeland to join FRELIMO or to seek refuge in neighbouring countries, the majority remained, fighting to survive in the increasing harshness of the colonial regime. The Mozambican national liberation struggle, led by FRELIMO, was an important, yet difficult and complex process. It brought suffering for men and women, albeit in gender specific manner.

This study is not suggesting that women had been less important, or that they had suffered more than the men in the fight for liberation. It also is not suggesting that all men that had been against the participation of women in the struggle. Thousands of men and women have died or were injured in combat during the liberation struggle and to date there are still a few fighting to heal the injuries that were inflicted in this process or to complete the objectives of the revolution.

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representantes do governo dos EUA, como Frank Wisner, Chester Crocker, George Shultz, e George Bush: See pp.166, 199, 200.

Indeed, it was the in the WD that the role of women gain qualitative characteristics when breaking the barriers of traditional society and entering into the spheres of male domination. By fighting side by side with men in combat work, women had penetrated into a sacred place reserved for men only.

Indeed, the presence of women in military bases, the capacity demonstrated by them of being trained as military persons, to participate in combat operations, being military instructors for men and women and the capacity to work and live with people that weren't their relatives, or of the same ethnic group, has triggered a revolutionary movement within FRELIMO and in the liberated areas. FRELIMO's male leadership and the rest of its members were forced to restructure the role it had allocated and reserved for women at the outset of the struggle.

This study demonstrates the crucial importance of the regional and international solidarity in the liberation of Mozambique. The partners have provided logistical, military and humanitarian support and involved themselves in diplomatic campaigns to denounce and isolate Portugal. The liberation struggle carried out by the FRELIMO freedom fighters and other combatants towards freedom has illuminated the world on the right to freedom, and has influenced the introduction of changes in international law, regarding the liberation movements. Despite facing the challenges within the context of the economic reconstruction and nation building, by involving new political and social structures, FRELIMO continued to provide its solidarity for the liberation of Southern Africa. It provided direct support to the liberation movements and adopted a pragmatic approach in its relations with South Africa.

## Acronyms

CONCP:	Conferência das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colónias Portuguesas ( <i>Conference of the Nationalist Organizations of the Portuguese Colonies</i> )
COREMO:	Comité Revolucionário de Moçambique (also MORECO) <i>Revolutionary Committe of Mozambique</i>
DF:	Destacamento Feminino ( <i>Women's Detachment – WD</i> )
FRELIMO:	Frete de Libertação de Moçambique ( <i>Front for the Liberation of Mozambique</i> )
LIFEMO:	Liga das Mulheres de Moçambique (Liga Feminina de Moçambique) ( <i>Women's League of Mozambique</i> )
MANC:	Congresso Nacional Africano de Moçambique ( <i>African National Congress of Mozambique</i> )
MANU:	União Nacional Africana de Moçambique (initially União Nacional Makonde) ( <i>National African Union of Mozambique</i> )
MOLINACO:	Movimento Nacional de Libertação das Comores ( <i>National Movement for Liberation of Comoros</i> )
NDP:	Partido Nacional Democrático ( <i>National Democratic Party</i> )
NESAM:	Núcleo Associativo dos Estudantes Secundários Negros de Moçambique ( <i>Associative Group of Black High School Students</i> )
OUA / OAU:	Organização da Unidade Africana / <i>Organization of African Unity</i>
OMM:	Organização da Mulher Moçambicana ( <i>Organization of Mozambican Women</i> )
PAFMECSA:	Movimento Pan-Africano para a Libertação da África Oriental, Central e Austral ( <i>Pan-African Movement for the Liberation of East, Central and Southern Africa</i> )
PCP:	Partido Comunista Português ( <i>Portuguese Communist Party</i> )
PIDE:	Polícia Internacional de Defesa do Estado ( <i>International Police for State Security</i> )
RENAMO:	Resistência Nacional de Moçambique ( <i>National Resistance of Mozambique</i> )
SACP:	Partido Comunista da África do Sul ( <i>South African Communist Party</i> )
SADC:	Comunidade de Desenvolvimento da África ( <i>Southern Africa Development Community</i> )
SWAPO:	Organização Popular do Sudoeste Africano ( <i>South West African Peoples Organization</i> )
TANU:	Tanganyika African National Union (União Nacional Africana do Tanganyika)
TDF:	Forças de Defesa da Tanzania ( <i>Defencse Force of Tanzania</i> )
UNAMI:	Partido para a Independência Nacional de Moçambique ( <i>Mozambique National Independence Party</i> )
UDENAMO:	União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique ( <i>National Democratic Union of Mozambique</i> )
UNEMO:	Organização dos Estudantes Moçambicanos na Europa ( <i>Organization of Mozambican Students in Europe</i> )
UNIP:	United National Independence Party
ZANU:	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU:	Zimbabwe African People's Union



# 2.4

## Mozambique

### Personal Stories

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## Ambrósio, Miguel

[Gaza, Mozambique, 2008]

*Miguel Ambrósio was born in Nangololo, Cabo Delgado, on October 1945. His father was a victim of the Mueda massacre in 1960. At the age of 12 he enrolled in the primary school at the Catholic Mission of Nangololo. Lather, he completed his native teachers' course at the Marire Mission. At the age of 16 he began his activity as a teacher and catechist. In 1962, he heard of Eduardo Mondlane and FRELIMO through his sister who was living in Mtwara. Later in 1963, he acquired his membership card through Tomé Eduardo and Focas Lourenço who were returning from Tanzania. He was persecuted and arrested by PIDE in Cabo Delgado. Released through the intervention of the Dutch priests of the Nangololo Mission, on the 19<sup>th</sup> July 1963 he decided to flee to Dar-es-Salaam with the help of João Baptista Cosme's brother, Henrique Cosme. Accompanied by Salésio Teodoro, Inácio, Ernesto Cuvelo, Makwati, Marcos and Geraldo he crossed the Rovuma River into Tanzania. In Dar-es-Salaam the group was received by Joaquim Chissano in August 1963. He was part of the group that opened the camp in Bagamoyo, in September 1963 and, at the age of 18 he went to Algeria in a group of 75 men. Upon return from his training in Algeria he joined a group in Kongwa and later was ordered to open the Zambézia front. He saw action in various combats in Niassa and Cabo Delgado and worked in collaboration with Filipe Magaia, Cândido Mondlane and Mariano Matsinha, amongst others. He describes challenges reeled with the desertion of combatants, difficulties with Malawi, infiltration of weapons, support by the populations and preparation for combat. He had interviews with Chairman Eduardo Mondlane in his visit hinterland of Cabo Delgado, accompanied by Secretary Sergio Vieira and later in 1968 he prepared his visit to Catur, Niassa, accompanied by his secretary Armando Guebuza. He participated in combats against the Nô Gordio offensive in Cabo Delgado. He received training twice in the Soviet Union. Was an instructor commander, political commissar amongst other administrative tasks. He ended the war in Chai/Mueda were he raised the flag of the Mozambican independence on the 25<sup>th</sup> June 1975.*

My name is Miguel Ambrósio. This year in October I shall be 63 years old. I was born on the 2nd October 1945 in Nangololo, where I was baptized. I grew up like all Makonde, went to school at the age of 12 in the Nangololo mission. I went to Marire to study at the teachers' training school, i.e. school for the training of native teachers as kit was called at that time, where I completed the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> grade. The school was then transferred to Marire, in Chiúre, but during the year we were studying in our 5<sup>th</sup> grade the Mueda massacre occurred. When we were on our way to school, when we returned to the fields during the June and July holidays, I learnt that my father had been detained, injured and arrested during the Mueda massacre. My brother had survived and I lost my father. I then returned to resume my studies.

In Cabo Delgado, there were Dutch priests, and these priests kept a blind eye to everything FRELIMO was doing, they pretended they knew nothing, while everybody knew that they knew something was going on, because normally on Sundays in Nangololo, after the second mass, people would go meeting at the bush nearby, next to an old man called Pascoal, where they were selling cards and many people would go to the mission. All were members of FRELIMO and the priests knew about it.

The Dutch priests knew about it, but the Portuguese priests there at the school in Marire didn't know, they were PIDE informers, while the Dutch priests knew a lot, I think when Lázaro Kavandame fled he then left the motorcycle, the Portuguese shot. The nuns in Mbuvo were worried, they wanted to know if they were to hand over somebody to cure such person if he was injured or not, etc because they knew in the Nangololo, Mbuvo, Vumela, Nambude, Chitolo missions where the Dutch priests were in the Maconde areas. They knew everything FRELIMO was doing, but kept silent and did not openly support, their support was hidden. The Dutch priests, the Napatino priests and the Cosloata nuns, who were Italians, all of them knew what was going on. Normally, the people would meet on Sundays after the second mass at a bush nearby, and they knew it. In Cabo Delgado, the Muslim cultural influence did not penetrate through the Macondes and did not have great strength, there are few Muslim Macondes. Those Macondes in Mocímboa da Praia that migrated from **Mitena** for example, created a *regulado*. So **Ndoa**, was a **Ndaduara régulo** (traditional chief), didn't have great influence in the mobilization. But the mobilization, in itself, I wouldn't say that the influence came from mainly the religious beliefs. It came from FRELIMO. The objectives defined by FRELIMO were indeed addressing their aspirations, there were not colliding, you could be a religious person, you could be polygamous, you could be I don't know what, a healer could be a member of FRELIMO, no matter what. With the Maconde influence there, the democracy FRELIMO was not defending, it easily attracted the Macondes because any Mozambican, so long as he accepted FRELIMO's policy without discrimination of belief, religion, race, that was what they like most because it did not impinge upon one's personal life.

One thing to be noticed is that the Macondes are of matrilineal lineage, you must follow what the uncle, the mother's brother says, because you cannot ignore what your mother says, if the uncle says something you have to listen to him. So, we have to conform with what the uncle thinks, one cannot identify a home alone. This was unacceptable, where was my uncle, brother of my mother, I have to build my house here, now, we can't build if we disagree in our minds, we have to share the same idea in order to live together, so that was the key mobilization. If the uncle would mobilize, the niece would have to follow him because the lineage was matrilineal, that was the issue, the issue of having to strongly respect one's maternal uncle.

The schools in the Maconde areas were started very late, because the Portuguese effectively occupied the Maconde highlands in 1920 and it was only in 1924 the first Catholic mission was built in Nangololo, followed by the Mbuvo, Nambude, Gumele, Chitolo missions. So, after the Macomia mission, but before in our zone there was no school before the arrival of the Portuguese.

Before the priests there was no school, no one would say that there were schools before the arrival of the priests in the Macondes areas. There weren't schools because if you were not Christian you would not qualify to study.

– All schools were in the hands of the missionaries, so one could study thanks to those missions. The Portuguese prevented those people from studying because it appears that when the Portuguese found that there were traitors– one comrade told me –they would build more schools and many more missions, and this comrade mentioned the case of Angonia, in Tete, as they betrayed the resistance against the Portuguese penetration, they erected there many schools, to say that the sin was to be abated by religious means to avoid raising the nationalist spirit linked to the liberation movement. [translator's note: This sentence was adapted to its closest possible meaning, as the sentence in the original text makes no sense in Portuguese. It is unclear whether this was due to an error of transcription from the original recording or to poor articulation of the interviewee)]

And this friend also said that this was the same system imposed in the land of the *machopes*, as these machopes had allied themselves with the Portuguese before the *changaan* they then placed many missions to train priests, bishops so that they would not betray them, for example, saying – this is not a traitor so we have to instil a certain ideology not to betray us so, that is what happened, whenever there were traitors ,they would erect schools and missions. The first resistant that commanded the troops was a relative of Chipande, called Malapende. Malapende was the first to lead against the Portuguese onslaught in Muidumbe, because they wanted to cross through Muidumbe in to the plateau, coming out of Konjo, leaving Chai on the left to reach the highlands, they had to go that way. So, according to reports, the first two clashes occurred there because the Portuguese couldn't breakthrough as they were always defeated. Later, they did surround manoeuvres – one group attacking frontally while the others would plan to exit from the back – so they were able to kill Malapende.

It appears Malapende died in this clash, I'm not sure, and he was later replaced by Namachacole who was chased by the Portuguese up to Mueda, from Mueda to Mueriti where he died in 1920. It appears the resistance, if I'm not mistaken, the death of Namachacole ended with the entry of the Portuguese.

– I was, at that time, 15 years old, I didn't know as yet how to distinguish things properly, nothing had happened yet, even about independence, I hardly heard of TANU, but such influences forced Cibelide and Faustino Vanombe to claim certain things, necessary for the autonomy ... because Vanombe, for example, who lived some 3 km from my home, and the place where they met in order to go to Mueda, about 3km from my place. The concerns they had to be brought to the colonial government were aspirations of everybody, and I heard that my father was one of the speakers to denounce the atrocities, to say that were

weary of that, my father, for example, spoke about the ground nuts, we were growing peanuts, sell it to them and then to see it being sold in the *cantinas* (shops owned by the white settlers) at the price of 5 escudos, and that was unfair.

– One of the things my father spoke was that in the day of the massacre when he arrived, according to my late brother who was here in 2003, he was there and when they arrived the authorities wanted to know who wanted to speak before the Governor's arrival, and that these people who go to the administrative offices to present their testimony, as they Governor had already arrived, so my father then, together with others went there, and when they arrived there was nothing there, except hand shackles, and he then stayed close to his cousin Anastancio to be shackled with him, his cousin Anastancio told me, that Alencar was there...so he was shackled with Alencar, he said that if he has to die let him die with my brother, so at that moment the whole confusion started, with stone throwing all over .

Now, when my father saw these people being shot dead by the bullets, he wasn't very worried, he was rather concerned by his son, because my brother was in that group, and he was 24 years old and my eldest brother, then he started to look and said

– My son is that one that is running, my son is out of the range of the bullets – while he already had a wound in his head, I don't know if it was from a bullet or from a stone, but the wound was big, my sister Matilde was at the Mueda hospital because her husband had a fractured arm when the trouble started , and then she saw my father being treated and brought to jail, he told everything – I saw dad and that was how it was and he was in jail from the 16<sup>th</sup> June to September 1962, we was in the Mueda jail, after the trouble then they were released, my father, I was the seventh child, I'm the seventh child, so if I was the seventh, he must have been old but, despite it, he returned and continued to encourage people, when he joined FRELIMO he was already at his peak, he gave advice to all, it was Cibilinde with Faustino Vanombe.

– We completed standard six (*sexta classe*) in 1961 and then I was placed as a teacher and catechist at the Diaca administrative post when I was 16 years old. Until 1962 one would only hear about MANU from that uprising. We would know about it even at school in Chiúre, we would talk about our parents that disappeared. When the three movements united in 1962, for example, I wasn't in any of these movements, I did not partake. But when FRELIMO was founded in June, my late sister Catarina Ambrósio who would normally stay in Mtwara went to Mozambique and told us that another party had been formed that was called FRELIMO whose leader was Eduardo Mondlane. But didn't like him because he had married with a white woman. That was the reason held by many Mozambicans living there. That was in June 1962. So, in 1963 he was already known by many people in Cabo Delgado, though secretly.

In the area where I was in Diaca, this was part of Mocímboa da Praia and comrade Tomé Eduardo had travelled to Tanzania, in 1962 or 1963. But it appears that it was late in 1963 and when he returned, he told us that he and his uncle had already acquired membership cards. And that he had returned back with his membership card hidden in a shoe. So that was when he heard about FRELIMO under that context. My friend started immediately to teach History though we both belonged to the same mission. That's when he told me that he held a membership card. But later in February, maybe in March 1963 comrade Focas Lourenço (deceased) who was from Mocímboa da Praia, came to talk to me about the matter. We agreed...Oh yes, it's ok.

So, henceforth, in March, I started the process of obtaining my membership card, because in those days one would have to be prove oneself in order to be trusted and to be earn membership. As I was teaching at an administrative post, people distrusted me. If you were a teacher there, you must be a PIDE agent. The Portuguese must have earned you. Not so, my father had by then been released from Pemba prison in September 1962. He would advise us to follow what FRELIMO ordered. Under those circumstances, the persecutions pursued. People were being jailed here and there. And we were a group of catechist teachers, deemed to be more educated, a standard six education was already rare in Cabo Delgado. Our own teachers Lucas Makwati, Chipande, held only up to standard four qualifications. We were standard six. So were superior than them, that was life.

So, these were the rumours. We were approached because we had already been hounded by 3 police officers. One of them was called Pedro and was an interpreter at Miudumbe and another was Alvaro, who was a trader at the village where we were staying. The third one was Gaspar Anaimba, brother of Germano Teodoro, who was spying on us and wanted to report us, because he already knew of all of our movements. So that's why we formed a soccer group. The soccer group was just to discuss the means of escape. The members of the group were Lucas Luís Makwati, Marcos Namachulua – he is now an ambassador, I think, in Tanzania – Sibério Teodoro, Tomé Eduardo, Inácio Rufino and Ernesto Cuvelo, we formed this team with others. We formed a team to play football. So that's how we noted that our condition was perilous, soon to be caught. In one occasion, had it not been for the intervention of the Father Superior in the Nangololo mission, who came in our defence in Mueda, we would have been arrested by Gaspar Anaimba. They had reported us, that they saw us planning something for FRELIMO when we were attending a Mapico session in Nampunganga. We then learnt that it wasn't from there, and were advised by someone that we had been reported to, the priest then ran to the administration. Father João, a Dutch citizen, wen to the administration and told them that we were his teachers and had nothing to do with it. But he knew perfectly about what we were doing, as a foreigner he knew about our activities. But he was simply doing his job to defend us. So when

When it reached the stage of us having to be defended by the priest, we realized that we could soon be arrested.

So, officially on the 15th July 1963, we broke up completely and decided we had to go to Tanzania. Each one had already his membership card in the pocket, so we said we had to go to Tanganyika. João Baptista Cosme's brother Henrique was the guy who came to fetch us from Tanzania. Henrique handed us cards. He had come from Dar-es-Salaam. We decided we had to leave on the 19<sup>th</sup>. We left to Tanzania on the 19<sup>th</sup> July, at about 19h00, through very challenging trails. We didn't travel by the road because we were known by most of the *sipaios* (colonial African police officers). The administration's motorists knew us, so we couldn't travel by road, we had to move through very camouflaged and mountainous routes. Sometimes we had to carry bicycles.

The others had to walk, such as the late Makwati Marcos and Geraldo. I, Salésio, Teodoro, Inácio and Ernesto Cuvelo travelled together. We left in bikes, because we each had our own bike. But the bikes had to be returned. So, we went in twos and I went with my late cousin Januário.

We travelled the whole night via dark and elusive routes, by dawn we reached Chidimba at the plateau. We then decided to leave the bikes. We couldn't ride the bikes at daylight, because we wouldn't be able to hear any noise, whether there was any car coming or going. We left the bikes and walked until the now Namatire area. We arrived at night and slept. We met there two comrades that had moved forward by foot. We slept together and in the following morning we went to Rovuma. We crossed and met our emissaries that were living in Dar-es-Salaam. Henrique Cosme was there waiting for us at Maúta. He fed us and we left to Nhaura. There in Nhaura we waited for another departure. After a week in Nhaura we left to Mtwara and slept for a day. From Mtwara we left to Limbe. Once in Limbe we stayed there for two weeks and met with some challenges. They were saying that we were teachers at home, full of proud carriage. Now we had to also wash our own clothes, to carry water, to cook, and so forth. At home we were teachers, but now we had to do what FRELIMO ordered.

When ordered, we would oblige, some would order us for revenge. We had to endure all of that, but did not resist. When we went to Tanzania the second group was already in Algeria. And we were the standard 4 ones, in fact, from the standard 3, even standard 2, who had to move swiftly to Dar-es-Salaam to incorporate the group that had to go as the number 3 to Algeria. So, we then went to Dar-es-Salaam soon in the afternoon. Comrade Joaquim Alberto Chissano was the one who received and led us to the accommodation site. He was working directly with Magaia in matters of security.

So, he took us there. When we arrived there, they gave us mats, blankets. Sometime thereafter, I think we arrived in Dar-es-Salaam in August. In September we went to open the Bagamoyo camp.

The first group was already in Dar-es-Salaam but they were envisaged with some respect. They were a FRELIMO's secret weapon, they were hidden in an appropriate place. So we went to open the camp, the first camp under Magaia's command. At that time the highest FRELIMO department official was Leo Millas. Millas was later uncovered as a Black American and not a Mozambican from Chibuto as he claimed to be. He was always claiming to be a Mozambican, he would speak Chibuto to Chibuto persons and it appeared he had indeed spent some time there but he was not from Chibuto. The truth was later uncovered, his parents were in New York.

– So, we went to Algeria. Our group was to be listed. I drew up a list of the comrades that came with me for some place I can't recall its name. I even have them in alphabetical order: Adão Sousa, Alberto Chigamuca, Anselmo Gregório, Anaila Manjor, António Chicapa, António Pelepa, António Pereira. The latter died in the first clash in Mutarara. António Silva, Artur Fole, also died in such clash Augusto Constantino, Augusto Valério, a certain Bartolomeu, but from Sofala, I can't remember fully his name. Francisco, Cândido Ayuba, Casimiro, Marciano, Catarino, Cornélio, Polela, Dinis Moiane, Domingos Polela, José Cosme, Justino, him from Inhambane, Lucas Luís Makwati, Mateus Miguel, Miguel Ambrósio, Osvaldo Tazama, Pedro Abdala, Romeu, Simão Carlos, Tiago Valério, Timóteo Matumba, Tomé Eduardo. We were 75 in this group; the other 10 I can't remember who. I was 18 years old. So, we went to Algeria. In Algeria we met the second group at the area bordering Morocco. Because of skirmishes between Moroccans and Algerians they were changed elsewhere. There we met our comrades of the second group, under the command of Samora Moisés Machel.

Our instructor was Luís and his assistant was a sergeant called Charifo. The camp was then moved next to the desert, where we completed our training. After the training we waited for our return at city of Uran, the second major city of Algeria. I called it the second region. So, we waited in Uran for our return. In our roundtrip we travelled in Ethiopian aircraft while the return flight was via 3 or 4 aircraft from the Egyptian Air Force, these were Antonov airplanes. We return home to Dar-es-Salaam. Here we started to experience our challenges. Some wanted to this and some wanted to do that, those who refused to eat that food. Many refused to eat the food at the site. But comrade Joaquim Chissano came to prove that the food was edible, he came and sit with us and ate the food to prove that it was real food. But we left and then he said they were preparing the site in the centre of Tanzania, in Kongwa, Dodoma Province. We went to Kongwa to open another training camp.

I first participated in the opening in Bagamoyo, then we went to participate in the opening of the Kongwa camp. The first desertions begun at Kongwa. To Zambia and elsewhere I can't remember.

But we stayed, with one of us having become a leader to lead others. Me, Salésio Teodoro, Inácio Rufino, Tomé Eduardo. So Salésio, Tomé took the lead. He said, friends, we grew up together and actually since standard 1 we have been always together, so our friendship is very solid.

So, Salésio said, comrades we came here for FRELIMO, so we have to listen to what FRELIMO says. Many are running away from FRELIMO, I don't know where to. We have to stay in FRELIMO. And if FRELIMO ceases to exist, then the best thing is for us to return to Mozambique ask the Portuguese for forgiveness. We came here for FRELIMO and we must stay with FRELIMO. Only if FRELIMO ceases to exist must we return back and beg immediately. But that didn't happen because FRELIMO still remains. That was the talk we had when we were still young. Someone took the lead, said no, saying that FRELIMO was our cause, otherwise the rest is all a joke.

There were desertions. Shortly after the talk, I went in our group, and one of the first to be incorporated into a group ready to go to the front. We arrived at Kongwa, I think in March or April, we opened that camp but already in June I was part of a group about to move to Mozambique. The others left firstly, the groups for Cabo Delgado, of those that went to Niassa none apparently had survived. We left after our group had been scheduled, with the late comrade Filipe Samuel Magaia coming to fetch us in Kongwa in a Land Rover.

Our group, who was sent to open the Zambezia front was formed, let me see, by António Silva, Alberto Singamuca, Jacinto Vintane. Those that were already with me in the same group Jacinto Vintane, Miguel Ambrósio, 1, 2 and 3, nobody else there. Gonçalves Mulele was from our group. Also from our group Eusébio Gomes. Tomé Nanculange, Tomé Joaquim Nanculange, Eduardo Silva Nihia, Bonifácio Gruveta, Alberto Mutumula. So we went to Zambézia. We went by car from Kongwa, we arrived by midnight at Mbeya. When we arrived in Mbeya we slept in the car because we didn't know where was the representative, comrade Jeremias Jacob Nhambire. So, he received us in the following day and we stayed at his home. And then we started preparations to proceed to Zambézia.

The weapons were there, as well as the ammunition, because we had to pack them. We bought dry fish in bulk. The maize was to be mixed with the bullets. A small bag would weigh kilograms, and this was no joke. They would think it was maize but all was mixed inside. As to the weapons we pack them in fish bunches. We would put the fish at the bottom and sides and then fit the weapons. And with such packets of fish we left in our own vehicle to Tunduma in Zambia. At the border we first entered in Zambia to change, then we went to Tunduma. We left our vehicle there and proceeded by bus. We would load our packs in the car and then proceeded to Rumpi. From Rumpi to Lilongwe and then to Blantyre. But in Lilongwe we changed, instead of boarding a bus

we hired a car, to foil anyone. So, we then loaded a truck and went to Blantyre. From Blantyre, there was a Mozambican nationalist, Lisboa, whose car was used to carry passengers, an open bodied vehicle, called Matolatola. So we loaded our stuff, weapons as packed, into his vehicle. We travelled with him to the border to António Silva's home. He had a house across the border in Malawi. He was married to a Malawian woman because he was from a place next to the river. So we offloaded our stuff there but the Portuguese learnt that something was happening at Silva's house and remained on the alert.

One night they came to attack, threw a grenade inside the house and comrade Eusebio Dantas was injured mainly in his arm as a result thereof. We were sleeping together but I was staying till dawn at Alexandre Mago's home, as he was FRELIMO's secretary in that area. In the following day, the house had been attacked when we went there. We evacuated in the same night, comrade Silva hired a vehicle and carried all the material to Luchendza at the house of an old man called Tongulolo, who was a FRELIMO member. Comrade Alfredo Wacira's father, who as a FRELIMO Commissar here in Niassa. So we stayed in Tongulolo in Luchendza. There were already missions here for me and comrade Eduardo da Silva Nihia. The first mission was to discover Thompson's secret. We did not learn in Algeria. We knew how to disassemble weapons but there weren't Thompsons therein. There were many Thompsons we had to load to Zambezia, but we didn't know to disassemble these weapons, how to do it...So then we sat together, locked in a house, me and Nihia and in two days we managed to disassemble in Luchendza. We disassembled piece by piece and fit properly. Then we assembled again. We both learnt alone how to disassemble that weapon. We disassembled and then told our comrades – we managed to do it for this weapon. We then we left the general parts and left with our weapons to the border. Everything was already organized, including the populations, to carry the guns. We entered Mozambique with all our weapons, but another stayed behind, we were carrying weapons for at least 100 men and we had such weapons. We arrived at the border, prepared many people, we loaded, crossed the Melosa River at dusk and moved through the Karico areas. We actually crossed the Lugela and proceeded to the *régulo* Konua area, as he was a relative of Mutumula. Alberto Mutumula knew very well that region because he had been and interpreter and hunter in Lugela, so we then set next to a river called Merico.

Our first base in Zambézia was at the River Merico in *régulo* Konua's region, we two stayed in the base in the first day, Nihia and myself, after we had buried the weapons in our shelter. The others returned to fetch the guns that remained, while we stayed with Nihia, our comrades then met us and we told the population that we came there to initiate the struggle, they were FRELIMO and those who wanted to return to their homes, could do so,

those who wanted to stay with us could stay at some place there, so then one of them raise his hand and stated his name, and he was followed by another four people.

On the first day when we arrived from our place after we secured our weapons, we didn't remain in the bush. Me and Nihia went to stay in the Kumuwa village who were feeding us and supplying us with everything, we walked all along. We were civilians like any other young guy from the area. But when our comrades arrived, we went to the area alongside River Merico and formed our base in the first day, and forthright we picked 59 volunteers who joined us. 59, I will never forget that number. There were 59 comrades who volunteered to stay in the base with us. Later there were further others who joined us and, within a short period of time, we were more than 200 altogether.

Our medic nurse, João Luís Mucumbidze, joined later but he didn't stay for long, he had to return because there were some mishaps, he was slightly disabled at that time, he should have stayed elsewhere; so then he was replaced by another medic in the group, comrade Davis Siteo, who became later the Chief of Medical Services here at the Chief of Staff, he my friend and is from here, Mutassa, and became our nurse.

– On the first clash, we were at the base organizing and training volunteers on how to shoot, how to this and that. Meanwhile, Comrade Bonifácio Gruveta arrived, he had stayed in Blantyre, in Limbe. He was our link with Dar-es-Salaam. He came to tell us that the day to begin the fight had been determined and we were delayed, because that date to commence was on the 25th, we were on the 23rd, and we were delayed, so we had to find some way to start the fighting and the war was to be that and believed to be here also in Lugela.

The outset of the armed struggle for us, guerrilla fighters was indeed another stage of the struggle that had already begun, because we moved from underground into the open confrontation, but the actual confrontation was when we returned from Mongoé, when I thought that there was nothing else left to do, just hunting each other, nothing else, the mobilization was no longer underground, it was now a matter of meeting, to hear about which place had been attacked, and wanting to go public.

– But in the Province of Zambézia the fighting failed not because we were weak or vacillating, no, but we thought that if independence was being delayed, we were to open another route in addition to the Tanzanian one. The other attempt after we crossed to Zambézia, was that of the other group that crossed to Tete, and then our reinforcement came afterwards. When the second reinforcement from Joaquim Mutamanga with Fernando Mungaca arrived, we were held in Malawi in October but started to fight there and within a month we were held so they stayed for six months. When Eduardo Silva Nihia was called to move abroad he was also held. These were some of the key things, it was Banda who caused the failure of the Zambézia front, because we, after the Mongoé attack, also attacked Tacuane twice. In one of the clashes, me and my friend Nihia sat together to talk

and we said how come after we had fought, two weeks later we had not attempted any combat further. So we decided to talk to the commander to see if we were to attack anybody else..... so while we were talking, I had my money because FRELIMO in those days funded us in case we came across a *sipaio* (African colonial police made up of natives), you would pay the pass. Nihia and I would have these monies. So, as we were about to go into combat action we decided to hide them in the cave, I packed it in paper and put a stone over it and my friend did the same, and then he went into combat action in Tacuane, but we didn't return to this base because it was attacked by the enemy.

– We attacked Tacuane twice. Another important clash was on the 24th December in the Milange area. We attacked the whole of Milange from the village to the *cantinas* (trading posts) at Borges, we destroyed bridges and many things. Another battle was from one of our other groups that had been deployed to the Mongoé Zone who ambushed the *chefe de posto* (Administrative Head), he was killed, we left his wife, the comrades did not capture her, and then we had another ambush in Liziro in Zambézia – we were keen to fight. The comrades that were heading to Tanzania would not return. As I said, Gruveta was arrested several times, Nihia was arrested more than 4 times, many times.

– Later, he began opening the road to Catur to open the Southern Niassa Front. In nearly all Police Stations in Malawi photos of Nihia were posted as *persona non grata*. Whenever he was arrested, they would send him to Tanzania, and then to return back and to commit again the same mistake of moving weapons into Mozambique, he was always arrested, the best they did was to never hand over the guns to the Portuguese and, even our guerrilla fighters would not be rendered back, they would be treated as refugees. There were no doubts about that because when the front failed, we went to Malawi and remained as refugees waiting for six months while their conversations between FRELIMO and President Banda, to seek success and authorization for us to return again inwards with new weapons. That was not successful. We remained in Malawi for 6 months, from July to December, from the end of June to the 31<sup>st</sup> December.

We left the base towards the border, we left the Lugela District, entered the Milange District again, went to Malawi, we removed our uniforms, hid the weapons in the bikes, we crossed Malawi by bikes to the other side when moving south of the river. We crossed into Mangassange and from there everything was prepared, we arrived and sent people for urgent reconnaissance of Mongoé. We sent someone riding a bike to have a look and he returned, on the 30th September, we moved nearby..on the night of the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 2<sup>nd</sup> we attacked Mongoé.

We went to the administrative post (district office) at the entrance like that cantina there and then I leaned with Nelson to avoid any escape to Limage, and then others went to the administration office, when they approached it, the dogs started to bark very strongly, so the *chefe de posto* was alerted and the *sipaio* that was there started to shout: “Master ! Master ! Bring the gun, the war has started, bring the gun, the war has started”.

The *sipaio* was really shouting, so the comrades moved next to him and asked him to shut up, they didn't want to harm him, what they wanted was the person he was calling, the white man and not him, but he was shouting more and more, so comrade Gonçalves Pendulo Mulene shot him and he fell and then they forced open the office in search of guns, they saw the chefe de posto and started to shoot....

In this attack there were two groups, our group was to attack Mongoé, while in the other group was Mutumula and Nihia. So Nihia and Mutumula were to attack Mulungo but got lost on their way and instead they ended in Namarule, so the attack failed, but for us the commencement of the struggle was on the 1<sup>st</sup> to the 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1964 in Mongoé. Our group consisted of Gruveta, the commander was António Silva, Oendula was with us, Chingamuca, myself, António Nanculane and that group.....We divided the group in 6 to each side, we left 2 at the base with some locals who were undergoing training.

–But the Mulungo group got lost, as I said, where comrade Nihia was and we were unable to attack so they returned by the same route, through Malawi, and we crossed to Mozambique again and when we entered our zone we realized the situation had changed, people went to *régulo* Pendula, , he had arrested people to enquire what people had heard and so forth. Someone told us: “Hey, Pendula is here with 2 indunas. What are we to do? Where is he? He is said to be within the people”. Chingamuca said: “I know him.

As we are wearing civilian clothes and, in the night, he will not recognize me from afar, I'm going to speak in the local language, he will reply and I would know where he is and we go and attack the guy”. So then I left my comrades and me and Chingamuca, he spoke the language and everything, then we moved forward, behind us was comrade Nanculaco, we came closer, kneeled and found the regulo, he enquired who were us, he stood up and was to greet us, then he approached the regulo and beat him on his head, he fell in the chair, the other two comrades came running to us, we tied régulo Pendula. In the first days of the struggle, anyone who was my enemy, accused of being a PIDE, would not be forgiven for being a PIDE, he would immediately execute. In the following day we would bury him, would go back to the base, and in that way, we begun the struggle in Zambézia. That was my journey from the base to opening the Zambézia front in 1964.

Most of us were young, 18, 17,19 year olds. We were young, the elders I was referring to was the old Tualibo, in our group there were not old people, there were mostly young people, for example I think Mucuate for example, Lucas Luís Macuatee was, at the time, 29, 30 years old, the kind we used to mock for being old folk.

We had to evacuate the population in the Province of Zambézia, most of the population was pro-FRELIMO, the challenges came later because there were many traitors. After the Zambézia fracas, I returned to Tanzania. We took a two month rest and I was in Bagamoyo, from Bagamoyo we went to Nachingueia, we trained our group, firstly on combat facts, then on strategy and skills and the group was formed to go to Eastern Niassa.

History sometimes teaches us a lot of things, I know that in 1966 i was misunderstood by those coming from Zambézia. The company was formed for us to go to Eastern Niassa or to Niassa and at the parade it was announced that the commander was Lima Abrão, and I can't remember who was the deputy commander. Then they announced the name of the Commissar of the company, João Facitela Pelembe, and the deputy-commissar's name. I was the head of the centre at the time. Samora Machel who was designated these people for the centre, I said:"no Comrade Chief I don't want to go with that company, that company lived with me from the interior, it was good, but when we arrived in Malawi that company has changed a lot. , there is total lack of discipline in it. Not in that company, I don't want it. He pushed me aside, and appointed another guy to be in my place, I was abandoned in the centre of Nachinwea for so long time because he thought I was refusing to go to combat action. No...no, that company didn't last when it went to Eastern Niassa, it didn't last and most of the time it handed itself to the enemy with its own weapons, and had said that this company wasn't good for Nachingueia, but nobody understood me, I was left in the camp with nothing to do for a long time. He thought I was refusing the company, no, I wasn't. Lima Abrão died in Cabo Delgado, the company was then dismantled until 65/67, there was nothing left from the company, but many people did not understand me at that time.

The Comrade commander of the camp misunderstood me, left me for a long time doing nothing, later he placed me in the commissariat group and after that course, I was incorporated into the reconnaissance group in a group that left for Western Niassa in September 1966. The section head was Candido Mondlane and I was his deputy. Mariano Matsinhe and many cadres were in that company under the command of Filipe Magaia in that trip he didn't return from. So we then left from Nachingwea towards the hinterland of Mozambique, to Niassa, when we arrived at Mutumule I didn't proceed with the group and rather returned, Magaia told me to return to Songea, to wait further orders, so I then returned later, I was also in the other side and received the mission to return to Songea to await new orders, so we left immediately, arrived in Songea and later we left to Kongwa.

So, when we were in Kongwa, we heard that Magaia was killed in combat action in Niassa, and in that mission he ordered us to go to the Soviet Union at that time to head at group that was going there, we then left to Dar-es-Salaam, so in Bagamoyo, Dar-es-Salaam we received a group and then left to the USSR. We stayed at Propo for 2 months, then we went to Moscow to undergo a command course, as well as other courses in Engineering and sabotage, explosive risks and underground struggle.

– I returned from Russia and arrived in Nachingwea if I'm not mistaken, on the 31st August 1967. On the 5th September I received a company to go to Eastern Niassa, it was a combative company, I was sure that we were really going to fight, not to cause troubles, I went to Eastern Niassa, I stayed for nearly a month, returned to Nachingwea. It was a military mission the cadres that were with us would go to solve an issue, Chipande was in the group, Odallah, Tazama, Candido and it appears Guezimane was also there, nearly the entire echelon was in this group, yes...yeah, there was a group they were going to sort out, and then I was going to lead the company that was accompanying them, so I went with them.

– After completing that mission, I returned, once arrived in Nachingwea I remained working in the recruitment and training of cadres with Candido Mondlane and then later I was given the second company of the fourth battalion and, if the memory serves me well, it was in November, not October of 1967, when comrade Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane also arrived, he interviewed me, it was in his book, which says *Fighting for Mozambique*. Mondlane asked me questions, his secretary was comrade Sérgio Vieira, and we talked, he was recording what I lived in Zambézia, as well as in Niassa.

– With the second company...in January 1968, I was ordered to Cabo Delgado. In Cabo Delgado my company was first stationed at the Beira Base because it was on the verge of the FRELIMO's first chairman entry to visit the liberated areas and my company was one of the units tasked to defend as a place-of-arms, used to enable the entry of the FRELIMO chairman in rallies and then to leave, so I stationed my 3 platoons in Lipama, Ntoliand Tini. I stayed with the fourth platoon at the Beira Base.

Comrade Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane reached Catur and visited the liberated areas, then his personal secretary left, I think he was comrade Armando Guebuza who advanced up to Namachiúte. I had to accompany comrade Guebuza, from Nangade to Namachiúte to speak to the populations, about something they already had spoken because Mondlane had already returned to Tanzania. From Namachiúte we went again to Beira Base.

My mission ended then there, he returned to Tanzania, I received my company to the central base where I found José Moiane in March. In March at the site in the middle of the mountains, we stayed in the base for a few days. On the 22<sup>nd</sup> (?) there was some bombing at midnight, by seven aircraft. It was bombed three times and people died...they came, they came... I think that in that day we didn't lose less than 35 people. The commander of the second sector, John Issa, died there hit in his back, when he shouted and I heard him, we attended with first aid but the wound had shrapnel, it entered here (in the pelvis) and hit him.

The cook, at the time, was shattered. John Issa left here, it appears they broke his pelvis and his kidneys, but he didn't die, we managed to carry him up to the Magude medical centre, where he died. My company at the Mozambique central base. Even now they call this site by the number of aircraft that bombed it. There is a small village called Chaba-Chaba, there were 7 planes, seven, they bombed, came back to reload and then came back 3 times. After that shelling the base was moved downstream of River Muera.. It was dense bush area with plenty of panga panga and snakes. This was the Namitego base. We stayed in Namitego from March, April up to the preparations for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress, where there were political problems. Comrade Samora came, I can well recall, to inform us of what we were going to do during that stage. He informed Josina Muthemba (Machel) about her uncle Sansão Muthemba's death. Josina didn't moan, she remained thinking. At that stage the guerrilla fighters were more advanced than the politicians who were excited and did not have a real dimension of Mozambique and were only thinking about the Cabo Delgado and Niassa regions.

– The *chairmen* had no geographic knowledge about Mozambique. The awareness and knowledge about Mozambique's geography was a domain of the freedom fighters. Most of whom had standard 4. In the 1967-69 period the guerrilla fighters were the ones who saved FRELIMO. In 1968, Samora informed us about the Congress. They were informing the populations and preparing the 2nd Congress. We didn't yet know about the complexity of the process. It was only after the Congress that we understood a lot more and about our mission. We understood what the Chinese were telling us – prolonged struggle, people's struggle. Unity was built by the guerrillas. Without guerrilla, there was no unity. In 1969, after the Congress, we felt the need to form the cultural movement, whose leader was Lindolondolo (deceased).

The 2nd Congress clarified a lot of things because after that each one seen with his "own face". I did not participate directly in the Congress. But the Congress saved FRELIMO, because the military wing and the delegates from hinterland were well represented. There were delegations from all the provinces. My input was related more with the site defence, with a coral group. After the Congress the Cabo Delgado border with Tanzania was closed because someone didn't want Mondlane or Samora Machel. They wanted to organize another site to avoid Mondlane speaking. They wanted to organize the Congress in Tanzania. The Portuguese thought the Congress would take place in Cabo Delgado, so they went shelling it, but the majority was in Niassa. The informants were from the anti-Mondlane wing and alleged racism (because Mondlane was married to a white woman). There were many disturbances an student demobilization. They were saying "you that know a little bit must not go to war". "Let the illiterate to die and the intellectuals to govern". Then the Samora wing asked: "How can an illiterate handle a canon?". Kavandame was telling not to feed the freedom fighters by saying: "'a hungry dog hunts best". After the Congress I arrived at the border before its reopening. I was then assigned to replace John Issa.

In Dar-es-Salaam, the Central Committee meet afterwards and brigades were sent out to explain the decisions of the Congress. Mariano Matsinha, Marcelino dos Santos, Samora Machel, amongst others, of the Central Committee were at the Beira Base. I then returned to the 3rd Sector thinking that everything had been solved. When I arrived at a detachment in the afternoon, Radio Tanzania was announcing the death of Eduardo Mondlane. I thought it was his son's death, because I couldn't believe in what I was hearing. His death caught us by surprise.

At that time, I was in the line and proceeded to the sub-base. I had affected the reconnaissance of Meluco. We attacked the Manhane Lalamo's barracks on the 8th March 1969. Commander Hugo Gonçalves, Infantry Captain, remained there. There were 19 soldiers, of which 2 were Blacks. Since that attack, the enemy never returned back there. This was the first important attack after Mondlane's death. I led the group together with Chamboco ! Fernando Massamba, commander of the Maputo detachment died there.

I was influenced by two people during the struggle. Filipe Magaia liked me. He taught me how to be a soldier. A soldier never vacillates when he has the conviction to be so. Samora Machel taught me to be patient. Leonardo Cumbe, Provincial Secretary of Gza, after the 2nd Congress, taught me politics. In 1969 I did a Chief of Staff course in Nachinguela, guided by the Chinese.

At the end of March 1970 the Provincial Council was organized. Cândido Mondlane became the Cabo Delgado Provincial Commander and I Miguel Ambrósio remained at the Beira Base as the Commander of the 1st Sector (Mueda, Nangade, Palma, Mocímboa da Praia), from Lugenda to the Indian Ocean and from the Rovuma to the road (!). Some time later there rumours about the preparation of a major Portuguese attack to Mueda. A Mozambican soldier of the Portuguese Army deserted to the Negomano detachment and was taken to the Beira Base where he was interrogated by Candido Mondlane and Salésio Teodoro on the reasons for his escape. He said he had been illtreated by the Portuguese commander Abílio, so he decided to flee, and also informed them that the Portuguese were preparing a major attack. Early in Paril we moved the bases. Reconnaissance and photographs were being effected by Dakota PB12 aircraft. In 1969 the enemy didn't attack the FRELIMO bases, they were offloading materials and transporting them from Mocímboa da Praia to Mueda. Salésio ordered the evacuation of the Provincial Secretary Base, Raimundo Pachinuapa. So, we then evacuated the Malapende base. The Portuguese were commencing Operation "Nó Górdio" with the polecat operation, by opening roads for the arrival of trucks to be transported by helicopters towards the Beira Base. The Portuguese bombed Beira Base for about 5 to 10 hours since the morning after we attacked in the previous night their positions. After the shelling, they stormed the base but we had already withdrawn before. So, they didn't find anyone. The furious Portuguese then attacked the population and arrested various persons. Alberto Pinda still tried to gun down a helicopter. Then the group prepared the mortars for the attack of the Portuguese positions, from which they hastily fled, leaving everything behind.

The Portuguese then organized new attacks, this time directed at the Omar base, which was occupied for a long time. We remained without having a bath for 45 days and the local population supplied us with chicken and some water. There were fears of the Portuguese closing the border between Lugenda and Quionga. It was risky for the chiefs to visit the 1st Sector, because I could not pay attention at the same time to both the leadership and the enemy's attacks.

During Operation "Nó Górdio", which commenced on the 11th June 1970 with operation polecat, followed by *Rodovia*, *Dureza*, and ended on November of the same year. We lost 12 soldiers, of which five were by bullets and the remainder were hit by landmines laid by the enemy. We had some infiltrated agents who provided intelligence information to the enemy. For example, at the Limpopo Detachment, where the material and buffer zone were located, we neutralized a guerrilla who was informing the enemy about our positions. During the "Nó Górdio" operation, Candido Mondlane was noticeable in the command of the operations that had wrecked the enemy. Cândido knew how to lead the battle, he used to be in the battles. Important in the security field were Salésio, Chauma and Lidimo. At that time, I was still not skilled in canons, just on mortars. The Provincial Commander, Candido Mondlane and his team understood each other and trustable. It wasn't a centralized command. That saved us. For example, I would ask and present my combat plan and was appreciated by Candido Mondlane. He knew how to listen and to allow people to act. If it wasn't for that, we would have lost.

In 1971, with the ending of "Nó Górdio", I was deployed for Artillery training in Arusha, together with Hama Thay, where there were Russian instructors. We trained with B11, recent version B21. On return to Nachinguela and after Cabo Delgado, I continued with military operations with this equipment. This was followed by actions in Mueda and work at the Nangade Pilot Centre. I was designated Provincial Artillery Commander of Cabo Delgado and went to the Ngungunhama base, considered to be the backbone of the war. The mission was difficult, we conducted many combats day and night. The mission consisted in the infiltration and demolition of military barracks. The deputy were António Silva Mutumuke and Luís Joaquim Mvwa. There were some good gunners, such as Lidimo, Mutumuke and Hama Thay.

In January 1974 I went to attack Mueda again after being ordered by Chipande. I went back to the 3<sup>rd</sup> Sector where commander Madeira was based. We did a few combats together and then the 25<sup>th</sup> April 1974 occurred. On the day of the Lusaka Agreements (7/9/1974) I made preparations to return to Chai. Many advanced to the South. I was ordered to prepare the rearguard forces in case of failure of the negotiations. In Chai I raised the flag of the Mozambique's independence on the 25<sup>th</sup> June 1975.

## Andisseni, Lisboa Lapissonne

[Tete, Mozambique, 2008]

*Born in Tete, he joined FRELIMO in March 1968 at the Mau Mau base, mobilized by the guerrilla fighters in his village of Chidzidzi, Chiúta. At that time he was employed as a mainato (laundry servant) of a local Portuguese Administration Officer (Chefe de Posto). Trained in Infantry at the 1<sup>st</sup> Chizame Military Sector. Served under the command of José Moiane and Political Commissar João Facitela Pelembe. Begun seeing action in Maloeira in 1968. Fought in various points in the Tete Province, including artillery at the 2<sup>nd</sup> Sector. During the Nô Górdio Operation he replaced his Head of Detachment, who was killed by the enemy in 1970 at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Sector in Manje. He held this position until 1974. He witnessed terror practices by the Portuguese Army. He organized and cooperated with the militia forces of the populations in patrols and defence actions. He refers to the collaboration of black Mozambican soldiers of the Portuguese Army by providing information to FRELIMO.*

On the 14th March 1968 a first group of guerrilla fighters appeared in the Chidzidzi – Chiúta village settlement, where I was living. However, they had prior contacts with my colleagues and stayed for 2 days. They returned again and I could approach them to find out about their objective. Since it was the second time they were coming to the village. When I asked, they replied that their main objective was to fight the Portuguese government because Mozambique wasn't Portuguese. At the time they found me I was a *mainato* of a Portuguese who was a *Chefe de Posto* in Chiúta. The treatment wasn't good so I joined the guerrillas to fight against the Portuguese colonialism.

On the 14th March we left to the Mau-Mau base which was the first to be installed in the Chiúta District. It was called Mau-Mau because it didn't have a fixed site. One day here, one day there, the situation wasn't yet controlled. I stayed in the base for a week and then José Molane, the commanding officer a Provincial D.D. He was together with the Political Commissar who was doing the mobilization in the Tete Province. His name was Facitela Pelembe. Then, when they arrived at the base, they selected me to undergo training at the 1<sup>st</sup> Sector, in the Chizame area. I underwent training for 3 months in Infantry, to be trained again in Artillery, where I was trained in 82mm mortars. After the training they incorporated me in the operational group.

The first clash happened in Maloeira, in 1968. In 1969 I was in the 1st Sector, in Kassuende, for 6 months and later transferred to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Sector. At the 2nd Sector I was attached in the artillery department, I was to provide support in any operation of the detachments.

The Kassuende base was the corridor between Zambia and Mozambique. It was there where goods and weapons were offloaded from Tanzania, via Malawi. And it was from there that the materials were distributed to the bases. The vehicles carrying the material offloaded them in the bush, furtively, and from there they would arrange it to reach Kassuende. Kassuende was a transit base, where goods and weaponry would be offloaded.

The commanding officer of the 3<sup>rd</sup> Manje detachment, Luís Guambe, died during the N6 Górdio offensive. He died because he volunteered and didn't want the guerrilla fighters to pursue a group of Portuguese troops that had destroyed a maze *machamba* belonging to the guerrilla fighters.

After the death of the commanding officer, I was deployed to lead the 3<sup>rd</sup> detachment of Manje. I took the command at a difficult moment caused by Kaulza de Arriaga. The Portuguese operations were aimed at causing terror, killing, reducing to tatters and to hang heads of people, so that others could see the withdrawal and see the village being returned back to the Portuguese. The village was right here, where the colonial troops had their dining-hall at this house.

I started the mobilization, firstly with the *chairmen* because the soldiers have all hidden their guns and then taken refuge in the village. The *chairmen* were leaders that controlled the entire villages in the liberated areas. Today we call them the *chefes de povoado* (chiefs) and they had a link with the base commander, he was the direct person on questions of food and goods supplies. The *chairmen* had their own elements who were the militia men and a few *sungatchuma*. The *sungatchuma* were the people that guarded the wealth and food of the community. The wealth in those days was the maze flour.

The militia supported the military. Until 1970, some of them were chosen to train and upon completion of the training we would distribute "Mauser" guns and they remained with the communities. There was a zone attributed exclusively to the militia for patrol work. Their weapons were different than ours. When they shot 3 bullets, we already knew that the enemy was in the area. They were our alarms. So, they played a major role in the liberation struggle.

In "N6 Górdio", when Kaulza de Arriaga realized that the war was advancing, he created a special force, aka *commandos* who had a cadre training. So, they had determined that they would clean all the guerrillas within a short period of time, because there were too many terrors, they thought with such terror they would win the war. But, to the contrary, that Kaulza de Arriaga's force did not succeed, when the Portuguese government then realized that it had no more action, as that special force was Caetano's hope. So, the special forces failed. When it failed there was no other force to be entrusted and that is why there was a massive recruitment of Mozambicans into the ranks of the colonial troops. That's then when the *Flechas* and the OPVs (Civil Protection forces) started to be formed... We in this district had only one barracks base of the white Portuguese troops.

For example, for us, there was a village in Chicoco, they were OPVs and one single white man, in Chiuta-Serra we called Kaunda throughout the road, nearby in Chiriri and at the Chiritse- Ponte bridge, in Kachere, all of these barracks had Mozambican OPVs. In all of them there were whites were in charge, one per barrack, albeit with many Mozambicans OPVs.

When they realized that they alone would not be able to achieve anything, they began recruiting Mozambicans to fight in our midst. They did not succeed.

As to desertions, since my commanding period, from 1970 to 1974, there were no desertions. On the enemy's part, we knew this group of OPVs, since I was born in this area, they couldn't abandon their positions into our side, but they had always supplied us with information from the OPVs.

For example, we had the case of the military barracks of Chicoco, we were doing our work there, but with the information provided by the OPVs. Our troops would leave to Chicoco and, at the time of arrival the OPVs would be with a member of the population who would be sent to say: "you go, because you know the base, leave the message that the guerrillas are here and that tomorrow we are going to enter zone x".

The OPVs were the ones passing information. Instead of taking the initiative they would rather warn the population. For example, in our case we had a *mulato* trader, who sustained the entire war, and he was giving us information directly to the base... "look, the troops are here, on day x they entered the bush towards the x direction..". and before the enemy entered we set an ambush. For them all that was a surprise, they weren't expecting it. So, our work came clean, thanks to these elements.

With regard to COREMO, I accompanied but I wasn't able to meet them. I followed the situation of COREMO in 1968 when I was at the 1<sup>st</sup> Sector. From COREMO, in terms of the war, I picked nothing.

I think there is a relationship between the failure of "Nó Górdio" and the coup d'état in Portugal. The operation failed, with many Portuguese having died in the army, so they realized that the Portuguese people was suffering and dying in doves in Mozambique. At the time of the coup d'état, on the 25<sup>th</sup> April 1974. I was always commanding the 3<sup>rd</sup> Detachment. We heard of it through the radio. Mauricio Gabriel Madimba, the sectorial commander told us to intensify the fight to support the coup d'état in Portugal. We had to something to make them feel it. The individual account I made of myself was worthwhile because, firstly, I was free from the colonial government. I was an integral part of the revolution. It was worth having participated in the struggle for liberation. Thus, up until now, I do not want another opposition force to disturb the independence.

## Chissano, Joaquim Alberto

[Maleice, Gaza, Moçambique, 2007]

*Born in the province of Gaza, he concluded his secondary school studies in Liceu Salazar, main official high school in Lourenço Marques (Maputo), being the first Black enrolled at that school. He participated in the NESAM – Centre of Secondary School African Students of Mozambique, a cultural organization with an associative nationalist dimension. He left to Portugal where he started his higher education studies and later moved to Paris. Engaged in nationalist activities, he was involved in the formation of UNEMO – National Mozambican Students Association which operated as a nationalist organization in the diaspora. As a leader of this organization in 1960/61, he established contacts with Eduardo Mondlane, then a United Nations official and university professor in the USA. He was involved in the preparation of the founding of FRELIMO in Dar-es-Salaam in June 1962 after contacts with the nationalist organizations UDENAMO, UNAMI and MANU. During the liberation struggle, he performed many functions in the FRELIMO leadership, in the areas of defence and security, and advisor of Chairman Eduardo Mondlane.*

*Trained in the USSR in matters of security, he was very active during the liberation struggle in the foreign relations and logistical support to the war fronts. At the end of the war he participated in the Lusaka negotiations in 1974 for the establishment of transitional basis for the independence of Mozambique. He led the Transitional Government in 1974 and upon independence he Minister of Foreign Affairs until 1986, when he replaced the late President Samora Machel, taking the position of President of the Republic. He developed many support activities for the liberation movements in Southern Africa, within the scope of the Front Line. He led the peace process in 1992, after 16 years of civil war prompted by RENAMO. He became the elected President in the multi-party system in 1994 and voluntarily retired in 2005.*

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I must say it is difficult to speak of the biography and the motivations for the struggle, that's a task I've already performed and I will not repeat it. It's just a case for some more patience and to receive what was the work I did, which would more or less answer such question about what moved me to the struggle, my motivations because, there is not really a motivation, waking up in the morning and to say: "look because that one hit me and I'm going to the fight, without knowing what it is, there are people who seek motivation in another aspect of their lives, but if I'm to think that the people of my age suffered the same vicissitudes, that had the same treatment. Not everybody went to the struggle, so I'm a little distorted of taking one or another point and to say that was the motive that set me into the struggle. So, I tried to deal with it by speaking in a broader manner of about something that will take many pages, if not even hundreds of pages. Someone reading such pages will say: "look that is the way a fighting spirit is created, firstly to know that there is a possibility for such struggle, which there is, but to say a little about my biography, I was born here (Maleice) at that blue house there. It wasn't at that condition but it was refurbished throughout the years and where we are here there were only farming fields (machambas) and all those buildings you see around us

We rent; here, they were machambas, so you can see I was born in field conditions and further afield you might have seen a lake, I don't know if you've seen via Chibuto, maybe you didn't see this lake, one can only see it coming from this side you can see the lagoon. So beyond the lagoon there are machambas and it's where my parents had machambas but, more precisely, by my mother. In addition to the machambas that existed in this higher place, the lower is down there, many things are produced, including rice and corn, and in the higher areas cassava, ground nuts, nhemba beans are produced, as well as cashew. As you can see, I was born in the land of the cashew trees and other trees. Nowadays, it is difficult to see a tree that is not a fruit tree, there were mafureiras, pear and guava trees, there is mafureira there, cashew, mango, orange, paw paw trees, i.e. we can look and it is difficult, there is this big tree which is not, it's a tree they call tambeira or missassa which resisted the times and grew and that there many such trees because they are building materials, mainly.

Well, my mother is still alive, she is some 92 years old, but my father is deceased, so my mother is a peasant, my father is also of peasant origins, but he ended up as a teacher in this school, at that mission there, you see. He then gave up and went to work as an interpreter in the city of Xai-Xai in many activities, so at that time when I was studying at the school, he was already an interpreter while I was at the secondary school, when he was an interpreter at the Administration. I completed my primary school studies in Xai-Xai when he was working at a trading establishment.. I completed my primary school at the age of 8 years and only a year after he became an interpreter, spending a few months at the train station in Xai-Xai and then I went to Lisbon in 1960 to begin my medical studies, which I did not complete because we travelled to Paris, already within the scope for more freedom and when we arrived in Paris we thought it was possible to reconcile the struggle actions, although in those days it was a political struggle, a struggle that, shall we say, in inverted commas, a diplomatic struggle against the Portuguese colonialism, and our studies. I was not able to conciliate the two things, and I can even say that I was paying more attention to the political struggle within a student environment, which caused me not to advance my studies. So, when I was thinking of changing my course into a more compatible course, I was called to join the liberation struggle directly at Dar-es-Salaam for FRELIMO. I was a FRELIMO founder, because FRELIMO is pursuant to the various stakeholders and my small group of Mozambican students, which was very active for the unification of Mozambique's movements of liberation, such as MANU, UGENAMO to be united.

This attempt to unification of the liberation movements led me to visit Dar-es-Salaam in 1962, on the occasion of the Easter holidays and I maintained contacts with these two movements in Dar-es-Salaam. But before that we had meetings with Chairman Eduardo Mondlane, who was then teaching at the University of Siracusa in the USA. The first meeting was in 1961, while the second, well, the other meetings were happening, I travelled to the USA

and then he travelled to Paris where we met in 1961. We had met in Dar-es-Salaam, there was an important topic, sorry, we had met in Paris and the third meeting was also in Paris. And it was after that FRELIMO was formed, there is an episode often talked about, in which it was said that FRELIMO was founded in Ghana. It is true that both leaders of the UDENAMO and MANU were in Ghana where they have decided unify the movements, but that was a question of wanting to have a different protagonism because the issue was being discussed in Dar-es-Salaam. Many activists became very sensitive at that time, you can talk to Lopes Thembe who can explain that, because he was in Ghana, and had to learn that they had signed such document in Ghana and was surprised because he was unaware of what was being done in Dar-es-Salaam. The other man that can talk to you about this matter is João Alfabeto who here is known as Joao Munguambe, about those who were there at that time. I am recalling these two names who know very much what happened. Hence the reason why we continue to attribute the formation of FRELIMO to the efforts of Eduardo Mondlane, Julius Nyerere and obviously Kwame Nkrumah, but without ignoring various stakeholders, including the group of activists in Dar-es-Salaam at that time, who commonly would be called as student groups, where they weren't students but called student groups. And the students group represented by me, Pascoal Mocumbi, João Nhmbire, Nhambiu and Ana, which is called now Ana Neto, who was Ana Simião who had formed UNEMO and that is the group that pressed for such union, jointly with Eduardo Mondlane, Julius Nyerere, Nkrumah of Ghana and certainly many other stakeholders, because at that time there was a movement called PAFMECSA, there were many stakeholders from Kenya and Tanzania. Well, therefore this was something to take one's hat off, but I think that we could talk, if you would like, about what was happening in the liberation movement in 1963, or 1962 onwards, because I left Paris in 1963 and went to Dar-es-Salaam in 1963, we can talk from 1963 up to now, because I left Paris in 1963 and went to Dar-es-Salaam, the work I'm doing will be more complete, goes to the detail, is more vocal, but I have not written anything from that date onwards, but not quite that, because what I wrote was about things with actuality, such as the description you have for us to talk about the past. So, then I describe this context, speaking therefore about actuality and thus about the war of destabilization, which is contained therein, though it is not intended to talk about that, so we can talk from 1963 onwards and in that way, I could be talking and see what can one do.

Well, when I arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on and about September 1963, there were some liberation movements there who had their provisional headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam, in addition to FRELIMO, so the liberation movement that

had been unified, was seated in Dar-es-Salaam, ZAPU and ZANU, two of the Zimbabwean liberation movements, next to the FRELIMO's offices, and the offices of UNIP, Zambia was still not independent and across the street it was the offices of the ANC, but there were also offices in Dar-es-Salaam, I don't know exactly where it was because I did not visit the South African PAC's offices, as well as of the United Movement of South Africa's offices, and then it was the offices of the SWAPO, of Namibia and later there was a SWAPO split to create SWANU and later also a SWANU NORTH, with whom we did not live.

Now, FRELIMO would relate with any of these movements, but did not have deep relations with the United Movement, nor with SWANU, but would have with SWAPO, in South Africa the operation had been intensified against the ANC, there was a lot of suspicion about the PAC, because we suspected some of their leaders were having relations with the South African intelligence of the apartheid regime, and there wasn't any seriousness in the PAC's movements, they had some very good intellectuals, such as the case of Gora Hibrabim, but they also had some controversial figures, such as the case of their own President Leballo, so the contact with the PAC became a formal contact of courtesy without cooperation. To cross South Africa to there but it wasn't for that the cooperation would ripen with the PAC, but not all members were trustworthy. In the case of Zimbabwe, we started cooperating with ZANU, but soon ,mainly in the 1964 there was a lack of seriousness of certain members with whom we worked, we would have to maintain secrecy about the things we were doing, people were not behaving well, did not honour their commitments and at that time it was the late Filipe Magaia who was dealing with them, so we had to take precautions because we had to maintain our liberation struggle with the collaboration with ZANU. ZANU was led by Chitepo who was at the same time the Attorney-General in Tanzania, he was a Zimbabwean, while at the same time he was the Tanzanian AG, although the members with whom we were working did not shown any integrity, at least in the perspective of Filipe Samuel Magaia, so that is why we started to cooperate with ZAPU, more deeply, but without abandoning ZANU, while in the more delicate issues we nearly worked more carefully, but that is for further details later.

Now, as far as Namibia, we practically only worked with SWAPO, which was the movement which we recognized as the genuine movement of Namibia, since the other one was the result of a split in the original movement, which reasons we couldn't deeply understand, and the PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau even had some representatives in Dar-es-Salaam, but an office, and it was FRELIMO who gave them support, even before the MPLA opened their offices in Tanzania.

The MPLA later opened their offices in Tanzania, I believe in 1964, but as I said previously, between 1961 and 1963, there was a movement called PAFMECA, which was a gathering of solidarity of all the liberation movements in Southern and Central Africa, they had their meetings and when I arrived, they were still meeting, and I attended 1 or 2 meetings. And that was what developed later for the creation of that forum that congregated the countries from the Central and Southern Africa, that met in Dar-es-Salaam for the growing of the movement, and not how it ended after the forum of these countries. But the alignment between the liberation movements was splitting and so a group was formed which was called the Real Group of the Genuine Liberation Movements versus the Non-Genuine, so those that we claiming to be the more revolutionary were all the genuine ones against the divisionists, so the ANC, FRELIMO, SWAPO and Angola's MPLA, PAIGC of Guinea-Bissau, ZAPU were the genuine ones. The other ones were the SWANU, SWUANU NORTH, PAC and UNITA and ZANU and the UPA, later FNLA, FLING of Guinea-Bissau, and then that Cabinda movement that appeared later, all being considered non-genuine because they didn't have genuine programs directed at the liberation, quite to the contrary there was a suspicion these movements were serving opposite interests to national liberation, with services infiltrated by our enemies, the Portuguese colonialism, apartheid, the interests, and then there was UNITA from Angola, which was also not genuine. So, the cooperation between the genuine movements continued, I don't know what was going on with the non-genuine, but it didn't appear to me that there was between them some solid solidarity as it was happening with the genuine.

In the case of ZANU, there was an evolution where, as I said, we did not completely abandon, in 1968 we had contacts again with ZANU, while Mondlane was still alive, so we were comparing the strategies of struggles of the movements and we saw where we were to have joint tasks. It is therefore that with ZANU we tried to coordinate actions to facilitate the armed struggle in Zimbabwe, but ZAPU had chosen areas it thought more favourable to it and they were located west of the province of Tete, so they didn't have a direct link with us in those areas because they thought the crossing was safer, like the ANC that preferred to try a crossing through that area in coordination with ZAPU, and it was a very difficult area, as far as I'm concerned, because it was challenging as the river banks were very steep, despite the width of the river not being very large as in the case of the Tete province, so we weren't interested to try such a river crossing through there, we would try to cross nearer to the city of Tete beyond Cahora Bassa, we also tried Cahora Bassa to anyone coming from the west but, nevertheless, we were interested in operating throughout the entire border between Tete, i.e. Mozambique and Zambia and to try finding another crossing there but were only able to do that with ZANU who were interested in it.

So ZANU's leadership rendered us more responsible leaders and we started to work with them, but even these first ones had to be replaced because there were suspicions of improper links from these people who ended up deserting the ZANU's ranks. We were right but eventually we had good people with whom we worked to support them in crossing Tete and the River Zambeze and the rest of Tete to enter Zimbabwe by the northern side.

With the MPLA we had long lasting relations, as you know, in 1961 the CONCP had been created in Casablanca and the CONCP had its headquarters in Rabat. Comrade Marcelino dos Santos was the CONCP's Secretary-General and incorporated all the liberation movements of the Portuguese colonies. We had relations with the PAIGC and the MPLA within the CONCP, in addition to Guinea, Cape Verde, Angola, Mozambique, there was also cooperation with the Goese liberation Movement, often forgotten, hence we met Aquino de Bragança who was linked to the Goese liberation movement and whose influence disappeared with the Indian absorption of Goa, which was taken without the intervention of the CONCP, but the CONCP wanted a different intervention, as we wanted an Indian intervention in favour of the liberation movement of Goa, and once Goa was liberated, there were to have negotiations between the movement and the State of India about how the relationship was to exist and its format, such as a whole unit, a federation, confederation, etc, but that didn't happen. Djaorlar Nehru initially hesitated and didn't want to interfere, but once he had taken Goa he did not consult the liberation movement, he intervened and integrated Goa into India and the liberation movement was set aside. When we visited Goa with Samora Machel, after its integration, some members that belonged to the liberation movement of Goa told us of their resentment for being marginalized. Now, this relationship with the MPLA and PAIGC continued up to independence, while with ZANU and ZAPU it was maintained until the independence of Mozambique. I can say that with ZANU the cooperation was very deep because since we supported them since 1969 and especially from 1970, 71 and 72 we supported them for them to start fighting in the North of Zimbabwe, via Tete, where our own population would carry their equipment, ammunition, food, clothing, uniforms across the whole extension, as if we were one single movement, of the transit camps we had in Lusaka used by ZANU members. We were also producing their agricultural products support in kind this Tete front, including those who were in transit, recruits or combatants already trained who were returning to hinterland in Mozambique. I personally was tasked to supervise the activities in this Tete front with comrade Mariano Matsinhe, before him was Alberto Sithole, who were the FRELIMO's permanent representatives in Lusaka doing a more direct supervision at the level of the headquarters.

I was responsible for accompanying the activity and that's why I on various occasions had visited the Tete front, at the border area, then would enter the interior and, sometimes deep inside until next to Cahora Bassa and at an advanced stage.

The cooperation with ZAPU was a political one, because the genuine movements were meeting always, I remember one that took place after UNITA's formation, where we found that SWAPO had a tendency to set links and cooperation with UNITA, simply because UNITA was going to operate in the south of Angola, and it would be difficult for SWAPO to use Angolan territory to penetrate into Namibia without UNITA's cooperation. At the same time Zambia had a need to have some agreement with UNITA, to avoid UNITA's sabotaging the Lobito railway, which crossed a territory where UNITA was passing. We thought it would be very dangerous for SWAPO to disassociate from the MPLA, who was a genuine movement, and be linked with a movement that was, in the least, doubtful, since as far as we knew, UNITA had been created as another manoeuvre by the Portuguese colonialism, aimed at creating a buffer zone in southern Angola to avoid MPLA's penetration in the south and from opening another front therein. That would interest the boers from South Africa's apartheid because SWAPO would be prevented from penetrating in Namibia. So, there would be a buffer zone occupied by a false liberation movement. But colonialism did indeed have that tendency, the capacity to create situations where a movement would emerge believing to be a genuine movement. That was the case of RENAMO. Ask any member of RENAMO, starting with its own Chairman, who will tell you a story that will go much further beyond RENAMO's origins and into what RENAMO ended up, of what culminated into RENAMO, coming up as its own making but without a previous background, where a group of young people had met and had created what came to be known as RENAMO. It never happened that way. There was a certain gentleman, called Rocho or Roxo, that's his first name, who was the commander of the commandos and whatever, groups of African soldiers, African and *Mulato* Mozambicans created by him in Niassa, mainly against FRELIMO, so one against the liberation struggle, he was a Portuguese and no one about his role. During the occupation of Radio Mozambique, on the 6th and 7th September, it was led by him and he was the one who was talking. I have, we have, the recording, you just have to seek it in the internet. Look for the desperate people in any situation like that, it's in the internet, you will hear him speaking, there one can find the voice of order to the people of Niassa and so forth, and he came with this story that they didn't want a single party system and so forth, that all they wanted was peace, using RENAMO's expressions, but they didn't say who was Rocho, who was Jorge Jardim, who was Gomes dos Santos, nothing about such people, they created an environment and didn't say who was FICO, etc. A whole environment was created that started in 1964, 1963-64, an environment against the liberation movement, superficially talking about things, so in Angola, UNITA emerged in the creation of such contradictions, amongst conflicts within the liberation movement, both in the MPLA and the UPA. It was against that background that UNITA emerged.

We had never held a cooperation with UNITA, but UNITA was affirming itself, many African countries believed UNITA.

In Mozambique, we also had a similar phenomenon, FRELIMO had its own conflicts since its formation, disagreements that resulted in the formation of new movements, such as the case of UDENAMO, the New MANU, with its own conflicts that led to the division of the New MANU, who had then disappeared, because part of them became united with the New UDENAMO to create the FUNIPAMO, who also later broke into the New UDENAMO and FUNIPAMO while another part formed New UDENAMO, while another part formed FUNIPAMO, COREMO, or MORECO, to be located in Dar-es-Salaam, no not Dar-es-Salaam sorry, it went to Lusaka, and therefore false liberation movements. They sought congregated people who, for their ambition, fell into the trap of manoeuvres set up by our own enemies to weaken the national liberation movement. We even knew that the Portuguese tried to create a buffer zone using COREMO, but then it suffered another division, proving that they weren't solid movements. There was another split in COREMO, where Adelino Guambe was booted out and he grabbed the leadership and continued.

So our solidarity between the genuine movements was also to monitor such manoeuvres from our enemies, by speaking as one voice about the liberation of Africa, especially of Southern Africa. Southern Africa if we include Angola, because Angola at that time was grouped in Central Africa. West Africa was formed by Guinea and Cape Verde. We also maintained contacts with other movements who at the time were less important, less visible, such as the Liberation Movement of Eritrea, which we had to do it very carefully because Ethiopia was claiming that Eritrea was an integral part of the Ethiopian Empire. The other front was the Liberation Front of ..., of that Spanish colony, those Spanish islands, the Canary Islands who, at that time, wanted to be considered African islands, so we felt some sympathy for them, and we also had links with the Movement for the Liberation of the Comoros, MOLINACO, the movement that was recognized by the OAU, as well as relations with the Movement for the Liberation of Seychelles, who was also recognized by the Liberation Committee. In reality, these movements were not as strong as those I mentioned in the beginning. Those of Southern Africa, together with the PAIGC and the MPLA, were the ones who had a real and stricter coordination of their activities. Perhaps because of the aforementioned PAFMECA lost its impact, as other consultations occurred from the genuine movements. This thing about the genuine movements wasn't a baptism, we were speaking like that, this was genuine, that wasn't, etc. So we ended up as a group, it wasn't a designation, nor a title, and it ended, as there were progressive and non-progressive countries, it wasn't a title of an organization, it wasn't an organization of genuine movements,

it was those movements that were convinced they were creating a revolution and who had been genuinely formed, that's why they were meeting with confidence and called themselves as authentic movements.

I don't know about the cooperation of the liberation movements.

No, we did not create divisions concerning our relationships with FRELIMO, as I said, in the consensus of the so-called genuine movements, ZANU was not invited, but there contacts with ZANU, especially at the level of the leadership, Chitepo continued as a teacher to have meetings with Chairman Mondlane and he expressed the wish to maintain the cooperation with FRELIMO, and consequently Mondlane told us to have meetings with them to deal with some specific matters. So we then had careful meetings with, I even remember that the liaison person was a certain Nkomo, always in a safe way because we didn't want Southern Rhodesia, of Ian Smith's regime, to find that we were preparing something important to trigger the armed struggle for the liberation of Zimbabwe. But we also didn't want to be under pressure by ZAPU in order to avoid relations with ZANU. Our reasons for not relating with ZANU weren't totally ideological, it was a matter of trust. There was also the issue of the conflict between China and the Soviet Union, so there were movements who chose to be supported solely by the Soviet Union, while others chose China's support. FRELIMO was the only movement that could obtain the balanced support of both the Soviet Union and of China simultaneously. And also from Yugoslavia, because there were three divisions, as well as from Cuba. So ZANU was supported by China and North Korea, while ZAPU was solely supported by the Soviet Union. The MPLA was for a long time supported only by the Soviet Union and maintained such support and, at some time, we at FRELIMO interceded with China to start supporting the MPLA also, and we also spoke to Chairman Agostinho Neto asking him not to exclude China, since it was also important to obtain China's support and so he established a relationship between China and the MPLA. As regards to ZANU, there was never an approach with the Soviet Union and SWAPO never had an approach with China, while the ANC didn't as well, and the PAC had an approach with China. It was the Chinese theory whereby "the friend of my enemy is my enemy", so we couldn't convince them that this rationale wouldn't work because there were interests at stake in such alliances that we were forming and we were defending our interests and not necessarily those of the enemy. The levels of such hostility were not to be envisaged in such way, it couldn't be, because in such rationale they must be careful not to be allied to apartheid, because apartheid could befriend Chinese interests or those of the Portuguese colonialism. That begun in 1965, it started with the division that existed, with the antagonism that started to begin between the Soviet Union and China, you just have to see when it became more intense and notorious.

As far as I'm concerned, I think that in 1965 it was already felt in the liberation movements, in that sometimes the leaders of liberation movements were classified as pro-soviet, pro-Chinese, pro-Yugoslav, and this did not always correspond to the reality.

[As to Mozambique] China, at one stage, listened to COREMO, but we had the task to explain them to stay away from COREMO, given their philosophy as I explained before, because COREMO was aligning with UNITA, China had the tendency to support UNITA because it was against the MPLA, an ally of the Soviet Union, so we had to do some work to show that it wasn't exactly that what was happening, so China did not provide therefore a substantial support to COREMO, but Israel did support them. We stopped our cooperation with Israel after its occupation of the Egyptian territory by Israel. As you know, Israel trained some of our combatants, especially medics and radio operators. They assisted us in Dar-es-Salaam, in the installation of the radio communication system, with which we could communicate with Maputo via radio, all we needed was a radio receiver and transmitter in Maputo, we could have contacts, send messages from Maputo, Dar-es-Salaam to Maputo. It was a very powerful transmitter which we installed there for radio communications, via Morse or even voice, although we were favouring Morse communication, but after the attack to Egypt we could not cooperate with a country that was attacking and occupying parts of Africa. We, as liberation movements could not do so, as a matter of coherence. Israel was funding us, I think with some 10 000 US Dollars monthly, provided in cash but we abdicated that. Obviously, they did not remove the radio transmitter, but we were losing replacement parts until the radio station became silent because we were no longer cooperating with Israel. The head of the radio transmission station was the late Mateus Sansão Muthemba, who was a good radio telegraphist, all the news from *Agência Lusa* (Portuguese news agency) that were being sent to the telegraph could be captured and it never fail, it was very fast. So COREMO had that small support, it must have been from the American right and indirectly by the Portuguese themselves. At some time, we felt that there was some facilitation of COREMO's movements in the Tete region because the Portuguese wanted to create a buffer zone to hamper our movements. But COREMO wasn't rooted in the population, we had operations that really eliminated COREMO's influence in the Tete region, which was the only region where COREMO could operate. The Soviet Union did not support. Zambia who tolerated the formation of COREMO, i. the establishment in Lusaka, providing it with offices, tried to set a mediation to unite COREMO with FRELIMO. Chairman Mondlane replied that he would not rid himself the idea of unity, because he had worked for it, he wanted unity, but the Zambians need to know

in such a major movement it was bound to have divisions, so it was necessary to wait until it could be proven to enjoy a really popular support in Mozambique, with something within the context of the struggle for liberation in order for us to really re-create FRELIMO. We wanted a wide front, which would have to be always FRELIMO, so such union could not create anything but a liberation front and, as the name was already a front for the liberation of Mozambique, it wouldn't be worth changing the name, so what mattered was to create the basis for what we would have to do to be united. But from the dialogue with the Zambians, in the person of Vice-President Kapwepwe, we were seeing that COREMO wasn't showing any serious intention, it was suffering divisions after divisions and showed that hinterland it represented no one, absolutely none, because we had a strong domain in Tete as well as in the provinces that were following suit. I believe that we had not really felt greatly the influence of the Sino-soviet conflict in the development of COREMO. Interesting with this Malhuza, the late Malhuza in the offices, because there was a liberation centre in Zambia, which was created where there various offices of the various movements, regardless of being genuine or not. We were in an area, in a place more or less the size of this backyard here, where the offices were scattered, where we could move in the offices of the others. So I meet Malhuza. Malhuza, was from Gaza here, he was my country fellowman, so he told me that they knew COREMO was going nowhere, we were the leaders in the liberation movement, we were the movement for the fight for liberation. They had created that group but they were there just to push pressure for us to do better. So, according to Malhuza they didn't believe in what they were doing, so this could only prove a series of ambitions and he spoke to me like that and whenever he saw me he would lean in this manner and so forth, that it would be good that no one from his side would know about it. But in fact, they all knew about the conversation. They would always look at me differently, they had never ignored us as then, they realized that we were that leaders, even Gumane himself. I have never felt anything being imposed by them, but I think the Soviet Union and China realized that it wasn't a very serious movement, the Israelis themselves probably stopped short of giving more support than necessary for their survival. They weren't accepted, all countries reviewed COREMO and it was not accepted. Nor were any of the other dissident groups accepted, none was accepted. By contrast, it happened in Angola, where there were two recognized movements, the MPLA and the UPA, later FNLA, and there was a tendency to recognize UNITA, though it wasn't recognized. At the time of national independence UNITA had such a force that some countries tended to support the existence of UNITA and the OAU was split in this matter, with 22 countries, in 1975, favouring the proclamation of independence under the banner of the MPLA government, while 75 supported the need to recognize the other part of Angola dominated by UNITA, so there was this stalemate. The recognition of Angola, that is, the Angola's admission to the OAU, took some time it did not happen after the proclamation, Angola was only admitted in 1976.

No, the MPLA, as I said, I think it was in 1964 that set up their offices in Tanzania, and their representative was Chipemba and, to give continuity, it enhanced our relations and within the framework of the CONCP, we had coordinated the information, seeing the colonialist was the same, the Portuguese colonialist, we had more information to share with the MPLA than with the other movements and it was for that we had more frequent meetings than with the other groups, and we were monitoring closer the liberation struggle of Angola. We had adopted common positions against the Portuguese colonialism and in that way it had a repercussion in Europe, where the support groups to the liberation of Angola started also to support the liberation in Mozambique and vice-versa. Those supporting the liberation of Mozambique were also simultaneously supporting the liberation of Angola. This was the example of the Angola Committee which was formed in Holland who started also to support Mozambique, where the Mondlane Foundation was even formed, then followed by the committee that was supporting Mozambique in England, which was created by the Polly Gaster group, you know Polly Gaster and her colleagues and, with Lord Gilford that movement grew and started to also support Angola and eventually all liberation movements in Africa in general. But from that close coordination of our actions in the diplomatic and international fields, which was good, as I said, with the MPLA. We supported to bring China to support Angola. I think the MPLA had sufficient means to bring the transport of its materials from Dar-es-Salaam until....it is possible in the traffic in Mbeya, because we were the ones who had a more advanced transit centre in Mbeya, although they later would also hire their houses where, for example, Alexandre, Quito were residing, but I can't remember his name at the moment, already deceased, who were the representatives and he was later the Angolan ambassador in Mozambique. Codensa, that's his name, he was called Toca, his name is Condensa de Toca, all of them passed from Dar-es-Salaam, from Chipemba, Toca and another, his name escapes me, I can see his face and so we cooperated because we all had interests, and even movement of people and goods through the same routes to Lusaka at least, there was some inter-action and for small things there was surely mutual support.

With ZANU, I would highlight that, apart from our Mbeya transit centre, in Lusaka, we provided support to ZANU. I must also say that when we gained independence, the Nachingwea camp was offered to be used by ZANU during a certain period, I don't have details of what happened afterwards, because even before independence we were already receiving ZANU people in the Nachingwea camp right through our independence. Then, after the proclamation of independence there were those discussions within the countries that are today known as the Frontline States, or that became known as the frontline states, and today they are no longer known as such.

There were discussions on how to give continuity to the national liberation struggle and to how to support it, which culminated with the release of some of the Zimbabwean leaders, who went to attend the meeting in Lusaka which, unfortunately, culminated with the assassination of Chitepo, external leader of ZANU. So the Zimbabwean leaders attended in that meeting, which dictated the meeting between President Kaunda, accompanied with various representatives of the Frontline States. The Frontline States were at that time Mozambique, after independence, Zambia and Tanzania, Angola and Botswana, so it culminated with that meeting with Ian Smith, which took place in a railway coach on the border railway on the Livingstone Bridge or Victoria Falls Bridge, depending on which side. In Zimbabwe it is Victoria Falls, while in Zambia it is Livingstone, on the bridge over the Zambeze River, where they sought a negotiation, thus a negotiable solution or, rather, a negotiation between the liberation movements and Ian Smith. He had proclaimed unilateral independence so, we had agreed that if there was failure, if Ian Smith failed to give positive steps, the solution would be to request Mozambique to support the armed struggle from Mozambique. At that time we had paused in the armed struggle to see if we could obtain a negotiable solution, but obviously this was not possible with the character of Ian Smith and his regime. They insisted on the unilateral independence, all they wanted was the surrender of the liberation movement, which made Mozambique to opt to accede to the request of the countries in the region, as well as of the liberation movements, so we closed the border, applied the UN sanctions against the Ian Smith regime, by closing the Machipanda border post and the Port of Beira barring the receiving of goods destined to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

At that time ZANU then established its external bases in Mozambique, in the provinces of Gaza, Manica and Tete and that gave rise to retaliation action from Rhodesia by attacking various points in our country, the bridge over the Limpopo River and Guijá were destroyed, in collaboration with the Mozambicans and Portuguese that were in Rhodesia, and attacked the Sofala, Manica areas and supported the creation of bases, or created bases, the first RENAMO bases, with the direct participation of the Rhodesian forces, as published in books published nowadays. You can see it in "Silent War", you can see also a bit in the works of the mentor Ken Flower. So that's what we had, but the ZAOU leaders came with the same freedom to fight from Mozambique. Even those that we didn't know, those who we thought were linked to the regime, like Muzorewa, Bishop Muzorewa, he came to establish in Mozambique. After a while we had them all there and Ndanbaninge Sithole had also established himself in Mozambique. In Mozambique he was deemed to be a natural leader of ZANU, and apropos the discussions they held, Mugabe was set aside, he remained as a refugee in Zambezia, and we offered him a place to teach in a secondary school in Zambezia.

But we continued to work for the unification of those forces and that had culminated with the creation of the Patriotic Front. Jason Moyo, of ZAPU, and partly Silundika of ZAPU, and ZANU, Tongogara, played a predominant role and the Patriotic Front was formed. ZIPA, Zimbabwe People's Army, was formed. There was again a split later on, and ZAPU assumed again the ZAPU designation while ZANU adopted ZANU Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and continued as ZIPA forces, but members of ZAPU did not integrate into ZIP. So then it would be the ZIPA firefreedom fighters that pressed for the return of Mugabe to lead ZANU and he returned, there was no trust in Sithole who they thought he was associated with the enemy – it appeared that they had done some work on Sithole (it appears there was torture in prison). Then there were also the views of the western countries who viewed ZANU with distrust, as it had strong links with China, as I said, so they saw Sithole as a moderate, but he was really pro-western. Thus the struggle proceeded under the leadership of Mugabe until victory. But politically we were linked to ZAPU to the extent that in the context of the Frontline States we were collaborating with both in support of the negotiations they held with the British, which culminated with the Lancaster House agreements.

Therefore, we used our experience with the negotiations with the Portuguese, our experience on the transition period, transition from colonialism to independence, on the exodus of the Portuguese from our country and the consequences it had on the economy, in analysing the Zimbabwe's economy which was strongly in the hands of the whites, we gave our advice to help Zimbabwe, and they decided according to their conscience, and then the independence was proclaimed.

During the Zimbabwe's liberation struggle, there was a moment when we decided to provide a more direct support to the struggle, providing, very secretly, our guerrilla experience against colonialism, by sending, not a big, but sufficiently big, maybe a company, which remained until victory. I don't know if it was for 2 years and without the British knowledge, they only knew it later, in that we had asked the British to evacuate such forces with air force means, as we had, in the meantime, established a good relationship with England, because of our support to the negotiation process. The Mozambican government supported the negotiation process, as you know, Bernardo Bonwana and Rafael Maguni were there and we together with others also participated in the Geneva meetings, in the coordination of the positions of the liberation movements, since it was important to act as one voice, at least ZAPU and ZANU, and then the Muzorewa and Sithole faction, though we cooperated more with Mugabe and Nkomo, therefore with ZANU-Mugabe and ZAPU - Nkomofactionos

We received Sithole because he was the one recognized as the ZANU leader and he was in prison and then released, he participated in the Lusaka meetings and then received in Mozambique, but Mugabe and him were in disagreement, on something that happened before in prison, so I think that, that distrust because he was linked with the regime, seems to me that you should look into. It started while in prison, so there wasn't a good grasp between them, but our liberation movements only knew Sithole, and if there was Nkomo and Sithole, then Sithole was to be recognized as the leader. Now, as I said, it was the guerrillas that refused to recognize the authority of Sithole, so there were problems and they felt that only Mugabe was able to provide a good leadership, so they demanded the return of Mugabe and that was done in a meeting that took place in the Bilene beach with President Samora Machel. Mugabe was in Zambézia, as he couldn't stay in Maputo, he himself decided that if he was hindering the leadership, then he would prefer to remain far away as a refugee, and we told him he should have been far from Maputo to avoid influencing, so we didn't place him in Sofala or Manica, not even in Tete, we placed him in Zambézia. In this way we could prove that he had no direct influence in causing such animosity held with Sithole.

[Mugabe was still not well known in FRELIMO] Well, at least I didn't know him, and I believe the President didn't know him either, whether he him for his name only, when he was in prison, that's why Sithole's name was known when there was dissent between ZAPU and ZANU, it was with Sithole and when ZANU was stationed in Dar-es-Salaam represented by Chitepo, it was there because the leader was in prison and they were talking of Sithole and never of Mugabe. Mugabe was a member of the leadership, whose name was growing amongst the prisoners, I believe, he was most certainly known amidst the Zimbabweans, but we only hardly knew about the leaders. And as I say, also in ZANU we weren't very sure about knowing Chitepo, Mataure and other names I am forgetting, and later Tongogara, Zinu was the guerrillas. Rex Nungo was amongst them, but at that time I ...Rex Nhongo came from the time when we carried materials across Tete, Rex was already there, working with this Lopes Tembe, the late Francisco Langa. Yes, well he became notorious therein in the command of the forces, he became the leader of the liberation forces and is also a military and political figure because Zimbabwe, contrary to what happened in Mozambique, had a clear military wing that made up the army, with its command, etc, and a clear political wing, while with FRELIMO the leadership was both political and military, so Tongogara was in both sides.

Now, as to the MPLA after our independence, as you know, Angola had not yet proclaimed its independence because of the issue with UNITA, and the South Africans had invaded Angola militarily in support of UNITA, while the MPLA had no direct external support, it was only equipment coming from the Soviet Union, but it didn't have any force to counter the presence of a powerful South

African force, who was slowly gaining territory. It was necessary for Angola to become independent to call for foreign forces. So, then there was this meeting of the CONCP in Maputo, where we decided to convince President Agostinho Neto, that is, President Samora Machel decided jointly with the others to convince Neto to be patient and hold on until the 11<sup>th</sup> November to proclaim the independence, which was the date planned for the proclamation, and only then he could call for foreign assistance as a sovereign country. And so, he did, he left Maputo to proceed to Luanda to proclaim independence and to request the intervention of Cuban forces, who were already headed at sea waiting for such legal legitimate call, and the Cubans entered legally in Angola, while the invading South Africans had no international basis for their participation. Now, it was from then that a campaign in favour of Angola was created in Mozambique and we appealed to the people to morally and materially support the Angolans. So then a one day salary contribution campaign was launched, not only to support Angola but also to be converted into a contribution to solidarity, firstly with the liberation movement, but mainly to Angola, so then funds were called, helicopters were made available as well as of military materials, so then Angola had its means to obtain equipment to hold the period where they had no ammunition, they had nothing, so we introduced some means, not many, because we were also short of means. This was the support to Angola by continuing our solidarity that was existing since 1961. It was in November. We provided the support throughout the entire month of December 1975, we organized a campaign, it then expanded to 1976 until the MPLA had thereafter held its own feet, and the campaign then waned and became a solidarity extended to Mozambique. The contributions slowed down, and there was no more campaign and the solidarity fund was not structured in a way to maintain a great continuity. I for one, continued to deduct from my salary for a long time to contribute to the fund, and it served for small things because there wasn't many deducting via their work. It was voluntary, for those who wanted it deducted from their salaries. That was something being done at the level of the Party but the funds were being also used for the purposes of solidarity, even indiscriminately for natural calamities, etc., though with little significance. As I say, as soon as the main motive ceased, which was about Angola, .....I don't know if there are any records thereof., ....

Zambia was the country with a very weak link, a landlocked country, so it needed exits to the sea and one of them was Lobito, which it ended up losing because the Port of Lobito was destroyed, and the other was Beira, so then they negotiated in a very delicate manner, because Zambia had always been in the frontline in contact with colonial regimes and the apartheid regime, so they had to find a solution for the war as soon as possible. Zambia had a contact with Jorge Jardim in Mozambique, with Ian Smith and with the apartheid regime as well, to find some solutions, but it was doing it with our consent, since it would not, for that reason, stop supporting it could give to the liberation struggle, it was a way of acting from here.

Kamuzu Banda's Malawi had decided to support the colonialists solely to safeguard its foreign trade lines, the Port of Nacala and the Port of Beira and its trade with South Africa, the only African country that had an embassy in South Africa. We had to maintain contact with Malawi, we had undertaken to attack any train carrying goods to Malawi, and our policy would be not to destroy the railway, the Nawala railway was never destroyed because we wanted to ensure the supply of goods into Malawi, and we would not attack the road coming from Zimbabwe, therefore from Southern Rhodesia to Malawi which is the one that enters through Changara in the Tete corridor. We didn't undertake it, but we also weren't systematically attacking the trucks carrying goods. We had to stop the movement of Portuguese troops, so any trains carrying weapons or troops would be attacked, so they would have to avoid carrying troops and goods at the same time, or else we would know through our own information and would attack the trains. This certainly was being fully adhered to, but it was an undertaking which was worthwhile and a form of showing our goodwill and understanding, albeit not fully complied with by Banda. Our struggle had started in Zambézia because of this attitude of the Malawian government and we had to stop it right after Malawi's proclamation of independence, we commenced in 1964 when Malawi was not yet independent. The Malawi Congress Party was supporting us at that time but it was changed by Banda when our armed struggle started and after Malawi's proclamation. So, we then continued with Malawi but through the Malawi Congress Party, about small things like to carry medicines to that zone and then later it was for both Zambézia and Niassa, when the fight expanded to the southern part of Niassa. We continued to cross Malawi, but we could not carry weapons, uniforms to the front, only food, medicines. Later, we negotiated with the Malawian security forces, we managed to have friends therein, who allowed us to carry small quantities of uniforms in a Land Rover vehicle, for example, for the Niassa front, but they were using us as an obstacle to their own opposition that was organizing an armed resistance against President Banda.

We had Chisiza who, even without any contact with us, used the Tete territory to enter Malawi with weapons and personnel attempting to overturn Banda. We did not succeed because he did not coordinate with us and our comrades tried to dissuade them to continue, because there weren't conditions, we told him of the need to organize properly, but Chisiza thought it was an easy job, he was captured, arrested and killed in a horrible way. Chipembere tried to penetrate again from Niassa, so he had his men, but no coordination with us, though the Malawian regime thought there was some coordination with us. We proved that there was no such coordination and that we tried to convince them that the best way would be for them to accepting to support our liberation movement. In that way the opposition might have abandoned the armed struggle. One of the reasons for the dissidence in Malawi, or perhaps the major reason, was a disagreement in Banda's attitude in supporting colonialism, apartheid and Ian Smith's regimes. That's where Chichanhamatchume, Chisiza and Chipembere and another one I can't remember were in Lusaka after resigning from the Government and went into e, and that is the reason why Malawi was not part of the Front Line States. It was not sufficient to be bordering a country fighting for liberation to be admitted as a frontline state.

In listing the national liberation movements, I forgot to mention that there was also one in Swaziland. There was a Ngwane Liberation Movement (?), I can't remember its full name, I think it wasn't a very strong movement.

[On the solidarity with the liberation struggle in South Africa] Well, as I said initially, there was collaboration in the general struggle for liberation, amongst the liberation movements, comprising the ANC, even collaboration in the transportation of people who were leaving Mozambique to join the liberation movement in Tanzania and the ANV also gave its great support. For example, President Samora Machel, with Joe Slovo's support, and stayed in Dar-es-Salaam and in general it was support for the advocacy, thus in the world campaigns to speak against apartheid, to gather funds for the liberation struggle of South Africa and related with the cooperation that existed within the colonizers and the South African oppressors. So they had a collaboration, we established the relationship, whereby we were saying to the world that whoever supported our national liberation would have to support also the fight against apartheid. This was a strong campaign against apartheid, we were always for sanctions against South Africa and apartheid. There was a joint support work, As I said, various support groups for Southern Africa were formed. In Europe these groups that were formed by the actions of FRELIMO, MPLA or ANC then changed to support all of us, exactly because the reaction of the action of our enemies.

Upon independence, we accepted the ANC to set up offices in Mozambique, as well as for its leaders to live in Mozambique. That's how Oliver Tambo had his house in Mozambique, along with other leaders, although there wasn't any military base. There were leaders of the armed struggle based in Mozambique and they conducted underground operations for military pressure inside South Africa. The former President Jacob Zuma was one of them, and there were others I'm unable to enumerate because I wasn't actively involved in that front, because I was the incumbent Minister of Foreign Affairs and had to keep a low profile. But there was some underground work support because their fight was underground so the apartheid regime realized that was very dangerous and in that way accepted to negotiate and this culminated with the Nkomati Accord, which became really necessary for us to take some breath. This is because after Zimbabwe's independence the Renamo base had been changed from Salisbury to Phalaborwa, with also the weight thrown by South Africa in favour of RENAMO. This was when President Samora saw that, for a solution to be really found for our problems, we would need first to eliminate or attenuate the foreign force that was the apartheid, to attenuate its influence. It's from there that the contacts with the apartheid regime were started which culminated with the signing of the Nkomati Accord.

So, even after the Nkomati Accord we had a small pause to monitor the South Africans, though continuing our political support, something the South Africans knew about because the Accord was not a recognition of the apartheid system, we continued our opposition to apartheid, but we needed to search for peaceful solution for the South African situation, through a negotiated outcome, we tried it but it was not possible, so we continued to provide a more secret support to members of the ANC, or to tolerate their activities, since the apartheid regime not only was tolerating, but also accelerating the spread of RENAMO into regions RENAMO were not operating before the independence of ZIMBABWE. This is how in 1981-2 we saw RENAMO in the North and in the South, thus in Maputo, in Gaza, RENAMO begun to be felt in the 81-82, hence many Mozambicans believe that this war begun in 81-82, without knowing that it actually started in 1976. I was looking in the internet and some RENAMO friends date RENAMO to 1977, well 1977 but historically their collaboration dates far longer, it started immediately with our liberation struggle 1963-64, obviously, if we look at the genesis of RENAMO we have to go back to the collaboration with the Portuguese, Rhodesian and South African forces and so forth, we would have to go even further, the triggering of the armed struggle after independence, we would have to go back to the moment we closed the border on February 1976, with the Rhodesian reaction.

Well, in regard to South Africa, it emerged strongly after the Zimbabwean independence so, going back to what I was saying, President Samora Machel saw that it became necessary to eliminate the external part or to reduce its influence and thus to enter into an agreement with the apartheid regime, which didn't work and led us to continue to support in the way we could support the ANC. [On the Nkomati Accord] Many people did not understand the reasons for the Nkomati Accord, but that was for a short while because, for example Nyerere had a very strong reaction against the Nkomati Accord, he didn't understand why, he thought that we believed the apartheid regime would comply, he didn't see it as an attempt to attenuate such force after we gained some time to survive, to avoid the same that happened in Angola but, after analysing the extent of our suffering, even without direct attacks from South Africa, how much we had suffered with the application of sanctions and the South African retaliations in the form of sanctions against us, by not using our labour, not using Mozambican ports and railways, etc. Apart from the indirect support from Rhodesia, the sabotage of the petrol depots in Beira and the attacks in Maputo, etc, not to mention some sabotage attacks we suspect were perpetrated by South Africa and Rhodesians. Well, all that would be understood later, that for us to support our friends in their fight for liberation, and that was our philosophy, we would have to guarantee our existence, to maintain the line, to play, that's a game, we had to play, and they said we played very well because after the Accord the rules of the game were no longer the same, the Nkomati Accord had drawn the attention to many things within the South African community, of the South African society, the people, whites and blacks, the information was a different one and we saw who wasn't interested in peace, these were clearly Pieter Botha, Magnus Malan and others of the same kind, who thought they could solve the problem through war. But because an opportunity came about, some saw it as an opportunity, as they didn't want the risk of Mozambique falling into despair and to get to lose everything, but with serious consequences for the apartheid regime and to the economy, but with more serious consequences for us, and that due to a moment where we already had realized that the balance of power in the world was not as one thought it was.

In 1982 we knew that the socialist countries didn't have the capacity to wholly support the emerging countries in Africa and to keep the support to the already independent countries such as Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, as all of them were already destabilized.

So, the balance of power wasn't as we thought, we had done an analysis of the situation and many understood. Chairman Oliver Tambo was one of the first to understand, I remember him when President Samora Machel was talking to him saying:

“Comrade Oliver Tambo, you are the ones who do not understand”. Oliver Tambo replied to Samora: “Who said we don't understand? Yes, we understand”. This was a very strong attitude from Chairman Oliver Tambo who called for his colleagues patience who complied our orders because he was clearly seeing where we were headed and what challenges we were having, and they saw with the death of Ruth First, with the raid against Albie Sachs, where he lost his two hands, as well as in other raids to other individuals. So we had to try and neutralize, we knew that there were certain forces in South Africa who acted *motu proprio* who did not obeyed their political command, but it was necessary to gain more forces from people that would take a similar to that of John Vorster, who accepted to live with whom he used to call bad neighbours. So, it wasn't an understanding between the apartheid's political part and ourselves, but that of ensuring a neighbourhood capable of ensuring our survival and to find a platform to debate the change of the situation in Southern Africa, with the ANC taken as a test.

I must tell you that I, as the Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, the Nkomati Accord served for us as a means to obtain many friends, we had many strong critics from the left, but we had also many from the left who understood us, and many from the centre-right that changed their vision in regard to Mozambique. They saw a pragmatic leadership in our country so we gained more than we lost and today, in South Africa, its leadership and people mostly understand that Mozambique had a great sacrifice in its support to the struggle, despite the Nkomati Accord, which was a form of the necessary fight.

Failure to follow such route would be suicidal, Angola is too far away, Mozambique is so close, we are close to each other and South Africa didn't know what would the reaction be, whether a Cuban type where they could act, being closer to the capital it's not like Angola where it was far from the Capital, but we didn't have all such conditions, in 1983. That would require preparation. So, even if we had a Cuban intervention, it would be under a way to amplify the attack to Mozambique while we would not need to reduce such raid, so we adopted would be to reduce the attack, taking into account that South Africa had its own precautions, it wasn't prepared to take risks, everything or nothing, it couldn't be for us, especially because we were close to another, with a greater chance of us being destroyed through a flight, a bomb dropped by an aircraft flying directly from SA, within 20, 15 minutes to drop bombs in Maputo.

It was far more difficult to send reconnaissance drones to Luanda than to Mozambique, like we shot the remote-controlled drone overflying the Offices of the Presidency of the Republic. And at the same time we an interest in continuing that part, the small economic part that still remained which still had to work, the 60 000 miners that were still going to work in the South African mines, or the Ressano Garcia route also had to operate, as well as that of Goba because all of the others had been suspended, we did want to increase the sanctions because those sanctions were rather affecting us instead of affecting the enemy. These were sanctions that were having an effect on us, 5 billion US Dollars we were losing just for the closure of the Limpopo and Beira railway lines into Zimbabwe, in addition to other indirect losses, loss of labour, so there was need to do a strategic military and economic study, necessary to take that decision, it wasn't an easy decision, but it was also a courageous decision of maintaining a firm support on the fight against apartheid and to use the act to raise more strongly the voice of the struggle against apartheid. I, for example, as Minister of Foreign Affairs did not have to slow down one single inch in the speed and force of attack against apartheid in international conferences or in bilateral contacts, quite to the contrary, I had to intensify because that was the remaining weapon, based on the goodwill shown by us, in seeking peaceful solutions and to demonstrate that it wouldn't interest us to exterminate a race, the white race, but rather to institute a democratic regime that would encompass the entire South African people, without racism.

With all with what I have spoken here, if you would go to the sources, I might be pushing my memory so quickly, there might be some speeches that were delivered in the occasion, there might something that would enhance what I have said.

[On the position of Masire, from Botswana] That was his idea but we didn't have, the review of others was that we were capitulating, but he never said they would never do so, because if would think so, they never engaged in the struggle, so they have never even capitulated, indeed they never engaged, the implication is here, we were taking a position that they never had to deal with an ANC army crossing to South Africa with weapons, and in their case it would have been easier to cross, they never had guerrillas members of SACTU and had a total cooperation. Therefore, we, despite the Nkomati Accord went further in the participation in the struggle for the liberation of South Africa, more than themselves. They had clear contacts. We didn't, we had that delegation of the Portuguese workers that had left, we didn't even have a South African consulate, we were not part of the SACTU, while they had always been.

## Dhlakama, Maria Francisca

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2007]

*Maria Francisca Dhlakama, born on the 21st June 1956, in Búzi in the Province of Sofala. Maria Francisca Dhlakama a combatant of the armed struggle since her tender age when she left the country in the company of her parents.*

*In 1971, at the age of 15, she was recruited and sent for a political-military course in Nachinguea, which she successfully completed.*

*At the age of 16, she went to Mtwara to attend a nursing course, then she was selected to attend a course for operational commanders, a speciality that would provide her with the skills to command any military operation inside the country.*

*Her functions in Nachinguea were to train Mozambican women military and politically coming from hinterland or from Tanzania.*

*Though of young age, Maria Francisca Dhlakama describes some moments of the FRELIMO life, including the crisis that led to the closing of the Instituto Moçambicano and the organization of the women in the armed struggle (LIFEMO, Women Detachment and OMM). It's an interview worth reading.*

My name is Maria Francisca Dhlakama, I was born in Búzi on the 21st June 1956, I lived in the District I was born up to the age of 2 years, then my father was transferred to Beira, where he started to work. I lived in Beira until my 6 years of age, when my father was once again transferred to Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) where he lived for 2 years and the family stayed for 1 year and joined him in 1963, we returned to Beira where we stayed until September 1965 and then headed to Tanzania.

My trajectory was very nice. We minor children weren't even conscious that we were leaving Mozambique. My father took advantage of a transfer that was offered to him to work as a nurse in Moatize, so we knew we were going to Moatize, we didn't know we were leaving Mozambique for Tanzania.

We left by train with an uncle of ours and his respective family, we were 11 children, 6 of my parents and the others were of our late uncle João Mulhanga and we separated in Tete. When we arrived in Tete, the men could not travel with us to Malawi by train because we didn't have passports, my father and uncle also didn't have passports. PIDE had refused to issue a passport to my father. That alerted PIDE and there was already a warrant of arrest against my father, simply for applying for the issue of a passport, for the purposes of visiting our great uncle nurse, who was living in Lichinga and we had to travel via Malawi.

My father had to do the remaining trip by foot, then by car up to the Zobe border when they were questioned by some officers that were there, I don't know if they were police officers, so (father and uncle) alleged they were going to accompany my brother who, at that time, was studying in Zobe, he was a seminarist, and then from there they had to do the rest of the trip by foot, until they reached Malawian territory, where my brother knew the area very well. When we reached the border between Mozambique and Malawi we had all to pull out the train, there was a search and the Portuguese immigration officers became suspicious because we were carrying our parents' clothing and that hadn't seen any men, just children and youngsters. They didn't create any major problems to me, but the Police made a point of accompanying us to Malawi. Since there were extradition agreements between the two governments, the officer in charge of the

Portuguese border post instructed his Malawian counterpart to extradite us back to Mozambique.

Never. Look, the human being is an animal that adapts to all circumstances, we were children and felt rootless from our environment, we need a period of adaptation. In the first times when we knew that it was a voyage, it was a bit hard, but when we arrived in Tanzania where we stayed during the early times, we were well received and what motivated us was the fact to meet known people and there was a high spirit of camaraderie and our voyage was extraordinary.

We went by train to Malawi, Lindy, it was a trip of a day and a half, more or less. When we arrived in Lindy we had to stay for 3 days until our parents arrived. Our mothers were very concerned because they didn't know if the father and uncle had been arrested by PIDE, but they joined us. When we arrived in Malawi, comrade Chico Lourenço was the FRELIMO's representative in Malawi and he used his home and received any Mozambican fleeing from colonialism and who was willing to join FRELIMO. He wanted us to stay longer waiting for the passages that were coming from Tanzania so that we continue with our voyage. But, as our family was carrying some money, they said it would be a risk to stay there because we already were very sure PIDE would not rest until they capture them, so we used our money to continue with the trip, travelling by bus until we would reach Tanzania.

Once in Tanzania the entire group was split. Our parents had to go to the Soviet Union for political and military training, our elder brothers were integrated into the American Institute and the remaining ones who had standard 4 were sent to Bagamoyo. For the girls, they created a school for them to complete standard 4 in Dar-es-Salaam. As for us, who were less than 10 years old, we had to remain with our mothers and were integrated into Tanzanian schools.

During the first years we had to learn English, we had a private Mozambican teacher, and I thought it was a waste of time, because he was not conversant with the language and I thought this was moving backwards. My mother had asked couple Lourenço Muthaca for me to live with them and so I moved there although I still had to continue in a Tanzanian school because I still had 1 year to complete standard 4 to then study at the Mozambican Institute. Then FRELIMO created a primary school in Tunduro and I went there to complete my standard 4. I stayed in Dar-es-Salaam for a few months and then left to Tunduro to complete the studies.

We were the pioneers because when I arrived there the school was teaching up to standard 3. I returned to Dar-es-Salaam in 1968 to proceed with my secondary school studies. I entered the struggle in 1971, when I was 15 years old, when I was studying in Mbeia, because in the late 1968 the Instituto Moçambicano had closed due to conflicts between students and the top leadership of FRELIMO and there were no conditions for that school to continue. I was again hampered because I remained nearly a year without studying and returned to live with my aunt in Mbeia where I continued my studies in Tanzanian private schools. I was recruited in 1971 for the WD in Nachinguea. The FRELIMO representative there where we were staying, informed us that he had been ordered from the top leadership, then presided by Samora Machel, to send us for military training in Nachinguea and so we travelled with other comrades from colonial Mozambique who were being integrated for the first time in FRELIMO.

It was hard, we had to adapt once again because we were coming from boarding school. In my case I was in a school run by Catholic nuns, so the type of life was totally different where, overnight, we were doing military training.

Overall, the outcome was positive. At the age of 15 years I was selected to attend the course for military training and military instructors, which was organized in the relative section in Nachinguea. We were 2 girls that were selected, me and Boldina Cristóvão, and from there we started our work as instructors and after a while Boldina ceased to be a cadre in the WD. I don't know if it was due to her own option, or for the purposes of the revolution. Meanwhile, at 16 I was sent to Mutuara to complete a nursing course, I was again selected to attend a course for operational commanders, which meant that we were able to assume the command of any military operation inside the country. In addition, I also performed some functions at the WD.

No, Enoque Mavota was related with agricultural work, so he didn't form part of my group, he didn't form part of the political instructors. At that time my colleagues were the current Minister of Defence Tobias Dai, the late Massanga, he wasn't in this group but we worked together. The group of instructors included Erasto Mulembué, this group was so special as part of the cadres that formed part of the instructors as well as the military command who had a long experience in the struggle, who fought or led the fight in "Nó Górdio", and President Machel felt that it was time for them to return to the training camp for some fresh training, to enhance their political and military knowledge and then to receive new tasks. I had as colleagues Erasmo Mulembué, the late Megico, the late Lindololo who later were ordered to be trained as musicians in Germany and cease their military tasks.

My time to contribute to the guerrilla war was a very positive one, thank God Frelimo's internal conflicts had been overcome, the level of understanding was different, people were feeling happy despite the sacrifices being faced daily..... Yes I noticed that in the 1960s, not so much in the 1970s, that we were all very united, we had clear objectives and fully conscient that the common enemy was the Portuguese colonialism and our objective was to liberate the motherland from the colonial yoke and to reconstruct our country.

Frelimo had a leadership, which was the DOI (Internal Organization Leadership) which was the first leadership created in the movement and whose task was to mobilize and organize the Mozambicans hinterland in the country, from the Rovuma to the Maputo Rivers, in order to integrate the national liberation struggle. My father (Urias Simango) was a deputy of the DOI, comrade Mariano Matsinhe was the head of department and unfortunately some colleagues lost their lives.

People knew exactly what was expected from them, but we all were conscious of liberating the country, they knew it would be a long way, we never hid that from anybody, that our war was not a miraculous war that was going to liberate our motherland overnight, but that we had to be prepared from generation to generation until the total liberation of the country.

We had Mozambicans from all walks of life, they all were integrated in the struggle albeit in different ways. The first ones were peasants, we had a few workers that formed the minority, public servants, students, intellectuals. The majority joined the struggle at the final stage.

Yes, in the 1960s decade I was already in FRELIMO and accompanied several direct and indirect decisions, one of the divisions I lived was the one related with the formation of the Mozambican Institute, where differences have arisen with FRELIMO leadership. FRELIMO wanted the institution to become an organ of the armed struggle and the soldiers weren't very happy although there was a director, Janet Mondlane, who was Chairman's Mondlane wife. FRELIMO leadership felt they had the right to intervene in the institution and that caused trouble.

We had tribal problems, that was the greatest Achilles heel in the liberation struggle, it wasn't easy to unify people from Rovuma to Maputo, to make such people to think alike and to have the same objectives. That's difficult, although every Mozambican was unhappy with colonialism, each one had his own way of seeing things, and that brought problems. .

There was a lot of brutality, unfortunately, and this led many people who had nothing to do with reactionary spirit to abandon the struggle, some peacefully felt they could not continue because there were no conditions for that, others took their spouses and children and found a place in Tanzanian territory and started to live as refugees.

When Samora Machel assumed the leadership, in the last years of the liberation, I think that the attitude of the Tanzanians to seek and hand over these comrades was incorrect, I thought they should have not acted like that because the participation in the struggle shouldn't be forced upon a person. They were arrested and handed over to FRELIMO and we all know of the trauma that subsequently happened. Many of these comrades were murdered, they didn't cause any disturbances, they weren't promoting any campaign against FRELIMO, they were living in small Tanzanian villages and towns and were living normal lives, it was their right as human beings.

Tanzania tried to meddle in and to create solutions for our problems since we were guests in their country, but I'm not sure the solutions they tried were the best ones. What made Mozambicans to re-unite was the great offensive because of operation "Nó Górdio" because if we did not unite, we would lose everything. That's why we regained the conscience of the risk we were taking and the priority was the decolonization.

I don't know but few of those who felt persecuted for their desertion remained in Tanzania. Most who felt insecure in Tanzania left for Kenya, including most of the Mozambican students, very few left for Uganda and a great part for Ethiopia. Others returned to Malawi, while others to Zambia, since Zambia had hosted COREMO when that group of Mozambicans had split from FRELIMO and formed another party in Zambia, and there they enjoyed protection.

To a certain extent, yes. Given that, with the exception of Zambia, no political parties were formed elsewhere. They were refugees and every refugee have a right to political asylum.

From the early days up to the creation of FRELIMO there was a stage where there was a lot of democracy. FRELIMO was democratic, people would freely express themselves, there were debates, people would say what they thought. Things changed after the death of Filipe Magaia, who was the commander of the armed forces and head of the security department, later just head of the department of defence, when it then was headed by Joaquim Chissano.

In my military duties I was, above all, a political and military instructor, I was training guerrilla fighters of both genders, in order for them to develop their activities hinterland, but I was also the head of the Women's Detachment.

The women's participation took effect in stages. The first women joining FRELIMO were married women, who were accompanying their husbands, and very few were young, some had ventured to Tanzania because they had political conscience which constituted the majority in the 1960s decade, because things were not going well in Mozambique, while others went there because that had grown there, such as my case. When I arrived in Tanzania I belonged to the group of the continuers ....given that I was a child. In 1966 or 1967 during a conference organized by a group of women, in Mbeia, the 1<sup>st</sup> conference of the Mozambican women, it was decided to form an organization called LIFEMO.

It was headed by the late CELINA Simango, wife of Vice-Chairman Urias Simango. The main function of this organization was to support the tasks of the Mozambican revolution. Women were mobilizing other women in the education area, etc. and in 1967 the Women's Detachment was formed, which was an initiative headed by FRELIMO's leadership.

LIFEMO ended up disappearing due to internal cleavages. Almost overnight there was a nearly FRELIMO factor which was the fact that Samora Machel disagreed with the existence of LIFEMO. Firstly, because it was an organization that comprised the wives of some officials, and this was not supposed to happen, although it had to have someone in the leadership. The tasks were being performed on the ground, in the country, meanwhile LIFEMO was structured generally to develop other tasks in other countries, and hence creating a more aggressive situation when integrating young people and women that had political and military training to develop their activities inside the country.

The tasks of the Women's Detachment were essentially of mobilization and organization of the masses inside the country, to integrate the national liberation struggle in all its stages of development. Then we had other tasks such as the WD's cadres that had to be trained as nurses, teachers, while other cadres were engaged in activities such as sabotage, military reconnaissance on the ground and on the battle field. We organized life in the rear-guard bases, such as orphanages, we contributed in the agriculture to feed the freedom fighters, we carried war materials, because we had no donkeys or horses, no means of transport. Those who carried war material from the Rovuma border to the bases hinterland in very advanced sectors are real heroines.

There is no doubt that the national liberation struggle used many children as an element of reconnaissance, since a child goes unnoticed and young females were also used as messengers and reconnaissance members and we were also saying that we needed the contribution of all aged, young, men and women and children, all had to contribute taking into account their capacities, and the only capacity of a child was to recognize, act as a messenger but not to combat because they were minors.

As a leader of the Women's Detachment we received members of the WD coming from hinterland, some would come from other Frelimo centres who were studying in Tanzania, such as in Dar-es-Salaam, Songuena, Mtwara,, but most of them were from provinces hinterland already fighting, such as the case of Tete, Manica, Niassa, Sofala, Cabo Delgado, very few were from south of Save River. Their mission was to be trained and we knew that within an x period we would deliver the 1st stage of the march forward, then to deliver weapons within an x period and followed the strategy and tactics stage, all of this process accompanied by practical classes, since we didn't want to create murders for a war, but rather to train people that knew exactly why they were there, what were their tasks and functions and what the People expected from them.

As with everything in life, it wasn't easy to be a pioneer in any activity of social life. The mere fact of persuading FRELIMO leadership to approve the existence of the Women's Detachment was a struggle. Within the Central Committee of FRELIMO there were comrades and leaders who disagreed because of their prejudice that the WD would be used to serve the needs of men, that we would be used to be lovers of the commanders of this war, which was not the case. Many men were not prepared to see a woman fighting exactly like them. This fight took a while, firstly there was debate within FRELIMO, the decision was not easily accepted. It became necessary for women to prove their capacity and that was a very difficult task.

One of the more positive aspects of FRELIMO, during the struggle, was its organization. Since the first moment of the creation of the liberation struggle, FRELIMO was always very rigid in terms of organization, and the basic ones were the mass mobilization campaigns, it became necessary to sensitize the people towards the crucial need to win the war with the participation of the women. Women had to be there and with clear tasks that would serve as a support for the struggle and decolonization.

The WD was the base where the female cadres trained towards the struggle and every member of the WD would come out with a clear political and military preparation, capable of performing any role and from there any other functions, like teachers, and conscious of its contribution in the labour sector. We had nurses, some secretaries, comrades that were managing orphanages who were conscious of those babies being the pursuers of the fight, many of whom were already prepared for the prolonged war, but we knew the war would never stop because we had those who would continue it.

Women left a very strong mark in their performance, because later in 1973 the OMM was created in order to take another struggle, which was that for the women's emancipation.

They were comprehensive throughout the organization, not only in women's tasks in the specific case of the WD, we had instructors that also trained men. I was a pioneer in this field. Me and Boldina Cristóvão were in command of male platoons and we also had comrades, such as Marina Pachinuapa, Deolinda Guezimane, Mónica Chitupila, Teresa Muli and the late Josina, who became members of the Central Committee of FRELIMO. Our principle was that there could be no women's liberation without the liberation of men, it was necessary to free men from prejudice to adhere and assume that it was possible to work on an equal basis and to share the same opportunities with women. We were not dealing a lot with the Tanzanian women, except in our day to day tasks, and generally there weren't formal invitations to meetings, works, or to speak about Africa's liberation.

Of what I lived, everything was done at FRELIMO, they were internal decisions. The creation of the OMM, for example, was an internal decision of the FRELIMO leadership, it was not even a decision by women themselves. That's where the OMM differed from LIFEMO. While LIFEMO was formed by a group of women who merely asked for men's blessing, Eduardo Mondlane went to Mbeia to bless such organization in 1966, with the OMM it was a decision taken, if I'm not mistaken, by the FRELIMO's executive committee in 1972, if I'm not mistaken, and it was created only in 1973, so a group of ours had to contribute for its organization. But the decision and the initiative weren't ours, we were simply informed of the need to create it.

We had a lot of support, but I can only talk about it in a very indirect way because it is something I didn't live personally. LIFEMO had a lot of non-monetary material support from the socialist countries, especially from Bulgaria, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, China, etc. But we also had the blessing of sisters from other countries.

After the national independence what was effectively done was to try to integrate every woman that had contributed in the struggle for liberation. Shortly before, some were granted scholarships to study nursing, secretarial courses, while others proceeded their studies to pursue university studies. But they were few because it was another stage, with different vision and opportunities. There was integration, but not yet total, the majority of the WD and of the guerrilla fighters drifted away, they felt marginalized and didn't feel integrated during the entire process and, even today, they feel marginalized, they had not enjoyed the benefits of independence 31 years later because the integration was done in a small scale. Years later, we still feel today proud of being there, feeling the historic moments, but on the other hand we expected much more from the Frelimo Party who is in power since independence to date. We expected more from the Mozambican Government. The issues related with those who contributed to the liberation struggle should have by now already been addressed, we should have been more focused in nation building, in the fight for the absolute ending of poverty in this country and not focused as yet on the issues of the former combatants. This only demonstrates what the leadership of this country doing for those who sacrificed themselves for this country.

In the specific case of Zimbabwe, we have indirectly contributed, as far as I know, no Mozambican woman marched against the regime of Ian Smith, but we were there, we supported the Zimbabwean freedom fighters when they crossed through our bases, we hosted them, all of them sought refuge in the provinces of Tete, Manica e Sofala, we offered them the little we had and we lived with them, we mobilized the masses to provide them with food and shelter.

We received immense moral support, as well as from the OAU because their main objective was the total liberation of Africa and the OAU never let us down

With the Liberation Committee as its main figurehead. The whole of Africa contributed directly and indirectly, with Tanzania at our key supporter, because it served as a sanctuary to FRELIMO as well as to all liberation movements in the region. We had the support of Zambia, though later in the 1970s. We had Malawi's support, which was conditioned and very limited due to the Kamuzu Banda's agreements with the Portuguese colonial government but thankfully they have always allowed asylum to Mozambican refugees.

Algeria granted a lot of military support by training our first cadres and they have always maintain contact with us. Egypt too was always there when we needed them. In western Africa we had Ghana's support who facilitated and enabled Frelimo to grow but then it became politically very unstable with successive coups d'état. Kwame Nkrumah was no longer on the scene so a lot had changed. Frelimo existed and was able to trigger the struggle thanks to these socialist countries of the Eastern Bloc. As to China, most of the support came from this bloc. The Nordic countries had also given us a lot of support, though not financial, they sent a few teachers for education, such as the case for the Mozambican Institute, which had teachers coming from northern Europe, who helped to develop the Mozambican press, they were Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark. We had support from the West, albeit from specific groups, not from Governments, as Portugal was part of NATO as well as some western countries who couldn't allow Portugal to be attacked, though morally there was one or another country that was with us. Financially, we had communist and socialist parties, including the Portuguese, who gave moral support to FRELIMO and it was thanks to that the negotiations were facilitated.

I think these countries gave their support without ulterior motives, the idea was about the decolonization of Africa and aid in the national reconstruction.

South Africa officially could not play any positive role for us, quite to the contrary, we were their own enemies, it had a deep alliance with Portugal, while they were already having a very serious problem inside South Africa, which was the ANC, who had Kondo Yassikwa who was an Achilles heel and all other movements who didn't want FRELIMO from gaining power for their own wellbeing. We always maintained good relations with all the movements that were fighting against apartheid in South Africa, who aspired for progress. The same happened with Rhodesia. In the beginning our relationship was deeper with ZAPU. ZANU didn't exist it came later. When ZANU appeared, Frelimo generally didn't agree because it was in fashion, in our way of thinking they were single parties, many people could not understand why these nationalists of ZANU were not integrating in ZAPU, instead of dispersing their forces fighting against the same regime, but FRELIMO in 1973 stopped supporting and maintaining deep relations with ZAPU and, instead maintaining relations with Robert Mugabe's ZANU.

This information was given to us in Nachinguea, at a meeting of cadres and Samora Machel was there and received a ZANU delegation led by Robert Mugabe the late commander Tongo Gara and the head of foreign relations. These ZANU's senior cadres had visited Nachinguea for the 1st time and we had a meeting. Samora said that up until then the type of link and support with Rhodesia would be via ZAPU, but after all we had never taken into consideration ZANU, we thought that ZAPU was in better conditions to liberate Zimbabwe, but we had reached the conclusion that those that would really liberate Zimbabwe would be ZANU, and never ZAPU, because the latter was not developing concrete tasks such as the struggle for decolonization of Africa, after we monitored the real history. ZANU had a higher spirit of sacrifice, dead and tortured prisoners, etc. while ZAPU was more self-indulgent. The ANC is the oldest party in Africa so when we started to organize ourselves during the liberation movement, the ANC had already existed so we automatically had links with the ANC, with exchange of experiences. The other countries were coming later and we didn't think it was correct to disengage from the ANC to link with other parties. The consequences were hard for the Mozambican people, the cost very high, we weren't prepared. I wouldn't say we made a mistake but after independence we proceeded with our solidarity, it was our duty to support those that needed us. In the case of Zimbabwe we, after independence, needed time to consolidate as a people, as a nation, and unfortunately we didn't have such time, heading a nation was something new for us, no one had been trained to be a president, leader, minister, each one would learn, would work making mistakes, some serious, other not so serious, that is how the Mozambican nation was born.

Later, we all know what happened with our unconditional support, which we continued to provide to the ANC. The apartheid regime did not hesitate in entering Mozambique and to bombard our country, to kill ANC militants within Mozambican territory and we didn't even have the capacity to respond.

## Durão, Linguilirani

[Tete, Mozambique, 2008]

*Born in Tete, he joined FRELIMO in 1968 at the Central Base of Cachumbo mobilized by the guerrillas, at his home in Marávia. He went to fight the Portuguese after the torturing of his father by the Portuguese. He received the early training in Kassuende prior to proceeding to Nachinguea. He first saw action in 1969 from the Kassuende base under the command of Sebastião Mabote and José Moiane. He partook in various battles in the Tete province until the downfall of the Portuguese colonialism. He acted in the radio communications of which he was the head. He participated in the 4th Motorized Infantry Brigade and fought in Zimbabwe until independence in 1980, successively in alternate periods of six months with other groups. He participated in the civil war until the signing of the Peace Accord in 1992. He tells many episodes of treason in the combat front. We got married during the fight in Kassuende in 1973/74.*

I left on the 15th July 1968. What made me go to war through the mobilization of the guerrillas who used to come to my house. My zone is Nhenda, in Maravia. When they came on the second time, I told my mother I was going to join the FRELIMO ranks, because I saw my father being tied up when my brother went to Zimbabwe. So the Portuguese said he had gone to the *turras* (terrorists). They therefore demanded the payment of taxes. They tied him up and left him out in the sun and I was very shocked with such atrocities, while my brother was in Zimbabwe. When I left that place, I spoke to my mother telling her that I was going to fight the Portuguese for what they had done to my father.

When leaving I took my *sakudú* (bag) and a plate and reported to the Central Base of Cachombo. I went alone to the base. They then explained me the objective of the Armed Struggle. They then took me to Nachingwea where I undertook training, after having first been in Kassuende. In 1969 I returned to Mozambique to fight for the liberation of my country. I was a section leader, had 11 members with me, so we were 12. I stayed at Kassuende, a base where José Moiane was stationed. After all activities performed here, I was sent to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Sector where Nandimbo was the Sector commander. My mission pertained to radio communications of which I was the head. I was moving to all the sectors where there was no radio or radio operators. In the event of a breakdown I would effect repairs and would reach up to Sector 3, where Sigáúque was. That was my mission which I performed for 10 years, always in the communications area.

When I joined I only had standard 3 and when I returned from the struggle I resumed my studies. After the Lusaka Accords we went to Tete in the 4<sup>th</sup> Motorized Infantry. From there we went to Zimbabwe to help the Zimbabweans to fight against Ian Smith. After the Zimbabwe's independence we returned to our country. Here I participated in the fight against the 16-year destabilization until its end. To enter Zimbabwe we would leave the 4th Brigade and would camp in Manica and Machipanda near the border, and then we would enter in Zimbabwe. We would enter mixed with the Zimbabweans, we even had there an officer called Kandu de Niassa who died in Zimbabwe but we returned his mortal remains back to Mozambique.

In Zimbabwe we raided the boer barracks and there were many Mozambican soldiers. As to human losses, I only saw the death of our commander of reconnaissance, that officer from Niassa. We remained in Zimbabwe during six months and then to be replaced by another group. Therefore, there was relief every six months. After Zimbabwe I went to Gorongosa in Sofala and we operated in Maringue and passed via Casa Banana.

After a 16-year war one is already seeing improvements in our country.

During the armed struggle, the battle that impressed me was the Maloera, in Maravia. There was an OPV member that had fled into FRELIMO's hands and he went for training in Nachingwea. So, when we went to raid Maloera this OPV escaped and handed himself to the enemy on the eve of the attack and he gave all the information to the enemy. The enemy was on the alert and we heard the alarm horn blowing in the barracks and, in this battle, we lost 8 comrades and several injured.

Well we could say that this OPV was a reconnaissance guy because we didn't also have participated in many other battles with significance to Maloera (Chifunde District), Nura (Mukumbura) and Chingodzi, in the suburbs of the Tete City. In this battle of Chingodzi we left well from Kassuende to Chingodzi, but we suffered a lot from hunger, either to and from. In the return we arrived in Phonde where we were attacked by the Portuguese. In the Chingodzi attack we did not suffer any casualties, only the enemy had suffered them and we destroyed houses not aircraft. At that time I was attached to the 2<sup>nd</sup> Sector, under the commanding officer Natimbo and the Provincial Commander (DD) who was comrade José Moiane.

We fought to reach our objectives. But I have some criticism for the Government's failure for taking all combatants to Maputo.

In the fulfilment of demobilization there were a lot of failures, it's defective for the combatants that suffered, we drank urine in the absence of water. This currently is sentimental. Those who enjoy pensions are infiltrated people to the detriment of the genuine former combatants. The infiltrated ones are the ones enjoying priority. For example, I am a captain but earning a private's remuneration. What messed it all was UNIMOZ, it did not handle the process properly. I was living with my spouse in 1973 and got married in 1974 in Kassuende. During the war the political commissar were saying that if you wanted to get married you could, but not to forget that we were at war. I didn't get married earlier because she was still a teenager, we were dating each other but could only get married after the war. She is now 45 years old.

## Ferrão, Valeriano

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2007]

*Valeriano Ferrão, joined FRELIMO in protest against the repression of which he was a victim in the City of Beira, where he was living and he worked at the Beira Customs. In FRELIMO, Ferrão worked as a teacher at the Bagamoyo school and in 1974 he was sent to replace Oscar Monteiro as a FRELIMO representative in Algeria. After independence he worked as an engineer at the Mozambican Railways at the Ministry of Transport. He was a Secretary of the Council of Ministers (Cabinet) and Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation and First Ambassador in the USA.*

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*Motivation for joining the Liberation Front:*

Most naturally, no colonial situation is pleasant. It is not pleasant, especially when a person does not compromise, say, with the colonizer, that is the act of the colonized, although I'm not originally a Mozambican and a Black. Naturally, the colonial oppression was directed to all, but especially to the blacks. So, the Indians also got their share and I see myself in that situation, although I was a bit rebellious, as always. I have always been a bit rebellious but what really pushed me to join the national liberation was the fact that I was beaten twice in the streets of Beira, where I was born, by the Portuguese.

The first time was when India's Prime Minister Nehru, threatened to invade Goa with his freedom fighters, as he called them. That was in 1950, 53, 54 more or less. In the second time was when he really sent the Indian army to go in and invade Goa. That was in November 1961 and the Portuguese begun naturally increasing the repression immediately against the Indian community. So, the many of the Indian community bent their knees before their masters, while others kissed their feet, and others remained quiet, that is, they endured all that. I didn't, I was weary, I said "no, enough is enough. I am leaving". Note that I was employed in a very good job at that time. I was working at the Colonial Customs, I was earning 7400 Escudos per month on average, which was very good at the time. I used to save a nett amount of 5 to 6 thousand Escudos per month. You can well imagine the extent of my salary.

But I preferred leaving all that in favour of joining the liberation movement and to comply with my duty, as any Mozambican, to this country.

*From Beira to Dar-es-Salaam*

No, from Beira when I decided to leave, I had all the documents, I had a few challenges to get a passport. But I managed, I bought an air ticket and left via Salisbury, today Harare, to France, in 1960, 1963. And although I had bought the ticket to Hamburg, Germany, because at that time Paris was a hub of the international communist subversion. So, to go to Paris was something a bit too daring.

So, I told everybody at home that I was going to study in Germany. And so that is what's happened. I stopped in Paris and I had a meeting with an ex-colleague from high school, António Almeida Matos, nowadays he is in the (Southern) group, it appears he is the PCA of the Austral Group. And he practically brought me to FRELIMO. He informed Pascoal Mucumbi, who was FRELIMO's representative in Algeria, who in turn informed Sar-es-Salaam, and it was decided that I should wait in Paris until FRELIMO would decide what to do.

Later, I started working in a factory and then António Almeida Matos told me that Mucumbi would like to know if I would be interested in a scholarship, as FRELIMO was offering one such grant. I thought it was easier to study than to work in a factory, so I accepted the offer. I passed all the tests, filled all the forms, etc, and then a few months later they advised me that I had been successful and would go to Switzerland to study at a higher technical college, in accordance to the study course I had selected, which was Engineering.

I moved to Switzerland in April 1965 and shortly after I began my studies. The course lasted 5 years and a half and when I completed, I began my journey to Africa. So, in May 1970 the Portuguese Colonies Solidarity Conference took place organized by the Solidarity Committee in Italy and I went there. I went to meet our leaders, Marcelino dos Santos, Armando Guebuza, Panguene, amongst others. And the comrade Vice-Chairman, Marcelino dos Santos gave instructions to our representative in Algeria, who at the time was Óscar Monteiro, to make arrangements for me to return to Dar-es-Salaam.

So I travelled to Geneva in August, and from there to Algiers, where I stayed for two to three months, and then travelled to Cairo, already with an Algerian id and passport, airplane ticket paid for by the Algerians and everything else. In Cairo I endured a boring 6 months in order to get a Tanzanian visa and eventually I succeeded and went to Dar-es-Salaam.

In Dar-es-Salaam I stayed two or three days and then I was sent to Nachinguea, for political and military training, and then shortly me and the late comrade Alberto Cachimo were called by comrade Chairman Samora Machel in Nachinguea, where that we both had to be posted at the FRELIMO's Secondary School in Bagamoyo, to replace a Swedish couple teachers who had misbehaved with acts of sexual corruption, etc.

So, within 3 days we were already in Dar-es-Salaam and then from there we proceeded to Bagamoyo. At Bagamoyo both of us remained as teachers and the principle there was that Mozambican teachers were to teach what the foreign teachers could not teach. So we taught everything that was necessary, I for example, was teaching Portuguese, Natural Science, Drawing while Alberto Cachimo taught History, etc. So basically, we spent there some 3 or 4 years until July 1974, when I was called to Dar-es-Salaam to be informed by comrade the Vice-Chairman, who was the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that I was going to

Algeria to replace José Óscar Monteiro, who was the local Representative.

Like other FRELIMO cadres living in Algeria, all were all in Dar-es-Salaam to participate in the preparations of the discussions with the Portuguese Government regarding Mozambique's independence. So, I went to Algeria where I arrived after the signing of the Accord in September 1974. So, there with two or three trips, one to Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Dar-es-Salaam I returned finally to Mozambique in the second week of June, 1975.

This was, more or less, my trajectory in summary. I think that there are more descriptions in the book.

Experience in Bagamoyo:

Bagamoyo was not what we call a school. We could rather call it a traditional school in the sense that the Bagamoyo school, generally, was teaching all the content required for a secondary school. But it wasn't a school to graduate children to high school., at standard 9, possibly standards 10 or 11, but rather to train combatants, because the young people that were there, even the little ones, had undergone military training in Nachinguea. And that's because they were destined to continue the struggle.

At the time of the liberation struggle, all efforts from all departments of FRELIMO were directed towards the war, the war of liberation. That is to say, the children who were going for school, once graduated, would have to study and be trained to handle more powerful weapons.

I recall at one stage comrade Chairman Samora Machel saying that in the school that they needed to continue their studies because the Russians, the Soviets had already made available to us helicopters for us to quickly advance hinterland in Mozambique, to avoid having to move through routes that were taking months to reach certain targets. And that was reason why they were studying, and there was no doubt in the minds of the students. Thus, even during the holidays, the so-called long holidays, Summer holidays, in December, the learners would not remain in the school. They would be sent to the interior, to participate in the liberation activities in the various sectors: Education, Production, even in war, I don't know, so they were performing activities that would form an integral part of the liberation struggle. This to make it quite clear that the children were not to be graduates but rather to become combatants who would go to pursue the war, when we could no longer carry our own weapons.

And, naturally, the entire school structure had to set up to this effect the political mobilization was ongoing, permanent not only for the FRELIMO leaders, but also for the teachers themselves.

The political education classes were there, focused always around this central aspect that it was directed towards the liberation against the Portuguese colonialism.

In my first year there, there were 52 students. I think that in the second year it had doubled to 120 students, more or less. But in the last year there were 350. While in the first years students were, in the majority, relatively adults, some with 22 or 23 years of age, in the last year there were 11- or 12-year children who had left the Tunduru primary schools from hinterland, That is, we were teaching children from the age of 6 and 7 years to complete their standard 4 and advance to standard 5 and 6. Most of these learners nowadays are married persons.

Almost all students, were coming from Cabo Delgado, some from Niassa and Tete, and at the end their students coming from Manica e Sofala. There were far less children from combatants from the Southern region.

The girls, in the first year, I remember being only 4 and in the second year the number went up to 11. So, it was more or less almost 10% at the time. I can't remember the other number, I only know that it started to increase substantially after we built another bunker, what we called the women's detachment.

The language of teaching was the Portuguese, this is because it was the idiom, we were most conversant, but perhaps not so much on the part of the students. But the language was the Portuguese, they were not allowed to speak the other national languages, although we knew that the youngsters, the children spoke Maconde or Nyanja or Nyungue, or even Swahili. All of them spoke Swahili, i.e. 18 months before all were speaking Swahili. So, it was the language which was the easiest to communicate, but that was prohibited to avoid spoiling the knowledge of the Portuguese, as there had been an attempt in the past, at the time of the Mozambican Institute, in Dar-es-Salaam. It was an attempt from certain reactionaries that are longer with us, such as Father Guendjere and others, that we should have taught in English, and not Portuguese, because the Portuguese language was a colonialist language – as if the English was also not colonialist. This language phase tallies with his assassination.

Experience of Nachinguea:

I stayed about 2 months in Nachinguea. I can't remember exactly how long, I didn't complete my training because I was called, and interrupted my training, because of the lack of teachers in Bagamoyo, I was already at that stage they called "*marcha com arma*" (march with a weapon), from which we would move into other aspects of tactics and later to the shooting range. So, I then didn't have the opportunity to learn how to shoot. Not clearly, because Bagamoyo was a school, not a camp for political and military training.

Yes, there were teachers who would go hinterland, but not me. I suffer from a spine problem since my times as a student in Nairobi and President Samora knew about it. I never went, but others like Libombo did go. Cachimo also had a health problem, he had heart problems, which led to his death.

But Libombo went, and also Mário Silva, the school headmaster.

The headmaster was Mário Silva. He was there until my arrival, until he was transferred in 1973 to the Political Commissariat and the school was handed to us Mozambicans, who were there as in the school governance. Silva was a Mozambican and he was transferred to the National Political Commissariat.

Solidarity amongst the Liberation Movements:

Note that when I was in Europe when we were invited to meetings here and then, I think in the solidarity committees, we would participate but solely as an input that we could give. But we were not members of this Committee. There was no Mozambican in the Committee. It had to be a combatant only.

When I was studying in Switzerland, there was no such right, there were those things of the Solidarity Committee. It was a small group, that would help with something at the Swiss Mission. This Swiss Methodist Church was giving some support, it was through them that FRELIMO obtained the scholarship that was granted, for example, to Pascoal Mucumbi, Feliciano Mondlane, Adelina Mucumbi, Aires Fernandes. These were therefore scholarships that were the only form, the only contribution they would arrange. There were no other contributions, either in medicines and least with weapons and ammunitions.

Functions after independence:

Well, but when I returned I was, initially, was placed to work at the Railways as an engineering in the general workshops but I was regularly called, because I was a teacher, to do things for the education, including to go to New York. So I unfortunately didn't do any engineering work so, after a while, the Minister decided to remove me and took me to the Ministry of Transport because he wanted to train, to create a provisional committee of Road Transport, I worked there for two months.

Well, then the State Ministry in the Presidency, Óscar Monteiro asked the Minister of Transport he needed me in his Ministry. I was transferred to this Ministry and remained there worked as the Secretary of the Council of Ministers since September 1976 until April 1978, when I was appointed as the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Now, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs mutually had to have contacts with foreign diplomats, but it had the contact with representatives of the movements and Solidarity Committee who had representatives here, or as visitors. That is, more sporadic things. Shall we say, not such a permanent work, although FRELIMO would have a line not to neglect the small groups, committees, or even big support committees that gave their support during the liberation struggle, including the treatment given to them, which needed to be done.

In regard to the delegations from the governments of the countries that visited us, we had a principle that if we were giving crystal glasses to one we were also to give crystal glasses to others because of their support and we ought to support them or throw stones because they were with Portugal.

No, directly in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was not involved with the liberation movements, that is, if there were any matter related with them and we needed information, we would then request it to ZANU or the ANC, they were the ones more often requested. Because it wasn't about Swaziland or the Comoros. It was mostly about Zimbabwe and South Africa.

So, in addition to the proper Government's structure, there was the initiative to create a refugee support committee linked to the liberation movements which consisted in covering the needs of these liberation movements, which was not the Ministry's task. If we had those contacts, it was because they were needed. If a leader of these movements came here and asked for a meeting with either Minister Chissano, or myself, we would oblige without any problems.

Naturally, according to our foreign policy as defined by the Party and by Government, that would normally an important matter to denounce the colonial occupation anywhere in the world. Secondly, in relation to Zimbabwe, also to denounce the regime, in regard to South Africa and apartheid, there would be no doubt.

I think I've said before, the prevailing task was to denounce colonialism anywhere in the world and in particular the illegal and rebellious independence of Southern Rhodesia and naturally, the apartheid regime which was pressing his own people and was also attacking neighbouring countries such as Mozambique, for example, who were attacked so often. And this was happening constantly, that is, there wasn't quite a special articulation, we would submit the case, and one would agree or not with it. It was hard anywhere, any foreign government could say that Ian Smith was a good regime, but we would say not here in Mozambique. Then, as regards the apartheid regime and the embargo against the regime, there were informal contacts between some people and they started to negotiate directly the Nkomati Accord with the South African Government.

On East Timor:

East Timor, we didn't support them, because it wasn't a question of a colonial occupation, but the Indonesian invasion, and we were supporting the FRETILIN, in regard to coming here or to any Timorese that wanted to choose Mozambique as their country of exile. There was no other support, other than a political one, it was difficult to render military support,

Maybe limited financial support. Mozambique did not have much resources, but we did grant them some benefits in favour of their freedom fighters.

We would provide them with access to land for farming and to generate some income with the sale of their produce. I also know that we would provide them with Mozambican passports for their travelling, including to Mário Alkatri, Ramos Horta and many others that travelled here. So now they are there, they are now independent and confronted with their challenge about the independence.

Support to the Zimbabwean cause:

No, naturally, I'm going to say something to you. If I was in Ian Smith's place, I would do the same. That is, we were naturally strongly supporting the Zimbabwean war, as they know. Practically to the two movements, ZAPU and ZANU. They were put against a wall, they were considered suicidal, they wanted our support, they wanted to create a sole common front. So they formed the Patriotic Front. The ZAPU guerrillas were, in effect, here but just for a short while, because they got weary and left, and Ian Smith fought naturally with euphoria.

Obviously, to attack the enemy at home seems much better than for him to attack first. So there was a key objective, which was to create trouble, to destabilize in such a way so as to prevent our support to the liberation movements.

Now, there is something here about the smart way to start recruiting people, maybe even before independence, within those special groups that belonged to Jorge Jardim. Some brainwashing that had already happened, telling them they would be killed by FRELIMO.

So he recruited those people, then he also picked those who had been in the re-education camps in Sofala, Manica. And in Chimoio there was this group called *Africa Livre*. So there were all these aspects, no country that would oppose a Marxist Mozambique, nationalizations, etc could agree and support. To deny them, they were doing well, they were right. They knew very well it was an act of aggression, because some of these people, some of the attacks were not Mozambicans or not conducted by Mozambicans, but rather by the Rhodesian forces, such as the bombing of the Mapai station, the Telecommunications Station of Mapai, of Chiluba in Beira, Sofala, destruction of the petrol depots of Beira, all these were not the work of Mozambicans. These were led by commandoes, specialist troops, aircraft that our Matsangaissa didn't have.

Look. It's true, FRELIMO during the liberation war and for a long time supported what were the so-called genuine liberation movements, such as FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO, ZAPU, MOVINAPO and the PAIGC, I think those were all of them, there was no other with the quality of (.....)

These were the so-called true liberation movements, without any coordination or organization congregating all of them, but they had an affinity with the ANC. Sorry, I was forgetting the ANC.

So, all of the others, such as SWAPO, the PAC and others, were not considered true liberation movements, the FNLA in Angola, and certainly not COREMO, etc. at that time. But when FRELIMO liberated the province of Tete in 1972, in the two years it became completely free practically in all liberated areas, the Portuguese would not leave their camps, their barracks, essentially around Cahora Bassa, a little bit in Zobe. Here there was a territory FRELIMO offered ZAPU to combat. But ZAPU didn't accept, they were having doubts and there was a guy who pitched up, if I'm not mistaken his name was Joel Milevo, a Zimbabwean from ZANU, who had been a FRELIMO scout. He was the one who explained the whole situation, because ZAPU could not take the advantage of using the liberated Tete areas to advance the fight to Zimbabwe because it was simply a tribal matter.

ZAPU was more linked to the Nderero group, who bordered with Zambia and Botswana, while on this side of the border there were the Shonas who are related with the Sizulus, etc. So, on the face of such agreement, FRELIMO opened its eyes and begun supporting ZANU, by training its men in Nacchinguea and later giving them the support to penetrate Rhodesia.

I recall one time, of a company of young girls that had been kidnapped in a school by bandits, but that were training in Nachinguea and later returned to Zimbabwe. But this group, once finally ready for combat to trigger the war from free and independent Mozambique, was solely made up by ZANU. The group remained fighting, later with our support, as well as from our forces who had been deployed for that purpose, such as engaging the enemy in their land instead of fighting in our war.

Naturally, the British felt that the situation was going beyond their capacity because they doubtless knew they were supporting and protecting Ian Smith. Then there was the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Commonwealth, in Lusaka, Zambia. England took the decision to tackle its rebellious colony and to initiate the process of negotiations. That's when the freedom fighters started to return and to be assembled.

Our troops who were fighting there returned back to Mozambique, transported by the British Air Force. But against this background there was the South African reaction. They recovered all of the RENAMO based in Rhodesia and brought them to Transvaal, to proceed henceforth with the destabilization. I imagine that all that work Rhodesia wasn't alone and it was being support logistically and otherwise.

And from that moment in 1980 the destabilization war extended overnight across to all the provinces. They used everything, helicopters, aircraft, Dakotas, submarines, fishing boats, everything that transported people to destabilize in the provinces and Mozambique.

At that time, it was hard to dissociate everything. It was difficult to disassociate FRELIMO from the Government who was practically FRELIMO. Even the leaders from one another. So, naturally, all these decisions were taken by the Party, and implemented by those same members that had taken the decision at government level, there is no doubt about that.

To start with, it was the process, I can't remember in which year, in Dar-es-Salaam. So I heard, where President Samora was talking with that guy Joel, I don't know if he was Joel Nlovo, who later had some tricky things with Ian Smith. The we had these Zimbabwean troubles, though it was from that guy Joel.

Relations with Angola (first years of independence):

After independence, are referring to our independence? I am going to be honest, I know very little, I know that our people were there in Angola, our military people, but don't know who, when and what they were exactly doing. Naturally, there was some affinity between the so-called genuine movements, either politically, either because we had been colonized by the same masters. So there were common tasks, like when comrade President Chissano helped our brothers in terms of the USA recognition as an independent country. I, in whatever I knew, would inform Ambassador Enício Figueiredo, Angola's Ambassador in the UN. I would catch him whenever there were delegations in Washington.

Obviously, this could not please the Portuguese. It wasn't the Portuguese Government, but rather the Portuguese settlers who were being neglected, and who had left Mozambique, that in one way or another lost their property and wanted to take revenge so, they very often served as guides for the Rhodesian forces, or indicated to them economic military targets left by them to be destroyed. For example, the case of Chokwe, if I'm not mistaken, when they came in choppers and destroyed, inter alia, the bus company premises. A medical doctor, and the locals saw that, said that there was a Portuguese was leading the operation. They were destroying things that had been abandoned and claimed by the Government. There were those who had hidden them, but many went to South Africa who is also to be blamed for it.

Well, when we became independent, thereafter started the nationalizations, in July, if I'm not mistaken. The Americans also waited for long, they voted laws, resolutions prohibiting economic assistance to Mozambique. They banned many things, immediate prohibitions. When I arrived there, a lot more had happened (...). When I was sent there, it was already in a context of improving our relations with the United States, with the American Administration.

The second main task was to block the RENAMO advancement in the White House, because they were nearly having both feet there at the White House. Thirdly, it was naturally to recover (....) recover. Whenever they were there to revitalize the support of these groups, committees that existed in the US to support FRELIMO in terms of the liberation and then to Mozambique....

Because during the time we were absent they were left abandoned, there was one or two contacts with our ministers...practically when Minister Chissano went to New York, but it was very limited. Even today I received an email from a friend telling me he has a photo of mine showing President Samora Machel receiving a cheque minutes before or after independence from a certain Bob or Liroup who was doing some filming of the liberated areas. Acheque I don't know of how much, I only recall I was there, so I was talking about these two features and then...well, to work within the American system, using what they had in their Press e in the media in general, the individual journalists, that is, a whole of a mark we had to use and I think we had used it within time.

While at that time the image of Mozambique was significantly good. It must have been some work of ours, there at the Congress. There were some prohibitions being lifted every now and there. We started to receive some economic aid that was not directed to the Government, since that had been banned for a long time. We also managed to have the US to start supporting in the SADC projects that were being carried out here in Mozambique, something that had been prohibited until then. They were supporting all projects everywhere, in Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Swaziland but not in Mozambique.

Basically, one can say that we started to raise all of the productions and for that we could also count with the popular support in the USA, because there was the support of an organization called *Mozambique Support Network*, which was led by Black Sinasbit, a North American that had always supported us since the liberation.

And there were practically delegations of Mozambique Support Network across all American states and even before, when it worked in the USA it would not work here. But it did work in the US. When a representative was questioned by a voter about a problem, he would say he had to be careful. He should have had the right, it was the opinion of his voters and if it was just a question of sending post cards, business cards asking for support for Mozambican, why not? The campaign to support Mozambique started to change its dialogue and it was a matter to start supporting Mozambique because there was people for that, and that's how the campaigns begun.

Our Parliament lost respect, it wasn't working. So that's why such popular support was very important. In addition, we were working directly with Congress. We had something very important we were doing, working specially with the assistants of congress men, because the latter were not interested.

One day one of them told me” Ah! Mozambique, do you speak French?” Not me. We speak Portuguese. Ah! Mozambique, yes. And he was referring to Guinea. So, I kept quiet and then told him I was not from Guinea, I was from Mozambique.

Well, I couldn't go against it, and certainly not to interrupt, but we worked a lot with the assistants and we wanted a group of assistants supporting Mozambique. We would sit with them, there were those who would really not be in favour of us, albeit they would respect us, it was part of their work, to obtain information from all parts, that would be very important for them.

With all that support while dismantling all that opposition against Mozambique until the last one was from the military assistance. But naturally I wasn't working alone. I had a (...) and I also had an American Minister. He was working well and was very good. He was a great company. One person wasn't dear for the work he's done, although it was abandoned after I left. It appears they abandoned, left and cut his contract. So, they didn't need him, in my opinion it was a bit wrong, not because of having to keep him in gratitude, but for what he could continue to work, instead of catching him. We didn't catch people, he had the capacity for that.

Now, to support also the others who participated in this work, the American ambassadors could not lie. So they had to draft reports and support the decisions of our leaders and gradually they started to go away from Marxism as well as about President Chissano. The name of the Ambassador was Cameron. I am going to quote her for you, you can read about it. It was about an interview a certain lady did, a journalist from the National Journal. National Journal was a people's newspaper because it was expensive. It cost at that time I was there 16 US Dollars..

The interview was about an article written about small things, works that have to hire companies so it had been recommended by our friends. So they said it wasn't worth talking about the one from Lesotho, just to say the guy was a good guy. I'm not talking because I won't mention it, it must have had a better sequence. I have that interview at home, it talks very little about me, so I'm going to take the opportunity.

We had Mozambican students sent from here, Mozambique, with scholarships granted by USAID. Not many, because at the time they were about 30 or 35 scholarships. As we were not using such qualifications in Mozambique, they started to cut down and reduced them to 10. This is how suddenly they were lost.

Many Mozambicans, Mozambican students, were limited. I remember some of them, the Minister of Tourism, dr. Zucula. They all had fairly quite some spent in the liberation struggle. Maybe some, after the independence, but a great part had spent time in the liberation. They were angry with FRELIMO.

Maybe they didn't want to work because they preferred to stay in the USA, because they would say to return back would be to catch malaria. So they managed to make plans not to return. And this was not just there, it also happened in Europe.

That was it. They would then integrate into the American society and got married there and bought their residence permits, they already had their jobs. Who would abandon such life to begin life at 50, 55 years. It's a drama. In Washington, in particular there was this ex-bizamist Pião and a doctor brother of his. He was here. He left after independence. He studied in Cuba, I can't remember his name. So, there were these two, when this bizamist Piao was at that time appointed the RENAMO representative, I think.

The other support for RENAMO in Washington was a white one, they were all whites. So what white people could talk about Mozambique? They had to give some support, it appears they insisted there, they went to Gorongosa to ask Dlakhama to appoint me. I said yes (in the beginning I was a pawn) so I was a pawn and there was a lot of work to do. If I had to be less smatter, I could have done a lot more than I did. A guy that thought he was already a big wig, the white guy was there to provide support, the white was doing everything, he would improvise, I would be there to give support, he should have understood this but he didn't. There was a serious problem.

So, he said, it appears that one day he convened a press conference. So a chief is a chief let him talk. Then there was a journalist from the Washington Times, who was from the right, you know, don't you? So this guy from the Washington Times reported nothing. So, it was a total failure, he was weary of being white, in the USA racism was working, that's it.

The support of Northern Africa for the liberation of Mozambique::

In Algeria there was no doubt about that and even Egypt were countries that weren't involved directly in such support in this aspect. Because it was the passage. And even militants would end up there. For them, there was a representative that would deal with official stuff in Algeria and in Egypt, and we would not have to meddle in matters that were not of our competence.

But essentially because it had a war of liberation and became independent in 1962 it automatically turned into a homeland for freedom fighters and in Cairo President Nasser became a great champion for the liberation of Africa when he brought down, and it wasn't him, it was the other who brought it down, Faruk, and he brought down the opposite, that is, it all became a great (...). In Cairo there was a sort of a Liberation Centre or House of Liberty, where all liberation movements had offices also. We worked from our own from our residences, we didn't have offices there, but I know that we had a certain Doctor Hassan, from the Presidency, who was the one linked with the liberation movements. But that the support was out of conviction I have no doubt and the support was essentially financial. In Cairo, yes, but from Algeria no, it was a military one, you know that they trained many of our leaders including President Samora and many others, like Feliciano Mundanga. But that was out of deep conviction, they had the same type of war.

Morocco also provided support, albeit not in military terms. I think they gave their support via liberation committees or via the OAU. As Marcelino dos Santos had his contacts there he spent some time in that country. Tunisia was a bit quieter and has provided essentially political support and later Libya when they overthrew the king.

## Gruveta, Bonifácio

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2008]

*Born in Namacuta, Nicoadala, Zambézia in 1942. He joined FRELIMO in 1963, mobilized by Lourenço Mutaca in Zambezia. In that same year he fled to Malawi accompanied by some friends. From Malawi they were brought to Tanzania where they arrived at the same time as a group coming from the south which included Samora Machel and Matias Mboa, amongst others. After about a week in Dar-es-Salaam he left with a group to Algeria, via Nairobi, where he met the Chairman of FRELIMO, Eduardo Mondlane for the first time, He stayed for a year in Algeria at the political-military camp of Marneya, close to the border with Morocco. Upon return from Algeria, he stayed for a short while in the Kongwa camp before performing the reconnaissance mission and preparation of the armed struggle front in Zambézia and the mobilization of young members to FRELIMO. On the 25th September 1964, in pursuance of Filipe Magaia's orders for the commencement of the armed struggle, he organized two groups of guerrillas for the military infiltration in Zambézia via Malawi, with figures such as António Silva, Eduardo Nihia and Milgare Mabote. He led one of the groups that raided the Administrative Post of Mongwé in Milange on the 26<sup>th</sup>. After three months of military action he was forced to interrupt due to difficulties of transit into Malawi. He stayed in Malawi to perform political work until 1968 when he was arrested by the Malawian authorities and later deported to Dar-es-Salaam in the company of various refugees. He stayed in Nachingwea until 1974 when he returned for the re-opening of the Zambézia front and led some attacks. In September he participated in the FRELIMO delegation in the transitional negotiations for the independence in Lusaka. From there he integrated a military mission to Lourenço Marques (Maputo) to face the riots perpetrated by some Portuguese settlers and the Army. With A. Chipande and Raul Guezimane they ensured the end of the riots and the preparation of the national independence on the 25th September 1975. Member of the Central Committee, he participated in the II FRELIMO Congress in 1968, and after the independence he was a Provincial Governor and a Member of Parliament.*

My name is Bonifácio Gruveta Massamba..I was born in the province of Zambézia, on the 5th December 1942 and I joined FRELIMO via Malawi, former Nyasaland, at that time through a friend of mine, Lourenço Mutaka whom I met at Vila Saraiva Junqueiro, known as Vila Junqueiro, Gurue, and this was in 1963. I was the first zambezian leaving to hinreland for Frelimo, while Mutaka was also a Zambezian, but had left from Lisbon, where he was a student. I went to Malawi, or I went to Nyassaland. In Nyassaland. In Nyassaland came a gentleman called Lourenço Mutaca who had already been with him in Gurué. Lourenço Mutaka came from Lisbon to Zambézia. He went to Gurué district, where his father was a clerk at the Chá Manuel Junqueiro company, and Chá Junqueiro was a plantation called Junqueiro. The owner was Manuel Saraiva Junqueiro. So dad spoke about a lunch with some colleagues and we were very young, we weren't invited, but we went there. When we arrived there, Mutaka left the main table, of the parents, ordered to make another place to be with us. The conversation was all with us and he didn't speak openly about FRELIMO. He only stated: "look, you must be prepared to go to study, you see, we have to work, the country is ours". It was a language we had not understood, the message was about recruitment. He was stating that we could meet in Malawi...."I often come to Malawi" he said.

So we were motivated by that conversation intending to contact Mutaka to go for studying, to be like him. The idea of becoming military appeared later.

When we arrived in Malawi, Nyassaland he came to talk to me stating that he wanted more young people in an uncertain quantity because we had to proceed to Tanganyika, where a national liberation movement had been created who wanted many youngsters, some of whom to get scholarships, essentially and as to the rest we would know later.

- I, together with some friends, were immediately accepted, according to this man told us, and he took us to Tanganyika. And in Tanganyika we stayed for 7 days. All along these days we spent preparing documents to travel to Algeria. And in the day I arrived in Dar-es-Salaam, the late President Samora Moises Machel also arrived there. I was coming from the camp – as I said I was coming from Zambézia, while Samora was coming from the South. It was Samora, Matias Mboa, who is today the owner of the driving school, I don't know if you are aware of that – and also Mr. Massango, who today is a medical doctor and is in Germany. And then there were others, whose names I don't have, because they didn't come with us for training in Algeria.

We went via ground travel to Dar-es-Salaam, the capital, thus from Tanganyika to Nairobi. When we arrived in Nairobi Chairman Eduardo Mondlane also arrived therein. He joined us in Nairobi and then we left by airplane. These were aircraft hired by the African Union. And we flew in these aircraft to Algiers. In Algiers, we stayed for nearly a week and to prepare the voyage to the political and military training camp, the camp was the Marneya centre, therefore at the border with Morocco. In Marneya we underwent military training that took nearly a year to complete the training. From Marneya we returned to Tanganyika. When we arrived in Tanganyika, which was during the period where there was an attempted coup d'état against President Nyerere. At that time the situation in Dar-es-Salaam was not good. The Tanzanian government was advised not to let us remain in the city. Had we supported the coup d'état, this would be very dangerous for the government, because we were undergoing special training. So we were then moved into a centre but this was challenging. It was difficult, because some of us were holding the view that we should have not left immediately – because we had just arrived – so we should have remained in the city for a while. But those were the ones who, in the majority, had their relatives in Tanzania. They wanted to see their families, they wanted to be with their relatives. So there was disagreement: those wanting to go would stop at a certain place, the others at another place. The majority wanting to go to the training centre had been encouraged by the late President Samora Machel, who sustained that we had to leave, so we had to agree and the majority left. We left to the training centre. It wasn't a centre, we went to a camp a camp that was a Tanzanian railway stop towards the south, so it was a railway station called Komgwa.



So we stayed in Kongwa. I just stayed for a short while. I was selected, in a selection process was effected without the selected person's knowledge whether there were any friends being also selected or contacted. The objective of such contacts was for the person to travel to region where he/she would come from – therefore Mozambique – and determine the number of military colonial troops through the barracks; to find out how many barracks there were and how many soldiers stationed therein and the type of weapons. This now in 1964.

I did that work three times, that is, I got in and did the work and deliver a report; the report raised some queries so I had to return as a result of these queries, I had to return to Mozambique to clear the queries. And delivered the report again. There was another query. While one doing such job, the Liberation Front was infiltrating war materials – it had entered in various forms and it was Feliciano Gundana who was doing such job. mas e quem fazia esse trabalho lá era o Feliciano Gundana. The head was Filipe Samuel Magaia and there were others. So the material had then been infiltrated hinterland. No one knew, in Nampula, that there weapons entering the country. If it was entering in Niassaa and Cabo Delgado, for security reasons. In case the one member was to be detained, and he had information about the province about suffering, torture he could denounce that. So the objective was to avoid knowing where would be sent. But amongst us we sometimes meet at the buses, those buses leaving Dar-es-Salaam to Mbeya. “ Oh, that guy is here? He must have the same mission”. But we couldn't ask questions to one another. And that was how it happened. Each time I travelled to Mozambique I would bring some war materials. I had to deliver it to a certain person – only one person would receive it – but without knowing that in the following day somebody else would come to deliver to another person a second, third time, or even a fourth by an unknown person.

So I had success in my work on underground work. I entered three times and there was a high school teacher – Liceu Nuno Alvaraes in Quelimane. This teacher had met Eduardo Mondlane in Portugal, they knew each other. So when I left he gave me a letter to be delivered to the teacher. When I found the teacher, he called me into his office and ask if I knew what I was doing, if I knew that I was deemed a high risk and he asked if I really knew Mondlane. I pulled out a photograph showing me and Mondlane. He stopped asking questions, he only maintained the idea that I was a high risk. I don't know if I had any idea that the Portuguese had already discovered that I was in Mozambique, I said I wasn't aware. He then said I had to be very careful. And if I was to be arrested I should have said I didn't know him. They would then try to see what could be done, but I had to deny knowing him. So from that day I became frightened and luckily that was my last trip.

So I delivered the letter and asked him for a reply. I said he didn't have a reply- "I'm not going to give you a reply because if something goes wrong, I'll also be in trouble. But I will reply to Eduardo Mondlane. Before you arrive back my reply will be there". So I asked - "How are you going to do that?". He said; " I know how. Mondlane will tell he received the reply". And indeed the gentleman replied. I discovered later that the reply had been sent via the USA and delivered to Eduardo Mondlane.

In the same yer, during the third time I went to Tanzania, I was delivering a letter. Filipe Samuel Magaia told me not to open the letter, though it was for me. So I questioned why I was not supposed to open the letter. He said: "No, since you are longer going to Mozambique, you should not set foot in Mozambique.". He said that out of Mondlane's instructions, because my life was at risk, so I could not return to Mozambique, as per the teacher's reply. The letter is to be opened on day X. Day X, I think, was in September. I surely think it was on the 20th. So the latter was announcing the commencement of the struggle, or giving instructions on how we were to begin the fight, and at waht time. And that's what happened. On the 20<sup>th</sup> I opened the letter alone, as reccommended.

So I then called the colleagues and informed them: "Lokk, it looks the preparations are in the right track and we are going to start the war. The comrades asked me: "But where are the materials? The weapons? Ammunition?". As I had seen a part of the ammunition being delivered I replied that I had given them to someone who took them to Mozambique, together with guns. So that was it. We started to consider the target. " But when we arrive there what is going to be the target?. Who determines what is the target?". I said: "No, the target is determined according to the enemy's concentration - that is, the concentration of Portuguese troops". We spoke about it in Malawi, then we crossed into Mozambique in 2 separate groups.

There was a group underr the command of mr. António Silva. It was António Silva and other colleuages. In that group there was Eduardi Nihia. Nihia is today a General. I went with another group, under my command, though the the general commanding officer was António Silva. I was the chief of that detachment. The group headed by António Silva - which included General Nihia - encountered challenges which caused disagreement in the group which eventually has culminated with desertions. But on the date set out to commence the war we executed the orders. So, Eduardo Nihia shot the first bullets on the 25<sup>th</sup> September 1964. In my case, each one would proceed to the administrative post, as we had decided. That group went to the Tacuane Administrative Post, in the Lugela District. I went to the Mongwe Administrative Post, District of Milange. We weren't able to reach the target in time. Firstly, our companions, who had claimed to know the area, hardly knew it. They could know it well during the day but, as we were at night, they had lost themselves. By 4 o'clock in the morning had not reached the target. We reached there too late at dawn, when we attempted the raid, Sorry, no it wasn't in the same day, it was in the following day - 24 hours later - when we effected the attack. But we had good greater success in terms of the enemy's fatalities, than our Tacuane group, of Hihia..Other are still alive in Chokwe, I can't remember. Some are in Xai-Xai. It was a Police commander, I don't remember his name, he is still there. I'm only giving details of how we marched, the challenges during the marches because it looks all nice telling the story, but the reality was sad because it was the begining, the first day.

It's not funny to kill somebody. To shoot. So those were our first problems. What happened thereafter?

Kamuzu Banda's government, that is the Government of the Malawi Congress Party realized that his country was being used as a guerrilla corridor. So he then triggered a strict surveillance offensive. It was from there that he would not allow the groups that were reinforcing the war front. Some comrades were arrested, amongst which Fernando Mungaka, who was the local fire chief, comrade Raul Guezimane, Deolinda's husband and many others charged for moving with weapons. This created an embarrassment. The guys hinterland were short of weapons and the trail was closed. Solution: two or three months later, the solution was to retreat. We retreated to Malawi as civilians. Banda would allow our passage as civilians, or as refugees. The government would allow the movement but not in uniforms or armed. But we created conditions, we created friendships with Malawians, in some cases even government officials that supported us. To be noted was a certain chief of the presidential guard of Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda. His relationship with us was due to the fact that his wife was a Cape Verdean who spoke Portuguese. So from the conversation we had with his wife, she persuaded her husband to give us protection. All he wanted to know was about the time we would arrive at the border of his country leaving Zambia because to enter Malawi by road first one enters Zambia and only after that one enters Malawi. Malawi didn't have a direct border with Tanganika, it is also via Zambia. So we would tell him the time and he would send his guards. Upon their arrival we would be there with our luggage. The luggage consisted of bundles of fish. In certain areas of Africa, such as in the Great Lakes, there is a certain way of packing fish in big and long baskets, of about 2 metres long. So the AK would fit completely in there. Then we would place the fish on top, fit another weapon, another layer of fish, etc. So we would enter as fishermen, dressed like the local population and fit the luggage on bykes. One would push them and choose people would speak the local languages if necessary, open the bales and sell two or three fish and would use flasks with tea and hot water to hide the ammunition and the detonators. Many other ways, a small suitcase, I don't know with what and put what each one would make employing his own strategy, nothing uniform. But the uniform plan was solely for the weapons, more lengthy things to cross until the border with Tete and the border with Zambézia and Niassa, within Malawi.

So that was what we were doing for those who knew the Catur, Milange and Vila Nova da Fronteira areas, here with Tete already on this side.

The plan was very strong, and these people would do two things: to take weapons inside, take people from there, take Mozambicans out of the country because the main task consisted in bringing in war material and take young people out, as well as aged people, depending on whether we would see that this one or that could undergo military training and become useful. That was it. And if the war was weakening the people would retreat, create enormous discontent among the people because the oppression and massacre were great. But to safeguard that it became necessary to carry out major military operations in the Niassa province, in order to keep the flame alive, even near the common borders with Milange. At the time, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, had not yet opened the border to let the guerrillas pass, so then Dr. Eduardo Mondlane made an effort. He convinced Kaunda and Kaunda then opened the gates. So then the guerrilla fighters crossed into Zambia and from Zambia they would enter Mozambique, though the objective of these freedom fighters in Zambia was to take the war in order to escalate it to the south of Mozambique. This strategy aimed to enable us to reach the South as quickly as possible, that is, to reach Beira where Samora Machel would say "to beat the enemy at his stomach" and to proceed to Inhambane as Samora Machel's objective was to reach Lourenço Marques. He used to say: "If this war doesn't reach Lourenço Marques, we are going to face difficulties, these guys will not understand, it will be better for them to understand this war"

With the development of the war in the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete, this had created conditions for the guerrillas to proceed to Zambézia, via Zambia. We crossed Zambia, got to Tete, and before that in Vila Nova da Fronteira, cross the Chire River and climb again into Morrumbala and as we would return to Tanzania again, then enter into Zambézia. This march was very difficult, from the Zambian border to reach Morrumbala. It would require 30 days and heavily loaded. Those mortars you see there are very heavy, that mortar base, from the bottom, the one you see there, is very heavy. Walking with such equipment for 2 or 3 days, together with the ammunition for self-defence and also with cassava to feed you. All that turns things in a war very difficult, but with willingness everything was easy. So then the war failed, reached a point of failure to be brought to a complete standstill. Some of the guerrilla fighters had been arrested by Malawi, others escaped and were entering Tanzania and were re-deployed for the fronts that were combating, such as in Cabo Delgado, Niassa, Tete, except Zambézia. We wondered how many of the then two hundred and fifty men were to be deployed into three or four provinces, leaving the rest to maintenance centres in the Centre, in terms of training and other tasks. The mission consisted in recruiting youngsters and to train them in the hinterland. The training had not necessarily involve training in weapons and firearms..

They could be trained with sticks. They would only discover what a weapon is on the day of the battle – when they would be deployed to a certain combat. We must have been about twenty to twenty-five, twenty in Zambézia. Then we would train young people to swell the ranks. That is why, in each Centre, where in each camp there were centres of preparation, the training would have not been of the same quality as in Algeria. It was just some training to prepare for situations, that is fairly what it was.

After the military setback we continued with the underground work very strongly, a very strong network, selling FRELIMO's Party's membership cards, mobilizing the people and recruiting youngsters for FRELIMO. We would meet in three cities: Blantyre, Limbe and Lilongwe, essentially. In each city we would have an official house, known as a FRELIMO house. I had a problem in Malawi with a colleague of ours. It had been trained in Moscow, in Russia, with President Chissano, where they went to do a security course. When he returned he deserted from FRELIMO and handed himself in Mozambique. And he was ordered to go to Malawi to find ways to kill Bonifácio Gruveta, Inácio Nunes and other colleagues. He carried a pistol and a list of names wanted by the Portuguese. We knew about it, we knew he was going to come to our house in that day. He arrived earlier, I met with my colleagues and said: "What are we going to do?". So we decided that when he arrived I would invite him to my office to talk with him and when he would start to assault me, I would shout and then would have to not waste time, we would have to grab his briefcase for the documents. We didn't know what he was carrying. And that was it. We were well organized. A small gesture in the office, they would force open the door, got in and grabbed the briefcase. He had a gun in it, money and a list. The one grabbing the briefcase, would check with the colleagues and to leave immediately, to catch the bus to Tanzania. So he was badly beaten and went left and burnt his motorcycle.

And, as I was innocent, I didn't know him well, how to act in court, when the Police arrived in the afternoon. "So his, and this, and that happened, is it true?" I said: that yes, it was true. "They say that you were the ones who did it". I said no, it wasn't us. "if it was me, us, who else did it? Can't you see nobody else is in this house? It was me". "You beat him, then grabbed the briefcase, took the money, and took the gun?". I said: "no, he is lying, I saw no gun, saw no money, briefcase. The motorcycle, I burnt it, is it there outside!". So I was then arrested and taken to the Police to do a statement.

Then they asked if I admitted doing a wrong. I said: "No I do not admit I did any wrong, I'm only admitting I performed the action". You admit you did it?". I said yes so they asked me to sign and I signed it. That was my mistake. I was talking to them directly in X-Chema. So on the third day I was sent to court. They asked if I had a lawyer in court. I said I had not yet spoken to him and that I wanted to first speak to him. So then they postponed the proceedings, and we went to talk. So the lawyer said: "When we go to that room you mustn't say you speak Nyanja. They will be forced to call for a translator but you will not accept. But since you have already accepted and signed, tell them that they told you to sign.". And that's what happened: when we went to trial they asked me if I admitted having done it. I said: "I did it because they forced me to do it, I did know the local language". "Ah, but yesterday you spoke it very well". I said that I didn't. So then my defence lawyer took the floor and said: "How did he speak yesterday? He didn't say anything about that!". And so, it was all that quick. "Yes you are free to go" I was in the Malawi politicians cell. This cell was the prison cell for the death sentence inmates. So they were discussing between them and the Malawian politicians were saying: "Not a problem, stay calm, it will be sorted out, you are not a Malawian, you are not going to be executed. If they want to kill it will be in your country". Meanwhile FRELIMO was working on it. Comrade Jorge Rebelo was delayed in arriving in Malawi for the trial. He didn't arrive at the time of the trial. I was prosecuted and sentenced to nine months in prison. But at the trial the judge – I don't know what was his name – said: "No, given your good behaviour from the first day, we must reduce three months, to six months.". And so, that was it. I remained

ready to be repatriated to Mozambique. I was wearing a prisoner's clothing to be repatriated. In that week Comrade Jorge Rebelo arrived. He said: "I have a letter from Eduardo Mondlane. You can't be repatriated to Mozambique, you will be repatriated to Tanzania". So there were some discussions for a few days. When it reached Dr. Banda he ordered the repatriation to Tanzania. So then, at that time there were a lot of refugees. FRELIMO didn't have the money to feed them. I asked those people who were fetching me to go. I said I would not leave while those refugees were in centres. I wanted to leave with all of them." Those there, their buses will go on the front, I will go at the back because all of them arrived during my time and I'm responsible for them." They discussed for two, three days, then said everything was ok. We could all go. At that time there was Hama Thai – I don't know if you know him – General Hama Thai. He was arriving as a refugee in the centre. He was one of them. And we all went to the border with Tanzania, we were received and that was it. All this in 1968, apparently before Mondlane's death.. And that was it. I went. The government of Malawi declared me a *persona non grata* in Malawi, I was not allowed to enter Malawi.. I only returned to Malawi when I went to the Lusaka Agreements because then I returned to Mozambique via Tete, because I couldn't set foot in Malawi. In the last years and months of the war I would only reach the border, then I would return back. But the war was very strong. We had nurses to treat us, we had medicines, because our major problem was lack of foodstuff and first aid medicines in Malawi in case of injury .

All I know is that Banda held the view that he recognized and observed the African Unity Charter, but not for war. He wanted the Liberation Front to speak to him to become the leader, the spokesman of the Mozambican people. And FRELIMO was saying no, they didn't need a spokesperson, what it needed was support. And when Che Guevara came he said he wanted to enter directly into the struggle. Mondlane said: "No you have a lot to do for the Mozambicans, but not to fight, if you die in Mozambique, that would be a big debt which no Mozambican can afford to pay. Rather go and mobilize public opinion to bring weapons, food, money for our war. Never, never to go personally, and physically fight in Mozambique". I saw Che Guevara in Dar-es-Salaam and, indeed he, as you know in today's history, that he died where he died and the debt remained.

About the second stage of the armed struggle in Zambézia:

The second stage was the extension of the first stage. I said before here. The war didn't stop. The shooting, the military shooting had stopped, but the political work underground continued and we further continued to talk to the elders, with the people. Our visits didn't stop, work was developing. And, again, we started to infiltrate weapons via Malawi and beyond Zambia. Before the 25th April, I think, the conditions had already been created, even the Portuguese realized that. There were (mass imprisonments) yes]. Many people were arrested, many massacres in Milange. So, with that infiltration my group was ready. When the 25th April occurred, my group was ready to come out, to leave Nachingweia to hinterland. We were in Nachingweia to hinterland. The military group who was coming with weapons was in Nachingweia, but the underground group was already inside. The conditions were created in the interior. When I say interior, I am talking Mozambique. This time it was a big group My group included more than 80 men. That was the group that would bring the signal but there was already another group inside the country disguised as population, doing their machambas, We got in via Tete, crossing the River Chire – pity we don't have maps here. Comrade and General Tomé Eduardo was the one who was ordered to receive me and my group. Fernando Natavele and General Moiane, they were the ones that laid the ground in Zambézia. They received me and took me to the river. At the river we got in canoes, we crossed to the other side which was Zambézia. We arrived in that area two days later and we prepared an attack plan. We raided Morrumbala, Milange and the main road that leaves Mocuba to Milange. All in the same day, at the same hour to signal that were already there... Then we went to the Chire Post, where there were troops, Chire barracks, Morrumbala, Chire and then Milange and closed the Quelimane – Mocuba road there at Caiado, where we lost a commander. His name was Ferrão ! I can't remember the name, I know the surname was Ferrão. Alexandre Magno was the 1<sup>st</sup> Secretary – I don't know if you remember this structure – so he was the First Secretary of Zambézia in the entire province. The political head was Alexandre Magno..

But Alexandre Magno was, at the same time, a traitor. We monitoride his movements, his way of being and even his personal behaviour, we discovered he belonged to the enemy, not to us. And, thus, he was tried and convicted by the revolution.

[The Central Base in Zambézia was Muando) :decide that the base was to be there, there wer conditions dictating the decision: plenty of forest, permanent water, a well populated area, where it could produce and feed the freedom fighters and its geographic location.....all that matters.

After the Lusaka Accord – I remember it was signed on the 7th April 1974, in the afternoon, at dusk – then there was here in Lourenço Marques, a revolt where they occupied the Radio station – I don't know if you remember – and Samora was very angry, and he called me in Lusaka to say:” Listen, from now on we're resuming to war ! “. So it caused a very sad situation to the Portuguese, to the Portuguese delegation. We could see their movements, their phone calls – in those days there were no cell phones - , we saw all the movement in Kaunda's palace. I don't know if we've even slept that day, but then he was advised by some people who were in the delegation. I recall Chissano, Joaquim de Carvalho and others and those who left here. There were some Portuguese who left, who went to Lusaka but with the Liberation Movement. So then they called Samora and advised him to remain calm. It was a difficult advice. Samora already had decided. We were also ready. Then he called comrade Chipande, myself and Raul Guezimane – who is there in the Ministry – and said: “ You must depart to Mozambique now and today. The airplane is ready, and you must put down this fire. I want to hear nothing else other than it's over.”. Because he had already said, in his own way, that he would only send his true friends to combat, because he knew he would not be betrayed. So, we took into the 9 seater airplane, we were four. We flew, then late in the afternoon the Accord was signed and we arrived in Nampula in the following day in the afternoon, at 19h00. The airstrip was inundated with Portuguese troops to protect us. When we arrived at the hotel, some waiters told us: “Everything is under control, no problems, don't worry”. This happened on the 8th. We slept over. On the 9th we flew to Lourenço Marques on the same airplane. When we arrived at Mavalane Airport, we couldn't leave by car to reach the city – there were human corpses. They brought a chopper, we entered the chopper to there...the Chiefs of Staff headquarters there, today it's the Ministry, isn't it?. So we went there, and were received...they didn't serve us any meal, we didn't have warm meals that day. Just to arrive, hold conversations. We arrived there and Chipande said: “ Listen, no meetings, no talk. Stop this revolt. If you don't do it, our submarines are arriving; what will happen, I...we...don't know”. The recomendation was that we were not to stay in Lourenço Marques, just to work and return the same day – so, about this they would take that as a point for the interview with General Chipande. .... (?) it suffices to arrive there and to tell us when you left Lusaka, after the Accord (being signed), who was with you? He will tell.... and then after that where did you go? What was the mission? ...Yah...

I didn't leave Lusaka for the interior, I left Lusaka to Nampula, to Lourenço Marques and then to Nampula; from Nampula I went to Mocuba and returned to my base. And then I received my orders at the base...we could now enter...what we call a triumphal entry in the capital, in Quelimane> We entered into the town and were well received by everybody, the whites, the *mulatos* , the blacks. We stayed. . And at that time there was this Mozambican Democrats Organization – do you recall this? – where one of them was a medical doctor whao was in Nampula, who had been in Nampula, then followed by his wife. He was Dr. Casimiro, one of the leaders of the Organization....

I went to the II Congress as a delegate leaving the Zambézia province, I was representing Zambézia and Malawi, because there were many Mozambicans in Malawi.. they had also been invited to participate in the Congress. In my delegation there people from hinterland...as I said, the sister of that *régulo* Macassanja (traditional chief) also participated in the Congress and a lady by the name Felizarda Matavata also – she was residing in Malawi – as well as other people whose names I can't recall. To me, it was the first FRELIMO Congress in which I

participated. It was a very historic moment, where the the main guidelines of the Movement, at the time already the Liberation Movement of Mozambique, were discussed. Guidelines, for example, with whom we were fighting, against whom and why we were fighting. These were questions being posed which were immediately responded. It was there that each one realized – the majority of us – that our war was not against the whites. The definition of colonialism was not encompassing the whites; the definition of the enemy wasn't the colour of one's skin; the definition of the objectives we wanted to reach. Therefore, this helped a lot and continued to help people after us, because there was trouble. When I joined FRELIMO I used to define the enemy – I had my enemy: he was the *cantineiro* (white shopkeeper) next to our home, our hut; it was any white and *mulato*, even the *assimilado* was our enemy. That was the definition, but that had come out of the definition of those who would come out with more clarity than us...that's what I can say. Furthermore, there it wasn't a matter of learning, it was rather of living the reality.

The Congress was named the Congress of the Victory (*Congresso da Vitória*) because there was some conflict amongst those of us in the Bureau. We were all FRELIMO but with different viewpoints, because there were already Liberated Areas in the Cabo Delgado Province, in particular; there they were already producing a lot of sesame, cashew nuts and other types of commercial products for trade. So, that was when the political line had to be re-defined. Some were saying that we were delaying, the war would not take long. Black Mozambicans were the majority, if we picked our machetes, we could in one day kill these whites, from Rovuma to Maputo.... That was the idea of the *chairmen*, you heard of them. So, Eduardo Mondlane used to say: "No, it's not like that, that's not a war of liberation.

We have to clearly define the enemy". Eduardo Mondlane would be against you if you were to fight ...the Portuguese soldier raised his hand...he can't kill..He's no longer the enemy: the enemy is the one who has a gun in his hand and ready to shoot.. I don't know if you understand this..... to explain it to anyone one finds in the street....he would not accept that. And in the line of fire for you to observe this, that was the education Mondlane used to give. When people knew that there was a meeting with Mondlane, even if you had no lunch yet, they would go to the meeting because they would know they would come to learn.. He would say:"Look the Portuguese want to build Cahora Bassa". There was a big battle to convince the (Frelimo) soldiers.

They would say: " No, we mustn't let them build. But he said:"No, let let them build. Cahora Bassa is going to be very important for us. We can't destroy, or impede, we must just make it difficult". What was meant to make it difficult? To attack a vehicle carrying materials to Cahora Bassa, do small ambushes to the escorts, but if the vehicle arrives, it must be allowed to be built...None of us had the vision that Cahora Bassa would become as important as it is today, but he already had that vision then. That's it. The Congress occurred under an environment of tension because the elders, those one can say were responsible for Cabo Delgado, had a notion. If the Congress was to be organized there, they would disturb it with their interventions. So it was changed to Matchedge, Niassa. Had the venue be in Cabo Delgado we would have been bombed, because the information about it would have been well propagated. It was a surprise for the *chairmen*, for the leaders of Cabo Delgado, for the colonial army, the Portuguese government and amazing for ourselves. Not for those who weren't quite in the matter, that didn't participate in the preparation. It was a quick decision, to change from one place into another.

## Gundana, Feliciano

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2007]

*Born in in the locality of Inhanringue, Chiloane, Machanga in 1940. Still young, he left to the city of Beira to continue his studies and to work. In Beira, he witnessed the colonial repression and brutal treatment and injustice perpetrated by the Portuguese and colonial authorities, especially the PIDE's persecutions. From Beira he started to interact with Mozambican nationalists related with the associative movements in Beira and from Southern Rhodesia and Malawi. It was mainly with the nationalist movements in Zimbabwe, in particular ZAPU, that he developed his nationalist conscience and the idea of joining the Mozambican movement around UDENAMO. He fled from Beira in February 1962 in the company of Filipe Samuel Magaia headed to Dar-es-Salaam where he joined UDENAMO with other nationalists, such as Urias Simango and Lopes Tembe, amongst others. He participated in the foundation of FRELIMO and in the preparation of the guerrilla for the development of the liberation struggle of Mozambique and subsequent actions until the downfall of the Portuguese colonialism.*

When I joined the Movement, FRELIMO was still inexistent. I arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on the 15th March 1962, from Beira where, on the 22<sup>nd</sup> February 1962, on passing Dondo where I stayed for 3 days because I initially should have boarded in the following day the workers' train that left from Malawi to South Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). Meanwhile, the train did not arrive in the following day and I had to wait for three days. Since they were already looking for me at work – I worked for the railways company – I spent the three days in the bush and would only return at night. On the day of the departure, when I arrived at the railway station to catch the train, there were already there many of my colleagues, which made it difficult for me to get into the train.

In Machipanda they changed the locomotive and a PIDE officer got into the train to do search work. When I saw him approaching, I left the train through another door and only re-entered when he left.

From Salisbury to Blantyre, we were 5 Mozambicans boarding an aircraft. Of the 5, three that were already living there. In Malawi I stayed in Limbe at the UDENAMO's representative Chico Lourenço's house, who later was murdered by PIDE. After a few days stay in the country, PIDE sent an officer. The trip from Malawi to Tanganyica was done by boat, but when I boarded the boat it was broken down and the weather was rainy. The departure took place 10 days later by ground. From Blantyre to Mbeya I travelled by bus and from Mbeya to Dar-es-Salaam by train. I arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on the 15<sup>th</sup> March 1962. In Dar-es-Salaam I found other fellow compatriots, including Lopes Tembe and João Munguambe, who were living in the Mungulane camp, which was formerly the old Dar-es-Salaam airport, close to the area where the Mozambican Institute had been built. What motivated me? It was the prevailing situation in the country and in Beira in particular. AS we have borders and are close to Malawi and Zimbabwe and we also had information on what was going on in the nationalist struggle. Then, after the commencement of the armed struggle in Angola on the 4th February 1961, the Goa, Damão and Diu's absorption into India, the PIDE intensified its arrests, it was difficult for people to gather and discuss the situation of the country.

I myself was arrested for 4 days in mid-1961 when I accompanied my parents who were taking a boat to travel to Inhanringue, where I was born. It was at night and there was a white and a black policeman at the entrance of the pier giving access to the boats. The Police usually would let some people pass while with some others it wouldn't. When it came to my turn they refused me entry. I started arguing with them and they said I was one of those being sought. They phoned their Chief and he ordered I was to be sent to the Police Station and as it was a Saturday I was sent to the jail. On Monday I was interrogated and released on Tuesday.

By the end of 1961, I planned to leave permanently so I sought to check the itinerary for my exit. Then I knew of a patriot who was about to go to Tanganyika during December. I thought of accompanying him to the border because I had a pass allowing me to cross the border often throughout the year. I had never used the pass. The journey

was successful up to Southern Rhodesia. As there was no return trip by train during the morning, I spent the morning waiting for the train. At night, in the return trip, as I arrived in Machipanda, PIDE entered the train checking for documents, passports and when it came to my turn they asked me where was I staying and where did I go. I replied by saying that I spent the morning, it was the end of the year and I was using my pass, and was returning home. They asked me what was I doing there and I replied that I was doing nothing. I didn't know that in that day there was a ZAPU meeting taking place. Had I known of it I would have attended it. The Police then took my name and my documentation and ordered me to report to PIDE immediately in the morning.

I reported to PIDE, where they interrogated me the whole day, asking me the same questions repeatedly. I spent the whole day being interrogated and then they let me out.

So what prompted me to leave was to join the Liberation Movement of the country, seeing that there weren't any conditions in the country, so the best way was to organize it with the others. We had groups where we spoke about the liberation, the need to better organize ourselves and to prepare the way out. The others were leaving and I ended up leaving with Filipe Samuel Magaia, from Beira to Sar-es-Salaam and then we were together again in Algeria. When we arrived in Salisbury the others were there already together with other patriots such as Silvério Nungo, Gabriel Machava and Pedro Sibindi. When we reached Blantyre, two more people joined the group.

There were people in the organization that supported us and we stayed for another 3 days. In Dondo.

Then we wondered how the rest of the journey would have to be. There were meetings, which had to be unknown and not formal.

As I said, things started to become difficult specially after the Goa developments. At dawn we used to hear about many Pakistanese, and Indians that were in the warehouses, but these were locked. PIDE intensified the persecution of people, even in the suburbs where we were living, with jeep vehicles roaming around.

As I said, when we arrived in Dar-es-Salaam, UDENAMO was already there. UDENAMO could not remain in Zimbabwe due to the lack of security. And Tanganyika was about to proclaim its independence on the 9<sup>th</sup> December 1961, UDENAMO was also entering there. So, when we arrived in Dar-es-Salaam we found the UDENAMO leaders, as well as the patriots that were there before. We went to live in the Mungulane camp where there was a big group. As I mentioned, two of the members in the group were Lopes Tembe and João Mungambe. But there also others, such as Machaieie, Mungaka. This group was naturally concerned, because people had left the country to get better organized, to fight better. The Movement had to be re-organized so that it could be able to thoroughly conduct the national liberation and the group was always on the Mungulane camp, thus facilitating the facilitation of meetings and debates about the situation in the country. In the camp there were also nationalists from other countries, such as from South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe and others. There was an incident that had already occurred by Adelino Guambe, Chairman of the UDENAMO, who claimed to have some 15 000 men, trained and ready to enter Mozambique. The incident happened before Tanganyika's proclamation of independence, on the 9<sup>th</sup> December 1962. His statement was deemed to represent a security risk, so the Tanganyika Government had decided to expel Adelino Guambe. His return back to Tanganyika occurred upon the arrival of the UN Committee who came to meet the nationalists from various countries who were in Dar-es-Salaam. The idea of the organization of the movement, and specially that of uniting Mozambicans. Was always a concern of all those arriving in Dar-es-Salaam. It was pursuant to it that some people wrote to Dr. Eduardo Mondlane requesting his presence there. But I think he already had that scheduled because he went to Tanganyika after his visit to Mozambique. When he arrived he did not join any of the liberation movements. He was President Nyerere's friend, as we all know

they had met at the UN. He spoke to the majority of the compatriots who were in Dar-es-Salaam and worked with the leaders of the Liberation Movement. At the same time, the Conference of the Combatants was being prepared in Accra, Ghana where a delegation of the Liberation Movement of Mozambique was to attend. The Ghanaian Government Conference organizers wanted the movements to become united there. Our delegation there was the only one from our country because we had already initiated the unification of the Movement. Upon their return from Accra the process of forming FRELIMO was accelerated.

The conclusion we have to arrive at is that Eduardo Mondlane was preponderant in the unification of the Movement. So much so that his visit to Dar-es-Salaam had a relation with his visit to Mozambique, after he left his job at the United Nations. So all the work had to do with the preparation he was undertaking.. He came to Dar-es-Salaam, worked with the Movements, met with President Nyerere, with the nationalists, their leaders, refused to join any of the movements, including UDENAMO, because he had a greater objective. On the 25th June 1962, in Dar-es-Salaam the constituent conference took place which founded FRELIMO, the the Mozambique Liberation Front. The conference had decided the I Congress to take effect on the 23<sup>rd</sup> to 28<sup>th</sup> September 1962. The I Congress laid down the main guidelines about what to do in order to take the struggle to victory. As part of the implementation of the Congress decisions, various people were detached to mobilize in the country and to recruit members. I can remember of at least two of them, with one already deceased. Fernando Mungaka, who was deployed to the central zone and the other was José Nkovane, who often went mobilizing in the south and who took several groups of people that joined the Movement. This was also done in all provinces. From there the work of spreading the message of the existence of the unifying Movement had started, as well as the tasks of the Movement that culminated with the Mozambicans achieving independence, while selecting simultaneously those whose age was suited for military training. But others continued to work underground. As we shall recall, during the colonial times we didn't have the possibility of meeting each other. When we met in Dar-es-Salaam, with people from various points in the country, it was a process for us to get used to hearing the many languages we weren't used to hear. The same would happen with the women. The women felt they could have their voice and could lead. For example, we had many women who had been instructors for both men and women. In the course of the national liberation they were freeing themselves from all that could create problems in our own development. People, on a day to day basis, were getting increasingly involved through their own participation in the work.

Working jointly liberated men and women, by increasingly uniting men and women to the tasks of national liberation.

The Algerians hosted the main groups which from January 1963 went to Algeria for military training. The first group left on January 1963, the second one on July 1963 and the third group in October 1963. Compatriots were sent to other countries such as the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China and many other countries. And so the Movement grew on, as well as the means, enabling more actions which gradually took us to achieve our objectives to liberate our country. As the struggle developed, we started to produce hinterland, in the liberated areas, with exports to Tanganyika and part of the production consumed in the country. But we must say that the creation of the Organization of African Union (OAU) and the Liberation Committee were a highlight in the support of the Liberation Movements, as well as its seat in Dar-es-Salaam. The Tanzanian Government, Party and People played a very important role in the support of the Mozambican people struggle. The Zambian, Party and People have also rendered us an invaluable support for the advancement of our struggle. We would also highlight that a great part of the logistics was coming from the solidarity of the peoples and governments of various countries.

Our first political and military training camp was Bagamoyo. It was formed to attend the arrival of many compatriots who could no longer be accommodated in Dar-es-Salaam. Bagamoyo is about 45 miles from Dar-es-Salaam. It didn't harbour the

conditions to become a political and military training camp because of its proximity to the capital city of the United Republic of Tanzania and to jeopardize its security. That's the reason why they had to first arrange for the Kongwa site, which is about 300 miles from Dar-es-Salaam. Later we found another site far away from Dar-es-Salaam, but closer to the Mozambican border which was Nachingwea. Bagamoyo hosted later the FRELIMO's secondary high school. When Kongwa was created it was for FRELIMO but later the Tanzanian Government included more liberation movements. Nachingwea was just for FRELIMO.

Chairman Eduardo Mondlane played an important role in the relationship between FRELIMO and the world, having established the basis enabling FRELIMO to have more friends than enemies, avoiding entering the conflicts that existed between the West and the East, so that the support from such bloc was not conditioned. We did not join any of these blocs, we opted to maintain good relations particularly with the Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union. At that time, despite China being providing training to our cadres at the Nachingwea camp, the Soviet Union had never abandoned us, they have always supported us in the training, supply of weapons and other goods. FRELIMO managed to maintain such neutrality due to its vision on the objectives to be achieved and in the manner necessary to mobilize all those capable of supporting our struggle.

FRELIMO's offices were sited at Kwame Nkrumah Avenue in Dar-es-Salaam. Next to our offices was those of SWAPO and a little further to the left was the ANC's. The others were slightly further, including the MPLA's offices. We would say that our natural allies were the socialist bloc countries. ZANU appeared naturally, those who founded ZANU were from ZAPU. It appeared with a program of struggle that would accelerate the struggle in Zimbabwe, including the armed struggle. Ours in Mozambique was an armed struggle. Thus, it was easier to consolidate the relations because, as I said, for ZANU to reach the borders of their country they needed to consolidate their relations with FRELIMO. That was forging the process of struggle specially in the objectives of achieving our own fight. So there were these affinities and naturally the exchange of experiences for the development of the struggle and the need for mutual support, because the struggle in Zimbabwe was a form of weakening one of the Portuguese colonial legs of support. Once this leg was weakened, we could accelerate our fight in avoiding the alliance between Rhodesian and Portuguese colonialists against the Mozambicans. The struggle would have to be simultaneous in these two fronts. However, we were the first to obtain independence and as we had stated that we weren't free while Zimbabwe was being oppressed, we crossed the border and went to Zimbabwe, and fought with its people until their liberation. So the proclamation of independence in Mozambique open the support base of the National Liberation Movements. Formerly, that base ended in Zambia and then to Mozambique. So the countries that weren't independent, such as Zimbabwe and South Africa, could use Mozambican facilities to continue the struggle. And Mozambique had always stated that it wouldn't free while other countries weren't equally free. This is why all were received, and given all support. The Nkomati Accord featured in the process of the own consolidation of Mozambique's independence, so it could better assist other countries. So there was never a Mozambique's denial of the fight against apartheid. With the Nkomati Accord, the apartheid regime became more limited. It could no longer act openly against Mozambique. But we knew what it did, it organized the massive entry of all those armed people to destroy our country and that's why there were some moments of understanding. Some time later, all understood why Mozambique had never abandoned the South African struggle. And we all knew apartheid would end and the conditions that had to be created for increasing the relations. And that's what happened and now that liberation of South Africa has been achieved, we are now developing relations in all economic and social areas.

So, to me, the Nkomati Accord was an important step to conclude the process of eliminating apartheid.

Yes, women were always present right from the first moments of the struggle. At one stage, the need to better organize the women's group became necessary. In 1966 there was an historic meeting of the Central Committee which analysed the status of the struggle, where it was found that there were problems related with the participation of women and the relationship between militants that were at the front of the war, in combat areas, and those living abroad. The meeting re-affirmed that in the process of the struggle there are many fronts, those that are inside naturally, whose success is totally linked also to those who had to mobilize international public opinion to seek the means. And those who are in the Political and Military preparation centres, whose mission is to train the new forces to be sent hinterland, and those who carry the materials, all of them doing so to reach those that are at the trenches to shoot. The participation of women was a need of the struggle and a condition for victory. Women had been equally exploited by the colonial regime, just as the men. The meeting drew attention of the men about the relations they had to have naturally with women in the struggle and the need to improve women's training and organization, hence the creation of the Women's Detachment, its expansion and consolidation.

In addition to participating in the Front, women who were living in the liberated areas in 1966 had participated in production, children's care in creches, carried materials and mobilized the population. So what was missing was a better organization of this front, in the struggle, and from these decisions things started to take another course. So a structure was created, comrade Filomena Nachaque and comrade Marina Patchinuapa were the leaders of the WD. The women's participation was expanded.

Women had participated also in the centres that were created abroad, Tunduro and Refugee Centres, in the mobilization, in creches, and in health centres. In nursing courses, from the time they were led by comrade Helder Martins, in the Mozambican Institute. Therefore, the women's role in the national liberation is unquestionable. The intensification of their military and political training was very important because it empowered them to increasingly become involved in tasks alongside men. The OMM also played an important role in the mobilization and incorporation of women, both to the war front as in other fronts.

## António

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2007]

*Born in Mambone, Inhambane, on 1/01/1954, in 1965 he moved to Beira where he worked on several trades, including the Jornal da Beira newspaper. The stories he heard from his maternal great grandmother about the colonial repression and the livings of such experience in Beira had created in him an anti-colonial revolt. In 1967 he started listening secretly the Voice of Frelimo with a group of young people. The exposures about the colonial war and news in the colonial press, including the handing over of Kavandame to the Portuguese in 1969 enabled him to understand the roll-out of the armed struggle, which raised his nationalist consciousness and motivated his escape and adherence to the national liberation struggle. In June 1969 he kept his contact with a FRELIMO militant, Agostinho Mandimba, who had gone to Malawi and was in Beira to fetch his wife, and seized this trip to join FRELIMO. He left to Malawi with a group of 16 young people who later were arrested. They then proceeded to Zambia and Nachingueia, where they were received by Fernando Matavele. In 1970 he was sent to the USSR for military training. He later was sent to Arusha in 1972 for artillery training. In the same year he saw action in Mucumbura in the province of Tete as a commanding officer. He participated in the raid to the Portuguese army barracks of Chitima together with Esuado and João Pelembe. He took part in several battles, including the collaboration with ZAPU and ZANU forces, from the area of Tete. He tells the stories of women participation in the armed struggle and the support of Cathloci missions. In 1973 he participated in meetings with Tomé Eduardo and leaders of the Zimbabwean nationalist movement on the continuation of the struggle hinterland Zimbabwe. Upon the independence of Mozambique he served in several military duties as a commander of the FPLM supporting the struggle in Zimbabwe and in the war against the South African and Renamo's destabilization. We was a Governor, Mayor of Maputo, Chief of Staff of the FPLM, Deputy-Minister of Defence, Minister of the Former Combatants and an MP of the 6<sup>th</sup> Legislature of the National Assembly.*

The most important component contributing for my departure from Mozambique was my work because I was at the sales counter in the “Noticias da Beira”, where people would come to place their adverts on their businesses. We sized the adverts, cut and paste and then send them for publication. There were the two of us, me and Mrs. Farinha, a Portuguese lady. Although she didn't have a grade 4 qualification (primary school) she was earning twice my salary, so I complained. I went to see Mr. Brito, who was the head of the staff department and I asked him to explain why I was earning only half of Farinha's salary if I was more qualified with a second year in secondary school. Mr. Brito then told me: “António, you are mistaken”. Then I said: “No I am not, I earn half that lady's salary.” He replied: “Son't you know, you are a black man, she is Portuguese and she is white. You are Portuguese, but you are Black and you can't claim a right you don't have”.

Then I said: “Mr. Brito, in your mind, don't you think it's unfair that with her doing the same work, but with less qualifications, she is earning more than me?”. He replied: “This is Portugal. The Government is Portuguese”. So this marked me greatly and I recalled the salaries I didn't receive while working at Mr. Patricio's sawmill.

On the other hand, on talking to Antunes, a tailor working for Marinex Limitada, I said that these people came and settled here, but maybe at some time they must go back. I was really despondent.

Then we stopped getting paid for 3 months at “Notícias da Beira” and the workers at the printing section went on strike. At that time the printing was hot lead typesetting with layout processes, and all that was being done by the Portuguese, while the blacks were working mostly in the printing process. It happened in the morning, I had joined the protest, so we stormed the manager's office, who was Mr. Aurélio Alves, who was bald and wearing the latest fashion shirts. Mr. Mendes led the protest. “How can you be so rude in coming into my office?” said the manager. Mendes replied: “No, you are the one being rude. What we now want is to eat for free because we are not being paid our salaries”. He went to the workshop and got hold of an object and said: “I have this object to break the manager's bald head. I will be

arrested but at least in jail I will have free breakfast, lunch and dinner. We will all go to jail and will have free meals whereas here we work but don't get paid." The manager was scared and asked to have sense. We replied: "You are the ones who have to be sensible. We had enough. You are the one who have to be careful or else today you and your bald head won't go home. Do something about our salaries".

So he then phoned Jorge Jardim and Victor Gomes, the newspaper's major shareholders. He came back and said: "I spoke to the boss, so you can go back and calm down. We are going to pay you. So Jorge Jardim did sign a cheque. The protest happened at about 9 o'clock and by 13h00 we were getting paid. So I got the impression that something wasn't well with them, something in the Portuguese governance wasn't going well.

In short, to answer your question. Mr. Mendes was Portuguese, yes, he was a Portuguese. They were there in the majority, we were about 15 in the protest because most of the blacks worked at night during the making of the newspaper. In short, just to add two more things. One was the exhibition in 1967 by the Portuguese colonial army at the "*casa dos bicos*". In our 2nd year class the Portuguese language teacher, Maria Bazenga, told us about this exhibition and asked us to go and visit it and for us to write a composition about this matter.

The exhibition marked me deeply because they displayed a short film displaying the Portuguese troops running in the bush burning thatched huts. There was also a display of weapons like anti-tank landmines manufactured in Communist Czechoslovakia, Soviet landmines, Chinese weapons and several other captured guns.

My adherence to FRELIMO stemmed from the permanent injustices and my awareness that we were living in an irregular colonial condition, as my great grandmother Mathongasse used to say when I was a child.

We, in 1968, were already a large group where we had our periodic meetings which we would call rebellious youth. The challenge then was how to leave Beira to go where Frelimo was. We had to face this big problem, otherwise we would have left in 1967, but we couldn't work out how to leave. Then in 1969 there was another episode, which was that of the handing over of Lázaro Kavandame to the Portuguese. He called a press conference and said: "if we, the Portuguese Makonde don't want war, the war will end as we want peace, I'm the father of the Makonde and I'm going to put an end to what Frelimo is doing".

In 1968 there was another one coming out, Albino Chacha. I even carried out some research to find out who was he. He wasn't a Frelimo fighter. They showed a guy that was apparently working for the colonial propaganda (called Psych-Social action). He was saying: "I am Albino Chacha, I was a Frelimo guerrilla fighter, they told us that we were going to the war, that it would be very short and we were going to get cars, homes, etc. . There was famine in Niassa and suffering, so it was going nowhere, so I am calling all to leave the bush and report to the Portuguese authorities because you will be well treated". He was confronted by his colleagues saying that if he was a guerrilla fighter, he was a traitor, unless he wasn't a fighter. Why was he the only one, if Frelimo was a lost cause then there should have been at least some 50 saying they were leaving massively, not just one alone.

It was only by 1969 we were able to leave Beira, with the arrival of Agostinho Mandima. He had already been in Malawi at Frelimo's offices, and he was coming to fetch his wife from Beira. So we then knew about him and left. The problem was, we couldn't take anything because we could create suspicion and be arrested. It happened in June, which was a month of school holidays and our documents were student cards.

We boarded a train in Beira and got off at the Dona Ana Bridge, in the northern banks, and then walked into Malawi, at the Nsanje border post. We spent a day there and in the following morning, as we were hungry, João Mazungaire and Agostinho Mandima went to a *cantina* (eating house) to exchange money and buy food. They were well received at the eating house. They came back to fetch us and we ate the food but when we finished the Police arrived and we were all arrested at the Nsanje police station. We were 14 jailed for 5 days in one cell. Mandima was able to communicate with the Blantyre office where the reply came 5 days later. During the release the police officer said that we were lucky because Jorge Jardim had requested our expatriation but they had told him we were no longer in Malawi.

So we then took the train in Nsange to Blantyre where we met comrades Pedro Chimpeni and Ambrósio Labuque, who were in charge of Frelimo locally.

We were 14, as I recall they were Zacarias Chamossora, Dinis Gotogoto, João Mazungaire, Jaime Zingala, Paulo Abílio, Salomão Mulhanga, Daniel Gundana, Joaquim Gimo Simango, Jaime Matate, Chango, I think I have a list elsewhere, plus Zacarias Tivane, Jossefate Mulhanga, he's the brother of Celina, who was Urias Simango's wife, Agostinho Mandima himself, who was the guide and was with his wife Laurinda, José Simango, I can't his wife's name and sister Angelina. I think these were them, more or less. Jossefate is from Búzi and Jorge Estevão from Machanga. The Mambonese were Dinis Gotogoto, Jaime Zingala, Joaquim Simango, Agostinho Mandima, all from Nova Mambone and myself. João Mazungaire was from Manica, José Simango I'm not sure where from but I think from Sofala, I don't about Chibabava, if from Machanga. ~~Because with the rebellious youth were some funny group, we weren't much about that thing about tribalism, who is who, though we were feeling well with our very interesting agenda.~~

So, as a brief summary for this first part, the main reason for my departure was because of the Portuguese injustices and rule, the worst in living memory. After my studies I realized we had lived through the worst form of colonialism in the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

– After our arrival in Blantyre, we were received by Frelimo. They wanted to find out how was the situation in Mozambique and we told them about the episodes in Beira. We said that there were many people being arrested. In Beira, a mere conflict with a wife or where some person didn't like the other, they would report these people to PIDE saying they were planning to flee to Tanzania, it would be enough for them to be arrested. To escape was in itself a matter of luck.

In Malawi we were received by comrade Pedro Chimpenie Ambrósio Labuquene. We arrived at night. Mandima took us to a place and we slept therein. Early in the following morning, Pedro Chipene arrived there. This was the first time I heard the word "comrade" when we were greeted "Good morning comrades". We were all very excited and embraced them warmly. We then asked who he was. He said he was from Frelimo. So we asked: "So you are not a PIDE officer?". He then pulled out his membership card and we embraced him again. He took us to the office. They had a house where they would leave people awaiting transport in Ndirande. As there was a lot of people and we were a more or less cohesive group, they were worried about us and left us in Bangue. We travelled by train and stayed there and the drama there was that we were having only one meal a day. We had to cook *xima* with dry fish because we had trouble having to eat mice. The main curry food at the time was Mbewa (rat) which is a delicacy in Malawi. The curry was eaten in the morning. People would come with baskets to sell at the local market. We didn't know how to eat it so we preferred the fish which was something we knew about.

During our stay in Bangue there were two episodes. The first one was with

Canhamachume, then chief of security in Malawi, who I believe was later executed by Banda. We were underground, not all in Malawi was of public knowledge. Malawi had some commitments with the Portuguese. There we were under the guard of a certain Dick Chipare who was living in Malawi for a long time. But it so happened that this chief of security heard something about us and came to investigate. So Pedro Chimpeni, who was fluent in English, spoke with him in English and then they passed to Nyanja. He asked: "You, Pedro Chimpeni, where is your home?". Chimpeni told him where. But Canhamatchume pulled a pen and drew a sketch of the village showing where his own house was located. Then asked Chimpeni to show where his father's house was. He admitted he had no relative there and said he was from Frelimo. "Ah, then that's another matter" – he said. This security person was scary. It's not easy to say you are from Mafalala and when they show you a sketch of Mafalala saying that here lives x and y there. Actually, this guy didn't know, he was trying to fool us. He told us not worry, he knew we were from Frelimo and asked us to relax.

The second episode was with Mamma Kadzimira, who was coming to a meeting about crime. There was a lot of people killing others at night. So she convened a meeting in Bangué, at a soccer field next door. We all went there. And whenever she would say some slogans we had to raise our hands and shout "We are all from the Government". At one time in the meeting she said "raise it" – there was a type of card held by all Malawians but we didn't have one. We wondered what to do, so we raised our elbows instead, just to pretend that all had a card. That saved us. We were afraid, since she was from the other line. Had she suspected there were people not holding a card we would have been arrested and it would be very difficult to be released. Like what happened with Bonifácio Gruveta, not for the same reason but for burning a PIDE's motorbike. So he was arrested.

Then, we didn't have more clothing so we had to go to the river to wash our clothes. That time in June is very cold in Malawi, with little sunshine for practically for 10 to 15 hours, with endless shadowing and that area is mountainous. We would go to the river, take our clothes off and then leaving it to dry, where we would remain naked and talking and saying that the Portuguese would pay for that.

– By the end of July, Pedro Simango came with a truck and that is how we left Malawi. It was a long trip, we drove past Tunduma at the Malawi-Tanzania and Zambia border. We spent a night there and that's where we met the Frelimo guerrilla fighters for the first time. There was Sansão Mazula, who was coming from Niassa with a group of his colleagues, who narrowly escaped from prison in Malawi. He was the one who told us about was all about the liberation war.

He started to sing about Mozambique, our sacred land, fighting for freedom and unity in the whole country. He told us he was in artillery, that he could fight the enemy wearing a suit because he was firing a very powerful weapon, that could shoot with a 3km range from the enemy. We travelled with these comrades to Nachingwea. The hardest stop was in Njombe, a very hilly part which is very cold during July. We made a bonfire and at dawn we filled our stomachs. In Songea, there was a Frelimo representative so there we slept in a house and had a meal. In Mbeya we had the same and then we moved to Tunduru, which was an education centre and from there we arrived in Nachingwea. I think this was how we travelled. In Malawi we travelled only at night. During the remaining journey we travelled by day because we were already out of Malawi. Malawi was the only dangerous territory because after the border it was all within Tanzania. There we were always welcomed, with no problems. The trip took 4 days, the distance was long, one could see how many km long in a map. The driver was Pedro Simango and he was brave, the vehicle belonged to Frelimo. Frelimo had a small fleet of transport cars in Nachingwea and our truck was of the ones doing such transport. It would often travel to Malawi, the Tanzanian border with Cabo Delgado and also frequently to the Songea border with Niassa. We arrived in Nachingwea early in the morning before mid-day. Our instructors were Ambrósio Labuquene, chief Fernando Augusto, António Machava, Jone Mwala, Mussa Abdala, Domingos Awasse. They were all instructors. The 1st group in this case was Ambrósio Labuquene, António Machava and Fernando Augusto. They did the first part of the training, i.e. marching. The camp was under the command of General Fernando Matavele. That was the first time I met him. He received us and he said more or less the following: "this is the political and military training camp of Nachingwea. We deem this camp as being like a miniature Mozambique, where the struggle is developing, so the barracks equipment are insufficient, we will give out the minimum". So we were given a blanket for each one of us, a pan for 2 for the tea and food. Food was easy, but tea was more challenging because you had to wait until the other finished. Sometimes the other guy would take for ever to finish drinking his tea. And that was how we spent the first months after our arrival to Nachingwea.

Training in the following day was practically theoretic about marching. During the 1st period trainees in Nachingwea don't walk, they run every day until they undergo training in weapons. It's only after a month's training they are able to march and to sing and to go to the field. The training afterwards becomes tougher, we had to wake up at 4 am for the morning exercises. Breakfast was served at 6am and at 7am we were on parade, with lunch being at 12h30. Then at 14h00 parade again for the assignment of tasks, then we would again return for training. Parade time would be for any announcement, general information or any other thing. Then in Nachingwea there was the Camp Commandant, then Chief of Staff known as the *Escala Nacional* (National Scale). or Central conhecido por Escala Nacional.

In Nachingwea there were people faking sickness forever. Anything but to complain of hair pain. But during this period there was a guy who had been deployed to our platoon, a man called Camacho, who had been a boxer in Beira. He had a disagreement with one of our comrades and punched him. So David Langa, a camp commissar, met with us and said that he had to be punished.

So what was the punishment? We told him we had some difficulty in knowing how he was set inside his mind and we would like to put it right. In Nachingwea there was a goat that had been offered to Chairman Eduardo Mondlane in Cabo Delgado. This bode had a lot of a sort of human behaviour. He would be at the morning parade to drink some tea, he would be at the mainparade to get his food. Then after the 7 o'clock parade he would roam around in the women's detachment barracks and only after that he would join the herd of goats. So the punishment was for the boxer to follow this goat. Just to follow it, not to do shepherd work. So he would wake up and immediately start following the goat. He would follow the goat to the parade to get his breakfast also and eating while following the goat. After 7h00 we would go for training while the goat would visit the barracks and the boxer had to follow and all this until 10h00 when the goat would join the herd and he would stand waiting for the return of the goat at about 12h00. Three days later he went to David Langa and said: "Comrade Commissar, I am asking you to rather give me another punishment. This business of following a goat is not working." So Langa told him: "ok, it's good that you have noticed it and you are beginning to note the difference. Go back to your platoon but don't do it again. Use your energy against colonialism, not against your comrades. If this was a fight by pulling punches it would be ok, but our fight is against colonialism, so don't do it again".

I was having a lot of expectations because the idea I had of this process, especially when we were acting individually, that is, on the tactics teaching the lone soldier, this guerrilla war training grants a lot of autonomy in terms of freedom of action, and these expectations were two. In one, I could die, earning the reputation that I have contributed to the liberation of Mozambique, and the other was that colonialism would have to be punished, to end and then victory would be achieved. That was the greatest expectation in that during the struggle whenever there was to be a change of tasks I had never complained. I have merely made myself available and required to have access to the fight in order to be an active part of the national liberation. That was what pleased to me as an expectation.

Moreover, during training in 1969, I told Gotogoto that I would love to be an officer of the Chief of Staff. What was that? It was the top of the military organization where one only study military conflicts, about wars, etc.

So we laughed and wondered why wasn't such position, it required perseverance and this conviction helped me a lot, because in 1972, when we went to do an artillery training course in Arusha, there were colleagues that had deserted. But in this struggle we were sure we were going to win, no reason to say you going to die. There was a colleague who posed two possibilities: one was that, if you run away where would one go to? To Kenya, one wouldn't know if the war would end. The other alternative was that one might not get killed, because not all die. Since the war started there were people killed but there were also those still alive. So, why would one think of a fatal luck, if all those alive I could also survive. My expectation was to see the independence and to return and see friends returning and to see how some people lived under colonialism. This expectation was achieved 100%. I saw the independence happening, then I thought on what I was going to do, perhaps to conclude my course in the building industry and spend a life as a peaceful citizen doing my activities. But after independence things became very difficult, in that the country ended up as it ended. President Samora said: "look, I know many of you are contemplating leaving FRELIMO, or were thinking of doing something else after independence. So who do you think we are going to give the power. There is no one. It must be performed with our availability, we have to build". That was the second expectation, to build the country, it is infinite, and I didn't know if I was going to die while we were achieving it. We continued to keep this idea of having a strong and prosperous country where there would be harmony and a lot of understanding. So in taking stock I, as an individual, felt fulfilled, the war was very hard. Those marches in training, I used to walk some 50 km a day. Half of the men started to urinate blood, but looking back it was worthwhile the sacrifice.

– So, to say what was the centrepiece, the mobilization was to explain the acts of colonialism. In our Chinese training, they used to tell us that it was necessary to unmask the enemy in favour of our cause so that people would participate consciously in the struggle.

That why when the struggle reached Tete it expanded, in a short period of time to Manica and Sofala and it moved a lot because the struggle was there taken as an integral part of our people's lives, without which there would be no future. The meetings were short, one hour to an hour and a half and aimed at giving to speak. Because there were many remote zones in Tete, for example, where there was not one single school for 500 years. We had to build the schools for the first time in certain regions. There was no growing of cassava, we had to introduce it. In others, people were still wearing tree barks, you see – that was colonialism. We can travel in some areas and see how people are living, in spite of the poverty in Mozambique. No one is wearing tree bark. So, what we were doing was to explain.

When there were decisions of the Central Committee we would receive summaries and would then meet, firstly with the soldiers and then with the people. That is why that in all FRELIMO's units there were always Political Commissars.

The role of a political commissar was that he was always the one to explain our cause, both at the level of the combatants and as the level of the people. With the creation of liberated areas we were having commissars at district level. We gained advantage in this whole exercise because of the structure. If you read the Party's constitution of 1962, you will notice that the national territory was structured by *círculos* (wards). These were territorial divisions, followed by localities and above them there were the districts. Above the districts were the provinces and then the nation. Interestingly, the *círculos* corresponded to the traditional chiefdoms (*regedorias*) of traditional chiefs (*régulos*), and that's the reason why the chiefs who accepted our cause were incorporated in this structure, with no one falling outside the organization control.

The work of mobilization was exactly that with very clear statements, that the struggle needed more people, so rarely there was a shortage of volunteers in mobilization meetings. They all wanted to go but we told them not everybody could go otherwise no one would be left to sustain the others, so we would select a few, the younger ones because the others had to remain in the area. If the chief (*régulo*) was hostile, which was the case of Bush in Mocumbura, we would have to take steps. We earned Mocumbura's support because the *régulo* was hostile but didn't enjoy much support from the population. So, his disappearance became the first liberation of that people and started to see new horizons and FRELIMO's membership there was 100%, with no focus of disagreement. So, in brief words, one can say that in cases where there was no school around the solution lied in explaining our teaching program in Nachingwea. It provided right from the first days an explanation and information on how colonialism occupied Mozambique. To those people with a greater understanding we could explain how colonialism arrived in Mozambique, in what year, etc. but that was now at other level.

– When we set out the base, if the *régulo* was still reluctant we would start our work and he would in time feel isolated as x had left the area without saying good-bye, or if he did not comply he would be accused by the Portuguese. It would be much easier if he would conform and so most of them did join the national liberation process. We would say to the *régulo*: "you are arresting people for them to join the colonialist troops, you are collecting taxes but what, as a *régulo*, do you earn. Did the administrator ever invited you to come and eat with him in his table to gratify you?". They would say: "Ah, but they give us meat to eat ...". We would then say: "but you're not Portuguese, as they say, they just want to use you to serve their interests, Lisbon's interests, not ours here. The cotton leaving here goes to Lisbon, where there are factories doing what we aren't doing here? Aren't people wearing  
loin-clothes  
here?"

– We in Cabo Delgado and further in Tete had people to collect information and how we did it, we would select amongst the best guerrilla fighters with some communication skills, specially in the Portuguese language, which was the local language, ensuring that they would not wear a cap or a hat for 3 weeks. This was because they would cause a discolouration of the head front that could cause suspicion in the villages. In the cities PIDE would use people trained to identify this detail in people.

Then we would draw the attention for any planes, as there was a case where a comrade who was sent to Beira who fled when a jet flew past him, and this caused a difficult situation to him. We at Tete had some intelligence people who would go to Mocumbura, as well as in Tete, in Marara, who would extend our network.

The key role, in our case in the underground networks in Tete was information about the enemy, in the first place, and then to recruit more people to our ranks. So we would receive young people through that way, whereupon the Tete operations would not be so complex as we had the bush on our side all the way, being 3 to 5km from a village such as Nhacamba, for example, or Nhantsanga near our liberated zones.

Then we had the periodic communication system. We would agree on a site to leave a message, where someone would come and collect it. In few cases we used books, for security reasons, such as in the case of comrade Chissano's area. We were mainly looking for more information about the enemy's troops and recruiting people for our ranks and the information would advise about the arrival of more members in a certain place, about a meeting and what was discussed therein. This was required to operationalize the liberation struggle nationally.

– During this period of the struggle there was strategy sharing and use of territory with the Zimbabweans. In Tete, on October 1972, I advanced with one of the first groups that entered the Darwin border, close to Mocumbura. They were going to combat in the Chihoi area, some interesting fights at the time. Then there was conflict that occurred, a misunderstanding possibly, because the ZANU freedom fighters had some challenges, because the Zimbabwe theater was an open terrain, with very few dense forestry to accommodate the guerrillas with safety. So the guerrilla activity there was very short with only a few hours to stay in a certain spot, often tobacco farms and sometimes sugar canes.

So then they started to say that we Frelimo guys would be forgotten after independence. Some of the soldiers that were with us wanted to joint ZANU, while the ZANU soldiers wanted to joint Frelimo.

So then we had to convene a big meeting in Xifombo, next to the Zambian border. In that meeting, on the Zimbabwean side was commander Jossia Mtongogara and chief Ndangane, Mucono Meiaolimbo and Chimurenga. On our side there was General José Moiane, João Pelembe, Tomé Eduardo and the topic was how to resolve the matter.

So I liked what Jossia Mtongogara said: “look, this is a liberation war where we want the independence of Mozambique and Zimbabwe. There shouldn’t be any arguments front and backwards. So we resolve that whoever is in ZANU will stay there to the last consequences. The same with Frelimo. After independence, if it is still a problem we will then solve it. For now let’s just forget about it.” And that’s how we resolved the dispute. I then left with Ndangane, Meiaolimbo and Chimurenga and crossed River Zambeze to explain the ZANU and our fighters. I think it was the best panacea, so our support was extremely important.

Abroad, whenever Frelimo spoke about itself, it would also speak about the other movements, and that was in our constitution and solidarity program for all peoples and national liberation movements, including the use of territory and company we were doing on the other side of the border. The first group was in October 1972 and the same happened in the following year, but the one I followed closely was around 1972, even in 1973, where there was action up to 1974, with many of them. They would go up to the border and organize themselves in Xifombo, where there was a base camp.

They sometimes had their things that did not end up well. I remember once where Chimurenga and some of his colleagues were found at a Zambian pub. They were drinking and got drunk and there was trouble until the Police was called. The Police then came and asked who they were. “ *we are freedom fighters*”. So the Police then replied: “*Freedom fighters and whisky ? How come?*”. They had a bit of a drinking problem. Even when I was the Governor of Tete I had problems because of their drinking and their misbehaviour in the shops. But we understood this problem with emotional outbursts. This was in Zambia next to the border where they had no pubs, and they had to go to the village.

We met in February 1973 in Xifombo, at the border of Zambia with Tete. For us who were fighting in the region south of the Zambeze, it was more convenient to exit from Xifombo because it would take more or less 8 days to reach the river and after crossing the river we would have reached our war front.

## Khida, Mateus Óscar

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2008]

*Mateus Óscar Khida, son of Óscar Khida Namaquanda and of Helena Haripoch, was born on the 1st January 1947, in Ngombe, Lago District, province of Niassa.*

*Mateus Óscar Khida was a freedom fighter in the national liberation struggle since 1965, when he joined FRELIMO, having performed several functions such as: private secretary of the West Niassa commander, Secretary for West Niassa, Political Commissar for East Niassa and Regional Political Commissar.*

*From 1965 to 1974, in addition to seeing action in the Niassa and Manica fronts, he participated in the 2<sup>nd</sup> FRELIMO Congress as a security member and attended military courses in Tanzania and in the Soviet Union.*

*In June 1975 he was deployed as a Political Commissar to Manica charged with the task to prepare the entire independence process. While in Manica he participated in the defence of Zimbabwean refugees in Inhazonia. We witnessed the Inhazonia massacre perpetrated by the Rhodesian forces.*

*From the end of 1976 up to demobilization he continued to serve in the military area having performed the following functions: leader of the regular army training in Nacala, commander of the first motorized infantry brigade in Boane, political commissar and Deputy Director of the Munguine Military Centre. He is currently the Minister of the Combatants.*

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To talk about me at this moment is a little heavy, as with age many memories wane out, but what is ours has to be recounted, because that was our reality. My full name is Mateus 'Oscar Khida, the child of Óscar Khida Namaquanda and of Helena Haripochi. I was born in the province of Niassa, Lago District, at the administrative post of Kowo, at the Ngombe village. Geographically, Ngombe is about a six hour walk to the Tanzanian border. That was the reason why the influences and activities of our parents, specially of my father, was to go to work in Tanzania at the then big farms. He worked in peanut and sisal farming at the areas where we, the combatants and freedom fighters of Mozambique, were based at the Nachingwea training camp. In Nachingwea there were big farming fields where our ancestors and parents worked to grow peanuts and then in other areas, sisal. So I was born on the 1st January 1947 and I am today 60 years old.

During my childhood I stayed a long time with my parents but later, when my sisters got married, I was taken with one of them, Elizabeth. I was 7 years old. I stayed there and started my studies in Tanzania. But, as her husband was a policeman and could not remain in the village, she joined her husband who was a prison officer in the Mbeya jail. I had to return to my village and, upon return, my uncle, who was my father's elder brother, took me as his traditional medicine assistant. His children were already grown ups and married, so he needed a boy, his brother's child, who was me, the penultimate and ninth child of my mother.

He wanted to turn me into a great healer but unfortunately some time later he became sick and died. Meanwhile, the number of children in the village was growing and one of my cousins, feeling sorry that we had no future with the kind of life we were having without studying, went to Father Menegou, at the Cobue Santos Anjos Mission, to ask permission to open a school to teach the drifting and schooled children. The priest had fortunately authorized and in 1959 the local school was established. At that time I was already 12 years old. I started studying in 1960 and continued my school at São Miguel College in Cobue. I carried on my studies and in 1963 completed my primary school. But because the primary school graduates in Cobue were very few, we were transferred to the mission in Hulango.

At the end of 1963 early 1964, primary school studies were resumed in Cobue. At that time I already knew of the liberation movement. My village is located very close to Tanzania, which was already independent since 1961. Most of my sisters were already married in Tanzania and my brothers-in-law started to largely influence us about Tanganyika's independence. They would say that we young Mozambicans should have also created the conditions to fight like the Tanzanians did, politically to liberate ourselves from colonialism. But at that time the possibility of an armed struggle was not an issue but rather that politically we should have committed ourselves for those who had education to create the conditions for an independent Mozambique. At that time, in 1962, Frelimo had been founded and so they were saying that there was need to create our own movement and, since it had already been created, it would be good for us to study so that we later assume the leadership.

This principle about the knowledge of the liberating movement created in us a vision. When we were transferred....when the primary school moved from Cobue to Hulango, there was a certain attitude of the Father Superior where...he was greatly encouraging tribalism, so we spent almost every day fighting between Nyanjas and Ajuas/Yao. The region where we staying was an Ajaua/Yao area. So the Father Superior used to say:"we came to this area, this is not your land and you have your own, and you have your own manias". This created a feeling of revolt and I was one of the ringleaders and ended up being expelled.

Once expelled, I returned back to my village and informed one of my brothers, who was very keen and wanted me to study. I explain to him on the reasons why I couldn't continue in the village and he said:"ok, let's see what to do", In 1964 the primary school was re-opened in Cobue and I proceeded with my studies there. Before the holidays, I don't remember if in June, , cousin invited us to the Easter holiday festivities and suggested that I should have returned to the village. I said:" ok, I will return". And so I continued with my studies. At that time there was a very strange movement of the colonial troops, with controls on the access to Lake Niassa.

Boats could not easily sail from Mozambique to the Licoa Island and they were searching everything. On the 25<sup>th</sup> September 1964, at night, we heard shootings at the Cobue administrative post. Shots, shots, shots and then we were alerted by the priest, by the mission's friar and teachers that the situation wasn't good and the post had been attacked by the guerrillas. In the morning there was an unusual flurry, with a lot of colonial troop movement to reinforce the garrison which was stationed in the mission. The Portuguese had decided to reinforce Cobue by the end of 1963. Before that they had only the militias and the troops moved in, they were usually naval forces coming out of Metangula to Cobue. They would just pass and never stayed. But by the end of 1963 they deployed a detachment there, I think it was a platoon, and after the 1964 shootings the force was increased. We stayed but the situation was becoming unbearable. There was searching and one of my brothers, who was carrying cassava in his canoe for his mother-in-law was intersected by a gunboat. They beat him, put him in the boat's engine room and dropped him at the shores.

He was exhausted, he was seriously...bad, very bad. Because of the hiding and engine smoke. When I returned therefore in December during the Xmas holidays, I arrived at the village and I discovered that the guerrillas that shot at the mission had fled to my village because it was situated at the top. From there one could see the fish jumping out of the waters in the lake and that was when we knew that was time for fishing.

I don't know if I said it before, but the name of my village was Ngombe...We arrived there and spent Xmas there and on the 26<sup>th</sup> December we had to leave to spend the New Year with our families. So I returned back on the 4<sup>th</sup> and was informed that the Frelimo guerrillas were there and, as I spoke Portuguese, I had contact with several leaders.....

I was, at the time, 18 years old...so they then said:" We are here at your village and we thought you are already a boy and have primary school studies. Get ready because you are not going back to the mission. You will have to go to Dar-es-Salaam, to study and train". I said I was available and because of the massacre I had seen and to what they were doing, I could not really return, or else I would have problems. But on the night of the 4<sup>th</sup> to the 5<sup>th</sup> we heard the roaring of the gunboat engines of the Portuguese Navy... At five o'clock we heard shootings. It was the navy boat mooring at the River Ngombe's mouth. It was sailing upstream towards the guerrillas' base. This was due to the fact that a PIDE officer had recognized the location of the base and taking the troops there to destroy the base.

So we heard the gunfight, both us and the population, we started to run to the mountains. We fled towards Tanzania and left everything back. The guerrillas resisted the attack, because they fled before the Portuguese shooting and because of the noise of the engines. They went to prepare an ambush. When they were ready to attack, they shot and killed some of those in the boat and the boat was not anchored.

It sailed to the higher parts of the lake and from there it started to batter the village with heavy machine gun shooting. The guerrillas at that time didn't have guns with sufficient range to hit them. ...

They didn't have mortars. Not at that time. They had the Thompsons, the Martis, Mausers, *Canhangulos* (muskets)...those were the weapons they had at the time. So, it wasn't possible to hit them, but the Portuguese could hit them with a tange that would reach the mountains to where we fled. Fortunately, we suffered no fatalities. The entire population was able to flee without leaving any injured or dead. This happened on the 5<sup>th</sup> January 1965 and so we took refuge, together with our parents, into a village. In the following village we went to the border with Tanzania. There the troops came and blocked the border and we were taken hinterland for fear of being bombarded if we stayed there. So I stayed for a while with my parents. Later, Chairman Mondlane came to visit our camp. We were already at the refugee camp.

In 1965, till March, we were still with our families. It was only from July-August when the refugee camp had been erected, that Chairman Mondlane came to meet the refugees and inform about FRELIMO's objectives. Although we had already heard of him, this time it was a different thing to hear him personally. After this meeting various boys were selected and placed at a site where we would go to study, undergo training while others would go for combat purposes. As I was already at some age, I have decided to fight instead of going to study, because everything in our village had been raised to ashes. Apart from the machine-guns that were used on the 5th, then came the airplanes that bombed and burnt the village from one end to the other. The entire village had been raised. So, as there was nothing left, I felt that the best thing was to join...

Yes. There was no alternative, I had to fight. Meanwhile there two choices: to go to Kongwa for training, or to go to the border and undergo basic training and then to henceforth go to fight. I opted for the fastest way. I was anxious to fight colonialism.

So, at the border we stayed for two weeks with the instructors that had been trained in Algeria. After the training we entered hinterland via Mtomoni. I think it was in October 1965, when I started to handle a weapon for combat. So, in terms of my trajectory towards Frelimo, this was more or less what happened and then went to fight hinterland up to the end of 1966.

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As you heard, I opted to fight instead of studying. That is, we held a spirit of seeing a Mozambique free from the Portuguese colonialism. So our voluntariness, our patriotism were so high we were unselfish. It's one of the things that needs to be known; at least of what I was at the time of the struggle, personally hoping to enjoy the independence of Mozambique. As I was far away, I never thought that my contribution would mean an independent Mozambique in which I played a part. e, eu nunca pensei que a minha participação significasse um Moçambique independente em que

I was prepared to fight because the enemy was stronger than us and our war was a prolonged war and, by the enemy's capacity I knew I could one day become disabled and die; but the struggle would continue, others would continue to fight for the national independence. So, the vision we had was that we had to liberate Mozambique and it would only become independent with our sacrifice....

No. That is our problem. That is the genesis of our struggle, in that we were so motivated we had nothing to fear for our sacrifice. We had nothing to do with the sacrifice of the others. We knew that the sacrifice we were having was beneficial for the future of Mozambique and the Mozambicans. We didn't have any wages and were living at the cost of the masses. As our struggle was a fair one, the people understood we were fighting to liberate Mozambique. We were strictly forbidden from raping any member of the population or to seize any of its property. Not illegally. We were living within the people, for the people. So that caused the sincerity, friendship, the people's support, all that motivated us to undergo a proper war.

These were the main motives and I was really revolted with some of that priest's attitudes. He had been a chaplain in the II World war so he returned with his chaplains' manners and was doing that. He was conscious, only later did I realize that he knew that by dividing us we would be weakened. He knew we were at the border between Mozambique and Tanzania, with a better vision about independence. Because, at that time, in 1963, when I arrived at the Hulango mission, Frelimo had already been formed and the Portuguese knew it and that it would later begin the revolution in Mozambique.

So, all that created in me a feeling of repudiation to anything displaying division or humiliation. And in the mission....it's a pity - one day I will take one of my nephews to talk to some of my colleagues that studied with me in the mission. I almost every day used to be beaten in the mission. Because the priest thought I had some attitudes of revolt and with a bad influence onto the others. Just to give an example, when I was at the mission, when going for the holy communion - I am a Roman Catholic. When in communion, I had my own way of walking, so when I approached the priest and kneeled before him, he would touch my chin and refused to give me communion and I would leave. So when returning I would have some mannerisms everybody would start laughing and the priest would know I was the cause of the laughter. So when the mass was over he would personally come and asked all men to leave and then me; he would stop at the door, asked the girls to go and then beat me with a stick. That was humiliation and endured it but then I couldn't any more, so he expelled me. Why expelled?... Because one day, we were 23 from the Cobue mission. The others were locals and were about 83. So we had a fight, between us because of the tribalism he was nurturing.

We fought and were defeated because we were fewer than them. At night we organized ourselves, and in the cafeteria we said: "we are few here, we are going to be crushed, but we have to find some tactics for a good fight and to cause trouble amongst them". So, what did we do?

The Nyanjas. Nyanjas and Ngunis from the Cobue locality. At night, we went to see them and started to provoke them. The intention was to shut the lights off and stay aside, so that nobody would know who was fighting therein. As we knew our tactic, we withdrew to the corners and let the others fight against each other, but the situation became very serious. There were some injured people. As none of us was hit they said that we provoked them and were carrying things to hit the others. That was the reason for the expulsion. But our reasons were that we were few and had to find the means to defend ourselves. So the victim was me. I was expelled along with another guy.

Ah, this one (Father Menegu)no. He had an attitude very close to the colonial government, but we also had certain Father Mondí who was a moderate, he was a good priest. We thought Father Menegu was helping the regime, but perhaps not a staunch supporter. We, for instance, were receiving a lot of support in the form of books, pens and other materials. There were some priests that were giving such materials, but not this one.. This was a staunch one.....the Portuguese priests, and some Italian, were staunch supporters. Initially those were coming from the II World War. These were not in favour of the liberation, but we got support from others, who were also Italians.... they used to give us a lot of things...

Ngombe, yes ... Ngombe is the name of the river. That's why the village carried the same name. Not a special meaning, just the name of the river...

The problem was the vision. As I said, we were close to Tanzania and we were all the same family, and we had the capacity to greater secrecy. My cousins, for instance, my elder brothers, had absorbed a lot of the Tanzanian politics. One of my cousins, before the liberation war, was being hunted by the Portuguese. They were about to arrest him and he had to flee to Tanzania. He settled in an old village of ours, because we were...for example, our grandfather died in Unompo, where my cousin had sought refuge and stayed there until he died. When Mozambique became independent he never returned, he stayed where my grandfather was buried. So we had a village with people with political conscience and that facilitated the secrecy of the information. One could not obtain any information from children, women, or from anyone else, about the presence of the guerrillas in the village.

No. One day they came in while he was out to do some business. So then they enquired where was the property owner, Mr. William, because they wanted him.

Later, we did some enquiries and we discovered that the guy looking for him was a PIDE agent. And when we discovered that we immediately alerted him not to return to the village, or else he would be arrested. So, from then onwards the Portuguese started to hate the population, and this was what motivated my brothers to mobilize all to help the freedom fighters that were staying there. We fed them food free of charges and, as the site was a village with plenty of fishing we also provided them with fish. So this is more or less what happened. Yes, yes. I learnt a lot of Swahili before moving to Tanzania. When I went to Tanzania I could already speak Swahili, because they used to come to our village to buy fish. There was a lot of fish to buy, there were many Tanzanians coming to buy fish, and that's how my sisters got married in Tanzania. All of them were married in Tanzania. The one before me was the only one who got married after we became refugees. She got married in 1963, while all others had married before. As we had links with Tanzania and Malawi, and those islands, our family became very divided. From Tanzania, from Malawi, so we were a lot of.....

As I said, my village was an open place. The guerrillas were there and had no fear.

Yes. We were far, very far from the post. But generally the Portuguese used to send reconnaissance groups, the ones from PIDE. They would visit the village to find out about the situation, and when they would find people like us, who would speak Portuguese, would then ask: "But how are you living here? What about thTanganyka? Aren't there people from Tanganyka passing through here?". They were enquiring... but as we knew the objective of these soldiers we would simply say: "we know nothing and saw nobody here, we never heard of anything, we don't even have families...". We would refuse to answer, but always fearful that if we had said yes, trouble would arise.

Father Menegou was the priest in the Kobue mission. He practically founded the church. The boarding school was already existing a long time, but the church was founded in 1960 – it's the work of Father Menegou. That's his name. He was Italian, he settled there and caused some balance in terms of educational development. He was the one who the school in that area and it was tahnks to him we learnt the alphabet. He was apriest that educated and taught.

Yes, I have a lot of friends from childhood. Some are here, for example we have here Mr. Maceique (engineer). He has a computer training school, he's my childhood friend and there are others in the village. Many are in Lichinga and so are others too.....

No. My father was a fisherman. My mother was a peasant. At the age of 7, at the time when I was living with my uncle learning the art of healing, my father also taught me how to fish. We used to leave at night to go fishing. What was my father's plan ?.....it was to teach all of his children to become fishermen. He was a great fisherman. There was a lot of fish being captured at that time and part of the catch would be distributed in the entire village.

But there was a great part where people would come to buy fish and the proceeds of the sale would be distributed by him to those who had been part of the fishing.

I, for example, would be given some money by my father if I had participated and sold the fish. No, not at that time ! It was rather for Frelimo. At that time it was of the fishing. So he would keep the money and then would buy something, such as a pair of shorts, a shirt, but as a result of my own work. At that age, 8,9 and 10....I learnt how to fish and was a good fisherman.

Swimmer. A good swimmer in our village !....A child should be able to swim at the age of 5. No. My father had supported me a lot. He was the one in the village, he was the one doing the fishing and would give it to the freedom fighters...Yes, when I was already 18 years old. When the guerrillas settled there I was still at the mission. So, they were the ones giving all the support..Yes, my mother, brothers, cousin, everybody had to.... No, not that one....There was no distrust because he wasn't even in the area. Where he was beaten was close to the Cobue administrative post. So it was far from our village and far from where the guerrillas started to camp there. If it had been after, they could have killed him because they would often kill people crossing the lake. They would kill, sink the canoes and people would die.

It was frequent. As soon as they knew Frelimo was on the move, and from the time the struggle began, the area was already very dangerous.

They didn't start destroying in the beginning, before the 25<sup>th</sup> September. The destruction began after the attack to my village, so the bases withdrew from there and they moved forward to open new fronts. There were reinforcements and this enabled the moving forward. From there, they started the training of volunteers hinterland. With the reinforcements coming from Tanzania, a new base was built to train new volunteers and that's how the war was moving in major steps into farther afield in the front..

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Why? Western Niassa?

It's Western Niassa. Because during the struggle Niassa was divided into 3 zones: Eastern Niassa, Western Niassa and Southern Niassa. The latter was in the south bordering with Malawi, Zambézia and Nampula. Western Niassa bordered the Lake Niassa, Tanzania and Eastern Niassa with the province of Cabo Delgado and a small part of Nampula. Therefore, these were the boundaries of these operational zones.

Yeah, when it started. When the freedom fighters were trained in 1963, there were some cadres coming in. Like the example of the hero and general Tazama Mathumba, a cousin of mine, who was killed at the outset of the war. He trod a landmine laid by the Portuguese and then died. So, they then just came to do a political mobilization.

Of the years...that is, early in 1964, before the onset of the war...

They came to mobilize, prepare, set up weapons caches in certain areas! But these sites were unknown to all ! Let alone by me, as I was still a child. I couldn't leave, it wasn't my area.

It was hinterland. So, at that time they started to talk to the elders. I know that because my brother, who settled in Dar-es-Salaam and didn't want to return used to say: "it's good for you to prepare yourself, you have to study but to be aware that afterwards you will have to participate in the struggle for national liberation because our brothers have already gone abroad to study and we already know that Tanzania is free and the Tanzanians politically fought for the independence of their country. So, since the Portuguese are refusing us the independence we shall have to obtain it by force. We have to take up arms to fight colonialism". This was in 1964, I was 17 years old. But the known ones were my brothers-in-law who would come and spend nights talking, telling how Tanganyika became independent., what the Mozambicans would have to do for the liberation of their country. It was from then I started to gain the political notion which culminated with my physical joining to Frelimo. I got my membership card in 1965. It was paid by my father and handed to me by him. Pitty, I don't know where it is right now.

My village was raided in January and I had to flee to Tanzania with my parents..Yes. After we fled some boys were selected and we were at a site. We left our parents homes and went to a site, waiting for the arrival of those selectors to take us. That's when Mondlane came to visit the centre. I think, it was Mbambane? Yes it was!

It was the most pleasant moment I had. He came and met with all refugees, accompanied by Tanzanian government officials. He explained the reasons for the national liberation. He said that we were there but that it wasn't our place, we had to return to Mozambique. He said: "your coming here was an emergency one to protect yourselves and what you have to do is to respect the Tanzanian government. Wait here as refugees but you must at any time be prepared to go back to your motherland, Mozambique. There must be some volunteers to fight for the liberation of your country. Your coming here is the consequence of the colonial regime violence. It's the consequence that has been culminating over the years. That's why us, as Frelimo, feel that we can only become independent via the liberation struggle. So let us all, who have the strength, go fighting".

My tribe is a very cocky tribe. They like to dress and eat well, it likes to enjoy every moment the good things...we don't like violence, but when we join some cause, we become staunch supporters. When we want to defend something, we will do it to the last breath. There are those who had to carry the load, despite us being cocky....

I don't know if it was because of that. May it has to do with the origins. For example, we have two dances: one for men, called the Muganda, and one for the women, the Chihoda. I don't know if you have ever seen this dance. You would have seen during the dance, we wear only white shirts, pants or shorts, white socks, white shoes and all else is also white. It's not always we wear white clothing, because it can become dirty. But we use it to dance and swing around.

Apart from eating fish, these are our customs and traditions. It also includes combing your hair well...I lost all my hair now, but we generally take good care of our hair. At that time combing our hair used to take a long time to put it right....

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Perhaps it's better to turn back to the time I became engaged in the struggle. When I joined in 1965 at the Ngofi base, there were some huts there. The huts were built with reeds. The beds had bamboo and grass to soften... so in 1965-66 we slept men and women staggered.

Yes, we were. Any female or male guerrilla would sleep like that at our bases. But that meant nothing. To us, women were simple combatants, we felt nothing about them. At the time we were also conscious that when a man slept with a woman, when a Portuguese raid happened, the man would be the first to be killed. Apart from that fear, there was also the notion that women were our companions, not for other intentions....So we slept staggered and nothing happened.

With time we were growing and having more solid bases. Instead of just one hut, there were huts for the leaders, and the guerrillas were building improved houses, where each one would build a house together with his mate. It was then the time to think about having wives and girlfriends...

Any change in one's way of life tends to cause an impact and to cause trouble in our minds. But this was a novelty we faced naturally, because even the first women fighters not always were wearing pants. It was a process. Uniforms were designed later and the female comrades then started to wear pants and we had to get used to it, because we were all at the front. Our female comrades could not fight with *capulanas* (traditional dresses). We then understood that women had to wear trousers because we were all comrades and it was necessary to wear them when running...it was a smooth transition, understanding that women needed to wear pants....

Easily, yes. Yes. There was a very big mixture. Our first commanders...our first commander, who led the attack to Cobue, was General Tazama and he came with people from other tribes, specially from Cabo Delgado. There were many commanders and instructors from Cabo Delgado and it happened so naturally that incorporation of all tribes was so smooth that we had no idea who was from what tribe. There had been a few tribal protests the national liberation struggle but they were stamped out over the time, but there was always careful attention played to avoid the triumph of tribalism.

When I joined in 1965, I left Ngofi to the Mpochi base where the central base was located at the seat of the struggle. I was taken together with the late General Tazama, as his private secretary.

We travelled from Western Niassa to Southern Niassa and during August-September we went to Tanzania in 1966. Upon arrival I had already been enlisted in the group that was going to the Soviet Union. I attended a specialist military course and returned back in 1967, having graduated in a sapper course.

So when I arrived there we stayed in Songuea. Then came the other selected guys and we later headed to Kongwa. At that time when we were preparing to go to Kongwa, where we were going to be later sent to Sar-es-Salaam, Bagamoyo and finally to the Soviet Union, the late Filipe Samuel Magaia, chief of DSD, arrived to enter into Niassa. A group of four went to Niassa.

Yes, the chief of DSD. So they entered hinterland and we left to Kongwa. When we arrived there we were informed of the death of commander Magaia. Later on, we were taken from Kongwa to Dar-es-Salaam and from there to Bagamoyo. In Bagamoyo, in October, comrade Samora arrived to inform us in detail about the situation and that the path to get us to the Soviet Unions was still standing..

We left to the Soviet Union in October and only returned in October in the following year.

Yes, from 1967. When we arrived in Chinguea, we attended some more courses and I was later again enlisted to proceed to Western Niassa. I was deployed as a sabotage specialist but, as soon as I arrived hinterland I was also designated the organization's secretary in the hinterland. My task was to draft a list of the liberated areas, organize the community life in the liberated areas and to encourage, together with the political commissars, to continue their support the struggle in various aspects. This was essentially in the transport of materials, as well as in the supply of food. This was in 1967-68.

In May 1968 I went to Tanzania, accompanied by the chief, who was comrade Tazama and later I became aware that Chairman Mondlane was to enter Western Niassa, in a working visit. So we then entered hinterland accompanied by Mondlane, returned to Songea, to Mtomoni...no, I stayed in Mtomoni and the chief to Songea.. Chief Tazama returned with the establishment of a committee for the organization of the II Frelimo Congress.

I did not participate in the Congress as a delegate, rather as a security officer. I was protecting the Congress, deployed in the group that was to ensure the security in the congress. Once the II Congress was over, I was appointed to be the private secretary of the Provincial Secretary. Each province had a provincial secretary, especially in the liberated areas, who would ensure the political life in each province. So I was appointed the provincial secretary in Niassa, Kadawele. This was in 1968 after the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress. I stayed in Songea, also charged to organize the interior. I was in charge of all supports to the population. I was to organize the *Calamidades* (aid donation) clothing.

The international aid was coming in bales to support the population in the liberated areas. The clothes would generally come from America.....used bedspreads and clothes, a few caoulanas from ngos. So, apart from being the private secretary I was also a secretary for the hinterland organization, to organize this sort of things and then to send hinterland to the liberated areas. Meanwhile, a group of the population, together with some freedom fighters, left the interior to Songea, to the border, to carry the materials to the hinterland. But upon arrival they were arrested by the Tanzanian government and taken to the refugee camp. So I was then deployed by the Provincial Secretary to go to the refugee camp to speak to the local chief to free the people in Tanzania. I went and I was able to release the population. The Secretary ordered me to take them back because the people had already been detained and sent to the refugee camp. I was causing some agitation hinterland. I couldn't understand how the Tanzanian government would arrest people that were only carrying materials and this was causing some demotivation. I went there, released the population and accompanied them to the hinterland to explain the reasons for the incident. I explained, I mobilized the population and returned. When I returned to Songea in November, the Secretary decided that he also needed to go hinterland to meet the population and, as I could not let them go alone I accompanied him. That was in December.

Once there, Chairman Samora was crossing into Eastern Niassa into Western Niassa. We entered Eastern Niassa and he went to meet us to inform us of Chairman's death. There was a region restitution meeting and I was appointed District Political Commissar of Mucalapa and had to stay there. This in January 1970.

I remained in Eastern Niassa until the end of 1972, when I was designated Regional Political Commissar and later deployed to the Marrupa areas, but there was a need to again attend a course in the Soviet Union. In 1973, I was called to Machinguea and in 1974 we left to Dar-es-Salaam and from there to the Soviet Union.

During the second time, when the coup d'état occurred in Portugal, the head of our group, the current President of the Republic (Armando Guebuza) was called and forced to leave us. We left from where we were stationed and left to Moscow where we proceeded with our training until 1975.

In May 1975 we returned to Nachingwea and made preparations for the proclamation of independence and in mid-June I was appointed Political Commissar and First Commanding Officer of the Battalion. Our battalion was to go to Manica. So we left Nachingwea by car to Mtwara and boarded a luxury Mapinduzi ship of Zanzibar towards Nacala. From Nacala we boarded trains, some by bus to Nampula. From Nampula, on the 19<sup>th</sup> June, we travelled by car. My commander and his deputy had to travel by airplane. I had to lead a column of some 25 vehicles, including trucks, buses and all that....At that time these were all civilian transport. Buses because they were carrying troops,



So I then escorted the column and on the 23rd I arrived in Chimoio, as a battalion. On the 24<sup>th</sup> we distributed the companies for the districts bordering Rhodesia (Manica, Catandica, Mossurize e Expungabera) and on the 25th the independence was proclaimed. I was deployed to Manica and later after the restructuring I was designated provincial political commissar and then provincial commander and in October 1976 I was transferred to Maputo.

Earlier in 1976, there were many Zimbabwean refugees coming to Mozambique. So we then started to look for refugee sites and I, as a political commissar, received many refugees, including Mugabe. I started to look for places to harbour them. The Governor was comrade José Molane who charged me to look for such sites. I went with the local authorities and we identified the site. It was a place which served both as for the stay and receiving of support and for farming. They were places with plenty of water.

Nhazónia... that was the site, in the Barue District. And that's where they were accommodated.

On the 9<sup>th</sup> August or October the massacre occurred. So, I went there to see because the Chimurenga festivities, on the Zimbabwean struggle, were about to take place. I arrived there and went to find out what were their concerns and then returned back. Three days later, as the Governor was preparing to visit the Barue District, I went early to his office to receive the recommendations, because I was to remain because I was expected to look after the provincial affairs. We were in a meeting when we received the information that the Pungue River bridge had been destroyed and that in Nhazónia the refugees had been butchered and nothing had been left. We left in a hurry to create the conditions to proceed to the site.

The Governor immediately managed to get an helicopter. General Mabote, from Maputo, went to appraise himself of the situation. It was really a massacre. They entered in armoured vehicles, disguised in black and chanting Zimbabwean revolutionary songs. So the population came massively to receive them.

And it was really a massacre. More than 600 people were killed, machine gunned and a complete slaughter out of context.

We had our weaknesses. We didn't have commensurate means. For example, the Zimbabwean troops entered Penhalomga. In Penhalomga we didn't have a fixed unit that could patrol those areas. We had a force in Machipanda, in Rupanda, in Chipungabera and at the border. But they crossed into an area where we never thought they would be able to cross. They entered. Made an incursion and when we realized that, it was too late to respond.

There were many incursions. Bombings, border shootings. We on several occasions had to stop them in battles at the borders before my departure from Chimoio to Maputo-Nacala.

There were many because, after that situation on the Nhazónia massacre, I was very traumatized – I really was – with all those bodies...It wasn't easy. The Chimoio hospital was so full, they had to erect tents to receive the injured in the hospital. People on the floors...you have to see it to believe.

Yes, yes. That really traumatized me. I honestly felt so on account of the conviviality. I had followed the lives of those refugees. Knowing that those who were living with me had lost their lives really left me traumatized.

All those people weren't there any more. They had been slaughtered! So, it left me traumatized.

From then henceforth we had to receive instructions. We could assemble our canons along the border and bomb Zimbabwe but, if we did it, we would not achieve our results. We could hit the communities. So we had to await for orders from above.

After this attack, they didn't do anything immediately. There were some small clashes along the border. At Penhalonga, where they entered. They continued to provoke at Ruthanda, Espungabera. From there the situation became softer. We had some skirmishes, exchange of shootings along the border.

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I can't think of anything better I had done in my life, other than my decision to participate in the national liberation struggle because, after all, our people needed to be freed and the liberation had to occur anyhow. And Frelimo showed up as the unifying vehicle of all Mozambicans, from Rovuma to Maputo. I am pleased to have been part of such a glorious battle in the fight against the Portuguese colonialism. I am very happy!

You know, both the living and the dead should be proud. They should be proud for what they have done to this people.

Were there any liberated areas?

.....or to demobilize.....(*text is not legible*).....

## Macamo, Rosália

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2007]

*Rosália Vicente Macamo, daughter of Vicente Macamo and of Laurinda Tembe, born on the 29th July 1945 in Chamanculo, city of Maputo, currently residing at the Capuane, District of Boiane, Province of Maputo. Rosália Vicente Macamo, known as Rosália Tembe during the national liberation struggle, was a combatant since 1965. In 1964 Rosália, through Josina Muthemba, became aware of the political situation and of the Portuguese colonies in general. It was from this friendship that she joined the other Mozambican nationalists residing in Lourenço Marques and where their escape to Tanzania had been organized. In 1965, she arrived in Dar-es-Salaam accompanied by the Miambo family, Adelina, Josina, Guebuza, Manave, Langa, while another group of young people leaving Lourenço Marques had been arrested in South Africa.*

*During the struggle, apart from being a student of the Mozambican Institute abroad, she worked at the FRELIMO's offices in Dar-es-Salaam, at the Américo Boavida Hospital and at "Voz da FRELIMO" (Voice of FRELIMO). She became recognized as Rosália Tembe during the broadcasts of "Voz da Frelimo", a Frelimo's radio station based in Zambia. It was her voice who was informing and mobilizing the Tsonga speaking Mozambicans. At the end of the war, Rosália returned to ex-Lourenço Marques accompanied by other comrades, where she would work for Radio Mozambique, as well as for the OMM.*

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You asked for the location of my neighbourhood – it's in the District of Boane, and I am Rosália Vicente Macamo, I was born in Maputo in 1945 – but when you say here in Maputo, Maputo is big – I was born at Chamanculo. My parents were Vicente Macamo and Laurinda Tembe.

My primary school education was at the São José de Lhanguene school – it was in a mission, it was a public school, where the schooling was taking place, one has to recall that.

– This school was a mission school, a mission of nuns and priests. My teachers were nuns and I remember the name of two of them who were teaching standard 2 – Sister Judith, and Sister Geraldina, of standard 4.

Indeed, from standard 1 to standard 4, that was the primary school - there was no rudimentary late – but rather the standard 3 rudimentary late – up to standard 4. After completing the standard 4 I started to learn sewing. I started learning sewing there at the mission and then I moved into another school, the João Albasine School, at Xipamanine, albeit just to learn to sew. The school was also run by priests and nuns.

I don't quite remember, but 1950 and so, 1957, 1958 – after I completed standard 4, looking at those times, girls weren't equal to the boys, so I did sewing. I stayed at home and when my mother died in 1958 I had to look after my brothers.

– I had 4 siblings, with me we were 5 people– they were all younger than me – there were 2 boys and 2 sisters (how many?) – there were 3 boys and 2 sisters.

So then I had to look after the household, cooking, washing – and Dad was working as a servant at Café Continental at the Scala.

Upon looking after the housekeeping I stayed and in 1965 I met Rufina Muthemba. Round about the 60s I had enrolled for the night course at the Salazar High School, in 1964. Rufina was my neighbour, she used to come to my home, we became friends – we would go to school together – no, not really we didn't go together because she wasn't attending school. At high school I was with Margarida Jone, mother of Joel Libombo – she was the one who was my school mate. But we would meet always, she would come to my home and we became very good friends.

That's when we started to talk, that is in 1964, we entered into politics, we would talk about Mondlane, we would talk about a struggle that had started in Angola in 1961. About a militant family, the Mutembas, whose parents and uncles were underground. We talked about many things, including that in 1964 there had been some fights somewhere and that there had been pamphlets being handed out.

I had not seen that happening in my area but she spoke about it. We spoke about the struggle, that there was some fighting – (...) where were these happening, where did one hear about them – that pamphlets had been distributed but all that was done underground. In my area

But we would talk about it, the struggle that was happening and that a certain Dr. Mondlane had been here in 1961 and that he was working at the UN. Our conversations were basically about that every day.

She would say that there was a Movement that was taking students to America to study, we would talk about that, that we would have to think about those routes, that we had to find the people that were there, because there was a way to go to study. It appeared simple, just to go to Swaziland and across Swaziland.

I started to become interested, to wonder what to do, to drive the mobilization and there we would have already comrades, men like António Simbine, Adolfo Bila. We would already speak all about the same thing and sometimes we would set up certain days for our meetings in various places.

We would choose sites that not even I would know them well, but one of them was at the native township, I can't remember in whose house, because it was just a matter of going there. All that was done underground, to such an extent that we didn't even know each other.

So we would then attend those meetings, sometimes at the native suburbs, and sometimes at the school at night. I can't remember, but António Simbine, Adolfo Bila and others.....(...)and as far as women it was only my mother and Rufina – Rufina, Eulália Muthemba. If I can't remember...I will remember later.

We would talk about going to Tanzania so that we could go to study in America, that was essentially what we would talk about. A few months later many started to plan the escape in small groups, so that we cross the border.

As I stayed at home to cook, I had the head of the household and one day....we wouldn't dress normally, we would put in our *capulana* (traditional sarong cloth worn in Mozambique), scarf, worn shoes, things like that, because we were not going to take any clothes and we would have to wear used clothes as a disguise.

Yes, 1965 in March, I had finished my holidays, I can't remember if it was the Carnival season holidays, but it was of something. So we were done with our holidays and that is why the date was in March, and we set to go our way, one by one. And I went alone....the other mate left at 5h00. So I left home at about 11h00 to the *Gingador* bus stop, t the Swiss Mission, my destination was Namaacha.

There was nobody, they only told me to go to a certain place, to catch a bus at Namaacha. So I took the bus. They would tell us how to recognize and meet the people who would come to fetch us, i.e. the house, the type of people. The guy to meet was a *mestiço*.

-‘So you would already have the information about whom to meet?’....’ Yes’....

They were our mobilizers here in Maputo, that small group where we would meet, António Simbine, Adolfo Bila. I can't remember if there were others, but this was the group.

I was at some place, I can't remember where, but it might have been his house, and we stayed there until at night.

-“And how many had already met Rufina? ....with whom?....”.(...) Josina was there with some 7 people. It was my mother, Josina, there was some other ladies – I can't remember. It was about 7 people.

So we then arrived at this gentleman's house and stayed there until night and then at night we left to Swaziland.

We crossed the border by foot, the barbed wire, we passed,we walked cross-country, we tore our clothes, there were some pieces of my skirt left behind in the barbed wire and off we went.

-‘The man that received you, this mechanic, he stayed behind “- he didn't go ahead because in Swaziland we went all the way up to Mazinin by foot, the whole night.

In the following day we reached Manzini and from there we looked for a bus..... – “to take you where?..... Somenone in the group had a man there. In Manzini we took a bus and then left to Mbabane.

There were a lot of us from here, Guebuza, Manave, Francisco Langa, Adriano Subane, António Sumbane, who was also in the group, there were many, they had a base already, but we didn't know where they were based.

When we arrived we were received, of those people I would highlight Guebuza, I don't know why, but he was one of those who received us. The house was within Mbabane right in the mountains. We found a small house that had already been rented, a house from an old woman, sowe stayed at that house. There was no one that could be seen, the house was isolated in the mountains. We stayed for about 2 months in Subuza.

This group grew a lot, I can't remember if the people were arriving. There was Maria Chissano, Ivete Mboa, Alice Chongo, mama Muiambo with 3 children, Virgínia Tembe, Adelina Mocumbi, it was a large group.

We lived an apparent normal life. We ate vegetables we collected, we fetched the fire wood in the mountains and we were doing our things. I'm swallowing some of them.

It was in the fields in the mountains, the firewood was also from there but we had very restricted movements, we couldn't leave the house, just stay there. And our comrades from above would regularly come to visit and bring some food, bread and all other things. We depended on them, we had no voice, they were the ones who were sending everything from up there and we had to report to the Swazi authorities regularly, once a month. It was a matter of reporting in person to show that we were there, but our leaders were the ones who knew more about it.

Yes, we talked about reaching Tanzania, the next step now was to go to Tanzania, we wanted to go to study. Two months later, it was time to leave to Tanzania. We left early in the morning, all cross-country to go to a place to catch the bus.

But, as all that was underground work, when we left Mbabane, we walked and walked up to a place where we got into a minibus and left. There we had to travel a lot because we had to reach Botswana, so we walked quite a lot. I honestly didn't know nothing about that place, I just walked and walked, I didn't even know where I was, but that was it!

We arrived at a place we came out and then walked and went to catch another bus. Then we caught a train and travelled by railroad.

From Swaziland we walked, with that mamma that had the children, myself, Josina, Adelina Mocumbi, we were about 8 people, with no men. This was the group with that Pastor Muiambo, a church Pastor – mamma Muiambo was accompanied by her husband, the Pastor.

I don't know if I'm wrong but he was walking on behalf of the Church.

So I was saying that in Bechuanaland – just to clarify, in this group the husband was of mamma Muiambo – yes, we were women and the 2 kids were boys, they were little boys.

We reached Bechuanaland by train, they didn't tell us where to and what we were going to do, because we crossed South African territory, also by foot, and we walked by day and slept at night. It was in the bush across all those fields. The land there was big with a house here and there for I don't know how many Km.

Once we arrived at a certain place and were intercepted and they asked where we were headed to and the Pastor said he was travelling with his family, wife and kids, to a certain mission, and he showed a certain church.

They were policemen in Land Rovers. Land Rovers like the ones used by PIDE. So he said and named the place.

Then, in the train that took us directly to Gaborone. We reached Gaborone and in the same train there were Guebuza, Manave, Langa, also Assane Tchesman, they were all in the same train, and we all reported to the Police. They went inside to deal with the matters and came back to us and said that women could stay at a house, a house of refugees. So we went and stayed there and the men entered the house.

We stayed at a UN refugee house and after quite a while, two weeks or a month, or more than a month, waiting for those who were inside.

After that came the day when our leaders arrived and they told us that we were going to Tanzania, that the car had already arrived, the car would come to fetch us. So it was just a matter of packing up our luggage hurriedly and had our things packed in our backs. They told us the car was from the UN.

We wanted to know to where we were going but they rushed us, they were referring to Zambia, we were going to leave Bechuanaland to Zambia – the men had also been released from jail.

So then they took them all, we got into the car; the whole night, we couldn't wait, because Mondlane was already talking at the UN, asking for the children to be released because the kids had nothing to do with politics, the kids were going to

study, they had to be released.

But I forgot something – where was I, when we left from Swaziland there was a major group of young people, some 75, when we left they spent 8 days, they were also preparing the escape. Because there had been some manoeuvre, about the Mozambican students in America.

We arrived there and that group of 75 where most of our comrades were, the Sumbanes, and the brothers, all of them, a lot of people, 75 – imagine them all put together into a closed furniture truck.

They all got in and walked also, because there was a sign that had been arranged when some days had passed, when they passed we were in Bechaunaland. So they all were caught in Pretoria and deported to Mbabane.

There were women, little children, men, they all were deported and jailed. In that group there was also Milagre Muthemba, Milagre Mazuze and many others who were then arrested and kept in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) at that time.

So, we proceeded from Bechuanaland, walking the whole night, we couldn't stop; we arrived in the morning in Zambia and that's how I entered. We arrived in Zambia and met comrade Mariano Matsinhe, who was the Frelimo's representative in the refugee camp.

In the refugee camp there were all sorts of them, even Coremo was there, as well as the other liberation movements. We stayed there only for a few hours and greeted everybody and then got in a Land Rover again headed to Tanzania.

We entered Mbeia and there were also many refugees there, it was a waiting centre, we stayed there for 2 days, if I'm not mistaken perhaps 3 days and then we proceeded to Dar-es-Salaam. We arrived there on the 8<sup>th</sup> August 1965.

Mondlane was there, and Marcelino dos Santos also. How many arrived in Tanzania? There were 8 with Muiambo and his family. We were 3, hum I'm not right, there were men also, there was Guebuza who was also in that group. It was already quite a group. Because they were 3, Guebuza, Mannave, Langa and Tchessman – 4. We arrived and took a rest. In the following day we went to the Mozambican Institute where they were giving classes, it was a Frelimo's school.. From the group Adelina Mocumbi went to Songueia. Songueia was another region in Tanzania where we had social affairs. And Josina also went to Songueia while I stayed at the Institute to continue since I already had reached my destination. The Muaimbo family remained in Dar-es-Salaam for a while. I don't know where did the Guebuzas go, they could have only gone to Nachingueia, or they stayed in Dar-es-Salaam to study.

After a while, Adelina left again to Dar-es-Salaam, and proceeded to Algeria with her husband – they left. Josina stayed for a while in Songueia, then she left Songueia to the Institute also and went working at the offices.

Institute's Administration, they used to call it the offices of the institute, Janet was also working at the Institute. Janet was the chief and was considered a director.

I started at the 7<sup>th</sup>, at the Mozambican Institute. The teachers were Lobo, Carlos Lobo, Chissano and Guebuza.

The teacher I remember was Carlos Lobo – there weren't others that were of his time. So, after the studies at the Institute there was a need for us to go to the Soviet Union. We went to the Soviet Union round about 1966 or 1967. We were sent to a Youth course.

– How long did this course last? – it seems it was a 1 year or so course, I can't remember. I went with Deolinda Guezimane, Lúcia, Teresa, Bande, Gabriel

Mourine Mandlate. It was a group of 6. After completing the course, we returned to Tanzania. We went to Nachingwea which was a training camp.

After a while, I left Nachingwea to stay in Mbeya.

In Mbeya there were a lot of Frelimo's houses and there was this one where there were girls who would only stay with mamma Dlhakama. It was considered to be her house though it was a Frelimo's house. It was Mamma – Francisca Dlhakama.

I then returned to Dar-es-Salaam, I can't remember in which months – I was attached to the Frelimo's offices in Dar-es-Salaam.

Doing assessment work, I would do a bit of everything with the Head of the Administration Department. I got married in Dar-es-Salaam in December 1968. I married Lopes Tembe. And how was the courtship, because I can't see it happening anywhere, or talk of him, if we were together in the bush – no, I wasn't with him.

He is from Maputo here but he went to Zimbabwe in 1962 and left Zimbabwe to Frelimo.

-So how was he a militant in December 1968 if he went to Mbeya in 1962, I found him there?

In 1968 I met the comrade in Dar-es-Salaam, he was living in Tchanombe at a Frelimo's home and I was at the Mozambican Institute, and that's how we met.

I think the courtship period wasn't very long, I can't say when did it start, it only lasted for a short period, as it was all there by Frelimo, it was all easy. So I got married in 1968.

That's how it used to happen. Just a matter of talking to the leadership. People talking to each other. The husbands would go finding their best men, the bride would do the same. In my case for example my marriage godfather was Mondlane with Janet, and Samora had to accept the request which he did.

And who were his godparents? It was Simango and his wife.

Was also at the administration in the form of supplies.

There was no cake, I made a cream colour dress, a very simple dress. We got married with very simple clothing, there was no cake, we just had to cook something. We got married and everything was over by Saturday, by going to the Tanzanian civil registry offices.

Yes, in our matrimonial life we went to live in home for aged people, we had a bedroom and stayed there. They were old people from Frelimo, parents-in-law of Dai, Mulhanga, so we went living there.

Then we managed to get a study bursary for Cuba, in 1962. I had the ambition to study Medicine, he wanted to study Agriculture. When I arrived, I became pregnant after a while and the Cubans weren't happy with that. They told us they had granted bursaries for 2 people, not 4. So, we went from Ministry to Ministry and did not obtain anything. We told Samora and he then asked us to return, as the relations weren't good and so we did return.

But I'm not going to go that way – I'm talking about the political relations – we reached that conclusion because there were Bulgarians, Guineans, Chileans whatsoever, who would become pregnant without being married and they allowed it.

What happened with our case where they did not accept was a source of speculation, when we informed Dar-es-Salaam and Samora told us there were no problems and asked us to return. There were many African comrades, including from Guinea, Guinea-Bissau who had children.

So, as I already had started the course I wanted to complete, I was already practicing nursing at our Américo Boavida Hospital in Mtuara.

When you arrived in Cuba you studied some parts of your course?

Américo Boavida was an Angolan who died in the battle field in Angola. Frelimo (in recognition to his bravery) gave his name to the hospital because it happened in Mozambican territory.

So, I did this nursing course and then they suddenly ordered me to change the course to study information but then it wasn't not for a course but rather to work in

the information desk at the Voice of Frelimo.

It was complicated because I was feeling very well with the course I was studying, I thought I was feeling good about it. But eventually, other interests decided otherwise. So, after so much gossip, which ended reaching Samora, these were things I didn't consider because there was no way of querying or to do anything about it.

But at that time, it was all about orders, so when this order came from Nachingweal left to Zambia where there was a need to open another radio station in Zambia and we first worked in the Tanzanian station.

But that was also because my husband was working in Tete and with me staying in Zambia we would be closer to each other, and that's how I went to Zambia to do radio work at the Voice of Frelimo.

In 1971 when returning from Cuba I was in M'twara at the hospital and left the hospital by the end of 1971.

It happened. At Frelimo everything happened, so I arrived and underwent training. It was a short training in order to do radio work – this thing about 1968, I have to go back to it because in 1968 I was doing radio work in Dar-es-Salaam. At the Dar-es-Salaam radio I was with Nordine and some others, there were a lot of us, including the late Sebastião.

Because it all included all the Mozambican dialects. After the Dar-es-Salaam radio I had a lot of turns upon completion and then returned to radio. That's the reason why they remembered me.

No, we had no training. My colleague Rafael Maguni was very smart, very unencumbered. I wasn't with him at Radio Dar-es-Salaam and it was only to open the new radio in Zambia we worked together.

He was my boss, then I was the next senior and there were others, there were many languages and that's how we worked up to the 24<sup>th</sup> April.

With the Zambian radio the Voice of Frelimo had mobilized, the program was essentially a mobilizing one.

We prepared the text in Portuguese, it would be the original one and we would then have it translated into other languages such as Shangana, Ronga Xisewa, all the existing languages.

Maguni was preparing and in his absence, it would have been me, from the war communiqués which were being issued, I think, on a weekly basis. The communiqués would be in Portuguese and from there we would translate them. And we would also introduce a bit of music, recreation, though on a very small scale, it was just to put in, there was very little musical content in our programme. And all of the documents from the information desk from Jorge Rebelo would be broadcast. They were read in Portuguese, and only read in English after the reading in all dialects.

Each one would ensure the language from which the text would be translated from Portuguese.

So, I caught that in life, I didn't learn a language, the written Shangana I didn't learn, though in order to do such Frelimo work one would have to learn on our own. It happened with the others who had no other choice but to learn.

And I am a Catholic, as I said, we spoke Shangana and Ronga at home and I didn't learn to speak them at any school. Even the tactics of doing radio, we didn't learn how to do it because it was a matter of coming and they would show you a booth, a bench and to start to shuffle things around.

No, we didn't have. I personally didn't attend any one. Maguni didn't know. We did not start working on the field. It was just to do what was in the information desk, all material was being sent.

Maguni might have done so, as he was from Cape Delgado, he might have gone there once, but not in terms of a working visit.

No, it could have been for us, all that was necessary was to have the materials received because there were political commissariats in the provinces that were to send such materials. But I personally had never seen this newspaper about the

heroes.

But the paper did exist there because there were many newspapers, many pamphlets to that effect, but in terms of the translation the political commissar would have had to bring them across to the information desk for us to deal with it, but that was something not for me.

As far as I'm concerned, I never collected materials, and it is quite possible that it was being done via my boss, I never had them in hand. So, I had to leave it as work never done, we would visit those camps, the we would talk around but not as work, it was something that had not yet reached there, perhaps it would as an improvement.

We had a major refugee camp in the Zambian capital.

I followed Mondlane's death, he was killed by a trapped letter.

We felt a moment of great loss because he was indeed a real leader, and there some things still waiting for the final investigation, waiting for I don't know what, what is not known is where did the letter come from, who delivered it and sent it to Mondlane.

All I know is that he went to die at a house, a house where he used to hide away, to do his work.

A pregnant woman, or a married woman, where the husband is elsewhere and we were all members of FRELIMO. So, I stayed in my ground, I came out here, and all I needed would be cared for in this centre where I was.

And he was there caring for his centre, for his life, and can return here when finished. So, there was no difficulty because I alone could manage all the children with the help of Frelimo because, where the wife is with the children, Frelimo would take care of them, it has children's centres, social affairs, everything it was just a matter to be attended to.

He would also do the same there in Tete.

The OMM, I will first start with the OMM. It was formed in 1973 after comrade Josina's death. So, we at Frelimo chose the date of the 7th April, date of Josina's death, though at that time it was just a small suggestion. So, we submitted the proposal to Frelimo's leadership, and they accepted it and the day was called the Mozambican Women's Day

Maria was there, Deolinda was there, I was there and many comrades, including Catarina Mabote. We would travel there to Tunduru when necessary, it was just a matter of travelling there.

Yes, we cooked before (the 1st OMM Conference), each one of us, I was at the radio, the people from the hospital were also there and we gathered all ideas and submitted the proposal to Frelimo, which was accepted about the creation of a women's organization in memory to comrade Josina.

The elected Secretary was Deolinda Guezimane, First Secretary-General, and the roles were the struggle for emancipation of women, that was the first one.

To emancipate women was to emancipate, because we believed to be engaged was to emancipate.

It wasn't quite that true, the struggle for emancipation was understood as a fight side by side with men because that would be to fight for their rights.

Women were engaged in the work, everywhere, but a right to work, right to food, right to school and to many other things.

To a certain extent I can state that we are achieving the objectives of emancipation.

WE have women in Government decision-making, we have women Ministers, I might have forgotten but I know what we have achieved. We are achieving, we women working in banks, in working in major companies.

We feel that the life of women is gradually being changed. Today there are many women in commerce, in all spheres of society, women are being emancipated.

The WD- can't talk much about it, but the important work done by women was to ensure the rear-garde had supplies, food for the freedom fighters. The WD was also doing that in conjunction with the population.

Women were doing many things, even on information security, women were participating because they could obtain information and send intelligence information, sending it from here to there, women were being used to pass information, they would also do such work.

It's one of those things that making you feel revolted because they were doing it themselves. For example, I knew of a comrade that lost her baby in Cabo Delgado. It was security work, she lost her baby because of some bombing, the child was at her back – there weren't things to be said here.

All that is the spirit of being at war, to save guerrilla fighters and this is not an isolated case.

Please don't write about this.

About the Lusaka Accords, there I'm not going to explain, all I know is that we came here, Chissano was already the Prime-Minister, to prepare the conditions for transfer of power to independence. I don't know anything else.

I left Zambia in November 1974. I came with my kids, the husband stayed back, the children were 2. There was a reception by Frelimo, we arrived here and were allocated to the various homes still in groups. I stayed at a house there by Kenneth Kaunda Avenue with Luís Bernardo. So that's how we came, and how we stayed for a while.

After the coup, from those listeners I started to send correspondence to the family, there was nothing else, we just had to stay calm and wait for the news. But no one went to live in his house, we went to live together Frelimo style.

My father was already hearing about it, so he suffered when I went. PIDE was right across the street from my house, a certain Mr. Mabote who was a nurse. So, my father suffered a lot with my departure because Vicente Mabote, who was a PIDE agent, had the same name as my father Vicente. They wanted to know where did I go, if I was going to those FRELIMO guys, to do what we don't know.

My father would reply that he didn't know, they were supposed to know, not him, he only knew I was going somewhere to pursue my studies. He said I always wanted to go study. He knew about nothing.

But it was all a matter of persecution, that thing of controlling someone even inside his own house. He was always at the window. My father was saying that they were the ones telling him that his daughter had gone to Tanzania. And he suffered so much for a while feeling tortured every day.

I remained at Radio Mozambique, worked at the radio, doing programs in a dialect at Studio B, as well as in studio A. But as I was always running up and down, I didn't last long in the Radio, they pushed me to the OMM. From 1974 to 1977 I was a radio announcer, in Portuguese and Shangana. In 1977 it was the holding of the III Congress – the one of transformation from a movement into a Party. I went early at the OMM, this thing about taking it all. Because we arrived in 1974 during the transition and I was the Provincial Secretary of the OMM from 1974 up to the 25th June 1975. I was at the Provincial OMM there by the Avenida de Angola. I was the Provincial Secretary and my Deputies was Amélia Sumbane and Isaura Fernandes.

I was always in the OMM with these changes.....(...).I only left and didn't say good-bye. Up until recently I was part of the Auditing Council butt don't know exactly where. There are alternate members and I was a member of the auditing council and worked with Sabina Santos.

# Matsinha, Mariano

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2007–2008]

*Mariano Matsinha, son of Mitelisse Matsinha and Francisca de Araújo Lobo, born in 1938 in Cazula, District de Macanga, Province of Tete. Got married and is residing in Maputo. Mariano Matsinha was a FRELIMO leader – member of the Central Committee since 1963. Before he joined FRELIMO, Mariano Matsinha was a member of NESAM (Centre of Mozambican Students) while a student in Lourenço Marques, where he started his political activities. By studying in Portugal, he received UDENAMO's newsletters inviting him to join to this movement in order to join the struggle for the liberation of Mozambique.*

*Determined to fight for the liberation of Mozambique, he returned to Mozambique and shortly afterwards he left to Malawi and later to Tanzania. During this journey he became a member of UNAMI. Upon arrival to Dar-es-Salaam in 1963, through Marcelino dos Santos, he was co-opted to become a member of FRELIMO's Central Committee. He immediately received military training in Nachingwea under the command of Tomé Eduardo.*

*As a leader and member of the Central Committee he describes with detail the major challenges faced by FRELIMO with emphasis to the issue of national unity, the formation of the united front, the concept and type of struggle, the role of the leadership in the struggle, definition of the enemy, the role of the chairmen and the participation of women in the struggle.*

*Mariano Matsinha vividly recalls both the role of his participation in the fight led by Filipe Samuel Magaia hinterland Niassa, and the later assassination of Magaia, and the organization of the 2<sup>nd</sup> FRELIMO Congress in Matchege, where Eduardo Mondlane was re-elected Chairman.*

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I am from the Tete Province, at the then Post of the Macanga District and Administrative Post of Cazula, therefore some 80 km off Tete towards the North. I attended the then elementary school education; my father was a teacher at the Cazula Suburb. Hence my name Matsinha, my ....and myself, being both from the North. He was an elementary school teacher, I did my standard 3, of the elementary school, since it went up to standard 3.

Jossias Mitelisse Matshinha. So, I completed the 3-year elementary schooling, which was equivalent to standard 3 of the primary school, that is, today's primary school education, for the whites, since blacks would only start at elementary level. So I then passed to the primary school level, completed the standard 3 and 4 of the primary level and that was the highest level in Tete, I stayed for a year, I was exempted and sent to Zimbabwe, Southern Rhodesia at the time, in order to proceed with my studies there, but I didn't, I didn't have it because I was there working, also as a teacher, then suggested to my father for me to go to the then Lourenço Marques, today's Maputo, to concentrate all children of my father's first marriage. So, I finally came down to the South to proceed my studies at the Institute, at the Industrial School. There was no Institute then so I completed the industrial course, two more complementary years, after which we could do an aptitude test, if we wanted to study in Portugal.

I then obtained a bursary, as in the case of other Mozambican citizens and studied for 2 years at the Industrial Institute in Portugal, followed by an aptitude test for Science university studies. My interest was to study civil engineering.

I attended the Industrial Institute then did my aptitude test for admission to the Lisbon Faculty of Science and that was the time when we started to receive news briefs about certain liberation movements. UDENAMO asked us to leave and join the liberation struggle, the national liberation struggle. We were very excited by that, that is, we tried to leave Portugal, but we couldn't leave Portugal to Europe but we took advantage of a Portuguese government scheme where we would be granted the opportunity to spend holidays in all Portuguese colonies. I came to Mozambique, crossed Malawi and from Malawi into Tanganyika, today Tanzania. So, this was, more or less, the route, with many incidents. So I came, I could speak a little of Nyanja but when I left, I had no understanding and the Tanzanians are those for whom English is like a second language, so I was always speaking in Swahili. So that is the whole of my political biography but to also add that in Maputo, Lourenço Marques, I belonged to the Centre of African Students (*Núcleo de Estudantes Africanos*) was operating in Cindza, which was the Black Associative Centre of the Colony of Mozambique, and there was the African Association, which was the Black Secondary School Students Group which was formed by Eduardo Mondlane before he left to Portugal and then to study to the USA. He left that organization, but it was an amazing organization. In spite of the fascist regime, which was very strong, including the PIDE, we were able to carry out several activities, apparently for civic rights, which deep inside were a political option which taught us a lot, it wasn't by chance that many FRELIMO leaders were members of the African Secondary School Students Centre, I forgot this aspect which is very important.

I joined UNAMI, National Union for Independent Mozambique, which was one of the groups that joined other groups to form FRELIMO.

I was going alone, as a lone refugee naturally, I knew many people, amongst relatives in Malawi and then from Malawi I travelled by boat to Tanzania and then to Dar-es-Salaam by bus. At the time the road was still not fully tarred, so we would leave by morning and to Mbeya, which is a border town between Malawi and Zambia and we would only arrive by dawn in Dar-es-Salaam. There was a very interesting thing that happened when I arrived there. I approached a policeman and asked where was FRELIMO. He answered he had no idea where that location was, so I was shocked because, to me a policeman was supposed to know about it. Fortunately, during my trip, I made friends with a Malawian who was on a study bursary to Kampala, Uganda. So, we were friends, talked to each other. When I arrived, I had an uncle that was a public servant with the Government of Tanganyika, so I told him: "look, let's go there, it's already night". So, we went to my uncle's house, slept there, and in the following morning we went to TANU (Tanganyika African National Union), which was the ruling party at that time.

We went there and were very well received by my uncle, we dined and slept in the car and in the following morning went to TANU, our English and then they would answer in Swahili and wanted to know who were we. We told them we were refugees, so then they would speak in Swahili and we didn't know Swahili, so then they indicated to us where FRELIMO's offices were, and that is how I arrived in Dar-es-Salaam.

I think I was 6 or 7 years old, but it was in 1947. I came to

Lourenço Marques in 1951. To Portugal I went in 1961.

I got a study bursary at the Education Directorate, the Portuguese Education Directorate of course, who would submit applications that would then be offered. We understood what was happening at the time, the Portuguese Government was interested to show the UN that there were Black students, so there was the opportunity for us to obtain study bursaries. So, when we arrived in Portugal, they organized a big lunch which occurred at a wine cellar and attended by the Overseas Territories Minister. So, we went there innocently, had lunch, you know, to be a bursary person in Portugal was no joke. We earned little and to be able to go was a serious problem, so {#?} **[translator's note: This sentence was incomplete in the original text and it is unclear as to what the author meant to state after the word so. The sign #? Is also printed in the original text.]**

It was reported in the first page in the newspapers that Portugal had granted study bursaries to overseas students, etc, and that was when we realized that it was a message they wanted to pass onto the Africans at the United Nations, that Portugal was also giving education to its students overseas, to study in Portugal. So, when we realized it, we wanted to leave Portugal, but we were very few Mozambicans, really very few, not more than 10.

They were dr. Mário Machungo, dr. Salomão Munguambe, dr. Mutaca who died, Lourenço Mutaca, Mário Augusto da Silva Mguala, who now works at EMOSE, myself, at secondary school level was a certain Manica, who is now here in Maputo and is a teacher, I forgot her first name, and then Tembe who is now in Gaza, Chokwe. So, they were the ones. Well, Arouca was already there and had already completed his course, there was also another one who had also completed her course, so these were of the 160, 58, 58 and 60 classes.

No, the ones who had left were the late Lourenço Mutaca, who crossed Malawi, myself, a few days later, when it was my turn. I left at that time, because three days later PIDE raided my father's home, in Zobwe at the border enquiring about my whereabouts, when I was already at Malawi.

I didn't have any problems, but left my father's home, crossed the border by foot to Mwanza, but not through the road, so I went ahead until I finally reached the Mwanza Village. There I then enquired where was the bus station, they showed me the way and then I caught the bus to Blantyre.

No, when I arrived, I went to the offices.

That was in the early 1963, on February 1963. I was received through a security member, I can't recall his name, but I think he was a security man born in Tanzania, because he spoke Portuguese, English, Swahili, English – that shocked me.

I was a Mozambican, I spoke as I saw it happening. So, I arrived in Tanzania, I spoke Portuguese but they were interrogating me in English, for the initial interrogations, etc. I was wondering about it when I realized later that I was Mozambican, yet there were Mozambicans living abroad and the people I knew that were in FRELIMO at the time, Lourenço Mutaca, Silvério Nundo, etc, weren't in Dar-es-Salaam, they were in Arusha, in another town elsewhere, in Tanganyika at the time. So, they were there and I enquired about them and on why weren't they there. So, I then felt a bit I was on my own, with all those people speaking English, Swahili, no one speaking Portuguese until, finally, things improved in the following day.

An interesting thing happened. I was 25 at the time and thought I was still a child and, suddenly, comrade Marcelino dos Santos told me: "Look, we've opted you to be a member of the FRELIMO Central Committee". I was shocked. I was a new member of the Central Committee, something that to date I had never thought of, because people could be co-opted, by election for the CC, to replace someone who had been expelled or who had forsaken membership, or in the event of a shortage. So, I was co-opted, like others that had been also co-opted and told Marcelino that I was still a young child. And he said that I was fighting for the liberation of our country, I wasn't that much of a child, I was 25 and already an adult and acceptable. What I needed to do, he said, was to think and move forward. So, I then moved upwards to the highest echelon of the Party, because the Central Committee was that structure that, at the time, reported to the National Committee, because FRELIMO was structured as follows: The Congress, National Committee, Central Committee and then downwards. The National Committee never functioned, it was contemplated in the constitution, but it never operated, or was formed so, eventually, it was historically extinguished, with only the Congress and the CC remaining.

Yes, I underwent training in Nachingwea, one of my instructors was the current Deputy Minister of Internal affairs Tomé Eduardo, who was one of our leading Mozambican instructors. We also had Chinese instructors but he was our leading instructor. It was hard training, very hard and my guerrilla training was in Tanzania and there was other specialist training useful to the war.

No, there were only Chinese in the guerrilla training.

We had Czech and maybe Dutch, though only in the Education field, but the guerrilla trainers were Chinese and they were also political instructors, that is, they would assist us politically to train our people. At the time, essentially it was an issue of colonialism, Portuguese colonialism, any Portuguese, be him a child or a baby, was to be eliminated. It was all for Mozambique. But they explained that we were not fighting against the Portuguese people, we were fighting against the Portuguese colonialism. We had to stress during the training of the comrades until they would realize that the fight was not against the white people, as such, but against the Portuguese colonialism, against the Portuguese colonial system and, for us, the Portuguese people were our allies against Portuguese fascism.

Therefore, it was possible for our comrades during the armed struggle to distinguish what was clearly colonialism or not. A Black or a White person serving colonialism would be killed, such as Administrators, troops, PIDE's, anything related with the colonial structure was to be eliminated, or otherwise join us, like in the case of those leaving the Portuguese Army, such as black Mozambicans who deserted to us and fought alongside us.

It was an extremely hard work, extremely hard and understandable. For the people, colonialism was white, that thing called colonialism, system, etc. was not well accepted within the population. If it was a white person, it was to be killed, that's it. So, it took a long time and a lot of struggling, especially for these guerrillas coming with weapons in their hands, to clarify the people, that it was possible to capture Portuguese and to receive, feed and take them to Tanzania and to the Red Cross. And right in the beginning it was really difficult, but made possible because to us, the enemy could not be the enemy so our policy was to take some civilians who had fallen in our hands to take them to the Red Cross, civilians, for example farmers, which we would capture and hand them to the Red Cross. Less important was their mobilization to Portugal, we were not interested in that, the political act was to hand them to the Red Cross and we know that some Portuguese went to Australia and then remained there with very few returning to Portugal, mainly women.

Well, the mobilization at first wasn't in liberated areas, it was in semi-liberated areas, where colonial structures still existed in such areas, and we would call them semi-liberated areas. Once the Portuguese would withdraw, and only us remained there, we would call them liberated areas. The mobilization work always happened there. There is a very interesting thing which I never told in my life. When we formed FRELIMO, it was formed a little like other parties in independent Africa. The only difference was that we had a Department of Defence, with security and defence, while the rest was really a copy of the front movements. I think that it was a bit because of the war, although we corrected that error during the struggle. We had a Department which was the Department of Organization, like the Organization Department of the other movements in Tanganyika, Zambia, etc, but the guerrillas took over it gradually, integrating the Education, Health and finally the mobilization of the peoples, by ordering some persons to conduct mobilization in a certain area, to spend some time there once the conditions had been created, where the guerrillas would move and turn such work more effective, where our Army would have to wait until the specialist Department would have done its work.

But there was also another condition in the liberated areas. The people instead of going to the *chairmen* to submit their concerns they would go directly to the military who were youngsters, kids, compared to the politicians who were old people. So, in practice the people would look more to the military to solve their problems, various problems, enemy attacks, trading issues in Cabo Delgado and Niassa, where there was a lot of trading of ground nuts in Tanganyika, now Tanzania. It was a type of foreign trade and a need for them, they would sell to buy salt, clothing, and it flourish a lot since the bases and liberated areas were formed.

I was a member of the central government, I was a head, a head is a head, I didn't go to Cabo Delgado, I went to Niassa, to Tete and marched, climbed mountains and suffered thirst, hunger, all that. It was very hard and I nearly died in a combat lead by comrade Filipe Magaia, because he maintained that members of the Central Committee were to have combat experience, and the same with all cadres, so he took a great part of the cadres to combat in Niassa, and so we did it. I personally had many doubts, querying that the Nyerere weren't taking up arms to fight. They were older people, with illnesses and why was chief Magaia leading troops to invade a barracks? But then we went, it was a big group, the groups at that time were groups of guerrillas. They were 10 at the most and we attacked and left quickly but we were some 200 and we attacked at night. The reconnaissance had been weak, we had done it during the day, the Portuguese had their sentries organized in a different way during the night, by placing more inside, so we entered into an ambush, they fired shots – pa, pa, pa, - so we couched immediately. Magaia didn't even give the order to attack, but we had guerrillas there that would not normally listen to the order to combat. They would arrive there, and would begin shooting. That was my first experience, with flaring tracer bullets, with blue lights from the bullets. FRELIMO immediately withdrew by shooting – bo,bo,, tat ta ta - and then Magaia, during the day, ordered us to return immediately, as the surprise factor had already abandoned us and, without that, the combat would become very difficult, so we returned to the base. We tried a second time again but with little success, because the Portuguese had seen us, they felt we were approaching. We knew that because the Portuguese sentries started shooting instead of shouting, like they would use to do formerly. Instead, they fired shots – pas, pas, pas – and then others would shoot too “pas, pas, pas, pas” and then stopped, so the surprise factor had disappeared, and they prepared their defence and we also had a few fatalities.



from our own bullets. In any case, we had the courage to go to the Portuguese base, with not a small group of guerrillas, but a relatively big one some 200, I think.

But it was in that trip that Magaia was killed by one of the infiltrated agents amidst us. He was shot and died in the following day. But it was great, he was one of those inexperienced commanders, he was a leader but with little experience. So, I could say I had been there, that I had seen the challenges that existed and those faced by the comrades, like thirst, hunger, heat, rain, etc.

Well, Marcelino dos Santos, Joaquim Chissano, Pascoal Mucumbi, Jorge Ribeiro, Oscar Monteiro, Silvério Nungo, Simango was Vice-Chairman, Urias Simango, Lourenço Mutaca, General Chipande, Raimundo Pachinuapa, Casal Ribeiro, who then betrayed, escaped, etc, then it was Kavandame, naturally before he escaped to the Portuguese, Chagonga, they were many, 70 or more.

Yes, but that was Samora Machel.

To form a chief party is no joke, it is exactly a lot of democracy, we are Africans, but a lot of strength, especially for a national liberation struggle, especially when the when the ideas are very, very low, so we had to keep a constant struggle, firstly because our enemy in Mozambique was the Portuguese colonialism, and not the Portuguese people. And that was to be embedded into the head of mainly our leaders, especially the military ones and of the militants, so the guerrillas who had the weapons and then into the people. But even before that, when FRELIMO was formed, we had militants residing in Tanzania who thought that a liberation movement was a welfare organization, that is some unemployed, etc, so they would go and ask for money when the party needed support and that was creating a serious situation. The level of ignorance was such that there was a so-called Elders Committee. In Tanzania, in Natana, there was an Elders Committee that would advise the leadership of the Movement, who were formally completely ignorant. So, there was one of our comrades, whose name I can't recall, who would go with a map to explain the elders how Mozambique was big. So, one of them then asked: "Is that Mozambique? You must be mad, man. Mozambique is big and you are showing us a small paper?". So, he said: "No, this is a map". The guy said: "what map. Mozambique is like a small office and it is like a small party". And the comrade said: "Mozambique is a big country, you can walk many kilometres". This level of ignorance caused numerous problems for the issue of colonialism.

What was I saying? Yes, there was a lot of serious work to be done and that was interfering a lot with the national unity, this concept of national unity had not yet been well grasped by all Mozambicans and we naturally had to look into it, as there were some opportunists infiltrated within the organization.

So, it was constant work, the Central Committee was analysing FRELIMO's work and was giving orders on how to move forward, and one day we had victims of the conflicts within the organization. Samuel Kankhomba was assassinated by a group of Makonde, that is, it was something traditional. He was an enemy and had to be killed, so they stabbed him to death. So, a death threat to all of us, not inside Tanzania and we had to go through that. But we always had insisted, like President Guebuza is doing now to fight absolute poverty. He talks about it in every speech and that is what we were doing then, talking about national unity every time we met – mobilization was to national unity.

There was also another issue, in that some people thought we were to invade the cities, in the guerrilla struggle. What normally was advised was that one should attack the enemy where he is most weak and never where he is strongest, otherwise one would be beaten and demoralized, so the Portuguese were most weak at the fields. There was a thing in Pemba, something from Pemba and then to organize the defence of Pemba and the Portuguese would have liquidated us. So, it was necessary to take hold of the field and then gradually take the small villages without importance and then to take hold of the entire Mozambique. It would have then only for us to start thinking about combating from position where one would take a village, then to organize it, organize its defence and we did not take Pemba, Nampula or Tete but were dominating in the bush. These people wanted us rather to take the cities. They were the Kavandames and others, so we had to explain that our struggle was a protracted one, not a short war, so they had to think. I personally used to say that to be in the struggle was to die of old age, and that our children would continue the struggle and that we were prepared for a prolonged armed struggle, not for a quick armed struggle and naturally the Portuguese resisted and have fallen and, some were saying, they were having major problems in Guinea-Bissau and in Mozambique, where they had problems of defence. So that was it, it was a march that would end up in the total weakening of the enemy, as it happened.

No, it wasn't that, that is, we didn't do a struggle in the arms. We took what was the good of the Chinese, Algerians, Cuban experiences.

Cuba, he was from Cuba, Che Guevara was a concept that was a bit odd. I personally, we at FRELIMO, didn't follow it. I think that was the reason why our relations with Cuba were very good. After independence, there was a time the relations were very good but then they faded, though after independence they had improved considerably. We sent students to Cuba, some became ministers and studied in Cuba. Che Guevara had a theory named the theory of fire. You are the fire and the fire spreads but it does not spread all over, you have to work hard for it to happen. I think that was the mistake he made when he went to, where was it? in Colombia, where did he go? Estalantina?

I think there were things he shouldn't have neglected, he isolated himself and that led to his weakening.

It was the Congress, which I led. Well, the issue of the Congress. We had the Congress as a form of reviewing the functioning of the Party and we would naturally end up electing a new leadership in terms of the analysis made during the Congress. But some wanted the Congress to take place, especially the *chairmen*, in order to change the Leadership in Cabo Delgado so, then, the Congress venue was changed, closed, nothing was analysed, nothing done, because the Congress was to take place in Cabo Delgado. Due to these conflicts, the *chairmen* had decided to boycott the Congress. That was the reason why the Congress did not occur in Cabo Delgado, (not in) Tanzania. They boycotted the Congress because they didn't want to go to hinterland. So, when we were ready to go to Cabo Delgado, we feared they might hand us over to the enemy, so we had to change to Niassa. We changed and they didn't know about it, only much later, because (we feared) if they knew they might have alerted the Portuguese and FRELIMO might have not come in time. But nonetheless, we were overflown by an airplane, a small reconnaissance airplane on the penultimate day, where it overflowed, at a low altitude the area, so they saw us, and then we closed the Congress. Two days later, they came to bomb us very fiercely, thinking that we were still meeting in Congress. So, they bombed, and that was it, they wanted to kill bandits but we weren't there any more as we abandoned the area.... that Madjedje, that Madjedje.

I recall that after the Congress, the so-called *chairmen* tried to annul the results of the Congress, they wanted another Congress because they had not participated in it, as indeed they didn't.

They boycotted, they did not participate. There (at the Congress) we strongly discussed our policies, but the policies we discussed at the Congress were related with the integration of women in the struggle, women were already in the struggle, but there were some issues. So, as there was no policy decided by the Party about women's integration in the armed struggle, things were a little bit weakened, but the II Congress decided that women should participate in the armed struggle, they were part of the Mozambican people, so they had to participate in the struggle.

It was much different than today, which is much more sophisticated, with much more means than we had at that time. Essentially to organize the logistics. Logistics consisting of organizing materials, Congress materials, including camping materials, transportation and the whole process of invitations. We had in the Congress invitees from MPLA, PAIGC. We had an Englishman, called David, an historian – how do we call it? – yes, an historian without higher education training.

But he did an excellent job, working in white Africa, he was there along with other foreigners present at the Congress. From England, MPLA, PAIGC of Guinea, etc.

It took place on July 1968. The important thing was to discuss the items on the agenda and we discussed the points that were presented. The essential ones, anything, logistics, food supplies and the security system, sentries, etc, as well as about the protection of such discussion work of the congress themes and then, finally, it ended up in the election of the leadership where Chairman Mondlane obtained 100% of the votes. There were some votes to Simango and to others but, more expressive, Mondlane obtained 100%.

Voting was secret, there were these small pieces of paper. It is interesting – there weren't voting ballots, as we have them today. Nowadays one has a ballot paper with the names of the candidates. Not then, you would have to write the name in a piece of paper, the name you wanted for President, so no mistake could take place.

So, a candidate would do his propaganda, and discuss it and then would be voted and the (elected) Chairman would form his Executive. The Executive would not be elected in Congress. Only the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman would be elected in Congress. So, the Deputy Chairman was Uria Simango, and there was no election of the Deputy Chairman. The Congress had decided that Mondlane was to be the Chairman and Simango the Deputy Chairman. There was to be no election for a Chairman and another for the Deputy-Chairman.

Instead, it was just the second most elected.

We were the ones to be in charge of security. So, there were sentries all round, and in the surrounding villages. There were also people to check how things were running. For example, when the aircraft overflew us, there was nothing we could do. We could shoot the aircraft down, but we rather stayed still, making no noise, completely quiet, to give the impression that there was nothing there, just bush. If we were to shoot the plane down, this could indicate that the Congress was taking place.

I think so, yes, I think so. That the airplane overflew over the base, flying very low, I was standing like this, in a tree, I saw the pilots, I could see perfectly the pilots, looking down and we looking at them. No, there was no panic, they left and we continued with the congress works until the end. We were already at the voting stage, counting the votes, etc and there was no panicking. It is true that afterwards, in the following day we started to withdraw the foreigners that had nothing to do in the Congress, and then we left later.

When I was in the hinterland there, no one was there, we were in a remote area, with Madjedje nearby and the settlements were a bit distant. There weren't many settlements in Niassa, it was a very quiet place.

Yeas, but we had already withdrawn. The bombing occurred when no one was there. I think there were a few guerrilla fighters but there were essentially few people. Most had already left.

There Eduardo Mondlane had indicated his team members after a period of waiting. It included Marcelino dos Santos, the guy who is now in Portugal and that had escaped,

Silvério Nungo, Lourenço Mutaca and that was it essentially. It wasn't a complex structure as it is today, it was a very small, light yet very active structure.

They were all members of the Central Committee.

No, the commanders were no heads of any departments of delegations, but the guerrillas were, with their commands.

In the liberated areas, the delegations were larger but, for example, here in the South it was just one member, I can't remember who he was. Nampula was only one person, I happened to know who he was who is now in Nampula. ...he was Bonifácio Gruveta, representing Zambezia. So, the delegation was greater in the area we were operating as guerrillas, and smaller in the underground areas. And then, for the South, because it was far distant, the coming into the area was a little more challenging.

It was for the Provinces to decide.

Exactly, we would only indicate the number (required) and would refer about the participation of women. We would give indications, the Provinces would decide on who to choose, like for example here in the South.

That was after, because before that a lot was secret for security reasons. But we had always to inform there in Niassa. Many walked there for that reason, because we could not be completely closed. This thing about a secret between two persons wasn't working, so the Portuguese then found out. Imagine what could happen before the commencement of the Congress, I don't know, but they only appeared almost at the end of the Congress.

It would be nice to talk to ...what's his name? The guy who is now managing a bank, Matias Mboa. He should remember it well, not his chief because he Naduna Chinana was murdered. They arrested him and then he disappeared, but Mboa is still alive, he is there. He was not the big chief, but whether he knows it or not – it's quite possible he does know.

No, after the Congress the Central Committee met, the new Central Committee. The documents were re-organized, formulated, corrected, etc. and only after that the results of the Congress were published. At the Congress we militated for the integration of women, because before that there were many problems. There was a need to integrate women and to educate the guerrillas to accept that. Guerrillas didn't accept that, women were to prepare food at home, the war was only for men. So, there was a need to educate the men who thought that way to have a wider vision, something not very easy. We all in the beginning thought like that and we were all saying that women could not be ministers, they had to be good cooks, good wives, look after their husbands, not ministers. So, there were problems. But look, we have now our first woman Prime-Minister, she is competent, not just any person, but there will always be such resistance. It is true that during the war FRELIMO was very aggressive.

Today, as we are more widespread, from North to South, everywhere, and living a period of allowing to be pushed around, where there was a Party. Look now, the need to draw up things, that issue, for instance, about the fight against absolute poverty. The President did it deliberately to teach the cadres below:" ...you must explain the people that it is possible to do so, to take steps to that effect..."

Well, in the beginning, many women were against it, especially the older ones, the elders, who were closely attached to tradition. They couldn't see a woman taking up arms, that was too violent and many women joining FRELIMO weren't old. They were young, children and had joined with enthusiasm, eager to hold a weapon and be able to shoot, but the older ones, more traditionalist, had problems in accepting that. We were gradually mobilizing the people, about the idea that the war was going to be long, not easy and many had been liberated to be in the bases.

It is true that the women's base was separate from the guerrilla men's base. Women were on the one side, they had their own leadership, their own leadership structure. Women were doing ambush work, especially in Niassa, that I know, as well as in Cabo Delgado. Men were in their own base, naturally. It wouldn't be easy to mix men and women in the same base, with babies and ...trees (?).. so we considered that, a base for women and a base for men.

That's natural, to explain what the person ..(??? convinced?..), there is a person you should interview. It's Mr. Moiane, engineer José Moiane. He said something I'm not going to tell you now. I hope he will say what he thought about the war. It would be good to ask him that question: what he thought about the war, whether it was against colonialism or against the whites. What would be his answer ? I'm not going to give you the answer, what he told me. That's a secret, that's it. But it would be good to ask him, what he really thought when he joined the struggle? Was it to kill all the whites, or to do what?

They were already there, they had already been trained, but there was no decision taken by the organ of the Party. It was done because there was a decision taken from hinterland, so they organized bases and everything else. They trained, distributed weapons and a decision was necessary from the Party, what the Party thought and to say what the Party was doing, or what your commander was doing and not the Party. There was a need to separate the issue. What was that mad commander doing by putting women in, or another much crazier commander doing by putting women I don't know where. One would know that was a decision by the Party, on the way to proceed.

No, there was no separation, so how did the guerrillas operate? They operated through intelligence information: "look, there is a Portuguese column coming now, it is moving from this to that part". So then, they would choose a site to hide away and would wait, sometimes for two days. So, the car would come, reach that part and "boom..."

The *tugas* (term used by the guerrillas to describe the enemy) would jump out and try to pursue the guerrillas, but then they would be far away. And there was one thing the freedom fighters wouldn't do. They would never escape directly to the base. They would previously agree to choose a site for re-assembling and then once they were all there then they would return to the base. But if there was anyone missing, they wouldn't do it because one wouldn't know if that missing person had been arrested by the enemy and revealed the whereabouts of the hideout. It was automatic. If *x* didn't pitch up, then we would take our things and change the base site.

We had our central base, and regional bases in a region, but we also had a type of security base. So, one was always watching, there was a network of information who would inform the upper base, informing what the enemy was going to do, to invade this or that place, so we had to take steps, to organize and await for an attack.

And, what were the real activities most indicated for women?

It was to do everything, including guerrilla activities, but also nursing, teaching, or if they were of tender age, to do softer tasks. But when we started, they wanted to do combat work and were very happy when returning from the fighting. As it was guerrilla work, many areas were very low also. One would attack, leave and disappear. The enemy would launch their mortars, etc. When they (the guerrillas) disappeared, they wouldn't do it all together, they would spread out to the reassembling point and then from there a decision would be taken, whether to return to the base in order to move into another base, or to continue in the same base, depending on the number of people.

## Mondlane, Cândido Jeremias

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2008]

*Cândido Jeremias Mondlane, the son of Jeremias Mondlane and Eunice Cuna, born in 1943 in Xai-Xai, District and Province of Gaza, residing in Matola F, Province of Maputo. Cândido Jeremias Mondlane was a combatant in the national liberation struggle since 1963, the date he joined FRELIMO. With humour, Cândido describes the circumstances under which he developed his nationalist conscience and how he conducted his escape into Tanzania.*

*In 1964, accompanied by Francisco Magaia, Paulo Samuel Nkankomba and 8 other comrades he left to China for military training. Upon his return, he was deployed to render military training in Kongwa and later on to Nachinguewa.*

*As a military member, he participated in military operations in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Cândido, on reviving his past, narrates both his participation in combat under the leadership of Filipe Samuel Magaia and the N6-Gordio offensive, as well as the great debates within FRELIMO, the II Congress and women's participation. At the end of the liberation war, Cândido was sent to the USSR for further military training.*

I thought of saying the following. I was lucky in my life to pursue the national liberation armed struggle before, during and after and hitherto. I joined the national liberation war in 1963, while the armed struggle had not yet started, one year after the formation of FRELIMO.

At that time, during 1963, there was this story in Luanda in 68...machetes (??), there were the incidents about the Congo refugees coming to Mozambique, as well as of some Angolans, the 4th February, where the Youth started to move about what was happening in Angola and in Congo.

And there was something very interesting, many people forget about the hijacking of that steamship at about the same time, that story about the Captain ..., all that had agitated the Youth. And we Mozambicans were wondering why we were doing nothing, seeing that some movement had started in Angola.

So then, we started to think that something had to happen and that was when some wind started to blow in Dar-es-Salaam in order to liberate our country, and we started to think on how to adhere to the movement. So then, me and my cousin, who later became a medical doctor, decided to go. We had to join and stop being like sissies – excuse my reference to gender.

So, we left via Chicualacuala in August 1963, and when we arrived in Chicualacuala there was naturally the PIDE there.

- “Hey boys, pull out and come here”.

- “But we are *assimilados* and as *assimilados* we are free to move freely around the national territory”.

- “Hey boys, this is the border post and here you have to come with us”. So, we went to the PIDE agent's office at the border.

We arrived there for the identification, we were *assimilados* and had the right to move across the entire national territory. Then, luckily, there was an excursion of the *Ferrovário de Maputo*, a soccer club who was playing at the time in Chicualacuala and we came to know that there was going to be a ball party.

So, when the PIDE officer asked us what were we doing there, we replied that we had come in the excursion to visit our uncle Pedro Mondlane, who lived there. We had come in the excursion to visit our uncle whom we had not seen for a long time, and then afterwards to go to the ball party. A great excuse - otherwise we would have to be held there.

- "Ok, so you came to visit your uncle". PIDE then decided to accompany us to our uncle's house but, as they didn't have the patience to do such things, they instead had decided to phone our uncle to confirm.

There was an interesting detail here. As our uncle had been living a long time away from home, I wasn't sure he would recognize us. He was in Chicualacuala, I didn't know if he would recognize me. I said I was Jeremias' son, Jeremias was his brother.

My brother Malequias ... PIDE had no longer time to accompany us, so we left, PIDE said *ah inga ku heleketa*, they would not accompany us. The 3rd Receiving Post of Chicualacuala would meet us there. We were to go to the ball first.

What happened then was very interesting. PIDE had said that if we had not returned to the ball, our uncle would be in trouble with them. So, we were wondering whether to return or not return, seeing that he would have confirmed to PIDE that we had arrived there.

So, as we were preparing to venture out, a Land Rover had just arrived. They wanted to know if we were Mr. Pedro Mondlane's nieces. We had contacted our uncle to take us and he agreed, so we waited for him not for a long time and he took us to the Mukerane camp site.

We ate what we had to normally eat. Our uncle hadn't seen us for a long time. He ordered someone to bring a calf and a lamb, etc. He was a cattle breeder and, in the afternoon, he took us for a promenade, so and so, and we arrived to the other side and crossed the border. We didn't know it was so close, so the uncle told us something interesting. On the other side was Rhodesia, at the time it was known as Rhodesia. And then he said we had to return to the country of our origin, from which we were all *molezas*.

We nodded to each other, wondering whether to tell him that we wanted to cross to the other side. So when we crossed back to the land where we were *molezas* we told our uncle that our intention was not just to visit him. We told him we wanted to cross to the other side to go to Tanganyika.

He was very happy stating that he had helped many people by using his home but never had a relative wanting to follow that route. We told him that we were there to go forward.

He said that yes, those guys there washing by the tank were from Rhodesia and he could talk to them to help us catch the train. We said: "Uncle, we didn't want to precipitate things. You created the conditions for us to tell you about the purpose of us coming here in Chicualacuala, which is to cross into the other side in order to remain there.

So then, we started to prepare our trip. (But we made a) Mistake, when we left at 4 am, instead of going through the trails towards the shepherd's houses, he directed us towards the station. So instead of leaving, we were turning back. It seemed it wasn't the right trail but then we (eventually) proceeded towards the shepherd's house.

So, we arrived there, he indicated us the way to go and he told us not to catch the train at the 2nd station, the 2<sup>nd</sup> station was something like..... So, I retained the name of the 3rd station where we were to catch the train – Tuisa, we had catch the train at Tuisa...we walked to Tuisa

The train would only arrive at 22h00, we made a mistake, we had to hide ourselves at Tuisa until the arrival of the train, but luckily the train station master was a Mozambican. As we were waiting in hiding for the 20h00, some local youngsters arrived. We had some Mozambican coins, which we offered them, but they refused them. That's not what they wanted.

- "Since you came here to Malvernia (Malvernia was what is today Chicualacuala) ..... we don't want those coins !". We offered those coins but they wanted more. So they said: "You want to catch the 20h00 train. We will inform PIDE that you are here!"

The train was nearly arriving and we had to tell..... that there were these guys that were going to report us to PIDE. He said: "Stay with me, fortunately I'm travelling to Bulawayo".

We were walking and clinging onto the old papa's coat, with the train approaching, with PIDE arriving in their Land Rover to enter into the train to search and check passports from Tuisa to Malvernia. So he said that PIDE's car was arriving and we would have to stay clinging onto him, because we wanted at the time to. ....

Luckily, the chap told us to remain there, until the train leaving Bulawayo to Malvernia arrived as well as the next one. He told us that there was no problem, we were just as Black as the other Blacks....so we entered into the train. My uncle wanted to open the window in the train and an old man, who already had a few drinks said:" ah, you are closing the window here in the train. You are a Mozambican, you are closing here to Rhodesia". Luckily, the man who was travelling with us told him to shut up and off we went to Salisbury.

When we arrived feeling hungry for the last 2, 3 days we went to a pub to have something to eat. The waitress told us they only served *sadza* (traditional staple food)and I told her that *sadza* would be like something from *xikwembu* (Tsonga word for "God") to us at that time. But *sadza* proved to be some biscuits and *Fanta* drinks. .... So from there we then left for Salisbury. When we arrived in Salisbury, we took 2 different taxis, with him taking one as he was the eldest. But, as we didn't know the place, we didn't have an address, and gave the taxi driver a card with directions. The driver read the card but then he took us to a Police Station.

As he entered the Police Station we wondered whether he was handing us to the Police, so we thought of running away. Imagine, us in Salisbury, where to escape, perhaps the best would be to stay in prison and then to wonder what would be our next destination.

So, after a while he came back to us and we asked him why he went to the Police Station. He answered: "the card you showed me indicates a place unknown to me, so I came to check in a map in the Station". Imagine what a stress!

So he took us there, to the house of the gentleman whose indications had been given to us in Maputo.

So we arrived at his place. He wasn't there, we were received by his cousins. Any person arriving there...he had bombs there and one of his cousins, a swashbuckler type of guy, asked where were we Mozambicans going to. As we were used to keep secrecy, we told him we were going to Tanganyika and asked him not to tell anybody about it...My uncle was taking people who wanted to speak to Mr. Macuiane...but there were many of them in Rhodesia.

So then, Macuiane himself came and took us to his home and served tea and milk and in the following day wanted to know what we were wanting from him.

- "We have an indication to contact you in order to facilitate our journey to Dar-es-Salaam".

- "But you guys are too young. I wouldn't want to take you to Tanganyika. I have study bursaries from the Church that could take you to America."

We told him that we had left Mozambique to go to Tanganyika.

- "well, if you want to go to Tanganyika then I'm sending you to another representative..". We agreed, finished drinking the tea and milk, bread, etc. He even arranged for a taxi to take us to a certain Santaca, a guy from Beira.

As we arrived at his place we told him we wanted to go to Tanganyika. He told us we had to go as soon as possible because he was about to retire as a civil servant. If the Government was to find out that he was hosting us, he could lose his retirement benefits. We told him that was his problem...

- "So you want to leave today?..". We told him: "Yes, we just don't know how". So the old man agreed and, interestingly, we were having lunch. This thing of eating with hands wasn't a habit for us in the South. There are some who do it, others not.

They brought *uswa* (???) and the old man told he was amused to know we left our parents to come to suffer. I said we weren't suffering. Suffering was rather not to eat...eating *uswa* corn was suffering. Santara felt sorry for me.

I told Mr. Santara that he was a Rhodesian railroad worker who was about to retire and was afraid of losing his retirement benefits. I asked him whether he wanted an independent Mozambique. He replied he wanted so, but he first wanted his retirement. His problem was his retirement...

So, he then finally quickly organized, we left in trucks...what you call them?...in wagons, those *madjikaduzi*. Our truck had its wheels broken down for 3 times before we reached the penultimate village to reach Lusaka, and we were being left behind.

The truck driver was upset and told us that we were Africans, that we were as Black as them. We could stay in the truck cabin, as we were going to cross the border we could remain there instead of being exposed to the heat outside. We fortunately crossed the border between Rhodesia and Zambia inside the truck. After we crossed the border post he said: "*wa buyi...*" and so we reached Lusaka.

We thought Dar-es-Salaam was like New York or so. It was rather like the bush. We looked right and looked left, seeing nothing. "Is this Dar-es-Salaam?"

So, when we reached FRELIMO's offices...ai,a,ai ! The first person receiving us was a Makonde comrade with a tattoo. Comrade to the left, comrade to the right.. we weren't used to this story of using the term "comrade". So being called "comrade" by someone with a tattoo was quite a shock. I thought that was probably not the place we were looking for.

Comrade, comrade to answer was something difficult because, firstly, I wasn't used to being called a comrade, I didn't know of such term...

They received us. I was signed up on November, 1963.....well, seeing that stopping doesn't cost any money, I would like to stop to have something to eat.... Let's take a small pause.

It's like when we left Durban, when they told us that there was PIDE, who was controlling us, we had to leave the train and had to walk, and reached Ketchambe. In Ketchambe we were told that if we wanted to continue we had to walk for more than 7 hours in order to reach to the next station.

So, we chose another site at about 17h00 or 18h00. The intention was to sleep over and wait for the train in the following day at 6h00. One person arrived and told us: "Guys, there are rules here. It is best to leave the railways camp site, calm down and try to sleep". We did that !

My God, we entered into the kitchen....there was a couple who was a friend of them that was there to drink and to heat up the food for supper.....

As the cabbage begun warming up...(?)...I woke up my brother, I don't know why the lady didn't shout...she looked, looked, looked... *gubogubwe, gubogubwe Tuisa...* we would say this to say that we came from Tuisa. She went to call her husband, he came with that friend of his who was drinking...*gubogubwe Tuisa...* then after *manhole nhala nhala*. Nhala was the closest area to Mozambique, where shangaan is most spoken, more thn their language in Tuisa.

*He Nhala, Nhala* and he said *eh wina ... ni ca Gaza*, already in shangaan.

... "you are fleeing, I'm asking you to sleep here, but I'm not the chief in this camp. ..(??)... Later, at 5h30 you'll have to leave and mix with people who are going to catch the train to Somagusa". That was our luck!

We would say: "Tuisa, Tuisa, you don't know how to speak xKalanga". ...."You're from Tuisa, but I would say I'm from Xai-Xai and did not speak Shangana". -" No, it's not possible, it's inconceivable.. If you're from Xai-Xai you ought to speak Shangana, perhaps sometimes not very well. In my family we only speak Portuguese but must be able to speak Shangana, because of my socializing with friends. One ought to know Shangana".....

To go to Dar-es-Salaam, one would have to go as if we were going to the movies, taking nothing with us. I wore a pair of pants; a shirt and I was also lucky to wear a pair of shorts. My cousin was wearing pants, a shirt, as if we were going to the movies. We were smart enough that when we arrived at Chokwe I had sent my cousin to return to Lourenço Marques to change some Rhodesian currency, otherwise we would have trouble using Mozambican money.

So, we exchanged the currency we carried. We were lucky, because many would leave without exchanging money in Rhodesia. We moved freely with the money we had exchanged. There was foreign exchange bureau at the time, I don't even remember if at the time the Rhodesian currency was called a Dollar.

Luckily, we had no problems moving inside Rhodesia until we crossed to Zambia, and I asked my cousin to exchange the money again in Chokwe, seeing what to do with Mozambican currency.....

From the offices, some of us went to Illala (?), while others went to Bugurundi (?).

From the head office, after we met that comrade, we were sent to Bugurundi before we went to Bagamoyo – an interesting event. After Bugurundi we were transferred to Bagamoyo, a camp close to the beach. We first went there to meet our comrade and then later sent to Bugurundi and later to Bagamoyo, which I had not seen for some time. In Bugurundi my brother was sent to Israel and from there to China to the military academy of ....., the second military academy, because the 1st one was in Prussi (?) in 1974, which was the best Soviet academy. This was when the Marshall wanted us to stop the guerrilla warfare to become a regular army....to beat, stay and occupy.

The first one was the Nanjing academy, where I attended a guerrilla and guerrilla command course, and they say it is already too.... I, .... the trip to Nanjing...sabotage, I taught the tricks. At the time we had no choice as Frelimo military. You would be sent to Egypt, China or Algeria.

And when I knew I had to go to China, I nearly missed it because my uncle Eduardo Mondlane was arranging for me to treat a broken tooth. I didn't feel I had to miss it because of a tooth ailment. He told me I could afterwards go to Egypt but I preferred China. My uncle used to often play with us. He was my uncle and he was speaking as an uncle, or to speak to us as the Frelimo's Chairman. So, I agreed, I would go to China. We were like that. Now, with his wife I was addressing auntie as a niece, or as a Secretary of *swa ku tcakala tcakala*. She was from the Red Cross, after this AIDS problem...if she was talking to me as a niece, then the familiarity would continue...Nlhethe has come here and sat an English word who were the ones who went to China? Filipe Samuel Magaia, Paulo Samuel Nkankomba, Francisco Valingua, José Macamo, Cândido Mondlane, Rafael Maria, Ntchere. We were 11. Back in 1964, timeously.

I'm not despising the others, but the training in Algeria was solely for guerrilla warfare...bang, bang, bang...not for political training. Our group was sent to be trained for guerrilla leadership and political organization. We were fortunate to receive training for such purposes and that's why many of us ended up as political commissars who had an inclination for operations. I remained in operations.

You were a Mozambican, we were Tanzanians, but not allowed to speak Portuguese at airports, as no Tanzanian would speak Portuguese.

In Dakar, in Pakistan – no, it was in Karachi – there was an interesting incident with this Francisco Madenga. Our hotel, the Palace Hotel, was located close to the Portuguese Consulate. We couldn't sleep properly, waking up every now and then, fearing the Portuguese would come to capture us because we were speaking.

That Madengo ended up deserting. He went into a refugee camp and he was later ousted ...

Guerrilla leadership was a very complicated matter in that you had to learn everything. 1) You had to learn how to endure hunger. For example, to endure hunger because we were trained to be at the war front without food and you are not going to stop leading because you are hungry.

2) You had to learn about the struggle, so we went to the camp site to stay over. In the following day we found we were sleeping in the cemetery and were told we were dreaming of something. We were apprehensive to see graves all around in the morning.- "So you think that the dead...*swa ku tcakala, tcakala*...with your heads lying on a grave.

It was my greatest experience in China. Sleeping in a cemetery. It was all just sleeping,tiredness ....*loku hi pfuka*...we saw that they were tombs, but, it was good, their graves aren't like ours....in any case it was a cemetery any way.

There was a group who got lost, they lost their azimuth, we were meant to enter the bridge. If you lost your azimuth you wouldn't reach the bridge, you would pass by. One of our groups entered, so they had to go back. They were very close, the instructor noticed they had made a mistake....*loku a twa ku pua*....

In China we had to firstly (accept tuition) in Spanish, they didn't have a Portuguese interpreter, but then later there were 2 interpreters, who came from their Language Institute, and they were Chinese.

They had to bring forward because we were with our leader Filipe Samuel Magaia and, as the struggle had to begin, and he was the commander we had to return earlier. This affected us because we had scheduled to go on a tour. But we went to visit the Great Wall. If you visit China without visiting the Wall you can't say you visited China. And it's like us drinkers, to go to China without drinking *mautan* (cup of tea ?) it's like not being in China.

On the part of us being Tanzanians. As we were bringing weapons to Mozambique. When we returned we went to Kongwa, as Nachingwea didn't exist yet. The activity there was to train troops.

I was involved in operations training, I held the post of political commissar, but was always involved in operations. When the Nachingwea camp was established they wanted people to be trained there.

When the war broke out, I didn't participate in the 1st guerrilla group who entered hinterland. It was indeed supposed to start in Gaza. My material was rotten and I was believed to be dead or arrested, because I was expected to be in the Gaza Front. But the guy that was in charge of the weapons there was a double agent.

Luckily this was discovered, otherwise I would have come in my personal name and would have been captured while still cleaning the guns. I was lucky, I could have been caught while cleaning the guns. I was to enter after Magul, what's it called?, at the ..... I was lucky. If that guy was a PIDE agent, he just had to tell them I was there, cleaning the guns.

I would like to say the following: I was in operations in 1965 and 1966, but in 1968 I was nominated a military commander in Cabo Delgado until the 1970s we had that the infamous "*Nó Górdio*" which unfortunately had fallen on my watch. I say unfortunately because it should have happened to somebody else. I was the unlucky one.

Both the communities and the military were wondering what to do. We were to do whatever we had at our means. To deploy there and to such zone. It fell on my hands, I couldn't escape. In fact, there were rumours that I had ran away and handed over myself to the Portuguese.

To say that the commander had handed himself to them and had paid dearly for that. To say that I had fled when I was actually there. – "Friend, go tell the Portuguese that I fled...". So you know what we meant to say. To say that I fled, but that was simply a joke of bad taste.

- "How did he flee, if we see him every day..". He knew very well, he must have been na agent to demotivate the people. If a commander flees, how come the people is still resisting?

The sector leader, the sector commander said that it would be better for the leader to leave the base to stay in Nali, a base that was a bit far away from the 2<sup>nd</sup> sector, as it was a calmer area. If I was to leave, how would the others continue? Why would I leave? They would then say the commander had left.

Believe me, there was a time when I stayed for 8 days without moving. It was very hard. "*Nó Górdio*" was such a terrible thing, when we knew that something was happening. Weapons, soldiers, we were wondering why so much more troops, guns, what was our *patrão* (boss) thinking. We used to call the guy our *patrão*.

Continuously for 3, 4 times. Why was Mueda with so much materials? In the beginning we couldn't understand why so much weapons and troops, so we started to take some steps. We, at that time, had some detachments with 150, 300 guerrillas. We thought of dispersing our troops, instead of having a base with 150 freedom fighters. They were reduced to 30 and then to form new detachments with the remaining staff.

The central base in which I was stationed was sub-divided into 3: A, B, C. The A base was the command headquarters, B the sub-command and C for reconnaissance, where Lidimo was stationed. So we then stood waiting for them. However, we didn't just stand waiting, we were also conducting our own raids to provoke them. The more we provoked, the more they became irritated and then ended up becoming more precipitated. This happened for a month, during May 1970.

We were doing it...attacking Nangade, Muidumbe, Nacatar, elsewhere, to see if the region was accumulating with so much materials. But, as the *Boss* had thought they were going to complete it in 3 days, they begun staying quiet and take stock.

We mined all the roads, we planted banana trees there but the *boss* wouldn't move. When the time came to advance, they would use bulldozers to open roads alongside the mined roads. They would not trigger the mines because they knew the roads had been mined. The bulldozers were accompanied by mortar and Canon weapons, with helicopters flying over to check for possible ambushes.

We remained quiet. They would open new roads never to use them again because we were mining the new roads, with pits and banana trees, so they had to build new roads to return back. As they returned we would ambush them and that is when we started use B10 canons in our ambush fighting, instead of the AKM.

The planting of banana and cassava trees was to give the impression that they were planting fields (*machambas*). We did that in the 1st and 2nd sectors. In the case of the 1st sector it was at the Mueda-Mocímboa da Praia road while in the 2<sup>nd</sup> sector it was at the Mocímboa da Praia road up to the Misava River.

... where I was visiting the chief and told him I wasn't a military one....I had a well arranged home with a very nice balcony.

This is an extra story. The boss thought we were weak, both in weapons and in intelligence, so they fell into the trap. When *Nó Górdio* started, oh my goodness, ... we wouldn't sleep, he invaded and occupied the old provincial base where we weren't there anymore, when they claimed to have occupied the Provincial base.

It's funny, our sentries were at a short distance from their patrols, but they didn't have orders to shoot to avoid detection of our base.

They moved to raid the site they thought it was the new base, they moved to attack Naminde with helicopters where they thought it was the new base.

They went there and left us close to them. During the great offensive in May, then we got used to it. The May period was the hardest, just look at what I am trying to tell you. There was a colleague of mine who for 31 days never took off his boots, never changed his shirt. I myself took some 8 to 9 days without knowing what was it to change boots, because we would never know when the enemy would attack.

It was daylight, choppers were on the air, the propaganda airplane was throwing pamphlets where the Makonde, being Catholics, didn't see they were being colonized. The aircraft would do it day until night and at night there were Canon bombings. We were sleeping in shelters, that is, we would dig shelters because we wouldn't know where a shell could hit us; the problem was to sleep in a pit. The Portuguese troops were going everywhere, they didn't know where to go – that's why we had to wear our boots all the time.

We wouldn't take off our boots, our clothing was kept aside before..... we were only using the clothes we were wearing. The food was made in another detachment, it would only come to be distributed to us, we couldn't make our own food. I recall once at a time when we had plenty of oats. They ordered us to prepare the meal to calm down our hungry stomachs,. As we scooped the first spoon, the shooting started. **[Translator's note: The last sentence in this paragraph was translated in its context, as the sentence in the original text was incomplete].** When we came back there was no food left and the plates were in a bag.

The most dramatic scene for me was when I returned from the 1st sector I found my comrades in a provisional base in Nhaminga. I moved with some soldiers, guerrillas and at night I went to look for the soldiers that had fought. We were only 3.

I walked to the sentry. He told me that all of them had passed there fortunately in the following morning saying that they could not leave their leader alone...they came alone and our detachment had been reinforced. I'm not going to say I wasn't afraid to go with only 3 of us, I had to stand up, otherwise if I had fallen the men would be without a leader.

The combatants arrived in the following day and we were feeling strong when we arrived at the detachment. I must say, I would be lying if I would say that I didn't sleep worried. With 3 people only, it wouldn't be enough. It was also good that they stupidly never thought that we were only 3 people, otherwise they would have come and get us.

We were lucky, because one could not Cook there at the base. The food had to come from another detachment for us to eat it at the base. I'm talking of oat flakes. We would eat *chima* which was cooked at that detachment and the food would be brought by the women's detachment.

We still wouldn't have radio facilities, we would have what we called the liaison members who would operate from my base to Nachingueia, a communication lasting 2 to 3 days.

I would write a letter, a report and (messages) would come and go. I don't know which because when they advanced, they would use bulldozers, canons, mortars. We went to attack....we went to attack Nangada, with daily small clashes at the road that leave Aca to Chai.

The Logistics were well organized. At one stage they discovered a cache of weapons in Limpopo. We never had difficulties with logistics. We even used some of their own weapons that they abandoned. We used their G3, which weren't part of our weapons, but would fight with their own logistic materials.

No, and you know why? Because Nkavandame destroyed himself by not attending the 2nd Congress that took place in Matcheze. He mobilized those so-called *chairmen* who were the district leaders, not to attend the II Congress, he was an Osseman ally.

Upon the II Congress, I was fortunately there, when it ended the *chairmen* demanded a meeting with FRELIMO's leadership....Simango remained there...the *chairmen* bla, bla, bla remained there and never came back because there was no longer a role for them and everything there but never returned to the hinterland because the military leadership deployed the political commissars to the detachments to take over the districts...the *chairmen* bla, bla, bla remained and never went back because there was no role for them anymore, and that's how it all died there.

Some of them probably can only remember this year... I personally...never had any problems. In Cabo Delgado I was so loved that I had mothers and fathers bringing hens, at the base. They were like surrogate parents, I had no problems at that time, I was very nice.

I never had problems, I had my father and my mother, who would come to visit me at the base and, as a Commander I had to find a place to host them. The way our bases were organized, we had what we called the Provincial Command and then the detachments. The Provincial command was a sort of a village. The home of the Command was what we called the *xitlava* with a porch where we would pass the food....so with a family visit you could imagine what it was.

They were adoptive parents because I had my parents here in Maputo but I was treated like a son there. They would first look at you, then they would fancy you and then called me their son and FRELIMO wouldn't interfere with that and wasn't against it either.

Samora wanted me to meet him, but, pity him, 1) Samora died before him 2) he died because Samora's followers wanted that to happen so keenly, but there was a meeting that failed at the Rovuma Hotel for Commanders that participated in the war.

So were notified and arrived at Rovuma Hotel, but the commanders didn't come, just one chap, who was a certain Dr Something who was representing.... The allegation was that money was short for the commanders to meet us. We even told them that if they didn't have money, they should have told us and we would have come to them.

We were to talk about how operation *x* had occurred, as well as how operation *y*, but they simply didn't pitch up. I can only recall it happen in the 1980s...Samora wanted us to confront with those powerful enemies of ours.

To say that Samora wanted to show Kaulza the Guy who had beaten him. No, but Samora had already died, otherwise.... Kaulza was postponing and postponing, otherwise Samora would show him the guy who we wanted to destroy in 3, 4 days.

Well, I would say that when the enemy was harassing us, we would say they were adventurous. Have you ever imagined a guy who comes along and was saying that he would destroy us in 3, 4 days or in a month, not knowing of our capacities, our dispersion, not knowing whether I had been in Vietnam, that knew nothing about Vietnam before he knew the Vietnamese and just because we were Blacks, he would sort us in 2 days?

Some of our tactics were drawn from the eastern countries...the leadership course of *Francisco Couto* still exists, as well as others.

I don't know about that, because many freedom fighters have now retired, some from here, others from elsewhere...Filipe Samuel Magaia...walked for 72 hours because he had to bring the message about his death, in order to send a car to the border to take Filipe Samuel Magaia to be buried before returning to the crypt and there you couldn't sleep, just walk.

A motivated person walks like an automatic machine. Those carrying the cask were walking slowly but we, the others, had to move faster so that the others at the border could find the car there.

He had been buried at Songueia, at the seat of one of the Provinces, but interestingly, one of my colleagues in the region said that at his age he could not dig the grave. But we were at war and had never participated in a burial, so we asked him to dig the grave.

There was what we called a....at the time when we had no experience of the hinterland, the combat experience, I had been in hinterland many times but Magaia wanted me to mobilize a battalion of cadres to go to the hinterland. We had even planned a combat, etc, etc....a very sad story.

I was doing reconnaissance work, then he sent others and we were attacked in the hinterland, something of a war business. And then Magaia was killed in the return trip, so we had to rush to inform headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam that Magaia had been killed at a certain location distant.

It was a battalion of 4 that had to go, Magaia wanted to deploy to hinterland to gain experience. He had chosen Niassa for such exercise, he was the chief, and that caused a lot of controversy because no one was happy to deploy cadres, a battalion of cadres for an operation.

We could be bombed by the Portuguese, then this loss of cadres in just one event would be a major loss.

But it was good that only our leader died. We didn't die we were part of the battalion but only its leader died executed by one of us stupidly. As far as we knew, that wasn't the case unless he had been a PIDE agent. If it was PIDE it might have ordered its execution.

It could only be that, because if it was due to tribalism a person killing Magaia might have been also a Maronga, if a Shangana then.....no, both were Marongas. Until today, I don't know why, that man was thereafter seen here in Lourenço Marques, now Maputo.

At that moment when there was a shooting, we wanted to know what was the type of weapon, when a gun has just fired a shot, one can distinguish through the smell at the breech, we military men know that.

Magaia was a friend of Mário Mussavatel here in Maputo before he left to Dar-es-Salaam. I knew his house, I was in school with Manuel, the Guy who committed suicide because of his wife after that.....they were my family, I almost met Magaia before him. Now, that we went there and participated in the struggle, to say that they were speculating – speculating what? Speculating that what was being speculated in the Portuguese regime with PIDE? And my age at that time, I had myself participated in the armed struggle. There were these movements, in Congo there were many refugees coming here. There was this 4th February in Angola, a lot of moving around, which I was following at high school.

Magaia wasn't of my age. He was of the same age as my brother Salatiel. I was a friend of brother Magaia, who studied with me at António Enes High School, but Magaia was much older. Pity he died at 65...he was a leader. It's like asking what would have happened to Mozambique if Eduardo Mondlane hadn't been killed. God have mercy of me if I can't in my statements satisfy that he was a leader. Magaia was a leader – Magaia was one of those people who would not be concerned.....

Magaia was a great commander, very intelligent, simple and very humane. I am going to tell a very interesting story. We didn't about *sura*, both me and my cousin. We both drank *sura* which didn't go Down very well with my cousin. My cousin is much like a brother, so we had to carry my brother.

Magaia was pacing by and I told him that my sometimes had this problem, when he doesn't feel well and can't walk. So Magaia moved. We went to the barracks and he didn't forget him, he wanted to know about my brother's condition. So, when he arrived, I ran into my brother to tell him the chief was coming.

So, he lifted the blanket and said: "You said he was sick, but he is drunk!". I didn't say anything because there were other people there, so I went and apologized to explain the chief that it was a small exaggeration.



Do you know what he told me? –“ When I met you, you lied to me, why didn't you tell me he was drunk?. I was going to punish you but since you are lucky you came to clarify this matter”.

... II Congress mobilized by Nkanvandame, Nkanvandame was allied to Uria Simango, who, naturally in his capacity as Vice-Chairman of FRELIMO was counting on the elimination of Eduardo Mondlane where he would take over FRELIMO's leadership. And, as Nkanvandame was a very influential Provincial *chairman*, he thought of the possibility of becoming the Vice-Chairman.

Then there were these administrative secretaries – the Nuro who also had his part in delivering the book that killed Mondlane, and so forth. It was indeed a very turbulent period. 1968 was a very turbulent period – we can talk about that.

Then when Paulo Samuel Nkankomba was murdered, he met Sansão Mutemba at the Frelimo's offices. Chissano almost got killed but stopped at the hospital.

When Eduardo Mondlane died, I was in the hinterland, in Cabo Delgado and then I tried to leave because I wanted to participate in the burial since he was my uncle. The border was closed, it was very difficult to cross the Rovuma River to Dar-es-Salaam. I arrived too late, the burial had already taken place. Facts of life...

There was an interesting fact. I was going to meet Samora Machel, he was still the head of Department, not yet the Chairman. So we agreed to a meeting of commanders. I had left the Beira base, then I jumped at a curve in Madume...and got some water, my comrades thought I was committing suicide, because for them they thought it was poisonous.....

So they took it in their pocket so that they could say in the meeting I had taken some poison....

The sergeant where he was coming from...Pachinuapa, Candido for you. In that night when I arrived, it was the tragic death of Mondlane. I didn't wait for Machel's arrival, he too didn't come for the meeting, and a certain person told us about the tragedy.

He didn't meet him here, as it was always with my brother Salatiel, his first child was Norberto, a medical doctor, but he is in Portugal. I was his carrier pigeon from Maputo to Bella Vista when RM was in Bella Vista.

As simple as that, Cândido Jeremias Mondlane, the child of Jeremias Mondlane and Eunice Cuna, born in Xai-Xai, but my parents were from Nhacutsi, and my father was a *régulo*.

Here, here in Matola F....my grandfather is Anavane....when I was born he died in 1943. I was born in 1943 and he died the same year, in May 1943, my birthday is in Karl Marx's Day.

... The history of my ancestors, the Penhane. They were good friends of Ngungunhamne, they were together in Mussapa, but after Penhanhane

They returned to their land because he was a pretender to the throne. So when Gungunhane was leaving to his land Soshangane it all happen there. ....

He was received there as a great friend of Penhanhane and they ate meat.

So they moved forward to..... eating cattle heads that they had slaughtered, *munhanze*. And were stopped because of the battle of Magule. So Ngungunhane sent a delegation to fetch more *munhanze* which lasted the time it lasted, but please excuse me but I am going to tell what I knew.

Many people who were going to return to Manjakaze to fetch some more Munhanze were tired of walking so much, so they returned halfway. Ngungunhane said he was tired of sending people...so they told Ngungunhane that the Penhanhane said that he had a small finger that was going to scratch in his mother's backside and not to bother them. Whatever he said we returned to Macaze and that started the war between the Penhanhane and Ngungunhane because of the intrigues of people, but the Penhanhane never said that about his mother. So Ngugunhane was upset and started the war between friends.

My parents were never there, my father built a house in Chamanculo to host his children. Firstly, it was Salatiel, after my father's death I had to control the *regulador* and Salatiel had to stay.

On strategy, I would like you to ask me questions for me to answer them unambiguously, because for a journalist or an historian one needs to have concrete things, so ask me the questions.

Operation *No-Górdio* was what General Kaulza had learnt from Vietnam. He thought he would arrive in Mozambique, to destroy shabby people – they called us shabby – in less than a month, even in 3 days. An operation that involved 70 000 tons of weaponry and 50 000 troops of both races here, from all the provinces, if not even of the entire colossal army which included Guinea and Angola.

So, they thought they would decimate the shabby people in less than 3 days during the day. It was when we tested the Fiats, we didn't know the fiats.. The fiats were using the helicopters and at night it was the canon bombings. And then we had to get used to open shelters and to sleep in them, because a Canon shell could hit us. We were sleeping in pits.

This happened during the whole month of May. It so happened that during the *Nó Górdio* we had oat flakes, I Will never forget, it was a fast food. We were about to eat the oat flakes when the *boss* would come and started to raid nearby. The body guards would remain to look after the food.

The province most affected was Cabo Delgado, we were from an independent Republic in 1969 and Samora Machel said that something very important was about to happen. We had 200 personnel in the detachments, we were already independent in Cabo Delgado.

From the drawing of attention, we started to reduce the number of members in the detachments, that is, instead of 300, we would have 100, we would sub-divide the detachments into smaller units.

So we from 50, increased the number of detachments, with one in Nampula having 300 being divided into detachments of 30 or 40.

Thus, had facilitated our manoeuvres, so every time the enemy would pass, they would encounter resistance. Instead of intervening with a major detachment we would reduce it to just 1 detachment.

The provincial base where I was residing was the Mozambique base which was subdivided into 3: Mozambique A, B, C and from there they would no longer find a base with such a colossal number of fighters, as a bomb could kill many hundreds of them.

So, Jesus, that was all we had, where we had our struggle in the Tete and Manica e Sofala zones. Independence was Mozambique and Mozambique were Cabo Delgado and solely Cabo Delgado. We had all our things there, including the Congress in Niassa, though predominantly with the sovereignty of Cabo Delgado.

In 1968 we were independent in Cabo Delgado, we didn't know of any settlers, the *tugas*, as we called them. They were only concentrated in administrative posts, they wouldn't set foot in our zone, we were at ease in our zones.

Our theme was that we were already feeling independent when Kaulza de Arriaga concentrated his troops in Mueda. The concentration was in May, we were finding that something was going on with so many troops, with all those transport aircraft arriving in Mueda 4 times a day, so something was about to happen.

Concentration of troops, materials and reconnaissance also. We had also our reconnaissance on the other side seeing aircraft movement, troops, something was going on. The enemy wasn't concentrating troops and war equipment for nothing, there must have been an objective.

And then fortunately there was this deserter that was at ...who escaped and informed that there was a lot of troops in Mueda, so if there was a lot of troops there might have been an operation going on, otherwise why so many troops, to do what ?

One of the great deputies was Amad Chong, who lost a leg due to amputation, when we were meeting with Magaia at a detachment. He lost his leg due to amputation and had to carry on like that. The same mine had caused me injuries in my sight. I have serious health problems because of such mine explosion.

The late Alberto Chissanga, who was from Artillery, had Jeremias and he then moved to security and worked with those 3. He had Salésio Nalemivana who was for many years acted as Deputy Minister of Security, and was my boss. Good times that have gone.

He was a commander, deputy, security, operational commander...it wasn't Chongo but was injured and had to accommodate. Sand was in Artillery.

We in Cabo Delgado started to work in Artillery in 1968. Mortars, B10 canon. It would seem *Nó Górdio* didn't cause so much damage, as it would have been expected. The good it caused was the intense dislocation of the populations, etc, etc. In human terms we had evacuated the population in the conflict zone, which was the 2nd sector and we transferred to the area beyond Nagatar, and that didn't interest the Portuguese.

They wanted to kill the Candidos and the Mondlanes to take the bases. There was population there. Let me tell you a very interesting story. Joba changed from his base when a bathing suit was stolen and at that time we decreed a sort of a decree. Whoever stole 30 sjambok .....my bathing suit.....and they said the chief has decreed he will have to be punished with 30 sjambok beatings.

I said no, he doesn't have to be so punished with 30 sjambok beatings, I felt sorry and he was only punished with a few sjambok beatings.

The population in Cabo Delgado is terrible.

I was the 1st political commissar, Nigico was the 1st deputy-commissar as well as Mawota. Mawota is now at his place and is a business man. He is at the Choupal area.

Military steps, adequate patrolling, we had patrols everywhere to counteract the Portuguese patrols.

I was going to tell an interesting story.

I wouldn't like to remember that because when the offensive started in the morning, some were awakened by the Fiat bombings. We recognized the Fiats we were being bombed...when the Fiats appeared.

... 2, 3 bombs to arm an aircraft permanently, to do propaganda with the Makonde stating that they were Catholics and did not go well with the Shangana. They were saying the Sangana were coming to occupy the rich lands of the Makonde, etc. The airplane was operating from 07h00 to 17h00 daily. There was naturally a space left for the bombings and then afterwards they would resume the propaganda with pamphlets. They no longer needed the toilet paper.

And at night it was the war canons. We wouldn't sleep. For a person to think of changing clothes or to take a bath, we wouldn't know when the Portuguese troops would be there or when a bomb would be thrown. We had to withdraw the women's detachment into a distant zone and just leave the male guerrillas.

So the food was prepared at a detachment away from the base. Food would only come at about 18h00. We would eat hastily and would save the leftovers for the morning. During the first days, the colonial troops were occupying and combing the Bush, because there was no time for nothing. Our Bush wasn't that easy and we knew it well.

If a colonial troop column was pacing, we would first see the reconnaissance aircraft. If we were nearby, we would back away. It wasn't easy to foresee when the Portuguese troops would arrive.

And our clothes, our *sacuduns* . as we called them, were with the distant women's detachment. We only had our own clothing worn in our body. We slept in shelters because the Canon bombings at night were deafening all the time. A shell could fall into your hut, that's why we had preferred to use the shelter system. With our jerseys, of course, but just that, it was by force of the circumstances, we had no choice.

We had a system of liaison, we used to call them liaison officers, the fastest way of communication with Nachingueia, even in times of peace. You would send a liaison officer which today would normally would take some 3 days, at that time he would take a day. And as the Nambilau area was practically blocked we would have to go via Massasse, which was easier to communicate with Nachingueia.

In war this is never missing. Just to mention a fact that should have been initiated, the fight here in the South had all the materials placed in Chicoalacoala, but the Guy who was our agent was a double agent. Had we not uncovered that, I would have entered and be handed out.

The important role of the WD was that of transport of materials because normally the transport was done by the population. But most of the population had been dispersed during the NÓ Górdio operation.

Thus, the role of the WD was very important in the transport of materials. They were with us and had no other alternative and played an important role in the transport of materials.

It wasn't an exclusive task because of them were engaged in combat work.

– *Can you remember anyone of them Manuel ?* Many of them kept Malé names being called Manuel, Felisberto, but Filomena Machava was one of them, Marina Pachinuapa.

Naturally, during those hot spots they had to interrupt the specialist centres. Some schools, like the Provincial School, had to be transferred into another zone because there was nothing could be done other than to do combat work. It was unthinkable to give classes.

As I said, the shooting was from daylight to night and in the following day with constant bombings, with no time for the teacher to give lessons.

The elders, yes. But it wasn't that necessary because in our internal organization we had the guerrillas, the militias and the local forces and it wasn't necessary to mobilize the students. Naturally, one or another could have participated but it wasn't necessary to mobilize learners and teachers to combat work.

Well, some things were destroyed. The Makonde had some habit, even without a war condition, of not placing the granary next to the population. We would always arrange some site so the Portuguese troops could not discover its location.

Even during that period, the population would have been mobilized by the commissars not to neglect the hoes. At night, at some time, they would have to do something to avoid dying of hunger.

No, in Cabo Delgado it wasn't the case because when the struggle erupted in 1964, the populations were used to go to the *machambas* at night. One couldn't go during the day, because they feared the aircraft, so they worked on the fields at night, it wasn't taboo.

And it was from then that Kaulza de Arriaga realized that he lost the war, that was the greatest gain. And in the following years they tried to do helicopter operations but it was clear they had lost the war and in the following year in 1971 when he tried to advance such operations the result was his resignation. The greatest gain was that he could not dismantle the bandits, the *turras* (short for terrorists) in just a few days. It was a sign that the *turras* had won the war and that was a great gain.

They would open roads but they were all mined. They would return with new roads but these would also be mined. There were areas that even we feared to tread.

There were so many mines laid that even today there are still great demining challenges in Cabo Delgado. Anti-vehicle mines, anti-personnel mines, all those are difficult to de-mine in Cabo Delgado.

There were some we brought but we had our own weapons depot...you can't imagine...such things.

We could have even lost a lot because it was a depot with a lot of weapons, but we were also committed not to let that happen.

It was a time where there wasn't a Tanzania, there wasn't a Mozambique. The only difference was that the Tanzanian troops never crossed the border to support the struggle. All of the logistical support for the guerrillas to cross the border coming from the other side, the border protection was all from the military.

Thank God, it never happened and even when they used to say that the Cubans were there, we didn't have relations with Cuba, we didn't have good relations with Cuba. When Che Guevara, who led Guinea-Bissau in some operations wanted to do the same, our leadership refused their offer.

So, then they started to say that we were vain, what not, that we were refusing the Cuban revolutionary assistance. I only knew Che Guevara when I came to Dar-es-Salaam from the hinterland and he happened to be there. We had never had Cubans in our midst.

And my head was at stake. Not knowing why, we had photos of ours.

In Cabo Delgado I had no name of war. These names of war were being used more often in Tete and Manica e Sofala. I only had a war name when I went to the Soviet Union to take up a Science course. Machel had already decided when he thought that once the guerrilla war is over we would have to train cadres for the regular Army, to come, occupy and progress.

That's when I held a war name which was Nelson Bamaia but why this name. If I was to die someone wouldn't know I was Bamaia. My relatives would call and say that Bamaia was the name of my grandfather, Nelson Bamaia. Because Machel had decided that troops were to enter, beat and occupy, because we had liberated zones, the ambushed zones would have isolated the administrative posts and the intention then was to expel in those posts and for us to occupy the liberated zones, as it happened with....where all the soldiers were captured when it was occupied.

Yes, of course. We had the problem of entering into the 4<sup>th</sup> sector so we started to progress into the 4<sup>th</sup> sector.

The 4th sector after the road, then after Misava it was the 3rd sector after the Montepuez road, Porto Amelia- Montepuez, so the 4<sup>th</sup> sector was after all that. The struggle had progressed a lot at the Tete line. Tete dropped to Manica e Sofala and were headed to Inhambane.

The *bosses* saw that and decided to put an end to it because they felt we were advancing and it would be prejudicial for them to allow the struggle to advance that down south.

Imagine what could strategically be a defeat reaching Lourenço Marques, all those Shangana in Inhambane, Gaza....that naturally hastened the Lusaka accords.

We were already having operations in Cabo Delgado with some 300 guerrillas. We would rid bases, enter their barracks I don't know where. Not shortly before Chongo. More or less in the beginning because we weren't meeting with Raimundo Pachinuapa and they were telling that the *bosses* were opening a road to the Mozambique Base, which was the main Base. So we suspended that meeting, Amado Chongo at the time was the chief of operations, I was the DDP (1<sup>st</sup> Provincial Defence). So we went to the base that had already been occupied by the *bosses*, we descended between Dial and Sacal and it was during the crossing that he triggered a landmine. As we were close and he was a member of the operations, and I was the DPP, we were talking.....those distances.

So the leg was gone and I was affected with the explosion. I didn't feel it immediately and proceeded. He was transported to Tanzania, I continued with my leadership work without knowing that the whole of the 70 had been affected and I finished therein. In 71 I was providing a report to Machel obviously... with my eyes red they sent me to Dar-es-Salaam.

It was then when they diagnosed me a traumatic cataract which was developing very rapidly and surgery was decided. The operation took place and the cataract brought the need for spectacles.....

The OAU at the time was supporting, in addition to other partners and they then noted that the war was becoming serious. It was supporting everything as well as the Government of Tanzania.

So I was operated and our medical doctor told me that I could not return to the war zones but I had to return in 1973 to Muende, Niassa, but these are other stories. So when I arrived in the Soviet Union, they put me these implanted lenses. It was in July, they operated me to use these implanted lenses for normal spectacles. The implanted lenses.....supersede...the 4...of the crystalline...in the hand.....were implanted in 1974.

At that time, it wasn't the one desired by Machel to control the regular Army; and when I arrived there they didn't want me to train with such type of spectacles because I was not fit for military service, so they sent a message to Machel. But Machel wanted me to do the training and I had to continue.

There were 2 stages. The first one was a battalion command course for 8 months, and then some of us were selected to advance to regiment level which was in Moscow, since the first one took place in the Ukraine. I don't remember many of the details, it was as the Police Academy teachers.

I couldn't return like that. 1968 was an historic stage of our Party, we started to define 2 lines in our Party. A revolutionary line and a reactionary line. The revolutionary was represented by Eduardo Mondlane, strongly supported by Samora Machel and his cadres.

The military part which was the main part was at the time in favour of Eduardo Mondlane. The other part was led by Urias Simango which was supported by Nkavandame. What were the characteristics of these two lines? The Nkavandame, Urias Simango & others wanted us the guerrillas to be organized into large groups in order to raid the enemy posts. Guerrilla takes a lot of time for independence and it would require the guerrillas to attack the barracks. That was an adventure.

The other line supported the continuation of the guerrilla warfare in a prolonged war until independence.

They wanted to oust Eduardo Mondlane at the II Congress and wanted Urias Simango as Chairman and Nkavandame would be the Vice-Chairman.

So, the revolutionary faction won. Mondlane was re-elected. Simango continued to be the Vice-Chairman, but things didn't go that well henceforth.

... II Congress then they forced a meeting..... and from there the Government chiefs, the secretaries disappeared. And they were replaced by the political commissars in the leadership.

So Pashui's mandate died there.

The environment became tense when we went to the II Congress and became aware that there was a fight to oust one and replace him by another. As we were supporting one, we had to avoid that from happening.

But it happened...the pressure...Chairman Mondlane was re-elected and so was Simango (as Vice-Chairman).

It's very simple. If the *chairmen* of Cabo Delgado were pro-Simango, Mondlane would not leave the place alive. If they themselves didn't go to the Congress to claim the Congress to take place in Cabo Delgado, would Mondlane survive?

At the last part, one opted for (the Congress to take place in Matchedje, Mondlane would have not survived...from the Party was Chissano....I don't know, it was for the Central Committee to decide.

The preparation of the II Congress in Matchedje was something that surprised everybody. They talked a lot about Cabo Delgado, and suddenly it Matchedje, Cabo Delgado.

At that time, they weren't many foreign delegates in the Congress. The very few that were already in Dar-es-Salaam were only travelling in small aircraft in Songwea.

In the last day of the Congress, my God, there was naturally some interest. We had a tough time; the Congress was closed and the air force came. But the first aircraft were merely reconnaissance airplanes...so, hey, it was to run, run, run, comrade and they were able to finish the food that had been prepared for the dinner...but we...

In the following day, Matchedje was razed by bombings, but the Congress had already been closed and they only destroyed huts.

It wasn't necessary, the congress delegates had already crossed the border, it was a matter of jumping...to Matchinse. In fact, I went to Cabo Delgado, I was the head of training and political commissar in Nachingueia, but it hadn't be registered because it had been only recently created....

So we volunteered to perform the mission in Cabo Delgado and I ended staying (there).

... he might have liked it, when I said that I was going to replace, he might have liked. At the time he might have had the power to nominated me for Cabo Delgado

...

To complete the Nkankomba mission, which was a supervision task, where the political commissariat was already meeting, so.....Nachingwea would have been nominated to return to.....

On that matter I have to say something. My greatest luck was that the Makonde liked me. Even today, if I travel to Cabo Delgado I'm praised. The Makonde like me I don't know why...Cabo Delgado, as the whole of 69, we used to call it the avenue.

The large detachments...there were a lot of operations, we tried the number of.....it happened in each detachment, the task of occupying the large territory by the same detachment...you can see that, can you?....it was a larger territory and we were lucky to establish the detachment.

The Mpua detachment had 370 or so, with 30, with 50, the rest created more detachments, we were occupying the territory with....not to accumulate many freedom fighters into one single site, because there were patrols. They all had subdivided the provincial base. The provincial base was a colossus, we had to disperse the provincial base, by creating bases Mozambique A, B and C.

Now it was Lidimo, of the security, there were great changes being made...guerrillas, commanders to determine the freedom fighters...in the hinterland of Cabo Delgado, I'm not talking of Tete.

No, Machel then ordered some to do some internship there to render support there, it wasn't necessary, we were sufficient.

I personally had, because there was this meeting of the *chairmen* after they boycotted the Congress. I appeared in Cabo Delgado and they never appeared. The *chairmen* were replaced by the political commissars in the detachments that were going to occupy the districts.

If that meeting that they demanded with Eduardo Mondlane had (taken place) in Mutara. Mutara is in Tanzania, they never came back to Cabo Delgado. When I came in, I had nothing to do with the *chairmen*, and because of that I had a tough time. That wasn't an issue.

We had a meeting in Naquimane, Samora Machel came in he was in hinterland in Cabo Delgado. We had a meeting convened to Naquimane for the 3rd February. I left the Beira base where I was stationed and went to Naquimane where interesting events happened. In Cabo Delgado they call the *mafura* nut a Chindulo. I looked at it then ordered to be removed. The Makonde consider it to be poisonous, the soul of our parents, that's when you are in mafura. So I arranged a pot and ordered to be filled with hot water.

My security man took it and put it on a fire, he wanted to know. He looked for the President, who was not yet President, he was still a Deputy, but that nu as eatn here in the South.

The most interesting thing is that Pachinuapa was keen to go with Samora Machel. Samora Machel also picked himself some mafura seeing that it is eaten in the South. I was provincial secretary in Cabo Delgado and, as Samora was in his place of birth, we and o be with him.

But they didn't arrive in time for the meeting of the 3<sup>rd</sup> and at night the radio reported the tragic incident in Tanzania. So I left immediately in the morning to the border because it was closed.

I had also already heard and that meeting didn't take place, the militias were informed, they then opened the border and I crossed it. I arrived in Nacingueia, the commander of the Tanzanian battalion arranged for an aircraft and I went to Dar-es-salaam.

It was a shock, I was going to Dar-es-Salaam from hinterland to visit my uncle's home and to hear about his death was quite a shock, as you can imagine.

The Makonde are very strong, they are sensitive but very strong. The best contribution we could render to Eduardo Mondlane was to continue with the struggle. I could, myself, think of deserting, but if I was to do so, I would be betraying Mondlane's ideals. He died for this cause, to continue this cause.

For me to answer to a journalist and not to an historian, I would have to say the following. It's a question about security. As you are a historian, I can't answer that question. That's a question about security. Do you really think that when a great leader is lost it would be due to lack of security, both from Tanzania and from us?

I didn't arrive in time, so I just went to see the grave, with all those issues of crossing and not crossing and then to arrive, after arranging for the small aircraft from Nachingwea to Dar-es-Salaam. Three days, because he was buried on the 5<sup>th</sup>. It was 3 days, if I'm not mistaken because I arrived on the 8<sup>th</sup>.

*A luta continua*, a pronouncement made by him when he visited Cabo Delgado – meaning the the struggle must go on. I was the one who organized Eduardo Mondlane's visit to Cabo Delgado, when he went to do that rally at Rovuma. At that time, I was still a Machel moved around quite often.

We walked, walked, I was already tired and told the story about a movie I saw about crossing the desert. A commander ordered the entire platoon to be awoken. But a soldier said: "I'm tired, commander, I don't want to do nothing". He killed him. You cannot say no to your commander. To say, not to write..in the foot...he was tired. Then he even sent jerseys. We used to play football in Cabo Delgado, so he then sent us Benfica's jerseys, as I am a Benfica fan, so he sent Benfica jerseys.

There was an interesting event. Went to Play a football game for the first time in the following day. If you know soccer, you know that when you hadn't played for a long time and then you play, your muscles become stiff in the following day.

All tight, to go Down they gave me some water to take a bath. In the morning at 9h00 the comrades went to attack the old base and I forgot I had a painful muscle. I walked, moved, organized this and we went to camp in a certain place.

12 hours later, we went camping and I still climbed that Hill at ease. At 17h00 the airplane already had overflowed and I had to go with my comrades to the base. My muscles refused to work, one person this side, another on the other side, a third one at the front to avoid me slipping, I couldn't walk. I believe that if there was another shooting...I would have to run again. I couldn't walk in the morning, but when the aircraft appeared, I walked at ease, I even climbed the hill, though I had to be assisted when descending. But if there was another shooting, I'm sure I would run again. They were Ngungunhane bases, Sande was in one of these teams, still alive, if I'm not mistaken, in Nampula, but Sande died, what a pity.

We used to play football under the mango trees, it wasn't a championship between the bases...no,no, we didn't have a calendar of football matches. We at that stage even thought of playing in an open field, but that didn't happen because the boss....

We wanted to play in the open.

The training, the men allocated for the operations had to receive training, because we had to train the men as we wanted to use them in the operations. Other than that, there is not much history to tell.

The training chief was from the camp, then Machel decided that I was to go to Mwembe. And a battalion was formed in Niassa, so we were prevented from putting our things, and I said to the chief we should have not gone, but this was to accompany the President. But at that time he had no war experience. So Machel asked me to accompany him.

So then I went and like the Bembe. I had never climbed a mountain like that one, but I learnt how to climb it. At one stage, when the helicopters were hovering around, I stopped with my backpack and wondered if they could discover me, so decided not to climb nor descend. But fortunately, they didn't spot me and I proceeded climbing.

Scenes, I lost my wonderful lighter which was offered to me by Marcelino dos Santos. I left it in my bag, which was left Down Hill and I forgot it. There was no time to remember such things.

Then I left Niassa after being called to return for that course in the Soviet Union. Guebuza was also in the Soviet Union, he was the one who had the radio to listen to the BBC news. He was in Portugal and returned hastily to become the Minister of Home Affairs and I who...

He interrupted his course, he was in the same course as I, but then he became President !!! No, I'm joking.

No, we didn't return, we returned directly to Tanzania but then the airplane took us back again, and we no longer stayed in Tanzania, I was a *guntransitor*

... people related to the operations, throughout the entire war I had always dealt with operations and it looks as if I love it.

Any Chief of Staff needs operations, and at the Chief of Staff Department there is a department that deals with operations.

The Portuguese soldiers no longer wanted the war. You know that better than I do. ...to accept to hand over the weapons, the whole barracks to surrender the weapons.... What is that area from Zambezia called? I forgot it, it's close to the border. On the 17th December, there was this meeting between presidents, the President was taking his cadres with him. On the 16th December, it was that meeting of the Presidents which we went to Dar-es-Salaam, i.e. meeting between President Nyerere and Chairman Samora. We stayed there, we had no role to play.. We were there just to form part of the team.

We returned on the 15th in our Boeing 707 and at the airport there was a group of dissidents camped to attack the presidential aircraft. They were located near the railway there were there to attack the presidential airplane..

So, I was to stay with the people on that fateful day. Joaquim Munhepe informed the General that it appeared some rebellion was taking place at the airport. Thank God, the ambush was thwarted because I had to accompany Samora to the airport and not to Mbuzine. It's true, the ambush was dismantled and the airplane landed safely. That's when Munhepe informed me about it. I was in operations, informed about what was happening in Machava, so I went straight into Machava.

I no longer went with the delegation to accompany the President, I went straight into Machava. There was a rebellion and there was a meeting. The head (of the division) boss wanted to know about the remuneration that had not been yet defined.

And the rebels were in a hurry, they wanted to be paid bla, bla, bla and the salaries of that month had not yet been paid... . So I had to go to the radio to communicate with my chief who was Macuacua. He came with a group to assist because he was alone.

Everybody was there and that was the informal communication. So he started to talk, he lied. He talked, talked and we then heard that weapons were being removed at the armoury, so I went there. The officer in charge was reporting that weapons were being removed and he asked that they be stored away. "Comrade chief that is not a good intention, get in your car and go away". "You are my driver!" They even broke a window of the car's door. Myself and Abel Sande had left our car in.....cotlo.cotlo.cotlo..., so we had no car and had to leave.

The meeting was scheduled for the following day. I was at home, I was staying at the time at the military quarters, house 2.0. So he said: "hey, that comrade is moving from Machava towards the city, he is armed and he is headed to the city".

I was about to have a meal I prepared, because I saw .....Ministry of Defence

I tried to call chief Mabote but didn't succeed, then eventually I got him. And I said:-"they are advancing comrade, they are already attacking, but we were able to set up barriers at Logistics, we've set up barriers at the Brigade because they were coming in 3 directions and are going to attack the airport.

So, we did all that. Sometime later they were already attacking the Chief of Staff quarters and from where they were coming, God knows.

So we've set up 3 posts, where the chief was already there, I was at central Beca and the ...at the Ministry. To tell you the truth, Mr. Alexandre, I didn't know from where those bandits were coming from, they were already attacking the *Triunfo* township with shootins etc, Then they left *Triunfo*, left the ground.

A while later there was already one dead at the entrance of the road to the airport, so I was ordered to proceed to Machava, I was at the Beca Power Station of Mozambique, proceeded to the Alto Maé police station and my car was attacked.

I reached the Alto Mae police station, pulled off the car, sorted myself and phoned the Chief and told him to proceed in the police car to Machava.

Believe me, Mr. Alexandre, when the bandits surrendered they arrived with weapons and (we wondered) who were they. You know, a rebel is a rebel, they could at the last minute still use the last cartridges and shoot, so we told them to lay down their weapons. They could still shoot to us.

But fortunately it didn't happen and that's why I'm still here. On the 17th December rebellion, we were there, they were staying in Machava, at the Machava jail, it was their base, so when they surrendered, they had to return to base and leave the weapons.

Could come back, curious, and trigger the last shot.

What argument? They didn't have an objective, as everything had been decided and defined that the salaries would start to be paid from October, they just had to wait, they accommodated themselves and were waiting.

Because we did the whole war without being paid any salaries. Ok, we understood. After independence it had been decided that we would be paid from October and we were awaiting. But we didn't have defined ranks for commanders, battalion commanders. We knew that each level of command would be paid a certain salary, but to hasten the issue would be tantamount to agitation.

I personally did not believe that (the rebellion) was the work of the bosses (colonialists). Rather, there were some in-fighting within our own midst, the Portuguese had nothing to do with it. I could be mistaken, though I don't believe it could happen.

I couldn't see the interest the master colonialist have to manipulate such a thing, with us illiterates. No, I couldn't see it. Not for those people, I don't believe so.

I have a name of someone who died there, I forgot his name, he was a good commander, I can see his face, but I can't remember his name. He probably didn't have a war name.

No, I'm an operations person, I would never do it. I would rather watch it like you Mrs. Historian, I would watch it on tv.

My greatest memories were when we, that is me, Salomão Mondlane and Romão Paulo, who later became a medical doctor. Dr. Romão Paulo died stupidly. When we arrived, Chairman Eduardo Mondlane was visiting Bagamoyo. Congua was still inexistent at the time.

When he arrived, they told him that there were these 19-year-old kids at home. We weren't exactly kids but, yes, they said we were kids He said he was going with me. So, I went to put my pants. I only had a pair of pants and when I was about to leave they were wondering where was I and then finally I entered into the car.

We reached Hosta Bein at his residence. Hosta Bein said nothing to me. He didn't speak to me then because we were talking about several things in Bagamoyo. They then showed us the place to take a bath.

After that he said – “your bed is here”. I didn’t know at the time that he was a lieutenant. We had just arrived, he introduced himself and said he would accompany me in the following day.

In the following day, I had to decide if I wanted to take a bath. I didn’t like to bath in the mornings but I had to. Had breakfast and he naturally asked me know from where I knew Mondlane and then he was telling everybody that I was his nephew that came from Lourenço Marques.

... yes uncle, I said yes, comrade Chairman. So he told me he wanted to return to the camp in Bagamoyo. We went to the office, the provisional headquarters. He entered into his study after leaving with me and I even bought a new pair of trousers. And then he ordered his driver to take me around so that I could also do some shopping. They took me to Bagamoyo.

After a while, he sent for me. He said he was surprised why I wanted to return while living under the training camp conditions, eating beans and maize food. I told him that’s what I wanted. I told him that he had fetched me, that I had left under those conditions, he had asked me if I wanted to return and I said that that was the place I wanted to be.

I said that I wanted to be there, waiting for new missions. At that time there was this thing of going for training in China, Algeria, and Mondlane was surprised when I told him that yes, I wanted to go back. I could stay for a few days, but I wanted to return. But it was good to wander around in his car at ease.

But in the initial moments there was always some fear, but it disappeared. – “Uncle, I need to go to the beach, so I want to borrow your car”. The driver was a Tanzanian. But there was no driver. The car was theirs, at home the car was theirs. If I asked for their car, I could drive it.

In Tanzania there is what they call the “learner drivers licence”. You may not have yet your full driver’s licence but the learning driver’s licence is a licence for a learner driver and I had this licence before obtaining the driver’s licence. So I would tell my uncle:- Uncle, I would like to use your car, if you are not using it”.

As you could see, we at Nachingwea had facilities. So that apartment was when sometimes once a year, we were there when in Dar-es-Salaam.

I had to correct myself, but on one occasion I had to invent a trip to Dar-es-Salaam, in the 3rd week I said I didn’t have to return, I had invented I had a report for Marcelo. I left to Nachingwea and when I arrived there, the film wasn’t in Nachingwea, it was in Dar-es-Salaam and I had met the chief, I had found the chief, and handed the report.

I thought of arranging a trip to Dar-es-Salaam. Remember, I had an eye doctor’s appointment and had a probe to be placed in my eyes, and that is when I had decided to go. Instead of taking the bus, go around Songwea, Mbeya.

Luckily, they got the plane tickets and I went to Dar-es-Salaam before I had gone to the tickets. I paid the ticket, and reported to the department...it was something like this: - Hi, comrade Candido is here....”. And I was worried, Jesus!

There was the 20h30 session and there was another at 00h00, there at the centre there must have been some 4 sessions. Luckily, I recognized that there were these sessions, when there was mission to perform, I knew about it, that was my luck. I never went to Tete, but went to Niassa, Cabo Delgado. Cabo Delgado was my home, but I don't know about Niassa. For other missions I even volunteered to do them, and that pleased my bosses.

We, in Cabo Delgado already had a press, we had typewriters. But later, as we developed, we photocopied materials. I used to draft a monthly report and naturally, if there was something urgent, as we had communication with Nachingwea once a week would first go via car no.8, then it was radio before the cellular phones. Suffice it to say that it was a zone deemed to be arid, formerly a camping site of I don't know what. ....It was me who made Raimundo Pachinuapa to get married.

If you could switch off your recorder, I could say something very funny

And to say, it's not tribalism, it's not species conservation. In the liberated areas we would call them mini-Mozambique, with many people coming from Beira, Zambézia, Songo, from that region itself.

Believe me, if you Mr. Alexandre would arrive in the área, we would not want to know from which part of Mozambique you were from, if from the South or from the Centre. And there was something that was partly facilitating that too. Many people, for example, would arrive in Cabo Delgado had already been in Nachingwea and, as such, would speak Swahili, if not speaking Portuguese.

We would not be concerned whether one would be from Zavala. You would be a new combatant who was being received. One would know about it later, but it would not constitute a prime concern. That concern, at that time, had been set aside. It later resumed but it wasn't existing at that time.

Oh, yes, you would leave Cabo Delgado tattooed and we would know you were from Cabo Delgado because of that. Other than that, no one would mind about it.

## Nalyamipano, Salésio Teodoro

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2008]

*Born in Mueda, Cabo Delgado, in 1944, he attended primary school in the Nangololo and Mariri Catholic missions where he concluded his standard 5, followed by the teachers training course in Chiúre completed in 1961. Amongst his school mates there was Tomé Eduardo, his future companion in the liberation struggle. Together with his colleagues, he soon started to manifest nationalist ideas through cultural activities. His father witnessed the Mueda massacre. Upon the completion of his training he taught in the primary schools related with the Nangololo Mission. Between 1962 and 1963 the youth mobilization activities intensified in his region. Already in 1963, one of his relatives, Lucas Macuáti, offered him a FRELIMO card which led him to flee and join the liberation movement in the company of other young people. Upon arrival in Dar-es-Salaam, two weeks later in August 1963, he was deployed to the opening of the Bagamoyo camp where, along with other companions, he initiated his preparation of the trip to Algeria. In that group were, inter alia, Daniel Polela and Oswaldo Tazama. He witnessed the return of the first group that trained in Algeria, led by Filipe Magaia. After six months of training, in March 1964, he returned to Dar-es-Salaam and later left to Kongwa as an instructor. In 1965, the group was transferred to Nachingueia, where he continued as an instructor and receiving new knowledge from the Chinese. He later was sent for security training in the USSR for a period of 6 months. Upon his return he was incorporated in the Department of Security and Defence. His first combat experience was in Niassa, between September and October 1966 in a battalion led by Filipe Magaia, who would be killed on his return of a mission. He led the training of the first group of the Women's Detachment in 1967. In the subsequent years he led the security sector hinterland in Cabo Delgado. He participated in the II FRELIMO Congress in Matchedje, Niassa in 1968. We got married in 1970 during the struggle. Escaped an air bombing during the Nô Górdio Portuguese operations in Cabo Delgado. After independence he served leadership duties at the level of security and defence and in diplomatic and peace negotiation missions in Southern Africa, having served as an Ambassador to Angola.*

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Well, I'm not going to detail much about Manu because I know that comrade Marcelino dos Santos, our baobab, will say it better. In Cabo Delgado what was really happening was in the gods' secret. Amongst the youth, myself for example, when I left in July 1963, we didn't know that there was MANU, I only received the membership card on the 15<sup>th</sup>, I can even show you my card. ...As that would constitute a reason for me to be arrested, I hid it in the bush on the 15<sup>th</sup>, so that I could take it on the 16<sup>th</sup> because there were many arrests taking place. Many had been sent to the Ibo Islands, the prison here in Machava was full. Because in the searches conducted by the Administrator, he discovered a bag with membership cards with names from people up to Mueda. Then, based on that, the *sipaios* (colonial native police) who knew the villages, had guided the administrator to search for those people and obtained everything about the leadership of what was then MANU. Everyone had been arrested, so it wasn't easy for someone to talk about it

To tell us, thinking we were naive. They wouldn't talk to us deeply about it. But in recruiting us they would say it would be to go study further; to improve our education, to become an Administrator, to be someone in the leadership of our Country. But they gave me this on the 15th, when they heard I was leaving, they gave me this card and that I should take it with me to Tanganyika. So, I did, but it was risky carrying along the way. Luckily, we went and crossed over and returned back with the card. The old cards were like this, written in English. Therefore, I'm not going to talk about Manu because I had heard about it like the others. It was a big secret, they would talk about it amongst themselves, about contributions, who would pay them, they were the ones who were sending the money to Tanganyika, to see how things were. Where I was teaching there was this catechist teaching to children. He was the link between the elders and those in Tanganyika. He was working with me, never said anything. He would say he was going to Tanganyika to buy things to sell here. He was also a tailor at the same time. So, he would, after all, not only take money but to bring back trousers, but I didn't know it. I only knew of it when he was arrested, when the Portuguese killed him in jail. His name was Inácio. PIDE killed him next to his home. There was a PIDE living there, who reported him as being the link between the elders and the Tanganyika people. He was arrested and killed by PIDE. They brought his cask to the village and I was at his funeral. That's when I learnt more about politics, early in January or February 1963. Inácio Malimbongwa, this name is a bit complicated, let me write about it to you....so, he was killed, so I knew little about Manu. He was a Taylor and a catechist, he was my assistant at the school where I was teaching; he was the one who knew, doing the things, and never told me, never spoke to me about that stuff because he would do everything cautiously. The Guy who betrayed him was Gaspar Anahimba. So when we would speak about politics, because the level wasn't enough to create a political situation, to see the country globally, but there we would see the number, the aspects of the ethnic group and which had actively participated in the Tanu movement in Tanganyika when they were preparing for their independence. They were very active, the Mozambicans there and the formation of this movement was precisely a copy of Tanu. The organization, and the names of the branches were a copy. They thought they could do the same, to negotiate with the Portuguese as the Tanzanians did with the English, like a copy of what the Tanzanians did, but not done here, then there was the Mueda massacre, there was no dialogue, so that is what happened in relation with Manu, what else?

– Today, what is today the Province of Cabo Delgado reflects ethnic problems between the Makonde and the Macias, to say that the armed struggle in Cabo Delgado had delayed a lot because the Portuguese were able to convince the Macias.

The armed struggle was being prepared by the Makonde to kill the Macias and people believed in it. For 10 years we couldn't reach Nampula, which is not far away, but we couldn't go across it because that was where the Macau group was. All of them had been...a great part of them were being concentrated into village settlements controlled by the Portuguese forces, by the so-called GEs. GEs were special groups, OPV (colonial civil protection groups), they were the ones who controlled the populations in the villages, which we created. They would accompany the population when they would go to the fields (*machambas*). On our side, when doing reconnaissance, and if footprints were discovered, these would be pursued, so we couldn't do our work and it was difficult to advance. That happened with my friends in Tete, as well as in Niassa so the rivalries between the Makonde and the Macias were so deep one can still feel them today and I can tell you that here in Cabo Delgado, a great part of it supports Renamo, because they're Macias. That's to counteract the Makonde who support Frelimo because Frelimo is from the Makonde. This all have to do with this thing of elections. We have to endeavour a lot in Mocímboa da Praia. In Mocímboa there are both Macias and Makonde. We have a great Job to do there, even in Pemba. Pemba has many Macias, we have to do a lot in Montepuez, in Chiúre, etc.. And why? Because of the rivalry that existed and still exists between these two groups so, if you ask me about the consequences, these were the consequences. The struggle in Cabo Delgado had not moved forward due to that. For that same reason.....those who were with us easily betrayed us. I must tell you, I tried to train some Macias to infiltrate and then they never returned. They remained there and, at most, they would lead the Portuguese troops into our areas because they knew them and would pass our information to the Portuguese. That happened and I had the names of those who did it. So, these tribal issues, comrade Samora struggled a lot, because he produced examples of people who died during the war. So, and so who had been betrayed by a Makonde or by a Macau, a Nungwe, Ajawa, etc, etc. He showed clear examples of treason. Dearly paid, so what could I say.

When this phenomenon appeared in 1968, due to differences we had in Cabo Delgado between us the military and the *chairmen*, not at the level of the population.



The people wasn't asking where we would come from. They would only see us as Mozambican soldiers, uniformed and armed fighting against the Portuguese colonialism That's all they were interested. So they would easily noticed that these guys weren't from Cabo Delgado, that they spoke the language because they had a direct contact with the people and were eating more than I did, when I sometimes felt hungry and they never felt, because they had good relationships. Their behaviour of the commanders was also good, they respected the people.

-In the II Congress. Firstly, to say that in February 1968, Chairman Mondlane visited Cabo Delgado. The first time we heard in February 1968 that the Comrade-President would come to visit the Province. We, the military, prepared ourselves. Lazaro Nkavandane, as the Provincial First Secretary knew about it and he convened his *chairmen* to tell them not to allow Mondlane's visit, so we said there were conditions for his visit. We would organize and ensure his visit to take place because there were serious issues between the provincial leadership, the *chairmen* and we the military. We were the ones who were leading and who were making the war. We were the ones who knew the enemy's behaviour and knew who could allow someone visiting the Province and how we could guarantee the entry of any leader, to do his work and to leave the area.

So, the *chairmen* didn't want Mondlane to come to the Province without their permission. They felt they were the ones in charge, they were the ones that had the power, while we were saying that we were the ones instead because we were in a war, we were the ones who had the weapons and we were the ones who were in command. And we said that Mondlane could come in and we organized it all. Lázaro Nkavandane took all of those who were *chairmen* to Mtwara, Tanganyika, all of them were in Tanganyika. He left the Province without *chairmen*, everything was under our control, we thanked and occupied the positions and Chairman Mondlane visited the Province. He had his rallies with the people, where he said in the end: "yes, now I can die". He said that after the rally: "I can die because the revolution is rooted in the masses". This in February 1968 when he was leaving the Province by the end of February, on and about the 28th, when he crossed the Rovuma River, on the 28<sup>th</sup> February 1968. It was the last time I spoke to him. He asked me what was the material necessary for my work. I gave the list, etc,etc. We spoke about the security, at the bank of the Rovuma River.

So, after all, both the *chairmen* and Lázaro and Urias Simango had a plan to organize a congress because they were challenging Mondlane's leadership and that Mondlane was to be replaced by Simango. That's when they drafted a document requesting the organization of the II Congress in order to elect a new leadership. We had access to such document and it was circulated to all the provinces and Samora Machel was the head of the DD at that time and he came to Cabo Delgado to ask the military wing if we wanted the Congress.

We replied that neither the Congress nor the elections were deemed as priorities at that time. The priority for us was the combat work, to fight further to enhance our areas and only when the right conditions existed could we organize the Congress. We drew the attention to the fact that the constitution contemplated the 5-year election period, this could not be strictly followed during war time, we had to be flexible, otherwise the fight would have to continue. That's what we drew the Frelimo's leadership attention to.

And the matter was in debate to the level of our forces and people and, eventually, Chairman Mondlane decided that the congress was to go ahead so that people wouldn't say he didn't want it because he didn't want to forsake his power. He was very prudent and very humble. He knew his own capacities and the capacities of others in terms of organization and leadership, as well as his influences abroad which we didn't have to obtain support for a movement which was still very young.

It was from then that he started to organize the II Congress and we decided that the Congress would take place inside our own country because there were conditions therein. Not in Tanganyika, we refused Tanzania because we knew Lázaro Nkavandame, as well as his *chairmen*, had the support of some Tanzanian ministers, and in any event they could afford Lazaro's protection, they could commit murder or any impediment, etc. to stop the organization of the Congress, while we could organize it peacefully in our own country.

– As both Lazaro Nkavandane and Urias Simango had been identified as the leaders of the disorganization in the Province of Cabo Delgado, the Executive Committee or Central Committee at that time, decided that Lazaro Kavandane not, but Simango was to visit Cabo Delgado, so that he himself would appraise the situation in Cabo Delgado and to mobilize the people for the war. That was when in April 1968 Simango led a delegation to Cabo Delgado. In that delegation there was the old Dhlakama, Samuel Dhlakama, their secretary was João Baptista Cosme, my cousin. He was the secretary, taking notes and everything else. If you speak to him, he can tell you better, but the objective was to commit Simango with the people and I, unfortunately, acted as interpreter in the rallies from the Beira base to the border.

– Zacarias Assiculava, Calisto Migigo and myself therefore, were representing the Provincial leadership and we accompanied Simango's delegation... Have you finished? Can we continue? The trip lasted for a week. During that week we travelled from Beira base to the border, where there shops, cooperatives, where Lázaro Nkavandane also had his own, called Lipudi Kavandane. He had his shops, without Frelimo's knowledge. And once in Lipudi, Simango met the *chairmen* and came up with the demand for the 2<sup>nd</sup> Congress to take place in Lipudi. João Baptista Cosme has some notes about that.....

As a summary of the meeting. In the last day I was expelled. He prevented me from attending the summary meeting because Lazaro Nkavandame told me that. We were all with the *chairmen*, the four of us and their secretaries and assistants. The meeting wasn't starting, all quiet and so Simango and Lazaro were seated there, when Simango asked Lazaro to talk. He said it wasn't yet time for that. He would speak in Swahili then translated into Portuguese by me. He said that in that meeting there were people who weren't supposed to be there. Simango asked who? Nobody knew. I was seated there calmly, as I was part of the Provincial leadership and thus entitled to be there. Lazaro then said: "It's this one here.." and pointed to me, I'm was not supposed to participate in the meeting. So then Simango said: "Comrade Silésio, you must leave..". So I said. Yes, he called me like that. It was normal to do so. So I left and went to sleep and three of my colleagues remained. They spoke of trivial things but they were also expelled. They wanted to meet with only the critics, so then they remained with Simango and Lazaro and then planned to draft the letter demanding the realization of the II Congress and so it happened.

- So both the Portuguese and everybody else knew the meeting would take place in Cabo Delgado, because Cabo Delgado had better conditions, in terms of security, protection, food. Even the enemy knew the meeting was going to take place in Cabo Delgado. It was the best venue for FRELIMO. That's why the Portuguese intensified their bombings in Cabo Delgado, in the liberated areas, every day, from morning to sunset. Bombings because there were infiltrated agents in Frelimo and the Portuguese were monitoring closely the problems being experienced at Frelimo. So the decision that was taken to hold the meeting in Cabo Delgado was known to the Portuguese and so, at the last hour, it was changed to Niassa while we pretended it would take place in Cabo Delgado to distract the Portuguese from Niassa. That was the reason why they chose the remote areas where there was nobody, and all that was prepared hastily, and the force deployed to protect the Congress was sent from Cabo Delgado.

Raimundo Pachinuapa was the Secretary, he was the head of DD and the force went with him. In this case it was Raimundo Pachinmuapa, and not to know who was the company commander. Raimundo Pachinuapa led the forces that protected the leaders, especially of Eduardo Mondlane and others, so if you ask me what was the reason for that, the reason was the ambition of Urias Simango to become the Chairman and he used Lázaro's influence with Chairman Mondlane, because he was well respected. Mondlane would not start any meeting without him, he used to call him Zé Lázaro, and the latter abused his trust, respect and the people was with him, as well as important people who could decide. He allied himself with Simango. Kavandame was very intelligent and smart. Yes, he appeared to be a soft man but he was smart, did talk too much, but a great speaker. Whenever he spoke everybody else would be quiet and would listen to him.

Lázaro was a good speaker so when they ask what was the problem I would say it was because when the congress was to be convened, the *chairmen* had met in Mtwara and they didn't attend. They stayed in Mtwara with Lázaro Nkavandane while the others organized the Congress from the outset to the end. And what happened in the Congress, those who went there in Matchedje know that in the last day the site was bombed. People knew the location because they had the information about the site much later when the Congress had already occurred for 4 days.

- In 1968 many had deserted from our forces, the armed forces. There was some disorganization. The *chairmen* were responsible for such lack of organization. They used tribalism and were saying that the soldiers that weren't from the area were to return to their own provinces and that the chiefs then had better conditions than the military, that is, the language of the enemy was being used by the *chairmen*, they were acting as the Provincial spokesmen for the enemy's propaganda and supporting desertion and some of them are still abroad, they are in Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda still to date. Some of them have the cheek to come here to collect their retirement benefits and still live in Tanzania because they formed part of the struggle.

- Urias Simango wasn't a peaceful man, in spite of being a pastor. He was a pastor and a good speaker but not a peaceful person because he had his ambitions and this was exposed through his hypocrisy, he was an hypocritical, one could notice it in his talking and in his eyes, in his pretending, he pretended things, what he was doing was because he was forced to do to please somebody, and he would only keep his truth with his group. Some of them are still around, live here. All I can say is that there people who deserted Frelimo when Mondlane died. Some chiefs are still here thanks to President Samora Machel who invited them here.

-What I saw of LIFEMO's work was the support it rendered to the orphans and children of those who lost their lives in the struggle. LIFEMO would then take care of these children, that I saw in Cabo Delgado and which was more developed when the OMM was formed, as LIFEMO was then developed across the entire country. Many women didn't know that we had such an organization, it was more known in Dar-es-Salaam and at the border where there were women refugees and when there was some knowledge about LIFEMO. But inside the country there was no LIFEMO. No one knew and it all developed when the OMM was created, because there was already a definition about the tasks for women. The task of mobilizing, the task of transportation of materials, social services were the purvey of the OMM and that was seen when comrade Josina Machel took charge of the organization and was often seen in kindergartens, formerly known as orphanages. The name orphanage was removed and changed to kindergarten because these would be a bit confused with orphans. It was not just for orphans but to children of combatants that were at the bases and it was our spouses who were working there.

When things became more organized in Cabo Delgado we had a creche centre where the entire leadership, our forces, as well as the Party leadership played an important part in ensuring that children were fed and had the conditions to study. That was due to the schools that were established with teachers for some of the kids that were in kindergarten and today they are now graduates here working I don't know where. They don't recognize us, they have graduated in our universities. They are people who are looking after themselves, so that is what I can say about Lifemo.

- At Frelimo we weren't allowed to marry. They would say that marriage would bring a double burden. The first one was because you would have a wife, and children and then had to face the war also, so the war was a priority and that's why no one would think about marriage. But this stood for years and our leaders started to marry. Marcelino dos Santos, Chissano got married and the President said that it was time to get married. So, the first started to get married. In my Province, the first to get married was Raimundo Pachinuapa. He got married in 1969 and I got married in 1970. He ordered me to marry, to get married on the 1st January 1970 at the Central Base. He married at the Beira Base and I at the Central Base, we had to form our families. But even with marriage life wasn't easy because no one was living with their own spouses. We wouldn't live with our wives in the hinterland. At least I didn't. My wife was at the creche looking after children and I was at the base. On the day of our marriage I left after the registration. I had to leave because President Samora was coming to Cabo Delgado and I had to receive him at the border.

There was a party, we danced mapico and there was good food. To feed the officers, soldiers, there were tables for the leaders, surely no joke. My godparents were Calisto Migigo and his wife, he was a political commissar in the Province. His wife was called Helena Miguel.

- [In September 1974, with the negotiations happening in Lusaka] We were in Montepuez after our trip from Niago and Balma. We were staying and sleeping at the Administrator's house, we wouldn't sleep at the barracks. The Commander took us to the barracks for a brief visit. Later, the Montepuez Administrator called me and told me that Radio Lourenço Marques had been taken and he was phoning his relatives in Lourenço Marques to find out what was happening. At the same time we got a message from President Samora Machel ordering us to advance into the hinterland of the Province to reach Nampula because at that time the Portuguese Government, the Portuguese President António Spínola was in favour of the occupation of the LM radio station. So I read Samora's message

And our radio listening post in Cuamba had also captured the message where the Portuguese commandoes had heard of President Samora's message, so the Montepuez Battalion Commander wanted to know what the President had said in his message. I had to tell him that the President wanted to know if the Portuguese troops on the ground were supporting the events in Lourenço Marques.....

– In Cuamba, our radio “Voice of Frelimo” was being interfered by the local Portuguese radio communication centre in Cuamba, so it was controlling all our messages...so they intercepted the message and informed all the Portuguese forces. The Commander was confused, so he asked and I replied to him in that manner. He wanted to know what was the spirit of the commanders on the ground, but he didn't know I was lying to him. So, what did I do? I met with my colleagues. We didn't ask to leave, we suggested that they allow General Domingos Fontes to leave....because he was coordinating the activities in the troop advancements. We had been with him in Montepuez for him to communicate to our troops that were in position in Mueda and elsewhere, to order them not to attack the Portuguese barracks because their leadership was not supporting the occupation of Radio de Lourenço Marques. So they believed us. But our intention was.....for Domingos Fontes to convey to the others and for himself to lead the forces beyond the Lurio River towards Cabo Delgado. General Domingos Fontes, and later the Battalion Commander and the Special Troops Commander, major Belchior accepted our proposal and arranged for three trucks loaded with commando troops to escort General Domingos Fontes to the Ancuabe District... and left him there between Porto Amélia and Montepuez in the Bush. They left him there alone and then he went towards the area where we had our B11 detachment. The, in the following day I received a request from the Battalion Commander for my group to go to Nampula to speak to the Chief of Staff of the Portuguese Armed Forces. I refused, because I didn't have that mandate within the scope of my mission. If they wanted to dialogue with us they could come to Montepuez to talk. That said, in the following day the Chief-of-Staff sent an officer, whose name I can't recall, from Nampula to Montepuez with 3 aircraft. One in which he was travelling and the other 2 for escort purposes. It wasn't easy to determine his rank because he didn't wear his insignia. We spoke with him and suggested he should go to Dar-es-Salaam in his aircraft in order to dialogue with the Frelimo's leadership. He refused and preferred that we ourselves leave Montepuez to Mueda and from Mueda to Dar-es-Salaam to send the message...(?)...Frelimo and we accepted, the return to Mueda...

After all, the aircraft were for us...to go to Mueda. They took us to Mueda, with the two escort airplanes. My aircraft took me alone, so I was flying in the middle with the other two on each of my sides escorting to Mueda. When I arrived in Mueda, I received a message from General Chipande. He was in Lusaka, this after the 7th, 8th and 9th of September. General Chipanda sent a message to Mueda prohibiting the return of my group to the Beira base and for us to await for him in Mueda. The Portuguese commander brought me the message which I read but I didn't believe in it. I thought this could be a trap. We could be held hostage, seeing that the Radio taking problem had not yet been resolved, also to say that a part of the troops I took here had been in ...??..

- Exactly, it was to take the Montepuez commandoes to go down (to LM) and when those who were occupying the Radio's premises knew about it they asked Beira airport not to allow the landing of these aircraft. So, once in Mueda we stood awaiting...Indeed, when the General went to Lourenço Marques and they had retaken the Radio, he went to Mueda and met us there and it was from then I never went back to Beira base to date...and when General Chipande arrived he told us about the mission where we had to proceed to Nampula, but on our way to Lourenço Marques. That said, we left Mueda with him to Nampula and waited there for a week. Our troops who raided Omar, we took some soldiers here, so that was the first battalion to arrive in Lourenço Marques. It was that force that came here, with comrade Chipande, comrade Jacinto Veloso, comrade Panguene, myself, Pedro Juma and others in that group. We slept in the airport, I don't remember where, and then we were transferred to what is today the Ministry of Defence. We stayed there for a few days because there was no space for us and the situation was still not very good and the troops who were coordinating with us were the Air Force, because it was the only force accepted by the people of Lourenço Marques. It could move freely around, so we used their vehicles and, in that way, we could do our work in the suburbs, mobilizing the population not to react, just to stay calm....because there were a lot of killings, cars and houses destroyed, etc. They were to stop all that and...comrade President Samora Machel, after the taking of Office of the Transitional Government wanted to appoint me as, according to him, the Police Chief.

I had to ask to go to Dar-es-Salaam to tell him, the comrade President, that I was unable to lead the Police and he then advised me to receive the material, at least, until he would appoint someone to lead the special forces. I stayed here at the City Command to receive all that the Portuguese Police had. That was easy because those who were in Command were Portuguese military staff. It was a Colonel and I received the material and at the same time he gave me the mission to select a group of new recruits that were in Boane to accompany me to the GDR, ex-Democratic Republic of Germany. The objective was to train our Police in all branches of security, immigration, Ports and Railways and Criminal Investigation (known as the PIC), all 4 branches.

So I took this group in February 1975 to the GDR and we returned in June on the eve of the proclamation of our independence.

One part of the force that protected the proclamation of our independence was that one that received training in the GDR, while the other part had been trained in Tanzania, in Nachingwea and after that...or rather, before that, comrade President Samora Machel had appointed comrade Osvaldo Tazama as the General Police Commander. He was the one who received that force I brought along and then I continued working at the Ministry of Defence in the Intelligence department. So, together with comrade Jacinto Veloso, I coordinated the work of intelligence collection and worked with comrade Chipande who, at that time, was the Minister of Defence. No, he wasn't the Minister of Defence during the Transitional Government, but rather he was working in the joint military commission. Our action was coordinated by him and after independence I continued to work in the sector – known as the DDSL, before the independence. Afterwards it was then the Ministry of Defence – SI (Information Services). So we did that work and in 1980 the comrade President then decided to create the Ministry of Security in April 1980. – the previous interview Will say that it was in April 1980. Jacinto was appointed Minister and I was his Deputy and held this position for 11 years since 1980 until 1991 when I asked to resign and leave or to change as I was feeling a bit tired. So then, at that time, the President was Joaquim Chissano, in 1991, so I moved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where I worked for 1 year and in 1992 I was appointed the Mozambican Ambassador in Angola. I stayed in Angola for 6 years until 1998, finished my mandate and returned home and retired. I'm now residing at ...??>>> performing my Party's missions since 2001 to date. So, this is my part, now you can come up with your questions, I forgot some others...?.....those details we shall see them later.

## Nkunda, Paulina Mateus

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2007]

*Paulina Mateus Nkunda, born on the 23rd March 1952 in Muidumbe, district of Mocimboa da Praia, Province of Cabo Delgado, residing at Bairro Central- Maputo.*

*Paulina explains that there were various facts that played a role in the development of her nationalist awareness, with an emphasis on the conversations she and her sisters had with their father, the work of mobilization and the sale of MANU's membership cards, the Mueda massacre and its consequences to the lives of the Nangololo populations in particular.*

*Having been able to flee from the Portuguese captivity, Paulina and her sisters initiated their flight to Tanzania. A time when the armed struggle had commenced. It was during this journey the family met again with the father who shortly after was killed by the Portuguese. A week after his death, Paulina was recruited by Aleixo Napatima to the ranks of FRELIMO in Muidumbe, where she played the role of a militia member for a year.*

*Early in 1967, the group of Paulina Mateus (25 girls) went to Nachingwea where she arrived on the 4th March, a delayed arrival due to the debate that was developed within FRELIMO, and between Frelimo and the Tanzanian Government about the role of women in the military field, to pick a weapon and to fight.*

*Upon return to Nachingwea, Paulina continued her work as the Secretary of the Women's Detachment, political mobilizer and as a combatant – she participated in the response to the Portuguese attack to the Nampula base. She returned to Nachingwea where she played the role of the Leader of the WD, on security, and it was in that capacity that she participated in the II FRELIMO Congress.*

*In 1971, she returned to Cabo Delgado leading the WD for the creation of conditions of the 3<sup>rd</sup> sector for the advancement of the war in the Province of Nampula. In 1974, upon the end of the war she was deployed to the Province of Zambézia in order to mobilize the youth to join the Army and the Police within the preparations for the independence. Paulina Mateus Nkunda is currently the Secretary-General of the OMM. The reading of this testimony is interesting.*

Thank you. I wanted to say the following: I'm currently residing here in the City of Maputo at Rua Salvador Allende. I'm currently the General-Secretary of the OMM (Organization of the Mozambican Women) and I'm working here at the OMM's headquarters.

On paper I'm married, but I am a widow, I am still a widow, my husband died and he was also a combatant in the national liberation struggle.

I say that he was a combatant because he was in the national liberation struggle. He was a national liberation combatant. And during the national liberation journey he was a military instructor, he trained many freedom fighters to the struggle. And after the national independence he remained as an Aide-de-Camp for President Samora Machel.

And after the intensification of the destabilization war he remained attached to the Province of Niassa. He is from the Niassa Province, where he died two months after the Peace Accord.

Well, as you know, I am Paulina Mateus Nkunda, I was born in the Province of Cabo Delgado at the then Administrative Post of Muedembe, District of Mocímboa da Praia, then and after.

I was born on the 23rd of...1952 and, as I said, at the aforesaid Post of Muedembe. And I attended, I can say, I was baptised and christened in the Nangololo Mission and it was in that mission I started my primary school studies in 1960, when I was in standard 1 in Nangololo.

I was living with my parents, my mother was a housewife and my father was firstly a bricklayer at the mission and then he was a catechist there.

As I said, in the 1960s, when I was in Standard 1 I saw the Mueda massacre and when the priest left the mission with the holy water in a morning after we left the church we were at the fields (*machamba*) ploughing the beans of my sisters. The priest left and went to Mueda at about 10h00 and we were at the hall when we saw him returning.

But when we were at the fields we heard roaring noises in the direction of Mueda, but we didn't know what was going on. At our tender age we had no idea what was happening.

But at 10h00 when the priest came back he went to the school, where we were boarding, and there was one of our school mates, during the break. He sent for her, her name was Maria Rita. He informed her that her father had died in Mueda and asked her not to cry because one day she would meet her father again in the Kingdom of God. And we saw our colleague desperately crying.

We all ran to her with some curiosity to know what was going on. She spoke in her Makonde language saying her father had died in Mueda, that he had been killed and then we all went into the dormitory, where she picked her clothes, luggage and left the boarding school.

And that was it ! The priest talked and calmed us Down saying that there was nothing to worry about. Something had happened but we were to continue to study, there was nothing ! So we stayed but by the afternoon, at 14h00, the troops started to come. Not only to the mission as also everywhere, in all villages of the of the plateau. The army was looking for those who had been injured in Mueda.

And they were enquiring more and more for the injured but the people refused to answer. The truth was that some of the injured had already been at the villages and the villagers had the healers attending. They took the injured and hid them in the bush for traditional healing, and fearful that if they were caught they would also be killed. So they preferred to hide them away and asking in each village not to inform about the presence of someone from Mueda. And we continued in the Mission watching the movements. The army used to come in, even during the Sunday mass. So during that time there was no quietness in the plateau.

But then the situation changed and when we went for holidays our parents told us about the Mueda massacre.

And me and my sisters, our father used to tell us that one day there will be a war in our country. At that time, we used to hear the expression that this land was not of the whites, this was not their land. One day they would leave and that was the reason why they were ill-treating us, because the land was ours and not theirs. One day we would do something to force them to leave.

So when this massacre occurred we would also wanted to find out from our parents. And they told us that this was it, that we had asked peacefully to be granted independence. They shot us and killed us. And we saw how they responded after we peacefully wanted our independence.

And we continued to follow the developments. At that time MANU was doing some work in the Cabo Delgado Province, and everybody knew who was MANU.

And, as I was saying, in the area there was also work being done where the elders were mobilizing groups of associations towards the production of cereals, ground nuts or sesame, cassava and others. But this type of work fell under the political context.

The colonial regime always had its agents within the populations and was always looking for information about these events in the plateau. They had also infiltrated their agents in the communities to report on the organizers of any activities and that's how some elders were being arrested, of whom my father was one of them.

My father had been arrested for three times but then always further released. In the last time he was arrested he was accused of organizing a movement against the Portuguese Government. They accused him of organizing people to produce things so that these could be sold and to gather funds to buy weapons.

And my father replied:—"Mr. Administrator, you are causing a lot of problems here. Every day we see the *sipaios* in the villages arresting people because they didn't pay their taxes. So, as we do not have money, the only way to mobilize the people is to organize them into associations, to produce things to be sold, to have some money to pay the taxes, so what is the problem?. If it's a mistake then we can stop."

So he thought it was a good idea and told my father to continue with the other colleagues seeing the money was to really pay the taxes. And my father was released and that was the last time he returned home.

In 1963 we had a problem at the Nangololo mission. The priests were doing retreats from mission to mission. But this time they had to do it at Nangololo.



In the missions in the plateau, the chaplains were being taken from the Army to be incorporated in the missions. Their task was to obtain information from the confessions, to see what sins the people were telling in confession.

So we had chaplains in the Nangololo mission to spy on what developments were taking place.

And so they came during our retreat there. And one day Father Daniel, who was from another mission, left and came back at 16h00 and went down the mission, where they would say they were going hunting to get meat for the retreat in the mission. But that wasn't true. The truth was that they would go to a place like a backyard mountain where the elders and the young ones would meet and plan the sale of cards in the villages.

So all that activity was planned at that mountain so they (authorities ?) were informed by their agents about it. So they wanted to confirm if that was logically the site where people would do their planning.

So they descended using binoculars and with weapons under the pretext of going hunting. So they observed the site with their binoculars and found that there were objects in the site, such as: pots and others used by the group to work there, while there was nobody there. And indeed there was nobody because our informers also advised us of their intention so people only left there some objects. People had already left the site when the priest arrived there to check on this type of activities.

So then he returned after confirming that there were objects but no people there. He returned back to the mission passing the information to the others and then they planned to go to another area to better confirm the site.

So they left in the following day, this time without Father Cornélio but rather Father Daniel and they passed a village called Kunamumba and found people there. The village told them that the area there didn't not have game for hunting but rather where from where they were returning.

The priest was accompanied by two persons. One was called Ernest and he used to beat the drums in the Nangololo mission during the *luba* mass. And a Mr. Agostinho Nantea who was working at the milling section of the mission. So they went down the trail but always accompanied by our people to check if they were really go hunting.

So they went down the trail and reached the site where they thought they could see if someone was there. They pulled off their binoculars but again they only spotted some pots and other materials and no people at all, because they had already left.

But I heard that unfortunately that they went down that trail and when they left they were ambushed where they went down. When they passed, they were seen pacing under. Indicated to someone to find out what was happening and understood they were hunting them. So he returned first to say that they were checking and looking for them.

So they stayed there to ambush them. When they returned they reached a place, shot and killed an animal. But as they were coming they thought it was a gazelle but it wasn't a gazelle. It was a fox, so they left it and continue to walk and returned to Kunamunha where they left the car to go to the Nangololo mission.

So they then fell in an ambush where Father Daniel was murdered. That gentleman I mentioned, Mr. Ernesto was shot and the bullet was lodged in his throat. Mas he managed to flee like the other colleague Agostinho in another direction and the priest was a guest in that mission. He didn't know the region and died.

But when he was murdered he wasn't known as a priest he was known as the chief of post of Muedumbe. So after he was killed they took the binoculars, cut a bit his hair as to be shown that they had killed the chief of post of Muedumbe.

The information that night after the 20h00 ran across the entire plateau. And they were saying to everybody in the plateau to flee to the downs because the war was going to start because the chief of post of Muedumbe had been killed. So, at that night everybody started to flee and the entire plateau remained people in the villages, everybody had fled to the bush.

I was at home, my father had just arrived two weeks before from Dar-es-Salaam because my father had an uncle in Tanga, Tanzania. He used to call my father to guide him to hand over cards. He called my father both before and after the unification of FRELIMO and my father would receive instructions for the work to be done in the zone. So this was the period, as I said, when my father would attend meetings underground, for the sale of cards and would come from the mission for holidays at home. My father used to take me always to these meetings where cards were being sold. So I always started working with my father at that time.

So on the day of Father Daniel's death, after we fled we stayed the whole night in the bush until dawn. At dawn we received information from those who were living in the periphery of the Nangololo mission. They weren't able to flee because they were too close. The priest asked all the others to go to the villages so the communities would go back to the villages. One person had been killed but it wasn't the chief of post of Muedumbe but rather Father Daniel, so the people could go back to the villages.

After 10h00 in the following morning a bomber aircraft appeared and overflying the plateau and the downs and asked for permission from the priests to bomb. The priests replied they could not allow that because the person who had died wasn't a colonial authority, but rather a priest.

They replied that they were educating people about peace, to kill was a sin and to bomb would be a sin. If they permitted the bombing the mission would be unaccepted in the Mueda plateau. So then the aircraft returned to Porto Amélia and the people started to return to the villages.

I was with my father, we were far away and we didn't have any information about having to return to the villages. So then my father, at about 16h00, said that we were to try to return and to obtain information close by. So we tried to return and as we were close he hid us in a hideout. He returned and went to see his old cousin Nhoca. He told my father that he was wanted and that he should not leave the Bush because his colleagues were saying that he was the one who killed Father Daniel with his niece. So, he was being wanted and would be killed. So we did not return to the village where we were living.

We remained in the bush and sometimes would go to our house, without being seen, to fetch some food and then return to the bush.

We would go to the *machambas* to pick some cassava and other things and then return to the bush and vice-versa. We lived altogether in four zones. The first zone was in our house, where we stayed for a month, but then the people uncovered us and reported us.

The troops were about to come to where we were staying with my father. Three days later that uncle of my father came to tell us that we had to move that same night, because the troops would be there soon because people had reported us to be in that area. So we then moved to the 2<sup>nd</sup> zone, where my married sister was living. My sister received us and hid us in the bush and she would every day come to bring us food.

But as I said, this was it. We were uncovered and they found that my sister was hiding us and they reported that to the Muedumbe Post. They then planned it, came to my sister's house, took her one night. And we had four days because when my mother fled she was nine months pregnant. So we stayed for four days after she had the baby and my baby brother was always crying at night. So then they came to fetch my sister.

Mateus, the late Mateus. So then they came to my sister's *machamba* so that she show where we were staying in the bush, so that we were to be captured. But she would walk and walk around the fields and in that day my brother didn't cry, when my father lit a fire there.

As I was saying, my brother didn't cry that day, and the fire we lit was extinguished and we slept. ....So, he came and so my father was the only one snoring....so when we reached that place the troops would stop my sister. ....someone was snoring, so my sister had a 1 year child, her daughter, and would say it was her snoring. She would say, it was the girl who was snoring.. So the troops would listen and then say we could go....then they would come again and say the same thing again. . On the third time, the troops would say to go home...but then at 8h00 they would come to fetch...for us to come during the day. They returned with my sister, then they went to Muedumbe.

My sister at 6h00 in the morning did nothing and left home running. She found us, took daddy, to show the trails she walked the whole night looking (for us). They had said they would come at 8h00 to fetch daddy and the best would be for us to go to another place. We then started to move from the Muedumbe area to Mocímboa da Praia, Nangombe mission, where my maternal grandparents were living. We moved in that same day.

So, my sister's husband.....my father said:-“no, my daughter I'm not going to leave you, otherwise they will kill you. WE will go together”. As we were talking, my sister's husband arrived He told us to go with him. He would plough the fields to cover out tracks, where we were lighting a fire, so the troops wouldn't find traces of our presence there.

So we left and arrived in the following day in the Mocímboa da Praia area close to the Mbove mission. When we arrived, we were received by my grandfather? Then he said he didn't know what to do because the Mocímboa da Praia 's Administrator had told all *régulos* they had to report any person arriving in the area and to bring their identification documents. Only thereafter would such persons be allowed to stay in the area. So, how could that happen if we were being chased by the authorities?

But my grandfather said he would take a chance. So he hid us where he was going to plough the fields and he was feeding us. But at that time it was hunting season and many hunters used to visit the area. They ended up discovering us and reported us to the local *régulo* saying that a man with his wife and children were spotted in the bush. They had said we were wearing long hair and looked scary and they didn't know who we were. But the *régulo* was a friend of my grandfather and knew that the area there in the bush belonged to grandfather. He came to speak to my grandfather and my grandfather told him the truth. And said to him:-“now you either report me or you don't. It's my daughter, she's with her husband. What must I do?”.

So then the *régulo* told him:-“I'm also asking you not to put me in trouble. Ask your son-in-law to leave this zone and move into another area before people.....because those people who are seeing you will talk before I report (to the authorities). I can be in trouble, so they must move into another area”. Then my grandfather came to tell us and my father agreed to leave and to move elsewhere. He said he would go back to the same area he was living with his family, to where they were born.

We left the area towards the Mwela River and there we were received and they hid us. We stayed there for a month but then people locally saw us and went to complain. They reported us saying that we were in area x, at such Bush area. The troops left Muedumbe looking for us. When the troops reached the first village the people ran to inform us.

We left and crossed the Mwela River, at the Namaua area, as it belonged to the Mueda region and the troops couldn't move there. That's why we moved to... So they reached that area. When (the troops) arrived they found the uncle (?)...the niece of that gentleman who was hiding us there. And he told them that we had been there, that his uncle was hiding us, but that we had left to area x, at village x which was at the Mamaue region. He told them that we were going there and we wanted the uncle to take us there. That boy (the niece) then took the troops to find us in the village. But in that day, when they found us we were preparing our supplies because my Dad had decided to take us to Tanzania. He would then go back to join his colleagues.

They arrived at about 14h00 and we were finishing having our lunch. One of my sisters-in-law was at the front and she saw them, so she went into the house to where we were at the backyard. She had picked up clothes and told us to run away to the bush but it was impossible because the troops had already applied the tactics of silent raid and had surrounded the entire village. Outside the courtyard in each house there were already 2 Portuguese soldiers. At the courtyard my sister-in-law was already there trembling with fear, so she dropped the clothes into the fire. The clothes were burning but we tried to pull out the clothes to avoid their burning but it was too late, the clothes had already caught fire.

There was a *sipaio* in Muedumbe who was a tough *sipaio*, his name was Constantino, his name in Makonde was *Antataualo*, which translated in Portuguese would mean "not going to have independence". So he came with them (the troops) and in the middle of the village he started to fire shots in the air to scare everybody in the village...Waaa... The troops didn't fire any shot, only him, a Mozambican, born locally, but behaving in that manner.

And he started to say:-"come, come, come here all of you in the village. Come here to the middle. Don't you know that this land has a master? You say, you are going to have independence, where are you going to be independent? Come here to see me, because I *sipaio* of Muedumbe, I'm Constantino and you Will know who I am.

So all the people, men and women, children came out and sat at the middle of the village. And the troops then started to come out of the places they were surrounding the village. Then Constantino asked: -“They are Mateus’ children? Where is his father?”.

He had come with another *sipaio* called Cingano. This *sipaio* was a member of Frelimo, he had received his membership card through my father. He came to fetch the two little ones – my brother, who is now a policeman, my sister, who is now a nurse. He took them, they were very small, one was 5 years old while the other was 2 years old. He took them to the entrance of the village. WE thought he was going to ask them to show where Daddy was hidden away.

But he told them not to say where Daddy was, even if they were threatened with a gun. -“They won’t kill you, so don’t tell them where your Dad is”. He then took them back and handed them. He showed who were the daughters, and they (the troops) took us together.....The troops stayed put but he came to ask us (what we were doing?)....He then told us they were looking for our father because he Cingano was our legitimate cousin.....he wanted us to tell where was our father. For us to remain a family we would have to tell him where was our father, otherwise we would cease to be a family of him. We told him we didn’t know the whereabouts of our father, but Dad was nearby in the bush, together with our mom with the child, the new-born brother.

So, when my father heard the shot, he picked my mother and crossed the River Mwela and went to hide away elsewhere. He later approached close to the village and checked if the troops still had been there.

The troops never asked us any questions. But Constantino did and we told him we didn’t know where our father was. So, then they arrested all men and women in that village. They were tied to one another and to the necks, like in the case of the slaves. No one was to be left loose and had to be tied up in a row.

Then they all left the village moving towards Muedembe, with the troops ahead followed by the population.

Constantino came back and took two suit cases and forced the lady who was the landlady of the house we were living, and my sister’s mother-in-law, to carry the luggage. And he said: - “Come on, let’s go, you are 6 children which means we found the entire Mateus”.

So, when we arrived the troops wanted to know where he was taking us. He said that we were all the entire Mateus family and were going with him. We started to walk and when we reached the creeks, the troops all jumped onto the other side by themselves. But Constantino held all the tied-up prisoners and wanted them to be used like a bridge for him to cross, threatening them if they let him down.

He was carrying a machete he took from one of the houses in the village and started walking and climbing, sometimes trampling over some heads while crossing the river. The colonial troops would do it by jumping alone onto the other side.

At the village before we left there was a cousin of mine who had come with my father in the day before and slept over because he was tired and sleepy as he had travelled the whole night. Constantino took a knife and cut Marcos' (cousin of the interviewee). The troops upset and had to stitch Marcos' hand and to medicate him, from their own medicines. Their medic was treating him, tying his finger and a trooper covering him with his uniform, and threatening anyone who would touch Marcos because he was his friend. He was the only one with whom we could walk without being tied up.

We then reached the last village towards Muedumbe, when we left the Sagal area where they told us to take a rest. We sat down and it was about 14h00. One of the troops, who had taken an assegai from the houses in the village, approached us and pushed it against my sister, who is a nurse, against her throat to pierce it through, and we started to cry and shout.

But then there was another soldier, nicknamed "25", who saw that and he ran to grab the assegai and fought to remove it from the other soldier. The commander came and wanted to find out what was happening. "25" explained what happened and the commander decided then to throw everything away and ordering this never to happen again. Took the soldier away and then moved with the prisoners ahead of him. He took "25" and "24" – they were nicknamed and called according to their military numbering. One at the forefront and the other at the back with us put in-between, the soldiers were guarding us, all the way.

So we continued walking until we reached a river called Muatide. This was a place where the waters hit hard and make a lot of noise. We normally, at the plateau, call this *cutangoumede* – a place where the waters speak because of the immense noise. When we arrived there the soldiers had already passed before, with their footprints shown on the sand, and then they had left.

These would traditionally be called *vacacavaxilo* which, in Makonde language, would mean the night brothers [designation given to Frelimo].

They had been there and realized that the troops had been combing the area to arrest people. So, they then moved upwards to ambush and we were moving there.

When we arrived, the troops went rushing to drink water in the river but then they noticed that there were trails and started to run. As we were tied up, we didn't know what to do, we didn't have knives to cut the ropes as this would allow many people to flee. But we were all forced to run behind them, without knowing why we were running, while they knew because they had spotted themselves.

So we went, we climbed the mountain and walked for a while and reached the village of Kunamunba, where there were some vehicles parked and who had come from Muedumbe. The vehicles were parked there to proceed downwards. There we found that gentleman, the niece who indicated us where we were and where the entire village had been captured waiting for us.

Then the troops begun eating their combat ration. They brought some parts of the rations and offered to us, but prohibited us from sharing them with the lady that was the landlady, who was our mother-in-law. The food was only for us, Mateus' children. At about 20h00 they made us get into the vehicles to proceed to the Muedumbe administrative post. So we climbed into the vehicles, we were prisoners and the vehicles were 3, all escorted by the soldiers to Muedumbe.

When we arrived they took us to a house. Muedumbe was an administrative post without a jail. But they took us to a house which was an outbuilding of the chief of post's translator, called Olindo. This house was at the back, they took the fire out and placed us there. Included were us and women from the village of Cunalinda. All had been arrested and the house was full, with the children separate. We could hardly breathe, the house was stuffy. We tried to lift our heads to breathe but we couldn't. We raised our smaller sisters a little up in the air for them to breathe. It was all a confusion, with shouting at night, people desperate to breathe.

So, in the morning they would open the doors and we would come out. They would give the elders hoes for them to plough in the farms of the administration. We were Young, I was 12 years old at the time when we were arrested with my sisters. They would give us all, Mateus' children, dry cassava to be scraped because it was a little darkened after Sun dried. We were staying next to the women who would go to the farms (*machambas*) and then return to grind the maze to cook the flour to feed all of us.

One day I was fetching water at the administration building to provide my sisters with water to drink. I bumped into the chief of post and he called me and asked who was I.

I replied I was a prisoner and that we had been arrested on day X , by military company X acting in the zone. He then sent for the commander wanting to know why the arrest and he replied he didn't know, because it had been at Constantino's call. Constantino knew why they had arrested minors as he was the one who brought them. They then sent for Constantino and he explained that it was all about Mateus Nkunda who they were seeking because he had killed the priest. He said that we were his children who could indicate where he was. The Chief of Post then convened the trial date for Friday. This was now on Tuesday, the day he spoke to me. I went to tell my sisters that the trial would be on Friday.

We continued to stay there and heard every night about the trials by the Chief of Post. At the end he would either execute the prisoners by shooting them with a pistol, or he had a big dog to kill them. And then in the morning some women prisoners would fetch sand to cover the blood and then to wash it out and let the Administrator work. That's where we were tried when it came to our turn.

They interrogated us, and asked if we knew where our father was. We said we didn't know his whereabouts because he had already abandoned our household with my mother and he was feeling sick and when to see the healers for treatment. And we didn't know what type and where the healer was based. I said we were school pupils, we had been on holidays and went to seek for our sister. Then troops had arrived to arrest us at our sister's house where she was living with her mother-in-law. It was difficult for us to know where our father was.

So, the Chief of Post found in favour of us and ordered our release. He ordered my sisters to leave the room and asked me to stay. I stayed alone and my sisters left the room. But they started to cry because, there by the place where we were drinking water with the troops this *sipaio* Constantino had told us that, if he was a White man, he would kill us to take our flesh to give his wife to cook for him. So, my sisters thought that I would be killed because he would ask the Chief for permission to kill to eat the flesh. So, I stayed alone with Constantino and my sisters had gone.

The Chief of Post then asked Constantino to take me to his home. He asked him to take two of his daughter's dresses, some soap and a pair of shoes and to give them to me because from that date we were no longer prisoners. We could take a bath at the river, wash our clothes and then to stay at his translator's home for him to meet us later.

So, I then left with him ahead of my sisters crying and I told to go to the place we were living as I would meet them there. I went to get the clothes and returned to my sisters and told to go to the borehole.

We went there and returned at about 15h00 and had lunch. At 16h00 the Chief of Post arrived.

As my sister was married, she had children at the house we were staying. He told my sister he was going to marry me, that I was going to be his wife. He said he was going to travel to Pemba to get rid of his wife and he wanted to marry me and that they were going to be his sister-in-law.

He said that from then we would be going to live with our dad and that he would come to visit us. He then ordered the Police car to accompany us. They bought some rice and all the household necessities and put them in the car. He then told the sisters to go and to leave me. I started to cry and said that if that was what he was ordering then my sisters might be killed by the soldiers. I asked if I could go with them to make sure they arrived there and since he was going to be there on Sunday, to the Nangololo mission as he used to go, he could fetch me on his way home. He agreed, I entered into the car with my sisters and we left to go home. We did arrive and stayed at home, they left and we slept.

In the following day, while we were sweeping in the village and had lit the fire, we heard people running and shouting: - "let's go! Let's go! Let's go!". We asked why.

- "*Régulo Kavanga* was killed today at 8h00...".

We fled again with the so-called *vacacavaxilo* (brothers of the night), but this time not to faraway. We hid ourselves in the bush, close to the village. And at about 10h00 there were people saying that it was *régulo Kavanga* and therefore there were no problems. Everybody could return back home.

So we returned back to our homes and we sat to meet on Friday. On Saturday my sister said we were to prepare our supplies because she had once been to Tanzania, when she was a girl. We decided to go to Tanzania because we didn't know where our father was. On Saturday we begun preparing our supplies in order to travel Saturday overnight to Sunday.

At 1 am in the morning my father was arriving. He knocked at the door and said it was him. He asked us to prepare because we were going away. We asked how did he know we were there. He said he had a dream about his late mother who told him to go home and fetch the kids because they had returned home. And if I delayed until Sunday, I wouldn't find Paulina because they would take her. He said he came without being sure because it was all a dream but since he found us, we had to. My sister told Dad that in the following day, on Sunday, the Chief of Post would come to fetch me so we had to really leave. So, we left that night with Dad directly to that area where they had captured us. From there we left to another house of his cousin.

He [the *Chefe de Posto*] came to the mission to pray and upon his return he went to the village and didn't find us. He started to search all over in the bush and, bad luck, there was a man opening the gate to allow the goats and chicken to roam.

The man didn't know that the troops were there with the Muedumbe Chief of Post and he was arrested. They asked him where were we and whether it was us who killed his wife. He answered that he didn't know, he was there just to do that job. They then took him with them to Muedumbe and released him two days later. They had concluded he knew nothing about the situation.

While we were already far away with dad, a week later after we returned to where my father was living, the national liberation struggle had started. We went to a zone where my father's cousin was staying. And my father was arrested by the enemy agents at 18h00 at night and was killed.

In the following morning we left my father's family house and went mourning his death to my mother's maternal family. We stayed there and from then we remained orphans of my father.

Two weeks later my father's niece appeared. He came to fetch me because during my underground work my father had always asked his friends that if he ever died his daughter Paulina was to continue her work. That's why he was always with his daughter because he had no other elder child, because the latter had died in Dar-es-Salaam and I only had a much younger brother.

So, I was the only one to be there. Aleixo Napatima was to fetch me, we went to the Muedumbe District where the militias were and I went there in that capacity. I stayed there for a year performing the functions of militia member.

By the 2nd year I was transferred to the post in the Muedumbe district, locality of Muedumbe, which was the Ndenga locality. And I remained as a militia member in that semi-liberated area. I continued to do my work there. And by the late 1964 I was already building the Mozambique Central Base where we were living. And by that time there was the possibility of forming the Women's Detachment within the Army because there were militia members within the districts. So there had to be also women soldiers in the Army.

So then, at that time, Raimundo Pachinuapa, Alberto Chipande, Ernesto Covelo and the late Justino Nacamanga came to a meeting with the population in the Namunda area. So, they came to our zone for a meeting with the population and came to the place where I was located. We left with the *chairman* of our locality for this meeting, because the population in this zone was under the control of this *chairman*. We went there, we participated in the meeting and upon our return Chipande asked the *chairman* if he could find a girl that was literate, to be with the others at the central base for the women's detachment to become its Provincial Secretary.

In that locality I was the only woman who was literate though I had only standard 3 primary school.

So, then they said: - "There she is. You can take her". In that same day I travelled to the central base and stayed there for 4 weeks the base wasn't completed yet and all those women that were to form part of the WD were at that time concentrated in the Nampula base where Ernesto Ndupa was the commanding officer. So Chipande told me not be alone in the central base under construction. I was supposed to be with my colleagues and would come with them to the base. So, they gave me a liaison to accompany me to the Nampula base as the Nampula detachment had been deployed there. As I was to arrive there would have come 12 girls from the 1st sector in the locality of Chude and also comrade Filomena Nachaque and Marina Pachinuapa Were in the group.

So we arrived and stayed at the Nampula base. And I started to perform my duties in order to familiarize myself with the work as the Provincial Secretary.

So I remained as the first deputy secretary of the Nampula base. We were working there and doing the roster for the sentries by shifts, drawing up reports, records of weaponry of each soldier leaving the base for a mission for better control. And we stayed for 2 months in the Nampula base.

Upon the conclusion of the construction of the central base we, as a company of the WD marched to the central base from the Nampula base.

At the central base there was a river division and the WD base was at the other bank of the river. Our base was called the Ibo base attached to the central base. I stayed there performing my duties as the provincial secretary of the provincial base of the Women's Detachment.

And in the 1960 I could say that when we arrived here, we started more or less with political commissar Paulo Samuel Kankhomba running for us the political classes, while we were receiving military training, though all in the Arabic language. And were doing the training, attending also the political education classes and also doing work normally with the other male colleagues for combat work, sentry duties, all that work done during the national liberation struggle. But my function was always that of the Provincial Secretary of the Women's Detachment in the base.

In 1966, chief DD Samuel Magaia visited the central base of Cabo Delgado and he found us doing our entire work at the base. He asked if we had received military political training. They told him we had only received Basic training. From he took all our names, of all the women at the base to Tanzania. We continued to work in the base.

At the Central Committee's meeting it was then decided that all women should have also undergo political and military training by October 1966. So, the list he took was returned to the base with the message that the 25 girls were to undergo training in Nachingwea to gain experience.

After training they would be able to perform the work properly, so all women could undergo training.

So, all of us 25 girls from Cabo Delgado went with our chief being Filomena Nachaque, and Marina Pachinuapa, as the platoon's political commissar and me being the platoon's secretary. We went to Nachingwea and arrived on the 4th March.

We arrived on March 1967 in Nachingwea. We remained at the border for a long time because of internal conflicts. Firstly, the Tanzanian Government had a sour experience when they obtained their independence joining men and women who started to clash with each other. And then amongst ourselves. In the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique there was a group that was saying that we were violating our tradition that the place of women is at home and that they couldn't take up arms to fight, nor to hold the flag and thus they could not undergo training.

So, it took us quite some time at the border where they were trying to divert us to the M'twara Province for us to work in factories and to learn so that later in an independent Mozambique we would come to work in factories. So, we then told them that we didn't want to work in factories and if they didn't want us to train then we would rather return to Mozambique to continue to combat the way we were doing without training, as we deemed as the main task to liberate the country and not to study and complete courses. We said: -"If Mozambique doesn't become independent in which factories are we going to work?". So from there they accepted and we entered Nachingwea on the 4<sup>th</sup> March.

After we arrived, we stayed for a week when Chairman Mondlane came to have a meeting with us. He mobilized us and he saw how tiny and slender we were and they told us that it would be better if we could go study and then to get training. We told them that we wanted to train and to do combat work and so the Chairman acceded.

We had 2 Chinese instructors. One of them would translate into Swahili after the principal would talk in Chinese. Our Mozambican instructors would then translate because most of us 25 girls wouldn't speak Portuguese – only me -all of the others would speak Makonde. So, then all our training had to be translated into Makonde.

So, we started our training with marching, individual attacks of a soldier, firing range and then we finished.

The Comrade Chairman came to inspect us because each company, each platoon after the training would be inspected by Chairman Samora [Mondlane] to check if we were ready to move forward to Mozambique. He came to inspect us and he saw we were all well prepared and granted us a month's leave.

So, he took comrade Marina Pachinuapa and Filomena, to give a lecture at the Mozambican Institute in Dar-Es-Salam. And myself, Filomena Loconi and Manuela Clementina, Mónica Clementina were taken to the Tunduru educational centre to receive the 45 girls company coming from Niassa for training. Because after we concluded the training started to open up and our colleagues from Niassa had not yet some elements about marching. So, we had to prepare them.

We were there for a month to prepare and brought them to Nachingwea camp. When we arrived, we also stayed for a week, Chairman Mondlane came to attend our pledge of allegiance as this had to happen to all companies leaving to combat. We pledged our allegiance and I was to remain at the base because they had chosen me to become an instructor.

My commander refused to let me go because she said she had none else literate enough to be a base secretary and that I had to move. So I moved again to Cabo Delgado and stayed working at the base. Two months later I was deployed to the third sector to mobilize my school mates in the Nangololo mission for them to join the Army. I did my work and then returned to the base.

Upon my return to the base I was chosen for combat where the enemy had entered in the Nampula base and, as it was a greater force, the base had requested for back-up. So, some of us had to leave the provincial base to reinforce our colleagues and attack the enemy and avoid it taking up the Nampula base. But the distance between the two bases was great and we had to climb mountains after mountains and running to support our colleagues.

When we arrived, the enemy had already entered the base and set it alight and left. We searched for our colleagues and found them where they had hidden themselves. As the road to the base was a normal path the enemy would follow to seek us, we sent a company to set an ambush while they were passing. They suffered many fatalities and we also lost a comrade.

We then stayed in the Nampula base for a week in case the enemy returned back to the area. Then we returned to the central base. Late in 1968 I was called again to Nachingwea and joined a small group of girls made up of myself, Gertrudes Daniel Fumo, Teresa António, the late Candida Cassimo and the wife of the late Mário Silva, as well as Teresa Simão and Mónica Simão. They put us to complete standard 4. Frelimo started to open up literacy centres hinterland and in Nachingwea and those who were more literate also opened classes. So, we then completed our primary school qualification with the standard 4 exams. Then my colleague Gertrudes was sent to Bagamoyo to proceed her studies and I stayed in the centre.

I was working in the security field as well as in the area of censorship of letters at the political and military centre. And then I went to participate in the II Frelimo Congress, as part of the security team. As you know, at that time there was this issue of the 2 opposing views about the fact that Chairman Mondlane not being fit to lead Frelimo because he was married to a white woman while we were fighting the white people. It wasn't making sense a person married to a White to be the Chairman of Frelimo.

So, there were quite some issues. Hence the issue that the Makonde could go to the Congress to kill Mondlane. So, me and Gertrudes were deployed to act as the Chairman's private security during the whole congress works. So, we were in Songueia waiting for the Chairman's arrival and then we proceeded with him to Matchedje where the congress was going to take place. We had to look after him for everything whatsoever. If he had to go to the toilet we had to go there first. In the case of food we had to ensure it wasn't poisoned. If he was to take a rest anywhere, we had to go there and sit with him or to check the area to ensure it was safe, as well as during the meetings.

We ended the congress in a situation where the enemy discovered its venue and they sent a reconnaissance aircraft we were already closing the works. We then picked up Chairman Mondlane and dropped him at Songuea so that he could leave to Dar-es-Salaam in the following day. And we returned to the base because at that time the DD chief was Samora Moises Machel and he prohibited any soldier to leave the base. We had to stay there until the next day to see how the enemy would react.

So we stayed but in the following day at 4 o'clock he ordered us to withdraw, to remain in the other (river) bank. We left where the congress took place, we crossed River Ntchindje which borders with Mozambique, Niassa and Tanzania and stayed there. Early in the morning, at 6h00 there were 7 aircraft bombing the site of the congress and when at 10h00 comrade Samora arrived, he ordered a soldier to fetch the comrade that had remained there as a sentry. We took them all, luckily all came out unscathed and they joined us. From there we travelled to Songuea and then we returned by car to Nachingwea, the military and political camp.

A week later, Chairman Mondlane came to the camp for us to do a review of the congress works and allocation of the new cadres to the Provinces. I, at the time, apart from acting as a security member, I was also the head of the Women's Detachment at the Nachingwea camp. All the women coming to receive political and military training were under my leadership in the camp. At the end of the review work Chairman Mondlane deployed me to Cabo Delgado to become the head of the Women's Detachment in the Province of Cabo Delgado, because both Marina and Filomena were illiterate and had to remain in the camp to study in the educational centre to raise their level of literacy.

So, I had to go there and replace them.

I received the orders and returned to Cabo Delgado. I worked in Cabo Delgado since 1969 until 1971 as the head of the Women's Detachment. And then there was a provincial meeting that appointed another head of the Detachment and I had to go to the third sector to be the sector leader of the WD in order to advance the war in Nampula. So, I then travelled late in 1971 to the third sector and stayed at the sectorial base in Manica. I stayed at the sectorial base, worked with all the comrades and evacuated war material into the fourth sector, including foodstuff, while at the same time performing combat work with our colleagues.

At the base I also had the duty to do literacy work for all the soldiers in the base. Why this decision? This decision was taken because we had realized the war would be prolonged from the II Frelimo Congress. When we started, we were all holding the view that the war would be finished in just a few months and we would have our independence. But after the II Congress we realized that the war would be prolonged for we didn't know how long. So, we had to prepare the guerrillas because we already had sophisticated weaponry, we had to have the reconnaissance and other important tasks. So that would also require some scientific knowledge for us to go forward. And that's when the question of opening educational centres came about, we needed to have nurses, and all that work.

So, I went there and started to do such work. In late 1973 I was coming from 2 combat attacks and then from there we went to raid the administrative post of Macomia. We raided mUagalde, in the Meluco zone and then, as we were returning to base, I received orders to go to Nachingwea.

So I returned to the base and prepared to go back to Nachingueia. At that time, the Comrade Chairman saw the need to enhance the political knowledge of the Party's cadres in order to improve their performance. So, he then called all the cadres doing political work hinterland, including some provincial commanders, to proceed to Nachingwea to participate in political courses.

So, I was included in this group to attend this course, and when the coup d'état occurred (in Portugal) I was still attending the course in Nanchingwea.

When the coup d'état occurred comrade, Chairman asked the course to be ended because he needed the political cadres to move to Mozambique to ensure the independence.

So, the course was closed and then the Comrade Chairman came to allocate the cadres.

In July 1974 he allocated the cadres and at that time the Comrade Chairman said that I would not never return again to Cabo Delgado, as I was going to receive orders for another mission for a new front. So he then said I would go to Zambézia for the opening of a new front, on a mission to mobilize more than 500 young people of both sexes in order to be trained as policemen and soldiers to ensure the independence. Also to mobilize the big tea companies of Zambezia, like Madal and others for them not to abandon, because our fight was not against the economy, but rather against the colonial regime. They were to continue because we would defend everything, including the economy and them.

So, I then moved to Zambézia and started to do the work.

I would like to say the following. The story is very long and it is difficult to narrate everything. So, it was the following: when we started the work of organizing and forming associations for the production of this and that, the women were also involved in forming such organizations.

As you know, during the Mueda massacre there was this woman called Modesta who accompanied the men who went to request the granting of independence and to mobilize others for the request for independence. She was then arrested, and died somewhere in the Ibo Island, whose death has not yet been investigated, where she is buried after all her suffering.

In this working process I said that those *vacacavaxilo*, named as the night brothers. The groups of women who had always worked underground in the sale of membership cards and so on. They had also performed duties when the night brothers were moving from village to village duly uniformed and wearing boots. This group of women was made up of women who kept all in secret. In the morning they were the first to check for footprints and to see if the brothers had been nearby and then to sweep clean the footprints to erase any signs of guerrilla footprints, and also so that people could not see them and to report them.

So when the liberation struggle started, this group of women started to work on the aforesaid districts. There was the colonial Mueda District and the Frelimo's Mueda District also, the District of Muedumbe and the Nangade District respectively, and the villages within the semi-liberated areas. Those districts had the so-called *chairman*, a designation used by Tanzania which we adopted in our zones. These *chairmen* were the district leaders. The *chairmen* in turn had the *mamachairmen* who were also the women who were leading the districts at the level of women. The *mamachairmen* were also leading the women militias, while the male militias were led by the chairmen. But both performed the same duties. Only the women would duplicate in addition to the patrol shift work. We as militia would do the shift work patrols with other militias in order to do reconnaissance of enemy moves, to determine the position of the enemy and to convey the information to the guerrilla fighters.

And, at the same time, women militias would also do the grinding of food to be taken to the base where the guerrillas were based.

So, I didn't have too much weapons. I had three, four hand grenades or one, two semi-automatic guns to help them in their patrol work. Because sometimes, in rapid situations they could throw a grenade as a warning to the guerrillas, so they would know that the enemy was in the area, so that the freedom fighters could leave the base and attack the enemy in that zone, if there was no time to go back to the base and submit a report. This was the role of the militias in the districts they were living in.

So this structure was then called later the CPD, i.e. the *Comissário Político do Distrito* (District Political Commissar).

When did this structure come into effect? It came into when there were conflicts between soldiers, guerrillas and the *chairmen* because the latter were leading at that time the Party, as it is now the Frelimo party. So those people who were leading wanted to become military, but the military were refusing to accept that, because that was a role for the military.

So, after too much confusion, and after the killing of Kankhomba and all that trouble, the districts, the localities were then to be led by the military. The military who were political commissars were deployed to lead the districts and the *chairmen* were then ousted, because there was too much confusion. It was then that those military taking office that they were called the CPD automatically. This was also the case with the WD to which a CPD was appointed replacing the mammachairman.

It's the Liberation Movement of Mozambique. When the struggle started the *chairmen* were ordered to lead the party at the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, which was a structure aimed at the masses. Then there was to be a military structure to fight colonialism with weapons in its hands. So, at Cabo Delgado the party was led by Lázaro Kavandame and his Deputy was Raimundo Pachinuapa and the military DD was Chipande. So, it was working in parallel like nowadays with Government on one level and the Party at another level. But at that time, it was the Liberation Front forces on the one level and the Party at another. So, it was the Party who was administrating the zones and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, Frelimo the zones, while the soldiers were only dedicated to combat work at the bases. So those that were administered by Frelimo were living in the districts and in the localities with the militia structures. They were separate structures but doing work in parallel.

Exactly, the militiamen had always been under the *chairmen*. It was only when the trouble started people started to die and these atrocities were being caused by some of the *chairmen*. The two opposing views were being supported by the *chairmen* and the militiamen and that's when the military wanted to know what was going on.

In order to control the situation then it was time to take the political commissars from the soldiers to ensure the immediate control of the administration, so the work would run smoothly, seeing that they were administering and controlling the populations in the liberated zones, they could influence the people and the war would thus run smoothly. So, it became necessary to control the situation. This is when some of the *chairmen* started to run away and some militiamen were taken to the political and military centres to undergo training and receive political directives to know what we were doing.

So, when they returned, they were then deployed to other work because they have then secured work by men and women political commissars. And the militiamen also started to be deployed for military training. And from then everybody was henceforth following the same line without any confusion. But in the beginning, the way we were organized caused a lot of confusion through the various crises up to the II Congress. So that was the work to be done.

Now, while there was this work done by the militiawomen, there were women working directly with the guerrilla fighters which was the Women's Detachment. They were working with the guerrilla fighters at the base. And it was these same women that were to receive political and military training afterwards with the CPD at district level. They were the ones who would mobilize women towards emancipation, the role of women in the struggle, and not the militia women.

I would like to say the following: at the Central Committee of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique based in Dar-es-Salaam there were two elders. Lázaro Kavandame and Kadawele. Kadawele was from Niassa but he was also performing the same functions as Lázaro Kavandame in Cabo Delgado. He was also the First Secretary in Niassa leading the same thing as Kavandame. These two elders were respected by the Central Committee of the FLM. This is why it allocated them these tasks so they could lead the organization in both provinces. So, they sat in the CC of the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique.

And the CC used to always consult these two elders before taking decisions. So, they were leading the Party of the FLM, Frelimo. These elders were leading the Party at the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, Frelimo. They would bring all the concerns and the party's developments in the provinces to the CC's meetings.

And the CC would study the matters and then in turn would bring them to Mozambique for implementation and that's how there was always a link. The discussions, decisions, implementations, as well as structures, were all decided there. Comrade Matsinhe was the head of the information department and responsible for the organization in the hinterland. So, he was also working together with that structure at the level of the activities and thus not separately. It was a matter where all were jointly coordinated, decided, planned with people being allocated for the tasks. It was a cohesive organ with the FLM All decision making was done at that level of the Central Committee, including decisions pertaining to organization and administration in war.

The militia women were always deemed to be militia and with their role performed therein. Except where a person would leave the WD to live in the bases, whereupon she would be a guerrilla fighter together with the others. And within these women guerrilla fighters there were also political commissars who would go to the people to do political work amongst the population. The work done by the WD would highlight the role of women and was congregating women towards the fight for emancipation, so.....

....1964, until then it was the Women's Detachment.

I'm going to tell you the following – the militia women were doing their work. But at the bases the work of these women was to take up arms to fight with the men, to do patrol shifts, do sentry work. Some of them performed together with male political commissars in order to mobilize the people about the war, to interpret the stage of the war, how the war was developing, what the role of women would have to be, women to be also in the struggle and the rights of women. They were a group of women taking up weapons and a part of them to be political commissars.

These women were volunteers, both the militia women and those who took up arms because not everybody had the courage to take up arms and to fight. They would reach the bases and state their wish to become soldiers. They would be received, given some basic elements, a weapon and complying with the military rules, they had never been recruited. Each one leaving their mother's home to do such work while the militia would perform the duties I mentioned before.

And the *mamachairwomen*, after we mobilized these women towards the fight for emancipation, they started to organize in the area of ceramics and cereal production, to sell the goods because there was a lot of nudity. To sell at the border so we could have *capulanas* (traditional clothing) or to have some soap. So, the *mamachairwomen* would go with the groups to organize women to do such work at the districts, while the guerrilla fighters would mobilize the

women to have the courage to participate with men in the military activities in the whole task of the struggle for national liberation.

So, as I said, at that moment when Magaia came and brought a list to Dar-es-Salaam, on October 1966 they decided that we should go for training. That's when we encountered some resistance from those people living in Tanzania, not here. The men hinterland didn't because they were already living with us and had recognized our role and our capacity. Those who had left Mozambique and who were in Dar-es-Salaam and in M'twara were the ones starting to resist against our training. They were saying that the place of women is at the household.

So, we then started our political and military training and we started at the camp on the 4<sup>th</sup> March. That's why Frelimo, after we completed our military and political training, had declared the 4<sup>th</sup> March as the date of the creation of the Women's Detachment. But this was not because in that day women took up arms, we were working on it, it was just that this was the date when some backward ideas had been superseded about avoiding women from participating in the struggle. They officially treated as the day of the formation of the Women's Detachment. But women were already in the bases for a long time fighting with weapons.

On this work of the militia and *mamachairmen* after we developed this work here. The FRELIMO Central Committee called Urias Simango's wife, who was the head of the Women's League of Mozambique and informed her that in Mozambique there were women with arms who were performing a good job in the fight for women's empowerment. So, she then created the link between her organization with that group of women, because they were doing the real work and she was supposed to do the same. She refused because the League had more or less its role as an association of housewives. It was an organization made up solely by women resident in Dar-es-Salaam. Most of them were the spouses of the leaders and Mozambican women who were more or less living the revolution by going to the Mozambican Institute, to the FRELIMO's offices and to find out how was the work going on.

So, they were working on this matter, the housewives refused to link up with the women in the armed struggle, who were doing the role in favour of the women's empowerment in Mozambique. So, then FRELIMO's leadership told them that if they weren't prepared to link up with the others, it would rather support the others who were doing a good job, and the League would be left alone. And it was exactly from that moment that LIFEMO lost FRELIMO's support.

So, as I was saying, it was from that moment that FRELIMO dropped LIFEMO and shifted its support to those women doing a better job hinterland, which was the work that FRELIMO really needed to be done amongst women. So, the LIFEMO was sentenced to death.

And from then onwards LIFEMO was dead and the Women's Detachment intensified its work.

After that comrade Josina Machel was appointed to be the officer responsible for the social and women's affairs department. She then moved abroad to request the materials required for the development of her task. And then visited hinterland the creches and to see the work we were doing in the hinterland, listening to the concerns we had about the creches, and about the hosting of the children and all those things.

With comrade Josina Machel the social work was more closely linked with the Women's Detachment hinterland and we started our work. She died in 1971 when our work was developing. Upon her death the WD met at the Nachingwea political and military camp and that's when a group proposed to FRELIMO to authorize the formation of the OMM ((Mozambican Women Organization) to pick up the work. Why? Because we were the women guerrilla fighters with the weapons while at the same time doing political work towards the women's emancipation, in that the war was growing and we were already engaged in this great task and bearing the burden.

So, we proposed the creation of an organization that would be dedicated to those issues pertaining to women in terms of their emancipation, while doing the work with our male colleagues. So, Frelimo accepted and we also proposed that the 7th, i.e. the date comrade Josina Machel died, to be the Mozambican Women's Day. These two issues were brought up to the FRELIMO's Central Committee and they approved the proposals and then we started to prepare the Conference. The Conference took place in Tunduru where the OMM was subsequently formed.

We opted to create the OMM where it would include every Mozambican woman in her fight for empowerment. Comrade Deolinda Guezimane was appointed the first Secretary-General to lead the OMM's objectives, and that the source of its cadres was to come from the WD, which clearly was the one performing such functions. So, it would have to ensure the first stage of organization in order to convey to the other women the objectives for the creation of our organization, of our struggle and with whom we were going to fight.

So, when we went to the provinces, we also indicated some cadres of the WD to lead the OMM at the time of the struggle.

These were the distinct stages of women's participation and the role each performed wherever they were both as a militiawoman and as a military member, as LIFEMO had disappeared.

Had LIFEMO been accepted we would have probably in Mozambique had the designation of Women's League but at that stage they could not survive. After we arrived at the bases and before undergoing training, our work would be the same. To build our huts we, men and women would all go out to cut bamboos to do whatever. To build our houses. If it was for the roofs, we, men and women, would both go out and cut the grass with machetes to cover our houses. We would do joint patrol shifts, we would do joint sentry work, we would go out jointly on patrol, there was no separation.

In kitchen work to prepare the food we would do it all together men and women at the base. Cooking, and serving food to our colleagues. There was nothing defining the relationship as in the case of the militias, where while the rounds for patrol would be done jointly, the task of grinding cereals and cooking was for women only. But not at the base, all tasks were done together, by men and women, nothing stating what was to be done by one or another.

And here I would like to say that, from that moment, we ceased to use our female names when going to the bases. We changed to male names.

My name was Raúl.

We held male names so that the enemy would not know that FRELIMO had also armed women guerrillas in its midst. This to recall what I said about the issue when we went to Nachingwea on the issue that the women's place is in the home. If the enemy would know that we had women fighters, they would think the enemy was stronger. They would think that if our women were to be at home, they could beat us, because women were nothing. So, we had to hold male names so the enemy could not perceive that women were also holding weapons in their hands.

So, all of us had such names. Marina Pachinupa's was Mário, our commander Filomena Nachaqui was called Luís.

We held those names in 1967 when we joined the political and military camp and President Samora (at the time he was the commander of the Nachingwea camp] came from Dar-es-Salaam and we were receiving our food that day. We picked our plates and said: - "Luís, let's go.....". President Samora looked at us and said:- "What?". So we then explained why and told him those were our names. He then asked:- "So what is your female's name?". I said:- "I'm Paulina, this one is Marina". And then he said:- "From now on you should all use your own names, the names given to you by your parents ! Why this)?".

WE explained why and the President said there was no reason to hide names, because when the Portuguese came to Mozambique, they didn't just colonized men. They colonized men, women and children and that's why the war is the people in arms and they should have known what was the people in arms, men and women fighting, the Portuguese had to understand that.

That was the reason for us to take our own names. So, from then, from 1967 we started to display our names again up until today. But we had male names during that process at the base.

So, the tasks were the same for all. Imagine you going on patrol with your colleagues. We were three, they would put you in the middle and when you arrived at a village, the people we would say: - "Good morning, good morning". If you had a soft voice you couldn't reply. Your male colleague would respond twice so that they wouldn't discover that one was a woman. We were hiding it from our people, they wouldn't know there were women in our midst. They would only know it later, i.e. that we women had weapons. So, our example then was a good one. After people became aware of the presence of women and seeing us pacing, or talking at a rally, interpreting and all those things. In the following day there were 20, 50 male soldiers reporting at the base and wishing to become freedom fighters. They couldn't accept women superseding them. Our presence at FRELIMO was very, very complex.

I wanted to reply to this question about the militia. We had quite a big warehouse and it was divided into two sections. In one we would have the women sleeping and in the other the militiamen. We would sleep like that, in warehouses in the districts. But in the bases, we would have our own base on the other side, or they would divide us at the parade. In the case of the Ibo base there was a river dividing, on the one side it was the central base and on the other side we would be on parade, where we would receive orders for our missions. There a soldier or militiaman would know when the enemy would be arriving.

Then I want to tell you about our traditions when they also helped us. We had in our minds the traditions conveyed to us by our elders when they used to tell us that when you go to war you must never sleep with a woman. If one sleeps with a woman one would be wounded or going to be killed, and that helped us where we lived. We would have to look towards the war, nothing else and not kidding around, or else we would run the risk of all of us dying. So, this helped until the II Congress where FRELIMO decided that guerrilla fighters should marry each other, to flirt, get officially married and submit to FRELIMO. If you had children, women would grow them, do transport of materials or grown orphan children. To grown her own children up to 1 year of age, then to go back to combat work, leaving the child to the care of the creche. This was very well defined and from then there were official marriages happening. President Guebuza married in Tunduru, where many other comrades married too. We would go to the weddings duly uniformed. There were no brides' dresses, the only dress was the uniform, the so-called *pingo de chuva* (rain drop) uniform, for both men and women. One could go to Tanzania, Zambia, to the border, to buy rings, yes gold rings, but the uniform was ours, because the enemy could attack during the wedding ceremony and one would have to leave to go to the fighting. That's how we lived.

Frelimo took steps. Frelimo took steps right from the beginning that one would not look to our sisters coming to the base, or those in the districts, as one's own wives.

They would be soldiers like men. They would be coming to serve and perform a citizen's duty to liberate our country. Because, at the zones, some people, like a guerrilla fighter's wife, would say that her husband was not living alone at the base. The husband would be living with those that were there for that purpose and that's why he wouldn't come to visit her. So, they would look to us as women who were taking away their husbands.

But we wanted to prove to our sisters that we were there to fight for liberation. We had not gone there because of the men, if we wanted men, we would have found them at our parents' homes, because each one could get married at one's parent's homes before going to war. We didn't need to go to the bases seeking marriage. We were going to fight, so they then accepted that we weren't at the bases seeking for men. It was on this basis that men and women earned our trust and people started to pour into our bases. So, when the Congress took place, there was some discussion amongst the guerrilla fighters prior to the congress works. Some were wondering that there were colleagues that had not yet married. Those who had married had children, so what about those that had not yet married? We wouldn't know if we were going to die or to reach the date of independence. What was going to be bequeathed to the families? It was proposed that Frelimo to find some answer to address his issue. Should somebody die in the war there must be some information about the deceased's family. So, on that basis the Congress decided that soldiers would marry each other, to avoid any leaks of information. There was the risk of marrying a civilian and then to tell the story about a military event and the spouse would then leak that information out. That's why it became necessary to allow only the inter-soldier marriages.

In the first, second and third sectors there was always population in the liberated areas, while in the fourth sector we had difficulties in populating the areas because, as I said, the war was advancing. So the enemy was creating village settlements in the districts, in the zones occupied by them, in the Meluco District where it was under their administration. They went to take all the communities that were that far away and built periphery suburbs at Meluco and consistently in all districts.

So, there we only had guerrilla bases, no population at all to produce and to feed for the war.

So, it was the Women's Detachment who was operating in the third sector and who was to transport the materials and the food for the guerrilla fighters operating in the fourth sector. After consolidating and seeing that the situation was fine, we were taking population, men and women from the second and third sector to join us to take in one go plenty of food and ammunition to the fourth sector so that the war could go forward.

Here we had many problems. If we would move a bit like that and someone leaving the enemy's village settlement spotted that guerrilla men had moved there, then there would be shouting all the time. And the shouting would be: - "Makonde, Makonde, the Makonde war, the Makonde war.". The soldiers would come out as well as population armed with machetes, loaded with everything to pursue us and kill us in the trails. And once we realized we were spotted we would then travel for two hours, one hour, one day, two days to move into another zone. So, it was difficult to bring the war to Nampula because of this system.

Even at the Lurio River, a simple movement of the guerrillas would be enough to cause some shouting that the Makonde war was happening. So, then they would close the road at River Lurio where both Portuguese soldiers and the local population would impede our crossing of the river. So, then a report to the Frelimo CC would have to be drawn and then studied and it was established that we had to take the war to Tete via Manica e Sofala and then reach the heart of Zambézia. On the opening of the new front the guerrilla fighters would enter Nampula while others would descend to the South. So that was it.

It was difficult to enter the war into Nampula through this front of Cabo Delgado because of this situation.

## Pachinuapa, Marina

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2008]

*Marina Pachinuapa was born in 1950 in the Mueda District, Province of Cabo Delgado and resides in Maputo.*

*Marina Pachinuapa was a combatant in the struggle for national liberation since 1964. In an eloquent testimony, Marina describes in detail how she joined FRELIMO and her participation in the armed struggle. By fighting in the Cabo Delgado front Marina reveals how the illiterate Young women challenged and changed the common perception about the women's participation in the liberation war. Against FRELIMO's program and of the common sense of the communities, the young women demanded military and political training and involvement in the combat fronts. Based at the Ibo Base, these Young women mobilized and organized the popular masses to support the war, they produced and supplied food to the freedom fighters, protected the bases and the communities, at the fronts, carrying material, taking care of the sick and children and work in security. They were the catalytic force for the formation of the Women's Detachment (WD) later to become the OMM.*

*The courage, determination and commitment of these young and illiterate women demonstrates that the participation of women in the national liberation struggle and the leadership roles they played were the result of the battles that women themselves triggered and assumed. The history of Marina's life is linked with the history of the national liberation, especially in Cabo Delgado. The reading of this testimony is interesting.*

I don't know where to start. When I was instructed to give this lecture, I asked the Secretary: "But what is the theme?"

– The theme?

– Yes!

The involvement of women during the National Liberation Struggle.

I started to do TPC, where to start, where do I start? I picked the papers, I started.....at the end I started to tear up the papers because I didn't know where to start.

But, ten years is a long time, one can't tell the whole story in one day, isn't it? I will sum up. Now, you want to know about women's engagement in the National Liberation Struggle, the role of women, isn't it? And also about the Frelimo's history, isn't it?

So now we are all going to leave Maputo here and let' move to 1964. We are not in 2007, we are now back to 1964 here in this room. The Struggle for the Liberation of Mozambique started in 1964. As we know, the Mozambican people tried in a civilized manner to obtain its independence from the Portuguese Government.

The response from the settlers was that we didn't have the capacity for that. There were numerous places asking for meetings to request the independence, which were unsuccessful.

But the Mozambican people were also men and said that they were going to start a war. But we knew we didn't have guns, troops, we just had hoes and machetes, wasn't it?

The Mozambicans got together and started their struggle for the liberation of Mozambique, isn't it? All those that went for military training were small groups of young people that left Mozambique to Tanzania, Algeria for training. They returned to Dar-es-Salaam and from Dar-es-Salaam they split the group. A group to Cabo Delgado, another to Niassa and our guerrilla fighters entered into the Province of Cabo Delgado on the 24th September 1964. That's when the war started. The people didn't know about it. The war begun. Not just for a day.

Our leaders were split into each province. In our Province, the Provincial Leader was Raimundo Pachinuapa, while the Political commissar was Paulo Samuel Kankomba.

So, what did our leaders thought for the people to understand and to know why we started the war. At the time I was at the religious mission. I went to the Mission in 1963. I went there to be baptized, that is, to be catechised and after that baptized and then I returned home. I stayed at the homes of the missionary sisters. In 1964 it was the outset of the war and the situation was bad at the mission. The troops would leave Mueda and pass through the Mission. There is a zone called Kutamba of the Makonde and on the way the Portuguese would shoot at anyone found there. The colonial troops would pass in the mission and behind them we would see people being carried to the mission, because there was a hospital there and they would go to the hospital. We would ask what was going on they would reply that the troops had fired shots to anyone coming.

Where I lived, we stayed for a week when in the second week the troops left Mueda towards the mission. And what were they doing? You can hear the whole story. It's not worth writing because you are not going to make it.

I was staying with the sisters, doing the housekeeping, helping them with the cleaning. I was a servant, taking the food to the table, I was a 14-year-old girl. So, I was helping the sisters in the cleaning and would be paid Mt 1 per month, more or less.

So, in the following day, on a Friday, one sister told in the morning to go fetch water at the borehole very early, in order to attend mass.

What were the nuns doing? There were some elder girls, we were the younger ones. A nun would enter, we would pray and she would then lock the doors. The nun would lock the main door and then leave the tins inside. Anyone wanting to go we would do it to the tins and then in the following morning would throw it out. It was under her control. At night, at dawn, the Portuguese troops arrived and stayed in the zone in the mission and anyone wanting to go to the borehole would be stopped. In the morning we heard shots in the mission, the sister came to open the door and we didn't know what was going on. There were shootings the whole day.

Then an aircraft came from Mueda and hovered around the mission. Our guerrilla fighters were in the zone and the troops had information about it. It was the first time our guerrilla fighters had shot down a plane in 1964 at the Mbuvo Mission. The plane was shot down there.

So that was like steering the bees. The Portuguese were badly upset. On Sunday we saw how the situation was bad, so what did I decide to do? As we had colleagues in the Mission, my colleagues didn't a chance to leave the Mission to go to their families so I said we could go to my mom's house. They were 3, with me we were 4. We fled the mission to the area where my parents were. So, we stayed there and on the second week the guerrilla fighters came and received the information that there were 4 girls at Manguegue's house (Manguegue was my father). So, they came and started to talk to us. They told us they needed girls to become political commissars.

And we asked: -"Political Commissars, what's that?"

They said Mozambique had started the war, the war was necessary and the people didn't know when the war was going to end. They needed us, we would undergo political training and we could mobilize the population.

We said no, we were going to think about it.

Our idea was to go to Tanzania. So my father then asked how did we think about going to Tanzania?

We said we didn't think much, but we wanted to go to Tanzania. Then he refused letting us go. On the third day there was another group coming, led by Kankomba, who was a Political Commissar. And so we accepted to go. It was me, Manuela Samantino, Bibiana Ringudo, Joana Adriano. WE were 4. I told my parents that we were going!

I had a flaw, you need to know that, you want to know it all, isn't it?

I had a flaw, I was a lazy girl. In the village we all know that when a girl grows up, she has to accompany her mother to the fields (*machamba*). The mother has to carry other things while you would carry others, isn't it? But I would only go to the fields when I wanted to. If anyone would force me, I would allege having fever, being sick. Also, during the rainy season, as we walked to the *machamba* the Grass would block your path and I had no shoes. I was affraid to walk and to step onto *maria café* (millipedes). I would then tell Mom I couldn't go because I had no shoes and I didn't want to trample onto *maria cafés*. So my mother would ask: "*Where are you going to get shoes?*". And then I would reply that, as I didn't have shoes I couldn't go to the fields.

But I was lazy, even to grind the cereals, I wouldn't do it. Not that I didn't know, I knew how to grind, but I had this flaw. I can't explain it. I can grind, if I say I want to grind, I Will do it. I would grind without a problem. But if my mom and sisters were to say to me to go grind, I can pick the pestle and start doing ...tcho, tcho, tcho.... But then I start vomiting and feel sick.

So, as my parents knew about this flaw, they would then whether I knew what would be the conditions where I wanted to go. Would I not find also *maria cafés*? Would I not have to pick a hoe? If someone ordered me to do it, would I do it? So, I told mom I was going and I said good-bye to my parents. We left and went to the barracks.



When we arrived it was a bit late. We were 4 and then an hour later three more arrived. They were Bibina Lathimbo, Bernardina Paulo, Filomena Nacheque, Eriqueta João, Paulina Maneta. We were 9 altogether. I don't know if you are following me: 9 girls.

In the following day we had a meeting with the Political Commissar Samuel Kakomba, who said the following:

-“We need you, I, as a Political Commissar, will teach you, you will leave here to mobilize the people, to explain why FRELIMO took up arms. Because we tried to ask for independence. The Portuguese refused. So now we have decided to take up arms to fight. Your task is to explain to the people that where they are where they are doing the cleaning, washing pans, to avoid dirtiness, and not catching diseases, because we don't have hospitals.

The soldiers, these soldiers we have here, it's the population that is going to feed them. The people have to produce to give food to the soldiers. The people are going to carry the materials at the border to give them to the soldiers. We don't have airplanes, we don't have cars, we don't have motorcycles. The cars and motorcycles are the people. A FRELIMO soldier is like a fish in water, would a fish survive without water? We have to be together. That's your task”.

We stayed for 2 months with political classes mornings and afternoons. When we completed after two months Kankomba told us he was sending us to districts, localities. Today we call them “localities” but at that time we would call them “branches” under a *Chairman*. as we were cadres we were like heads of Frelimo.

So, we then left the base and went to live where the *chairman* was. Our work, in the morning, consisted in having meetings with the population, explaining why we were fighting and the consequences of the war, because few would know about them. It was for the people to understand well and not saying later they didn't know and not knowing when the war would end. But we didn't have the capacity, we needed to stay united. We said, they are like the small ants with the big head. Then the other was saying.....???. So we needed to stay united. It wasn't just that, Kankomba. was saying they were trained in Algeria, they would not make it but could send us where there were troops, where there were barracks to do some reconnaissance. We would know that women are women.

He said that he was talking to Frelimo cadres, First Secretaries, where the roots were making history.

So, I then asked if I had to leave to go into the barracks to do reconnaissance work and then to come back to provide information and Kankomba replied that, yes, that was the job. Then I said I wouldn't do it and he insisted. So, we then asked what could we do. He replied: -“Put on your civilian clothes, comb yourselves and then get in. They will greet you. As they recognize you as women, they will greet you. And you have to use that type of language”

We were surprised about this thing of security, something we learnt elsewhere, not then.

We agreed, since FRELIMO at the outset had defined the line correctly. We started the war, all of us, men and women and the children, but we were all dominated. Women were worse because even men ruled at home, women had to do the cooking, then men would eat the meat, but it was women who cooked the food. I'm not lying, am I?

At home there are problems, that is, women had no word to say, they had to join men and accept their decisions. And women just had to agree. But then women would have the right to have a voice and to say they don't agree. This didn't exist at that time. At least that's how I used to live in the village I grew up. When there were problems in the family, only men would meet, not women, and that was humiliating. Women were supposed to be just mothers, spouses and to cook for the husbands, nothing else. Women would never be right, only the men would be right.

So let's talk about the real life, about what we had lived. So we said:—"Eh, *wena* ! Comrade Commissar, that task is too big."

And he said that was to be done.

So we assumed it, FRELIMO had it straight. We asked ourselves and said that we were Young, we would take up arms and we were going to fight. Some would carry materials, some would go to produce, others would take care of the sick people. These were well defined tasks. In the districts where we were doing political work, we would mobilize the people in the localities. At the districts there would be *chairmen* and militiamen. The militiamen would only do reconnaissance work, if the enemy would enter into the zone they would come and inform and the communication was very fast. And the militiamen could do some work but could be a bit weak on the political part but, as we had a Political Commissar the task was very straightforward and we did our work.

The group of girls returned to the central base. Behind them there were more Young girls. They said we shouldn't join that group. To do mobilization work the group of 9 was growing, we were now in the war and had to undergo military training inside the country. We had the training, we did patrols, sentry work but never left the mobilization work behind. In 1964/65 we were inside f Mueda.

Kankomba once ordered me to go to zone x to meet the First Secretary to hand a letter to him. So I then said: - "Comrade Commissar, that zone is very far. Could you arrange for a militiaman to accompany me?". He replied that they would ask at a village for someone to accompany me.

I asked for a militiaman, then I put in my clothes, scarf, blouse and we started to walk and, halfway, we found three militiamen – two girls and one man. In the previous day they had left to meet (someone?) to take some food to the *branch* ...to take food to the base. I remember very well, it was in February, but not the day.

I then asked the militia who was accompanying me to move to the back and picked a local militia, we walked and I ask him how was the area, how was the enemy there and how the enemy would react, what would the population do, if they would cut trees to block the roads to prevent the troops from advancing. He said the troops were leaving Mueda and were going to camp in the bush, but we still walked in those roads. Kakomba had told me we could find the Portuguese there. We fell in ambush and I gave the militia the letter Kakomba had given to me, then the militia ran away while the other looked like a butterfly and I stood there and felt dizzy.

You said you wanted the truth, right?

I felt dizzy, there were shootings all over, the only thing I did was to bless myself with the sign of the Cross and then I stood there. When I looked back, I noticed that the girl who was carrying the flour basket at her head had been killed, with a bullet in her head, bleeding like a tap. That was the first time in my life that I saw a dead person. So, I said: - "Well, what do I do now?". I stood still, the troops fired shots and came out of the bush....came to me and asked where was I coming from and I said I was coming from my parents' home.

- "Where are you going to?"

I said I was going to the mission. Since I had fled from the mission and the priests were still in the mission, I said I was going to the mission. So they caught me, I was leaving the base...*tchwa, tchwa, tchwa*...I was walking like a bird...*tchwa, tchwa*. We reached the site where the troops were camped...sincerely ! It was the test of life all that I experienced there. Then they started the interrogation, investigating if I knew the FRELIMO guerrillas, I said no. They looked at me and said that I did know where they were indeed. I insisted that no, because I lived in the mission where there are white people like yourselves. But they insisted and still said no.

The commander of the company came out, I stood in the middle, it looked as they were watching a dance. I freaked out, yes, I did! I was wondering to myself that I would tell them that I had left the base, but how would I tell them that I did not know them? And when they spoke about "*those Frelimo turras*" (short for "terrorists" in Portuguese), I told them that I never heard of that term before and I didn't know about them.

So they took me and put me in a place and I sat down. There were 4 sentries around me, to protect me. Ten minutes later the troops brought a pan, they were carrying these big and full pans, with wine, red wine – I had never drank wine in my life, never! This guy said: - "Drink !...". I drank, I finished, I was forced to, then I became too drunk to explain where the Frelimo soldiers. They said: "Look again. Do you know where the FRELIMO soldiers are?"

I said I didn't know. They could kill me, if they wanted, but it wasn't worth asking me that question. Killing me wouldn't take them anywhere.

Luckily, the troops had to leave the camp to Mueda. There were 25 trucks, then they cooked some food and brought it to me. I couldn't eat, I wasn't hungry. It was if my body was feeling.....

I didn't know if the blood was flowing, I freaked out. I wasn't going to be a sell-out, I'd rather die instead of sending hundreds of combatants to die.

Then it was time to get into the trucks, I can't remember how many were put into the trucks. An officer ordered me to get into a Land Rover, the officer's vehicle. They told me that I was going to Mueda. I said I wasn't going to Mueda.

:- "You are going where?"

I said I was going to the mission and left my parents' home to go to the mission, so they had to take me there.

We proceeded in the car towards the mission. The company commander had ordered the troops to stop at the mission. So they did it. What were the Portuguese doing? They would pick someone, then let that person alone making him to wait and think he was released. Then they would measure the distance, aim at that person, (shoot) and kill him. So when the troops arrived with 25 trucks and 4 Land Rovers (where the officers were being carried), the priests wondered why they stopped at the mission

When they opened the door, I came out and walked and people wondered whether I could be killed in the bush and not in the town. Thank God, they didn't kill me. I walked, I went pass the grounds where the students used to raise the flag. I went to my sisters' house and I ran into the bush and ran away. Those people who knew me then said that I had run to the bush.

There were militiamen there who left the base to the mission during the shooting and they were looking for me and found me at the Mbuvu mission.....they were ladies who would fetch some water. I don't remembre how many people came to fetch me downtown. I thenasked for Secretary Vintar. They told me he was at x place.

They then, at my request, accompanied me to the Secretary and it was already rather late at the time. Then the Secretary asked me to tell him what happened. I told him what happened and he wanted to know if the troops were there. And I also mentioned the ambush incident and about the girl that had been killed. So he had to go to the base (to alert them). He replied that it would be impossible because the base was very far, a 5-hour walk. Perhaps the militiaman who fled might have given the information to Kankomba. He must have told about we falling into the ambush and if I had not been killed and were to be caught by the troops, I could have told the troops where they were.

We left at 19h00 to go to the area where the troops were. And I asked the Secretary of the locality for us to go the site where the ambush took place. We went there and the community had already taken the girl. At about 20h00 they were already burying her. Then the people asked us where were we going and we told them that we were on our way to Namassude. They warned us that we wold not be able to reach there because the soldiers were blocking the road. But we said we would go.

Friends. A thousand FRELIMO freedom fighters. If I had to take the soldiers there would they all die? This is what one has to say: we're going to die but not all of us. That is a part of my life.

When my parents heard that their daughter had fallen in an ambush, was at the base and couldn't raise myself for three days, with high fever. Filomena Nachaque and others had to help me to stand up to go to the toilets. I was also scared – a simple moving of the Grass would frighten me. Kamkomba sent three soldiers to accompany me to my parents to show them I was alive. My father turned to me and asked: -“Are you still going to continue?”. I told him:”Yes !”.

Not only that. We were having problems in that zone. In the first time a group of girls joined the men. We started with our Provincial Chief Raimundo Pachinuapa. He had only clothes for the girls, that is, pants that he ordered to be made, and we were wearing them. We would do patrol work, sentry work but we had problems at the base. People like us there were just to do patrol work, not combat work. Then they were commenting on our beautiful pants, etc., I don't know what else.

Then out there they were saying that those girls were prostitutes. They were saying “...not supposed to see girls amongst men”, ”they are wearing pants, walking with men”, ”they are lost”. But we told them:” yes, we are lost because we know what we want”.

They would call us all sorts of names, saying that we were useless girls, without any quality at the base. When the guerrillas' wives would come to visit, they would show us ugly faces. We told them that they were wasting their time. That they thought that their husbands were also our husbands. It was good for their husbands to have concubines during patrol work. So when these concubines would turn their faces to us we would say:”ah, *hewena*. [Translator's note: **The last word in this sentence appears to be a misspelling of a word of a local dialect. Appears to mean an expression: “Oh, so you are the ones...”**].

So we were people. Our soldiers were saying that we were to do only patrol work, not combat work, we were to do nothing. We would say that if Manuel António was to go to combat, was it not because he had been ordered to do so by the base commander? They agreed.

Our base commander, Gabriel Nathimbo, then at Beira Base, would whistle us to go to parade when it was time for combat. He would order a Platoon Commander to take a certain group and to go to area *x* .....(??).

In 1966 we had our base, called the Ibo Base. We had changed our names. I, Marina, changed to Mário. Paulina Mateus to Raúl, Nacchaque to Luís. We all adopted male names so the enemy wouldn't know that there were girls in the base.

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(1) Smiles and laughter.

(2) But you....

It was ours. ...the girls detachment was growing up. But we wouldn't stop our task of mobilization. Would send our comrades of the Women's Detachment, to the districts, to continue the political work and we would take care of the Creche to take care of the children. Take care of weapons, children, materials. We were mixed with men.

Doing work to accompany the people to the Rovuma River at the border with Tanzania to carry materials. We were very dynamic, aggressive. In 1966 we went to the Base Commander Nathimbo and told him that were weary. He said that we were only doing patrols and not combat work, sentry work, wearing pants that they wouldn't, weapons, etc.

When men would go on combat and then return we had the very Nice tradition to whistle and every soldier would be on parade to receive them....What...is the story, the Commander, the Head of the Company would say:-"Comrade Chief, we the combatants are well but Manuel left his gun and ran away..."

Ah! So we started.....what? "He's a man, not a woman, he ran away? Isn't he a woman?". So we said, let's go ! We had that courage of saying that we were going to succeed. Our success was not to succeed in fighting but to show that there is no difference in being a women, like in the case of men. A man is a man, a woman is a woman. But women think equally like men, men sometimes think slower than woman.

We said that we were weary, that this thing of saying that we must never go to combat, etc, but when the troops were attacking our base all groups would act., the practice of the commander taking girls in the group had not yet started to be put in practice, so we wanted to go. Nathimbo agreed.

Muedumbe, Nangololo Mission, they had tangerines, oranges, and they were ripe and the troops knew the people were going there to get them. So Gabriel Nathimbo called Matias Lingone, platoon commander asked him to control the Muendume, Nangololo Mission area. Marina, Manuel, Clementino, Heriqueta, João would form part of his group. And we were happy with that.

We left and stayed for a week and in the second week the troops were coming from Muedembe to Nongololo, and you know what? When a person does something wholeheartedly, that is...if the thing is dangerous you take it, it's like..... but we wanted to keep our mouths shut, not walking and talking.... My brothers, the combat work was very good. In the first time it was very good, excellent, to see the troops pacing like this, *tchwa tchwa, tchwa*. The commander ordered us to shoot only after the commander has first shot, I'll never forget that. When we left the combat, our comrade fighters would carry us.

You can't imagine, us being carried by when we arrived at the village. Those things about the ladies doing *oló, oló, oló*.

But it's not easy to tell you what I'm saying. I just wanted to show that we are equal, but we had to overcome mountains of obstacles.

In 1966 the late Magaia visited the Province of Cabo Delgado. He arrived at the Central Base but he wasn't expecting (what he saw). When he saw all that, the Head of DD (Chief of Defence) – he was the head of DD before Samora – he said that it wouldn't be possible at Ibo Base. Magaia returned to Tanzania and then reported to Eduardo Mondlane at the Central Committee. He said that what he saw in Cabo Delgado required the girls to be trained, to train them in Nachingwea for the same military training given to men. We had military training inside the country but it wasn't sufficient, they need more training.

In 1967, first to Nachingwea, a group of 25 girls, of which were from Cabo Delgado. Lucky for me that I was part of that group but this group – I'm not ashamed to say this – was entirely made of illiterate people, we didn't know how to write an "A" nor a "B", we didn't speak Portuguese. We were illiterate girls. The only literate person was our Secretary Filomena Nachaque, who was the head of the Base. I was the Political Commissar, I used to talk quite a lot at that time, but not much now. Paulina Mateus, which is currently our Secretary-General, was our Secretary. Our group of 25 went to Nachingwea in 1967, we arrived at the border after leaving Mozambique in February. When we arrived at the border, we started to have problems. Men, you know, they sometimes do things, sometimes they don't think. When they learnt that the Women's Detachment was coming, from Cabo Delgado, to do training, they wondered what FRELIMO was going to do with these girls. Nachingwea had thousands and thousands of men, what was a group of 25 girls going to do there? Could they join grass with fire? This created a serious problem at the training camp.

First week, second week. Would the cars come (to fetch us). Samora had a commitment to these girls. 25 girls. Nachingwea was a camp. Soldiers coming from Niassa, Tete, Cabo Delgado, the camp was full, full of guerrilla fighters. Some came from Cabo Delgado and then remained at the camp, but when they were sent to Tanzania, they didn't want us to go to the camp for political preparation. They said we couldn't. Some of our comrades in Nachingwea went to speak to the officers to say that they would not drive trucks to fetch the girls because this would cause problems.

At the meeting Samora explained everything. Samora and Mondlane were aware of the existence of a Women's Detachment at the border. The WD had difficulties entering (into the country), and he then explained the situation. Eduardo Mondlane told Mwalimo Nyerere:

“- Nyerere, you guys gave us the camps, opened the doors and told us Mozambicans to prepare ourselves. We have camps to train the soldiers. There is a group there that has a problem and they (the group) are also having problems here in this part with the girls. Since you opened the camps for us to train our soldiers, please assist.

Mwalino made a few phone calls and the trucks arrived in the border on the following day. It was Mucunha who came to fetch us. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> March we left at night from the border to Nachingwea and arrived there on the 4<sup>th</sup> March.

When we arrived in Nachingwea, the men got upset. But we wanted to show them that we had not left Mozambique because of the men. And we showed them, our group did an excellent job in Nachingwea.

Three months military training with the Chinese. Real tough training. There was no difference in the treatment to the girls. We proved our good and I myself as a Political Commissar. Samora would leave that to us. Every Saturday there were lectures and he would tell us we would go to all the camps. During the lectures he would say something briefly and then pass the rest to the Commissar. So, then we would explain what was the role of women and why we were there at the camp. We would assume our duties with lots of love, we were Mozambicans, ready to die. The leadership had established that all women, the elders, children had the duty to liberate the country. It was worth losing our lives for the motherland and that was what we were going to do.

When the first group completed its training Mondlane came to Nachingwea, he convened a meeting with all the soldiers. In the following day there was a meeting for the Women's Detachment. Eduardo Mondlane didn't know who were the people of the WD. He had thought them as big and tall girls, so when we went there, he look at us, turned to Samora and asked: -"Are these the ones?"

"- Yes, they are the ones."

"-Are these the ones who received training?"

"-Comrade Samora, I had never imagined so. I thought they would be big and tall women. These are children. It would be best to send them to the school, to send to the Centre to study".

We had an interpreter because we couldn't speak Portuguese. The interpreter would translate into Makonde. So when he told us that the Chairman had said they would send us to the Education Centre to study, we responded in dialect that we were not going.. We said we had left Mozambique to undergo training and then after that to go to the centre. We asked the interpreter to tell the Comrade Chairman that we were not accepting to go to study. We would rather go back to Mozambique.

So he told us that (in Mozambique) the Portuguese were armed, trained, big men, who had aircraft and everything, while we were just girls. We told the Comrade Chairman that we had killed Portuguese when we left Mozambique, so it would not be worth talking about that..... we would go to Mozambique.

Eduardo Mondlane ..... He then said to Machel that before we were to go to Mozambique, me, Filomena, Nachaque, would have to go to Dar-es-Salaam to do some lectures at the Mozambican Institute and to meet the Centre, the first FRELIMO Centre in Bagamoyo. From Bagamoyo we moved to Congwa, another training centre and then later it was the Nachingwea Centre.

Then a second group came, from Niassa, with Teresa Mule, Mónica Chitupila while me and Filomena Nachaque went to Dar-es-Salaam. The Secretary-General Paulina Mateus and another group went to Tunduru, which bordered Niassa-Mozambique with Tanzania. So this group in Tunduru included Paulina Mateus with 3 other comrades, who would then go from Niassa to Nachingwea.

I went to Dar-es-Salaam with Filomena Nachaque and with Samora because Eduardo Mondlane had sent us to the Mozambican Institute to deliver a lecture. The Mozambican Institute was the Frelimo's School, where FRELIMO was hoping to train our cadres to become the future leaders. Are you listening? The Mozambican Institute was experiencing serious problems. The enemy had already done its work. The students refused to obey their superiors. When the leaders, even those like Samora and Eduardo Mondlane were there for a meeting, the students were talking about things that were not normal.

When Samora was explaining the situation at the Mozambican Institute, I explained to him about the difficulties we had because we were illiterate. When I went to Dar-es-salaam I was accompanied by a cadre, his name was Napunula. He was an interpreter from Chinese into Portuguese. But I would speak a dialect I wouldn't speak in Portuguese.

In the following morning we had a lecture at the Mozambican Institute. We started at 18h00. Samora had cautioned us not to worry if we saw some students leaving the room. There was this guy Vicente Ululu who was there and he was a student. So we went to the room and Samora began by saying that he was not going to talk that time but rather some girls that had come from Cabo Delgado who had trained in Nachingwea.

If a FRELIMO guerrilla fighter was to be there, the students would not greet him, even if they knew him. If he was from the same Province, they wouldn't

Greet him because they would say he had head lice, wouldn't bath, so they would stay away from him. "Good morning, how are you?"

Samora spoke and then asked me, the Commissar, to speak. The interpreter would speak when I was speaking in dialect and he would interpret it in Portuguese. The dialect to me was a language that when you speak in it we say what you feel. That is why my Portuguese isn't that good, not a clean Portuguese.

So I then started to deliver the talk and started to state that they weren't there because their parents had paid for their tickets, that their parents weren't paying for their school there. It was FRELIMO, it was the Mozambican People's blood that were paying for it. We then explained how life was in the war and what was the role of the women.

No one left the room. They tried to take some notes but then they stopped taking notes just to listen. We finished and left.

In the following day, in the afternoon, at about 15h00 two girls came to the residence we were staying. Augusta was a girl from Cabo Delgado and Josina Machel – no, not Josina Machel – it was Josina Muthemba, who was a student at the School of the Mozambican Institute. We greeted each other.

So Josina then explained why she came to see me. She said she hadn't slept Augusta spoke in Makonde. So we asked why she didn't sleep well.

She said it was because of our lecture. She wanted us to ask our chief to take her to Nachingwea.

We replied that we didn't go there to take anybody away from the school, we just came to give the talk. We would leave in the following day to the Bagamoyo camp and then afterwards to the Kongwa centre and we were going to Nachingwea. We tried to convince Josina that FRELIMO needed cadres and all of those in the School would become leaders. There were well defined tasks. We told her that their students, soldiers fighters such as ourselves, the elders to produce food to feed the soldiers. She should have not left school, she had to finish her studies, the war wasn't going to end in the following morning.

Josina left and Samora came in the evening and had dinner with us and we told him about what happened in the afternoon with those two girls, what Josina told us. Samora wanted to know what happened after and we told him that we refused to accede to her request.

Well, we did our job and went to Kongwa and Bagamoyo.

When we finished Samora asked us to go to Eduardo Mondlane's home to provide him with a report of the work that had been done.

Eduardo Mondlane already had knowledge of our work but Comrade Samora insisted that we officially go there to say that mission had been accomplished.

When we arrived Eduardo Mondlane and his wife had already prepared the dinner. We had dinner and Samora provided a report to Mondlane. Eduardo Mondlane said he had his teachers and we were his teachers. That was the first time I put a watch in my arm, I shall never forget. Mondlane had travelled to Switzerland and brought a backpack and a ORIS watch, a good watch.

“- You teacher, wear this watch because teachers need to know when to take a break when teaching. This backpack is for you to put your clothes when you go to Mozambique”.

We returned to Nachingwea and prepared to travel to Mozambique. We went to Nachingwea and prepared the trip to Mozambique.

Josina had a scholarship. Eduardo Mondlane had arranged for a bursary for her to study in Switzerland. She didn't want to study at either the Mozambican Institute nor in Switzerland. She didn't want to study in Switzerland under the bursary arranged by the Comrade Chairman. She didn't want to study, she wanted to be sent to Nachingwea.

This is what you guys wanted to know, isn't it? History is written by Man, isn't it?

So I returned to the hinterland. Josina refused to study neither in Tanzania, nor in Switzerland for her bursary. She went to speak to Eduardo Mondlane and said she wanted to go to Mozambique, to undergo training in Mozambique. But where in Mozambique? She wanted to go to Cabo Delgado, to join Marina. So Josina stopped her studies, she left Dar-es-Salaam to Nachingwea in 1968.

What I am saying here I have not put it on paper, I am saying that....to remember is to live, isn't it?

Josina went for training and when she completed her training we had our liaison man hinterland in Nachingwea. Samora wrote a letter to Pachinuapa to inform her that Josina was on her way and asked for Marina to wait for her at the border.

As I said, we had our base – the Ibo Base. When I was ordered to this mission I left with my group, the Women's Detachment. I had the bazooka people, parts, all the weapons men had. We left the Central Base to the border to wait for Josina. Josina entered in Mozambique. She knew Cabo Delgado. You can imagine the responsibility, the burden I had in my head. That is, a person leaving Lourenço Marques, with a good life, going to Dar-es-Salaam – all luxury; leaving her studies, forsaking her bursary to go to Nachingwea to go for training and then to say she wanted to go to Cabo Delgado. But did she know Cabo Delgado? Did she know Marina? She said to Marina she wanted to go to Mozambique where the war was happening and she wasn't from that area. The only girls coming from Lourenço Marques – you can see the burden? What if something happened?

So we moved, we moved to Mocímboa da Praia, all that zone, talking to the people, being introduced as the girl that had come from Lourenço Marques, in other words, to say that she was a woman, leaving all her property, to serve her people – that was the point!

Josina was a woman and I say, women, men, we are all equal, we are all together.

You are the First Secretaries – there by the districts where you the OMM are also acting there. When you do work you think that the OMM is some thing...you forget that women are machines, they are a force. You live in the base, you know it don't you? When it come to the time for the campaign, who tightens the *capulanas*, who shouts? Women, isn't it? It's no fantasy!

I would say that despite the role of the Women's Detachment role, men were still challenging how could women carry the flag like them. We said that the right to carry the flag was not exclusive to anyone in particular. The flag had a red colour part. During the war, death was nothing alien to us. Comrades who were in combat and hit by a bullet, the first thing they would say to me would be: "Manuel, please take my gun. Don't leave my gun please. The struggle will continue!". As they knew they were going to die, they would say: "My blood Will be displayed in the red colour of our flag".



And this was always in our minds. We would proudly state we would die for our country to become independent.

Here in Maputo there is one avenue called Tomás Nduda; at the *Praça dos Heróis* (Heroes Square) there is one hero called Djoni Issa. I won't name other heroes, just the two. Tomás Nduda was in charge of ....Affairs. From the base he was going to raid Mbuvo, so he stormed into the enemy's base, but he was hit and fell at the middle of the runway. He called his men and asked them not to leave his gun. The soldiers knew he had tumbled and was going to die. Nduda died with six other comrades. The (enemy) officer that was captured by FRELIMO, wasn't shot dead. They all left Nambude in the central base, as was FRELIMO's policy.

To explain that our struggle was not an issue of colour. The policy was that if a soldier would hand himself to surrender, we should not be executed, we would just be taken with us. There were many Portuguese soldiers we captured.

Djoni Issa left the Xibabasse to the central base and arrived at night. In the following day there were bombings. We lost many comrades...there were people shouting, they were capturing people. Tomás Nduda died in the hands of our women comrades. He died on his way to the hospital and the only word he said was:"I want to know if the blanket you covering me is from the Portuguese or from the Russians?..". We told him it was from the Portuguese.

Our soldiers would carry the things and kept them in warehouses. They were heroes. We have heroes. That thing about dying for our motherland was something the Mozambicans were proud of.

The role of women was very strong. The role of the women during the struggle was not just talk, it was one of doing things. Sometimes when the lions roar, they don't act. But they could do it in when quiet. It's like dogs, isn't it? Dogs can start barking but not bite, but when quiet they may attack, without barking.

But we feel very good, I feel good amongst the educated doctors. When I look at them, I say – it was worth it! Because it's not fantasy. The respect the Party has for women is no fantasy. It's not fantasy, it's in its grassroots. That's why we have today women ministers, a women Prime Minister, bigwigs! This is what we wanted, and we're proud of it. While we are alive, we say it was worth for those who died for the country.

We were illiterate, we weren't people with degrees. I will explain a little more. Time has gone, I tend to talk a lot, you said this would last from 9h00 to 10h00. But it seems like time has passed.

Let me mention something. Time is short.

Prior to the OMM there was an organization, LIFEMO. It wasn't created within the country, it was formed in Tanzania, in Dar-es-Salaam. Like the Tanzanian *Moto Wayawake*, there was a group of ladies, led by Sarina, the wife of Urias Simango, who formed LIFEMO. They were in Dar-es-Salaam, Mtwara, Mbeia, but had never been to Mozambique.

The first experience was in Cabo Delgado, when we were taking care of orphan children. We took a group of children and sent them to Mtwara, for the aforementioned ladies to take care of them. All those children died. The Provincial Command then decided that we would no longer send children to Tanzania. We had to create child care centres in Mozambique. The Women's Detachment then took care of these children. In practice we were saying that those who were to Cook needed to know how to pour the salt and the ingredients and for how long. One needed to stay in the kitchen to know how to put a pan to boil.

LIFEMO had no roots in Mozambique, they were hanging there in Tanzania, they weren't living the reality. LIFEMO didn't last because the main task was being assumed by the WD. In 1973, when we created the Organization of the Mozambican Women (OMM) we, the women in the Provinces, participated in the Niassa Conference in Cabo Delgado. As the OMM we decided that pregnant women had the right to give the baby her mother, grandmother's name. The right to give a name to the baby is a right of the parents, isn't it?

So then we decided that the 7th April would be the Mozambican Women's Day because that was the date we lost our comrade Josina Machel. Josina was a very courageous woman. She had great courage. In 1969, when Josina became very sick, Frelimo sent her to Moscow for treatment. After she had her first child, she stayed there for more than a month for treatment and then sent back to Dar-es-Salaam. On the Moscow doctors' medical instructions, Josina was to follow a special diet. She was also not allowed to make long trips and avoid doing hard work.

She had the conditions to do so, but she waived them and decided to just eat children's food.

In Tunduru we had a Child Care Centre. Had Josina followed the doctors' advice she would have probably be with us today. But she preferred to risk her life and instead take care of the children. She would eat everything children ate. She had a house, with cooks but wouldn't eat what the doctors prescribed.

In 1969, when I went to Mtwara to give birth to my baby, a representative, one month later, sent a message to Samora Machel to inform him that I was returning to Mozambique. Samora sent a message to Josina to say he wanted to see me. He sent a car to Mtwara for me to proceed to Nachingwea and then to Tunduru. Josina asked me not to go to Mozambique. We were friends, we used to bath together, she didn't want me to Mozambique. She said that if I was to go to Mozambique, she would take care of my baby. I didn't want that to happen so I stayed 4 months with Josina. Josina went to Niassa against the doctors' advice. She to Niassa for a week. We she came back I wasn't in Tunduru I was in Nanchingwea.

From Tunduru Josina went to Nachingwea. When we finished our seminar, I told Josina I was going to Mozambique. She told me she wanted also to go to Mozambique, to Niassa and Cabo Delgado.

But she was feeling tired, she didn't look after her health. She died on the 7<sup>th</sup> April. WE valued our comrade Josina Machel. She was a fine lady who died serving the Mozambican people.

So, comrades, you are First Secretaries. The first thing you have to bear in mind in your activities, is that your lives belong to the people. You are leaders in this house, and by this house I mean FRELIMO, corn and drumming. It's you who are going to ensure and give strength to the Party because you are the basis, there is no small force. Don't think that the districts in which you are leading are small districts. No, there are not, power comes from there, do you understand me? FRELIMO's tradition is to work with the OMM. The OMM is the FRELIMO Party's right hand. The women's engagement in the national liberation Struggle was a war woman had themselves assumed and displayed.

Thus, together we shall work. That's how the WD came out, as well as the women's involvement in the national liberation struggle. It wasn't easy. Where it started, where it left. The Women's Detachment trained in Moamba, with great pride for us.

## Rafael, Francisco “Katumba”

[Tete, Mozambique, 2008]

*Born in Tete, Francisco Rafael joined the armed struggle for the liberation of Mozambique, in FRELIMO, in 1970. A primary school teacher in Chiúta, Tete before his involvement in the struggle, he was supporting the guerrillas underground by supplying them food. He joined the FRELIMO guerrilla at the Military Detachment at the Sector Base of Chilundo. He took with him his wife and two children who stayed at the Chadiza base. He moved to the Kassuende base, the main guerrilla focus at the border with Zambia. During the struggle he taught from standard 1 to standard 3 at the liberated areas, while participating also in combat work. He describes the education system in the liberated areas, as well as social issues, such as marriages during the struggle. After independence he continued in the FPLM armed forces until his discharge in 1987.*

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My engagement in the armed struggle started in 1970 when, after completing my primary school teaching training I had been deployed to Mbondo and later to Katondo, in the District of Chiúta. At the latter village, the *turras* (nickname for terrorists given by the Portuguese) would come to the primary school where I was teaching. They would come asking for soap, scrapbooks, etc. Many people suspected the aid I was giving to the *turras* so, one could expect at any moment that some of my colleagues could report me to the Portuguese. But the mobilizer who was recruiting me to the Frelimo ranks was a commander (section head) whose name was Massambassiana, sensitized me to just follow one line so that everything would go well. After the awareness, he told me that I had been nominated by his superior. So then, on the 12<sup>th</sup> December 1970, they took me to the Chimwala detachment, where I met comrade Kambuko, whose head of the sector base located in Chilungo, was commander Aguacheiro. And from there they introduced me to the commander who had nominated me and who was waiting for me there.

At the time of my incorporation I was already married with two children, who stayed at the Chadiza base. I continued my march to the Mango base, in the District of Marávia, early in 1971, after first spending some time at the Pilot Centre of the DEC, in Chimwala, close to the Kassuende base. Upon some training in Mango, which lasted 45 days, I worked as a teacher but would also be involved in combat work, as and when the circumstances would require so. So, from 1970 to 1974, I was both a teacher and a soldier. I was teaching from standard 1 to standard 3. Standard 4 was rarely taught at the liberated zones. The classes would depend on the circumstances and had to take place at a place under camouflage. The syllabuses we were teaching were more of a political nature. WE wouldn't teach History of Portugal. We would focus on the realities of Mozambique, and about the provinces, districts and localities. The ages of the children would vary from 9 to 18 years. But at the age of 18 they would also have weapons. The 16-year-old ones would support the struggle by carrying war materials. We would move around the various detachments giving classes and do combat work. If the situation would bad enough we would stop the teaching and would place the children in safe sites.

Amongst my teacher comrades I recall comrades Domingos Chimuassa, Augusto Danger, Domingos Malicopo and in the 4th sector I met comrade Crispem Matches, who also worked during the struggle.

What prompted me to the struggle was the fact that I was seeing how the people were being downtrodden. The Portuguese didn't want to see an African as clean as an *assimilado*. Even if he had been educated, as long as he wasn't an *assimilado* he would not be accepted. So I then realized that my qualifications were not worth for the Portuguese. That was the reason why, at the advice of the FRELIMO political commissars, I had the courage to be involved in the armed struggle. The mobilizers were telling us the truth, they were not deceiving anybody. And the results of such mobilization are only now becoming known – an African leading his own country.

During the struggle we wouldn't go to the healers, because we held the military spirit to win a battle without resorting to drugs. If you go to a healer and his rules don't work, he will start to slide. On the conflicts derived from women our rules during the war would not allow such corruption. If this was being done it would be in a hidden manner. One was allowed to marry, but only officially. Anyone wanting a girl would have to report to his superior and would state: "...I love her and I don't want to do things secretly, I want later to make things official". One would flirt at a distance, that is, each one at his base until the superiors would be informed to get things official. There was no time for us to be together.

As to the sustenance for the family there where I was, there were Frelimo structures that would take care of the social affairs of the spouses of the combatants. Whenever possible, after a while, we would have visits of 3 days, though this was not consistently.

Upon the coup d' etat in Portugal, in 1974, we were joyful because for us, the guerrilla fighters, it was a victory. From that coup d' etat, FRELIMO intensified the struggle.

After the Lusaka Accords I remained at the Provincial Command in Tete during 4 months and then I left to the Pilot Centre of Chipera (Marávia) to work as a teacher. From Chipera I went to Jeque, in the 4th Sector, and from there to the Macanga District.

After independence I performed the functions of a company commissar (1982) and then a battalion commissar (1984). In 1985 I was promoted to battalion commander until the date of discharge on the 27<sup>th</sup> July, 1987, with the rank of Captain.

The assessment I make of my participation in the struggle is a positive one, taking into account that the independence has brought freedom to the Mozambican people. Formerly, during the colonial times, there weren't many schools, hospitals, etc. From the liberation struggle to the destabilization period I have a lot to praise about the work done by FRELIMO. Before them there were no schools, hospitals, there was no national unity. The national unity is a gain obtained through the national liberation. Today there is no tribal discrimination, one doesn't ask from where another is. I'm very happy to have participated in the liberation struggle. I would have regretted if I had not participated actively. Economically, the independence allowed the existence of stalls and street vendors, we have our *chapas 100* (combi taxis), something not happening before.

I forgot to say that when I was demobilized (from the Army) Frelimo deployed me as the Defence Secretary at the District Committee in Chiúta, from 1990 to 1991. And in 1994 we founded the Former Combatants Association in Chiúta, where I was the Secretary. In 2002 I was the Verification Secretary at the District Committee. Currently, I am one of the brigade chiefs of the FRELIMO Party.

## Romodja, Rafael

[Maputo, Mozambique, 2007]

*Rafael Romodja, born on the 29th June 1945, in Nkovo, Lago District, Province of Niassa, residing in Maputo, Province of Maputo.*

*Rafael Romodja was a combatant of the national liberation struggle, after he joined FRELIMO with the aim of continuing his studies. Contrary to what was desired, Rafael was mobilized to undergo political and military training for his integration in the liberation army. In 1965 he entered into Niassa to do combat work and was injured. After his recovery until 1970 he worked in the Kongwa and Nanchingwea camps where he performed his duties as a Secretary and national Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. His stay in the aforementioned camps enabled him to live closer to the debates and stresses that defined FRELIMO's growth (formation of the single front, definition of the type of struggle, the 1968/69 crisis) and the role of the Tanzanian Government.*

*From 1970 to 1974 he participated in military operations in Niassa and Tete – where he performed the functions of the sector political commissar.*

*After the proclamation of the independence, from 1976 to 1978, and accompanied by Marcos Mabote he was sent abroad where he specialized in Motorized Infantry. Upon his return he led the creation of the Marshall Samora Machel Military Academy.*

*From 1987 to 1990 he was the head of Information in the Ministry of Defence. In 1992 he was demobilized.*

Thank you for recognizing me as one of the great figures, in order to give my contribution to this research work, to gather both verbal and written bibliographies. I am not going to provide you with a detailed contribution because I lived at a certain stage, while others lived in another stage and spending more time at the forefront of political events and I think there are more informed people around.

I was born in the Province of Niassa, in the Lago District, Nkovo administrative post. I didn't go very early, it was a bit late and thanks to Father Vigélio, who took me from my parents and enrolled me in the school, at the boarding school in the Nkovo Mission.

After I completed his standard 3 at the mission to the technical and community school there but I didn't complete the studies because when I went on holidays, I noted that my friends and family members that had completed standard 4 before me had disappeared. And when I wanted to find out the reason for such disappearance, I was told that as we had done a little bit of everything we should have left to Tanganyika, where there was an organization recruiting people to study there. I was unable to pay for my studies in Lichinga, which at the time was Vila Cabral. Vila Cabral was very cold and my clothes were light, I couldn't bear the cold weather there.

I didn't have enough blankets, I had to continue my studies in Milange.

So I have thus decided that there were more possibilities, more clothes, a study bursary and with the bursary it would be all – and I left. And referred me to Frelimo on the 22<sup>nd</sup> October 1963. Of note is the fact that both my family that went there, such as the case of Paulo Samuel Nkankomba, who is my brother-in-law, and my school mates, we all knew we were going to study. When I arrived there, I met them at the Mozambican Institute. This was the case of André Massange, Bonifácio Deo, Salomão Joate and others.

André Massangois lives in Quelimane, as well as Bonifácio deo who is a medical doctor while Salomão Joate who died. So I arrived in Dar-es-Salaam, as I was already a bit grown up, and was sent to Bagamoyo where I met other people I knew at Niassa. I also attempted to study at the Institute but it was already a bit late because I was 18 years old. Others were also 18 years old, so my destination was eventually the one I'm describing to you. At Bagamoyo the training was basically military.

Fernando Mungata, another one, but the training was confined to exclusively marching drills, though with physical exercises, this in 1964. In June 1965 the first military training course in Kolua, Province of Niassa was initiated. At that time there were already the first trainees that had been sent to Algeria, and these were the ones that could provide us the tougher military training. I was integrated in the 2<sup>nd</sup> group.

They were many. WE, in the 2nd group must have been some 20 people. Our instructors were Major Akabbat Mabuko. He had been sent to Dar-es-Salaam, along with others, such as Aston Jonas. So he came afterwards holding the rank of ...**[translator's note: the rank has been omitted in the original text]**.....which was led by comrade João.

My military training had been completely, as well as of comrades Pedro Juma, Arisses Medimo and others. So we then returned in 1965 to Niassa to reinforce the 1st group of 11 guerrilla fighters who were all trained in Algeria to initiate the armed struggle, under the command of Daniel Pulela in Nampula, with his deputy being Alfael Tazan, who died recently.

So when they would hear about reinforcements for the Province of Niassa, we would be sent there accompanied by the Front Commander who was Samora Machel, for the baptism of fire, he would allow us to enter Lichinga. The marches were night marches, while during the day we would camp and contact the people and ask for their support in terms of food and water. Until that time the Province of Niassa had not been established yet, because they were the force when the war started...so then we came in and there was some furore because the column was very large, they were 8 and we were 75. Some would say we were 70 . Time has passed and it is difficult to remember, one can only remember well at the time the events take place.

For the group who started the struggle in Niassa this was a relief as we joined then to create the starting point and the classification for the operations, for the defence and attack, because the 1<sup>st</sup> group was already on the defensive and we wanted to reverse the situation, which we did. We managed to get a site far away and started to rank the operations to face any emerging situation. The Portuguese wanted to eliminate us, so the operations started to develop with greater intensity.

Yah, but I spoke about a 1st group who started the struggle before us. Now I..later in June, in the same year I was injured and evacuated. There in Songueia, after the shrapnel that hit me, I became a little perturbed, I was a person who didn't know what a child going to do there, a youngster who was going to war and then ends up injured. It was difficult to recover one's morale. So I asked Chairman Mondlane to come to the place I was. As I would like to go for my studies. So he came, and I arrived there later and met with Filipe Samuel Magaia and Samora Machel. I was very naive because in order to study anywhere I would need to have intermediate qualifications, which I didn't have, I had only standard 4. It wasn't easy.

So then Filipe Samuel Magaia and Samora Machel convinced me to return to Conga to recover, in order to continue to be a combatant. I went to Conga, the Conga camp was closed and a new camp had been opened in Nachingwea. So I then went to Nachingwea again as I had recovered and then was appointed the Camp Secretary. Secretary Dinis Moyane had died few years ago, and was the interim commander.

I returned to Quelimane again in 1970 and deployed again to Niassa to support the Provincial Command for 1 year. I returned from there and was appointed the National Head of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and went to recognize all of the principles of the Armed Forces in all fronts. In that task, I'm sorry, I was tasked to this job after I have received my initial training. And in the II Congress I was appointed as the National Chief of and would perform such duties at Nachingwea where the Chief of Staff was based. I also performed the function of Secretary of the current President Armando Guebuza, in September 1970.

In 1970 I returned to Niassa to perform duties at the front, and then from Niassa in 1971 I spent some time and then I left because I didn't want to continue in Nachingwea, because these functions caused vacancies until the 25<sup>th</sup> April with the independence of Mozambique. These positions had been placed under the bureau of the Commander-in-Chief Samora Machel. I stayed in Tete until the 25th April (71,72,73,74) as the sector political commissar, later the political commissar until the end of the war.

Once the war was over, I was called to Lourenço Marques, to continue with my position as the Head of Department at the ..... In 1976, together with Mabote, the new head of the group.

Tomoko, Malope, we were 20 in total but the 6 of us were the ones doing the higher education as motorized or mechanical infantry commander 1 year and a half after in November 1976 and returned only in May 1978 and I continued for some time here and then deployed to create the Samora Machel Military Academy.

Two years later I was once again called to Maputo to continue to lead the information department of the Chief of Staff. I returned in 1972 and in 1974 I was appointed commander of the 7th Brigade in Cuamba.

We were never in the defensive. In 1987 I returned to the military academy and then from 1987 to 1990 I was deployed to Maputo again to become the head of information at the Ministry. (when did the destabilization war ended?). From then I started to imagine how to manage. I had learnt something about it, in that it all depended on the higher structure, orders to receive everything, all free of charge, we would eat and travel free of charge and after some time, it wasn't easy, many of our comrades died, they couldn't make it.

I think I am being too specific.

Ya, so then after the talk I was appointed head of the.....in Nachingueia.

Let me take you back firstly. All of those of us who left Mozambique since 1960 hardly knew what we were going to do in the war. Those who left before 1960 knew were to organize in order to acquire independence in a peaceful manner. It was people of the likes of Adelino Guambe...Magagar Gomba and another who didn't die in the memory was Manu. All of them because they had a wider vision and, like in the case of other countries that already had their independence peacefully, they were going there to lead the organizations to negotiate with the Portuguese to achieve our independence. This was the first aspect of the conflicts. Those whom we found in the fronts and who had left via the underground movement knew they were going to fight. There were disagreements in the formation of the single front. Some were of the opinion that there should have been no armed struggle, but rather to negotiate the independence with the Portuguese.

But we knew we couldn't obtain it in that way....that's why we tried and obtained funds, though those who didn't want the war had gone away, those were the leaders of the other movements. They left because they didn't want the war, because war for them was a passage, not a matter of final liberation. The conflicts of 1968/69 were due, on the one hand, to these ideas. We were in the front and recruiting people in the liberated areas, people who had to do the war. The only ones furthering the war.

I took you back in time to show you the divisions existing in the leadership of Frelimo, right at the outset. I'm going to answer straight to your question about the reason why there wasn't a split (in the movement) seeing that I had told you that the war was being conducted by us (those who were fighting inside the country). We were aware that there were cleavages in the leadership. But we were not accepting the situation.



We were led by people who had a vision about the issues and we were being informed about the causes of these cleavages. And these internal conflicts never succeeded in Cabo Delgado or in Niassa, or anywhere else in Frelimo because we had the leadership who was always guiding us.

The Portuguese colonialism had a strategy – to eliminate the top leaders of Frelimo. This happened with Eduardo Mondlane. Firstly there was a plan to eliminate him. Secondly, to infiltrate Frelimo in order to gain information from the combatants at the front. Thirdly, to react to our strategy to intensify the armed struggle at Cabo Delgado and Niassa.

The leaders that were in a condition to lead in an efficient manner were Paulo Samuel Nkankomba, and after his death Samora Machel, who set the dynamics and who pulled those leaders out of the fear of going to war in Nachingwea, while others were ran away. I can name a few. So that was, more or less, the essence of the leadership issues and about the events at the time. In short, the power of decision rested on those that had the conviction to do the war.

Surely, because we had informants in each front we were opening. I didn't know much, in spite of being there. What I learnt exhaustively was that we were being colonized. The hate that led us to the struggle was that we suffered a lot to be able to study, we suffered because we were poor and had nothing and affected us all. Such way of living was not acceptable, the *xibalo* (forced labour) wasn't acceptable, being forced to work without pay wasn't acceptable. And that thing of exporting us to São Tomé e Príncipe wasn't acceptable. Being punished with sjamboks and palmers wasn't acceptable, being colonized and oppressed wasn't acceptable. No one could fail to understand that we had to get rid of oppression.

So our option was to tell our comrades to struggle to gain independence and set an example to our people, since that treatment wasn't giving us any good. The Portuguese were foreigners, not Mozambicans. We didn't know the combat front zones. But it would not be hard for a young person to refuse to fight when the Portuguese were setting fire to the homes of the people, killing defenceless people, killing everybody in an area where odd people were moving around. Those things contributed to enhance the rivalry and hate.

In 1969, at the Nkankomba Congress, a Deputy Chief of Operations was appointed, like in the case of *Nó Górdio*, as he was a political commissar in Cabo Delgado at the time. And when the Congress ended there was all that reaction, I'm talking about the troubles. At the base, Nkavandame ordered the militia men not to allow entry to anyone who allegedly wasn't from Cabo Delgado. As he disagreed with Frelimo's policy, Nkavandame always held the opinion that the war should have only been confined to Cabo Delgado and nowhere else. And that's why he ordered the withdrawal of the all the leaders of Cabo Delgado who were in Niassa.

He ordered them to go back to Cabo Delgado and stated that: "Firstly, we Makonde must first liberate Niassa and Cabo Delgado and only after that we will support you...you are whites." He had a narrow vision....and ignorance kills.

So, he ordered his militiamen to stay at the border where he had access and some influence, so he could then set the revolt of the militiamen under the command of Nkavandame. To cross Mecunha, at the border of Cabo Delgado, the situation there at the border with Cabo Delgado was chaotic and we could not understand why that group of the leadership was leaving. That reactionary group had such position long time before.....where there is a revolution there should be no complacency. It was the struggle and there was no space for complications.

So, from there Xipande continued to play a major role to contain such reactions in the guerrilla warfare. That was when Nkavandame felt he was under threat and handed himself to Frelimo ..... ????.the process couldn't occur with internal conflicts. To win the II World War, the Soviet Union had to eliminate the traitors, as there were was a lot of betrayal.

To all of us, this was a sad and shocking event. We knew about the capacities and skills of Paulo Samuel Nkankomba's leadership. He was a courageous leader combatant. We felt that and that is why we had to fight any reactionary tendency, which was duly fought against to the end.

Then..... after that reaction we proceeded to work normally and those dubious members ran away. If they didn't desert to the enemy they fled into refugee camps, while those that had committed serious mistakes had been punished.

.....he took note of it, but could hardly do anything, because that was wholly dependent on Frelimo, it was Frelimo's responsibility at the military level. But at the political level there were leaders who were supporting the reaction, and there were leaders who were supporting the Revolution. There were also divisions at the level of the Government. As far as the internal conflicts at Dar-es-Salaam, there were divisions at the top leadership. I recall a meeting where Nakvamdame was criticized by us and by people of the Government of Tanzania. But although he had created a lot of trouble and many atrocities, without a strategic but tribalistic view, there were some Tanzanian leaders that defended him. But when there is a true cause there is no false cause and the true cause always wins. Our struggle was a just cause and our policy was a just policy. Wrong causes don't win. But the sequels continued, since the historical process was unique and the struggle is a dynamic process and there can hardly be perfections.

I met Dinis Moiane at Mucumbura and he was a commander and part of one of the first groups to be trained in Algeria. He was trained in military communications but never played any communications task because he had always been known for his skills in .....after he completed his leadership duties he was detached to the Cabo Delgado Province. After independence, he came to Maputo and stayed in Boane and, since many remained to work for the State, to hold management positions at Companies and Cooperatives, he was later deployed to Manhiça and promoted to the rank of Coronel.

He had some businesses and went to Gaza, fell sick and was transferred to Maputo and died. He was often remembered because he set up the centre, which worked fully under his leadership and many of them were under his command.

I recall the day I went to Niassa to become the Provincial Commander, and the Party's leadership was aware of this deliberation. We had all been called to report to the Chief of Staff and deployed to each of the provinces to support the combat classification. I went to Niassa, and there the *Nó Górdio* offensive wasn't as hard as in Cabo Delgado because there we had trees to attack with armoury. In Niassa there weren't dispersed units but they came to attack us but were defeated, because we counter-attacked and performed sabotage operations everywhere and that is why I could go to Nampula without any risk.

At Bagamoyo we learnt more about political knowledge during the political and military training. At Bagamoyo we learnt more about colonialism and what was happening there.

There was nothing about political training, no marching. The instructors that came from Algeria had the misconception that the war was going to last for a short while. When I arrived at Congo was incorporated in that group of combatants coming from everywhere. Groups were formed and we started to train with weapons very hard. In the morning we would do physical exercises, then take a bath and leave for military training but without our own weapons. So we would do marching training, then tactical exercises in the bush, up and down and do it twice a day, in the morning and afternoon, then have dinner and go to sleep to wake up early next morning.

We had no relationship with our instructors, only during the training period. We were having discussions about what we were going to achieve and we were feeling encouraged because we had a vision about colonialism which we didn't have before. Our mission was noble we were going to accomplish it.

To this effect I had concluded that the type of armed struggle we were engaged was different than the one effected by those who were against the revolutionary ideals and who had been completely defeated morally, psychologically and physically. The leader at the time was Chairman Samora Machel and his leadership was very firm. There was no time to intervene in the lives of the military. There were leaders that were always in Dar-es-Salaam. When one would arrive there one would be considered and betrayed. We didn't play around. Comrade Massinga was saying yesterday that the Portuguese were erasing the names of Mozambicans because .....one was wondering if they had agents infiltrated there, but I didn't see that there.

Well, Samora always wanted to change his army into a modern army, so he had his contacts with the embassy.....military people sent to Europe, sometimes to Mozambique. The interest was highly focused on the regular forces to be converted into regular armed forces.

So he decided to start with the contingent in order to conceive an objective reality about the mobilization, or vice-versa. He picked the people he knew would transform the forces into regular forces, as they would learn according to required modern techniques.

There was a comrade at the Chief of Staff that didn't agree, because he didn't want me to go.

Samora led the group of 20 which...was already organized and we were already there, there were some 6 of us. So we left on the 6th November, we were 20 and the advanced group would go to the hinterland, while the other would go abroad with the mechanized infantry brigade and when we reached there.....

In November is very cold very knowledgeable, we had to learn how to lead a battalion, a brigade, a division in the offensive and in the defensive and during movement. We trained for a year. Our training lasted a year.

The group then completed its training, was successful and we learnt a lot, how to use the military operative technique, how to understand the enemy's situation in order to take a decision, and when to take a decision, and the importance of any enemy. One can't classify an enemy in an operation, and (you must know) how to coordinate with the neighbours. If it's at dawn you have to take into account, they might call at zero hours, one has to be ready, to know how to set up communications, how to create defences. To take off at the outset so that the group that had returned played a major role.

I went later. After the work at the Chief of Staff I went to the military school to set up a school for the training of cadres at an intermediary level and with knowledge of the Russian language and techniques, to work with Russian people to teach the young people about the war fronts.

As to the other colleagues, in the case of the late Conta Gore, who died a short while ago, he be in command of Napal. Everyone knows what Napal didn't do, facing the Boers, always quickly withdrawing in Napal.

Bin Tete and then continued. I already said these were fundamental points. And these chief commanders played other important tasks and they will tell you when interviewed.

So that's how the war started in 1964, there was a group who begun the attack at the front, but Zambia was not understanding the fighting. Malawi was allowing the Mozambicans to pass through its territory, because they had a strong link with the Portuguese colonialism.

And so the war did have a success, the front wasn't doing anything. But on the 8th November 1968 the war front was reopened and Zambia was already an independent country by 24<sup>th</sup> October 1964.

It was only by the 8th March, the front in Tete was reopened. Now in August 1971 the situation was already consolidated, the 1st sector was already consolidated and there were zones that were liberated. The military and administrative division was already effected by us. There was a lot of population producing and feeding themselves in the liberated areas.

When I went there, the Frelimo's representative in Lusaka was Mariano. He played a role with one of our military men who was dealing specifically with military issues. He had trucks to transport materials in Dar-es-Salaam to the border where we were usually with a delegation to receive the materials inwards and for transfer. But when I went the situation was normal, it was gratifying, it was nice to live at the Tete front. We would plan the operations, we would go to fight and would return normally. We would force the populations and we would gradually advance forward. The most difficult area was Dondo because of the lack of water.

So when the Matavel group was located, Matavel left Tete and was ordered to receive a group coming from Gaza and I was there. And when the group arrived, Mabote and I and other colleagues accompanied Matavel to cross the Zambezi River to Mocumbura and then we left him there and were gone. We returned and started to manage Frelimo's situations conveying information, to study and manage. Information coming from there, to be studied, its history and material support. People were arriving to be evacuated to hospital, and Fernando Tembo was here. The Front was more peaceful, dynamic in all aspects without conflicts, and I enjoyed a lot being in Tete.

You know dr., I know all language groups in Tete.

I can't invent everything I lived. A great deal of what I lived has contributed to the national liberation struggle. So I want to say that it's important. This work is going to have a lot of support and will be effected soon, and that's very good because it brings knowledge to the people, it brings references to the past history. It's already good for the time that brings us together, they say the future doesn't exist, it only exists in our conception. If time exists, then the future exists, now the future lives in each time occasion and such time lives in the people. Such people will need to investigate, but not to investigate false memories, there is no data, you are going to need to scrutinize the information.

The globalization world needs to know such globalization, to know the events and to guide towards the right direction.

At the time, at the liberated areas, we were already living for 7 years there, we were already independent, no one ill-treated us, no one was oppressing us, we were living at our own expense, we could decide on what we wanted to do about ourselves. And it was under that thought that there was a perspective, a promising horizon which, if it was to happen, would enable us to reach the goal.

In terms of the correlation of forces we realized that we were able to reach the enemy's combat capacity, and we were convinced we could win the war. And that's when we were motivated by the Chinese instructors' policies, giving us the example of China's liberation struggle, when they used to tell us that our struggle could take a long time but we would win.

The struggle could be a protracted one but we needed to be patient, because all just causes would win.

And we already had a high morale, independence was the total achievement.

You can't imagine how much I felt in that night at Machava. I felt that my sacrifice had been worthwhile, that I could now die because I had served my people. I was like a drop that contributed with other drops towards the big drop, a storm of drops to liberate Mozambique. It was gratifying for me, I am very happy because I know I know nothing, but I know I have contributed with the little knowledge I have. And that is the freedom we want, the freedom we that had suffered little with colonialism – not worthwhile, we could cry. Many Mozambicans were deported to São Tomé e Príncipe and died there. Ngungunhame himself, why did they take him to the Azores, why did they take our leader there?

To liberate the Mozambican people from colonialism. Pity, those that tell people about the atrocities of colonialism are in shortage. If you could bring here a person that suffered very little with the colonialism, one could cry. Many Mozambicans were deported to São Tomé e Príncipe and died there.

Gungunhama, why did they take our chief to Azores?.

And Portugal decided not to grant independence to the colonies, they couldn't care, they just killed....not like the British who granted the wish to their colonies. So we were forced to take up arms. ....

... yes, it is true but each stage had its impetuous moments.

You are from the decade of the 1980s, these are new times...each time has features one can't fight against because we were there.

Time has its strong events, one goes to fight, to catch...just leave it. The important is to manage, to have good management. That's why we have to have charismatic leaders. To be a leader, to have ideas, comrade Julieta. You can't buy these things, they just don't come out. It's a pragmatic person. You don't have to have a great education to be a leader. To be a leader is to be a genius. The leader is a charismatic, comes out alone in society. So we need that type of people to lead our internal events.

Just to complete, I didn't mention the date of birth. I was born in Niassa on the 29th June 1945 and only got married after the independence. My wife's name is Maria Christina Cristóvão, we have 5 daughters and they are all adults. One thing not mentioned, the address. I currently live in Maputo, at the city of Matola, since 1990. I have been here in Matola where there are no troubles.

It's alright, thank you very much for this input. We know that it is yet not ended. Someone will seek you to help us to work out some details because I'm alone, so I think my colleagues will probably check out what I couldn't check.

This was a relief so we integrated in order to create a starting point and classification of the operations, for the exit.

## Rupia, Kheriati Canguani

[Tete, Mozambique, 2008]

*Born in Tete, joined Frelimo in 1970 at the Chiritsi and received his initial training at the Kassuende base. Saw action in Chiúta operating 82mm mortars. He participated in various patrols and combat work where he was injured. He partook in the attack to the Chingodzi Air Base in Tete, under the command of Sebastião Mabote and José Moiane in 1972. In 1974 he was promoted to Platoon Commander in Mutarara, at the border with Malawi. He fought against the Rhodesians in Changara having participated in the air defence system. He fought in Zimbabwe for 6 months from Changara. After independence he participated in the civil war and then demobilized with the rank of second-lieutenant.*

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I was incorporated in December 1970, after being mobilized by Fernando Mascas who took me to the Chiritsi Base which was at the time led by Commander Levinala. I had my 3 month training at the Chimwala/Mango Base at the Kassuende zone. After the training I returned in 1972 to Chiritsi and was then deployed to the Manje detachment, in Chiúta. At Manje I was trained with 82mm mortars. At Chiritsi we did patrol work and attacked in 12 combatants groups which formed a section and then I partook in various combats in Chicoco and Bango.

During the war there was a lot of suffering and went through hard times in order to feed and clothe ourselves, and it was very difficult during the rainy season. As to food we would eat wild fruits, such as *malambe*, though we would also often mobilize the populations to obtain food. In those days, anyone threatening the population would be punished. We had a good relationship with the people. My colleagues at the time included Andreki, Kabissiwa, Tchuna Cheyenda, England Miguel. The first former two are still alive.

One of the clashes I can remember is the Bango battle, where I was injured, as a result of an enemy bullet. The battle was led by Chief Lisboa (Lapissone). From there we attacked the Chingodzi Air Base, in the outskirts of Tete, led by commander Mabote. We proceeded via Matenje and then proceeded in our attack. In addition to Mabote, commander José Moiane was also there and this happened in 1972. Mabote was the commander, while José Moiane was the Head of the Defence department, Mário Juma and a certain Miguel were part of the Police.

At the end of the war I was in Manje and from there to Macanga to fly to Chingodzi. From there I was attached to Mutarara as a platoon commander at the border with Malawi. In 1975 I was deployed to Changara where we fought against the Rhodesian Boers. At that time, I was at the air defence as a ZGU specialist. I also saw action inside Zimbabwe for 6 months. I can't remember in which sites because it was in foreign territory. We were 30, most of which Zimbabwean freedom fighters and the starting point was in Changara. There we only had a company, we were teaching guerrilla warfare to the Zimbabweans.

President Samora Machel had ordered us to train the Zimbabweans. In Zimbabwe we used to set up ambushes at the roads.

In 1980 I went to Gorongoza, Chimanimani, Inchope, where I fought for 9 months. From Gorongoza I returned to the Province of Tete, as a member of the local force, at the Chiúta District, in Manje, forming part of the 82mm mortar. I also operated in Chifunde and Nsadzo with 82mm mortars.

In 1986 I was discharged from service with the rank of 2nd lieutenant. But I was the commander of the 82mm rocket battery, so my rank should have been that of captain. But I am getting paid as a 2nd lieutenant. The outcome to me was positive in that we had put an end to the *chibalo* as well as to the forced labour. I am receiving today although the money is not enough for all. I think it was worthwhile because we are independent. I am happy because the work I did had the results which are reflected in the country. Democracy came through the National Liberation. The current challenges lie with having to achieve development, to implement democracy and to fight poverty.

## Yotamo, Isabel

[Tete, Mozambique, 2008]

*Born in Tete, she joined FRELIMO in 1970 at the Policia Base in Chadiza.*

*She spent some time in Kassuende before going to Tanzania. When she joined the national liberation struggle, she was still very young and unmarried. She left for Nachingwea where she received training under the guidance of Maria Makala. Upon return to Tete she participated in the combat zones at Maloera at Marávia. Saw action along with other women and men under the command of Sebastião Mabote and José Moiane. She recalls many episodes she lived about betrayals, in addition to the moments of hunger and strategies of survival adopted during the war. She was discharged from service with the rank of Sergeant after independence.*

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What prompted me to the war was the oppression of the Portuguese. I joined the struggle on the 10<sup>th</sup> October 1970 at the Polícia Base which was at the time under the command of Rui Calilombe. From there I was then deployed to the sectorial base which was led by Alfredo Maria Diomba and by comrade Lucas Lipewa. From the sectorial base we were sent to the Kalimaru detachment. At this detachment we would till *machambas* and our chief was Armando Chicanada together with comrade Dhumbo. From Kalimaru I went to Tanzania where I had military training going through the Beira and Chadiza bases. From the latter base we then travelled in a vehicle to Kassuende. From Kassuende we were transported to Lusaka and from there to Nachingweia. Our instructor was Maria Makala and we had some men training with us. We had our weapons training for 6 months. After the training we returned to Mozambique, to the Kassuende base.

My first baptism of fire was in Maloera, Marávia, to attack the Portuguese. We first went with the head of reconnaissance, to survey the enemy's position but the chief later escaped and handed himself to the Portuguese, and reported our plan to the enemy. So he betrayed us by warning the authorities that Frelimo wanted to attack the Portuguese barracks. We were struck when the enemy fired the first shots and we had to withdraw to the 1<sup>st</sup> Sector. The traitor never returned back. It was only in the second attempt that we succeeded in the attack to the Maloera barracks. From Maloera I went to Mphangula, on the 1st Sector where we attacked the local barracks. Upon return I was deployed to the 2nd sector. We were many WD members and these battles were led by commanders Sebastião Mabote, Canhem Chidzolomondo (Macanga), Manje (Chiúta). The Manje detachment commander was comrade Lisboa Andissene. After the Manje attack we returned to the base. The war was nearly over when we heard that the commander had been summoned to Lusaka. At the time of the Lusaka Accords I was attached to the 1<sup>st</sup> Sector.

During the war we suffered a lot, we didn't have food, we would eat wild fruits such as, for example a fruit called *mathoa*. Sometimes we would eat meat without salt and to find corn we would have to take long journeys, such as to the areas of Kawaza, Nkokoto and Ndoe in search of food to supply the base.

At these areas we would ask the people to help us without forcing them to do so.

Apart from combat work we would also grind the maize and cook. Given the high food shortage at the bush, those of us doing the grinding had to hide away the *misseres* (particles of ground corn) and would eat them carefully when going to sleep to avoid being caught by the other comrades. We had to do this because of hunger.

During the Transitional Government we moved to Bawe next to Cazula (Chiúta) with Chief Matias. We were farming there until the war erupted in Zimbabwe.

At the time I joined the struggle I wasn't married and was still a teenager, I only got married after the end of the war. During the war I never thought of dating anyone, I was just focused on the war. But there were some comrades who got married officially. There were no fooling around and we couldn't even date secretly.

As to the healers, we never consulted them.

I don't remember the year I was discharged from duty because I never studied nor did I hold any rank. Today I get an ex-combatant's pension. I get a pension allowance of MT 3 000.00, which is equivalent to a Sergeant's pension. Very happy with FRELIMO's achievements.

