

SADC

Hashim Mbita Project

**Southern African
Liberation Struggles**

1960–1994

Contemporaneous Documents

**edited by
Arnold J.
Temu and
Joel das N. Tembe**

1

Introduction



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Map of Numbered States



- 1 Democratic Republic of Congo
- 2 Tanzania
- 3 Angola
- 4 Zambia
- 5 Malawi
- 6 Mozambique
- 7 Zimbabwe

- 8 Botswana
- 9 Namibia
- 10 South Africa
- 11 Lesotho
- 12 Swaziland
- 13 Mauritius
- 14 Seychelles

Foreword

by Lt. General Hashim Mbita

In 1994, South Africa became the last country on the African continent to be liberated from colonialism and apartheid. That victory brought to an end centuries of exploitation, oppression, degradation, untold suffering and humiliation of African people. In order that present and future generations do not forget the sacrifices made by the millions of their forefathers and mothers in the liberation struggles, the 2004 SADC Summit Conference held in Port Louis, Mauritius, approved a Research Project to document the liberation struggles in southern Africa, and to publish the documents from that research in a series of books. It was agreed that indigenous African scholars and researchers from each country should do the research, thereby asserting the ownership, independence and integrity of the initiative. One volume records the contributions of countries and organizations outside the SADC that were sympathetic to and supported the liberation struggle in various tangible ways. It was also decided at that summit that the project should be funded through voluntary contributions from each member state. A Workshop to launch the Research Project was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania from 1-6 August 2005. It brought together two scholars/ researchers from each member state of the SADC regional organization to discuss and agree upon the method and strategy to implement the decision of the Heads of State and Government. Paramount among the resolutions of the workshop was that the researchers should be guided by the imperative of historical truth, objectivity and independence. The product of the research should not be one sided and should not exclude from the record individuals or groups of individuals which at one point or another in the evolution of the struggles may have played roles, whether positive or negative. In other words, while the SADC states sponsored the research, the resulting documentation should not only reflect the views of the political leadership, individuals and parties currently in power to the exclusion of all others.

These volumes constitute a comprehensive record of the liberation struggle in southern Africa. However, by the sheer scale, histories and involvement of millions of ordinary people, hundreds of thousands of freedom fighters, party cadres, political and military leaders, there cannot be one set of books or even several of them that can claim to be exhaustive. There will, therefore, be other books and publications on particular aspects of the histories of the struggles and of different protagonists – individuals and groups – within and outside the different liberation movements, based on the ideologies, biases and interpretations of their writers. These should be welcomed, for the principal objective of recording the history of these struggles is to make future generations aware of the price of independence and freedom and their responsibility to defend and protect it. States may wish to publish other material in their possession that the researchers in this project did not have access to. Other material not yet available may surface to challenge or give a new interpretation of events on which there may currently be consensus. Museums, monuments, names of streets, buildings and other ways of recognizing and celebrating the contributions of the fallen heroes of the liberation wars should be additional ways of recording this glorious history.

I was greatly honoured to be appointed Executive Secretary of the OAU Liberation Committees by the late Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, President and Father of the Tanzanian nation and confirmed by the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity. Before me, Ambassadors Faustian Chale and George Magombe had served in that capacity and it is right and proper to record their contributions to the cause of African liberation. Needless to say, we were only servants of the people appointed to the position by the foresighted and committed leader, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, and supported by the OAU to whom the ultimate credit must go. Without their commitment to the cause of African liberation, selfless and tireless involvement, it would have taken much longer and been more costly in human and material terms before the final goal of the march of African liberation was reached.

I would like to thank the leaders and governments of SADC for funding the project, and the Secretariat of the Hashim Mbita Project of Documenting the Liberation of Southern Africa headed by Prof Arnold J. Temu for accomplishing the task set for them and producing this monumental work. The researchers and writers, peer reviewers, editors and other individuals and institutions worked hard and diligently to produce this work. They deserve our appreciation. It is in light of all this that I recommend these volumes and hope they will not only end up on bookshelves, but that they will be read for knowledge and inspiration in our region and beyond.

Lt. General Hashim Mbita
Dar es Salaam, 2014

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Introduction

by Arnold J. Temu

The 1960s were the best of times for the fifteen countries that achieved political emancipation from colonial rule in sub Saharan Africa following Ghana that had achieved its independence in 1957. By the end of the 1960s a majority of them had gained independence from their colonial masters through peaceful means. In Southern Africa, these countries included the Democratic Republic of the Congo 1960, Madagascar 1960, United Republic of Tanzania born in 1964 out of union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, which received independence from Britain in 1961 and 1963 respectively. They were followed by Zambia 1964, Malawi 1964, Botswana 1964,

Lesotho 1966, Swaziland 1968 and Mauritius 1968.

The Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique (and Guinea Bissau and Sao Tome) were yet to be free. So were Rhodesia and Apartheid South Africa. During the first half of the century, African nationalist movements in these countries sought change and accommodation with the racist white minority and apartheid governments through negotiations and petitions. In South Africa, politics of change through accommodation and petition go back to 1912. In that year Africans formed the African National Congress (ANC). Its main objective was to seek equitable distribution of the land and the franchise that the Union Act, 1910, had denied them. So also did social formations formed by Indians, Coloureds of the time, and Trade Unions, as did social groupings representing ethnic groups, churches and workers in Namibia, Zimbabwe and in Portuguese colonial Angola and Mozambique. Instead of accommodating their moderate demands for change, white minority governments tightened their grip on the Africans by legislation and clamped down on any forms of political descent. Rather than cowering nationalist ferment, the draconian measures served to radicalise it, forcing Africans to form new political parties in the decade of the fifties and early sixties that organised mass demonstrations, protests and boycotts as popular methods and tactics of seeking change.

The white minority governments in these countries rejected nationalist calls for majority rule through negotiations and tightened their hold by repression of all kinds, including imprisonment of the leaders of the nationalist movements. When the nationalists turned to radical forms of seeking change in the form of mass movements, strikes and boycotts, the minority governments turned their guns on the marchers, shooting down some of them in cold blood. They followed these with arrests and incarceration of the leaders and banned the nationalist movements. By the end of the first half of the 1960s, all the nationalist movements had been banned in these countries and the leadership and other followers incarcerated in prison; others that escaped fled into neighbouring countries. Unrelenting, the nationalist movements went underground, formed armed wings and turned to guerrilla warfare.¹ Freedom fighters and refugees fled these countries and set up offices first in Tanzania, and when Zambia became independent in 1964, moved part of their offices to Lusaka, Zambia.

The blood that was shed over the region and watered the trees of freedom began to sprout with the liberation of Angola and Mozambique in 1974/5. They were followed by Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990 and South Africa in 1994.

In the meantime, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was formed by Heads of State and Government of independent states in Africa at their meeting in Addis Ababa in 1963. At the same time they declared that their independence would be meaningless so long as those countries under the yoke of imperialism were not free and formed the Liberation Committee, to help those countries achieve their freedom by peaceful means if possible or through armed struggle if need be.² Nearer home to the countries yet not free, the independent countries of Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia came together and formed the Frontline States to coordinate joint policies on the liberation struggle.³

By then the armed struggle for liberation in these countries was underway and freedom fighters and refugees were fleeing their countries to the neighbouring countries.

The blood that was shed over the region and watered the trees of freedom began to sprout with the liberation of Angola and Mozambique in 1975; they too joined the Frontline States. In the wake of the liberation in 1980 and 1990 respectively, Zimbabwe and Namibia joined the Frontline States.

(1) The extant political parties that turned to guerrilla warfare were: Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) formed in 1956; the National Movement for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) formed in 1962 and the National Union for Total Independence (UNITA) formed in 1966; Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) formed in exile in Tanzania in 1962; Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) (ZANU PF) formed in Zimbabwe in 1961 and 1963 respectively; the African National Congress, South Africa, formed in 1912 wore radical clothing while the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and the Pan African Congress (PAC) were formed in 1921 and 1959 respectively; South West Africa Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia formed in exile in Tanzania in 1959.

(2) The Organization of Africa Unity charter, in OAU Chapter, p.1.

(3) The Resolution Establishing the OAU Liberation Committee, Article II.

In 1980 on the eve of the liberation of Zimbabwe, the Frontline States formed the Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). It was essentially an economic development organisation and an outcome of a long process of consultations between member states in the 1970s. The leaders of the Frontline States realized that gaining political independence was only the first step towards real independence. And without economic and cultural emancipation, political independence would be meaningless.⁴

In the short run, SADCC aimed at collectively reducing the overwhelming dominance of Apartheid South Africa over the economy of the region, and in the long term, addressing neo-colonialism which aimed to turn the region into a dependency, thereby reducing the achievements of political liberation gained to mere paper. By then, only South Africa and Namibia remained in the clutches of Apartheid South Africa, and freedom fighters belonging to different liberation movements were fighting tooth and nail to liberate their countries. Therefore, SADCC aimed to engage by practice its member states to counter South Africa's dominance and politically oppose the apartheid regime to strengthen their support for the liberation movements fighting it, while taking concrete steps towards economic independence. At that time SADCC sought to address transport, upon which most of the region was dependent on apartheid South Africa, the role of minerals in dependency, and food security in the region. Other sectors that SADCC was charged with were agricultural research, energy and industries. The Frontline leaders viewed SADCC as a process leading both to coordination of effort and stimulation of economic growth within the region. In this regard special projects of interest to member states were designed and implemented. Little wonder, the formulation of economic programmes and projects became *sine qua* in SADCC. These included food security, agricultural research and the development of transport and communications infrastructure. The different sectors were coordinated by selected member countries depending on their comparative advantage in the sector. The SADCC Secretariat at Gaborone, Botswana, remained slim, tasked only with overseeing the various regional projects and organizing meetings of its constitutive organs.⁵

By the end of the decade, appreciable progress was made in the different sectors of the economy with which member states were charged. This opened the door for Frontline leaders to consider economic integration of the region which was left open in the objectives of SADCC. Dramatic events that occurred between 1988 and 1991 accelerated the process. In November 1988 the armed land and air forces of the apartheid regime in South Africa suffered a humiliating defeat by combined forces of Cuba and the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) at the

(4) The Frontline States, made up of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, adopted the Lusaka Declaration (entitled *Southern Africa: towards Economic Liberation*) at the Lusaka Summit on April 1, 1980.

(5) For more details, see Joseph L.M. Chitundu, "An assessment of the compatibility of SADC national trade policies", Economic Research Bureau Paper, University of Dar es Salaam, 2007.

battle of Cuito Cuanavale.⁶ She was also battered from within by South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), African National Congress (ANC) and Pan African Congress (PAC) freedom fighters. As a result of the ineffectiveness of its suppressive machinery to counter the attacks, the regime was forced to let Namibia go in 1990. Apartheid South Africa then unbanned the ANC, PAC and the Communist Party of South Africa. This opened the door for negotiations leading to majority rule in South Africa. At the same time the Frontline States moved swiftly to create an economic block that would include South Africa after majority rule. Consequently on April 17, 1992 in Windhoek, Namibia, the Declaration and Treaty establishing the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in place of SADCC was signed by the Heads of State and Government and founding members of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. South Africa and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) became members in 1994 and 1997 respectively. The Seychelles joined in November 1997, withdrew its membership in July 2004, and returned to the fold again in August 2008. Madagascar was admitted into SADC in 2004, bringing the current SADC membership to 14 countries.

The Research Project

In 2004, SADC Heads of State and Government in their Summit at Port Louis, Mauritius, approved a research Project to Document the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa and committed to fund it from the voluntary contributions of member states.⁷

In this way, the Summit signalled its intention that it should be undertaken by intellectuals indigenous to the country of research asserting thereby African initiatives, affirming their aspirations and safeguarding African intellectual property rights.

The countries participating in the Research Project are members of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) from the mainland. They include Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland. These countries are bonded together by origin, being predominantly Bantu speaking peoples. They share the common experience of origin and language in the sub-African Continent; they migrated from the Niger-Benue River and for centuries they expanded southwards and settled over most of the region. They developed centralized state systems and very sophisticated agro-industries and iron technologies before they were run by European countries. Sadly they suffered devastating and dehumanizing experiences of colonialism and underdevelopment. During the establishment of European control, the division of colonial boundaries

(6) Speech given by Commander-in-Chief Fidel Castro First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and President of the Councils of State and of Ministers, Havana City, December 1988.

(7) Launching Workshop, Report Annexure III, SADC Secretariat Research: Hashim Mbita Project, August 1-5, 2005, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

were drawn on paper mostly in Europe, cutting through nationalities and compact ethnic groupings such that the same nationalities speaking the same language were divided between two or three colonial powers. These together proved advantageous to the armed struggle, albeit retrogressive in the initial stages of nationalism.

The study

From 2006 to 2010 two leading scholars in eleven countries of mainland SADC – Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Lesotho and Swaziland – led research teams scouring the rural and urban areas of their countries, collecting by video and tape recorders memories and experiences of people in the liberation struggles. They focused on the participants and supporters of the struggle from both sides, concentrating on freedom fighters and refugees and those who supported the struggle: peasants, workers and the elite.

In 2007 the Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government at its meeting in Lusaka felt that the study of the liberation struggle in southern Africa would be incomplete without a complementary study of those countries and organisations outside SADC that were sympathetic with and supported the liberation struggle in various ways.⁸

Researchers in regions outside SADC did not follow the same format followed by those researching on mainland SADC, considering the time and extent of the regions in which they undertook research. Consequently, they followed methodologies best suited to them.

The chapters that follow are divided into nine volumes. The first volumes focus on the eleven mainland SADC countries. These are in turn divided into three groups: Countries of the Liberation Wars (Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe), the Frontline States (Botswana, Tanzania and Zambia), and the Extension countries (Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland). The last section focuses on select countries and international organizations outside mainland SADC that were sympathetic to and supported the liberation movements in various ways. The regions are Anglophone West Africa, Francophone Africa, North Africa, Canada and the United States, China and East Asia, Cuba and the Caribbean, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Nordic Countries, the Soviet Union, and Western Europe. The international organizations under study include the Commonwealth, Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the United Nations (UN). These chapters explore the contributions of the countries to the liberation struggle from the 1960s to 1994. Altogether they serve to join them to the SADC countries while also internationalizing the liberation struggle.

Together the volumes constitute the overall outcomes of the SADC Secretariat Project, “Documenting the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa”, otherwise

(8) 10th Meeting of the Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, 18-19 July 2008, p.12.

popularly known as the Hashim Mbita Project in honour of the last and the longest serving Executive Secretary of the Africa Liberation Committee.

The analytical chapters are written in the official languages of SADC, namely English, French and Portuguese with the exception of the Cuba and other Caribbean countries chapter, which is written in Spanish. The Personal Stories are written in the language in which they were collected; most of them are in English or Portuguese, but in the Tanzania chapter they are in *Kiswahili*, while in the South Africa and Zimbabwe chapters there is a mixture of English and vernacular languages. Eventually the book will be translated into the three official languages of SADC.

Prof. Arnold Temu
Chief Editor
Dar es Salaam, 2015

1.1

Interfacing with Personal Assistants to Former Presidents of Frontline States

4-5 June 2007, Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania

The Interface Meeting involved the Principle Personal Assistants to former presidents of Frontline States and the focal points in the research of the project for the documentation of the liberation struggle for the Southern African countries. The personal assistants who took part were Joseph Butiku from Tanzania, Mark Chona from Zambia, Lwegaila Joseph Lwegaila from Botswana, and Sergio Vieira from Mozambique. The focal points that participated in the interface were Eduardo Manuel Ruas and Pedro Capumba from Angola; Tomas Tlou from Botswana; Joel das Neves Tembe from Mozambique; Victor Tonchi from Namibia; Professor Bernard Magubane from South Africa; Professor Arnold Temu from Tanzania, who was also the Project Manager, and his Associate Country Researcher, Neville Reuben; Mutumba Bull from Zambia and Professor Ngwabi Bhebe from Zimbabwe. The meeting was chaired by Ambassador Hashim Mbita, the Patron of the Project. The interface was mainly the recording of the experiences of the men who worked very closely with the Heads of State of the Frontline States, during the liberation struggle. Their memories, when transcribed, give to the reader of this document a picture of what was really going on in the meetings and communications of the top leadership of the Frontline States. The four men talk about their experiences during that period, giving first-hand information about what was happening, as no one else can.

Ambassador Mbita

To start with, I would like to take this opportunity to welcome all of you ladies and gentlemen, to this interface meeting that is to take place here today and tomorrow. I have no doubt you had a safe travel to Dar es Salaam and that you found this short drive from the airport to the hotel bearable; and I am sure your stay in the hotel during the days to come will be comfortable, and the atmosphere will be conducive to a successful accomplishment of the work that we expect to do.

There are two groups of participants. One group is the Principal Personal Assistants of the former Heads of State; the other is the Focal points in the research of the project for the documentation of the liberation struggle of Southern African countries. Given these two groups of this interface, I will start by introducing the Principle Personal Assistants and I will leave to the researchers to research themselves to say who they are.

On my right here is Joseph Butiku. He was the Private Secretary to the late Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere - First President of the United Republic of Tanzania and now remembered as Father of the Nation. Joseph rose under Mwalimu to the ranks of Personal Assistant and Private Secretary. So I have the pleasure to introduce him. He is followed by a well-known statesman from Zambia, Mr. Mark Chona, who was also the Personal Assistant to the First President of Zambia, Dr Kenneth Kaunda. Mark, as an administrator, was moved to the office of the President very early during the independence of Zambia. He shouldered the responsibility of the State House under President Kaunda and was responsible for many of those arrangements which were used in assisting the liberation movements. He is followed by Lwegaila Joseph Lwegaila. He was introduced in the politics of Botswana and he was the Personal Assistant to the President of Botswana the late Seretse Khama; he worked with him, I

think up to the independence of Zimbabwe. He was telling me yesterday, that in 1979, a few months before the independence of Zimbabwe, he was here in Tanzania. When Southern Rhodesia became Zimbabwe, he changed roles; he went to the U.N in New York, as the Ambassador of Botswana to the United Nations, and ended up staying there for 25 years, which was like being employed by the UN in one way or another. Then next to him is the person who identified himself as a baby of this group. That is Comrade Sergio Vieira. Sergio Vieira was Personal Assistant to the late President Samora Moses Machel, right from the bush days. Sergio is known as a fast speaker and he thinks very fast; sometimes he concludes your thinking before you stop speaking. So, ladies and gentlemen, these are the four people, who were under heavy pressure within the working of the frontline system. First instructions as a minute from any Head of State that mandated the frontline invariably was according to what these four said. They were responsible for arranging of meetings, and so on. These were responsible people.

I thought in this process of our research to document the history of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, one of the most important components that needs to be understood and recorded properly, is the people behind the Frontline States. Fortunately we have only one of those heads of state still alive; the others have died, of course, and I have no doubt in my mind that the focal point in Zambia will do us justice, to see how much we can retrieve from the old man K.K., to incorporate into this. But still, there are things which the Heads of State themselves, saw the results, and they did not know how the results came to be; but these four people had to know or had some ideas of what was going to happen. Of course we have this opportunity, and we should take it to benefit from their experiences and from their memories when they are speaking. Perhaps later on, we will have questions and discussions, including how it will benefit all; not only the project, but how the region and the universe will eventually benefit from their contributions. So having said that now is the time that I should let the focal points and research leaders introduce themselves; I will speak a little bit more later. We will start alphabetically, with Angola.

Good morning. My name is Eduardo Manuel Ruas. My colleague is Pedro Capumba from Angola.

My name is Tomas Tlou from Botswana.

Hi everybody. My name is Joel das Neves Tembe. I am the country coordinator from Mozambique and Deputy Director of the Project.

Good morning every one. I am Victor Tonchi, the central focal point for Namibia. Thank you.

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. I am Neville Reuben, the Associate Country Researcher from Tanzania; the Country Focal Point is incidentally Prof. Temu who is around and who is also the Project Manager of the entire project. I also have the pleasure of introducing another colleague in our team, Mrs. Simpasa.

Good morning every one. My name is Professor Bernard Magubane, and I am the project leader from South Africa. Thank you very much.

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. My name is Mutumba Bull from Zambia. Thank you.

Your Excellency, my name is Ngwabi Bhebe. I am the focal point of Zimbabwe.

Ambassador Mbita

They have been too mean in expressing themselves I don't know if that is how professors do it, but I thought in the introduction you were going to tell us more about yourselves. I will start with the last one. Professor Bhebe is currently the Vice Chancellor of the Midlands University, Zimbabwe. He was the Deputy Vice Chancellor of the University of Zimbabwe, Harare. He taught in several universities in Southern Africa before, and has also published extensively. So that is Professor Bhebe; Professor Magubane, Professor Emeritus in a number of universities in the United States, and he is the Head of South African Democracy Foundation. He was an ANC Youth activist during the struggle, and he was their representative in the United States, particularly in California and Texas, in the western part of United States. Dr Tonchi was a SWAPO activist during the struggle; he is currently the Chairman of Electoral Commission of Namibia and a Senior Lecturer at the University of Namibia; Dr Mutumba Bull is a historian and politician. She was in the cabinet under the First President of Zambia, and when referring to Madam Bull, the President used to say that he had the only lady in cabinet that was a 'bull'. She held a number of portfolios and for some time she acted as a Foreign Minister. She is now leading the Research Institute of the University of Zambia; Professor Tlou of Botswana was at one time the Vice Chancellor of the University of Botswana. He was, I think, the second or the first Ambassador of Botswana to the United Nations; Professor Tembe from Mozambique is Deputy Director of the Project. He is the Chief Archivist of the Mozambique Government and he is teaching at the University of Mozambique. He was the Chairman of Government Archivists in the region until recently. We have a new arrival and we ask him to sit in for those who are coming in for another meeting but I think it is worthy to introduce him here, Professor Kings Phiri from Malawi; he is the man on the ground in Malawi for our work. He has just arrived. Thank you. So these are people with tremendous experience, whom you are going to interface with.

Having covered that part, now I am coming to what we are here for. I think we should start. We circulated to the Personal Assistants what we expected them to cover, but that does not limit them in their perceptions, understanding, experiences and memories. These were just areas which they could cover and they are not, in the form that they should follow as they appear in this paper. They can be tackled in any order you want. One thing which I must say from the beginning is that, this interface will be video recorded in full. This is for preservation so that we can note these things and in future when these are written down, then everything will be there for people who want to do research a hundred years from now. This research will be very valuable.

So we shall have this interface fully video recorded and some still pictures shall be taken for the sake of those who will appear. Now that you are aware that you are going

to be recorded, not only the Personal Assistants, but also the Focal point professors, whatever intervention that you will be doing, will be on record, because we also want to know the type of questions asked; and the type of statements you make, so that the people can get the proper picture.

My biggest problem now is how we start. I had an idea that, since the first Chairman of the Frontline States was the late Mwalimu, President of Tanzania I thought maybe his Personal Assistant should break the ice for his colleagues. As I said, you take your time and Professor Temu will explain the methodology that you will adopt. So when you do it, you know you are on your own and after him, then I could ask Zambia; after Zambia I shall ask Botswana and after Botswana I shall ask Mozambique; and once that is over then I will just invite all of you for general participation and after that you will be free. People will raise their hands and they will be able to continue with the interface. So with those few remarks, I will now invite Professor Temu, as a historian and as the Project Manager, to tell us what he wants us to do and to think about. Thank you very much.

Prof. Temu

Thank you Patron, and Your Excellencies. I thank you all for your attendance at this interface. First of all, I have the pleasure, as the Project Manager, to welcome you here. I hope you will enjoy the surroundings. The town will be cut off from you, but there will be people, your members are here, the sea is here, all the entertainment is here, so that at the end of each day you can make yourselves comfortable.

Secondly, as far as this interface is concerned, our approach is that we give the senior Personal Assistants to the former Presidents a platform for themselves. The method of approach these days is to recall your memories and experiences of the operation and working of the offices of the presidents you were Personal Assistants to with reference to the subject under discussion, which is the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. We will need you to recollect your memory and tell us as much as you can under those questions we have set up, but also on any other matters that you might want to catch up on. When you are tired, please stop, go and have a cup of tea or pass it on to other fellows. So we will not interrupt you while recollecting your memories.

In the end, of course, the Focal points and those who are here on behalf of them will have the opportunity of raising questions on your memories of certain issues that you might not have touched upon. That is the procedure, and I hope you will find it congenial. So Mr. Chairman that is how we proceed. I now pass it on to you to ask the first speaker to take the platform.

Ambassador Mbita

Thank you very much. I hope this clears the methodology of our work. So may I now please invite you Mr. Butiku to open the discussion with a recollection of your office. Thank you.

Butiku

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First let me say how pleased I am to be invited to be a participant of this group. This is not the first time; I think this is the second time. But I am also pleased to have another chance to meet old comrades, Mark, Joseph and Vieira Sergio, after not having met one another for several years, since we left our offices. I am not going to be of very much use in the beginning because I was only able to see these ideas yesterday. I was away, out of my office, for four months, in another project, which involved organizing an East African Federation. We had to consult a population of five million Tanzanians, and I was only able to complete this job on 28th of last month. So I just have a general idea of what is here, but I am comfortable because you and the researchers are here, and are going to guide us. The last point I want to make, is that it is true, I know something, maybe in some places quite a lot, but it is now 20 years since I left the State House, and I left all the papers in those offices. In the absence of organized archives, it is very difficult to sit in a serious meeting like this, and begin talking about the liberation struggle and the role of Frontline States. In those days there were many issues which were tackled, and some were very sensitive. It is not easy, but I hope during the operation between today and tomorrow, we will be able to make substantive contributions. Let me say a few points only, and then I will stop, and leave the rest to my colleagues.

First, the Frontline States, as far as I can recall, was the key, and a very important informal organ, bringing together, not all, but the few Heads of State, such as Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana; but sometimes, it was drawing in the leaders of the Liberation Committee and the liberation movements. It was formed, in my view as an advisory body for doing OAU work; we had the OAU Liberation Committee as the OAU formal organ and the Frontline States as informal body for frontline people actually in the front. These were the countries which were involved in the liberation struggle; that is where the name frontline states come from. They were advisory and co-coordinating the efforts of the liberation committee leadership as well as the efforts of frontline countries. They were also encouraging leaders of the liberation movements because they needed encouragement. They were in a very tough situation, so there was the need for a group that almost on a day to day basis, was working with the leaders of the liberation movements. Apart from the encouragement, there was the co-coordinating of the efforts of the office and seeking ways to support them from different countries, in various forms. Hashim knows better; so do some of my colleagues. I must also say that the organization of the state house private offices differed from country to country. There were areas where the Personal Assistant was clearly involved in the affairs of the Head of State, and others like Tanzania, where it was a little bit decentralized, so we did quite a bit of work, but not everything, because of the decentralization. So tasks like organizing material support and mobilizing diplomatic and political support, which were the most important, were done by various ministries particularly Foreign Affairs.

In Africa, we had the OAU, as a continental organ, but not everybody was close enough to fight in the front. These people were, I can recall here, some were scattered all over, and some were in Europe. They needed somebody to mobilize them, apart from what they were doing themselves and they were doing quite a lot. The task of mobilizing and providing political support externally and also internally here was a very important function of the Frontline States. Of course the agenda, in the picture, was helping the countries to liberate themselves; helping the countries in the front line to liberate themselves, that was the main agenda, and whatever else they did had that in mind; and whatever meeting that was convened, was intended to achieve that major objective.

Trying to know the enemy strategy, trying to work out our own strategies at various levels and various stages, was part of the functions, and that was a very detailed work. There was a lot of detailed work, which we can properly discuss and relate to what was involved. Let me say something on the strategy: We all know the Lusaka Manifesto, which guided the efforts of the liberation movements and the frontline states; but I am not sure to what extent the OAU and the liberation committee were involved with the Lusaka Manifesto. There were two alternatives. Could we achieve the objective through dialogue? Dialogue was the best, but if dialogue failed, then armed struggle was the next thing; that was what guided their way. So there was a time when there were talks, but at the same time fighting was going on, because talking alone was not enough. I am not going into details how the Lusaka Manifesto was organized, but it was extensively discussed; and it involved external forces, including the Americans. The message was that Africa wanted to talk, but if dialogue failed then it should be understood why fighting was necessary, and that was what happened. The main strategy was that dialogue should prevail.

I must say that the Heads of State worked together, and they were very close, almost personal friends; Mwalimu, Kenneth Kaunda Khama and Samora. Later, even the members of the liberation movements became very close; very frank to one another, extremely frank; nothing was hidden between them. I must say they were brutally frank; and that was essential when you fight with powerful enemies, and you are not as strong, you rely upon the strength of your unity. So they were very united and the only way they could sustain the objective was to discuss frankly and very openly all the time. Mark knows this better; it is not easy to relate some of these experiences because there were times when even talking was impossible, and even a bit of weeping was necessary to get things done when the situation was difficult.

Some of these things I am saying are recorded but we cannot remember exactly where, but I remember to have recorded some of them somewhere, so that was one. Frank talking, believing and trusting in one another not only between Heads of State but also between the Heads of State and the leaders of the liberation movements, and between ourselves was essential. Let me add one last point; the leaders of the Frontline States were determined, as a group. I really cannot tell you the influence that this group had on the liberation committee itself, or on the OAU itself, but you will

recall that in those days the West was either our partners or our enemies. On one side they were supporting our enemies and one side they were our partners because we were having dialogue with them. They were not able to do anything without coming to the Frontline States, either as messengers or brokers; they all had to come here or to Zambia, or Botswana, and Mwalimu of course was the chairman every time, because it was here that the day to day operations of how to support the liberation movements were been discussed. When I say it is here, I don't necessary mean Tanzania, I mean the Frontline States as a group.

Their meetings were not regular; the meetings were called according to the situation. I cannot remember even who organized an agenda, sometimes we went without even knowing what to do with the discussion; we just walked into a room, they talk about whatever they had to talk about, and then we go away. They used to talk until they agreed; you can always find the notes in the archives. They never left anything to chance. That was why they had to meet for long hours and very frequently, not on routine, but depending upon the situation. We had to meet, to make sure that nothing was left to chance. I don't know how much information the intelligence had, but it was very little, because it depended on what Mark was able to collect in the newspapers; the newspapers as they appeared in those days. We had the intelligence to work with. It was there but I think it was limited in a sense but in coming together they became operational, and in their talking together, they could discuss a lot of intelligence to help to make some decisions.

Having said that, maybe I should leave it there and then I can take it as a way of introduction. I don't know whether every point I see here is covered, but other things will come out when we exchange views with the rest of the participants, and answer specific questions; recall specific situations and specific incidents as a means of contributing to this discussion.

Thank you.

Ambassador Mbita

Thank you, Mr. Butiku for this beginning. I think it is the right way to start. Let me just recall one teaching which the late Mwalimu taught us on the question of making use of opportunities. A baby centipede saw that she had so many legs and did not know which ones to move first. It went to its mother and asked, "Mummy which leg should I move first?" The mother said, "Move child move; in the process the legs would sort themselves out." So gentlemen move. There is nothing to fear. Move the legs, and they will sort out themselves.

Thank you, Butiku.

Mark

Thank you very much. Firstly I wasn't even sure what this meeting was really about. I spoke to the Focal point in Lusaka but even now I am not quite sure about some of the things. I heard the joke but always I have to look at the end product; when I am

told move, move, and everything else will sort out itself, I am also conscious of what the end product of this interface should actually be.

But let me just start with a small correction, since this is for records. My actual title was Special Assistant rather than Personal Assistant. Secondly, again because these are now eventually records for the archives, I think that it will be important for known Tanzanian and known Mozambican historians to observe the last paragraph of first page of the context. The second sentence, on the blood of Tanzanians and Mozambicans, says thousands of freedom fighters..., I think that one has to know that we are learning a lesson from history, and that what was lost were not limited to a few countries but to populations in the region. Botswana whom we always call the sharp end of the nail, when hammering to get South Africa out of the way, felt the pressure and they paid the price; so did the Zambians and the other countries surrounding South Africa. We need to be careful in the language now that we know, what is expected of the document. That is why I am thinking about the end product, in the management of this historical process.

The Frontline States was really a crises management group, in many ways, and it emerged as a result of a war situation; it was not a conflict resolution group. It was actually the guys who were in the operations room guiding the thoughts of those who were actually going to execute the war; and because they were actually in the war zone themselves, they had to meet and find a way of actually managing these very grave crises, which threatened the lives of millions of people in the region.

If Tanzania did not assist the FRELIMO, then the Portuguese were going to move North to capture some areas of Tanzania; and if Zambia did not stand up to the pressures of the Portuguese, of the Rhodesians, or the South Africans, or the Angolans, or the West, then the South Africans could actually have moved farther north and we would have been like the Palestinians in 1967. So it was actually important to respond with all the sacrifices. It was made very clear that we were going to be bombed. So it was really partly a defensive move, but then we had to defend ourselves by extending our areas of freedom. That meant taking the war into Mozambique, into Zimbabwe, and into Namibia by assisting the freedom fighters in those areas; and frankly, there we had no choice. Those who thought that there was a choice they were living in the idle towers of the academia and the academia, which were not in the region but far away, beyond, where the South African missiles could not reach. But for those people who were in the academic field even at that time they knew that unless Tanzania acted, unless Zambia acted, unless Botswana acted, then apartheid and the war machinery would be moving north, and would be like the Arab land that was captured in 1967. That was what the Frontline States were not about to accept. We are thankful we had the leaders who were prepared to sacrifice their own lives and the lives of their own people and their economies and that was why, what I call the crises management group, became extremely important.

President Samora said, "If only Malawi did not behave the way they did, our independence would not have been delayed so much, and that certainly would not

have delayed Zimbabwe's Independence." Therefore it is extremely important to understand the genesis of the Frontline States. It was not always rosy; our people did not want to be involved. There had to be political management within our countries whether it was Tanzania, people had to understand why Tanzania was acting the way it did, because it was actually their resources which were being spent. Botswana which was surrounded almost totally; it wasn't even almost but totally, because the boundary between Namibia and Zimbabwe and Zambia is a point in the shifting sand of the Zambezi River, so they were completely surrounded. The politics of managing the armed struggle were very tough for them, but fortunately they had a very strong party; not only did they have a strong president, but they also had a very strong party, which could support the policy of supporting freedom fighters.

We had a very difficult situation in Zambia. The politics became very difficult because there was a very strong opposition. What saved us in many ways was the one party system. If we did not have a one party system in Zambia we would have easily been a counterpart of UNITA, and it was in the making. But thankfully we were saved by what people refer to as the one party system.

Therefore each of these countries had, their own strategies, in response to the pressures which they had to respond to. Every general, and I have only dealt with many of them, not in the battle field; but I read in history. I know for a fact that every general makes his own decisions. Even if he gives battle orders, then from time to time the people who are managing the orders still have to change them from time to time, in light of new circumstances they are facing. I think every single front line state, faced that position. When they sat at a meeting, they looked at dialogue, if dialogue was possible to buy time they supported it. When they were ready to move, or to get the freedom fighters to move, the trucks were ready, the arms were ready, and the army was ready to move the freedom fighters to the front. They gave them the arms at the border; for us that is where the freedom fighters were given the arms, and they were told, "Here you are. That is the enemy." Since the Zambezi was difficult we just told them to cross; and the way they described their crossing, was that the means used for crossing depended on that particular situation, at that particular time. Very often, for those who were crossing the Zambezi, it was actually to provoke firing across the border, and when the firing was going on, the freedom fighters were actually going under a hail of bullets. Those were the tactics of the freedom fighters.

Each frontline state had its own strategy but in the end it became necessary to coordinate their efforts, and that was when the meetings became necessary, because if there was unity in the thinking, and in the planning, then you help the freedom fighters better. Success on the Eastern front, for example, in Mozambique, was very helpful in managing the other battle fronts, or actually war fronts, in this case. Therefore cross fertilization of the thinking at the highest level, that was the presidential level, became necessary; and sometimes daily contacts became necessary on the telephone, because crises were happening every single day, and there were very few countries that were really feeling the presence.

The international community existed, and it was fantastic in rhetoric, and made a lot of promises; but as Zhou en Lai once told me in a meeting, “Don’t depend on the international community.” The world helped and that was the case so these first three presidents of Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana were the ones who actually asked, “What do we do?” Fortunately we had very strong leaders in the liberation movements, who were really acting like presidents of countries, we had faith in them and they could actually discuss secrets. It was only once President Samora said, “You know, I did not know that I would have secrets which I have to be careful to share, now that I am President, because actually it is now about the strategy of a country called Mozambique.” So it was not like before. But I think history will correctly describe these leaders of liberation movements as wonderful people.

So, when a country like Botswana or Zambia decided to make sacrifices of their people and their economies, it was always because the sacrifice was sacrifice that was worth making. The leaders of the liberation movements showed themselves to be selfless, determined and visionaries. It was only when the vision was not clear, for those who were supporting you, that you saw them withdraw a little bit and pose and asked if it was necessary to make further sacrifices, and if the answer was yes, then they gave you more, and this was why our defence forces committed themselves to support countries such as Mozambique, absolutely, without any restraint. The Zambian people had to be convinced because we had a parliament and we had the opposition in the parliament and the government had to go over the heads of the Parliament and simply said we knew what we were doing. We had one simple saying that if we don’t drink the bitter coca cola now, then our children would have to do it. The question was, “Are we so cowardly that we can’t take on this enemy now, instead of our children in the future?” We were actually part and parcel of the same group, whether it was FRELIMO in Mozambique or UNIP in Zambia. If we did not do that, we would have behaved like Malawi; and that was possible because the pressure was very high. We could have behaved like Kamuzu Banda, and we could have had an International Airport built in Lusaka, with South African money; no one bombing us, bridges would have been saved and billions of dollars could have been saved. It is a fact that if these front line leaders did not decide to commit themselves and their people to come out to help the freedom fighters the war would probably be fought now, and since the Soviet Union does have the problem of corruption then we would have nobody to turn to, not even the Chinese would have given us that kind of support alone. So, it is important for us to understand the environment of that time, in order to give the proper credit to the leaders who were actually in the struggle for independence.

I think that you will be asking us questions if we were clear what we want to achieve in these meetings. We will answer the questions regarding whatever details you want. Maybe what I am asking is, we should be very clear what we are actually doing because I am not as sure as I should be, but you know what you want to achieve and you will help us to help you. Thank you.

Mbita

I think the legs are sorting out themselves, slowly but surely.

The question that Comrade Chona has raised is worthy of being addressed by the Focal points; as to what we want to achieve. I may be having ideas but I am not a qualified researcher or a historian. I don't know which elements have a particular value and which are not, but still you will be able to think of them so that we can help each other and have the right information for what we want to achieve.

We have said before, this is a unique opportunity which has come to us in the region. Most of the time our history had been written by outsiders, mostly non-Africans whose sentiments about us are defective. They do not know us and so they subject us to their thinking with their history as back ground. We now have the opportunity through this project to portray our history in its proper perspective. It is not being treated anyhow, but really being professionally done and being put in its proper perspective for our prosperity. What do we do? We talk about the liberation struggle, we talk about assistance and everything we got, everything; but one thing, nobody could do for us, we fought for ourselves. You will be given everything, but the last thing you fought for it; our people sacrifices, our blood, our sisters, brothers, mothers and fathers, grandfathers who died for that struggle. What motivated them and how this affected them or was assisted by the Frontline States. I am sure you have those questions and you will put them forward, but the objective remains the same that is to have records of our history for this and future generations. Now let me invite Comrade Joseph Lwegaila.

Joseph

Thank you very much, actually what you have just said is exactly what I thought we are here to do, because last night when I read the paper I didn't really know exactly what you have invited us to do here, but you have just explained exactly, the purpose of our presence here to-day. We are writing the history of the Frontline States, what motives those presidents had to make the sacrifices they made, what made their people agree to die for the freedom of their neighbours, and I think that is what we are here to do. Mr. Chairman I have always believed that the Frontline states deserved the Nobel Peace Prize. They deserved to be recognized. When I was in New York as an ambassador, I was picked to nominate somebody for the Nobel Peace Prize and I wrote the names of the presidents of the Frontline States because they deserved to be recognized for the sacrifices they made.

The first meeting I attended of the Frontline States was in December 1974, at the State House, in Lusaka and the main agenda as was known between us was to unite the liberation movements in Zimbabwe, under Muzorewa, the pioneer and the head of congress. That was my very first meeting and I think for my president as well. It was probably the first or second meeting of the Frontline States and that was a very historic meeting, although the meeting was unsuccessful because the congress never took place. President Mugabe took off to Mozambique instead of waiting for the

congress to be held, so they could elect a new leadership for the liberation movement in Zimbabwe.

Now my task in the first incidence was to see which way my country was involved in the process of the liberation struggle, the geographical location of my country and then to remind you of what Southern Africa in 1974 looked like. When Mark says it was almost surrounded that is very true; we had only one point in the middle of the Zambezi River, and every time refugees were transported from Botswana to Lusaka, Smith said, the wings of the plane were either encroaching on Zimbabwe space, or was on Namibia space, which was run by South Africa, and therefore we were locked up. We were Frontline States, not only vis-a-vis South Africa, because we were bordering all the troublesome white ruled countries; Namibia to the west, South Africa to the south, and then we had Rhodesia to the north and north east, run by white minority ruled regimes. Therefore it was not easy for the government of Botswana to decide either to become a member of the Frontline States or to be active in supporting the liberation movements. In Botswana we always said we had no choice and there was absolutely no way we could avoid the impact of the liberation struggle, because we were there and when the refugees ran away from South Africa the safest country, for a long time was Botswana. There was nowhere else. If they went to the west they would go to a country ruled by South Africa; something which we were praying of course, to go to a country which was deeply dependent on South Africa, like Lesotho you might as well have gone to a prison in South Africa, because the South Africans would not allow you to be flown outside of Lesotho over their territory. So that was our situation, and therefore we decided cautiously, and it was not the question of bravery, it was a question of realism, and to be honest this realism of course was informed by the fact that we wanted to survive, and we couldn't survive on our own.

I remember the first time the President of Zambia went to Botswana in 1968, my President made a speech. He said, "To the north we have a friend, to the north we have Zambia." That statement was very important for my country because at that time we became a member of the Frontline States and we actually surprised a lot of people. How could we be a member of the Frontline States, with President Nyerere and President Kaunda, because Seretse Khama was considered a Chief, not only a Chief but a reactionary one; a very conservative man, how can he go and rub shoulders with those revolutionaries like Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda? But of course President Nyerere and President Kaunda had a lot of patience on their part. That was ideal, as there was something inside the cover that was arguable because of the speeches my president was making right there, close to the mouth of the lion. He was making speeches which endangered him, but he made them out of principle, against the apartheid. Our ambassador was among those who made speeches against apartheid in the United Nations, and put the country in danger; but we decided we had no choice but to participate in the liberation struggle.

Another thing is that, we were considered to be the first country to receive refugees all around us. You know that we were also the first country for having many spies

from all around the world; spies from apartheid South Africa, spies from Namibia, spies from Rhodesia; Francistown was teeming with spies from Smith. Gaborone, our capital city was teeming with spies from South Africa, when one was drinking tea at a hotel, the person he saw sitting next to him could be a spy from apartheid South Africa. Which meant when refugees came they came with that baggage; they came with people masquerading as ANC or PAC, but they were there to spy on them. That, of course, produced a lot of insecurity for our country, and that was the reason why we were bombed so many times. It was simply because those spies were informing on the genuine refugees; but we persisted. We decided there was no other choice but to continue to accommodate refugees, to continue to be a reliable country of first refuge to the refugees from all over the place. Actually, it was very interesting that there were even refugees from as far as Mozambique; Samora went there when he was picked up by a plane as a joke and Guebuza went there too. Chisano went there and the man who became the Foreign Minister of Botswana hid him in his house, because President Seretse Khama said that he should not be put in a Hotel. So we had all sorts of people as refugees. We made the sacrifice, as I said, for the sake of freedom, not only in Southern Africa, of course, but for the whole continent of Africa.

Now, my colleagues had talked about how the Frontline States were operating. It was always normal to see President Seretse Khama, President Nyerere, President Kaunda and they were later joined by President Machel, President Neto and President Mugabe. They were people who belonged to different generations, who were ideologically so much at variance, but because they had a common job to do, the freedom of Southern Africa, the Liberation of Southern Africa, you could think that they were born together and played together as children. They were so friendly to each other. They used to joke with President Machel and President Nyerere about their socialism. So twice when we came to a regional Frontline States meeting in Dar es Salaam, President Khama, who was a great farmer and who produced a lot of oranges came with bags of oranges for the socialists. When he arrived he said, "Julius, you know I thought that since yours is a poor socialist country, I should bring you some oranges." And Mwalimu used to say, "Seretse, you must attend all these meetings, because when some of us try to box each other, you always come with some witticism, which makes us forget that we want to punch each other." You know these are wonderful old quotes. Ten of course the opening of the southern route by Zambia angered Mwalimu and President Machel who boycotted the meeting. Actually in one of the meetings they went to Lusaka and after arrival turned back at the airport; the person who actually did a lot of reconciliation was President Seretse Khama.

We went to Dar es Salaam only to discover that the rest had boycotted the meeting. K.K came and then Mwalimu said to President Khama, "When you are going back to Botswana from here, please don't go straight. Go with KK, go and drink tea with him in Lusaka." We ended up spending the night in Lusaka so that the President of Botswana could say to KK that what happened was a temporary squabble among brothers so he should not mind it. In other words, this is how close they were.

Another interesting subject was the way the meetings were organized. One day President Seretse Khama said to me, "You know, we have not had a meeting of the Frontline States for a very long time. Here is a letter, go and give it to President Kaunda, to ask him what he thinks about holding a meeting of the Frontline States." I flew to Lusaka in his small plane; I thought we were going to crash somewhere, because it was during the rainy season. I got to Lusaka, and gave the letter to President Kaunda. The following day I had to leave in the evening because the meetings were secret. I was taken to the airport and the car parked below my aircraft and as I boarded the aircraft the pilot said, "You know Patron, we have no fuel." I said to him, "We are at the airport, why can't you fill up the plane?" They said they were told that there was no fuel. Actually there was fuel but the problem was that they had an international credit card which could not be accepted by the Lusaka airport. The pilots suggested that maybe we could fly slowly and refuel at Francistown. This was new drama, I mean these were secrets. As we were flying, just as we were about to get to Victoria Falls, they said there was no way we could reach Francistown, and so we had to land at Victoria Falls. I told them that we were in Smith's country, and I was carrying '*contraband*' from President Kaunda to my President. They said to me that the only other choice they had was to crash. I asked them what we were going to do after we landed there. What was I going to do? There were two white pilots flying the plane, so when the plane landed, the security was told that the pilots came with the plane from South Africa, and they had to land at Victoria Falls; they told me that if I remained in the plane, they may become suspicious, and so I had to go with them into the building. So I walked with them, the only black man with a big briefcase, walking between two white pilots. At the entrance to the place, the white man at the gate did not ask any questions, they just took me to the coffee shop. While they were signing papers and refuelling, I was told to drink coffee there, and I did not even have the money to drink coffee, so I just sat there clutching my briefcase. Eventually the pilots came to take me back to the plane. When we were going out, that was when the white man at the gate asked the white pilot, "Who is this man?" Then one of them whispered to his ear, and then he said, "Okay". I don't even know what they said; I got into the plane. When I told President Seretse Khama that we almost had a fix, he asked me, "How could you land in Rhodesia?" I told him that I had to land in Rhodesia because the only other choice was to crash, and to crash with the *contraband* I had in my briefcase! So this was how the Frontline States were organized.

Any member of the Frontline States called a meeting, and the meetings did not always take place in Dar es Salaam; they could take place in Mozambique. The only place where meetings did not take place, and I am going to be honest with you, is Botswana because Mwalimu wouldn't go there. Mwalimu used to think that the South Africans were going to shoot down the plane when it was about to land. That was the reason why he did not even go to attend the tenth independence anniversary. I came here to invite him to the 10th Anniversary of Independence, and Mwalimu called President Khama asked him if he did not want him to live so that he could continue

to be the Chairman of the Frontline States. Otherwise the meetings could take place in any of the Frontline States. In other ways I think people should not think about who contributed how much to the Liberation Struggle for Southern Africa, because every country that was called a frontline state, contributed. Even the countries which were not on the frontline, like Tanzania, contributed as much as all of us contributed for the liberation struggle of Southern Africa. The people of the Frontline States died in equal measures, they died in Zambia, they died in my country, they died in Tanzania, they died everywhere in these countries called the Frontline States. In other words, one of the things that we have to establish is that, we had to go to the rural areas, where the freedom fighters operated and talk with people who suffered; talk to the people who actually carried the brunt of the liberation struggle, as opposed to those who were operating from the cities. The people, in my village, at the border with Zimbabwe, suffered, and sometimes the government didn't even know. I was reminded the other day that Seretse Khama, when he invited one of the people whose house was used by freedom fighters, he used to say, support these freedom fighters but to be careful. So people suffered, and that is why in order for this history to mean anything, this history must include the element of the sacrifices by the people; not the people who are called the un-sung heroes, but the real un-sung heroes, and these are the people who were never even protected. These were the people who welcomed the freedom fighters and refugees; unlike some people in the cities, the reason why they were dying, was they did not even know who their visitors were, but they fed them. They were suffering because they were feeding these people. They could have easily expelled them; they could have easily gone to the police and reported their presence, so that they could be arrested or killed by the police, but they did not.

I hope one of the areas we will not leave out of our analysis, is that, if we did not have the divisions that we had among the liberation movements, we could have been able to prosecute the liberation struggle faster. I was looking at the names of the liberation movements, and almost in each country where you had more than one movement, you had conflict. Those conflicts were sometimes reflected among the frontline states depending on their ideological orientation. I would like to remind you, for instance, in 1976, during the struggle for the independence of Angola when we had MPLA and UNITA; I remember in January 1976, the OAU was divided right in middle, when we had the pro-UNITA and the pro-MPLA. I remember we spent the whole night debating at the Senegalese Embassy in Addis Ababa, and that is where it was confirmed that there was almost fifty-fifty division among the OAU states. Ten of course you also had the ANC and PAC for South Africa; and you had ZAPU and ZANU from Zimbabwe. Ten SWAPO was even asking countries to declare support for the authentic movement for the people of Namibia; it was not as smooth as it should have been. I remember, since we are all brothers here, my own Foreign Minister, said because of our political system we could not be party to declaring a political party or liberation movement authentic or non-authentic because that was going to be determined by the people, when they were free to elect their

own leaders. So I think for us it was easier, because everybody knew that the liberation movement with capability was the liberation movement that operated from outside not within.

These were some of the things which were quite complicated in the liberation struggle. I want to say something that is very interesting for me; the entry into the process of the “Gang of Four”, you know the western powers who intervened and eventually produced what was famously called a Security Council Resolution 435, in whose implementation I participated as a Special Representative of the United Nations, and I am reminded of what was called the “Gang of Four”. I remember in 1978, we were sent to Mwalimu as the Chairman of Frontline States, and he asked for Seretse Khama to send Mogwe to Lagos when President Carter was on a state visit, to go and talk to him, when we heard that Nujoma was going to be there. I remember we were with Siteke Mwale. When we got there we were told that Nujoma heard that the Frontline States Foreign Ministers were coming and he took off, because he didn’t want to be persuaded to have anything to do with the “Gang of Four”. So we got there and President Nujoma was in New Delhi. We asked the Americans to trace him with their wonderful communication gadgets and they managed to get him as he was landing in New Delhi, because Mwalimu wanted to know why he was running away from meeting with the Frontline States. There was another meeting of the “Gang of Four” in New York and Mwalimu was able to force him to go there. I remember that day Mwalimu said to Sam Nujoma, you were the luckiest of all the liberation movements to have five western powers working for you. Now you are calling them names? You are calling them names! As you know eventually they persuaded the Security Council in 1978 to adopt the Resolution 435, which eventually was used to allow Namibia be free.

So I don’t think that there is anything I can add to this. As I said, in my view, we must write an authentic history of the liberation struggle, with all the sacrifices that were made by everybody, who was anybody, in the liberation struggle of Southern Africa, without any prejudice to anybody. Once we do that, we are really insulting exactly what we are trying to do. Everybody contributed. We should not be saying that one contributed ten percent or one percent; and if there were things that were done, then those things had to be done.

In Botswana we had a law which did not allow liberation movements to have bases there. We never said, we did not allow the liberation movements to walk across Botswana, to anywhere. That would have been very foolish, because we have one of the longest borders with South Africa; we start at Namibia in the south west and end in the east, and therefore, we could not have said to the Tabo’s and the rest, not to ever cross our country. To tell you the truth, President Seretse Khama used to tell them to please do it quietly and not to allow the Botswana Government to see them, because we had a law, and if they allowed themselves to be seen they would be arrested. This is what we did and it was painful for us. The reason we did that was because we were so exposed. The South Africans knew everything that was going on in our country.

If we saw a freedom fighter with a gun and we allowed the freedom fighter to go, the South Africans called; Pick Botha called you the following day, saying, "Yesterday you allowed the terrorists to pass through your country." So we were doing that in order to preserve this country of first refuge, for everybody.

We had to make sure that we survived and the liberation struggle also survived because if we were occupied, then it meant that the frontiers of freedom would have shrunk. Zambia would have been where Botswana was; and therefore we wanted to be there, in order to be able to help the people south of us, west of us, north of us, to survive, as they struggled to free their countries. A lot of things will of course remain unsaid, until the questions are asked, and then we shall be able to answer those questions. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

Sergio

Thank you, Hashim. According to some of our colleagues here, perhaps with a small exception, we could share most, because of my experience in the army structures; and when I left government 20 years ago, I retired from the outpost. When my friends were talking all the things were coming back to my head. Perhaps this exercise should not have been for one or two days; it could be given more days. So we are recollecting. As we were talking about the airplane, I remembered two airplane stories.

Once, I was meeting the South Africans in South Africa. We had our plane not with white pilots but with Mozambican pilots and when we landed in Waterkloof Military Base, every black man there came to see the black pilots. The commander of the plane was João Honwana, the brother of the late Fernando Honwana. We had a very difficult meeting at State House in Pretoria, with Pick Botha. He was there in the meeting and I decided to take off, to break and to take off. By then the weather was very bad and I said I was going to take off. They said that the weather was very bad. So at 12 o'clock João told me, "Commander, the weather is very bad." I said I was going to take off, as I was a military man, and I was giving him the order. We took off, and when landing in Maputo the weather was also very bad and João came to me and asked me why I took that decision? I told him it was because I had broken the negotiations; I could not sleep in their house after that, but he will see the following day or the day after, they were going to come to us with a new approach, and they came.

On another occasion, I was with Hashim, and this is a little bit, I am giving you sketches. It was Hashim, me and our very good friend Bishop Muzorewa. We were pressing the Chairman of the Patriotic Front to go to the military camps, and all the time he was saying, "No, no, no." That day we talked about it and he said that he had just been to Nairobi. He said, "I was there and I bought a safari suit." Hashim looked to me and I looked at Hashim and then the Bishop said, "Any way, why are you pushing me? How many votes represent military people? I told him, "Without the military there were no votes." This was part and parcel of the problems we were having.

My friends were speaking about bombs. When I was coming here, crossing that bridge, I recalled the Portuguese had put a bomb over there, at Selander Bridge. We

had to face the problems of the forces of Kambona, trying to come to Tanzania, they were training in Nyasa Province and we crushed them on the head, because they were preparing to destabilize Tanzania. We crushed them on the head, we attacked that place, even though it was not in the program, but we attacked that place to destroy them. That was part and parcel of the history we have lived.

One day I was chairing a meeting of the ministers and Mogwe was there. There was a conflict between our friends, Tanzania and Zambia. This was the crises management. Mogwe asked for a point of order, and I said, "Okay Honourable Minister", and he said, "I have a very important thing to ask, of the frontline. You must help us to create a Ministry of Navy in Botswana. Why are you laughing? Zambia has a Ministry of Finance." Okay, that broke the ice; and now we break the ice. When we said we paid more or less. When Botswana became independent, their capital was outside Botswana; Mafeking was outside their country. In order to deal with the government during the colonial period, until independence, they had to cross the border and go to Mafeking, in South Africa. Who paid more, who paid less?

August 1978 was Neto's birthday, and he decided to spend his birthday with us in Mozambique. It was last time actually, because the following year, in 1979, he was buried on his birthday. So later on there was gathering of old friends by the swimming pool; it was a very nice evening and a number of people were sitting there. Neto came with his wife, and children, mother and all the brothers. But there was a small group, it was Neto and Samora, there was Paulo Jorge, Óscar Monteiro, Chissano, Marcelino, Rebelo and me. At a certain time, in a very pathetic way, Neto said, "You know my friend, when Namibia is free, then Zimbabwe will be free, then Mandela comes out of jail, that destruction will be in Angola and Mozambique!" I can say that we had that in Mozambique, one million people killed. One third of the population displaced because of the war!

I think we should speak about Nkomati. I managed that situation. The situation was very simple. You return weapons, coming to Angola and the target was Mozambique and Angola. I was reading the book of my land it says he had six nuclear weapons ready and they would be delivered by Mirage Cheetah to the comrades. Now we had studied that, we knew that.

We had a tremendous intelligence service, ladies and gentlemen. Because what people forgot was that black people existed. One day I was in the State House in Lusaka. One of the head waiters was from Mozambique, he was very glad to see us. Almost one million people were inside South Africa and several thousand inside Rhodesia. They cleaned your toilets but they listened and they reported. We had people inside the headquarters of South Africa Defence Force, and they were part of the network that we had organized. So we were very well informed. The Nkomati was about nuclearisation, and remember there were six nuclear plants, operational and not for experiment, and a seventh one was being built, and they were not for fighting against Russia, Great Russia or Great China, but for Mozambique and Angola. When Joseph said, they had to take some measures, so Botswana could survive and in

surviving, could play a fundamental role for the frontline and liberation; I say we had to survive.

In 1982 Samora dispersed the leadership, Chipande had to come to Gatu, Mashingu to Sofala, and I went to Nyasa. My wife was dying and Samora asked my wife permission to send me out, with the task of organizing the survival of the state, in case Maputo was to disappear. This was crisis Management during the war. I think it was Mark or Butiku who explained what the situation was like; we were using titles, the best title for me, the Americans have that style, the Chief of Staff of White House; but I was only a military man and an intelligence man. I started to work with Mondlane forty five years ago, because forty five years ago is when I created FRELIMO. Then I met Samora in it.

In terms of state house or presidency or whatever, my task was connected with war intelligence, support of the liberation movement. And I was involved in diplomatic activities as far as that military connection was concerned. I was involved in four to five activities and I remember when they were meeting in New York, they were

the *gang of four* nations; Cyrus Vance, Young, Gensher, Guirangaud, Lord Owen, I was there and Andrew Young because that refusal of Nujoma meeting at a certain moment Andrew Young with a deliberate Southern American accent, said, “Hi man, if you can make some dance I will play the tunes, okay?”

We were facing the situation because of sharing the border, which was the Limpopo with that particular regime. But their area of influence and protection included even Kivu. When we forget the Equator, South of the Equator, we forget a lot of time. Coming back a little bit to the concept paper, we have been talking a little bit about this, if you allow me. One thing that we would like to come out first and foremost is what happened with the archives of the Liberation Committee? This is basically fundamental. Of course the State House in Tanzania and elsewhere also have their archives, and to have these archives organized and operationalised, is a fundamental task, for historians. Everybody writes good things and bad things. I remember some years ago, even before the liberation of Southern Africa, I wrote a

book with Immanuel Wallerstein and W. Martin, from the United States, called *How Fast the Wind Southern Africa?* Everybody writes, particularly the white people of

South Africa; but we Africans, we write very little and our references are the books written by them, or by the Southern Africa revolutionists, not by us.

On that we can be sure that a distortion of history will occur. I saw a number of things on page two, the blood of Tanzanian and Mozambicans and other people but I would say that thousands of brothers of MPLA, FNLA, UNITA, UNAMI, RENAMO and so on and so on, left from these countries in the early 1960s, on long and often fatal trips, and they vowed to fight for the liberation of the their respective countries. While some fell on the way, others reached their destination exhausted. This is written by me. Hashim was in Mozambique, we took him to the liberated zones, and Mondlane was there, Sarakikya was there, and General Samora was there; even people from Newsweek went there. I do not think that they were not exhausted; I don't think

that you had been living inside a cave and you had no idea what our liberated zones were. But there were films made about these liberated zones and nobody reached his destination exhausted!

Evelyn Lynn never went to Tanzania or Mozambique, never, and I think it is not fair to treat MPLA in the same way as UNITA and FLNA. UNITA from the beginning was an organization sponsored by the Portuguese and organized by General Costa Gomes. They made one symbolic attempt against a railway station, during all their war in December 1976. It was symbolic to show the world that they existed. After that, they were supplied, organized, and instructed by the Portuguese; their target was not the Portuguese armed forces, but MPLA. After some time, the South Africans came in order to block SWAPO. While we were discussing the question of Angola, after 1974, nobody thought about UNITA, we always thought about FNLA and MPLA, because UNITA was acting on behalf of the Portuguese. So in being objective, one was not to say certain liberation movements were politically correct, but the truth is some groups were not politically correct.

When we speak about conflicts between liberation movements, we must speak about conflicts in Africa. I am speaking about our experience in FRELIMO, when Zambia and Tanzania recognized Biafra and we refused to support, the press was quite hostile to us, in Tanzania and Zambia. When some problems arose in Zanzibar we paid a little bit to that bill. Hashim, you remember when I was arrested in Nachingwea, because the Government was keen. I was a military man and I was arrested in a military camp and was taken from prison to prison; Butiku remembers that from prison to prison they were asking me why was I in prison, I said I did not know and they should ask the people who arrested me. It was this problem of conflict, not within but also within FRELIMO; but not only within FRELIMO.

When we speak about the heroes, we mention Govan Mbeki, and Samora Machel as the military commander. Ndabanigi Sithole was a good man but, he joined Smith, Chief Chirau and Muzorewa, to form a government against the liberation movements. At one time he was in the liberation movement when he created ZANU, but shortly after that he stated that he was against armed struggle. If you mention Herbert Chitepo, yes, right, Josiah Tongogara, right; but Sithole? Why not Chikerema with his motto, "Lets fight and die together," Some colleagues of ZANU and ANC, as soon as they crossed the Zambezi, they went to a press conference and shouted that their people had crossed the Zambezi, and they were going to fight and die together and liberate Zimbabwe and South Africa. Jesus Christ! There was a slaughter! Who can send a group inside a country; go across Zimbabwe to South Africa and then announce it to the press? Was that politically correct?

When we speak about the meeting in Addis Ababa, in December 1976, Mwalimu did not speak much in that meeting, except at one moment, after a very long statement by Senghor, he asked for the floor and he said, "Mr. President, perhaps it was a problem of translation, but our interpreters are so good. So I hope it was not a problem of translation; but it seems to me that President Senghor was saying that UNITA is a socialist organization,

and I want to know, if really I want to go to socialism, must I ally myself with South Africa?" Please let us be clear, if you want to be objective, if you want to tell the truth, a cat is a cat, a dog is a dog.

Many times I hear about civil wars in Mozambique and in Angola. That depends very much on the definition of a civil war. During the second world war, when there was an underground organization fighting against the Nazi occupation in France, even if there were some French people in France who were serving Hitler, that was not a civil war.

RENAMO was created by Peter Walls and Ken Flower in 1974. After 25th April, 1974, General Spínola dissolved PIDE, the political police, but allowed it to exist in the operational theatres of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. By the end of May, the Movement of Armed Forces took measures against PIDE and started to arrest them. There was a training camp of the fresh arrivals of PIDE; that was an armed force of the political police in Chimoio, before our first meeting with the Portuguese Government in Lusaka, in June. So in May, when Major Cardoso, commander of PIDE in Chimoio was informed that they were going to arrest him he crossed the border and took with him his elements. That was the origin of RENAMO.

When Zimbabwe attained its independence, the South Africa Military intelligence, *DMI* with General Van de Westhuysen, requested the Royal Air Force, to fly from Zimbabwe to South Africa, the elements that were there. Was it a civil war? Of course you can speak of Mozambicans and Angolans in RENAMO and UNITA. Is it? What was the history of UNITA? UNITA was in civil war with MPLA. And what about the

Government? Sometimes the devil can be a witness. It is written there with all the words. I think we have to be very careful when speaking about the question of the internal conflicts in Mozambique or in Angola. On the definition of these concepts, you can speak about it being civil, in the sense that Mozambicans and Angolans were used, like the Angolans were used recently, when they were preparing to make that attack against Equatorial Guinea. Most of the people who were arrested in Zimbabwe were from the South Africa Defence Forces and UNITA that were used in the Buffalo Battalion. I am not saying that we do not have sources of internal conflict in Africa, but it is a part of another thing, not exactly the history of the liberation movement, or the struggle that contributed to independence. These are some of the points that I wanted to raise, since I got the paper that suggested areas of interface.

I would start with the first point; given strategies, we adopt to move the struggle of our enlarged challenges and their reactions to different stages. When I was speaking about the liberation struggle, we were speaking about different liberation struggles. The history of the liberation struggle of Mozambique is not similar to that of South Africa; the history of Angola is not similar to that of Namibia or Zimbabwe for that matter. Now I am speaking about FRELIMO, and I think that is also correct, as far as Angola is concerned, if I know the history of that country. From the beginning, we knew, and we were aware that we had launched a people's war; from the beginning, we intended not to have armed actions. Supporting the external diplomacy for

Mozambique, Angola and Guinea Bissau for that matter could not foresee any Lancaster House type of solution. That was a tradition of the British colonists. When we speak about 25th April in Portugal I am giving you some enlightenment.

What I wanted to say even on the approach of the frontline, different experiences were there. Different backgrounds for historical reasons Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana, lived the experiences one way or the other similar to the Lancaster House. On our side, that could not exist, and I was giving an example. In 1961 after several years of discussions totally unfruitful and this is a decisive moment, for the reaction of the Portuguese armed forces, after practically ten years of discussion with Portugal, in 1961, in a decisive Portuguese armed forces and 3500 men, without a single plane, not a single artillery piece, some 81mm old mortars of the second world war, and no life air force, navy, tanks, air craft carrier; the general commanding them, was General Vassalo de Silva. He asked for instructions from his government as to what they wanted? He was completely surrounded in Goa, and Salazar sent a message saying "Portuguese soldiers, either Victorious or dead." So here we had a general without the possibility of fighting, receiving an order for a suicide, so he decided to surrender. Thirteen years later, when the manifesto of 25th April, 1974 came into being, the first words of the manifesto were exactly indicating that the Portuguese government again prepared to make their armed forces the scapegoat of their policy. So they were forcing the people to commit suicide or to surrender in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. So they decided, no; that is enough.

Now what I am saying is that in the beginning, we were faced with the need to conceive a total different approach as dialogue was impossible; that dialogue was treason for the Portuguese Government. It was impossible, since in the beginning we had to have another approach that created the conditions for the very armed struggle we had to launch. Sorry we couldn't go from here to the Zambezi on hit and run missions; it was impossible; completely impossible.

So we had to create the situation inside the country; Hashim was the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee for years, after George Magombe. We were not just coming and going, we had to walk, sometimes for one month, to arrive at another base. So we were very much inside the country and we had already created the situation to put the enemy armed forces isolated and surrounded bases, and we were controlling all the country. When we speak about the liberated zones, we speak, not of the areas which had only our armed forces, but areas under a new democratic administration, areas in which people were cultivating, and had schools and hospitals and had an embryo of a state.

There is one point that I think was different from Namibia, different from South Africa, and was even different from Zimbabwe; Mwalimu seized it at the very beginning. Mwalimu said from the very beginning, and I remember a very difficult moment we confronted in 1970, when General Arriaga, launched an offensive against us. It was the biggest military offensive that the Portuguese ever launched during all the colonial wars. We needed weapons and ammunition and Samora came and

spoke to Mwalimu; Mwalimu called Sarakikya and said, “Open the gates. The best way to reserve our weapons and ammunition is in the South, in Mozambique.” And we emptied the depots of the TPDF, almost completely. We had some problems of that kind again, when we started to confront the enemy and to use better weapons. At certain times the Portuguese and the South Africans were sending messages to President Kaunda asking us not to use, the GRAD P and Strella AA weapons. We had to explain the situation that what the South Africans and the Portuguese wanted was to deprive us of using weapons that were superior to theirs. I raised this point just to divide the issues and compare. So we can see what the strategic approach for each case was, and how the Frontline States reacted. I would like to stress that once things were explained we never faced any problem. Perhaps the best example is what Mwalimu said about opening the depots and that the best way to keep the weapons and ammunition was in Mozambique. That was a fundamental strategic decision. Tanzanians became heroes at that moment, so we could get the means to fight.

There are some things that perhaps, we will not find, unless we get them from the memory of the persons who were there at that moment. For that reason, may I suggest and I am going to conclude now because I think other people should tell us. I think that Sarakikya could tell us; it is impossible to hear from Ali Mahfudh because he died. They were the ones who were confronted with this situation daily and they connected with us. Of course Hashim was there, so it was not a problem and he was simultaneously a political, military and diplomatic man. He still is, and he is very brilliant; but these other people should have been from Southern Africa, I mean from Tanzania and from Zambia. When the Head of States were taking a decision, they were doing so after receiving reports of their military intelligence people; they could not take decisions otherwise. When I am speaking about Mozambique, I mean people like Machel and Neto were on the receiving end of these decisions of the Frontline States.

Tanzania took a great risk that nobody could dare to take. There were camps in Kongwa and Nachingwea, where we could train and do anything over there. The Portuguese air force was coming all the time. It was a risk. Some Portuguese planes were shot down here in Tanzania; Zambia too faced similar risk of war all the time. These three leaders, the fore fathers, I should say of the frontline before we joined, and we joined after it had already become frontline, we joined, it was very momentous. Before that they used to meet but it had not yet even had a name of frontline. But we were in the frontline from the beginning. They took a tremendous decision. Gaborone is few kilometres from the border of Botswana with South Africa. Lusaka is not that far from Rhodesia, in terms of an airplane, and the outskirts of Lusaka were bombed a number of times. They tried to destabilize Tanzania, by organizing groups to come, to put bombs and kill people here. That is why we crushed the Kambona group. There was the Alice group. That group was against Zambia, so we cooperated with Angola and Zambian forces to crush the group. They were paid by the South Africans and

the Portuguese. I think that, you my friends, when you are trying to make this history please bring the truth to this story.

We have memories; there are papers, but other things are not in the papers that were written. I think that it will never be written on paper that Angola and Mozambique cooperated to crush the Bushallah group. Never will it be written on paper that we crushed the Kambona group. We helped Tanzania to fight Amin's follies and that our volunteers were the first to enter Kampala. During the victory parade Mwalimu asked our guys to be there. Thirty years after, if we do not write and do not speak, memories will be erased. Hashim you have to speak what you have seen and what you have done in Mozambique because they think that the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee was supposed to attend meetings only. He has also walked in the bushes and during air bombardments lived underground in holes. It was like that, eating without fruits. Thank you.

Hashim

When we adjourned and rose for lunch, we had prepared our minds so that when we come back we start on the general direction; but before I do that I have got two requests which I want to grant, for some points to be further elaborated by the speakers from this morning. So, I wish to invite Comrade Mark Chona to make a few points and thereafter Comrade Butiku also to make a few points. So Comrade Mark Chona, please.

Mark Chona

Thank you very much. I am very grateful for this opportunity, just for some added anecdote. The joke which was made by the Foreign Minister of Botswana, about the Ministry of Finance in Zambia is extremely important. This was a very difficult time for Zambia; and as a result of supporting the liberation movement, our economy had actually gone down. Our bridges were being bombed, fertilizers couldn't move as rapidly as they should, so really the economy went really down. The copper prices went down; the oil prices were up, and everything combined became truly difficult. So actually Mogwe was right that eventually the Ministry of Finance was existing almost entirely in debt; and I think that God is supposed to have wept when the Minister of Finance was being introduced. The Minister for Finance of Zambia and God had no answer for the Zambian economy, so he just wept. That is connected actually to the issue of the opening of the Southern routes; the two are actually connected. I think this is where different strategies, different tactics, sometimes however perfect they may be devised; they are like those who have been involved in presidential delegations where protocol has done everything to prepare the president's departure from a hotel to the next destination. If just one man messes everything up by his non-appearance, then the president, therefore, the convoy has to wait; the security system in that country has to wait and everything is disrupted.

So even for the Zambians during this period, they really never thought that President Kaunda would go back on his word, namely that the southern route would never be opened until majority rule. Unfortunately for us in that year, there was so much cargo in Dar es Salaam, ninety thousand metric tons, including fertilizers, and September, October the planting season was coming. I talked about the hard choices leaders had to make. Unfortunately when you are a leader, your job is to make difficult decisions; and this was a choice between not succeeding in getting the cargo which was marooned in Dar es Salaam, because the port was serving Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi, Uganda and even the Central Africa. It was very clear to us that we had a problem, and the biggest problem was movement of fertilizers.

It was September and the rains were around the corner. How could you move ninety thousand metric tons of cargo to Zambia using TAZARA alone, in that time? Unfortunately our business community and farmers were crying out; of course there were those who didn't like what we were doing, and they were saying that we were only enriching Tanzania as they were the only ones who were benefiting. So it became a huge political problem for the president. Unfortunately demurrage charges were also going up in Tanzania, so we were paying more for the goods that were in the Tanzania port. We tried Mtwara Port but it was not possible and Nakala Port was limited; so eventually the choice was either Zambia to face food riots the following year, or to just face international criticism then? And I think the choice was to just face the music of the international criticism, but let our Zambian people survive the following year, because if they died, then the liberation struggle would have been frustrated. So no one would have won, because there was failure to produce enough food the following year.

I think that our Doctor Bull was in government at that time, as Minister of Commerce, and she experienced the problem of moving the cargo, and avoid going through Rhodesia by opening the Southern route. Botswana was proposed, then going via Maputo; then to bring the goods via South Africa, and then via the pontoon. I was laughing now as a strategist; I said it takes me a minute from Victoria Falls to hit the Pontoon, so I would be hitting that pontoon every single day.

So the strategic decision had to be made. The demurrage charges were costing us more, the goods were not moving as fast. So what do you do? Hence the very painful decision which President Kaunda had to make as a leader; and only a leader can actually swallow his word. But as I have said, a tactical retreat, or even sometimes a strategic retreat, is not surrender. What Smith had done was to bomb the northern and north-eastern routes to force us to go down to the southern route. So really everything else was impossible for us.

So it was only Zambians living in Zambia at that time, knowing the economic conditions and external factors being created, that made the re-opening of the Southern route necessary. So that is something that I thought is important for historians to know.

My colleague talked about the Nkomati. When the Nkomati Accord was signed, I defended it, and I did say that the other countries did not really understand what it was, to be a frontline country. We had lived with the nuclear weapons issue, and in 1969 President Kaunda agreed that I should form a company. We formed a company in 1970, named the ZANU Capital Enterprise Limited, to make just spare parts. That was not what we were doing. Actually we were anticipating that South Africa was making nuclear weapons using the Israelis, Germans and French and our intelligence was very clear about that. It was very clear, and you know even if we were poor, we could not just sit back. So we did launch one; we refused to sign the non-proliferation treaty and two, we were actually beginning to think of how to explore. A company was there, we started making small launchers, we were testing N60, and they were flying. The problem of the nuclear that we had faced was just an ordinary threat. We managed to find the technology, but it was extremely difficult. I carried things in my briefcase, and fortunately in those days we could still pass through without being detected. Our engineers did some very good work.

So we did think of it, we didn't get to the extent but I visited a country, a research, and they showed me their research facility and I looked at what was happening. They were not going to declare that this is what they were doing, I just asked a wrong question towards the end and I was told, "Mr. Chona there is a phone call for you at the hotel." So I was quickly whisked off because I was beginning to see how they were actually developing a weapon. It's a friendly country and a third world country. So I think that is an important point. I had very bitter quarrel with Indian political advisors, Mr. Saad and I had a bitter quarrel, because I told him that South Africa was developing a weapon and he said it was impossible; that it was very expensive. I told him that I did not go there to tell him how expensive it was, but I was only telling him that South Africa was developing a nuclear weapon to use against us. And so we lived with that problem.

When the frontline countries were reacting, they were reacting to a reality and so when people attacked Mozambique over Nkomati, they did not understand the strategy. It is like a president re-shuffling a cabinet. Sometimes he wants to solve one problem but he probably moves three other ministries in the process of solving that problem, so that it does not appear as if he is only targeting one particular person.

Regarding the South African Defence lines, if you look at the map of Zambia and Botswana you will find that it is like a sharp point coming into Southern African tummy. But the defence line, according to the map, which we were secretly given, it extended to the Congo. That whole area is what South Africa owned, and if you looked at their fighters you knew. I must admit that I hated the French whenever I was at water cliff as somebody associated with defence. I just loved beautiful aircraft, like fighters, mirage, and I wished it became ours rather than South African. But you could see how they had actually staged that and Namibia was extremely important to them. That is why they could not let it go, because that base in Namibia was so vital,

as vital as the Victoria Falls. Those were their launching pads for going further, and for going back.

Ten of course, finally, sabotage, that was a huge problem, and it was well executed as Joe said in 1966, when that huge group of refugees was leaving just before independence, a huge group of South Africans left via Bechuanaland and afterwards we understood among them, there must have been South African agents. The question was who; and those people, when they select they selected the best, those who could rise. They were trained to rise without any problem. So we knew that we had them within the liberation movements.

I think 1968 was a dramatic year, because very few, if any, really significant political parties in the region were spared of spies. Whether it was TANU, UNIP, FRELIMO, ZANU, ZAPU, ANC, MPLA, everybody; they were not spared. At that particular time the risk was that the racists understood that it was no longer just the issue of being given some information; they knew that the countries around them were beginning to be dangerous, so they had to destroy their political parties from within. That happened, but the good thing was that they did not destroy us. We actually survived; every single major political party survived, and later even strived to see the liberation struggle through. I just wanted to make sure that those points are clear.

Butiku

When I started, I was very general because I looked at those issues that had been listed but I think I should say one or two things to emphasize what I said earlier.

One is that the history we are making, including the contributions that were made this morning and now, is a huge program, a huge agenda, that cannot be covered in one book, but which could be produced by professors in details. It has several aspects and what we are trying to make, I hope, is simply to prepare the ground work, or foundation on which other people today and tomorrow will build upon. So point number one is the bench mark. There will be things which are general and things which are detailed. The details are very difficult to remember; and this is what we are trying to do here, in an organized manner. If you remember one point here, one there, let us not forget these are details.

The benchmark is the context. The decision by Africans to be free, and therefore the liberation movements, did not start with South Africa; we had TANU, ASP and others. So the context was that Africa had to be free, and the leaders were working together, and they had a vision. What was that vision? I will say it in Swahili.

And

then I will try it in English because I used to hear Mwalimu talk about it. "*Binadamu wote ni ndugu zangu*". That is brotherhood of all men. Two, Africa is one. So, as long

as there were some areas which were not free, then the rest could also not be free. This was a true destiny and it is going to remain true tomorrow. There was that vision and therefore the mission was that we had to liberate ourselves. What we are discussing here, is Southern Africa. It was the last area where it was necessary to bring our efforts

and energy together, to liberate, because the enemy there was probably much stronger than elsewhere.

The Portuguese believed that everybody was a Portuguese and if you were black, they had to convert you, so we had to liberate ourselves. That is the context. I believe that led to the creation of the OAU or the liberation committee and from there this also led to the formation of the Frontline States.

I was asking my friends, how the Frontline States started. There is no disagreement, that Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Angola were the real, frontliners; you stand face to face with the enemy. That is the truth; but how? What are these frontline states? I tried to say it was an informal organization. You said it was a crises management group. But what was it? If we don't go into details about this one, then we shall get it wrong, and some people will come and say whatever they want about it. So what is the frontline? I said there is this context, history of the OAU, OAU Liberation Committee, and the decisions taken; we are even talking about involving the people.

Who made the decisions to situate the OAU Liberation Committee in Dar es Salaam? Why in Dar es Salaam? President Nyerere had to call a huge public meeting to explain to the Tanzanians, what had happened in Addis Ababa, the decisions which were made, and what it meant to Tanzania. But it was not really only Tanzania, but what it meant to Africa. So that the whole thing, the OAU Liberation Committee was here. But it was there before, so those are some of the frontline context; the OAU Liberation Committee, the Frontline States, all these were liberation committees; the Frontline States, then the presidents were there, and then us. I wanted to make the point that there are a lot of details to be faced.

Two, is the idea that has come out, and I have heard it before, that who had contributed what, and in what form; who contributed more than the other. The liberation struggle, as far as I know, involved far more than the Frontline States; it became an international struggle. It became a global struggle, and that was why we were all brought together, whites and blacks, for and against, inside the countries themselves and outside; all of us were there. So when we look at the contributors, we have to look at both the positive and negatives contributions, because they were all contributors. The supporters were also contributors; so when you think about China or about the communist countries, who contributed military aid, or if you look at America, it also contributed. I remember President Nyerere, and I think he must have consulted his policy makers before he went to see President Kennedy to negotiate a strategy to get the world to understand why Africa had to face apartheid in South Africa and why it had to face the Portuguese.

Through negotiations, as I said, the Lusaka Manifesto was as it turned out to be what it was. So, who contributed what? I am sure frontliners played a specific role, because I remember all the bombings in Zambia, where South Africa got inside Zambia, and into the State House grounds, looking for Oliver Tambo. That was such a terrible thing, and such a terrible humiliation! They went there, but then we had to

answer the question as to why they did not assassinate Kaunda. You know they tried to assassinate Nyerere. Mozambicans were there, Angolans including Neto were there. These were in the frontline; maybe if it were today they would be labelled terrorists. Were the terrorists in those days, different from terrorists of today?

Another area was about the truth; we are to look, see and record the truth, so that the future does not misinterpret Africa and therefore drive a wedge between us, to begin quarrelling about our own history: The history which we made together, and the history which we are now beginning to write together. It must be well researched and well written; to that extent, I feel small to be consulted to contribute generally like this. I have to answer some exclusive questions and look to some of the things I wrote and be able to answer some of these questions in a context.

Another area is the conflicts; conflicts were always there and I said relations between the players in the liberation struggle were very frank, brutally frank and areas like our areas like Nkomati, brutally frank. But when we explained situations, from what I have heard, we got answers. You see, to be real frontline countries had to survive, if they did not survive, you don't mention them. So that explains it. I remember there was a time when Mwalimu completely disagreed with President Kaunda. You know Mark, when you came to Nkomati, with the idea that there was going to be some talk with South Africa and we were not supposed to be talking to South Africa; and Mwalimu never talked to South Africans until he died. He never went to Botswana and he never went to South Africa until Mandela was released and he was sworn in as President. He never went there because he had vowed never to go there, because those people were enemies. He was miles away, but Kaunda was next door, Seretse Khama was next door, Mozambique and Angola were next door. So there were some quiet diplomacy there and he knew a lot about the things that they were referring to. There was something for the international community, but there was also something for the survival for the real frontliners. There was a bit of discussion: What was the contribution of Kenneth Kaunda in that line? Tremendous. What did Seretse Khama do? Why was his plane never shot down as he flew over the South African airspace, to the frontline states and flew back home? Mwalimu got scared; he did not want to fly in there and to fly out, but Seretse Khama flew in and out and he was allowed to do so. Why? What was he trying to do there? How did he do it? That was another area; so there were areas of disagreement but also areas of agreements. So you have to look at both the areas of disagreement and areas of agreement.

When you come to political parties; FRELIMO never agreed with Simango; MPLA never agreed with Holden Roberto. We spent nights, long nights in the Congo Brazzaville and everybody got drunk; all of us who were there got drunk. The three Heads of State were talking, and all of us drunk and slept outside until the early hours of the morning, when we woke up and went to the plane. Neto was there and you know Neto was a tough nut! You talk for two hours and Neto answers only one question. It was a matter of principle; someone talks again and Neto answers just one question in one or two words. As a matter of principle no one could beat Neto. There

were conflicts. In the issue of contribution, what was the difference between leaders? I referred to some weeping. I remember in Lusaka where people really disagreed, and because they respected each other so much, you see, some broke down and wept. Some abandoned the meeting and wept. I think I remember one or two who were not weeping! Many were weeping, while all of us were holding our note books trying to write, but we could not, we stopped! All that I recorded was, "*They are weeping.*" Yeah it was recorded that they were weeping. What were those moments? Those are real issues. Why should these black people weep? Can you find out? Can you find out the areas of the incident and examples, why? There were areas with real differences but at the same time there were areas of real convergence. They differed but then they came together. How do you negotiate and how do you reconcile? So that is another area I just wanted to refer to.

There are projects which were designed like the TAZARA, to bring Africans in the region together. TAZARA was one of them. You remember what happened; all these communication channels had been blocked in South Africa and everybody was being blackmailed to go via South Africa. Take everything to South Africa and they would decide whatever they decide to do. So that was a political railway and was named the Freedom Railway. Are you aware about it? Can you find out? It was a huge program, it was not just China, not just cold war politics; it was an African decision. The Americans and the British opposed it. I remember the American Ambassador when he was approached, he told President Nyerere, the railway to Zambia passes through Zanzibar. There was disagreement about Zanzibar because of the cold war between West Germany and East Germany; the Americans had their satellite there and so they were telling us that if we wanted the railway, we had to give them something in Zanzibar. So the railway to Zambia passes through Zanzibar! The railway to Zambia came through Mao Tse-tung of China. Can you find out what happened in the discussion between Mwalimu, the Chinese and President Kaunda? I think they shared the same views. What did they think about the railway? What was the impact of that railway and therefore what views should we have about that railway? People are just beginning to say it was just another railway. It is not another railway; it is not a white elephant. It brought freedom to this region. That is one of the projects I can remember. But there are several others. There were people who were just writing records; I have one person in my office now, we were writing the Kawawas, Sokoines and so on, but there are young people who know the details because really, when we come to the issue of military aid, money or weapons, including a little factory here in Morogoro, I did not know about this nuclear thing. So those are details. There are people who know; and we simply have to talk to the big fish and then go down to the small fish who know the details. They are not even written in books or newspapers, they are not there, but that is real history. Those are facts that you cannot argue about. Even if they are un-noted and unallocated there is no argument about it.

My last point was Tanzania. I avoided the time when Mwalimu Nyerere was the Chairman; but you know those were politics. Like in the military; I joined the army

and received military training. In the military there is one very good characteristic. In the training there is no “afande”, but we are all trainers or trainees. When you are a recruit, one thing they try to get out of you first, is to obey the orders; if the trainer says, “Hey up!” You have to stand up, if you don’t, they will say it ten times, till you do it, because that is an order. The second point is: you have to know one another in details; you have to know a fellow who cannot go without water and the coward whom you cannot send out at night to go and listen to what the neighbour is saying in his house. Otherwise if you send him, he will come with the wrong information and say “I got there” when he didn’t get there. That is the army. That was how these heads of state were; so chairman or not chairman, they were colleagues, simply colleagues. They were colleagues working together; sometime they decided one of them will go to Sweden and represent the rest. This is a very important point because otherwise there is this exaggeration that with Nyerere it was such and such, but these were colleagues who understood one another. What I was trying to say here about Tanzania is just one thing; but it is common to all.

They mention the risks like assassinations or destabilizations; but really you have to go to details, that this was a very serious war involving everybody. Why did we come out the way we came out? I don’t know if it says anything. Why did we come out the way we came out? Winners? They did a lot of harm to our countries but not physical harm to some of our leaders. Why was it so? America was there, with all its capacity; with its own satellites and so on. But does it have anything to say about the quality of our leadership? I want to suggest that a person should look at this fact, that justice is justice. The enemies knew that Africa was fighting for a just course. But also the way you argue, the way Africa’s case was presented, can you find something common in what Kaunda or Khama presented? They had to know how to cooperate among themselves but also succeed to work with the enemy and supporters of the enemy. Those are historical facts; how did it happen? We need to go back to what Mbita had said, that this is our history and we have to be fair even to our enemies. Enemy action was there, but we have to be fair to them. We were working to defend our own interests, but they had the strength, and yet they spared their enemies also. Why were you not shot? They knew that the enemy was moving around, but they did not kill him. Fortunately we have him here, and that is a historical thing.

So those are the few things that I wanted to point out, very generally, and then later on, maybe, or when we meet again we can elaborate on the details. I was trying to look at the few bench marks.

Thank you very much.

Sergio

Thank you Chairman. Again when people are speaking, things come back to my mind. If I look at these five men, namely Mwalimu, Kaunda, Seretse, Neto and Samora, they kind of had some connections to the communists. Sir Seretse was a Conservative, Mwalimu was a fair deal; you can go on and on. First and foremost, the word

patriotism; second, the word Africa; and three they loved each other as persons. That was the reason they could weep when the relations were tense. Somewhere they loved as persons. They loved each other. If we forget that, then perhaps today our heads of state do not have this kind of close relationship.

I think in these three points, look thrice at their relationship, and they were blunt among themselves, they were not diplomatic. Two; when you spoke about Zhou en Lai saying you should not care about the U.N, it is a fact. I remember the question of the southern route; we disagreed. Kaunda came to Maputo to talk about it and Samora disagreed, but we never made open criticisms. Why? Would it help to resolve the situation, if we did? Today a lot of academics and newspapers are asking why you are not condemning Mugabe. Good, but we in Mozambique are delivering five hundred mega-watts to Zimbabwe and South Africa. If we stop giving out the five hundred mega-watts, the Guardian or the Times of London will praise us, but I will have the man on the other side of the border, coming to my house because I am married to his daughter; and my cousin would be on the other side. I don't have a notion of separating Zimbabwe from Mozambique or Botswana from South Africa or from Zambia. Who is going to pay the bill?

In 1975 Kurt Weldheim and many others came to Mozambique to ask us to implement sanctions against Rhodesia. We were studying the situation and we decided to implement sanctions for two reasons, but not because of their request. The first reason was that they were continuing to make war against us, attacking our country; and the second reason, as Mwalimu used to say, he could sleep because the Portuguese were not in Mozambique any longer. We could not sleep. They were on our border. They made a lot of promises and part of the Mozambican debt that we paid, and then we had to go in to what we call 'weeping', it was in fact because of this. Neither Britain, nor the United States, nor the western world supported us in this. They made promises but delivery was zero! So sometimes you can afford to be vocal, but not other times, no. Regarding killing of leaders, Samora and Mondlane were killed. Countries attacking each other, yes, South Africa used to do that.

I remember one day my eldest son was kidnapped. My wife was devastated! Can you imagine, I said, "No, I don't care. I am going to make some phone calls." I called Moscow, I called a person in Paris, I called someone in London, and I also called another man in London; I was just asking if the rules of the game had been changed. What happened is that three hours later he was released, and the Head of DMI was sacked and sent as an Ambassador to Chile. The South Africans did not respect any rules, while Ken Flower during the war kept communication with me, through Colonel Michel in particular. This was because we, the people of intelligence, communicate to prevent war and we communicate to bring peace, even during the war.

Regarding the problem of the headquarters of the Liberation Committee, there was a big discussion, whether it should be Accra, Ghana or here. Kwame Nkrumah was the chief supporter of a United Africa; everything was there. We were saying no it had to be near the war front. Ghana is very far away and that's the reason Tanzania was

chosen and that was the reason why a Tanzanian was always heading the Liberation Committee.

As historians, you have to ask yourselves why Southern Africa was the last place. What was the game of interest that made this part of the continent the last part to be liberated? And without exception, there is Mozambique, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe and even South Africa; none of them got their independence through peaceful negotiations. Why?

If I am not wrong, in 1978 there was a meeting in Malta, but during that meeting the Minister of Foreign Affairs came to see me, and told me that the Prime Minister was inviting me that night to go to his house in order to get drunk. I said, "I beg your pardon? In order to get drunk?" Okay, I called Maguni and I told him that I got my invitation to get drunk with the Prime Minister. So I went to the Prime Minister and it was not a joke, it was the truth. I did not get drunk, but the Prime Minister said to me that we were going to get drunk because he had signed an agreement. The British troops were leaving Malta, and for the first time in three thousand years, Malta was not going to have foreign troops on its soil. So that was the reason to get drunk.

During that meeting, David Owen was sitting with Andrew Young and General Prem Chand from India; on our side there was, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, behind them Warioba from Tanzania, me, Kito from Angola, and behind us other delegates, including Fernando Honwana and Maguni and so on. At one time Joshua, Mugabe and Owen were shouting, as if it was a brawl in a bar. Suddenly out of the blue Andrew Young slapped the table very hard, and said, "Gentlemen, you don't understand why the United States is here. We are not going to tolerate a new Mozambique or a new Angola." Andrew Young was a black man, a good personal friend from the Carter Administration and Human Rights, but he said, "We are not going to tolerate a new Mozambique or a new Angola." That was the statement he made and finished; he did not say anything more. Now, if we did not understand that, we understood other things.

You spoke about your Nuclear Program when we had a clear indication because some of our people were working, including work in that shaft, in which we were going to make the first test. In a short as 36 hours after I left Maputo, I met Andropov in a military airport near Moscow. I flew to Paris and I met Lacoste in Paris, I went to London and I met Sir Anthony Duff, then I went to Washington and asked them what they were going to tell me. Andropov said he was going to consult the Politburo. Ten I flew to Cuba. There was a very beautiful house; I sat down with Fidel around seven o'clock in the evening when I went, I was dressed like Hashim, very smart with a tie and Fidel was in his uniform. We had empty and clean ashtrays everywhere; Chomé took a photo in the morning when I was going to leave to the airport, he took another photo, only the two of us, I had no tie, Fidel had opened the buttons of his uniform, and the ashtrays were full. That was the situation.

The suppliers of weapons were against us. When I arrived in Maputo, Marshal Krykov was waiting and he said that the polit-bureau sent a message concerning our

request, and said that USSR had ships with nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean, everybody knew that Russia had ships with nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean. I asked him, what else?" He repeated what everybody knew. We then understood we were on our own, and there was no umbrella to protect us. Of course, I presumed that the Soviets spoke to the Americans and probably they were told "Control your good men over there. We are not going to tolerate this kind of thing." We could rattle this and that but nobody gave us an umbrella. In order to develop the liberation struggle it was necessary to have a state to look up to.

The southern route was a strategic option to survive. The law to arrest people in Botswana, whatever it was, it was a strategic way to survive. I may say that everybody paid the bill. You can't measure how many litres of blood were shed by that one or that one, but blood was shed. Similarly you cannot measure how many litres of tears were shed by mothers whose sons were killed. Perhaps for historical reasons, some had suffered more destruction, more deaths, but it was for strategic reasons. When you are attacking an enemy you choose your front; the enemy chooses and you choose. One thing that was important in the liberation was the frontline. I don't know what was the origin of the name; who coined the name? To start with I think in Lusaka when Presidents Kaunda and Seretse Khama sat for the first time to discuss the Lusaka Declaration and suddenly there was a front line. I think it just happened, it was not planned. That is what I can say. They could have seen that it was necessary to do that, and did it. Perhaps we are lucky today to have had the frontline; SADC is very good and very important; but it has become very complex compared to when it was born in Arusha, it was very informal then; we did not even have an organization. But now it has become a bureaucracy with a lot of organs, meetings, and this perhaps prevents people from being very free in exchanging their views, I don't know. In our days, when there was a SADC summit the Presidents sat down by themselves, and nobody else was allowed in. That was what we used to do. At the maximum there would be Joseph, Butiku, Joe, Mark, and myself, because we were non entities for their purpose, but we held up the legs and the hands for them. Today I think there are things which are missing; the capacity to being very blunt, sometimes, not diplomatic, because if we were not there we would not have witnessed as much as the witnesses who are on the chair, or at the table for their proposal. The terms in which things that were buried are coming out and they feel free to speak. Hashim used to come late in 1975 and 1976, I think, but the group of leaders created a unique relationship which I had never seen reproduced anywhere else.

Thank you.

Joseph

I have two points. One is very brief, the question goes by who coined the name frontline states and where it was originally from. I agree with Sergio that it may have happened, simply because they were countries on the frontline without anybody cautiously saying let us call ourselves frontline; but I was going to suggest that the

focal point in Zambia, since we have one founding father of the Frontline States alive, I would like him to go and ask KK, who actually coined the word frontline states.

The second point is: I was actually elated by the fact that I am one of the original founding fathers of SADC, and I think people need to know that SADC originally was supposed to disagree with the Frontline States. One day President Seretse Khama received a call from the Commonwealth of Nations, that said to President Khama, "You know, by the way, Zimbabwe is about to become independent, and I think it would be dangerous for the Frontline States to allow Zimbabwe to become independent, without preparing for the coming of independence in Zimbabwe." The suspicion or the view was that when Zimbabwe became independent all the other Frontline States would be forgotten and all the aid was going to go to the new nation, which was Zimbabwe. Then they decided to advise the Frontline States to form an economic branch that was the reason why it was called the Southern African Development Coordinating Committee; and it was to coordinate aid so that aid would not go to the new baby, and the old ones be forgotten. We were sent with Minister Mogwe to come to the Chairman of the Frontline States to tell him that we had been approached by the Commonwealth, and they had suggested that because they were going to help mobilize aid for the countries of Southern Africa, maybe the Frontline States should form an economic branch. President Khama said that we should tell Mwalimu that he was going to chair both the economic and the political fora. Mwalimu said, "No, no, no. By the way, I think you must be reminded that Tanzania is actually not a frontline state in the sense of contiguity to the white minority ruled regime; I think the economic forum must be chaired by somebody who is actually a neighbour to the troubled spots. So Khama must chair it." So Khama became the first chairman of SADC, and fortunately, SADC lived side by side with the Frontline States briefly, and the Frontline States achieved its objectives; and SADC remained the body for cooperation in Southern Africa. I am saying this because my friend Sergio sounds like he misses the Frontline States, because in SADC there is not the kind of comradely solidarity that our leaders experienced in the Frontline States; they were very close. SADC relationship is a little bit at arms-length, because there are fourteen of us. Otherwise the genesis is that SADC was supposed to be the economic wing of the frontline states. Thank you very much.

Hashim

Let us remove some plugs; Joe has been a chairman of a number of meetings in the U.N system. He had been a Deputy of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Namibia; he has been a Special Representative of the Secretary General of the O.A.U. in South Africa; and he has been a Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General on the question of Eritrea and Ethiopia. So, he is used to chairing and offering microphones to people. Now I think maybe we give the microphone to Madam Mutumba Bull, to fill in the part before she requests formally for other things,

maybe just to clear that issue on the first call of our living President of one of the Frontline States, *Mzee* Kaunda.

Madam Mutumba Bull

Well, we managed to get appointments to interview the First President of the Republic of Zambia, Dr Kaunda, and during one of the interviews, I asked him, what the origin of the frontline movement was and how it started. He said that initially it was really not planned to be what it came to be. We had invited Presidents Nyerere and Milton Obote to one of the UNIP Congresses at the Mulungushi, and the two leaders Nyerere and Obote said they were very much impressed by the way the UNIP leadership was discussing issues; consulting each other; region from region; branch to branch, and so on. So the three presidents who were at this UNIP Congress decided to form their own body where they could discuss their problems, exchange ideas and consult each other. So they formed a forum which they called Mulungushi Club; Mulungushi Club, from the Mulungushi Local Authority near Kabwe. So that' was what they called their grouping.

Now, other heads of state heard about this club and they started approaching them asking if they could also join the club. And I think President Khama was the forth to join the Club. He said, as more and more were showing interest, even Nigeria was co- opted because it was interested, particularly with Mozambique. Pressing issues that were being discussed were those of Southern African liberation, so they felt that the Mulungushi Club was no longer relevant as a name, and they changed it because the hottest subject occupying them was the liberation of Southern Africa. Those states that were on the front could now meet and consult each other about challenges and problems facing them. He said unfortunately Obote got overthrown while he was in Singapore, at the Commonwealth meeting. He said they had discussed the problems of Uganda in their grouping but they still persuaded Obote to attend the conference. And they regretted that they took him out and he was overthrown when he was out. Ten he said, the group kept growing with the liberation of Mozambique and Angola. Those two joined because they were considered to be strategically important to the war in Southern Africa. He said, Mozambique opened the doors and borders of Southern Africa to the East, Angola opened the borders of Namibia, so it was very strategic for the freedom war; very strategic and crucial to have Machel and Neto in the grouping. That was the explanation he gave us. It became a body that met regularly to discuss issues of Southern Africa and they called themselves frontline because those were the issues that pre-occupied the group whenever they met. Those were his words.

Mark

The issue of releasing African nationalists from Zimbabwe, the first meeting was in October on my mission to Cape Town, and K.K wanted to brief the two other leaders, President Nyerere and President Khama; when they sat Mwalimu said, "Oh! Kenneth,

you are the host. Can you chair the meeting?” and K.K said, “No, Mwalimu; just chair the meeting, I am merely hosting.” So Mwalimu chaired the meeting and gave a briefing on the fastest response to problems which we had in Zimbabwe; possible intervention in Mozambique by South Africa itself, using mercenaries. It was feared that they would interfere in Mozambique.

Then after that the nationalists came for their first visit to Zambia, which was embarrassing because they had to send them back to prison. The second meeting was crucial because the nationalists were going to be released. Again Mwalimu said that President Kaunda should chair the meeting, and K.K said, “No no, but you did very well the last time, so why don’t you just continue to chair?” So President Nyerere continued to chair the meeting and became the chairman of the Frontline States. That was how simple as it was.

Madam Mutumba Bull

Just to continue, K.K said that when President Nyerere relinquished the leadership, it was in Mozambique; President Nyerere said he was giving up, he was stepping down from the Presidency and also from leading the group, and asked who was going to be chosen as the next leader? Now in paying complement to Mwalimu Nyerere, they said there is one Nyerere and replacing him would be difficult. And then when they proposed the next chairman, KK was proposed and Samora Machel was the one who said, just as was done for Nyerere, there is always only one Kenneth Kaunda, always will be one Kenneth Kaunda. So he became the next Chairman after Mwalimu Nyerere.

Hashim

Well thank you very much; I just wanted to say one of those things which Mark has been very mean to say. In the efforts to get leaders of Zimbabwe out, these two people, those two people, Butiku and Mark were privileged to visit the prison to get those two people out.

Butiku

Allow me to say a few words, just to complement Mark. I don’t know the background, but I know K.K, was always a front liner, when it came to South Africa and Rhodesia. So whenever Mwalimu and his people got to Zambia, there was this idea that these people are going to be invited to go to a meeting. I am told the story why I came there was because Mark was there and they wanted two people to go there. The alternative was the ambassador, the late Ambassador Katikaza should have joined Mark, and from what he said, we were only personal assistants; we could not have the diplomatic aura around us. He said, “Suppose Smith changes his mind and arrests these people, I think Mark should lead the team and Joseph, you should also accompany us.”

Hashim

I just wanted you to know, you have people here, who went in to Smith's jails during the colonization of Southern Rhodesia and this adds value to this interface and interaction here.

Butiku

And Mr. Mugabe called us fellow prisoners.

Sergio

I think, for the people here and for the record, Mark Chona had a very difficult task. He was a bridge of communication. What happened was to take an agreement to them. We were in that October meeting; he was delivering the agreement to them and that was the first time we were joining the frontline. The agreement contained the following:

- One, South Africa would not interfere in Mozambique, and they had to make a public statement on that;
- Two, the political prisoners of Zimbabwe would be released; and
- Three, that they would bring Smith to the negotiation table, it was in Victoria Falls.

So this is the merit of the work done on this side of the border. Butiku was his aid in going to jail. But the one who went to Cape Town, to meet with these people was Mark.

Hashim

Thank you, Sergio, for clearing the cloud about the matter, I think you have really had a barbeque of information as regards to workings of the Frontline States, and many things which went on. It was not all, but maybe, now it is time for you to come to the other side, to start reacting to what you have learnt; where you think you did not get information properly, where you think you have some other kind of information which you now think has been well cleared, so that we can all share that aspect which has come out of this early exposure. Ten, we shall see how we can end the day. We shall still have two and a half or three hours tomorrow; so let us see how we can make the maximum of the time we have. Those who are ready to take part should please just indicate.

Tonchi

Thank you Mr. Chairman. Let me also thank the colleagues for their very informative discussion. We are privileged that we have people here who actually participated in the struggle of the independence of our respective countries and witnessed the initial stages of the liberation movements themselves.

I have two issues, one is general and the second one is more specific. I am interested in the relationships between the respective Frontline States and the liberation movements. This is because all the countries involved became independent

and they had different ideologies, and the liberation movements also had such varied ideologies themselves. Now I was wondering, in terms of supporting the liberation movements, were there key conflicts between the respective countries and the liberation movements? Especially Zambia, Tanzania, with all the liberation movements they were accommodating, and also relationships with others. I just want to see how the heads of state dealt with this. We had to maintain these relationships with African colleagues, the liberation movement leaders, but also have our other interests. So that is one.

The second one is how the frontline states, Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania handled this. Botswana, I think, it was much clearer that there was a law which had boundaries, which I mentioned; you can't carry weapons, you can't launch an attack from there, and so on; but with Zambia and Tanzania there had been incidents there. We want to know, how may be, the integrities were maintained. In Zambia we had SWAPO having problems in 1976 internal problems, with Chipanga, with large groups of people and we had the Zambian Government getting involved and so on; I would like to know exactly how Zambia dealt with that situation. With Tanzania, something happened much earlier and even Ambassador Mbita had also chipped in there; I think in 1965 there were real squabbles in the SWAPO, here in Tanzania, and some members were arrested, some fled to Kenya and so on. I would like to know the role of Tanzania at that time, because I think when these issues got out, Tanzania had to protect itself as a country. But you know there were the human rights movements, and there were other things; but you could not just let the liberation movements loose, to do whatever they were planning and how our heads of state dealt with such issues. Thank you.

Prof. Bhebe

Chairman, the Soviet Union and ZAPU were allies, with China and ZANU, being more supported by Tanzania. We were in it, so we knew; and so much was said about ZAPU, especially Nkomo and Kaunda. I think this is the first part of the question. Secondly, how did they manage to maintain their loyalties to the respective movements at the same time as they made sure that they did not derail the struggle as it were?

Mark

Thank you very much, very briefly on the first, regarding ideologies, it is my experience and Sergio's to say these leaders were within their countries, nationalists, patriots, international Africanists; and when it came to international championing of the freedom struggle, they were internationalists. President Nyerere summed up once, I think in 1979, when Mugabe and Nkomo were objecting to go to the Lancaster house talks; I think Mugabe made a mistake by referring to socialism, and he clapped and said, "Comrades you are not socialists, you are just fighting for freedom." Freedom was the ideology of our leaders. That is what matters and that is why they joked about bringing oranges to Dar es Salaam and all kinds of things. So really, at no time

in my life in the State House, dealing with liberation movements, did the issue of ideology come about. That was why we were able to talk to the Chinese, we talked to the Russians and we could talk to what we call our natural allies. It was a spectrum of all those who believed in the course of African freedom. That is one.

Two, with regards to Zambia's relation to ZAPU and ZANU, I don't know, whether people know that this perception of Zambia supporting ZAPU versus ZANU, never existed. And I can categorically say it didn't, because I was in the forefront. In Geneva, I think ZANU had a problem with accommodation, and I delivered the cash in Geneva, to support ZANU's accommodation during the Geneva Conference. I never delivered one penny to Joshua Nkomo in my life. At the Lancaster House talks, there was again another request, because this time Mugabe knew that if he asked, he would be given; a request came and I delivered cash to Robert Mugabe at his flat, and not a penny to Joshua Nkomo. The issue of their movement from Lusaka and to here was really for security reasons. When you are on the frontline, and it happened with PAC, we literally had to round up their camp in Livingstone, because it was dangerous to have people who were fighting, almost slaughtering each other in the frontline. So we had an agreement to move them to the background, to re-organize. In 1974 it was a terrible period for ZANU; we don't understand what happened, but these are issues that could only be explained by the movement internally. The fact was that they moved out of Zambia because it was on the frontline and Mozambique, at that time, was just beginning to get into independence; anything that happened in the frontline, destabilized those who were actually almost at the point of achieving their objectives. For us the independence of Mozambique was of strategic importance because it meant almost a new 800 kilometres border with South Africa.

Sergio

The border with Zimbabwe was open from Zumbo to Chikwalakwala which is practically 1500 kilometres; from Chikwalakwala to the extreme south is 1200 kilometres, and from Maputo to the border less than 100 kilometres.

Mark

So, the freedom of that border was of extreme importance to Zambia and therefore we had to make sure that anything that was threatening the success of that effort was solved; that is why it appeared as if Zambia had asked ZANU to move. I can assure you that some of the ZANU people actually survived under our beds, in my house; it was a very bad period. It is important to note that there was no ideology because I went to school with some of them, and some of them were married in to our families. So they were really a part of us, and the issue of ideology did not exist. Thank you very much.

Joseph

Yes, I agree with Mark that with us, we were not concerned with ideology because Botswana was the least ideological of all the countries. I think you will be surprised

to know that even today the ideology of Botswana is very interesting because it is a four legged monster. The ideology of Botswana is democracy, development, social justice and unity, four; that is what is called the ideology of Botswana. If you see the manifesto of the ruling party, that is the ideology of Botswana. Therefore, we did not look at ZANU and ZAPU, even the fact that they received support from different powers. I will give one example; I was sent to Lusaka to attend a meeting of Afro something solidarity. When I got there and I was told that ZANU was not allowed in because that was a meeting of liberation movements supported by the Russians. President Khama told me not to attend, because we did not want to be party to dividing the liberation movements, so I didn't attend. I enjoyed myself at the Intercontinental Hotel and I was very happy that I did not attend. So we were not concerned. I was telling somebody in the toilet there, that I remember a very interesting meeting between Muzorewa, Mugabe and myself, in Libreville on the margins of an OAU summit. Mogwe was the acting President and luckily enough we knew what he was going to complain about ZANU. So we decided to drink a local cognac to be able to confront him. What he wanted to talk to the Minister about was accusing Botswana that when the refugees leave Zimbabwe, and enter the border in the Francistown area, in the north, and Francistown borders Matabeleland, our policemen asked them whether they were ZAPU. If they said they were ZAPU they were told it was okay. If they were asked whether they were ZANU, and they said they were ZANU, then they were told that they could come in on condition that they joined ZAPU. Mugabe had come to complain about that. That was what was happening.

Of course we were so aggressive; precisely I said we had partaken produce of France. Mugabe used to remember any time he saw me, and even when he was President, he used to remember and say, "You remember that very interesting meeting?" So you know, in other words that was false, we never asked refugees what party they belonged to; that was so cruel; people were running away from war and you are asking them are you ZAPU or ZANU! We welcomed them in order to take them to Lusaka; we put them on a plane to be taken to Lusaka. With regards to South Africa, of course people were confused by the fact that President Khama knew Botha and they were friends; they were family friends actually. On the South African side, Khama went to school with Oliver Tambo and Mandela, so the very fact that he was very close to Oliver Tambo, it did not mean that he was hurting PAC; Dr Chengu went to school with Thabo Mbeki, and therefore we were not hunting the PAC. At independence we gave them one million dollars each.

We supported ZAPU. Our people did not believe in one being authentic and others non- authentic; but we gave ZAPU six vehicles for their campaign and then I think one million pula, which I think is equivalent to about four hundred thousand dollars, for the same purpose. Ten of course we sent a plane load of beef from Botswana for the celebrations. So we were never, never ideological with people who were fighting for their liberation. That was President Seretse Khama; some people don't even know that President Khama was very close to Herbert Chitepo. They were together in

London or somewhere. They were very close and therefore we were not ideological. So I think that is all.

The other one is about divisions among the parties; even in Botswana we did not experience too much conflict between the parties, because we didn't have a collection of liberation movements in the capital city for instance or in Francistown, because they were very few. Those who were actually participating in the struggle did not want to expose themselves by remaining too close to the border. So we had the representatives and they never fought. I don't know may be in the bars, they fought each other, but otherwise we were never involved in separating them, and therefore we never experienced divisions in my country. As I was saying in the morning, if we find you at the border we arrested you, and that was the law of the land, because we used to say to all our allies, "If you are fighting in a liberation struggle, why do you come to the bar at the Imperial Hotel? The country is so open why can't you go elsewhere? You are not fighting at the Imperial hotel, you are fighting in South Africa there; Our country is open, so please don't allow us to see you, because you are embarrassing us, and we will arrest you." We never made any bones about it.

Of course there was SWAPO; SWAPO never bothered us and they always came to Botswana when they were fighting for their freedom, and we took them to a place called Whitehouse in Francistown and then flew them to Tanzania or Zambia. So they never bothered us. The Angolan refugees came, and they never bothered us. These were people seeking freedom, they didn't have any problems. We never had problems with weapons from SWAPO, we never had problem from the Angolans. We may have had a few problems of weapons with ZAPU and ZANU; but most of the weapons were destined for the South African liberation movements, understandably because they had to take the weapons to South Africa and they could only do so through Botswana.

Sergio

After a non-ideological Botswana, Mozambique was quite ideological, but first of all what is being a little bit ideological? In 1977 or something like that, Wilfred Burchett was a great journalist, Australian and he had covered a great deal of the Vietnam War. He was sitting in Maputo with Samora Machel, and asked, "When did you read Marx for the first time?" He said, "You know when I was young, I used to graze cattle." He asked, "But when did you read Marx for the first time?" Samora answered, "When I was a teenager I was doing this and that." And then he turns to Burchett and said, "When I read Marx, it was the second time." We did not come from the ideology to the basics because the basics would come the second time.

Now, people ask about authentic liberation movements. I was involved with that. Liberation movements that were authentic were ANC, MPLA, SWAPO, FRELIMO and ZAPU. With the exception of FRELIMO, all the others were very much connected with Moscow. We once had very good relations with Beijing and Moscow. Why? I will tell you; ZANU appeared as a splinter movement at that time, PAC was also a splinter

movement, and those were not authentic. They sat and worked together with FNLA, UNITA, COREMO and ZANU. In 1970 when we crossed the Zambezi River and started operating in Southern Zambezi, during that period, and even before that time, we had the pressure of the Rhodesian forces attacking us in Mozambique including even the northern part of Mozambique. So we started to approach ZAPU comrades and colleagues, saying, "Listen, now you can cross the Zambezi and we can support you so that you can start operating; you have a good border, thousands of kilometres, you are extremely lucky." ZAPU took no measures, and Smith went on attacking us. A few months after that, Josiah Tongogara and Chitepo came to speak to Samora and Chissano, asking FRELIMO, to help them to cross the Zambezi. We asked ourselves what we were going to do.

We decided to send a reconnaissance mission inside Zimbabwe. That was headed by my colleague Ajaap, who later on became the commander of 1000 volunteers we put in Zimbabwe. He came with a report and said that nobody spoke about ZAPU outside of Matabeleland; everybody spoke about ZANU. We said, "Okay, ZANU wants to fight and ZAPU is refusing to use the facilities; then let us support ZANU because we wanted to fight, to go inside Zimbabwe, so they would not come to our country." That was why we started to support ZANU.

Well, at that moment, I have explained the question of authentic, non-authentic ideological approach and non-ideological approach. A simple fact was that ZANU was prepared to fight. Later on we had the exercise of creating the patriotic front and so on, and also creating a single army because we did not want to have two armies fighting each other in Zimbabwe. ZAPU sent a sort of a token group to train together here in Nachingwea because the Nachingwea camp was handed over to Zimbabweans and Mozambicans and most of them, they did not come. We had a meeting in Maputo. Jason Moyo and others attended the meeting. Samora asked them, what they were doing, and Jason said that they had people, who were extremely well trained. Samora, then said, "What? So we have to spare them?" Well, that was a cold shower to all of us. Mabote was there, Shitanda was there and I was there. Samora said, "Are you saying that, in your army, those who are stupid and illiterate can die, and those that are well trained you are keeping them for the moment of victory? Beware of that." The Germans thought that Stalin had all the generals in jail and Stalin went to the jail and said, "Let us fight! Fatherland is being attacked." The Americans and British wanted the Germans and the Soviets to bleed each other, and then they would come with fresh forces. The Soviets had experimental forces. In Angola, all of them escaped. An enormous army was outside the country and never fought. MPLA was an experiment; they crushed all of them like that. What we were doing was that, we thought we were going to crush the others when they were tired of the war; they were the experimental group.

Coming again to the question of weapons, Hashim knows that during the liberation struggle the Soviets never gave a tank to us; It was useless. Suddenly the Soviets gave tanks to ZAPU and then went to Zambia and delivered tanks to the ANC. I spoke to

the Soviets and I said, "What are you going to do with the tanks? Are you going to cross the border with ten tanks? Where is your air cover? They are useless for you. Where are you going to use the tanks at any moment? So I am taking the tanks." And I took the tanks. ZAPU wanted to exhibit the tanks; that was their approach. They used them not to go inside Zimbabwe and shoot down the military planes. They used them by Victoria Falls to shoot a civilian vehicle that brought retaliation against Zambia. So, you have to be serious with the question of weapons; what kind of weapon do you need, and when. Tanks are totally useless without air cover, because South Africans and Zimbabweans had air cover for their forces. You would be crushed before moving ten kilometres. The question of Soviets, and Chinese, was very complicated.

Back in 1978 Honeker came to Mozambique with a big group of his leadership. We had prepared a meeting between Honeker and Robert Mugabe, and that meeting was organized so we would patch up and finish this nonsense of Soviets and Chinese, and people who were fighting inside there. On the eve of the meeting, during the night, Herrman Axen organized underground, and had a meeting with Mugabe and he presented to Mugabe, a joint communiqué, condemning China. He belonged to the communist party of GDR, a member of Politburo and head of the external relations, he was also a survivor of Auschwitz and I respected him very much for those actions. Mugabe said he could not sign such a thing, and he was told if he did not sign he would have no support, and Mugabe said he was still not going to sign. As a result, the meeting between Honeker and Mugabe never took place. It was almost one o'clock in the morning when the GDR Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Willerding, came to me and informed me that he had to speak to me; crying, he told me about what happened, and that someone had phoned from Moscow, asking him to cancel the meeting unless ZANU condemned China.

These problems existed. We are not hiding anything but this does not mean that the Soviet Union was not supporting us, or China was not supporting us, they did support our offensive very much. Zhou en Lai took the decision to send 10,000 tons of weapons immediately to Mozambique, and then we declared a general offensive.

So our approach to ZAPU, to ZANU to PAC, to ANC, had nothing to do with being ideologically my friends or ideologically my enemies. They were one thing, were they present on the ground? What they fought, told me something. That was why at the beginning we only used ZAPU and then we started to support ZANU; and sometimes we had problems with these approaches. I remember that one day we went to Chinoi and brought the people of Chinoi, because the political commissar they had for ZANU and the other people wanted to spread Mao Tse-tung thoughts, and the *Red Book*. They just wanted Mugabe, and Josiah Tongogara out, because they were not communists enough. So I went there with Mabote and we flew them to Maputo to have a meeting with Samora. Samora said, "Okay, you want to build socialism immediately, good! Cross the border and start to build socialism, what we are going

to do is to support those who want to fight for the independence of Zimbabwe; but if you want to build socialism now, you cross the border." *And he was pointing the*

other side of the border. “And if you want to overthrow Mugabe, Josiah and so on do it inside Zimbabwe not inside my country.” And it was finished. The leadership of ZANU was very young; it was very young, very enthusiastic and sometimes what they thought was stronger than what was the immediate task. So I think that I have covered the question of control of weapons. We never prevented weapons from crossing. We organized the crossing, but we prevented tanks and useless weapons. Guns could be carried by a truck, but what would you do with tanks inside South Africa or Zimbabwe? During that time, was it possible? It was nonsense. I think that I tried to cover the concerns that Dr Bull and the other friends had presented.

Butiku

What I wanted to comment on was the bigger picture in the question of differences. I think we have to concede that there were differences between parties, between leaders and between the frontline states and the outside world. Differences were there; that we have to accept, but the point is, on which areas? On the vision and mission itself, African liberation and its freedom, there were no differences, and that was the ideology; no differences at all. I mean you never brought in differences in terms of the cold war, communism, or capitalism. It never came in. I will give an example; I think my colleague has tried to give an example. There was a time when there was a heated debate between Neto and the rest of the colleagues in a meeting in Brazzaville or somewhere, about scientific socialism; and Mwalimu turned to Neto and said, “Neto, do you know the origins of scientific socialism? You can’t become a scientific socialist in the Marxist sense when your people are still living on roots, and eating cassava, and potatoes, with no factories, no industrialization, and you are talking about scientific socialism or Marxism. It is nonsense when we are still living on roots. So we are simply talking about Africans’ freedom, liberation, and the war we must wage to get rid of these colonialists and apartheid.”

There was no difference; and I am going to say it again and again, because in the final analysis people are going to try and capitalize on the differences. So let us say the differences were there; some were capitalists, some were scientific socialists, but when it came to Africa, the real ideology was Africa, its freedom, and its liberation from colonialism; that was actually the beacon and there was no difference. That was the beacon and as I said, the destination. So that is one point I want to make, I can remember that there were differences between parties. The details are known; Hashim knows, in FRELIMO there were differences, there were differences in SWAPO; but the most important point here is not the differences about liberation but the differences in the interests. So the historians, what to look at, is what they were arguing about; whether it was FRELIMO and Simango that was the issues. Was it really a difference in approach towards the war or a difference in interests? So those are the issues and that is what we have to find out. Those who were there knew some of the negotiations that took place, and there were no differences based on fundamental issues, but on issues of leadership and interest.

We must accept that we took into account the reality of the cold war. There were differences because the big powers themselves differed. China and Russia differed. China used to call Russia certain names and there was a point when China thought Russia was just an imperialist agent, more dangerous than the United States. When you went to talk to China that was the picture they presented. You can always find out in the records that Russia and China differed, but they all supported the liberation struggle movements. Of course, there was the West. The West differed with China, during the cold war, and sometimes we got affected because of these differences. I remember in the case of Mozambique, Russia brought in a lot of weapons, and there was a meeting to discuss those weapons. There was huge weaponry; and the issue was how to use them. Who was going to man them? Where were we going to get the spare parts? But I think they were given on good faith. When we look at the weaponry; the amount and the problems they created in our region here, we had to know why they were brought in. So those were the differences. We must never deny that there were differences, but the basis of those differences must also be made clear. There were differences within parties and differences within countries, but on the real issues of African liberation, these leaders were Africans, intimate, working for a cause. They never accepted to be divided on their cause, and when there was any sign of division, there was a lot of reaction. This crying you heard was based on this one. Whenever it featured, that they were going to be divided, the exchange of dialogue was brutal, and they talked until they agreed.

Prof. Bebe

Let me start with ZAPU's case. It must have been towards the end of 1974, and the beginning of 1975, when ZAPU was completely paralysed by the split that occurred within the movement. That was when they were violating agreements between Chikerema and Jason Moyo. And apparently the whole thing took the form of tribalism, in which those who came, not necessarily from Matabeleland, but I think Matabo was too broad for that split; because it tended to be along the lines of the Kalavivas vs. the Zulu and some people also said that he had launched the forces, or even before that. In fact it was before, because I remember seeing in 1969 and in 1970s, a picture of the whole thing on television, when I was in London. I saw in BBC when Chikerema was boasting that they will now be launching the forces across the Zambezi; and all that was criticized, I mean these were the snippets that we were getting from outside, but it was such. The whole thing had far reaching consequences to the extent that the Zambian government had to intervene to resolve that, when there was a military confrontation between the two sides.

On the Chitepo side I think everybody must have followed that because it even involved a commission of investigation that went deep into the assassination of Chitepo, which had followed upon the heels of a rebellion within ZANU; and which also followed the talks that were going on between the organized dialogue, and this is where we would wish to hear from comrade Mark Chona. When in fact the dialogue

was organized, somehow it seemed to have triggered some differences within ZANU, so that there was linkage between internal disturbances and the external environment. We were given to understand that those, with whom there was dialogue, had exposed the movement to infiltration from the Rhodesian forces. These are the snippets that we have from the outside and we would like to hear from those who were on the ground; how they saw the things happening and how they handled them, particularly as we understand the two organizations, ZAPU and ZANU. Yesterday you explained, that there was no sympathy whatsoever, which was partial to one party or the other, but the perception is different. Kaunda was said to be a friend of Joshua Nkomo, and therefore sympathised more with Joshua Nkomo, and would have wanted to see him take over the organizations and take up the leadership; while we are told otherwise. These are perceptions and I am not stating facts but we are stating perceptions which we were grappling with, as researchers.

On the other side we are told that Mwalimu was a bit impatient with Joshua Nkomo's approach to the liberation struggle, and would have even wanted, the liberation forces to spearhead the liberation struggle to the exclusion of the political leadership, but slowly was persuaded to see the younger generation, particularly Jason Moyo and Robert Mugabe, as having some promise, and eventually gravitated towards Robert Mugabe. The ascendancy of Robert Mugabe can be explained partially through the kind of sympathy that he received from Mwalimu. We know that at one point Mwalimu was very angry that they had overthrown Ndabanigi Sithole in the process, but still eventually we are told that Mwalimu leaned towards ZANU. So, these are some of the snippets we have, your Excellency, and it is a pity that I am speaking extempore; I would have wanted to be more organized in my presentation than I have done.

Professor Tlou

Thank you, chairman. It is a footnote to what Bebe was saying, and I was going to raise this question anyway. When Sergio was briefing us about the offer by Mozambique for ZAPU to open a front in Mozambique, and there seemed to be some reluctance on the part of ZAPU to do so, in fact I came to that point in the UK. That reminded me of my own research, I was interviewing a young ZANU activist who actually left Botswana, joined ZAPU, and went to fight; this young man told me all the story of how they crossed into Zambia, how they trained in Morogoro and so on. He mentioned an incident which brought me to what you said. He said at a certain point, they were asked to go to Mozambique and open a front there, which ties in with what you said. He was one of those in a group and he mentioned other names, but I still had to interview the others. There were three people in Botswana who actually joined ZAPU. He said that they knew that they were probably going to be slaughtered in Mozambique because they knew that ZANU had plans to do that, to eliminate them. Again that was a questionable perception, because he said they knew. He went on saying that, himself and other people left the camp in Kakawa, Zambia, and literally

walked across mountains at night, in order to go back to Zambia and finally they reached Zambia.

He said a few of them actually went into Mozambique, and when they were there they could see that things were not very clear or safe. They too had a long march, went through bridges and so on, and finally got back. But these were not Botswanans, these were Zimbabweans. So what does this say to somebody who hears this story in the context of what we are discussing with our colleague? Say in terms of upheavals within the movements themselves, and perception that perhaps some of the Frontline States were taking sides? These were perceptions, but the young man had perception that Tanzania, Mozambique and ZANU were in cahoots in that regard. That was the perception of the young man. You see? So one would like to hear from those who had powers of this whole thing as indeed yesterday you were exposing things that we could never know. They are not written anywhere; they reside in your memories. But the point I was going to come to, as well, was when Sergio was saying ZAPU did not seem to be willing to make use of that offered front; was it not probably because, it was them, rather than these perceptions by the young man and so on? It was also perhaps due to the fact that they had also opened their own front in the west; because quite a number of cadres who infiltrated through Botswana were fighting. I did the research on the border and I learnt they were fighting from that place. They had their own front in the west, rather than probably in the north, because the impression one got when Sergio was talking, was that probably ZANU was not ready to start anything. Yet when you hear these other stories, you believe they had a front which they were opening, or had opened in the western part of the country. So, there is need for further clarification on this matter.

Prof. Magubane

Yes, Mark Chona had made what I thought was a very profound observation; that Zambian peasants, especially in the country, suffered a lot during the struggle, and that as a government they were faced with the issue of making a judgment, how the various leaders of the liberation movements were committed to the course. Ten what became a major problem was how to establish the fact that the leaders of the ANC, PAC, ZANU, ZAPU MPLA, FRELIMO and so forth were really committed, and that they were willing to make the necessary sacrifices to prosecute the struggle. I think that, you know the ANC was faced with that particular problem, especially after the Wankee Campaign in 1967. That was the time when I arrived in Zambia to teach at the university and I remember that when it was announced in the BBC that ANC and ZAPU cadres were fighting in Wankee, our spirits were raged. There were comrades among the South Africans, and Zimbabweans. Ten by 1988 it had become quite obvious that, a lot of lessons had been learned, and that some mistakes had been made; the movement needed to re-assess what was gained and what was lost, and that caused a tremendous amount of disenchantment in the camps. That led to the Chris Hanni Memorandum, which resulted in the convening of the Consultative

Conference of the ANC in Morogoro. I happened to have been selected to attend that particular conference as a representative of our branch in Lusaka. The ANC almost imploded; it almost broke up. That was when the Group of 8, as it was ultimately called, or the Gang of 8, was suspended from the ANC.

All these raised a number of questions and tremendous amount of disenchantment in the camps. How do you tell the people about what the leadership was doing? Because once you tell someone that we were assessing the situation, we had to find new routes into South Africa. One of the routes that they were pursuing was of course, through Mozambique, and I am sure comrade Sergio knew about Gele's mission with FRELIMO. He went deep into Tete Province and so forth, and he came back and wrote a report that going through Mozambique was impractical and the distances were simply prohibitive; even if you could go through Swaziland, how do you re-supply your forces? Ten J. Mathews was sent to Botswana because of the good relationship with Botswana, and the ANC had concluded that Zimbabwe was not the alternative. The only other border that had to be explored was the Mozambican border. But they also understood that, the government of Botswana was the most helpless against the South African forces, simply because of the geography; and in fact, as it was pointed out, the South African spies were literally all over the place. Ten the question was, how does one exploit that particular border, in those circumstances?

I remember comrade Mabida, coming to my house at one time, and asking, "What are you doing this weekend?" I said, "Why are you asking that question?" He said he wanted me to go to Dar es Salaam, and he had already taken care of the visa problem and so forth. I told my wife that there was that message, and I was on the plane that Friday. Nobody met me at the airport, as they were delayed because of the traffic, but they ultimately came, and they put me in a hotel, in down town. At midnight, my brother who was working for the Merchant Marines came and I said, "Shollo! What are you doing here?" and he himself said, "Buju! What are you doing here?" We talked for only thirty minutes, and then he disappeared. Now what had happened was that, there were lots of merchant marines from South Africa that were calling at Dar es Salaam port to deliver goods, and the ANC had recruited some of the Africans who were working in the ships. My wife had been given an exit permit from South Africa and Makiwanda came and took it from us, because he wanted to forge a South African passport. So there I was, meeting my brother; I really did not know why they asked me to come and meet him for thirty minutes.

Just to cut the long story short, talking to John Mathews, because he was there in Morogoro, there were lots of memoranda of complaints and so forth, saying that the movement people had become too comfortable in Lusaka, Botswana, and Dar es Salaam; and they were not really interested in prosecuting the struggle any more. Ben brought a rather sketchy memorandum on this particular issue, and then John Mathews replied. He said, "You know, you don't understand. We have to deal with governments that are faced with enormous problems, whether it is Botswana Government, Zambian Government, or the Tanzanian Government. Our arms come

from the Eastern bloc countries, they have to be delivered at some port; they have to be cleared, and they have to be transported across the country. There are threats of coups and counter coups. So you have to convince President Nyerere that, in fact, these arms will not fall into wrong hands.” I mean, we learned a lot at Morogoro about the day to day problems. We had to get these people to go for training and there was also the issue of the people getting local documents from this country so they could come back. How did the government of Tanzania, in particular, put itself on the lead, and give each ANC cadre travel documents; how would they know how many of these people were spies? I think the point I am trying to make, is about trust. To me trust was the most important; if you can just give a clue to us, how you establish trust eventually.

This is my final point, with regards to South Africa, you know, there was an alliance, the ANC had an alliance with South Africans of Asian origin, with coloureds, with whites who were mostly communists; so within the ANC there were communists and nationalists and Christians and so forth, who never really saw eye to eye. Joe Mathews raised that problem when they went to the OAU Liberation Committee, and it came to dishing out facts; because it was said that the South African political parties received a lot of funds from the Soviet Union, and therefore we had to give more to the PAC. There was a lot of sympathy for PAC in the message, within the OAU Liberation Committee, and this was saddening especially to Tambo, who could never really break the alliance. I am sure when Mandela, left the country, went to Ethiopia trained and came back to Dar es Salaam to meet with President Nyerere, he wrote a long memo saying, “Fellows, ideologically the PAC is beating us, but we have our own commitment to the alliance. How do we tell other comrades in the alliance, for instance Joe Slovo, that they should let the ANC project itself rather than being seen as taking the case from whites and so forth?” There was a tremendous anti-white attitude within the Africans. Leballo was able to play his card very well, but after Morogoro something happened, where Tambo established trust with Nyerere and with Kaunda. There was no question of trust with regards to Khama, because they had been at Fort Hare together.

Another thing that was very interesting was the fact that, even though ZANU, especially Mugabe, was pro-PAC and had this respect from all of us, as a senior, but not just a senior; but a senior who had tremendous brains, who was a man of integrity, who joined other students in a strike that led to his expulsion from Fort Hare, when he was supposed to be doing his UTE, and go to the priesthood. So there was that affection between Mugabe and Tambo, which addresses your question of trust. I think it is a very important point if you can fill us in. Sorry that I have taken so long.

Hashim

Thank you very much. I am sure, this is a wakeup call, for all those who would come in to see how things developed because whatever upheavals or tremors that they have said, they were not purely of external nature; the real ingredients were within

the movements themselves. As you have explained, there are so many contributory factors, which even the host countries could not know, because most of those discussions were among themselves. Perhaps the host countries, happened to face a *fait accompli*, and then adjusted themselves to see how to reduce the damage of the misunderstandings that had arisen among those people internally, and still not reaching the real issue. They could guard some of the issues as purely their own and they never divulged them to anybody; even at the threat of death, they would just keep quiet, but once you leave, they go back to them.

Reuben

My contribution does not centre on the issues of PAC, ANC as in the case of this discussion which is currently going on but is closely related to the same issues because it is on the positions which were adopted by Zambia and Tanzania in relation to FRELIMO and COREMO. The literature which is available shows that when FRELIMO was starting the liberation war from Northern Mozambique, COREMO was also starting the liberation war from the Zambian side. It would be interesting to know how it came about that eventually it was possible for Zambia to side with Tanzania in supporting FRELIMO to prosecute the struggle. What happened after FRELIMO was set up as a broad front for the liberation of Mozambique? We would also like to know the extent to which FRELIMO remained a broad front of all the organizations which came together to constitute the FRELIMO during the struggle. Now how did FRELIMO attempt to continue to put together all these organizations in the post liberation period? Thank you.

Prof. Tembe

Actually I have issues which I am motivated by the interviews and some secondary territory, which is available on the conflict management within FRELIMO, during the liberation struggle. The first phase is, at the beginning, with the creation of FRELIMO itself, where there were splits and the leaders of the embryonic political movements that came together, and then formed FRELIMO under Mondlane. The issue is how the Tanzania Government and TANU managed to resolve the differences within those groups, since the government itself supported and provided all the logistical and political facilities.

The second phase is related to the one which my colleague has already raised. The literature shows that COREMO was able to survive to a certain point. We don't know to what extent COREMO was a liberation movement that was able to launch the armed struggle, but there were some indications that they had a ground in Zambia. The point is how Zambia managed to resolve the differences between COREMO and FRELIMO, and provide facilities to FRELIMO to move on in prejudice of COREMO. Was this a kind of compromise between Zambia and Tanzania? Or was this a result of the natural developing process of those two movements?

The third is about ideological or non-ideological issues that we discussed yesterday. Sergio Vieira already mentioned that FRELIMO is very much ideological. If that was so, how did the Tanzania Government and TANU manage to resolve the conflict that arose on the ideological motivations that brought about the differences within the FRELIMO leadership? Let us say the differences between the Simango side and other sides? Our colleague Joseph Butiku yesterday mentioned that it could be true there were some differences but the differences may have not been that ideological. So, I was not very clear about this, since FRELIMO regarded itself to be very much ideological.

The last but not least is on racism. Within FRELIMO, there were people who defended black nationalism, and were not very comfortable having white minority and other coloured people leading the movement alliance, and taking advantage of the leadership positions. That could have been a source of motivation for the conflicts within FRELIMO. And there was some information that, that kind of racist attitude had a lot of support within Tanzania and particularly by some members of TANU. I would just like to understand how this was managed. Thank you.

Hashim

Good, now people are coming out and making progress with issues, so that we can put them in proper perspective in writing our history. That is the most cardinal point, that we are not diverted by side issues in putting the perspective of our history, definitely all those things have come about, there is no question about it. They have not only come out and they are even present to-day in our societies, in these countries, with our independence, there are all those tendencies. There is no point in taking the attitude of an ostrich; you hide your head in the sand, like an ostrich, and since you don't see the enemy, then you think the enemy does not see you! So, I think let us address them very soberly and see what was right and what was not right.

In my position as chair, and having had the privilege on two occasions, to serve my party TANU, first as publicity secretary of the party and secondly as executive secretary of the party. It was from that position that I was taken to the Liberation Committee. I will answer the last of the points that comrade Tembe raised, about the party and the congress, when the elections were about to come. The colonial government had devised a method which would have brought the question of racism into society; because they said there would be three votes, every individual had to cast three votes. You vote for a white, you vote for an Asian, and you vote for an African, so as to make sure that the Asians and the Whites have seats in parliament. At the Congress of the Party, it almost broke the party. It was held in my home town, I had just come out from school, and I was working for the party as a volunteer; and Mwalimu, when I listened, the lady group was anti-this position of the three votes and one lady who was from Mbeya challenged the men, she said, "What type of policy do you want to accept? This would be the first time we shall see, you men if you are men indeed. That for once you accept to have a wife with three husbands! We vote,

for Tanganyika, we vote for three husbands” So it took the party leadership a lot of effort to persuade and to say no, we want our independence that trick should not stop us from going through. We shall vote for the whites, we shall vote for the Indians, we shall vote for our men, but those whom we are going to vote for, would be of our own choice. Let them say these are the candidates, TANU would say which white is a candidate for this, which Asian is a candidate for this; and that was how the elections came to be. Yes, TANU won across the board, swept the board. So the Asians who went in were members of TANU, the whites who went in were members of TANU and the debate was TANU debate in parliament and the matter was over.

So those elements of saying may be TANU had sympathy in this element of racial discrimination in the movements, I would tell you categorically no, but it was a problem within those parties themselves, you see the problems were within the parties themselves and TANU’s work was to explain what I have explained. This is how we got rid of this problem. So those who still wanted to continue, to say TANU was in favour of racism, not seeing TANU was against racism; but because of this negation, it does not mean they are not prepared within their own parties to have that solution done. So the blame goes to the host country and unfortunately the country did not bend to those who were really bent on this notion of racism, and that was why, let us say FRELIMO, with its differences, was still accepted and managed to rally round the leadership which did not want to succumb to the weaknesses of racial connotation. The element of Simango and others tended to rise up, after the assassination of Mondlane. Unfortunately, the two party people in Tanzania who took part in the very serious discussions in Mtwara during that situation, after the assassination of Mondlane are no more; that was the old man Rajabu Diwani and Chairman Martin Kalemaga. He was the Chairman of the Party in the Southern Region. But from the FRELIMO side, talk to Daniel Chipande, talk to General Pachinapa. I showed you the ladies at the congress, in Qualimane, whom you should try to see and talk to; and then talk to Marcelino, because Samora, Marcelino and Simango were in the temporary leadership after the assassination of Mondlane. So, it was the military, the ideology and the nationalism. The military, because Samora had been the leader of the army after the death of Magaia, and Simango was the Vice President to Mondlane, and Marcelino was, in external relations in the political department.

Butiku

Well I think Hashim has answered the general issue of trust and all the differences, and therefore to relate them and discuss them in details will depend upon the research you have made. The two points which are important and they should be pursued are, first, those differences were there and it is important to know that those differences were there, and they did have effect; they were discussed pitting Zambia, and Tanzania, Nyerere and colleagues, and so on, but they had to be resolved.

The second important issue is what guided those who attempted to help the liberation movements and leaders to resolve those issues, be it ideological, or tribal

or racism. One, is they never lost sight of the objective; we had to go back to that objective. We talked about it yesterday, and that has to come out clearly, that was not all. Two, is the method: War is war. There is no ideology about war; when you are seeking weapons, there is no ideology about war. You can believe in communism, socialism and capitalism when you are seeking assistance and support; you don't ask questions about where you take the weapons from. Sometimes you do, but the most important thing is that you get them. So the method was, if you are prosecuting a war and in those dangerous circumstances that were described yesterday by Botswana, Zambia, Mozambique and even Tanzania, you are referring to this dangerous play, that Mark talked about yesterday; the sacrifice that has been made because you are fighting a war. So if you don't lose sight of the objective, you can avoid disunity, and it becomes easier to discuss all causes of disunity; you discuss them whether they help you or weaken you. This is the evidence I saw when there was such a discussion within FRELIMO, at State House, and Mwalimu was there, Samora was there, and Simango was there. The choice was between war and attaining the objective and the little squabbles, whether they were personal or racist and so on. When you consider the position of ANC or PAC, they say ANC yes, PAC so; but what does the fighting want to achieve in South Africa? What is the PAC adding, what it is subtracting? Eventually in the dialogue we agreed; and always you agree in favour of attaining the objective. In between, of course, there was the negotiation to persuade people to move from whatever position they had taken, whether personal, or what. So you avoid disunity and you try to minimize the dangers. I can speak for Tanzania. This question I saw yesterday in the paper about, the principles which the President prescribed for Tanzania; we knew that, prescribing to the principal of non-discrimination of any kind was the greatest chance for Africa. No tribalism, no discrimination based on religion or education; this was a serious thing, very serious, and we worked very hard, everybody worked hard in defence of this and I think when the presidents or the leaders met, this was one area of attention, where if you discriminate, if you go into tribalism or whatever, you weaken your position. This was a very serious issue and it was one of the most important principles that were to be observed in whatever negotiations were being conducted, when trying to resolve differences.

I think that is what I should say generally; the details can be filled in by those who looked at the issue; was it tribalism? Was it Mashona and Matebele? Because I know, from Zimbabwe Joshua was from Matebele, Mugabe was from Shona, and eventually when you are thinking about election, it is the majority and the minority and I remember this was a cause of very deep running fear, when Mwalimu was trying to persuade Nkomo and Mugabe to come together. Actually Mwalimu was neutral. It is often said that Mwalimu supported Mugabe, but that is not true. Mwalimu had a soft spot for Nkomo, and I know it is true Nkomo was a friend of Kaunda, but I don't think it made a difference when it came to these issues. The issues of friendship or soft spots did not arise when it came to the principles. I remember Mwalimu persuading Mugabe to listen more to what Nkomo was saying because they had more experience.

I remember at one incident at Msasani when Mwalimu was talking tough and Mugabe said, “Mr. President, I feel intimidated”, and Mwalimu retorted, “I have no problem intimidating you when it comes to the question of independence of your country.”

It was the kind of talk between these two, but it is surprising to-day one of the people with great respect for Mwalimu is Mugabe. I am very surprised. Tough talking but they knew the principles which were guiding them, and this kind of thing helped them move away from small things, like racism. Racism is dangerous when you are prosecuting a war. Can you talk about your brother, your cousin and your tribe when you are facing South Africa, the apartheid, the Americans and so on? What does racism help? So we encouraged ANC and PAC to discuss their differences, make sure they came to some kind of agreement that lessens their disunity and strengthen their collective bargaining vis a vis the enemy or collective action vis a vis the enemy. So this is the general thing I just wanted to add. I leave the details to Mark, Vieira and my friend Joe. Thank you.

Mark

Thank you. First, let me deal with the general issue. Liberation movements were like governments. They were governments in exile. They made their own decisions. They analysed their own problems, they sorted them out, invited the host government to help, where help was necessary and the host government weighed the necessity for intervention. UNIP was a nationalist movement; it came from the African National Congress in Zambia, like the African National Congress in Zimbabwe, like the African National Congress in Malawi, and like the African National Congress in South Africa. So they were actually part and parcel of the same movement, basically with the same principles. I did a bit of history up to university level, and after it became international relations, years later. Therefore I am saying to your historians to look at the way governments dealt with issues, whether it is in South Africa, in Zimbabwe or in Zambia; it is exactly the same the way they were dealing with problems during the liberation struggle in the unliberated areas. There were the same internal tensions within the host governments, not everybody agreed about the level of support which should be given to liberation movements. It was very tough to know who to give, or who was worth giving the support. I just wanted to make that general point.

These were governments in exile. We did not always interfere in their problems, and when we did, like we did with PAC, in 1972 in Livingstone, we had good reasons. Our army moved in at three in the morning, rounded them up, put them in a truck, and took them to the frontline; they had started fighting among themselves and endangering everybody, and as a government we could not allow that. During that particular period, I knew in details, because I got involved; normally I was not involved, but with regard to PAC we actually got involved. They endangered ANC, ZAPU, ZANU and SWAPO and we could not just allow them. That was why we intervened.

We intervened in COREMO; they had killed five Portuguese civilians on our border and buried them there. And that finished it! The stevedores in Beira boycotted Zambian goods. We had thousands and thousands of tons of goods there. I made a trip, and it was a dangerous trip because no one knew where I was at that point. No one knew, my wife did not know; only President Kaunda knew that I was in Lisbon in January 1971 to negotiate the release of Zambian goods, and the Portuguese had blocked them because COREMO had killed five Portuguese technical people. FRELIMO did not do things like that. When I was in Lisbon I was given, first of all the coldest diplomatic reception that anybody could really receive; the first thing was to be put in a taxi, then the hotel was absolutely awful. But I made my way to the foreign ministry. The Director General was an old man, and he was actually furious and I said that was it, I did not think I could tell him! But I sweet-talked him in what FRELIMO does; I told him that when FRELIMO arrested people, they detained them, they looked after them, and they did not kill them. I asked him, "In any case why are you punishing us? Those are your own people; you are fighting with them. Why should you punish Zambia?" Anyway a diplomat has a job to do; that is to solve a problem, and by mid-morning, I succeeded, and said, thanks. They agreed to release the goods. I went back to the hotel, I was summoned again. This time I was summoned and an official vehicle was sent, not a taxi.

The reason was, unfortunately that morning President Kaunda had held a press conference and paraded Portuguese soldiers who had been arrested by Zambian troops, and I was still there. So I arrived and I thought that there was some good news but the man just threw the report to me. I asked what the problem was and he said, "Just read it. You were telling me this morning what you do. Now look at what your President is doing." And for a moment I said, "How could President Kaunda do this? He knows where I am. Couldn't he wait until I had landed?" So I took time to read the writers report, but I was not reading it. I was looking for the answer to give, and thankfully God gave me courage. Suddenly I became very angry with him. I said that was the only survival technique. I became very angry, and genuinely angry, and I said, "What did I tell you in the morning? Do we kill your people when we arrest them? This is what President Kaunda has shown you; he was merely showing that when we arrest your Portuguese soldiers, we hand them back. We don't kill them. Has he said he is going to kill them?" Ten of course the man mellowed down, and I came back. Thankfully, I have never dealt with COREMO, but that was basically the aim, because COREMO was of no value to the liberation movement, on that front.

The issue of Nkomo and Kaunda being friends; yes they were. They had been together since the times of the African National Congress and they couldn't be otherwise; and the funny thing is that Mugabe was also known to us. I knew Mugabe more personally than I knew Nkomo except Nkomo was a big man. When I was at the university he came to address us at the university and he made a very fundamental statement when talking about racism, and he said, "Those who don't like baboons, if you don't like baboons don't go to the mountains." He was telling the whites that

if you don't like Africans then don't come to Africa. So for that we admired him, but as students at the university, we suspected that somehow, he had negotiated a constitution which was not very nice, and he almost sold out. We thought so; we liked revolutionaries like Sithole you know, he looked much more revolutionary and as students, that was what being students, was about.

As for Mr. Mugabe, for me personally, he taught with my father-in-law and he taught with my brother-in-law, in Chalibana. Therefore he was much closer, I knew him more than I knew Joshua Nkomo and I could not be against him. Regarding Chitepo, when I was doing a paper, now you call it paper, we used to call them essays, Chitepo was in Harare and he was the man I went to see to ask him some questions, about certain legal aspects about land apportioning. I got to know him, and he was close to my brother because my brother was the first Zambian lawyer in Zambia, before independence. So, I got to know these people very closely. In addition to that, some of the nationalist leaders passed through the same university that I was in; I spent three years in Harare University, March 1959 to December 1961; the University of Rhodesia-Nyasa, a campus of the University of London.

So I knew people very intimately, and consequently when these problems came they were extremely painful. Just like president Nyerere was not against Nkomo, Kaunda was not against Mugabe. Never, and I can testify to that. I gave a testimony about the money which we paid to ZANU at conferences, whenever there was a conference, whether in Geneva or London; on two occasions I had to deliver a briefcase full of cash to him. The reason why we did not pass money to Nkomo is that he was eating with us in Zambia, so he did not need any more support. So these issues of, whether we liked this one or we didn't like this one, frankly speaking, is unfortunate; and unfortunately perceptions at times rule the world and wrong decisions are made on the basis of perceptions.

Before the Commonwealth Summit in Zambia, I think there was that mood, that the independence of Zimbabwe was not very far, and so Kaunda called Nkomo. I did not attend meetings between K.K and his comrades at presidential level; whether it was Neto or Samora, unless there was an interpreter. Even then, K.K trusted these people so much that, it was not necessary for me to be there, unless there was a specific issue that he wanted me to record. But this time, for the first time he called me for a meeting with Joshua Nkomo and said Mark, come and attend this meeting. In the meeting my presence was very short, three minutes. He said, "Joshua, I wanted to discuss one problem with you. This perception that I favour you more than others is a problem for me. You are my friend of long years, but you know when it comes to the choice of the leaders of Zimbabwe, that is the prerogative of the people of Zimbabwe; and I wanted Mark to record this." Nkomo said, "But Mr. President we have known that to be the case all the time." and K.K said, "I just wanted this to be recorded." And I was dismissed.

I think it is important for historians to understand, these long term relationships, you cannot do anything with them, just as I would never accept that Robert Mugabe

was not a friend of my father-in-law and my brother-in-law in Chalibana in 1952; that was when I met him. I think it is important that when I talk about dialogue and its possible impact on the liberation movements, the answer is, no. What happened in 1969; was there dialogue then? When every single political party in the region was affected, that was a huge tremor, it was an earthquake, and UNIP suffered. In 1971, Simon Kapwepwe the Vice President of UNIP and of the Republic of Zambia broke away from UNIP and formed his own party, and so many other parties broke. Was it because of dialogue? Was there any dialogue? No. These were natural developments which happened in established governments. Even today there are still parties with differences and parties breaking away.

So I, completely and categorically say that the period between September 1974 and December 1974 the contacts were unknown.

When the nationalists landed in November, they landed at the end of the runway and the helicopter took them. Nobody knew in Zambia that there were Zimbabweans nationalists. They spent one night; on the following morning unfortunately they had to go back to prison. The second time they came again, very quietly and then an announcement was made by Smith and in Lusaka, that the nationalists have been freed. So by that time we already knew, in Katete people have been killed. One of them, whom for us was an extremely humble man, married to a wonderful nurse, was killed and buried in a shallow grave! We could not understand what could actually have happened.

Now, you can ask some more questions about the Nkomo and Mugabe negotiations, and Nkomo's experience in those negotiations. At Lancaster house it was Tongogara who gave lunch to my wife. We called it *people's lunch* after the success of Lancaster House, and his statement was very fundamental. It goes to what Mwalimu was saying about Nkomo, and he said, "You know these negotiations were really wonderful, we

did not like Nkomo; we suspected him. But do you know who was negotiating? It was actually Nkomo; he saw the finer points and Mugabe articulated them." So there was a symbiotic union between the two, and I think that it is important to understand that, we are managing these tribal issues in our own governments, even now. At that time there was a saying, "Who will bell the cat?" referring to Ian Smith. People are now saying who will bell the cat, about Mr. Mugabe, over the issues that are happening in Zimbabwe. So the issues haven't actually ended, there are still some incidents.

It is not always nice to engage in the blame game, but whenever we are failing the tendency is to engage in the blame game. And the blame is always directed to the external while avoiding the internal. It is more difficult to deal with your children; it is always easy to tell someone, "Why don't you tell your children like this?" But when it comes to your own house it has to be somebody else who has to come and help you. I think that it is important for historians to look, very carefully at these governments in exile and say these were leaders who should have been dealing with issues as governments. We did not know what was happening in their central committees, and

it was not our duty to do so. We had no right to listen to their problems, until there was an explosion, and then we felt the fall out.

I don't know whether there is anything else. I see that I have answered Professor Tembe's and Professor Magubane's questions, and I think that I have naturally been understood. As for Zambia, FRELIMO gave us no problems, ANC gave us no problems, SWAPO gave us no problems; in relation to what others gave us, ZAPU gave us some problems, ZANU gave us some problems, and you know that the MPLA gave us some problems. Actually with MPLA, I think it was almost one week of discussion and almost night and day. Otherwise for Zambia, when you are a frontline country, you must live with what those whom you are supporting give you, there is nothing you can do.

My house was a few kilometres from the SWAPO camp. Do you know I was a victim of an inside job caused by the SWAPO? I arrived in Makene on the first of February; two days later three of my big pigs were killed, and I said what could it have been? Five days later nine were killed, next fifteen pigs were killed. Ten we investigated. We found out that actually, the consumer was the SWAPO camp, and one of our workers was doing it. So that's on a lighter note. Three kilometres away, towards the city, there was the ANC camp, which the South Africans were bombing. We had these problems, but frankly these were governments. If you don't treat these liberation movements as governments in exile, then you are losing the sense of history; you are giving too much responsibility to the host government, missing the fact that the host government was just hosting them and these were autonomous. I had nothing to do with the headquarters of the ANC. I think the only time that I visited the ANC headquarters was in the 1980s, when I was outside the government and I became a conduit for receiving some newspapers from South Africa, which I had to deliver to the ANC and Pallo-Jordan was the one I was actually giving them to. This is because South African business people visited my house, visited our farm and that was about all we were actually involved in. The differences within these organizations were their responsibility. Thank you very much.

Sergio

I guess some questions were directed to me. One day we were meeting with the people, and there was a campaign during that time; South dominated the north and so on. They asked the questions they had always asked, until someone asked in the following way. If I want something, and if that man gets what I want, if it happens that he is from the south, I would say fine; if it happens that he is from another ethnic group, I would say that it belongs to my ethnic group; then if he is from another clan, I would say it belongs to my clan; if it happens that he is from my own village I would say that it is from another house. My experience, and I am speaking about my experience, because I saw these events, is that people try to fight when they are looking for a constituency for personal reasons. I think Mark talked quite well about

such problems and said they were a government over there. We were a government; they were a government.

When we adjourned for recess, my English was not that good. I was talking about the problem of tribalism, and then I was talking of the problem of racism. Hashim and Butiku may remember, we had a hospital and we had people working there, Mozambicans. It happened that they were white and they were recalled because they were white; but they were members of the movement. Butiku and I, for instance, we belong to the group. I and others found FRELIMO in the 1960s. One thing that was interesting was when I spoke about racism and tribalism being part and parcel of people's interests to build up their personal power base, where individuals were looking for constituencies. When we speak about relationship with Tanzania and Zambia, I can't say it was not good at any time. Anyhow, I may say some individuals either in Tanzania or in Zambia, sometimes in positions of power, made alliances with other people; this existed. But saying that Mwalimu and Kaunda, the top leadership, interfered, was not true, and never was.

I can say that we are in a better position to speak about those issues because we were once in liberation movements, and later we were in governments and hosting other liberation movements. The only exception in our zone was Malawi. Malawi was a close ally of the Portuguese and the South Africans; and they played that role during the liberation war, in the era of the Smith regime and apartheid, until Mr. Banda was excluded, when it was defeated. I fear to talk about splits in liberation movements, but I am going to talk about it. Please don't make a mountain out of a mole hill; that ZANU wanted to slaughter ZAPU in Mozambique; no they did not want to slaughter ZAPU in Mozambique. I do not believe that was the truth because Tanzania, in particular, was very much involved in trying to create one liberation movement and a single army; and a single army is not formed on the basis of one group slaughtering the other. ZAPU actually never opened any front in the west. Never! Of course they could not open to Botswana; it was impossible. So it had to be through Zambia. Zambia did not prevent them. It makes me think of Mugabe. One day he was talking and during the discussion he said that some people from PAC were saying that the frontline was preventing them from fighting, and Mugabe asked, "Where are you fighting, where are you fighting? No, in which place are you fighting?" With the exception of that working adventure, criminal adventure, as a military man I say it was a criminal adventure. If a spy did that, reporting that there was a movement of troops in a war situation, you would shoot him! A court martial would shoot him, if he is a leader. When the troops are in movement, and if someone was going to give a press conference saying my troops are in movement, Jesus, it would be betrayal and total irresponsibility! People died because of that exercise. They were slaughtered because of that irresponsibility. That could deserve a court martial in any country of the world.

Now, one day Samora was discussing with comrade Tambo, and Mabida and Chris were there, and Samora said, "Listen men, in order to make the revolution, you have to

discover your own strategy to stop them. You have to discover what your own strategy to stop them is. We have discovered ours in Mozambique. Tanzania discovered their own, at the time when it was Tanganyika, and you have to discover your own. Don't do like the Chinese or like the Soviets, or like the Mozambicans; do like you have to do. Discover what the reality of your own country is."

Before coming to the essential question, I am addressing FRELIMO and COREMO. When we were preparing to start the armed struggle on the 25th June, a group of people split, they had joined FRELIMO after they had split from MANU. They went to Cabo Delgado in June 1964 and they killed a German priest who was a very well-known person and very friendly to us. Of course this caused an alert on the enemy. We had our own plans but we had to postpone the beginning of the armed struggle, because of this misadventure. Some of you historians said that was the beginning of the armed struggle, but I say no, it was not. To murder a civilian, a priest, who was cooperating with us, and to call it the beginning of armed struggle in Mozambique was stupid. You know nothing; it is nonsense! I speak of COREMO; I think Mark spoke about it. They had two mis-adventures, the one in which they killed five civilians they had kidnapped and buried them in Zambia; and back in 1973, if I am not wrong, a group of them infiltrated into Tete province. They knew nothing, they were doing nothing and they were suffering from hunger, so they stole two cows from the village, slaughtered the cows, and started to eat them. The people thought they were from OPV Portuguese colonial militia, which was a militia group of the Portuguese colonial system, so they attacked and killed them. One or two survived and ran to Zambia saying that FRELIMO was slaughtering them. So when someone speaks about COREMO armed struggle, I tend to ask, like President Mugabe asked the PAC, where they fought or what they had done? Please do not confuse armed struggle with just stealing, murdering, or raping people. As a FRELIMO man, I am very proud of what we did. Perhaps it was unique; we had hundreds of enemy soldiers, not civilians, but hundreds and hundreds of enemy soldiers kept in prison. Some of them were wounded; we gave them blood to save their lives, inside Mozambique.

During the time we were discussing the Lusaka Agreement in September, 1974, the head of the Portuguese delegation was Lt Colonel Melo Antunes. He was one of the top figureheads, the mover of the armed forces; when we came to the ceasefire agreement, there was one article about judging criminals of war. He stood up and told Machel, "Please remove that, because one of the reasons of the 25th April is that we military people were fed up with war crimes." Then it came to an article on the exchange of prisoners of war; he again stood up and said, "We request to remove this article because we have no prisoners of war; they were murdered." It was shock for all of us. Samora stood up; he called us to the back. Mabote and Moiane were crying; and then Samora said, "Okay, if we are not going to sign this, will it bring the lives of all our comrades back again? If we don't sign are they going to be alive again?" Then he said, "We accept with one condition; we are going to give you the list of all the prisoners of war, one by one; all of the ones that are known to have been killed. We

have those we have released, and those we are going to release, and during the time of the exchange, you are going to sign that you could not hand in any prisoners of war because they were murdered.” You can imagine violations of all the conventions and the rules and even the code of honour, as a military man. So the question of prisoners of war was a point of contention with a lot of people, with due respect for his memory, the late Vice President Karume, criticized us. He even shouted in the military camp, when he went to Nachingwea saying, “Are you going to feed the Portuguese soldiers with cassava? Kill them.” So it was not the interference of “Chama cha Mapinduzi” or TANU of Tanzania; it was a misconception, of one person. Don’t mix this.

Now when you see an iceberg in the sea, please remember that you are not seeing four-fifths of it. A lot of the historians, some because of their age and some because of the situation they were living in, never experienced the liberation war. It did not matter even if you were in Germany, Soviet Union, United States, France, or even in Maputo. There were no historians in Maputo; you can ask how old Prof. Tembe was when we became independent. So the information was from what you could read, and in newspapers; there were monthly western papers that usually did not give any information. They were quite unfair to the liberation movement. They never reported the good things, but when there was some trouble, oh! Yes, that was on the first page of the newspapers. Sometimes even here in Tanzania, Uhuru and the Nationalist, printed things against us, not deliberately, but because of distortion and mis-information. This was until we took a group of them to come and visit and see with their own eyes and after they saw, they changed. I was joking yesterday with you, that we were not living in the bush, or in caves, dressed in skins; we had built our bases. One could see that in the fields, in photographs, so when someone like Simango split, a lot of noise was made. But was it real?

Gentleman there is a difference between the kind of war we waged and the kind of war that a state wages. Someone told me at one time that political leadership was excluded or we tried to exclude political leadership. When you are a government and a state, you fight with your friend. When Tanzania was invaded by Uganda, they had their own armed forces, and the principle of armed forces is to obey the chain of command, starting with commander in chief; we had that chain of command starting with the commander in chief, but we were yet to raise our own flag. The difference is that you can’t have a leadership that is out of the main task in that moment. When you take people like Simango they were completely out of the main task. Those who were involved in the task were like me.

When you say we were very much ideological. Why were we very much ideological? When you have your own flag and chain of command and a government, and an officer who is paid, is one thing; when you are working like that on a voluntary basis, nobody pays you, and if you die nobody is going to give a pension to your wife, if you lose your leg nobody is going to care, then you have to be highly motivated. In being highly motivated, you have to be ideological. When the contradiction with Kavandame arose, I was very much involved in that. Kavandame came to us

with a proposal of attacking the military base of Mueda. Mueda, which is in a high plateau, was the main Portuguese base in Cabo Delgado. It had a good airport, very well defended and competent; there were at least two regiments at that moment. So he came to us to attack Mueda. They presented their plan and President Mondlane called me. I went to work on the plan with Samora and colleagues, and we said that it was nonsense. At that moment the Portuguese had two regiments; they were doing nothing up there, but when they moved, they became vulnerable, when they were there and they were not attacking us. Now if we attacked Mueda, in order to attack, we would need to concentrate a lot of forces to overrun their defence, and we would lose hundreds of men; after that what would have happened? Were we going to stay there to be vulnerable to the air force? To any attack? Were we going to be in a situation that the Portuguese were at that moment? Were we to have forces that could not become operational? Were we going to be in a purely defensive position? We said no to him. That was the moment that he started to create his own party.

You mentioned *Mzee* Rajabu Diwani. We had a meeting with him, that was the problem; then he wanted to make secession of Cabo del Gado and proclaim a republic, the Makonde Republic that would operate the liberation of Mozambique. Okay, it was nonsense, nobody paid attention to it. He desired to join the Portuguese, and then nothing happened. My friends in Tanzania were very much concerned, what was going to happen with Simango and Karango going out; so Mbita and Sarakikya all went there but they reported back, that the situation was good, and it was totally under control, and moving forward. Those from outside were concerned, because as I told you, the defence of Tanzania was over there. The protection of Tanzania was over there, but once they realized that there was no problem, Mwalimu emptied the military depots in Tanzania, saying the best depot is in Mozambique, let them use the weapons and ammunition.

When I am speaking about the tip of an iceberg, sometimes I would even go further, not far from this place, we continue thinking of Samora as we continued, we organized. It was not one man's struggle. When we speak about the demise I want to speak, I had this very sad task of announcing to people that they were going to be killed. I and Chissano, we met with the military. I said it to Amilcar Cabral before he was killed; we informed him about the plot to kill him, up to the point we were in Conakry. We were in Conakry when he was murdered, it was in the middle of the night, when Sékou Touré called a meeting and Samora said, "Sékou, before you go inside, listen to what Chissano and Sergio have to say." When we went inside the room, Sékou Touré sent a note to Samora, and he passed it to me and Chissano; he asked, whether Amilcar knew about it, and Samora told him that yes, he knew about it. I went to speak to Chitepo two months before he was killed; he was in Dar es Salaam; I spoke to Marian Ngouabi before he was killed, and I spoke to Samora before he was killed. What can you say? I told him, I told him that all the things were being organized in Rhodesia, and they were trying to use ZANU people from Zimbabwe to kill him. When they were doing this, in the case of the military they used instruments;

it was people from Smith in case of Chitepo; in the case of Ngouabi and in the case of Samora, it was different; they could not do it that way, so they had to use other sophisticated weapons and means.

What I would like to say is, you should be unofficial, but you should be objective. Forget what you read from the South African and the Portuguese writings; first of all, listen to what you know, go to the leadership of the liberation movements or the Vice Presidents of these movements and there you have good material. Therefore when Mark, Butiku, or Joe started to speak, suddenly an alert came to the minds of the others, that you knew this and you knew that. Perhaps you should put us in a comfortable place and allow us to speak, to wake up our memories, as we did with Hashim, because we have the experience of having first hand original sources to write from. When I speak about racism, the man you met, when you went to Maputo to take your doctors, Tanzania also had one. Guinea Conakry was the first to give us support. I was deported way back in 1968, during the campaign against white men and mixed people like me in FRELIMO. That was not the position of Tanzania, because Mwalimu was 100% against and others. These people were worried, and were concerned with that; sometimes balance of forces within your country forces you to do things, which you don't like, in order to see something later. Thank you Chairman.

Mark

The mentioning of Chitepo did omit the comment made, specifically by Professor Bhebe. Chitepo knew that he was going to be killed. First, Chitepo is the only person who had ever entered my bedroom, in my life; my wife and I are exactly the same. I was sick and apparently he needed to see me; when my wife told him that I was sick, he said he had to see me, and he came. My wife prepared lunch, I had lunch with him in my bedroom and we spoke at length about his concerns. As I said I was not directly involved in the operations of the liberation movements, but apparently it was beginning to spill over into his personal security. A few days later another person who was my class mate at the University called me to say he needed to see Herbert and I said okay, I was going to arrange it, but by that time Herbert was so much guarded, that he was not basically free to move alone. And so what I did was he came to the State House, the security was in another place, we went through the back gate to my house and we just left the two people talking together. In ZAPU you are talking about Karanga versus Chizulu. In ZANU it was Karanga Manyika; and this man said, it looked like a lot of people are being weeded away and Chitepo was made to sign these death warrants, and now he has been left alone he was to be removed or eliminated anytime. I don't know what they discussed; all that we did was to facilitate the meeting. The day before he died, Chitepo wanted to see KK. We arranged the meeting; I was present; it was very direct; he said, "There is a threat to my life." To cut the story short President Kaunda said, "Who do you think, seeks to eliminate you?" He said well you see, they would have done it in Malawi, when he was visiting Malawi. They failed; who was it? It was Chigowe and Tongo. So KK asked, "Do you need security?" He said,

“No, not yet.” KK said, “If you need security, call Mark and simply say, yes. Don’t say anything else, simply say, yes.” That evening as I left the State House, I saw Herbert’s beetle, a little VW car he was driving, going in the western direction. My house was in the east when you turn left where actually Thabo Mbeki used to live where his house was, he didn’t live there always. I saw him and my body vibration, told me I must be worried; he refused protection, and that was the last I saw Herbert, for the last time.

Hashim

Ladies and gentlemen, there was something I wanted to speak about at the end of this, for these last two days we have been exposed to very privileged information to enable us do proper analysis of what we are going to do. I would appeal that we become sensitive of that privilege, even when we write, try to be very uncomfortable to use quotes out of this information. Analyse it the best you can, you are informed. There would come a time when these recordings we are having now, video and audio would be of use, and be used, it may not be soon, but definitely the knowledge that you have accumulated from your exposure, which are out of very privileged information. As many of you have said, some of these things we are hearing for the first time; there is no other place where one can get their records, and I could see the sensitivity when Mark broke down. I tried to resist during that time but it is some pain that we shared over the years of the liberation struggle. The problems in ZANU, the problems in ZAPU, the problems in ANC, the problems in PAC, and the problems of FRELIMO; there were moments, as Joseph was saying earlier, when the objective got swayed by some developments, do you lose your objective or do you persevere the pangs that came with those sways, but you don’t lose the objective? These things, did really hinge in that atmosphere, and during the struggle distortions were many. Some were only to detract the struggle from progressing, and poison the atmosphere; and if that poison was repeated several times, it appeared to be the truth; so when it came to dealing with the truth, the truth was being questioned because there was so much lies about, and the truth was thought not to be the truth, and the lie was taken to be the truth.

In this room Sergio and I, were part of the commission that investigated the assassination of Chitepo. We were part of an international commission of inquiry on the assassination of Herbert Chitepo. Because of the struggle, there were elements that could be made public, but there were elements which were detrimental to the interests of the struggle if they were made public at that time, such as what was narrated by Mark just now and made him break down. You talk about the ZAPU situation, going to the front, the elements that caused deaths in Mgagao and Morogoro, between the ZAPU and ZANU cadres. It was an effort to force a united force for the Zimbabwe struggle, a patriotic front that was wanted at that time. Two senior people, one from ZANU and one from ZAPU, were sent to instigate that movement. It was the late Muzenda from ZANU, and Jason Moyo from ZAPU who came to Tanzania; I sat with them and we went to the camps together; we went to the ZANU camp in Mgagao and to the ZAPU camp in Morogoro to see their cadres, and they appointed some leaders

from both sides as elements of a Joint Military Command, (JMC). From ZAPU it was Mtimhiri. Ambrose Mtimhiri and from ZANU, on top of them, it was Rex Nhongo, because in the military at that time, it was Rex Nhongo who remained outside after the assassination of Chitepo. All other military leaders were inside, and they were under arrest or had been killed. The most senior one who was killed soon after was John Makawe. So when I started the joint military command, other discussions had also been held, because discussions with Mozambique had been started by Chitepo, to start training the ZANU women guerrillas. They were the first to be sent to Nachingwea for training and then he said we had to do that together; so there was an agreement. Before the agreement was put to practice we had to test a few, and these were sent to Mgagao. But there had been hatred that had been building up over the years between the parties because of political differences, and these had intoxicated the young people. There was hatred between individuals because of their political differences, and they thought that once they were in the camp they could settle their own scores; those were the deaths in Mgagao, and deaths in Morogoro.

I had a bitter situation because the Liberation Committee was in Tanzania. The movements were killing themselves in Tanzania, what did Tanzania have to say? Had it failed to see to the security of these few people! We had to report to the President of Tanzania. I had a bitter situation when I had to report four different data of deaths in three days. What would I do with the bodies? Some were in three feet or two and half feet graves; in some graves limbs were sticking out! But this was the bitterness; the pangs of the struggle.

There were times when you just did not say, you accepted the death; but that was enough. That was given a different interpretation, but we did not have to compete with the interpretations of the ill-wishers; we accepted that.

So you read many of the distortions because then, the enemy had a field day here is a situation which could break the whole struggle, by distortions and everything that came about. Well, similarly there were issues which Joseph reminded me when we were taking photographs. There were things which exaggerated the differences and the enemies were able to do that because they were very good at it. They were saying, for example, "In the ANC the leaders are having it nice and the cadres are left to languish in problems." That caused a lot of pain to the young people against their leaders. This is what Professor Magubane was talking about the consultative meeting in Morogoro. So, these were the things which the movements could not easily get over. That was to say the leaders had gone to some place to demand something; they had all the money, they were meeting by themselves, they were eating and drinking, but the cadres were left without any food, without clothing, without anything; and so misunderstandings started rising up. You have to be in perspective when you are analysing such issues. What is written in literature is not Biblical nor were they written by saints; you have to understand the forces at play at a particular time of the struggle and what their objectives were. So I thought I should bring this up.

Mark

In the aftermath of the assassination of Herbert Chitepo, I paid tribute to Sergio Vieira, as he happened to be in Lusaka at that time, and I just did not know what advice to give to the government. But he said, “Look, what happens after the assassination of Herbert is an investigation.” So he opened our minds to the idea of the commission; and I really pay tribute because if he had not been there, it would have taken even longer for us to find a solution to how that investigation was to be conducted. The commission was his product and I thank him very much.

When Sergio Vieira was referring to the Wankee, incident, he used the term criminal; I don’t think he was referring to the actual crossing. He was actually referring to what Chikerema actually said, so I think for the record, it is better that it is understood, because we are also doing some history.

Thanks.

Butiku

I asked to be allowed to say a word because of the inspiration I have drawn from this meeting. I have worked with these gentlemen, but we worked under the leadership of what I consider to be very true African wise people; we were their students and had drawn a lot of inspiration. There is not yet much that has been written about what happened under their leadership. So I want to say these few words and I am going to say them very slowly.

Since yesterday we have been talking about Africans, ourselves, our history and I want to state the obvious about Africa. Our continent has been humiliated for centuries, and we are still experiencing that humiliation. There are many reasons, but the best ones are: we are very weak; two, we are still divided; and three, we don’t seem to quite understand or appreciate who we are. This history we have been talking about since yesterday is a struggle to rid ourselves of that humiliation and that weakness. It is being done by you, and some of you are still young. So it must be our history. We have discussed so many things, you have raised so many issues here to try and help you make this history our history. So I just implore you to make sure, that it is properly and correctly recorded, it must teach well, especially Africans, and our children, about our struggle, the reasons for that struggle, our enemies and our friends. It must offer hope to our future generations, both the Africans and the world in general.

Thank you.

Sergio

In May 1975, if I am not wrong, in a state banquet, Mwalimu bestowed on Samora for the first time in the history of Tanzania, the *Order of Kilimanjaro, Uhuru Torch*. It was the first time in the history of Tanzania. The award had existed for a number of years but the first person to be awarded was Samora. And if I can recollect my memory, Mwalimu asked, ‘How many times had a NATO army been defeated in Africa? It was in Mozambique that a NATO army was defeated. Two, how many times

in the history of mankind a nuclear power has been defeated by non-nuclear powers? It was Americans in Vietnam and South Africans in South Africa.”

So ladies and gentlemen when I was listening to Mark, Joseph, and Butiku, these words were coming to my memory in a strong way. I agreed with what Hashim was saying, that sometimes we deny ourselves pride and self-esteem. There was a saying in our country that the tail of a dog, should not order the head of the dog to move. But many times we allow the tail to tell the head to move; I am sorry. The tail is the imperialists who we allow to force us; let us take over. Thank you.

Hashim

Strong politically correct statements; I didn't say incorrect. Thank you very much, I think for these two days we have had wonderful exchange of information and I am sure we are much richer than when we came in, but for these two days one voice has not been suppressed, but has reserved itself and I thought before we make the conclusions we should hear that one voice, the Project Manager. The man who has the full responsibility of leading the researchers to do the work and produce what we are aspiring to do, while bearing in mind the very thoughtful advice from Mr. Butiku, in looking forward to the future of our history. So I want us to hear from Professor Temu, whatever he wants us to know about the project, the inspirations of the focal points and the associates, because after all from tomorrow we are going to start an appraisal workshop on what has been done for the last one year. Professor Temu, please.

Prof. Temu

Thank you, Chair. And thank you Ambassadors, Excellencies and Patron of the Project. Let me first of all thank the senior personal assistants to the former presidents of the frontline states for their forthright information they have given us forthright, because they have told us what they had probably told nobody else, and we remain to be committed to what the Patron advised us; to be sensitive to what they have told us and to interpret their information in the best way possible.

First, let me say, this is a monumental task and nobody in this group, or the associates who are helping them in this research, doubt that this is a monumental task, because we are approaching it in a very different way, even from what some of us who are already scholars, have done before. I think in doing so, we are trying to follow what the Patron and what President Chissano said before this project got underway. He said, “I have read many books, but I haven't heard in those books the voices of those who fought in the liberation wars.”

So, the task before us is to record, first and foremost, the voices of those who fought in the wars. Nobody else other than themselves and those who helped them knows their feelings, their memories and their experiences. This is why our first approach to the Project is to record the memories of those who fought in the wars, plus the memories of those honest, trustworthy people who helped in the struggle. The first

information is what we are given addition to the source that we are now collecting. We are collecting it from the former presidents, from the presidents, from political leaders, and from you gentlemen. We have reserved the Patron as a last resort, but we should probably put him in front. Because he is the Patron he has to take the platform, and we shall get to him. I dare say he has already given us a lot of information today which goes to add to what you have told us. This is the first thing I want to say about this project. Ours is unique because we are recording the memories of those who participated in the liberation struggle in one way or another. We are starting with political leaders and down to the foot soldiers and women; we are going into the rural areas to record their memories of the liberation struggle from the peasants out there. That is our first primary source. Once we collect the information, and this is why we study the list, we can fit into the picture the information we get from archival material that are recorded and written, then contemporary sources which you have already told us, like those that were written by Martin and this very young girl, Phyllis. There are many secondary sources like those, which have been recorded, but have also been distorted, because if you read some of them, they are now saying the liberation struggle was not necessary. They are saying quite openly that it was not necessary; but Chissano, you and everybody else say it was necessary, because without it we would not have liberated ourselves. There was no option. So we shall go into the archives and select very carefully the materials that go into supporting what we collect from the voices themselves. That is why I wanted to assure Butiku before he asks me that question. I want to assure you, gentlemen, that you are the first primary source, just as those in the war of the liberation struggle. One did not need to go into the jungle to remember what was going on. We are going to reach all those women who supported the people, those who housed them and gave them food. We have a lady who has gone into what used to be the camps, and interviewed people in the surrounding local communities, to record their views, their experiences and memories of the liberation struggle. The researchers have interacted with people in the camps; likewise Dr Bull; likewise the South Africans, likewise Zimbabweans; they have tons and tons of recorded literature, oral material.

So to cut the story short, we are most grateful for the information you have provided. Now Chissano has put me in a very difficult position. If you get a chance to interview him, you have got to quote him in your writing. Now it is as if he has put a spanner in the wheels. So long as we are sensitive to this information when we reach there we shall see how we do it. I want to assure you that we shall use it in the most effective way possible. That is what I wanted to assure this interface meeting; and that is what we are committed to do. Unfortunately we have a time frame and within a short period of two years, we can achieve very little, but you see small is beautiful. I want to say small is correct also. So, whatever we can come out with, this is what the Patron always tells me, you have two years and you must report to the Heads of State. He is always pumping that into my head, now I hide away from him. I say, "These are researchers, what do I do?" We are going to hammer that in our appraisal workshop.

Finally I want to assure you, personal assistants that we have in this room the best minds Africa has ever produced, the best scholars that we can be proud of, the best researchers and they are assisted also by the best researchers, the best minds that Africa has produced. So you can rest assured that they will use their minds to produce the best results. That assurance I can give you, Mr. Patron, my honourable friends, age mates, some of you are turning seventy, I am already turning seventy three so we are struggling but I must share my secret, what I used to tell my wife before she died on the 6th of January 2007, that I hope I will have the energy to finish this project. Unfortunately she cannot help me out now.

Hashim

Thank you, Arnold. Let me say a saying which I read sometime back about work, I was told Dr Aggrey on his trip to Southern Africa and East Africa, he came up to Dar es Salaam and that's why in Dar es Salaam there is Dr Aggrey Street. In explaining about education and the African he concluded by saying, in his mind, only the best is good enough, for Africa. You see, with this assurance we have been given by project manager, I am hopeful and assured that the best which will be good enough for Africa will come from this group. And I, my only part is to play the political part of trying, as much as possible, to open the doors for you to that research; to do that work. This is part of the door that I had to open, so that we could hear what we have heard, so that we could end up sharing tears, at this stage, as we were sharing tears in the 1970's during the struggle. We were sharing tears moving forward, we were not sharing tears to sit back. The tears which have come today are tears to nourish the work that we are set to do.

Africa should have had this information far back, but better late than never. We expect from those scholars who will be developing history curricula for our children that they are going to pick and shape, perhaps, a SADC history curriculum for primary, secondary and graduate or even for post graduates studies. Together with that, the archival material which is being collected, which may not come in a book, will be useful for further research and for further development of our history for centuries to come.

I want to thank these four gentlemen so much for having spared their time. I apologize for the shabby way we have treated them but we are learning. We shall not perhaps repeat such habits, but you know what they said, I think it was, Washington or somebody else who said, when you ask people to contribute for their struggle at that time, there were rich people, there were poor people and there was a woman who had nothing to contribute, she rushed to her house, her chicken was laying eggs; she picked one she brought as her contribution. And it was said that was the biggest contribution they have received for that struggle, because this lady took the last thing she had, nothing except to take an egg from her chicken as her contribution. This is what we are trying to do; we do not have much money, but the little which we can do is to make this contribution rich. So I want to thank you very much indeed. We are

most obliged, because your contribution has made our work a little bit more clearer; to see things more in the open. Thank you very much and the pictures we have taken, I am sure after the editing is done, you will have at least some of them, as something for remembrance. They will be part of the people who were sources of our work. Thank you very much indeed.

Let me now solemnly say we have come to the end of this interface, in our efforts to put out something; and if we still need some clarification here and there, now you know each other. You don't have to go through me or through the Project Manager. You see there was an effort yesterday, to circulate addresses and contacts, but I haven't seen them. See you at dinner.

