

SADC

Hashim Mbita Project

**Southern African
Liberation Struggles**

Contemporaneous Documents

1960–1994

edited by

Arnold J. Temu and Joel das N. Tembe

8

**Countries and Regions
Outside SADC**



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8.1

The Contributions of Anglophone West Africa to the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa: 1960- 1994

By Muhammadu Mustapha Gwadabe

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If we are now making a breakthrough in the difficult struggle, you must know you are a part of it. I have no sufficient words to thank the government and people of Nigeria. The crowd right here and the cheering from the airport has convinced me that we are not only among friends, but we have come home

Nelson Mandela, *The Guardian (Nigeria)*, May 14th 1990, p.1

Introduction

The West African region of Africa is found roughly from 5° to 25° north latitude and from 17° west to 15° east longitudes; covering a range of about 2.4 million square miles. From its western to its eastern limit, the distance is about 1,750 miles. Its North – South distance is over 1,350 miles.¹ By its location therefore the region is made up of varying climatic and vegetational conditions that favour mass movement and settlement of people, a sustainable economy mainly dependant on agriculture and a range of varying cultures and traditions. In addition, the region is equally blessed by varying relief system and the existence of a number of mineral deposits of some reasonable quantity. Amongst the resources available in the region include coal, copper, gold, iron-ore, petroleum salt and tin.² The prevalence of a combination of these factors supported not only human habitation, but the existence of political groups and a well orchestrated system of trading activity. It was in this course that a common culture and tradition and a form of worship emerged, which further unified the people and encouraged the growth of an economy that attracts other economies of the world. It was in the course of these historical developments that the region was introduced into international relations, beginning with trade across the Sahara, slavery and slave trade, ‘legitimate’ trade and colonization of their economies and societies by the capitalist world.³ It was in the course of these occurrences also that African societies and people got knotted by the forces of colonization of the imperialist type. The 20th century colonisation, specifically of West Africa, was in reaction to the challenge of industrial revolution faced by European countries, which first started in Britain. As the revolution extended to other European countries of France and Germany, the political terrain took a new dimension of precipitous competition between these economic giants due to the desire for sources of raw material, market for European finished goods and cheap labour. The attempt to contain the situation reached its peak in 1884-85 at a conference in Berlin whose outcome led to the division of the world among the imperial powers of Europe. France took the lion’s share of West Africa in terms of land area (1, 604, 000 sq miles) compared to Britain 497, 000.⁴ Some years into the colonisation of West Africa, people were mobilised and

(1) Mabogunje, A. “The land and peoples of West Africa”, in Ajayi, J. F. A. & Crowder, M. *History of West Africa*, Vol. 1, Longman, London, 1975, P. 1.

(2) See maps in Appendix 3.

(3) Rodney, W. *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Panaf, Abuja (Nigeria), 1972; see also Ake, C. *Political Economy of Africa*, Longman, New York, 1983.

(4) Post, K. *The new series of West Africa*, Penguin Books, England, 1968, P. 17.

forces were put together in a struggle for independence. Almost the whole of West Africa ceased to be the colonial possession of any imperial power from 1960s as it became a sovereign independent African entity. This change of political and economic status did not just come like manna from heaven; it was the efforts of Nationalists supported by teaming population of citizens of the respective countries, which came about in response to the colonial situation experienced by the West African States.

At independence, efforts were made to ensure that Africa and all other colonised people of the world are set free from all forms of colonial bondage. This chapter is specifically concerned with the efforts of the independent Anglophone West Africa in the liberation of Southern Africa. It argues that Anglophone West Africa, consistently (at individual levels), stood firm in their resolve for a free Africa, as it is clearly demonstrated in their participation at the United Nations (UN), Commonwealth of Nations, Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and other respective activism, in support of the African governments and Liberation Movements. In such endeavour none of the African leaders was left behind; even arch reactionaries like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire⁵ and Dr. Hasting Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, in their own ways supported the liberation effort.⁶ It was this mass and unanimous support, missing in the Arab world of today, that earned Southern Africa political freedom from the obnoxious apartheid rule.⁷

To illustrate this point, this chapter is divided into three sub-sections. The first Phase covers the period of 1960-1966. This was the Early Period of the response of Anglophone West Africa. This period was essentially characterised by the feeling of Pan Africanism, a movement championed by Ghana, the first independent country in

(5) Mobutu was the closest African leader to the United States during the Cold war period. He was recorded as the first African President to pay homage to President George Bush (senior) in the White House after his election and was known to have visited USA in 1986, 1987 and met Bush in 1989. He was the only African leader who supported Portuguese dictator, General Spínola's Lusitanian concept of regrouping Mozambique, Angola and Brazil (all Portuguese colonial territories) with Portugal into one nation under Portuguese imperial control. American aid to UNITA and FNLA was channeled through Mobutu's cooperation. It was also revealed by Andrew Tully, a White House correspondent, who covered the activities of the CIA between 1948 and 1961 that Mobutu was a good discovery by the CIA because he served the purpose of the intelligence agency in Zaire at the right time. See for details an unclassified document coded "Nigeria-Foreign Relations – South Africa," with the title Bumbled Diplomacy, Nigeria Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) Library, Victoria Island Lagos, P. 7-8.

(6) In spite of his pro-imperialist leaning, Mobutu was said to have called a meeting which comprised of 19 African countries of the calibre of Nigeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Chad, Niger, Congo, Gabon, Mali, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome, Principe, Zambia and Zimbabwe at Gbadolite, Zaire to witness and deliberate on the cessation of hostilities between the Angolan government controlled by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Jonas Savimbi led National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) engaged in a protracted civil war for the control of the territory. Mobutu's effort was to make the two see reason for peace. This effort was packaged in what was called the Gbadolite Accord. See Ibid for details. On the other hand Banda, though apparently aligning with the West, was secretly also hosting the liberation fighters in their guerrilla activities in Mozambique. Interview with Dr. A. Abba, An Associate Professor of history and political activist, January 2010, Zaria, Nigeria.

(7) The role of Mobutu Sese Seko was perceived differently by different people. Some argued that the Gbadolite experiment was a ploy by the United States to penetrate and dislodge MPLA from Angola as did to Patrice Lumumbas's Movement Nationale Congolais (MNC) which won the majority seats in the pre-independence elections. This line of thought argued that the USA is internationally known to cry for peaceful resolution of conflicts when its "puppets" appear to be in difficulty. See Op. Cit for details.

West Africa. The Second Phase tagged the “Trying Period” 1966-1980, was the period when all the West African countries had attained their independence and indeed had established national economies to support themselves and others. This period saw the fall off of Ghana as a dominant political and economic power amongst Anglophone West Africa. It was a period which saw the emergence of Nigeria, supported by its new found Petro-dollar economy, as the new power in Anglophone West Africa. This phase also saw the increasing active role of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and other international bodies, in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. The third Phase, tagged the “Defeat of Apartheid” 1980-1994, was a volatile period which marked the end of white rule in Southern Africa with the independence of Zimbabwe (1980), Namibia (1990) and finally South Africa (1994). To accomplish this task, a historical approach was employed as the methodology for data collection, which involved the use of libraries, archives and oral interviews with personalities involved in governance during the course of these political developments. Emphasis was also made in looking at history from a less idealistic point of view, by de-emphasising the role of individual heroes, a common characteristic of studies of this nature.

Early Period 1960-1966

By the late 1950s, only a few African countries were politically independent of colonial rule. Many African countries were under the control of one colonial authority or the other. In West Africa, Ghana (Gold Coast), Nigeria, Sierra Leone and The Gambia fell under the administration of the British Imperialist and are referred to as the Anglophone West Africa. Because of their political status (colonies) these countries were considered incapable of any cultural innovation much less of managing their own affairs. The general conception under this situation was that all works of excellence found on the continent, were the creation of the interaction of the white man with the blacks. Specifically in the case of Southern Africa, colonisation was in the form of racial discrimination under which the black race was subjected to all forms of degradation and dehumanization. In the words of a one time President of South Africa, Mr. Peter Botha, the “Black man is nothing but a symbol of poverty, mental inferiority, laziness and emotional incompetence.” The “White race on the other hand, was created to rule,” this explains why “we have to have the Mandelas rot in a prison.”⁸ This conception was challenged and fought against by the Nationalists, which led to the attainment of independence amongst Anglophone West Africa first in Ghana (1957),⁹ Nigeria (1960), Sierra Leone (1961) and The Gambia (1965). Thus

(8) Botha, P. W. “I am not ashamed being racist” *Daily Trust News* paper, Friday, November 3rd 2006, P.18.

(9) Ghana was the first Sub-Saharan country to gain independence from colonial rule, and indeed the one with so extensive commitment to the development of forceful pan-African policy. Ghana was also well-endowed with natural and human resources. It supplied one-third of the world’s cocoa as well as one-fifth of its gold. Ghana had an external reserve of over half a billion dollars at independence, more than what India had at comparative time in her history. For details refer to Thompson, W. Scott, *Ghana’s foreign Policy 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology and the New State*, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey, 1969, P.66-7.

we can assert that by mid 1960s, all the Anglophone West African countries were independent and therefore politically free to govern themselves.

With the attainment of independence in Ghana, political awareness in Africa took a new dimension. This started with a meeting of the All African Peoples Conference, organised in 1958, with the intention of freeing Africa from colonial rule and to initiate the process towards establishing a United Africa under a unified political state. Efforts toward achieving such a dream led to the establishment of “Freedom Fund” in which Ghana contributed immensely and supported a number of political organisations secretly.¹⁰ Similar efforts were made to initiate the basis for unity within and among the newly independent countries of West Africa. This explains the effort by Ghana in the independence struggle in Guinea, which led to the establishment of a Union Government between them. To make this effort more functional, the Ghanaian government supported Guinea with a lot of aid.¹¹ In January 1959, Liberia joined the Ghana-Guinea associated states of Africa after a meeting in April of the same year. Due to personality clash, colonial legacy and political intrigue which bedevilled the newly independent countries of West Africa, not much was achieved.¹²

The attainment of independence by Nigeria in 1960 created a new dimension in the political scene of West Africa¹³ as this posed a serious challenge to Ghana’s political position in the struggle for leadership of a United Africa.¹⁴ This was because, unlike the case of Ghana’s CPP, political independence from the point of view of the ruling party in Nigeria (NPC) did not mean the dismantling of the colonial structure. The political, economic and cultural structures of colonial rulership instead persisted and continued to condition, dictate and direct Nigeria’s foreign policy, even after independence. Therefore economically Nigeria continued to be tied to Britain with her mainstay of economy exported mainly to Britain.¹⁵ Nigeria also adopted the British Westminster parliamentary model of democracy and continued to look up

(10) In particular, Ghana gave KNDP in the British Cameroun a substantial sum—probably £10,000.00 to organize its campaign for the election of January 1959; in the same vain Banda’s ANC of Nyasaland was given £10,000.00 in April 1959. See *Ibid* for details.

(11) Similar Unions were established in what was formed as the Mali Federation, composed of Senegal and Sudan; and the Houphouët’s Entente, composed of the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Dahomey and Niger. See *Ibid* P. 72.

(12) *Ibid*. Thompson, W. Scott, P. 84-85; See also Mahadi, A. “Who is Afraid of History” in *Gombe Studies*, Journal of Gombe State University, Vol. 1, No. 1, December 2008, P. 1-27.

(13) Ghana under Nkurma had already antagonised Nigeria in different ways, but more importantly by refusing to be part of the various West African joint boards left by the British.. On this note Nigeria considered the claim of Ghana for the establishment of a United Africa as hypocritical. It added that if anything the joint board could have provided the basis for closer cooperation and possible unity. On the other hand Nkurma considered the joint board to be part of the relics of colonialism. For details refer to Rooney, D. Kwame Nkurma, *The Political Kingdom in the Third World*, I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 1988, P. 205.

(14) A Nigerian diplomat suggested that with the independence of Nigeria Ghanaians had two choices: cooperate with us in West Africa or oppose us. To cooperate with us entailed playing a second fiddle, so they chose to oppose us. Relation between the two countries continued to sour with the noted role of Ghana in supporting dissident groups, for example Mr. Chike Obi, Aminu Kano and Gogo Nzeribe. See *Ibid*, Thompson, W. Scott, P 77, 78, 79. and also in *Ibid*, Rooney, P. 205.

(15) Okolo, Amechi, “Nigeria and the Superpowers,” in Akinyemi, A. B. (et al) (ed.) *Nigeria Since Independence: The first 25 years*, Volume x, International Relations, Heinemann Educational Books (Nigeria) Ltd, 1989, P. 50-51.

to Britain as her guide and mentor through the jungles of international politics and socio-culture.¹⁶

Intense internal pressure mounted by the opposition and the general Cold War atmosphere, forced Nigeria to change her foreign policy to one conditioned by membership in the British-led Commonwealth of Nations and the Non-align Movement. In addition, the continued brutal atrocities by the racist regime to peaceful protests further challenged the political leadership in Nigeria. Increased pressure, was for instance, mounted on the Balewa administration to bring to an end the reign of terror by the South African minority regime, after the massacre at Sharpeville and Langa on 21st March 1960.¹⁷ Thus not long before it supported British imperial interest on the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), Nigeria showed tough African attitude against French atomic testing in North Africa. Beyond making ordinary statements, as in the case of other African countries, Nigeria went to the extent of breaking diplomatic relations with Paris in January 1961 and imposed a complete embargo on all French goods and gave the French ambassador 48 hours within which to leave the country. The visit to Nigeria by Nelson Mandela in 1962 also made it possible for direct contact with the reality of what was going on in the Southern African region.¹⁸ The visit, specifically earned for the African National Congress (ANC) the recognition and acceptance by Nigeria under the Tafawa Balewa administration. Winnie Mandela was quoted to have said that the sum of £260,000 (British pound Sterling) was secretly donated to ANC by the Balewa regime for the purchase of “hardware” (“AK47”) for the military during that early period.¹⁹ Nigeria’s foreign policy therefore continued to tilt towards the left especially during the civil war years, after the January 1966 coup that ousted the civilian regime of Sir Tafawa Balewa.²⁰ Successive Nigerian Governments, the population and communities in Nigeria, since then, have remained at the fore front of the struggle for the liberation of the people of the southern African region.²¹ Side by side with this also were political developments in the southern African region, under which African agitation for a birth right was reaching a crescendo in militancy and ideological clarity.²²

(16) Okolo, Amechi, Ibid. P. 52.

(17) *National Concord* (Nigeria) Newspaper, 25th March 1980, p. 12.

(18) Mandela sneaked out of apartheid South Africa in a diplomatic blitz to canvass African support via Nigeria for the ANC in its nationalist struggle against Pretoria racist rule. See for detail *The Guardian* (Nigeria) Newspaper, Origin of Nigeria ANC Relations”, 13th May 1990. P. 5.

(19) Mandela, W., “Winnie Mandela thanks Nigeria for South Africa’s liberation”, *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), 25th January 2010, P. 2.

(20) The elected government of Nigeria under the NPC was ousted out of office in January 1966. This coup led to the appearance of the military into political control in Nigeria. It also opened up a new stage in political and ethnic crisis in the body politic of the country which translated into a civil war that nearly divides the country into pieces. It was on this note that Nigeria changed her relations at international level in favour of the Soviet Union and reduced her dealings with her former allies of Western Europe and USA. See Okolo, A. Op. Cit. P.54-60.

(21) George Nene, ANC Chief Representative to Nigeria, quoted in Ibid. *The Guardian* (Nigeria) Newspaper.

(22) Much did not really change in the foreign policy stand since Nigeria was still found to have remained a very loyal member that often came to the defence of Britain and operated as a “buffer” between Britain and other African States on a number of issues critical to Africa. For example in 1965 Nigeria supported Britain on the issue of Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), when it discouraged other African Governments

The attainment of this new political status however,²³ raised the quest for a dynamic foreign policy stand, directed towards the struggle for African freedom from all forms of domination. It was in this context that the early period of the independence of Anglophone West Africa was characterized by the open quest for not only the liberation of Africa, but of Pan Africanism, as championed by the Prime Minister of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah.²⁴ His concern for Africa's independence was made known to the World in his famous dictum that Ghana's independence would be meaningless unless it was linked up with the total liberation of the continent. It was with this intent, therefore, that the first conference of Independent African States was organized;²⁵ with the sole aim of providing voice and venue to Freedom fighters throughout the continent, to assemble in a free independent African state for the purpose of planning a coordinated assault on colonial and racist rule in Africa. At this meeting, Nkrumah made it clear that before Pan-Africanism could be achieved Africa must at first be free of all forms of colonial domination.²⁶ Such, according to Nkrumah could provide the Political Kingdom, which was the over-riding imperative. He gave the assurance that Ghana will provide all the assistance, especially to the liberation movements, for the prosecution of the struggle against the colonial and racist regimes on the continent.²⁷ To back up this pledge, a special fund was created for concerted financial assistance to the liberation movements. In addition, the African Bureau was also set to offer direct financial, propaganda and military support to the struggle, while refugees from South Africa, Namibia, Rhodesia and other colonial dependencies in Africa were granted placements, scholarships and other facilities in the educational institutions in Ghana.

from breaking diplomatic relations with Britain. Looked more critically, this was all part of the post colonial challenge African countries had to pass through. Nigeria, being the richest and most populous African country thought to take its natural leadership position in the continent which contradicts with the claim by Ghana under Nkrumah. If any thing, this was possibly what explains the foreign policy stance of Nigeria, meaning that it was not really retrogressive as such. See for detail, Ajala, A. "Nigeria and Southern African Liberation Movements," in Akinyemi A. B. Ibid, P. 178.

(23) One of such factor was the general upsurge and call for Africa's freedom but more extremely was the call for freedom of the Black race, coined in the dictum of Marcus Garvey, the Jamaican whose followers elected him as the "Provisional president of Africa." Ibid Thompson, W. Scott, P.6.

(24) Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, the Prime Minister of Ghana was influenced a lot by his experience while a student in the United State of America where he came across people and ideas that instill in him the pride of an African. Primarily Nkrumah was influenced by ideas of people like Marcus Garvey, a Pan- Africanist; the writings of Dr. Dubois, Claud Mckay, Langston Hughes, David Diop and Dr. Edward Blyden. For details refer to Asamoah, O. "Nkrumah's Foreign Policy 1951-1966;" in Arhin, K. *The life and Works of Kwame Nkrumah*, papers of a Symposium by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, Africa World Press, Trenton, New Jersey 08607, P 232. See also Ibid. Thompson, W. Scott, P. 4-5.

(25) Nkrumah had earlier had such kind of meetings, though some were informal, to discuss the possibility of convening a conference of all the African States, including South Africa. The meeting took place during the one year celebration of the Ghana's independence with nationalist from un-liberated territories in attendance. The main agenda was the plan for a great Pan African conference of all political parties. The political leaders in attendance include Nyerere, Mboya, Azikwe, Murumbi, Garba Jahumpa, and Bakary Djibo. For detail see Ibid Thompson, P. 30-31.

(26) Op. Cit. Asamoah, O, P. 237.

(27) Basuntwi-sam, D. Landmarks of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, KIA Box 9273, Accra Ghana, P. 76.

Where possible, such categories of people were also given employment opportunities, to help prepare them for the struggle ahead.²⁸

It was on this venture that Mr. Robert Mugabe (now Zimbabwean President) found himself in Ghana in 1957, as one of the literate Africans recruited by Nkrumah to help in providing academic training²⁹ and in building a revolutionary base for the total liberation of Africa. The experience of Ghana fired in the imaginations of both Mugabe and all those that went with him, to go back to Rhodesia to stop the racist administration from blocking the right of Black Africa to be a free people.³⁰ In Ghana according to Mugabe:

I learnt that support for the movement would have to rest on something more than just intellectual attraction. To win a broad-based support among all Africans in Rhodesia, the struggle had to be made part of people's daily life. The barrier between political activity and all others had to be broken down. The people must be made to recognise politics without the taboo of thinking that it wasn't their domain. I learnt to appeal to people's emotions and to their spiritual and cultural values, to encourage them, through party publicity, to value their heritage.³¹

Drawing on his experience from Nkrumah's youth league, Mugabe began organising the NDP youth league wing with the appeal to search for the reality of their history in their cultural roots. Thus in Ghana, Mugabe developed his definite ideas that shaped what he wanted his political future to be. It was at this point that he accepted the general principles of Marxism and also associated himself with revolutionaries from other parts of Africa.³²

Dr. Kamuzu Banda of Malawi was another nationalist who stayed, and for some time, in Kumasi Ghana, and worked as a practicing medical personnel. Dr. Banda arrived in Ghana in 1953, not so much on the invitation of Nkrumah but on his own, in order to give "federation a chance." During his stay in Ghana, Dr. Banda took no part in local politics but he observed, learnt and used some of Nkrumah's methods of political organisation.³³ In December 1958, Dr. Banda returned to Malawi (Nyasaland) at a time when the country was seething with social and political unrest, fanned by distrust and discontent of the Africans, about the position of their country in the Central African Federation, dominated by white minority settlers in Southern and Northern Rhodesia. Dr. Banda was arrested and accused by the administration

(28) The Bureau later turned to be used as propaganda machinery of Nkrumah's line of thought and against any country that is not in support of such ideas. The activities of the bureau therefore turned to create a sour relation between Ghana and her immediate neighbours like Togo. For details refer to Rooney, D. Kwame Nkrumah, *The Political Kingdom in the Third World*, I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd, London, 1988, P. 218.

(29) Mugabe was first posted to teach at St. Mary College in Takoradi, Ghana located on the West Coast of Accra. For more information see Smith, D. (et al) Mugabe, Sphere Books Ltd, Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8JL, 1981, P. 22.

(30) Ibid. P. 22.

(31) Ibid.

(32) The new slogan is no longer asking Europeans to rule us well, but we want to rule ourselves now said one of the founding fathers of the struggle in Rhodesia. This change in perception was encouraged by the experience of especially Mugabe on account of events in societies like Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Somalia. See Ibid P. 37.

(33) McMaster, C. *Malawi – Foreign Policy and Development*, Julian Friedmann Publishers, England, 1974, P. 16-20.

of having triggered the unrest.³⁴ As a result of this, Ghana took it upon herself to challenge this action; and with the support of members of the National Assembly, staged a procession led by the Minister of Communication and presented a ‘protest Note’ to the British High Commissioner at Accra for onward transmission to the Government, in the United Kingdom.

Similar pressure from other parts of the globe was also mounted, which led to Her Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom, to appoint a Royal Commission to inquire into the riots and disturbances in Nyasaland, in the Central African Federation.³⁵ Though the report accused the regime of turning Nyasaland into a police state, Dr. Banda and his followers remained in detention. It was on this note that the Nyasaland African Congress (NAC) requested Ghana to assist with a competent lawyer to lead in the defence of the case.³⁶ The extraordinary interest shown by Ghana on the case led the British Government decline the request for visas by the two legal luminaries slated for the assignment. Similar concern and assistance was also shown to the Pan African Congress (PAC) of South Africa, possibly because of the Pan African posture of the regime in Ghana. Purposely it was in this respect that the PAC has on its flag an African Sun radiating from Accra. The symbolism of this was no more than the Ghanaian support ushered to them.

Ghana, under Nkrumah, was also instrumental at the United Nations and other international fora in spearheading the adoption of a number of measures against the colonial and racist presence in Africa. Most notably, is the General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 on the granting of independence to colonial territories.³⁷

(34) Ibid. P. 76.

(35) The Commission was headed by Sir Patrick Delvin and other very distinguished and experienced men in colonial affairs. Published in July 1959, the report was remembered for its sense of justice for exposing the truth without any inhibition, in its fact finding of the tragic events in Nyasaland. Ibid. P.79.

(36) Kwaw-Swanzy and Mr. E. N. p. Sowah were the lawyers the government of Ghana selected to serve in the defence of Dr. Hasting K. Banda and other cases with the imperial authority in the United Kingdom. Ibid. P.81-82

(37) Besides taking part in the adoption of the resolutions in support of a free Africa and against Apartheid atrocities, Ghana also rendered specific assistance to Sam Nujoma to travel to United State to make case before the United Nation on the Trustee status of Namibia. In his testimony Sam Nujoma narrated that following Ghana’s support he was able to escape from South West Africa to independent Ghana in April 1960, an assistance that introduced him to the centre of the campaign for African independence and unity. During this time Ghana was also hosting a conference tagged the Positive Action Conference against French Government’s testing of the atomic bomb in the Sahara desert at the time when the Algerians were fighting for their freedom and independence. According to Nujoma, in Accra I was warmly received and Accra held much in store for me and for our struggle. I met African leaders from different liberation movements in the continent including Kwame Nkrumah himself, Patrice Lumumba, Joseph Kasavubu, and Frantz Fanon, representing the Algerian National Liberation front (FLN). I was able, during this moment to talk to the world about our situation and more specifically about the Windhoek uprising and the consequent massacre which led to the killings of a lot of people by the South African police. At this conference I had personal conversation with Nkrumah and in his own words he stated that “the Ghana government is behind you, Keep it up”. Nkrumah did not only encourage us but his government also spent a lot of money in publicising the cause of the oppressed people of Africa. In Accra I was also opportune to meet with the special Representative of president Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, who also came to attend the positive Action Conference. He gave us a very sympathetic hearing which I was soon to follow up. Egypt’s first practical help came through this means and it totalled the sum of £100 sterling to the two of us. With part of the money I was able to buy an Olivetti portable typewriter, which I used for many years during the struggle and which I still use. See for detail, Nujoma, S. Where others wavered; The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma, Panaf, 2001, P.97-99.

Also Resolution 1716 at the 17th Session of the General Assembly in 1962 requesting Member states separately or collectively to apply diplomatic and economic sanctions including an arms embargo against South Africa; as well as the establishment of the UN Special Committee on Apartheid which was assigned responsibility for reviewing UN policies on South Africa and assessing the extent of their effectiveness. It was this pressure, mounted by Ghana and other concerned countries, that led to the independence of about 12 African countries in 1960 alone.³⁸ The commitment of Ghana was beyond doubt forth-right and uncompromising because of the basic objective of liberty for all, which was openly shown in many aspects of Ghana's foreign policy.³⁹ More specifically in the case of South West Africa, Ghana's enormous support assisted South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) to present her case⁴⁰ before the United Nations Organisation, which exposed the repressive actions of the apartheid South African regime. As a result a resolution was taken (Resolution 1514) which upheld self determination as a legal principle.⁴¹

Similar assistance was also rendered by another independent⁴² West African nation, Liberia, to SWAPO, when it made possible the trip by Mr. Sam Nujoma from Liberia to New York, venue of the United Nations meeting. In addition to taking an active part⁴³ in support of the course of the freedom of South West Africa, the Liberian government also paid for an air ticket for Mr. Nujoma from Monrovia to New York and back to Monrovia, Accra and Lagos by Pan American Airways; and possibly supported his other needs in the United States for his six months' stay. It is important to also note that while efforts were made by independent African countries, the white South African regime tried all things possible to make it impossible. As Mr. Nujoma said during his verbal presentation of 5th July, 1960, the Walvis Bay branch of SWAPO tried to petition the UN, but the white South African Administration refused them the chance, on the excuse that such a petition must first go through the Union Government. That meeting, therefore, provided that chance to SWAPO and increased the level of understanding of the internal situation in the southern African region. According to Mr. Nujoma,

(38) Arhin K. Op. Cit. P. 238, see also Nujoma S. Ibid. P 99 where Nujoma made it clear that Ghana played a very important role in awakening the people of Africa to demand their freedom and independence.

(39) Arhin K. Ibid. P. 238.

(40) We made a number of presentations one of which demanded that South West Africa be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations in preparation for our independence, which we wanted to come to fruition by 1963. On the contrary the independence of South West Africa (Namibia) was not achieved until 1990, thirty years after the UN declaration. Refer to Nujoma, S. Ibid. P. 103.

(41) Of the members that voted to decide on the resolution 89 states voted in favour with non against. Nine countries however absconded and they include Australia, Belgium, Dominican Republic, France, Portugal, Spain, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom and United States. See Nujoma, S. Op. Cit. P. 108.

(42) By early 1960s there were only 10 independent African countries, namely Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Mali, Morocco, Guinea-Conakry, Liberia and Ghana. Before the end of the year Belgian Congo (Zaire, and now Democratic Republic of Congo) and Nigeria became independent.

(43) Liberia was represented at this meeting by honorable Angie Brooks, an ally of SWAPO. She was the Assistant Secretary to the Liberian Foreign Minister, James Grimes, and later became Vice president of Liberia, Ibid. P. 102.

... this chance did not only earn us the observer status we were later given in the United Nations (UN), but also more support in the form of facilities.⁴⁴

The Apartheid regime, as a result of this, came under attack as object of the most inhuman practice in Southern and Central Africa. The rate at which this inhuman practice was hated and condemned by the newly independent countries of Africa and Asia, was so much that the United Nations General Assembly, by its resolution of October 1966, decried the plight of the oppressed people of South Africa and called on all member-states to commemorate the March 21st, as the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, in memory of the heroes of the Sharpeville uprising.⁴⁵ To support this, Ghana remained consistent in World fora on the question of Human Rights, applying severe economic and diplomatic sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia and contributed financially, to the “Trust Fund for South Africa” as a means of helping to stamp out apartheid and the violation of Human Rights and freedom. To further this effort, the Government of Ghana and those of other independent West African countries, through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and other sister African Governments; played an active role by providing moral, political and material assistance to liberation movements in their struggle to regain their legitimate rights. Ghana in particular denounced in no uncertain terms South Africa’s apartheid policy, and took more practical steps by offering training facilities for South African Refugees under the United Nations Education and Training Programme for South Africans.⁴⁶

In the special Political Committee Meeting of the United Nations, held in 1968, Ghana backed a resolution which condemned South Africa for its apartheid policies and for its assistance to the Smith regime in Rhodesia. Ghana expressed grave concern about the persecution of the opponents of apartheid and urged that fighters against that policy in South Africa should be treated as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention of 1949. It further reiterated that the policy of apartheid denies the essential humanity of those who suffer under this policy, a belief which provided justification for Ghana’s support for removal of all forms of racial discrimination, the denial of human rights and the imposition of alien, minority regimes on Southern African Blacks.⁴⁷ It was with this strong voice that Ghana cried that sanctions on Southern Rhodesia must be made to work, even if it demands the use of force, to stop South Africa and Portugal from serving as a convenient loophole through which assistance reached Southern Rhodesia. Giving much regard to this conviction, the government of Ghana increased its support through the OAU Liberation Committee to the freedom fighters against Portuguese colonialism in Africa.

(44) Ibid.

(45) For details of the events at Sharpeville refer to, Thompson, L. *A History of South Africa*, Yale University Press, New Heaven and London, 2000.

(46) In one of his speeches in OAU (Cairo 1964), Ghana made it clear that nothing can make racist South Africa and Portugal strong enough to arrest freedom fighters and put them in prison but the Africans lack of unity. Refer for detail to National Archives Ghana, 399/ADM. 16/52/1964, P. 15.

(47) Ibid. National Archives Ghana, 399/ADM. 16/52/1964.

As stated earlier, the contributions to the liberation of Southern Africa, in particular, and Africa in general at this early period, was dominated by the activities of the government and people of Ghana. Like in the United Nations, Ghana's role in the formation and activities of the Commonwealth of Nations was equally significant. As noted, Ghana's association with the Commonwealth was not based on mere sentimental desire to continue her links with metropolitan Britain or with former British colonies, but on the need to continue the economic, technical and cultural relations which had long existed and to build up new ones between Ghana and her Commonwealth⁴⁸ partners. Thus during the Prime Ministers Conferences of 1966 and 1969 in London, Ghana picked up issue with Ian Smith's illegal seizure of power in Rhodesia and maintained the position that "while conceding that Rhodesia is primarily the responsibility of the British Government, any agreement with Ian Smith that fell short of majority rule would be unacceptable. It is with the same commitment that the Government of Ghana viewed the question of self-determination for Namibia as against the 'trust powers' which South Africa had exercised since the withdrawal of Germany in 1918. In return the government of Ghana supported the adoption of Resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27th October, 1966, by which the United Nation and its member States committed themselves to the task of freeing the people of Namibia from the apartheid stronghold of the South African racist minority regime.

No doubt in this early phase, Ghana played a more principled role of assisting all colonised countries in Africa to attain the status of a free people. Very little was done by Nigeria, in fact, Nigeria's position was not based on any sound ideological leaning as with the case of Ghana. Sierra Leone⁴⁹ and The Gambia⁵⁰ were very weak political entities, indeed too weak economically. Sierra Leone had to request for International Monetary Fund, (IMF) intervention as early as 1966 to finance a three year Stabilisation programme.⁵¹ But more fundamentally the hope of achieving a sovereign African state, which also forms the backbone of the Ghanaian effort at the liberation of Africa, was not achieved. Rather it led to more bitterness even among

(48) The Commonwealth comprised of independent countries from British colonial administration. Established in the years immediately after the Second World War, the Commonwealth countries started first as an Association of people of Anglo-Saxons origin speaking either the same language or languages with a common root and possessing a basically common culture and sharing, in their essentials, common moral and spiritual values. To day the Commonwealth embraces peoples of different races and cultures because the membership has now increased with the admission of African and Asian countries upon their attainment of independence.

(49) Sierra Leone is a small country of about 73,326 square kilometres on the South West coast of West Africa. The economy was agrarian based and agriculture, using crude implements provides over 70% of the national revenue. For detail refer to Fyle, C. M. (ed.) *The State and the Provision of Social services in Sierra Leone since Independence, 1961-1991*, CODESRIA Book Series, 1993, p. 1-17; See also Abdullah, I. (ed.) *Between Democracy and Terror: the Sierra Leone Civil War*, CODESRIA Book Series, 2004.

(50) Fawole, W. A "Colonial history and the search for democratic nationhood: the case of Anglophone West Africa," in W. Alade Fawole, (ed.) (et al.) *The crisis of the state and regionalism in West Africa: Identity, Citizenship and Conflict*, CODESRIA Series, 2005, p. 46-58-69, also in Adejumbi, S. *Identity, citizenship and Conflict: The African Experience*: in *Ibid.* 2005, 1-39.

(51) Fyle, C. M Op. Cit P. 14.

the West African countries closer to Ghana.⁵² Ghana on the other hand used all its resources for this purpose but to no avail. In his comment on this matter, Nelson Mandela who happened to work in Ghana during those years under the platform of the United Front of South Africa wrote that “burden is systematically destroying Ghana.”⁵³ In the same vein, Ghana was also faced by internal challenges from both supporters and political rivals of the CPP.⁵⁴ This ushered in an era of severe political repression, fear and suspicion between even Nkrumah and some of his most trusted lieutenants,⁵⁵ which led to the detention of over 500 people. More so, as a political figure, Nkrumah was by this period wrapped in ideological confusion between communism and Pan Africanism.⁵⁶ Ghana remained under this political quagmire guarded by a Preventive Detention Act until the coup of 1966, which ousted the CPP regime.

The Trying Period 1966-1980

The history of Independent West Africa during this period was marred by internal political crisis in the form of military intervention, first in Nigeria (January 1966) when the military overthrew its first independence civilian government in a bloody putsch that claimed the lives of the Prime Minister and a number of other people. Ghana followed in February 1966 and Sierra Leone in March 1967, while The Gambia, two decades after in 1994. Such remained the state of affairs amongst, especially, the first three countries; until the 1990’s when democratic regimes were put in place.⁵⁷ Ghana’s decline in international influence, due to her conflict with some of her neighbours, for instance, resulted in the country going through a perceptible and devastating

(52) Ghana created for its self an atmosphere of intrigue and violence by supporting African freedom fighters of all kind. Such characters engaged in all sorts of practices, at a point a number of them were used for other clandestine activities against governments of countries like Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Niger and Togoland. At the Lagos Conference of 1962 Ghana was severely attacked and indeed warned for supporting the unsuccessful coup attempt master minded by Chief Obafemi Awolowo in August 1962. Such an atmosphere made the relationship between Ghana and its West African neighbours sour. Indeed among the Ghanaians, the sycophantic support given to Nkrumah by some clique of his supporters isolated him from being realistic to issues. For details refer to Rooney, Op. Cit P. 214-216, 218.

(53) Ibid. P. 217, This was also supported by the report of US Ambassador to Accra, William P. Mahoney whose intelligence report suggested that Ghana was both politically and economically at the verge of collapse. His report suggested that the economic predicament was as a result of senseless extravagant spending on prestigious projects and in disseminating Pan Africanism. Ibid P. 224-225.

(54) In response to such political developments, Nkrumah was attacked on his way at Kalangu. A development that led to further suspicion within the supporters of Nkrumah and the arrest of persons of the caliber of Cofie Crabbe, Ako Adjei and Adamafo on the August. 28th, See Ibid.

(55) Though he confessed that she was one of his most trusted loyalist, Nkrumah had to at a point confront Erica Powel in the presence of two security officials with security report claiming that she was a paid agent of a foreign power. See for detail Rooney, Ibid P. 220.

(56) What added to his problem was the increasing attack he was receiving from African leaders. In Cairo Conference of 1964, Nkrumah received an open attack of his life when Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Nyerere of Zambia and Balewa of Nigeria bluntly and scathingly rejected the call for a Pan African Government. The Conference later declined Nkrumah’s offer of £100,000 to the liberation committee and indeed Ghana lost her membership of the committee. This and many other challenges added to Nkrumah’s problems. Ibid. P. 230-232.

(57) Fawale, W.A. Op. Cit. P.57.

stagnation of national economy. This could be traced to Nkrumah's preoccupation with foreign relations. As a result, post-Nkrumah era was forced to prioritise even its national economy and relegate global affairs to the background.⁵⁸ It was also forced to increase its dependency on the Western world, which also undermined its national autonomy.⁵⁹ With the exception of Acheampong's regime, with its unprecedented call for the repudiation of Ghana's foreign debt, all post Nkrumah regimes have pursued a constrained and muted foreign relations, and given priority to domestic concerns.⁶⁰ The economy was characterised by negative growth rates, an acute shortage of foreign exchange and consequently, essential consumer items, spare parts, capital goods and other inputs for agricultural and industrial production, high rates of inflation as well as declining savings and investment. Ghana's relatively solid social infrastructure also deteriorated. Roads were rendered impassable by potholes and broken bridges; the railway system was down, so also the postal and communication networks. This was in addition to inadequate supply of water and electricity, even to the urban and industrial centres. Hospitals went without doctors, nurses and drugs, while schools were without books and teachers.⁶¹

This phase of our study in Ghana was really a trying period where destitution and despondency had become widespread, with everybody looking for a way out of the country. More disturbing was the growing state of corruption as well as very low public morale. Passing through these experiences, it became very difficult for Ghana to pursue a foreign policy stand as dynamic as those of the years of Dr. Nkrumah. Yet some level of continuity and consistency remained in Ghana's foreign policy after Nkrumah, as all the regimes showed commitment in varying degrees to the traditional foreign policy concerns of support for liberation struggles, non-alignment, opposition to racism and minority rule in Africa and support for the OAU and other international organisations.⁶² Same was the experience in both Sierra Leone and The Gambia, who were all in principle, committed supporters of the OAU and all its projects especially those that concern the liberation of Africa. However, the instability in their political setting, which translated into a serious economic decline made it difficult for her to play a more positive role, like that of Nigeria.

Unlike in the case of Ghana, Nigeria's experience during this period redirected its foreign policy stand to a more progressive line of thought. The new policy was based on boycott and confrontation with the colonial and minority regimes in Southern Africa, which started with the closure of Portuguese mission in Lagos. Sometimes in

(58) Boalo-Arthur, K. "Ghana's external relations since December 31, 1981", in Boadi, E. G. (ed.) *Ghana under PNDC rule*, CODESRIA Book Series, Dakar, 1993, P. 135.

(59) *Ibid.* P. 148-150.

(60) It was also during his regime that serious concern was shown on the liberation struggle when he seconded military officers to the liberation Committee to train ZAPU cadres for over a year at Mangoro, Tanzania. Commentary on this document by Professor Arnold J. Temu, Project Manager, HASHIM MBITA Project, SADC Secretariat Research, Dar- Es-Salam, Tanzania.

(61) Gylmah-Boadi, E. "The search for economic development and democracy in Ghana from Limann to Rawlings", in Gylmah-Boadi, E. *Op. Cit.* P. 2.

(62) Boalo-Arthur, k. *Op. Cit.* P. 135.

1963, the Organisation of African Unity ordered that all member states should close down Portuguese missions. Even though the Balewa regime was not in contestation with the decision, no effort was made to put it into effect. In addition White South Africans and Portuguese were declared prohibited immigrants in Nigeria, and Portuguese ships and aircraft that were constantly in Nigeria's waters and air space were banned due to Portuguese brutal colonial policy in Africa. Nigeria, from this period took the place of Ghana and remained at the fore front in criticising any western power supporting colonialism and racism in Africa.⁶³ Nigeria's stand in support of liberation movement continued to be on the progressive line due to its experience of the civil war.⁶⁴

During the Nigerian Civil War, Nigeria found itself in a bitter conflict that challenged its political sovereignty. While the Federal authority was working hard to take control of the situation, colonial forces and the white minority regimes in the sub-region were openly giving assistance to the rebels (Biafra). Initially Nigeria got her supplies of weapons from Britain, France, Holland, Belgium, USA and Czechoslovakia. From April 24th to July 5th, 1968, several of them clamp an arms embargo on Nigeria. This was at a time when Biafra's B-26 bombers were devastating Nigerian towns and villages.⁶⁵ This action further convinced the Federal authority that the Western Powers, in addition to the existence of the minority-dominated regimes in Southern Africa, were a direct threat; and the dominance of the administration of the minority regime in Southern Africa must be brought to an end.⁶⁶ Nigeria felt betrayed by the Western powers and was humbly welcomed by the Soviet Union, not only for economic advantages but also to secure ideological influence.⁶⁷ A closer and intimate relation, therefore, was developed between the Soviet Union and Nigeria. Nigeria signed an agreement that established an air service in January 1967. In February, the Soviets sent a high powered five-man delegation of economists, engineers and metallurgists who extensively toured the country and explored the possible ways of industrial cooperation with Nigeria. This was preceded with the

(63) Ajala, A. "Nigeria and Southern African Liberation Movements," in Op. Cit. Akinyemi, A. B. Heinemann Educational, P.180. See also *Africa research Bulletin* May 1966, p. 528 and February 1966, P.475.

(64) The most important change that occurred in the country's foreign relations during the civil war was the marked improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and the corresponding deterioration in Nigeria's dealings with her previous allies – Britain, the United States and the West. For detail refer to Okolo, A. *Nigeria and the Super Powers*, in Akinyemi, A. B. Ibid. P. 57.

(65) On the Biafran side, the major source of arms at the early stage was private entrepreneurs. This changed when France took the lead from August 1968 to boost her colonial hold and sources of cheap oil. In addition France also provided some foreign currency, so also was racist regime of South Africa which was noted from 1968 to be the major arms supplier to avenge for Nigeria's opposition to apartheid. Refer to Nwoliise, O. B. C. "The Civil war and Nigerian Foreign Policy," in Akinyemi, A. B. (ed.) (et al) Ibid. P. 204.

(66) Ajala, A. Op. Cit. 181.

(67) Soviet took advantage of this situation and establish new relationship with another African power by supplying Nigeria with heavy weapons war planes flying from areas earlier prohibited. This switch of relationship forced Britain to quickly staged a full scale come-back not only supplying Nigeria with heavy arms but also pilots. Nwoliise Op. Cit P. 204. See also Interview with Alhaji Muhammed Dikko Yusufu, Retired Assistant General of Police during the General Murtala/Obasanjo regime (1975-1979), December 12, 2009, at Kaduna, Nigeria. Copy of the cassette is in my possession.

signing of an additional agreement on cultural exchange, under which Nigeria's institutions received Soviet publications free or at a very insignificant cost. Under this guise Nigeria also benefited from Soviet military equipment, when it was allowed to purchase arms including the Soviet MIG 17s, six L-29 Czech Dolphins, and several patrol boats. This was followed by a formal pledge of support from the Soviet Premier, Alexsei Kosygin, through his ambassador, who toured most part of the country and initiated, in the process, projects aimed at supporting not only the suppression of secession, but aiding Nigeria's future development. Of great significance here was the spread of the ideas of socialism and the struggle for social justice, through the influx of Soviet based literature.

By mid 1970's Nigerian intellectual environment was transformed over and above its colonial and neo-colonial outlook. The teaching of courses in Social Sciences and Humanities were made with Africa as the main focus.⁶⁸ Within no time, ideas of social justice and human right became commonly used and discussed in all fields of human endeavour. The development of dynamic labour organisations championed by progressive minded people extended the struggle for social justice to all nooks and corners of the country and set the stage for radicalism in all the affairs of governance in the country.

Out of the civil war in 1970, Nigeria's appearance at the OAU meeting revealed to the world its new stand on colonialism and racism. Moral and material support became amongst the assistance Nigeria was sending to liberation movements in Southern Africa and other parts of Africa under colonial domination. By this, leaders of the liberation movements were not only allowed to visit Nigeria, but also were given money, military trucks, medical supplies and blankets. This increased in quantity and consistency as Nigeria became financially buoyant due to the discovery and exploration of the oil resources. Further than that, Nigeria increased her contribution to the liberation fund which gave her an upper hand in the political development in Africa. Addressing the OAU Summit, General Gowon warned, in a very strong language, the enemies of African freedom fighters, particularly the Portuguese, and the racist minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, with the active collaboration of their military and business allies, striving to check the historical trend towards freedom and independence, for all of Africa. It was consequent to this that Nigeria, through its External Affairs Commissioner, called all independent countries of the world to join hands against apartheid by supporting the establishment of the United Nations Liberation Fund, to speed up the liquidation of imperialism, colonialism and racism in Africa. More so, African leaders were urged by Nigeria, to provide substantial help to the liberation movements, so that at least one territory can be liberated through armed struggle, possibly within a very short time. To make its commitment felt, Nigeria donated the sum of US\$180,000, in addition to her normal contribution to

(68) Ibid. P. 59.

the liberation fund.⁶⁹ Nigeria also continued with mounting diplomatic pressure and support to the liberation movements, though it refused to allow the liberation movements to establish offices in Lagos.⁷⁰ Such stand continued until the coup of 29th July, 1975 which removed General Yakubu Gowon from office.

Under the General Murtala/Obasanjo regime (1975-1979), Nigeria's stand on the liberation of Southern Africa took a more radical outlook, both in theory and practice. From the outset, the regime made it very clear that Nigeria would no longer sit on the fence on important issues affecting African sovereignty. With this, the liberation movements were not only to come on official visits, but were allowed to open up offices in the Federal Capital seat (Lagos). Also, Nigeria changed its method of payment to the liberation movements by electing to have a Nigerian top official personally deliver the money to beneficiaries rather than allow bureaucrats to block or delay the fulfilment of Nigeria's financial obligation to OAU, and thus undermine its credibility as an active liberation supporter. Bishop Abel Muzorewa's African National Council was the first to enjoy this when it collected the sum of US\$32,750.00. Same gesture was extended to the people of Mozambique through their Government to the tune of US\$250,000.00, by the Commissioner for External Affairs, Brigadier Joe Garba. In addition, Nigeria supported the common position of the OAU and pushed for the independence of the two Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola. Unlike the case of Mozambique, the independence of Angola faced a lot of difficulties because of a number of political groups claiming to be the right representatives of the people.⁷¹ Since the time of Gowon, the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) was the secretly favoured Liberation Movement by Nigeria, though covered along the tag of the OAU's preoccupation of trying to arrange a national government of the three political parties concerned.⁷² The support of the MPLA, however, continued openly, during the time of General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, more so when MPLA was able to convince the Nigerian authority that they represent the true freedom fighters with no link to the Portuguese or any other racist regime. As a result of this, Nigeria, did not just recognise MPLA, but worked on all member states in the OAU to support them; a development which earned the MPLA recognition to

(69) In addition Nigeria also settled all her arrears to the liberation fund which she owed. See for details. Op. Cit. P. 181.

(70) This was possibly in response to the reconstructions going on after the civil war and the fear of the support by the Western powers who were the ones in charge. See Ibid.

(71) Among the three Organisations competing were FLNA, UNITA and MPLA. FLNA and MPLA were originally involved in the struggle for Angola's independence. UNITA was later added when Jonas Savimbi who was formally the Foreign Affairs Minister in the Government in-Exile resigned.

(72) This idea of uniting warren factions never worked in Africa as demonstrated in the case of Nigeria where the warren parties shared a lot in common unlike in the case of Angola. In the case of Angola the factions differed strongly on matters of both foreign and domestic policies. While MPLA was Marxist and pro-total liberation from all forms of colonisation, there was evidence, for example, that UNITA was collaborating with the Portuguese during the war of liberation, in addition to its South African connection. It was this that tarnished the image of the FNLA-UNITA on the face of Nigeria and call for the firm position Nigerian Government took in support of MPLA. For detail refer to Akinyemi, A. B. "Angola and Nigeria: A Study in the National Interest," in Conference No. 16, Graduate Institute of international Studies, Geneva, 1978, P.28.

enjoy assistance from the OAU. Nigeria went to the extent of openly challenging the US when it mobilised African progressive forces in support of the MPLA and not FNLA-UNITA, the favourites of USA and the Western powers. This was in a speech delivered at the extraordinary summit of OAU held in Addis Ababa, January 11th 1976, titled “Africa Has Come of Age.” This part of the speech below captures the position championed by Nigeria and Africa as a whole:

“... Mr. Chairman, Africa has come of age. It is no longer under the orbit of any extra continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or to mar. For too long have we been kicked around: for too long have we been treated like adolescents who cannot discern their interests and act accordingly. For too long has it been presumed that the African needs outside ‘expert’ to tell him who are his friends and who are his enemies. The time has come when we should make it clear that we can decide for ourselves; that we know our interests and how to protect those interest; we are capable of resolving African problems without presumptuous lessons in ideological dangers which, more often than not, have no relevance for us, nor for the problem at hand. Nigeria has come to this Assembly determined to co-operate with you, Mr. Chairman, and with all member States, to put a stop to foreign interference in our Continental matters. As an African nationalist of distinction, I trust that your wise guidance will direct our deliberations to fruitful conclusions of which our peoples will be proud.”⁷³

What made Nigeria take a clear stand in favour of the MPLA on the issue of Angolan independence was the intervention of South Africa in the Angolan civil war on the side of FNLA-UNITA group. Intelligence report revealed that South African troops had crossed the Cumene River ostensibly to guard the hydroelectric installation in Ruacana Falls, which supply electricity to Southwest Africa (Namibia) with a view to provide support to the pro-Western UNITA in its efforts to gain ascendancy in Luanda. As recorded by Brigadier Joe Garba, this report further awakened Nigeria, “and in a desperate move I was summoned to the Dodan Barracks by the Head of State. On arriving at Dodan Barrack” ...:

“I found with him [Head of State] at Dodan Barracks, Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo, Chief of Army Staff, Brigadier T. Y. Danjuma, and the Inspector-General of Police, M.

D. Yusuf. The excited talk focussed on South Africa’s invasion. General Murtala [Head of State] turned to me, exclaiming, a voice full of contempt for South Africa’s move that we would recognise the MPLA with immediate effect. I replied that I had just seen the American Ambassador who was right now cabling his Government, reporting our Government’s strong condemnation of the invasion and requesting the Americans to secure immediate South African withdrawal. Having registered so strong a protest, we would violate diplomatic practice if we announce recognition of the MPLA before receiving a reply from Washington. There was also the question of the OAU recognition of the three movements. They unanimously refused Murtala, though

(73) Wilmot, P. F. *Ideology and National Consciousness*, Lantern Books, Ibadan, 1980, P. 179-186; see also Video recorded interview with Chief Olusegun Obasanjo by Honourable Hashim Mbita and also an audio interview with Alhaji M. D. Yusuf. Chief Obasanjo served in the Cabinet of General Murtala Muhammed with Obasanjo as the second man while Yusuf served as general inspector of Police. The two are still alive and politically active.

usually sensitive to diplomatic nuances, was intransigent, shouting “we must recognise the MPLA now”.... But after further discussion, my view prevailed, and recognition was withheld for twenty-four hours⁴⁷⁴

Earlier, the President of United States, Mr. Gerald Ford, wrote to Nigeria’s Head of State, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed, requesting Nigeria not to recognise the MPLA. In the full text of the letter, President Ford noted that:

“During this critical period in African and World affairs I believe it would be useful to give you my views on the Angolan situation. Since your Government has recognised the MPLA regime as the Government of Angola, I believe it is necessary that there be no misunderstanding about our position. In turn I would welcome any ideas and suggestions which, I am sure you will offer in the spirit of friendship and cooperation that I present my thought to you.

The Objective of US policy in Angola has been to counter efforts by the Soviet Union to impose one faction as the government of Angola. Our view has been that only a government composed of all groups can claim to represent that country. We have consequently refrained from recognising any faction as the government.

We have several times called for an end to all foreign intervention and have repeatedly stated our willingness to cooperate with such an endeavour.

As President of a country which has global responsibility I want you to know how seriously we regard this Soviet Intervention 8000 miles from its borders, outside its traditional area of security interest. The Soviet action could have grave future implications elsewhere in the World.

I wish to assure you that we see the MPLA as one of the three legitimate factions in Angola. We seek neither the destruction nor the defeat of the MPLA. But we do believe that it should not be allowed to assume total power by force of Soviet and Cuban arms.

We hope a government of national unity will emerge and we stand ready to provide reconstruction assistance when that happens.

On the racist South African question, I wish to state that the US in no way sought or encouraged the South Africans to become involved in Angola nor were we consulted. They acted no doubt in defence of their national interest as they see it.

We did not initiate any consultation with them and have maintained our military embargo on all arms to racist South Africa. We share your concern over their presence and desire it to end just as we do that of the Soviet Union and Cuba. We will do our utmost to bring about their withdrawal in the interest of withdrawal of all foreign forces.

The upcoming OAU Summit Meeting on Angola can clearly be extremely important in promoting an early end to the fighting and a peaceful settlement of the civil war. It is our hope that the OAU will insist upon a prompt end to all foreign involvement in Angola, arrange a standstill ceasefire between the forces, and bring about negotiations among the Angolan groups.

(74) Otubanjo, F. “The Military and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy” in Akinyemi, A. B. (ed.) (et.al) *Nigeria Since Independence: the first 25 years*, Vol. x, International Relations, Heinmann Educational Books, Nigeria, 1989, P. 241-2.

My Government would support such an initiative and cooperate with it provided other distant powers do so as well. We cannot however, stand idly by if the Soviet and Cuban intervention persists.

I would be pleased to learn your reaction to the ongoing and I hope we can continue to exchange views on this and other matters of mutual concern.”⁷⁵

The reply by Nigeria condemned President Gerald Ford of the United State for insulting and scorning the intelligence and dignity of Black man and the independent African nations.⁷⁶ In fact Nigeria’s disagreement with the US position was further confirmed when it flatly refused, in protest of the continued US support of the racist forces in Angola and Mozambique to welcome the visit of the US Secretary of State, Mr. Henry Kissinger.⁷⁷ Mr. Kissinger was one of the political ideologue of the regime who conceived of Europe as the centre for maintaining the balance in the world in the sense that he saw, at least, from his own perception, the solution of problems in Europe as being the key, not so much to the solution of problems of the world, but to the stability of the world system. To him the important and crucial issues and questions were in Europe not in Africa, not in Asia, and not in Latin America. His ideas are best expressed in his book ”The Necessity for Choice”, in which he argued that the Third World has no any significant role to play in world politics. Thus to his line of thought:

“... when we are convinced of the correctness of our course, we should pursue it, even if it does not gain the immediate approval of the uncommitted (Third World) particularly in the field such as disarmament or the concept of the new nations.”⁷⁸

Nigeria’s action was out of a genuine commitment for a free Africa, and the belief that the US position was not for the good of Africa, thus the title of the speech “Africa Has Come of Age.” Truly Africa exercised its independent stand on this issue and specifically the bold position taken by Nigeria gingered most African countries to follow suit. In fact even Field Marshall Idi Amin, an arch enemy of MPLA, expressed his disagreement with FNLA-UNTA during this Summit.⁷⁹ The feeling exhibited in the Summit questioned the rationale for agreeing with the US; the position was so radical that African leaders were themselves shocked.⁸⁰ At the end of the Summit African leaders lined up in salute for Nigeria’s General Murtala Muhammed. The

(75) “Ford’s Note to Muhammed” Daily Times, January 8th 1976, P. 17; See detail of the letter also in Usman, Y. B. *For the Liberation of Nigeria*, New Beacon Books, London, 1980, P. 287.

(76) “Shameless America” Front page Comment in the Daily Sketch, January 8th 1976, P. 1 & 3. See the details of the reply in Appendix 2 as quoted in Usman, Y. B. *Ibid*, P.289-291.

(77) President Ford of the US wrote to the OAU urging them to support UNITA, Nigeria mobilised against it in support of the MPLA. Such a political action by Nigeria so disgraced US that cost the Republican administration to lose the 1977 election to the Democrats, under Carter. More than that, it led to the reversal of US’s policy on Africa and the appointment of a Black Civil Right activist (Andrew Young) as United Nations Ambassador to the US with the task of normalising African-American relations. Refer, for details to Okolo, A. Op. Cit. P.65-66

(78) Kissinger, H. “The Necessity for Choice”, quoted in (Foot note 7) Akinyemi, A. B. *Angola and the Nigeria: A Study in the National Interest*, Op. Cit. P. 10.

(79) *Ibid*. P. 18.

(80) “A Good Decision”, An Editorial in the *Nigerian Tide*, November 28th 1975, P.3.

leader of UNITA, Jonas Savimbi made all efforts to meet the General, but failed and was openly insulted in return by the General.⁸¹ To further make way for the MPLA, Nigeria supported them with massive material, military and diplomatic efforts to the tune of over US\$20,000,000.00.⁸² One month after, on February 13th 1976, General Murtala Ramat Muhammed was assassinated in an unsuccessful but bloody military coup.⁸³ Allegation that the coup d'état was carried with the support of the US was discussed everywhere in Africa. In Nigeria for example it was alleged that Colonel B.

S. Dimka, one of the key plotters, contacted the US Embassy in Lagos for assistance to return the ousted General Gowon to power. There isn't documented evidence to support this; indeed in a private discussion with General Yakubu Gowon he declined any knowledge of the coup.⁸⁴

The coup which led to the death of General Murtala Muhammed did not change the foreign policy stand of Nigeria much, in the sense that General Obasanjo, who succeeded him continued on the same radical trend. In his own case he introduced an open door policy to all African exiles from Southern Africa, mostly those nominated by recognised Liberation Movements. To support this initiative, the government officially launched the Southern African Relief Fund (SARF) in December 1976, to which, the general public donated generously.⁸⁵ Assistance from the fund was in the form of awards of educational scholarships, cash grants, donation of relief materials such as ambulances, buses, generators clothing, food, pharmaceuticals and tents; these were donated to refugee camps, liberation movements and front-line states devastated by the racist regimes. SARF, therefore, took care of the provision of medical and other necessary material to the liberation movements, apart from the sum of N5million that Nigeria was paying annually.⁸⁶ To further facilitate the course for a free Southern Africa, Nigeria hosted a World Conference for Action Against Apartheid, organised by the United Nations Organisation in collaboration with the Organisation of African Unity, during which it called for the whole world to join forces against

(81) Interview with Alhaji M. D. Yusuf, Op. Cit.

(82) It was under this administration that Nigeria was given the status of a Frontline State even though not among such States but because of Nigeria's leading and inspiring role in the Africa's effort to defeat apartheid.

(83) No doubt General Murtala Ramat Muhammed had a special interest on Angolan situation or on anti-apartheid in general. This was demonstrated on his insistence to attend that specific Summit to read the speech himself. Initially it was his second in command (Obasanjo) that was to attend, but reading through the speech, Murtala accepted to be there himself. For detail on this refer to Interview with Obasanjo by Honourable Hashim Mbita. Also in Interview with M. D. Yusuf.

(84) Private discussion with General Yakubu Gown when we paid him a courtesy visit in his Hotel room in Sheraton Abuja, during the preparation for the launching of the book "After NYSC what next?" Organised by Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria, 2008.

(85) The objectives of the fund was to raise funds through appeals, public campaigns, exhibitions, and other activities; to increase such funds through judicious investments, to administer relief assistance to the citizens of Southern Africa through scholarships, emergency materials, social assistance and the amelioration of the condition of the civilian population, the wounded and sick in the Southern African region.

(86) President Kaunda commended this effort during an OAU Summit in Libreville especially that it comes from the people themselves and not the Government and urged all OAU members to emulate the gesture.

apartheid and all it represents.⁸⁷ On this ground, and following the support from the UN, Nigeria went all out in support of the liberation movements. Tactfully, Nigeria reacted against the leadership of Margaret Thatcher for supporting Ian Smith,⁸⁸ by nationalising Shell-BP for its support to apartheid on the eve of the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka. The government renamed the company African Petroleum (AP), a development which forced Britain to summon a constitutional conference that succeeded in charting the manner in which majority rule would replace the minority government.⁸⁹ Nigeria also nationalised the Barclays Bank and changed its name to Union Bank of Nigeria.

The dominant role of Nigeria in supporting the liberation of the oppressed people of Southern Africa from White racist regime made Nigeria a spokes-person on major decisions that affect the region. From this view, and from the experience with the liberation struggle in Angola, liberation movements in both Zimbabwe and South Africa were advised to combine forces against the common enemy instead of dissipating their energies.⁹⁰ Inability to achieve this in the case of South Africa made Nigeria to support the South African Youth Revolutionary Council (SAYRCO) in their effort against racist minority regime.⁹¹ This body was provided with military training while its members were also awarded scholarships to study in Nigeria. In the case of Zimbabwe, the two Liberation Movements (ZANU and ZAPU) agreed to form the Patriotic Front and support continued to be channelled through that. Amongst such supports, Nigeria offered to train Zimbabwean nationals (some of whom fought in their war of independence as guerrilla fighters) at various Nigerian military training institutions. Some of the graduates eventually held top military positions in the Zimbabwean military.⁹² Nigeria was, though secretly, also supporting ZAPU until when intelligence report indicted the leadership.⁹³ ZANU was, therefore, supported financially⁹⁴ to contest in the February 1980 elections and at the end captured the

(87) General Olusegun Obasanjo “No Compromise with Apartheid” Speech read at a World Conference for Action against Apartheid organised by United Nation Organisation in collaboration with the Organisation of African Unity, Lagos, August 22 -26, 1977.

(88) When the conservative party under the leadership of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher took over office in May 1979, she indiscreetly fuelled the fears of African leaders when she maintained that her government would resume the sale of arms to Southern Rhodesia. Thatcher’s support for Ian Smith was designed to undermine the OAU’s active assistance to the Liberation fighters. Refer to Agbi, O. “Nigeria and the Organization of African Unity, 1963 – 1983,” in Op. Cit. Akinyemi, A. B. P. 170.

(89) Ibid. P. 170.

(90) *The Guardian* (Nigeria) Newspaper, December 11, 1988, P.2.

(91) Notwithstanding ANC and PAC still continued to be assisted when the government of Nigeria found them to be in difficult financial condition.

(92) Observation by General H. M. Lai (RTD). General Lai was then an instructor at one of the Nigerian military installations in Jaji, Kaduna State where the Zimbabweans were given additional training after being commissioned from the Nigerian Defence Academy (NDA) Kaduna.

(93) Intelligence report noted that Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs and a few officials at the Nigeria Ministry for External Affairs participated in a meeting held between Ian Smith and Joshua Nkomo in August 1978. Agbi Op. Cit.

(94) Interview with Alhaji Muhammed Dikko Yusufu, Op. Cit, December 12, 2009. He made it clear that Elder statesman Samuel Ikoku was the one sent by President Alhaji Shehu Shagari with the sum of US\$10million to give each five to the two Liberation Movements. After a critical examination Elder Ikoku noted that ZANU was

majority of the seats (67 out of 100) and thus formed the government controlled by the majority of Zimbabweans.⁹⁵

The transition to civilian rule which brought to power the administration of National Party of Nigeria (NPN) continued with the support for the liberation of Southern Africa in spite of their retrogressive political leaning. The President, Alhaji Shehu Aliyu Shagari,⁹⁶ for example, continued with giving financial assistance to the liberation movements in Zimbabwe; a US\$10million grant was given to President

Mugabe during their independence celebrations in April 1980. The amount was to be used to acquire the *Zimbabwe Herald* from the racist South Africa. Commending Nigeria on this, the leader of ZANU, Prime Minister Robert Mugabe, made it public that Nigeria spent more than US\$8million for the training of freedom fighters during the liberation war in Zimbabwe.⁹⁷ Amongst other Liberation Movements that enjoyed such support from Nigeria during this period was SWAPO of Namibia.⁹⁸ Like others, SWAPO was assisted both financially and materially. Assistance was, for instance, specifically, rendered in the form of supply of arms, relief materials, drugs and foodstuffs on a regular basis by military transport planes from Lagos through Rwanda. Besides, Nigeria donated more than US\$1.01 billion to the OAU Special Fund for the independence of Namibia.⁹⁹

The “Defeat of Apartheid” 1980-1994

This phase in the history of Anglophone West Africa was a difficult one in the sense that serious economic crises manifested in both Ghana and Nigeria. In Ghana this started much earlier which expressed itself in a number of coups until December 1981 when the Provisional National Defence Council under Flight Lieutenant

J. J. Rawlings staged a come back to face the challenge. Exhibiting revolutionary tendencies, though not as radical as he was thought to be, Rawlings thought the only option was to first look inward within Africa to salvage the crippling economy. Thus his close relation with Libya; a country accused by many African countries of various

the most serious and handed over the sum of US\$5million to them as Nigeria’s contribution to Zimbabwe at independence and returned the balance.

(95) Agbi. O. Op. Cit. P. 170.

(96) All through his administrative experiences were with Nigerian governments dining with the US, first as a Parliamentary Secretary to the Balewa government during the first Republic and as a Federal Commissioner in General Gowon’s administration. Though he presided over a government that was operating an American brand of democracy, Nigeria’s relations with other Super Powers continued. For instance, Nigeria was represented by a high-powered delegation at the funeral of President of Soviet Union, (Brezhnev). More disturbing to the US was the words in the message sent by President Shagari that “He will be particularly remembered for his support of the Liberation Movements in Africa; and his unqualified opposition to apartheid ad racial injustice as well as colonialism.” Okolo, A. Op. Cit. P. 67-68.

(97) *Nigerian Tribune* (Ibadan) August 11, 1984, P. 6. Same was also carried in most of the Nigerian dailies for example *New Nigerian News* paper and *The Punch* of the same date. See also Williams, D. *President and power in Nigeria: The life of Shehu Shagari*, FRANK CASS, London, 1982, P. 214.

(98) Ola Amupitan “Ties with South Africa” *Nigerian National Concord* 3rd December 1980, P.2.

(99) *National Concord Newspaper*, Lagos 20th June 1981, P. 1 and 16.

acts of destabilization and intervention.¹⁰⁰ The actions of Rawlings were however justified, considering the condition of Ghana economically, and the fact that Nigeria was not ready to assist, even with petroleum product.¹⁰¹ Humbly, however, Libya came to the rescue of Ghana with various forms of assistance that include several thousand barrels of petroleum products worth nearly US\$20 million in March 1982 alone. Libya also supported Ghana with relief materials for draught victims and the Ghanaians expelled by Nigeria in 1983.¹⁰² Notwithstanding its poor economic condition Ghana under the PNDC gave unflinching support to the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa, most notably to the African National Congress (ANC) and the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). In addition to the provision of refuge to students studying in Ghanaian institutions of higher learning, the ANC was allowed to open a mission in Accra, long before the organisation was legalised by the South African government. Ghana also consistently supported the United Nations Resolution 435 on independence of Namibia, and opposed the US policy of linking the Namibia's independence to the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. With similar commitment Ghana opposed US support for UNITA rebels in Angola and denounced South Africa's acts of sabotage and destabilisation in the Frontline States. When the process for the independence of Namibia got underway on the April 1st, 1989, Ghana sent contingent of police officers and men to help in the monitoring and policing of the process.¹⁰³

The Nigerian scene was not any better; and partly, this explains the expulsion of Ghanaians and the refusal to supply Ghana with petroleum. The growing crises led to the overthrow of the civilian regime in December 1983, some months after the civilian President was sworn into his second term in office. The new regime was led by Major General Muhammadu Buhari. Like the coup in Ghana, that in Nigeria also found justification on the state of the society and the economy.¹⁰⁴ The concern therefore was how to put the dilapidating structures in order and to forge ahead. A number of measures were taken, some of which discouraged the continued financial assistance Nigeria was giving out to liberation movements in Africa. The atmosphere however remained tensed and revolutionary, with growing difficulties due to the imposition of austerity measures. The labour movement in the country became more

(100) Nigeria was accusing Libya over Chad and over its power play in the region. Senegal and The Gambia and Ghana (under H. Limann) had publicly deplored Libya's diplomacy of subversion. Mali and Burkina-Faso expelled some Libyan diplomats on the same charges, so also Niger and Sudan who accused Libya of attempting to overthrow their legitimate governments. For detail refer to Boalo-Arthur, k. "Ghana's external Relations since December 31, 1981, in Op. Cit. 139.

(101) Nigeria had refused to sell oil to Ghana because of unpaid arrears of US\$150 million in addition to the opposition to the coup. Ibid. P. 139, Relations got worse by Rawlings allegation that Nigeria-with US support-intended to invade Ghana to restore Limann (the ousted civilian President of Ghana) See also Williams, D. Op. Cit. P. 211-212.

(102) Libya also assisted with various kinds of military equipment including the supply of very sophisticated weapons. Ibid. P. 139. See also Williams Ibid. p.212.

(103) Ibid P. 141.

(104) Abba, A. (et.al) *The Nigerian Economic Crisis: Causes and Solutions*, Academic Staff Union of Universities, Zaria, 1987.

agitated in alliance with the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU). Thus the social condition further increased the level of consciousness and the call for an administration with human face. In reaction, the government continued to be more draconian as a result of which it lost the support of the people too. Not long after, the government was overthrown by another section of the military led by General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida.

In the case of Sierra Leone, economic decadence continued; caused by persistent corruption, nepotism, tribal and ethnic sentimentalism. What supported Siaka Steven to remain in power this long, include amongst others, his army and the police living a comfortable life with huge subsidies in the form of much lower prices of essential commodities.¹⁰⁵ Yet some efforts were made in giving out scholarships to especially South Africans, Zimbabweans and Namibian youth in the liberation Struggle. It also played an important role in providing travel documents to a number of leaders that facilitated their free movements to other parts of the world.¹⁰⁶ The years commencing from the 1990s, however, were difficult years for Sierra Leone, when a protracted civil war engulfed the country and turned it to near extinction.¹⁰⁷

The long administration of Sir Dauda Jawara since independence in the Gambia did not produce much with regard to economic betterment, but was only saved by the unique condition of the country until 1994 when the military showed up. Though they remained loyal to the United Nation Organisation (UNO) and Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Sierra Leone and The Gambia were not known for rendering additional financial support to the liberation struggle beside the mandatory payments.

Thus from 1985, Nigeria consistently continued with her generous support to the liberation movements. Primarily her concern was on Namibia and South Africa, and indeed Angola due to the threat from racist South Africa's support of rival UNITA. The genuine concern of General Babangida (Nigerian military ruler) for the freedom of the region was shown when at this time he floated an idea to appoint (late) Dr. Yusufu Bala Usman as Special Ambassador Extra Ordinary for the liberation of Southern Africa, with a personal office at Harare, Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁸ Though

(105) He also engaged leaders of the major institutions in the country as members of his parliament and used them effectively against any threat on his administration. This was in addition to the use of threat of force which he used to employ particularly during election. See for detail Fyle, C, M. (ed.) Op. Cit. P.5-6.

(106) Commentary by Professor Arnold J. Temu, Op. Cit.

(107) Ekeator, C. *Battalion 7: a compelling story about the road to peace in Sierra Leone*, Spectrum Books, Abuja, Nigeria, 2007, Pp. 1-18, see also Sesay A. *Civil wars, Child soldiers and Post conflict peace building in west Africa*, College Press and Publishers with the support of the Ford Foundation, 2003, Pp. 113-131, and also in Fawaole, W. A. Op. Cit. P. 62.

(108) Interview with Dr. Alkasum Abba, Dr Abba was a close associate of Dr. Yusufu Bala Usman, 29th December 2009. Dr. Yusufu Ba;la Usman was a radical scholar (historian), one of the architect of Africanising the teaching of history in the Nigerian Universities. For details on his life and times and his contribution to the study of Nigerian history see Abba, A. "A life of commitment to knowledge, freedom and justice: tribute to yusufu Bala Usman 1945-2005", CEDDERT, Zaria, Nigeria, 2006, 2008.. For a number of times, Dr. Usman was invited to position of power in the administration of the country but he declined because he found the people in power to have lacked the commitment for a genuine transformation of the society, such that it will make life better for the people. On this specific case however, Dr Usman accepted the appointment; it is the conviction here that his appointment was a clear mark of a genuine commitment of the regime to liberation struggle in Southern Africa.

this did not practically take effect, active support for the liberation of the region was intensified. For example in early 1986, Nigeria sponsored a tour of the Frontline States by Reverend Jesse Jackson, designed to call the attention of the international community on the Southern African region. Earlier, during a Summit Conference of the OAU, Nigeria initiated the resolution which called for the isolation of South Africa, including the proscription of landing, over-flight and berthing facilities for South African aircrafts and ships in other African countries. Nigeria's moral, political, diplomatic, material and financial support contributed immensely to the success of the Namibian independence. At independence the elected President Sam Nujoma paid special tribute to Nigeria, that apart from the overall massive material and financial assistance which Nigeria extended to SWAPO and the Namibian people, the following were also worth mentioning:

- The launching of the Namibia Solidarity Fund by President Ibrahim Babangida on June 16th, 1989 during which the sum of US\$11 million was voluntarily contributed by Nigerians world wide.
- Payment of US\$400,000.00 to the OAU as assessed contribution in aid of SWAPO to finance its electoral campaign in the period leading to the United Nations supervised election in November 1989.
- The voluntary contributions of US\$100,000.00 to the United Nations for the repatriation of Namibian refugee and exiles to enable them participate in the UN sponsored decolonisation process.
- The payment of US\$162.647.00 as its assessed contribution to the budget of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which was emplaced in Namibia to supervise Namibia's decolonisation.
- The contribution of 182-man police contingent, the single largest, to the UNTAG.
- Contribution of 40 electoral personnel to UNTAG.
- The release of a retired Nigerian senior Ambassador to head the OAU observer mission in Namibia.
- The pledge of US\$1million, at the Namibia pledging Conference held at UN Head Quarters, New York, in July 1990, to finance economic and technical projects in Namibia, during the immediate post independence period.¹⁰⁹

By 1990 the only remaining country under colonial rule in Africa was South Africa, which was under the white minority racist regime.

In South Africa, new effort at reforming the system was last announced in 1983, but was bitterly resisted as not conforming to the United Nations Resolutions.¹¹⁰ From

(109) Okpaku, J. O. (et al) *Nigeria and the Organization of African Unity; In Search of an African Reality*, Third Press Publishers, Lagos, Nigeria, 1991, Pp. 44. Similar commendation was made by Nelson Mandela after his release from Prison. For detail see *The Guardian* (Nigeria) Newspaper, May 14, 1990, P. 1.

(110) In May 1983, Prime Minister P. W. Botho introduced a constitutional amendment that provided for three racially separate parliamentary chambers for white Indians and colored's, in which they will deal separately with matters affecting their respective groups. This reform did not in any way consider the majority South Africa's population classified as Africans (Black people). As a result the reform was challenged by not only the Black Africans who described it as nothing more than cosmetic changes, but also the liberal whites. See for details Halisi,

September 1984 violence erupted in black townships in Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging (PWV) areas, the largest metropolitan complex in the country where lots of people lost their lives. In response to the brutal handling of the situation by the racist police, the ANC called on its members to make South Africa ungovernable. In readiness to face this radical challenge against the administration of white minority, 7000 policemen were despatched to undertake a house to house search and arrest of all those considered to be suspects. In this encounter, more than 350 Africans were arrested and over 1000 died. In addition, for the second time since the 1960's, a state of emergency was declared which gave the police and the army wider powers. The continued protest by Black Africans despite the apartheid horror was a clear indication that the days of apartheid were numbered. This was in addition to the changing international community response to the white minority regime in South Africa.

It was noted at this point that even the Western European countries had started to view economic sanction as the only viable option required to force the minority regime to agree to majority rule. In the US, International Bankers refused to lend money to the South African minority regime or to renew existing loans; while many international corporations withdrew their services from South Africa. Despite the effort of President Reagan against sanctions, the US Congress passed the comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. The legislation prohibited giving out new loans, the sale of nuclear power equipment and technology, the export of computers to the government agencies, the sale of South African Krugerrand gold coin and landing rights for South African Airways. Similar efforts were taken by the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Commonwealth. As a result of this South Africa's currency (Rand) fell to its lowest level ever, and the government had to reintroduce strict exchange control regulation to avoid a drain on its foreign exchange resources.¹¹¹ According to the Guardian Newspaper of Nigeria, Pretoria's economy lost about US\$3 billion yearly.¹¹² From the view point of the Anglophone West Africa, the development both in South Africa, the Western World and the US, were an affirmation of what they already believed in, and that, were not cheaply attained. It had considerable cost in human and material resources. At this juncture, Nigeria made available considerable amount of money to the liberation movements, particularly the ANC and the PAC. Nigeria took personal interest in the welfare of the leadership of the ANC, especially in the health matters of Oliver Tambo, the then ailing ANC president.¹¹³ Indeed Nigeria made it out rightly clear that there was nothing bad with dialogue if that is what the racist regime was clamouring for, but the dialogue should start with Nelson Mandela;

C. R. D. and O'mera, p. "South Africa", in Martin, P. M. (ed.) (et al.), *Africa*, Third Edition, Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 403-404.

(111) *Ibid.* P. 407.

(112) *The Guardian* Newspaper, Op. Cit. May 13, 1990, P. 5.

(113) Osuntokun, J. "Nigeria's Foreign Policy during the Babangida Years," in Muhammed, B. Y. and Amuta Chidi, (ed.) *IBB A Heritage of reform*, Vol. 1 Perfectives and interpretations, the Open Press of Nigeria Ltd, Zaria, Nigeria, 2002, P. 536.

and his release from over a quarter of a century imprisonment. The statement added that any attempt to go contrary to this, will make Nigeria lend her weight to the armed struggle valiantly waged by Black Africans of South Africa. The lesson was simply that the evil of apartheid would be defeated either peacefully or on the battle field. This view was made with the intent that the year 2000 should see an Africa totally decolonised and free, with the issues of settler colonialism and apartheid being resolved in Southern Africa.¹¹⁴

Late in the 1980's nature took its toll when President P.W. Botha fell sick of mild stroke which forced him to relinquish the leadership of the National Party to his successor F. W. de Klerk. Pressured by the general political situation and the international pressure and call for an end to the apartheid inhuman atrocities, de Klerk opted to continue with the reform started by Botha. To redirect the reform moves properly, de Klerk took over control of the reform policy from the security establishment. This was followed by the opening up of new channels of communication with black leaders, most notably, Nelson Mandela. Among other liberal policies introduced was that which gave way to multi-racial anti-apartheid demonstrations. The release of 8 prominent black political prisoners, including Walter Sisulu, former Secretary of ANC; the subsequent release of Nelson Mandela,¹¹⁵ and the unbanning of the ANC were among what constituted the last straw that broke the camels back.¹¹⁶ By this, some Western countries noted as being close allies of the racist regime started insinuating for the lifting of sanctions on South Africa. In a speech in honour of Nelson Mandela, the President of Nigeria General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida condemned such a move when he argued that the task of liberating South Africa from the shackles of apartheid should go beyond the release of political prisoners to the total elimination of minority rule, which these reforms are opening ways to. He appealed to all well meaning peoples and governments around the world not to relent in their dedication to the struggle of the oppressed in South Africa. He said, "It is a duty which we all owe to the heroic people of that country. Having helped in our own ways, to wage the anti- apartheid struggle over the years, we can not now afford to relent." He added:

May I use this opportunity to pledge the continued and unflinching commitment of the government and people of Nigeria to the struggle for the complete eradication of apartheid. We consider it to be our duty, thrust on us by history and by our subscription

(114) Ibrahim, B. B., *For their Tomorrow we Gave our Today: Selected Speeches of IBB*, Vol. 11, Safari Books (Export) Limited, Ibadan (Nigeria), 1991, P. 234.

(115) In Nigeria the release of Mandela was a big celebration which attracted crowd of people with seminars and conferences marking the beginning of the end of apartheid regime in South Africa. Not long Mandela was welcomed in Nigeria and was decorated with the second most prestigious State honour tagged the Grand Commander of the Order of the Niger (GCON) by President Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. See *National Concord*, August 28, 1990, P. 1&2.

(116) After the release of Walter Sisulu, it took the intervention of Nigeria to speed up the release of Nelson Mandela. This was evident from the visit of ANC President Mr. Oliver Tambo to Nigeria in May 1989. During this visit whose purpose was to seek for Nigeria's assistance to provide military training to ANC cadres, Nigeria not only accepted the request but also pledged, through the office of Chief of General staff, Vice Admiral Aikhomu that Nigeria would do everything it could to secure freedom for Dr. Nelson Mandela. See for detail *The Guardian* Newspaper May 13, 1990, Op. Cit. Pp. 5.

to the universally accepted principles of justice and fair play, to keep up and extend the campaign against the racist regime in Pretoria until the apartheid structures on which it rests collapse. It was on this spirit that we identified with the Harare declaration of the leaders of the ANC calling on the Pretoria regime to release, without conditions all political prisoners that are still being held in racist jails, abolish all apartheid statutes that are still on the books, and lift, without further delay, the obnoxious state of emergency that was imposed on the country.¹¹⁷

Given closer look at the political and economic scene, it became obvious to the National Party leadership at this point that there was no better time to commence talks on multi-racial election than now. New brand of conflict (political rivalry) continued to take hold of most streets of the major cities of South Africa. Notwithstanding that, political meetings continued to be held at higher levels with all rival political groups concerned. A general consensus for peace continued to thrive amongst all the political groups with a commitment to work together to create a conducive atmosphere for negotiation, including the granting of amnesty to agents of both the government and the black liberation movements. At the end of June 1993, a compromise was reached between the South African government and the ANC. Further negotiations toward a non racial democratic election continued early in 1994 despite the increasing political violence especially between PAC and ANC. The greatest challenge before the white minority regime was to agree to the transfer of power, which was what the Black majority had in mind. This controversy was later resolved by Convention for Democratic South Africa (CODESA), established since 1991, to serve as a mechanism for transferring and sharing of power. Though not a member of the Southern Africa Frontline States, because of the key role it played in dismantling the apartheid regime of Southern Africa, Nigeria was elected a member of CODESA.¹¹⁸ Under this tensed political atmosphere, the White Parliament, including both the Indian and coloureds, voted themselves out of existence; this led to a quick arrangement that supported the sharing of power amongst members of the Transitional Executive Council (TEC). This development gave prominent African leaders direct role in the decision making of the country for the first time, and as a result set the phase for the drafting of an interim constitution with full representation by all the races.¹¹⁹

Responding to the progress so far in the development towards a democratic South Africa, Nigeria hosted President de Klerk to a two day working visit during which Nigeria acknowledged and appreciated the effort so far.¹²⁰ On April 27, 1994,

(117) Ibid. p. 251-252.

(118) It is important to also recall that General Olusegun Obasanjo was in retirement, also because of the supportive role played by Nigeria, selected as a member of Eminent Personality (Contact Group) on South Africa where he was once quoted as advocating following his desperate concern for a free South Africa from Apartheid misrule, for Africans to resort to black magic (juju) to overthrow Apartheid. This was carried by a number of the Nigerian dailies. See also Kuna, M. J. *The Role of Nigeria in Peace Building, Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping since 1960*, in Muhammed, A. S and Adamu S., (ed.) *Nigeria and the Reform of the United Nations*, CEDDERT, Hanwa, Zaria, Nigeria, 2006, P. 58-74.

(119) Halisi (et al) (ed.) Op. Cit P. 409.

(120) *Daily Times* (Nigeria), April 11, 1992.

the election started, marked by an extremely large and enthusiastic voter turnout and minimal violence. In the end, the ANC won a solid victory of 63% of the nearly 20million votes casted. Nelson Mandela was by this victory, elected as President, indeed the first Black African President of South Africa. This victory turned the history of the people of South Africa upside down and brought to an end the obnoxious white minority racist regime in the region of Southern Africa. Relations were normalised since then and independent South Africa came to be accepted as a member of all continental and international diplomatic bodies. According to Winnie Mandela, when delivering the 7th Annual Trust Lecture in Nigeria, she said, “We owe so much of our freedom to Nigeria.”¹²¹

Conclusion

The defeat of apartheid or the obnoxious White minority racist regimes in Southern Africa was achieved due to a combination of factors that were internal as well as external to the Southern African region. These factors transcend some individual personalities or the government of a particular country. It was, but, a combination of all. More particularly however it was a consequence of the determined struggle of the people of the respective states of Southern Africa. Thus of significance in our understanding of the forces and factors responsible for the defeat of the White minority regime in Southern Africa, was the consistent and determined fight sustained by the people at the expense of all temptations. It was not for nothing that a number of them had to experience prison life; not to talk of a life away from their families and leisure; or a life in the bush feeding on whatever nature provides. To most of them, especially those within the leadership, it was common to live a life of exile. Thus it was not surprising that at independence a number of them were without college level education or indeed any certificate. A greater number of them had gone through one form of maltreatment or another. Some had indeed seen their parents been killed in their presence. The resolve, as a result, was not for collaboration, though some tried that line of thought. For those who fought and won the independence, the resolve was for total freedom from all forms of domination and exploitation. It was a resolve for social justice to all despite racial outlook or economic position.

As the case above, the response to apartheid by other people of Africa and the World was also a determined one by a people of determined concern for social justice. In this case however, especially amongst the Anglophone countries of West Africa, the effort of these governments could not be understood without giving respect to the collective nature of decision making at that material time. As in Ghana, so also in Nigeria, the support given to those in control of political power assisted a lot in their radical pursuit for a genuine course. Under Nkrumah, Ghana was able to achieve all what they did because of the calibre of persons in the cabinet and the political arena, more specifically persons of ideological clarity of the type of George Padmore

(121) *Daily Trust* (Nigeria), January 25th 2010, P. 2.

and others. Added to this, was the general political atmosphere in the world, like the clamour for Pan Africanism and of course, the Cold War, and the challenge of the spread of socialism. More importantly also, was the favourable economic disposition of Ghana during the course of the leadership of Nkrumah. The years that followed were not as eventful as the former due mostly to the economic situation in which Ghana found itself; yet Ghana continued to remain resolute.

In the case of Nigeria, a combined role of people of radical background both within and outside the military played an active role. This was supported by a cream of intellectuals from the Universities, a development that extended Pan Africanism and the struggle for social justice to the nooks and corners of every part of the country. Sierra Leone and The Gambia on the other hand, could not feature much due to their respective peculiar socio-economic and political situations. Yet they remained morally supportive. In general, the defeat of white minority regime in Africa (apartheid) was made possible because of the united and unrelenting commitment by African countries. It was a consequence of defined resolve putting aside international politics and despising the American direct political threat and might, though at a cost. Clearly this was what characterised anti-apartheid struggle in Africa in general and Anglophone West Africa in particular; and it is what is missing in the Arab struggle against Jewish Zionism in the Palestine-Israel conflict.¹²² The defeat of apartheid system in Southern Africa was as the result of the embodiment of the roles of political leadership, vibrant press, buoyant economy and of the academia.

(122) In writing this piece I enjoyed the assistance of many hands both individually and institutionally. Staff of the Nigerian Foreign Ministry, more specifically Alhaji Munir Yusuf Liman, Prince Johnson and A. M. Salisu, Deputy Head of Mission, Nigeria High Commission, Ghana; offered their best. The Director Nigerian Institute of international Affairs and the librarian gave me a free access to their rich documents which I photocopied. I thank Dr. Abdullahi Ashafa for introducing me to the Director. In Ghana I was also assisted by Prof Baku, the Head of History Department University of Ghana, Legon and the Librarians at the Legon Main Library, the Institute of African Study library, George Padmore and the National Archives. Deputy Director Information Services Department Mr James K. Amuah and my able research assistant Mr. Kofi Akuso did a wonderful job in getting me linked to all centers of information while I was in Ghana. The staff of CODESRIA provided all the research assistance I needed on Gambia and indeed on most of the West African countries. Specifically mention must be made of the executive Director Dr. Ibrima Sal, Librarian Mr. Diop Pierre, and Alhaji Daouda Thiam, who together with Mr. Suleiman Adebawale provided me with a decent accommodation, while in Dakar. Alhaji Musa Muhammed Gyanan wonderfully made Abuja homely to me when I was doing my field work. My colleagues in the Department of history also assisted in one way or the other. Specifically here I thank Dr. Alkasum Abba, Dr. George Kwanashie and Dr. Hadiza, L. A. of the Department of English and literary Studies, for sparing their times to read through one of the drafts. Malam Nasiru Yunusa Samaru assisted me with library work at Kashim Ibrahim Library, Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria. My friend Alhaji Hafizu I. Ahmed was morally supportive, calling me for a gist while I was out of the country. I thank my family for the cooperation and understanding they rendered. Special thanks go to my able driver, Mr. Taiwo, without whom my stay in Lagos, during the course of my Journeys around West Africa couldn't have been possible. I finally thank the Hashim Mbita Project for giving me this noble chance of once again completing my struggle against Apartheid, a struggle which I also fought during the days of anti apartheid struggle of the 70s and 80s while I was in the University.

Appendix I: Speech by General Murtala Ramat Muhammed

Excerpt of the speech delivered by General Murtala Ramat Muhammed at the extraordinary summit of OAU held in Addis Ababa, January 11th 1976

“It is of great historical significance that the first extraordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government to be held since the founding of the Organisation of African Unity twelve years ago, is being held on the liberation of Africa. Angola is merely the excuse being used by those who cannot reconcile themselves to the momentous victories of the forces of African nationalism, to assert their neo-colonialist ambitions on the continent. Angola merely provides the occasion to recreate the nineteenth century partition of Africa into spheres of influence where the predominant consideration will be the interests of the big powers without any consideration for the inalienable rights of the African. Let us therefore make no mistake about problem which confronts us at this session: it is not the question of a simple disagreement between Angolans requiring a simple solution in the African tradition. Rather, it is a much deeper danger of extra-African powers in collusion with the inhuman and obnoxious apartheid regime in Pretoria trying to frustrate the will of a people who, having sustained a heroic struggle against a most brutal colonialist repression, are on the threshold of a glorious dawn of national self determination. If the neo-colonialist succeeds in Angola, Then our hopes for South Africa will have been dashed.

Mr. Chairman, the history of modern Africa is replete with shameless exploitation, brutalisation, repression and downright denial of the humanity of Africans. Side by side with colonialism which sought to deny self determination for the African, there has developed that unique doctrine of apartheid. An imaginary line beyond which Harold Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ would not be permitted to blow was drawn, to be sustained by the unholy alliance which came to be known as the Pretoria-Lisbon-Salisbury axis.

For years the OAU called the attention of the international community to the role of this axis in provoking a potential racial war in Southern Africa which would affect the peace and security of the entire continent. We analysed the diabolical role of the various points in the axis and implored those whom we knew had influence to put the necessary pressure so as to minimize the unsettling effect of armed confrontation. First we call attention to the diabolical role of apartheid. The main elements of that criminal doctrine are too well known to this assembly to necessitate my detailed analysis. Suffice it to say that the whole rationale behind this doctrine which the United Nations Organization has aptly condemned as a crime against humanity is the perpetual subjugation of the African in order to create a paradise on earth for the whites. Thus the 4 million whites do not only control all the instruments of government, to the total exclusion of the 18 million Africans, they also inflict on the Africans a repression unparalleled in human history. The Africans are condemned to a life of misery, hunger, disease, in a land literally flowing with milk and honey. They are no more than tools utilized by the white man in the interest of maintaining his high standard of living; as tools they are made to work in the white man’s mines and farms to increase the white man’s profit; as tools they are discarded and sent to pine away and die in the so-called homelands when they are no longer able to serve as beast of burden.

Mr Chairman, when I contemplate the evils of apartheid, my heart bleeds and I am sure the heart of every blooded African bleeds. When we talk of these evils we are assured of the 'sympathy' of the Western countries, but when we call for sanctions to end this shame of Western civilization, suddenly the glitter of gold in the form of high dividends becomes more convincing a consideration than the lives, the liberty and the well-being of Africans.

The Western powers have bluntly refused to take any positive action either in the form of military or economic sanctions which will dissuade the regime in Pretoria from pursuing its criminal policy. Rather, they are encouraged to persist through increased investment, military collaboration and other forms of cooperation.

Little wonder therefore that the apartheid regime became so emboldened as to embark on foreign adventures outside the immediate confines of its territory. In order to create a number of client states around itself, the Pretoria clique encouraged and sustained rebellion of the white minority in Rhodesia against Great Britain. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence by Ian Smith and his fellow conspirators marked the formal extension of apartheid northwards and pushed further South Africa's line of defence against African nationalists. Not only was Southern Rhodesia showered with economic assistance by apartheid South Africa, she was defended by South African forces working in close collaboration with the Portuguese colonialist. The international community looked helpless as the implementation of United Nations sanctions against the Rhodesian rebels was frustrated under the pressure of powerful economic interest in their countries joined in breaking the sanctions, not caring for the effect of their action on African sensitivities. The most notorious example of this open collaboration for the rape Africa was exploited by a super-power which claims world wide responsibility, but whose actions as far as the African Continent is concerned are motivated by no more than naked economic and ideological self-interest.

Having succeeded in installing a puppet regime in Salisbury, the South African regime had no qualms in exporting Apartheid into Namibia, an international territory whose Trust territory status was terminated by the United Nations in 1966. Seen as another buffer zone to stem the nationalist tide from the North, Namibia became a pawn in the game of the South African racists whose grand design is a sphere of influence in Southern Africa that will embrace not only the dependent territories under the Lisbon-Pretoria-Salisbury axis, but also the independent territories in the area. Were they not daring enough to raid Zambia and Tanzania under the guise of pursuing nationalist guerrilla forces?

Mr. Chairman, so long as the fascist regime in Portugal was able to withstand the onslaught of nationalist forces in Mozambique and Angola, so long did the Apartheid regime and their economic backers feel secure. Thus, South Africa saw its fate intricately bound with that of the maintenance of Portuguese oppressive colonialism in these territories. However, to their glory, the people of Guinea-Bissau under the PAIGC, the people of Mozambique under FRELIMO, and the people of Angola under the most active of the fighting forces, the MPLA, waged a most determined struggle which ended in the collapse of the fascist regime in Lisbon. Thus not only the African in the Portuguese territories was liberated, but through the sacrifice of the African freedom fighter, the metropolitan Portuguese who had endured a most brutal and repressive regime in Lisbon, was also liberated. The new Portuguese regime, faced with the realities of the situation, took the most sensible course and one, formally handed power to the peoples of the former territories.

Mr. Chairman, confusion and panic were naturally thrown into the ranks of the racists of Southern Africa. With the collapse of a pivotal point of the Lisbon-Pretoria-Salisbury axis, apartheid was doomed to come face to face with revolutionary Africa. Part of the buffer zone having collapsed, the forces of freedom are at the very doorsteps of the racists and the apostles of apartheid. This is the crisis situation that has led South Africa to embark on the most daring adventure of all by blatantly sending an invading force into Angola. The intension is clear. It is to crush the most powerful and the most nationalistic of the Liberation Movements – the MPLA. Thereafter, the South African regime hopes to install a puppet government in Angola, and then turn their attention towards fomenting trouble in Mozambique. The recent attempt at rebellion in Mozambique is instructive in this connection. Mr. Chairman, we cannot pretend that we are unaware of the machinations and conspiracies against our Continent by not just the racists of South Africa but even by those who pretend to be the friends of this Continent but whose sole interest is in what they can get out of us. The present Session of our Assembly provides a unique opportunity of reassessing who the true friends of Africa are.

Naturally, because of its strategic importance in the South Atlantic, because of its natural resources and because of the strength and dynamism of the MPLA, Angola has become an area of great interest. Strategically, there are those countries, including South Africa and obviously the United States who are frightened at the emergence of a truly nationalist government who will insist on the sovereign rights of Angola to control both its territory and the sea appertaining thereto. The hope of a foreign base to police this part of the ocean is inconceivable unless puppets are installed in power. Then there is the vast natural resource with which the territory is endowed, and which had hitherto been exploited by foreigners. Under a nationalist government that insists on the sovereignty of Angola over its natural resources, there can be no guarantee of cheap Angolan raw materials and energy to fuel and sustain the factories of neo-colonialists. The alternative, therefore, is to create confusion which in turn will result in a weak regime which will be teleguided from abroad as a reward for the assistance of helping that regime to come to power. Nigeria cannot accept such degrading and humiliating conditions for a people who have not been offered independence on a platter of Gold but who have had to fight hard against a regime indirectly supported by those same countries that now seek to reap where they have not sown.

Let us not forget, Mr. Chairman, that in the era of the repressive colonial regime in Angola and other Portuguese territories, the same super powers that now sees red in Angola had the opportunity of building a store of goodwill for itself by espousing the cause on which its history rested. The anti-imperialist and anti-exploitation slogan which led to the American war of independence had relevance in the Angolan liberation struggle which should have endeared it to successive administration in the United States. This was not to be. On the contrary, the United State Government as well as the Government of many Western countries saw the African struggle against imperialism as directed against Western interests. As long as Africa remains dependent, it is within the orbit of NATO countries and is available for exploitation to sustain Western prosperity while the Africans sink deeper into poverty. Rather than join hands with the forces fighting for self determination and against racism and apartheid, the United States policy makers clearly decided that it was in the best interests of their country to maintain white supremacy and minority regimes in Africa. As far as we know, this is still the extant policy of the United States in Africa, an area, I may add, considered of the

least priority as far as the United States, with a population of 23 million black people, is concerned. If Africa does in fact rank so low in United States concern, it becomes even more irritating that an American Administration should suddenly take upon itself to dictate to this august assembly how to settle an African problem. In the days before the opening of this session, we witnessed a flurry of diplomatic activities on the part of the United States. Not content with its clandestine support and outpouring of arms into Angola to create confusion and bloodshed, the United States President took upon himself to instruct African Heads of States and Government, by a circular letter, to insist on the withdrawal of Soviet and Cuban advisers from Angola as a precondition for the withdrawal of South African and other military adventurers. This constitutes a most intolerable presumption and a flagrant insult on the intelligence of African rulers.

We are aware of the role which the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have played in the struggle of the African peoples for liberation. The Soviet Union and other Socialist countries have been our traditional suppliers of arms to resist oppression, and to fight for national liberation and human dignity. On the other hand the United States which now sheds crocodile tears over Angola has not only completely ignored the freedom fighters whom successive United States administrations branded as terrorists, she even openly supported morally and materially the fascist Portuguese Government. And we have no cause to doubt that the same successive American administrations continue to support the apartheid regime of South Africa whom they see as the defender of western interests on the African continent. How can we now be led to believe that a government with a record such as the United States as in Africa can suddenly become the defender of our interest?

It is in consideration of the unedifying role which the United States has played in the African liberation struggle that the Nigerian Federal Military Government took very strong objection to the patronizing interest which President Ford suddenly developed in the Angolan situation. It should be made clear that African memory is not as short as the American Government thinks; we are intelligent enough to draw a distinction between foreign advisers from friendly countries invited by patriotic forces to assist in maintaining national sovereignty and those racist adventurers who take upon themselves to invade African countries in order to undermine their independence and exercise neo-colonialist influence.

This is the crux of the Angolan question. On the one hand is the MPLA whose record in the struggle against Portuguese imperialism is impeccable and whose Government in Luanda has been recognized by 23 African countries. The Nigerian Federal military Government being deeply convinced that it possesses the attributes of an effective Government joined other African countries in according it recognition. It is the duty of this Summit Session to complete the process undertaken so far by individual Governments by unanimously according the recognition of our Organization to the Government of the MPLA.

On the other hand the FNLA and UNTA, which have forfeited their right to the leadership of the Angolan people by joining hands with neo-colonialist adventurers and racist soldiers of fortune, including the apostles of apartheid, in a determined effort to destroy the sovereignty of Angola. After the moral and material support which Nigeria gave to the Angolan liberation struggle, the Federal Military Government cannot support any movement that seeks to hand the fruit of Angolan, indeed of African labour, to the enemies of Angola and Africa. It is a mark of the disrepute in

which the FNLA/UNITA front has thrown themselves by their unpatriotic association with the notorious subverters of African independence and the band of racists in Pretoria, that no African country has accorded them recognition.

Mr. Chairman, the Angolan situation is not unique in the stormy history of our Continent – a history which is mostly the making of outsiders. There is hardly any of our countries which, having emerged from colonialism to independence, has not been subjected to subversion and other covert activities to promote instability. Such a situation of political chaos helps to keep our countries weak and under-developed, to the delight of the neo-colonialist who can always point to the inability of the Africans to rule themselves much less rule the white minorities in Southern Africa. Yet, we know that peace is the most vital pre-requisite for orderly development. As long as the neo-colonialists who pretend to be friends succeed to set one section of our people against another, they ensure thereby our continued dependence on them. We spend our meagre resources in maintaining law and order, often to the advantage of the military industrial complexes in the so-called developed world. The gap between them and us thereby grows even wider; we become even weaker and create greater conditions for the interference of the developed countries in our domestic affairs.

Another recent development has further heightened the danger of conscious sabotage of our independence by foreign powers. The monetary crisis has highlighted the vulnerability of the economies of the developed countries and the extent to which their prosperity has been built on our poverty. The lower the prices we were paid for our natural resources the higher the prices we have had to pay for the manufacturers made out of the same natural resources purchased from us. The result of the world economic crisis has forced the developed countries to face the realities of the interdependence of the world economy, rather than the erstwhile presumptions by them that they sustained world economy by themselves. The collapse of many supposedly buoyant economies has led to reactions which even found expression in threats to physically attack some developing countries to force down the price of their raw materials. Neither Europe nor America can endure a drop in its standards of living. But rather than make the necessary adjustments, it appears some developed countries cast around neo-colonialist eyes and once again long for the recolonization of that Continent which is still endowed with much of the world's untapped resources. The new weapon is no longer the Bible and the flag, but destabilisation and armaments. Africa, Mr. Chairman, should show its new danger and see the Angolan situation not as an isolated affair but as part of the greater danger.

In the circumstances, Mr. Chairman, this Assembly has before it a dear choice. It should endorse the MPLA as the only Government of Angola and invite its President, Dr. Agostino Neto to take his place of honour among us. The Assembly should call upon the FNLA and UNITA to dissociate themselves from South Africa and lay down their arms and the OAU should use its good offices in consultation with the Angolan Government to effect national reconciliation of all the people of the country. This step is not without precedent. Nigeria recalls with tremendous pride and satisfaction the noble role which this Organization played during our crisis. The effectiveness of the role of the OAU rested on three key factors:

First, the insistence on non-interference by foreign powers.

Second, the firm recognition of the Nigerian Federal Government as the only Government in the country.

Third, the close collaboration between the OAU Commission and the Nigerian Federal government.

The easy and unprecedented reconciliation which has marked developments in Nigeria since 1970 is as much a tribute to the enlightened policy of the Nigerian Federal Military Government as it is a justification of the sensible approach of the OAU to the crisis. It is worth recalling that those who are now seeking to dictate a solution on Angola to the OAU were the same do-gooders and self appointed keepers of the moral conscience of the world who condemned the OAU resolutions of 1967 and 1968 on Nigeria. They were proved wrong in Nigeria; they will be proved equally wrong on Angola.

Mr. Chairman, Africa has come of age. It is no longer under the orbit of any extra continental power. It should no longer take orders from any country, however powerful. The fortunes of Africa are in our hands to make or to mar. For too long have we been kicked around: for too long have we been treated like adolescents who cannot discern their interests and act accordingly. For too long has it been presumed that the African needs outside 'expert' to tell him who are his friends and who are his enemies. The time has come when we should make it clear that we can decide for ourselves; that we know our interests and how to protect those interest; we are capable of resolving African problems without presumptuous lessons in ideological dangers which, more often than not, have no relevance for us, nor for the problem at hand. Nigeria has come to this Assembly determined to co-operate with you, Mr. Chairman, and with all member States to put a stop to foreign interference in our Continental matters. As an African nationalist of distinction, I trust that your wise guidance will direct our deliberations to fruitful conclusions of which our peoples will be proud."

Appendix II: The Nigerian Reply

Federal ministry of Information

The Federal Government has condemned the fatuous attempt by President Gerald Ford of the United States to insult the intelligence of African nations and scorn the dignity of the Black man.

A statement on Angola, issued today in Lagos by the Federal Government, revealed that President Ford had dispatched an envoy on an arm-twisting mission and also addressed an over-bearing circular letter to all African Heads of State.

The statement further disclosed that President Ford's circular letter contained a directive that the forthcoming O. A. U. ministerial Council Summit Meetings should insist on the withdrawal of the Soviet and Cuban military advisers as a condition for the withdrawal of the racist South African occupation forces.

The Government [Nigeria] totally repudiated the false logic that equated the presence of the Cuban and Soviet advisers in Angola with that of the South African regular troops, their fellow soldiers of fortune and motley mercenaries. The full text read thus:

Statement on Angola

Since 17th December, 1975, when the United States Senate by an overwhelming vote of 54 to 22 decided to cut off funds for convert military operations in Angola, the present Administration in Washington has indicated its intention of reversing the will of the American electorate as expressed by their elected representatives. President Gerald Ford has not only dispatched an envoy on an arm-twisting mission to Africa but, has also addressed over-bearing circular letters to all Heads of State of African countries. The central point of the letter is the patronising directive that the forthcoming O. A. U. ministerial Council and Summit Meetings should insist on the withdrawal of the racist South African occupation forces.

The Federal Military rejects completely this fatuous attempt by the Ford Administration to insult the intelligence of African nations and scorn the dignity of the black man. It totally repudiates the false logic that equates the presence of the Cuban and Soviet advisers in Angola with that of South African regular troops, their fellow soldiers of fortune and motley mercenaries. In case the Ford Administration chooses not to remember, the U. S. S. R. and Cuba have made the cause of the Angolan people their own since the earliest days of the Angolan struggle. It is also worth noting that the war for Angolan liberation had been the longest war of its type in Africa. Only the war in Vietnam which ended in victory for the nationalist and patriotic forces lasted longer. All through the heroic struggle of our Angolan brothers successive United States administrations unrelentingly supported, morally, materially and otherwise, the fascist, repressive and oppressive Portuguese Governments. All of a sudden one hears crocodile tears being shed for peace in Angola!

It is about time that friends of the benighted racist regimes and supporters of the degradation of Africans began to live with the realities of the present thinking in Africa. It should not be that difficult to draw a clear distinction between foreign countries invited by patriotic forces to assist in fighting for national independence and those racist adventurers who commit wanton aggression to invading African countries with the sole aim of undermining their independence, exporting their discredited and inhuman social system.

The Federal Military Government recognises the M. P. L. A. – led government in Luanda as the legitimate Government of Angola. It appreciates and respects the prerogative of that government to seek assistance from any source in the world in exercise of its sovereignty. Further, it draws attention to that basic tenet of international relations – that is non-interference in the domestic relations affairs of sovereign nations. It is on account of the foregoing considerations that the federal Military Government reiterates its firm decision to completely reject the ‘directive’ from the United States President. It also wishes to express the hope and expectation that all other sister African states which have been subjected to such untimely pressure will also reject it to enable us to build the Africa of our choice. Gone are the days when Africa will ever bow to the threat of any so called super power.

8.2

Francophone Black Africa in the history of liberation struggles in Southern Africa

by Abraham Constant Ndinga Mbo

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Methodology

We are somehow obliged to deal with "immediate history", when we are studying the contemporaneity of the facts concerning liberation struggles in southern Africa, from the 1960s to the 1990s. The main characteristic of this "history" is that it is reported and lived by the historian or his main witnesses.

In current historiography, the methodology of "immediate history" is a controversial issue. The study of "very contemporary" facts, "very close" facts - English historians use the expression "contemporary history" - raises not only methodological but also ethical objections among professional historians. They are based on:

- The inaccessibility to certain documents, specifically public archives. These documents, which are widely used by historians, are not always accessible for the "very contemporary" period.
- The contemporaneity of the facts, which exposes the historian to two obstacles:
 1. The historian facing the events is in the situation of a spectator, a direct witness or even an actor. He would lack serenity and impartiality to deal with the events he has experienced or suffered;
 2. The lack of chronological perspective and the brevity of event crises would make it impossible to place recent developments in a long-term perspective.

The advantage of the "very contemporary" historian is more likely that he risks getting lost in the diversity and overabundance of sources. So, the real problem here is still the sorting out of all these sources. Indeed, in addition to public archives, there are other important sources: memoirs, written and oral testimonies of surviving actors and witnesses, private archives, the press, audio-visual documents, etc.

The immediate history must recognize, in particular, the use of oral sources which are nowadays considered as to be one of the assets: the historian has the possibility of questioning the direct or indirect witnesses of the events he is studying. This has the great advantage of modifying the distance between the researcher and the object of his research and allows him to "build" part of his documentation.

There is rich documentation written on the history of liberation struggles in southern Africa¹ that we have found in Paris (at La Documentation Française and the Bibliothèque Nationale de France), in Brazzaville in public and private archives, in

¹ See Sources and bibliographical references, *in fine*.

libraries, on the Internet. Our research also included interviews, the collection of memories and experiences.

Our main sources of information, according to their qualities and status as witnesses or actors, were:

- Heads of State of Congo-Brazzaville still alive (General Joachim Yhombi Opango ; General Denis Sassou-Nguesso), former ambassadors in the "frontline States" (including Albert Kondo, Célestin Goma Foutou, Jean-Pierre Ossey), former foreign ministers (including David Charles Ganao, Pierre Nze, Rodolphe Adada), members of the political department of the "single parties" (including the heads of the external relations department), former chiefs of staff (they were often called upon to support war efforts);
- Officials of the OAU Liberation Committee (including Célestin Goma-Foutou, Martin Adouki from Congo-Brazzaville);
- ex-combatants who remained in Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa, their countries of adoption since their exile, displaced persons, intellectuals refugees in Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire (Congo-Brazzaville) and Kinshasa (Congo-Kinshasa) who did not see fit to return home at the end of hostilities (Jean René Moraïs, Antoine Kiakou, Antoine d'Oliveira, Antoine Jhon, Alfred Mboudissa, José Antonio Bolo, Raphael Jhon, Gaston Mampika, Garcia Makilandi, Fernando José Canga, Jeannette Ngombo, Bento)

Our research focused on three countries: Angola, Namibia and South Africa, therefore on the following liberation movements: MPLA (Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Angola), FNLA (Front National de Libération de l'Angola), UNITA (Union Nationale pour l'Indépendance Totale de l'Angola), FLEC (Front de Libération de l'Enclave du Cabinda) for Angola, SWAPO for Namibia and ANC for South Africa. Our regret is that we were only able to conduct our documentary investigations in the two Congo, French-speaking countries that are Angola's neighbours.

A- Francophone Black Africa (Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa) in the history of Angola's liberation struggle (1961-2002)

The MPLA, the FNLA and UNITA were the three liberation movements that have marked the history of Angola's liberation struggle from Portuguese colonisation and the inter-Angola civil war. Congo-Brazzaville and Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire, from 1967 to 1996), which share borders with Angola, are, with Zambia and Namibia, other border countries, among those African countries that took part in both periods of Angola's liberation history - the anti-colonial war (1961- 1975) and the civil war (1975-2002) - to the point where they appear even as real actors. For this reason, their place in the history of Angola's liberation struggle cannot be overlooked.

Angola is one of the countries that constituted the Portuguese colonial empire of Black Africa, along with Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea (now Guinea Bissau), the Cape Verde Archipelago and Sao Tome and Principe. Since the 16th century (1574), these countries had been closely linked to the metropolis, i. e. Portugal. Until 1951, they had the status of "colonies". From 27 June 1953, with the Organic Law, they officially became "provinces"² of Portugal. This purely formal amendment was in fact intended to facilitate Portugal's entry into the United Nations in 1955. This empire could not escape the decolonization process triggered by the United Nations since its creation in 1945, despite Portugal's categorical refusal to recognize the right to self-determination and independence of the peoples under its domination.

² See R. Comte, 1964, "Les provinces portugaises d'outre-mer ou la force des choses", *Revue juridique et politique d'outre-mer*, n° 18, avril-juin, p.239-262 ;

- A. Coret, 1962, "Les provinces portugaises d'outre-mer et l'ONU", *Revue juridique et politique d'outre-mer*, n°16, avril-juin, p.175-221

It was in fact the Portuguese colonial system that contributed to the awareness of the peoples of these five colonies and their determination to respond to "colonial violence" with "revolutionary violence"³. It is worth noting the characteristics of this colonization⁴.

I-Characteristics of Portuguese colonial power in Angola⁵

To further strengthen the political system in metropolis and in the colonies, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar had established, from 1932 to 1974, a fascist regime based on nationalism, control and prominence of the Roman Catholic Church. From 1932 to 1969, he was both Chairman of the Board and President of the ⁴⁶Republic, a power that was obviously very extensive that his successor Marcello Caetano did not change, until April 25, 1974, the date of the military coup d'état.

To maintain this system, Portugal had to set up specialized police forces (the International Police for State Defence -PIDE- and the Provincial Organization of Civil Defence Volunteers), a special judicial and penitentiary service and an army, which constituted real elements of repression and oppression to enforce the decisions coming from the high authority and to neutralize any revolts.

In addition to this oppression and repression machine, the other characteristic of Portuguese colonization was the fierce exploitation of blacks. From 1900 to 1974, the Angolan economy was essentially agricultural, based on coffee, maize, sisal and cotton. The discovery of diamond, iron and oil ores in 1966 encouraged the development of the extractive industry. Thanks to these agricultural wealth and resources, Angola experienced unprecedented economic development, unfortunately supported by "indigenous" Blacks especially (by the colour of their skin, the colonial administration had classified the population into Whites, *Coloured* and Blacks, the latter sub classified as "assimilated" and "indigenous")

They were dispossessed, especially from 1953 onwards, of the best of their land for the benefit of the white concession companies for which Angola, a Portuguese province, had become a populated area: the Portuguese colonial administration had developed an emigration policy that consisted in populating the colonies and promoting miscegenation and social assimilation. As advocated by Silva e Cunha, the intellect of Portuguese colonization:

As Angola is the Overseas Province with the best prospects for European colonisation, the problem of indigenous colonisation must be studied at the same time as the question of white settlement. Great caution must be made to avoid indigenous development, which may in the future constitute an obstacle to the settlement of settlers⁶.

Blacks were consequently reduced to the rank of agricultural workers or in industry, which was in full development. In plantations as well as in the extractive or light industry, blacks received very low wages and working and living conditions were very harsh. To avoid the desertion of blacks from these conditions, Salazar had applied the 1899 Labour Code, which enshrined forced labour, legalized by the Colonial Act of 1930, and gave free hand to private employers

³ Mario de Andrade, 1962, "Angolan Nationalism: Angola of Yesterday and Today", *Revue Présence africaine*, p.41.

⁴ Basil Davidson, 1969, *Révolution en Afrique*, Paris, Le Seuil, p.20-27. In this book, he describes, in broad terms, what he calls "Angolan poverty", a consequence of Portuguese colonization. This book is a "trial against Portuguese colonialism".

⁵ Our development is based on Pelissier's study, 1978, *La colonie du Minotaure. Nationalisme et révolution en Angola (1926-1975)*, Orgeval, Ed. Pelissier.

⁶ See C. Mahala, 1960, "Le Portugal et les colonies d'Angola et de Guinée", *Revue >presence africaine*, p.46.

and the colonial administration to use blacks as animals in plantations, ports, factories... To ensure the control of Blacks, a certificate, called "Modelo J.", was instituted, which they had always to present to the colonial authorities.

It was in this context that Angolan nationalism would develop. From then on, nationalism had become the ideology of Blacks for their accession to Independence: they resolutely engaged in the fight against colonialism, imperialism and racism!

The strong desire to conquer Independence pushed the nationalists to create structured national liberation movements, each with a political and military programme, despite the dictatorship of the colonial regime. It was above all Portugal's categorical refusal to recognize the right to self-determination and independence of the Angolan people that encouraged the development of aggressive nationalism.

II-Angolan liberation movements in the anti-colonial war (1961-1975) and the civil war (1975-2002)

1-Inception of Angolan nationalism

Indeed, it is a nationalism that had already been enriched in the 18th and 19th centuries, thanks to pan-Africanism born in the New World in favour of the struggle for the liberation of Blacks against white domination and exploitation. In Africa, Pan-Africanism had emerged as a true ideology of liberation, especially since the 5th Pan-African Congress held in October 1945, in Manchester, which had advocated the liberation of Africa, i.e. the end of colonial domination, racism, imperialism and the transition to political independence based on majority rule, universal suffrage and parliamentary democracy. Angolan nationalism had also been enriched by the vast movement of African students residing in Western European countries, such as the WASU (Union des Etudiants Africains de l'Ouest) created in 1926 in London, then the FEANF (Fédération des Etudiants d'Afrique Noire en France) created in 1952 (at its congress held in Paris from 21 to 23 June 1958, it affirmed its determination to support any African political party or organization that had clearly opted for national independence⁷). Already in 1950, the Angolans Viriato da Cruz, Mario de Andrade and Agostino Neto, the Mozambican Eduardo Mondlane, the Sao Tomean Francisco-José Tenreiro (who died in Portugal in 1953 in mysterious circumstances) and the Cape Verdean Amílcar Cabral had created in Lisbon a Centre for African Studies whose objective was to "rationalize the feeling of belonging to a world of oppression and awaken the national consciousness through an analysis of the continent's cultural foundations". This club of reflection and action was banned in 1957 by the Portuguese authorities, "for having facilitated the creation of an anti-colonialist movement, injected a nationalist character in the minds of the people of Angola". Many of these young intellectuals were in contact with the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), the only one at the time to propose a real decolonization of the Portuguese possessions in Africa and which in 1951 transformed its Angolan section into the Angolan Communist Party (PCA). This party was, of course, underground; but it developed a great activity in the popular circles in order to make known the fundamental principles of Marxist ideology, by creating in the popular districts of Luanda some mobile libraries and underground schools.

It should be recalled that the 1955 Bandung Conference (Indonesia) and the 1958 Accra Conference of African Independent States (Ghana) (the first meeting in Africa in the history of African decolonization)⁸ crystallized the fundamental needs and aspirations of all African

⁷ See "Declaration of 21, 22 and 23 June by African Students on Angola", *Revue Présence Africaine*, n° 17 and 18, February-May 1958, p.250-251.

⁸ See "The Conference of African Independent States (Accra, 22 April 1958)", *Revue présence Africaine*, n° 17 and 18, February-May 1960, p.246-249;

peoples still under colonial domination, including those of the Portuguese colonies, namely the right to independence and free determination.

The role of the churches⁹ was also critical in Angola. The Catholic Church, the American and English Protestant churches evangelized the populations who eventually acquired nationalist sentiments as their awareness of the colonial fact grew. Political-religious movements, syncretist movements such as Kimbanguism (with the Kongo country as an extension area) and Tokoism (with the Zombo country as an extension area) instil in notions of freedom and equity into the minds of Blacks, so that they eventually organized themselves in plantations, factories and other places of work. The few trade union associations, such as the "African League" and the "Association of Angolan Naturals», that had a programme focused on defending workers' interests were hunted down or disorganized, or even suppressed when dealing with political affairs¹⁰.

The leaders of these associations ended up creating, naturally, political parties that initially operated in hiding because the Portuguese colonial administration did not tolerate any political party on its colonial territories.

The presentation of these liberation movements will make it possible to understand, through their contradictions, how these movements delayed Angola's march towards independence, and then the reasons for the internationalisation of the Angolan problem, from 1961 to 2002.

2-Angola's liberation movements in the anti-colonial war and civil war: chronology

The war in Angola was unabated, from 1961 to 2002. As a matter of fact, two very different wars: the anti-colonial war, which was just a war¹¹ for Independence; and the civil war. Series of sabotage and raids actions started in 1961, the anti-colonial war, a war of liberation, will no longer have any force in 1966, when the MPLA nationalists launch a major insurrection by establishing themselves in the east of the country and, in 1972, when those of the FNLA settle in certain districts in the northern regions of Angola. In April 1974, thanks to the "carnation revolution" in Portugal, this war finally came to an end.

In 1975, on the eve of conquering Independence, when they were about to enjoy the fruits of so many sacrifices made during the 13 years of the anti-colonial struggle, the Angolans were condemned to terrible strife, terrible suffering and therefore an abhorrent civil war. This was even from those who had organized themselves into liberation movements against Portuguese colonialism. This merciless tragedy was the result of the Cold War and the rivalry that, since the 1960s, had first opposed two liberation movements against each other and then three Angolan nationalist movements. Benefiting from different external support, the two main liberation movements, the MPLA and the FNLA, were to distinguish themselves in the fight against the

⁹ For the role of the churches, read,

-Grenfell F. J., 1975, *Historia da Igreja Baptista em Angola (1879-1975)*, Luanda, Ed. Nucleo-Centro de Publicações; - Cf Malcolm Mc Veigh (R. P.), 1962, "The Methodist Church and Angola", *Revue culturelle du Monde Noir*, n° 42, 3e trimestre.

¹⁰ See Malcolm McVeigh (R. P.), 1962, "La situation actuelle en Angola", *Revue culturelle du Monde Noir*, n° 42, 3rd quarter.

¹¹ Read, in this regard, F. Wilhelm-Heimer, 1975, "Decolonisation and legitimate politics in Angola", *Revue Française d'Etudes Politiques Africaines*, n° 110, February.

Portuguese colonizer. Despite multiple pressures from the OAU (Organization of African Unity) and other allies of Angolan nationalists, the MPLA and FNLA will not be able to agree to launch joint operations. They will each act for their own account and under their own banner, even if it means tearing each other apart and giving each other low blows for national leadership. The contradictions between the two leaders, Agostino Neto for the MPLA and Roberto Holden for the FNLA, delayed Angola's march towards independence and led to an internationalization of the Angolan "problem".

Angola's great misfortune was first to have had two different and antagonistic organizations and then, from 1966 onwards, a third, UNITA with Savimbi as its leader, all three of whom were fighting for independence. That's what was fatal to him. Unlike FRELIMO in Mozambique and PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, only they fight against Portuguese colonialism.

Within the framework of this study, we have chosen to present the chronology of the events, and not an exhaustive account. This will be followed by a presentation on the place of the Black Africa French-speaking countries, in particular Congo-Kinshasa and Congo-Brazzaville, in the two periods of anti-colonial war and civil war.

Chronology of events

1928: Fascism settles in Portugal

1929: Setting up in Luanda of the African National League (ANA), composed of coloured and assimilated people

1953: Creation of the first revolutionary party, the United Struggle Party of Angola (PLUA)

1954: Setting up in Matadi (Congo-Kinshasa) of the Angolan Cultural Association (ACA)

1955: Creation of the Movement for the Independence of Angola (MIA)⁵⁰

1956 (December 10): Creation in Luanda of the: Mouvement Populaire de la Libération de l'Angola (MPLA) through the merger of PLUA and MIA

1957: Manifesto of the MPLA advocating armed struggle as the only way to liquidate Portuguese colonialism

-1957 (July): Creation of the: Union des Populations du Nord de l'Angola (UPNA) through the transformation of the ACA

1958: Creation of the Movement for the National Independence of Angola (MINA), which was immediately integrated into the MPLA

-1958: UPNA becomes the Union of the Angola' People (UPA)

1959 (29 March): Several hundred MPLA activists and leaders arrested

1960 (June): Arrest of 52 Africans, including Agostino Neto and Father Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, who were protesting against the Portuguese colonizer in Angola

1960 (October 31) In Leopoldville (now Kinshasa), the UPA was trying to merge with the Democratic Party of Angola (PDA) to form the: Front Commun Populaire des Populations de l'Angola (FCPPA)

1961 (February 4): Armed MPLA militants attacked the various prisons in Luanda where many political prisoners were held. Repression of this popular uprising was undertaken. This action was the beginning of the liberation struggle

1961 (March 15): The UPA triggers armed struggle in Angola's Northern provinces

1962 (March 26): Creation in Leopoldville of the: Front national de la Libération de l'Angola (FNLA), through the merger of the UPA and the PDA

1962 (April 5): Setting up in Leopoldville by Roberto Holden of the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), an organ of the FNLA. The MPLA and other political parties rejected this act

1966 (March): Jonas Savimbi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the GRAE, creates the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in Moxico, southeast Angola

1974 (April 24): Overthrow of the fascist regime in Portugal by the military

1975 (15 January): The leaders of the Angolan nationalist movements (MPLA, FNLA and

- UNITA) and the Portuguese State sign in Alvor, Portugal, the agreements that will lead Angola to independence. The date of Independence was set up for 11 November
- 1975 (31 January): Installation of the transitional government in Luanda
- 1975 (July-November): Civil war: armed confrontations between the MPLA on the one hand, and the FNLA and UNITA on the other. The MPLA won a decisive victory.
- 1975 (August 9): South Africa sent troops to southern Angola to support UNITA against MPLA forces, which were in turn supported by a Cuban expeditionary force
- 1975 (November 11): Angola became independent. The MPLA proclaimed the People's Republic of Angola. FNLA and UNITA founded the Democratic Republic of Angola and settled in Huambo
- 1975 (December 1): Admission of the People's Republic of Angola to the United Nations
- 1976 (February): The People's Republic of Angola was recognized by the majority of African States
- 1976 (May): Violent fighting between the MPLA supported by the Cuban military forces and UNITA supported by the South African military forces. UNITA lost the large cities it occupied, including Huambo, its headquarters. South African troops officially withdrew from southern Angola
- 1978 (28 September): The UN adopted Resolution 435 on Namibia's Independence
- 1979 (September 10): Death in Moscow of Agostino Neto, President of the People's Republic of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos became Head of state and of the party.
- 1980 (November): First major battle of Mavinga in southern Angola. UNITA moved to Jamba
- 1981 (February): Second great battle of Mavinga. South African intervened in a Powerful manner.
- 1981 (24 August): The South African army launched an operation against the Namibian SWAPO guerrillas (Namibian Liberation Movement) in southern Angola.
- 1984 (February 16): An agreement was signed, in Lusaka, Zambia, between the Luanda and Pretoria authorities, which provided for the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola.
- 1985 (April 15): The South African government officially announced the withdrawal of its troops from southern Angola, but acknowledged, one month later, that it will maintain a contingent in the area.
- 1985 (July 10, 2005): The US Congress imposed sanctions against South Africa despite an attempt by the US president to veto them. Several other countries followed suit.
- 1988 (February): Battle of Cuito Cuanavale. Defeat of the South African Army and UNITA
- 1988 (July 20): Luanda, Havana and Pretoria agreed, for the first time, to establish a direct link between the withdrawal of Cuban soldiers and the implementation of UN Resolution 435
- 1988 (August 5): New negotiations led to an agreement in principle, in Geneva, for a ceasefire
- 1988 (December 13): Tripartite meeting in Brazzaville between Angola, South Africa and Cuba, under the mediation of the United States, which led to the Brazzaville Protocol, which ended 40 years of apartheid, created the new South Africa, liberated Nelson Mandela, gave independence to Namibia and secured Angola through the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops.
- 1988 (December 22): An agreement was signed in New York providing for a "phased and complete" Cuban and South African withdrawal from Angola, as well as the implementation of the UN plan for Namibia's accession to independence.
- 1989 (March) Namibia became independent. SWAPO President, Sam Nujoma, became President of the Republic.
- 1989 (May): The MPLA had proposed a peace plan to UNITA in which it proposed the reintegration of the rebel movement into the MPLA.
- 1989 (June 22nd): Meeting between Dos Santos and Savimbi in Gbadolite (Zaire) and

"historic" handshake. Savimbi rejected the peace plan endorsed by the "Frontline States".
1989 (24 August): UNITA leader ordered his troops to resume fighting.
1989 (December): MPLA offensive against UNITA in Mavinga.
1990 (April 24): First MPLA - UNITA meeting in Estoril (Portugal).
1990 (May): Violent fighting in southern Angola. UNITA was redeploying north through Zaire.
1991 (January): Multiple UNITA attacks against economic targets in northern Angola and Luanda.
1991 (March 26): Parliament adopted a law that introduced a multi-party system.
1991 (31 May): Agreement signed between MPLA and UNITA on the ceasefire and on a process of political liberalization leading to elections.
1992 (29-30 September): First free presidential and legislative elections in Angola, under international supervision.
1992 (October 3): Savimbi challenged the results of the election, accusing the MPLA of manipulating the results.
1992 (31 October): Resumption of civil war.
1993 (May 19): The United States officially recognized the Angolan government.
1994 (20 November): Government and UNITA representatives signed the Lusaka (Zambia) peace protocol.
1997 (April): Formation of the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation. It included 4 ministers and 11 deputy ministers from UNITA. But a large part of the forces of the Savimbi movement had still not been integrated into the new army. They went to fight in Zaire to support Mobutu before retreating to northeast Angola.
2002 (February 22): Jonas Savimbi was killed with twenty one rebels protecting him, near the Luvuei River in Moxico
2002 (April 4): Successors of UNITA concluded the ceasefire agreement with government forces.

III-Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) and Congo-Brazzaville in the history of Angola's liberation struggle

Zaire, Congo, Zambia and Namibia, as neighbouring countries of Angola, were somehow affected by the situation prevailing, at that time, in Angola and they had contributed, each on its own way, to set in motion Angola's decolonization process which eventually led to the settlement of the "Angolan problem". It was also the work of international organizations, such as the OAU and the UN. The latter carried out intense diplomatic activity to resolve the "Angolan problem".

The countries having common borders with Angola, notably Zaire (Congo-Kinshasa) and Congo-Brazzaville were involved in resolving the "Angolan problem", in several aspects. Their contribution materialized at two levels: locally, their territories were used as a base for withdrawal; at the level of the OAU and the United Nations, these countries were claiming themselves as defenders of the Angolan cause.

1. Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) in the history of Angola's liberation struggles

The role of Congo-Kinshasa in Angola's liberation struggles can be explained by the fact that Angola and Zaire share a common border of 2600 km; the ethnic groups living along this border are related. The peoples of these regions were living in an absurdity created by the European when they have decided to share, among themselves, Central Africa region, at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. This was said clearly, at the 16th UN session in 1962, by Ambassador Mbeka, the DRC's representative to the United Nations, during the debate on the Angolan question:

The Angolan problem interests us for several reasons. Angola is our neighbour. It is well known

that in sharing Africa, the colonialists did not take into account ethnic dimension, but rather their insatiable appetite to expand their colonial empires. Thus, in Africa, it is not uncommon to find a tribe stretching on both sides of a border. This is the case of the Bakongos tribe, which extends on both sides of the Angolan-Congolese border. It follows that the Angolans are ethnically our brothers and it is colonial history that has separated us. The misfortunes that strike them, we feel them, despite the difference in nationality¹².

Zaire, suffering the consequences of Angola's bloody decolonization, had naturally to make diplomatic, military and even socio-economic efforts to resolve the Angolan tragedy.

On 30 June 1960, Congo-Belgium became independent under the name "Democratic Republic of Congo" (DRC). This status was strongly felt in Central Africa. The independence of DRC had a great impact on the Angolans who were still under Portuguese colonial rule.

The DRC had to denounce, very soon, in 1962, at the UN¹³16th session, the decision taken by the Government of Portugal to consider Angola as part and parcel of its territory by granting it "province" status: it did not recognize Angola as a colony, but as its province attached to the metropolis, the Kingdom of Portugal. At that time, Portugal was planning to transfer its capital Lisbon to Angola and to allow the migration of a large portion of its population to this "province" of Africa, as reported in the Portuguese newspaper *O Lobito*, published in Angola:

We must draw a lesson from the Indian aggression and wake up from the age-old sleep into which we sank after the great discoveries. If we had developed Angola and Mozambique as Australia had developed, if we had formed a community of nations with Brazil, we could face without fear these great powers that have just betrayed us or attacked us... In a few years, or perhaps in a few months, Angola and Mozambique will be attacked as the Portuguese state of India was... We must transport as quickly as possible to Angola the capital of Portugal and a part of the Portuguese people and their industries. Do not tell us that this is impossible; Brazil, which does not have its existence threatened, has built Brasilia!

Debates on this issue were heated at the UN, where all African delegations (United Arab Republic, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Upper Volta, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanganyika, Chad, Togo and Tunisia) unanimously condemned Portugal for its refusal to cooperate with the UN Sub-Committee established to examine the "explosive" situation in Angola. Portugal was called upon during the meeting to recognize the right to self-determination and independence of the peoples under its domination¹⁴.

At this juncture, one important fact should be mentioned: in the Northern part of Angola, there was no major city or industry. The ambitious Angolans, during the last fifty years of this colonial era, regularly crossed the border and settled in Leopoldville or in the Congolese port of Matadi where nationalist ideas were already spread over. It is therefore in these two Congolese cities that were found Angolans with more political training. It was in Leopoldville that the: Union des populations de l'Angola (UPA) was born, which became the: Front national de libération de l'Angola (FNLA), with its headquarters in Leopoldville¹⁵.

¹² *Revue Présence Africaine* (New Quarterly Series), 1962, "Angola of Yesterday and Today: Angola and the United Nations. Testimonies and documents", n° 42, 3rd quarter, p.105-106.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 105.

¹⁴ *Ibid*. at 92-185

¹⁵ *Revue Présence Africaine*, 1963, "Dossier angolais : connaissance du Front de Libération pour l'Angola", p.131-137.

One should add that it was in Matadi that many Angolans who lived in Congo-Belgium (nearly 200,000 from 1952 to 1954), were aware of their identity by creating the Angolan Cultural Association (ACA), on 7 February 1954. It was also during that period; here also, had a great impact the Bandung Conference of African and Asian Peoples condemning racism and colonialism. It raised awareness among all ACA members, who soon became aware of nationalism. They all left the port city of Matadi and moved to Leopoldville, the capital of Congo-Belgium, where they created the Union of the Populations of Northern Angola (UPNA) in July 1957, led by Pinnock Johnny Eduardo, Barulho Lulendo and Manuel Barruso Nicaca. In the wake of these three personalities, there was also their cousin and nephew Roberto Holden. Thus, the ACA collapsed in favour of the UPNA, which was only composed of the Bakongo of Angola.

The UPNA, aware of the expansion of the movement and especially of the fact that immigration was no longer only from the northern part of Angola, but from all regions, became in December 1958, a strictly tribalism and tribal party and thus it created the Union of the Populations of Angola (UPA), a national party. In December 1958, the President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, organized the Conference of the Pan-African Movement, under the theme: «African personality" that is common to all men and women of black race; that Pan-Africanism rejected any idea of assimilation or integration into the universe of the dominator. He invited one of the UPA leaders to this conference. The invitation fell into the hands of Roberto Holden, then administrator of the UPA. Now, instead of presenting the invitation to the three main leaders of the UPA namely: Pinnock Johnny Eduardo, Barrulo Lulendo, his two cousins, and Manuel Barruso Nicaca, his uncle, Roberto Holden wrote a secret letter on behalf of Manuel Barrulo Nicaca to the President of Ghana: "...being unable to personally attend the Pan-African Movement Conference, I delegate my young nephew Roberto Holden who is coming to Accra to represent the UPA... ». Thus, Roberto Holden, to the astonishment of the three main leaders of the UPA and all the other members of the UPA steering committee, went to Accra and took part in the Pan-African Movement Conference.

While in Accra, Holden met with President Sékou Touré, Head of State of Guinea, to whom he presented his concerns and objectives of Angola's liberation struggle. In order to train him politically, Sékou Touré contacted Kwame Nkrumah, who agreed to take him on an internship, into the presidential cabinet of Ghana. A few months later, at the end of his internship - his political training - Holden went to Conakry where Sékou Touré issued him a Guinean passport, under the name of Gilmor, and sent him to UN headquarters in New York to deliver a speech challenging Portuguese colonialism in Angola. Holden will stay a few months in New York. Thanks to the assistance provided by the Embassy of Guinea to the United Nations, Roberto Holden will speak vociferously about the liberation of Angola. In 1960, he returned to Conakry, the capital of Guinea, and he was to benefit from an excellent stroke of luck: Congo-Belgium gained independence on 30 June of the same year under the leadership of Patrice Lumumba, as Prime Minister. President Sékou Touré recommended Roberto Holden to Lumumba in Leopoldville. Benefiting from Sékou Touré's sponsorship, Holden was placed under the protection of Lumumba, who gave him all his support. He took such advantage of it that he went so far as to eject the whole leadership of the UPA, by removing Eduardo Pinock, Manuel Barruso Necaca, Barrulo Lulendo and the other members of the management committee. He became the unique President of the UPA. At the same time, he declared himself "socialist". In African progressive circles, the UPA was considered a more authentically African movement. The MPLA, it was said, was "a movement of Portuguese assimilates, cut off from the peasant masses". President Kwame Nkrumah will be in charge of financing the UPA office in Leopoldville. Favoured by the freedom of action and sympathy granted to him by the political circles of Leopoldville after the independence of Congo-Belgium, Roberto Holden's movement developed rapidly.

At the same time, other small political organizations were operating in Congo-Belgium among nearly one and a half million Angolan refugees. The main ones were the:

- Democratic Party of Angola (PDA), which defended the interests of the Northern part of Angola, then led by David Livrentos, Emmanuel Kunzika and André Massaki. The PDA only included nationals of Uige;
- Ngwisako, an association of Portuguese-speaking Angolans, led by Angelino Alberto;
- Movement for the Defence of Angola's Interests (MDIA), founded in 1961 by some UPA deserters.

The armed struggle against the Portuguese colonialists was launched from these political organizations, led mainly by Angolan refugees in Congo-Belgium, including the UPA and the MPLA. In addition, from 1961 onwards, the resistance organized itself around the MPLA and the UPA, two liberation movements, unfortunately deeply divided, each with its own army, and, yet, both movements claiming themselves as "socialist". In fact, it was more a conflict between two persons, Agostino Neto and Roberto Holden, who were fighting for leadership, as the stupid civil war that began in 1975 would demonstrate.

From the outset of the conflict, Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana, tried to encourage the two main Angolan groups to reach an agreement. In a treaty, he proposed the formation of a military alliance and the creation of a "Unified Command for the Liberation of Angola":

We consider that this is above all the military situation in Angola against the Portuguese.

Since this situation is in the interest of the Angolan masses that are savagely massacred, and subjected to all kinds of atrocities by the Portuguese aggressors, it is highly essential that we find immediate ways and means to attack and completely liquidate the enemy. My view is that the only practical way to successfully continue the Angolan war is to consolidate all nationalist forces¹⁶.

The agreement proposed by President Kwame N'Krumah stated the following:

- a) The formation of a new military alliance between the main political parties;
- b) The creation of a new unified military command to ensure full control of Angola's military forces. This command would have nothing to do with the internal politics of the various political parties, but should deal exclusively with the effective and rapid conduct of the war;
- c) The creation of a National Council with appointed and elected representatives of the various political parties to control the action of the military command.

Taking advantage of the agreement process carried out under the arbitration of Kwame Nkrumah, the UPA and the PDA tried to include in the composition of the National Council, the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA) – which was the result of the agreement and the merger of the UPA and the PDA - something that the MPLA and the other Angolan political groups rejected categorically. On March 26, 1962, the UPA and the PDA officially merged and formed the FNLA. From this front, the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (GRAE) was born in Kinshasa, on 5 April 1962. This formation of the GRAE provoked the anger of the MPLA and other various Angolan political groups because they were not associated with any consultation, unlike the Kwame Nkrumah's agreement¹⁷. All observers interpreted this gesture as a move by Roberto Holden to position himself well against MPLA leader, Neto.

¹⁶ Text reported by André Kisalu Kiala of *Le drame angolais*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2005, p.84.

¹⁷ See Dossier: *Memorandum to African governments on the formation of a provisional government of the Republic of Angola*, Leopoldville, 15 April 1962 (Unclassified Archives of the Angolan Cultural Centre in Brazzaville).

It should be recalled here one remarkable fact: Holden was never threatened in Leopoldville, despite Lumumba's disappearance. The College of Commissioners confirmed its support. When he came to power, Cyrille Adoula did not change the status quo. MPLA was barely tolerated in Congo-Kinshasa.

The OAU recognized the GRAE, in July 1963, as the only representative body of Angolan liberation movements. In Leopoldville, the consequences were immediately obvious: the activities of the MPLA were banned throughout the country.

Fortunately, the MPLA enjoyed a historic opportunity at that time: on August 15, 1963, the regime of President Abbé Fulbert Youlou was overthrown in Brazzaville. His successor Massamba-Débat authorized the presence of the MPLA in Congo-Brazzaville.

2. President Mobutu in the history of the Angolan liberation struggle (1965-1974)

Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the Congolese army, took power in November 1965, in Kinshasa and expressed his support for Holden. He advised and immediately forced Holden to turn to right-wing liberalism; otherwise he would withdraw not only his support but also his facilities. Hence, Holden abandoned socialism.

The FNLA obtained, in the following years, with the diplomatic offensive of Mobutu¹⁸, the support of Morocco, Côte d'Ivoire, France and many other moderate African countries. Unfortunately for the "nationalist"¹⁹ cause, Holden will easily follow the steps of and imitate Mobutu's dictatorial methods. He will not admit any criticism or opinion that goes against his opinions, even those relating to the proper functioning of the FNLA. All the leadership of the FNLA was confiscated and remained within his hands, going so far as to create a Security Service responsible for identifying potential protesters throughout the territory of Zaire. Elements of Roberto Holden's Security Police were often involved in acts of repression, imprisonment and execution against Angolan refugees in Zaire, suspected of belonging to or sympathizing with the MPLA (many of them were executed). In fact, the success of the FNLA among the two million Angolans (surprisingly, their number was increasing) who had taken refuge in Mobutu's Zaire had only been achieved through intimidation.

Alongside the State Party, Mobutu's unique party, le Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR), Holden was to create in the various districts of Kinshasa and in the various localities of the Lower Zaire region with a high concentration of Angolan refugees, local sections of the FNLA, from which animation groups will very quickly emerge where Angolan girls and boys, especially idle, some adults, men and especially women, who were requisitioned against their will, sang and danced to Holden's glory. A true cult of personality that the leader of the FNLA liked to praise himself with! This practice caused a great stir in Angolan intellectual circles residing in Zaire, who found it absurd and unnecessary, whereas the primary objective was the liberation of the country. Thus, in 1972, in Kikunzu, the largest FNLA military base in Zaire, Holden was in difficulty for the first time: a group of soldiers from the ALNA (National Liberation Army of Angola), the military wing of the FNLA, under the leadership of Commander Augusto Eugenio Londes, head of military operations and Commander Matumona, head of the military police, rebelled and opposed Holden. He tried to take over the military leadership of the FNLA. The insurgent soldiers will forbid Holden to set foot at the Kikunzu military base, while forbidding him to speak and act again on behalf of the ALNA soldiers. He was accused of being responsible for the inefficiency, weakness and immobility in which ALNA was locked up, and also of its selfish and dictatorial attitude, his inability or rejection of confrontation and his inclination towards the cult of personality.

¹⁸ See, in this regard, J. Odier, 1975, "La politique étrangère de Mobutu", *Revue Le Mois en Afrique*, n° 120, December.

¹⁹ On these facts of Holden's stay in Kinshasa, read: *Journal Jeune Afrique*, n° 785, "Les mouvements de libération de l'Angola depuis 1960". Facts confirmed by our informers, Angolan intellectuals who were refugees in Brazzaville

The mini coup succeeded well, at least for a few hours, since Holden lost control of his troops for 72 hours. At the headquarters of his movement in Kinshasa, he was no longer there. He remained entrenched in his residence in Mbinza (one of Kinshasa's rich residential areas). A large number of Angolan refugees in Kinshasa were delighted, "happy with the dictator's departure, happy to be able to organize the struggle against the Portuguese colonizer themselves". But their joy was short-lived. President Mobutu, hesitant at first to intervene, woke up with a start as soon as he saw behind this coup de force, the hand of the MPLA, which was really only a denial of Holden within the FNLA. He then decided to act and sent some FAZ (Zairian Armed Forces) units to Kikunzu. The rebel soldiers of the FNLA, knowing that any action against the FAZ would be suicidal for them, since they were in Zairian territory, decided to surrender without any resistance whatsoever. On Mobutu's orders, the revolted ALNA soldiers were handed over to Holden, who in turn executed them quickly. The execution of Commander Augusto Eugénio Londes, Commander Matumona and their companions created a stir in Angolan political and civil circles, and even in Kinshasa in the political and military ranks of the FNLA, a wave of emotion. From Brazzaville, the MPLA will strongly protest against this "murder of freedom fighters".

In 1972, the MPLA and FNLA engaged in an incredible and ever-increasing controversy. International journalists, at random meetings or contacts with one of these two organizations, published articles praising one or the other group. In June, the OAU decided to get involved and invited Neto and Holden to Rabat where the two Angolan enemy brothers decided to bury their differences. After this meeting and the historic hugs that followed between Neto and Holden, it was hoped that a new spirit of cooperation and understanding would emerge between these two leaders. The Rabat meeting had no follow-up. The wars will resume in earnest, and there will be a period of high tension between the MPLA and the FNLA.

The Republic of Zaire did not stop defending the Angolan cause in 1972. On 8 June 1972, an OAU Conference of Governments was held in Brazzaville²⁰. The meeting was attended by President Marien Ngouabi of Congo, President Mobutu of Zaire, a delegation from the FNLA led by Roberto Holden and that of the MPLA led by Agostino Neto. At the end of the deliberations, Mobutu declared:

I was optimistic when I was leaving Kinshasa, because I knew that between Roberto Holden and Agostino Neto, even if there was a disparity, it could only be circumstantial; it could not last any longer because Angola is their country and the goal pursued by the two leaders is the same, namely the liberation of Angola, which is dear to both of them.

The aim of the Brazzaville conference was the unification of all the forces of the two movements in order to accelerate the liberation of Angola.

Neto and Holden signed on 13 December 1972, in Kinshasa, another cooperation and understanding agreement between their two movements, under the auspices of President Mobutu of Zaire and President Marien Ngouabi of Congo, and the personal representatives of President Nyerere of Tanzania and President Kaunda of Zambia. The agreement provided for the unification of their military forces into a single command called the "Military Liberation Council" under the leadership of the MPLA, headed by a "Supreme Political Council" chaired by the leader of the FNLA. For his part, Mobutu undertook to open Zaire's borders to all Angolan liberation movements. In practice, the implementation of this agreement, following the mistrust that had already developed between Neto and Holden, proved impossible.

A year later, in December 1973, in Bukavu, a city in eastern Zaire, still with the aim of

²⁰ Read, *Revue Etumba*, n° 245, week of June 10 to 17, Brazzaville, "Rencontre des présidents Mobutu et Ngouabi du 8 juin 1972".

encouraging the two Angolan compatriots to bury their rivalries that were hindering the smooth running of Angola's liberation struggle, four African heads of State, Mobutu, Ngouabi, Nyerere and Kaunda, once again attempted a final reconciliation between the two Angolan leaders. At the end of the meeting, Neto will surprise everyone, announcing that he has decided to resign from his position as president of the MPLA and resume his profession as a doctor. The reasons for Neto's decision were twofold: first, Neto had been at loggerheads for a year with a large number of the MPLA leadership, who accused him of having signed the agreement on 13 December 1972 in Kinshasa with Holden; second, he was tired of signing dead-end agreements each time and immediately rejected by Holden, he disclosed in private.

Some African heads of State, including Nyerere, Ngouabi, Kaunda and many MPLA activists and supporters, considering that due to his past, his experience and charismatic personality, Neto had an important role to play in leading the struggle for the independence of the future Angolan State, convinced him to review his decision of resigning. Thus, Neto had to put his decision aside and took over again the presidency of the MPLA.

The year 1974 was the decisive year for Angola's liberation struggle. From January to March 1974, the FNLA engaged in extensive military activity in the northern regions of Angola. The colonial army registered significant losses. For their part, the MPLA military forces, the FAPLA, had also attacked the colonial army's objectives in eastern Angola. The losses in the Portuguese military ranks were also very considerable: several destructions of military aircraft and many weapons were recovered after being abandoned by the troops of the Portuguese colonial army when they were leaving for Luanda. The FAPLA approached within 200 kilometres the Angolan capital.

Meanwhile, in February, Agostino Neto had established contacts with the Portuguese authorities. Within the MPLA management, the motives were unknown. Chipenda, Vice-President of the MPLA who was in the *maquis* at the time with the soldiers where he was leading the operations, was surprised. He protested against Neto by openly accusing him of being in the hands of the Portuguese colonialists. The other two main leaders of the MPLA, including Mario de Andrade and Joaquim Pinto de Andrade and many others, also challenged Neto.

In fact, if on the ground of the liberation struggle, the FNLA strengthened its military positions; the MPLA, on the other hand, because of internal differences among its leaders, showed signs of weakness. Taking advantage of his duties but above all of the support and trust he enjoyed among all MPLA fighters, Chipenda established his own internal political-military network within the MPLA, known as "La Révolte de l'Est".

Neto was in serious trouble for the first time in his movement. He was contested. In a "call to all activists" written in Brazzaville on May 11, 1974, MPLA leaders called for a congress where grassroots militants could express themselves. The signatories of the «Brazzaville Appeal»²¹ have denounced Neto's "absolute presidentialism", which "has created an atmosphere of fear, suspicion, cynicism and hypocrisy within the movement" and was at the root of the "reversals of the guerrilla struggle". According to this "Appeal" to militants, the MPLA "has been deeply undermined by the virus of racism (allusion to rivalries between mulattos and genuine Black Angolans), tribalism and regionalism, which has violated the principle that the people of all districts are the true author and beneficiary of the liberation struggle". While advocating the creation of a "United Front for the Independence of Angola", the signatories of the text hostile to Neto criticised the agreement that Neto had signed on 13 December 1972, in Kinshasa, with Roberto Holden's FNLA.

President Mobutu, who was always keen to control, as far as possible, the developments in Angola, in order to position himself effectively in Central and Southern Africa, decided to take advantage of the difficulties faced by Neto within the MPLA, by shamefully engaging in a manoeuvre that tended to isolate Agostino Neto, who nevertheless enjoyed great prestige among many African leaders. He arrived in Dar Es Salaam on May 26, 1974, to hold talks with Tanzanian President Nyerere. The day before, Mobutu had had conversations in Lusaka with Kaunda,

²¹ See Dossier: *Brazzaville Appeal, 11 May 1974* (Unclassified archives of the Angolan Cultural Centre in Brazzaville).

President of Zambia. The presence of Roberto Holden alongside President Mobutu was intended to influence, and above all to encourage the two Heads of State, who were very loyal to the MPLA leader, to support and bring their preferences to Roberto Holden, by endorsing his probity rather than that of Agostino Neto. Mobutu failed: the two African leaders affirmed their loyalty to Neto. Mobutu returned to his country, Zaire, disappointed and even humiliated.

It was from that time that Mobutu decided to play the spoilsport, to complicate the situation, i.e. Angola's accession to independence, to the advantage of his ally Roberto Holden. He immediately contacted Beijing. On June 3, Kinshasa's Radio-Nationale announced the arrival of about 100 Chinese instructors in Zaire to train FNLA fighters. Mobutu encouraged Holden to recruit new fighters at an accelerated pace from among the 2 million Angolan refugees in Zaire. The FNLA proceeded, therefore, to enrol by force young Angolans based in Kinshasa²².

Meanwhile, the crisis was still brewing within the MPLA. Curiously, at the OAU summit in Mogadishu, Somalia, in June 1974,²³ MPLA Vice-President Daniel Chipenda, officially mandated by the MPLA leadership, announced that a climate of understanding and reconciliation had been established between MPLA leaders, and that the differences between him and Neto had been resolved. The various African Heads of State present at the Mogadishu summit, since Neto had not travelled in person to bring them this news, greeted Chipenda's announcement with scepticism. Indeed, a month later, the internal quarrels in the MPLA's ranks started all over again, followed by a deep and serious division among its leaders. The atmosphere between Neto and Chipenda was once more very tense.

The MPLA leadership convened an extraordinary congress of the movement in Lusaka, Zambia, with the aim to urgently resolve this internal conflict. Initially planned for two or three days, the congress lasted more than two weeks, from August 12 to 29, 1974. The congress was an opportunity for Neto and Chipenda to fight through faithful supporters. Stormy and heated debates between the different tendencies dominated this congress: the leaders squabbled in vain and needlessly. And faced with the impossibility of reaching an agreement between them, some congressmen, left the congress, notably Neto and his faithful Lucio Lara, Eduardo dos Santos and many others, For their part, the two brothers Mario de Andrade and Joaquim Pinto de Andrade and some of their followers also slammed the door of the congress. The remaining minority continued the work and elected Daniel Chipenda, President of the MPLA.

A few hours later, just after the close of the MPLA congress, Zaire President Mobutu, whose objective was still to isolate Neto, as always, opened his arms to Chipenda, the newly elected president of the MPLA: "*Don't go back to Brazzaville, come with the new MPLA leadership, and settle in Kinshasa*". But Chipenda declined the offer.

On his part, Agostino Neto did not take into account Chipenda's election, and considered himself the sole and only president of the MPLA. Chipenda, who was elected at the Lusaka Congress, also remained as MPLA President. The dispute over the leadership of the MPLA would continue between these two persons. The Conference of Central and East African Heads of State, held in Brazzaville, at the beginning of September attempted to resolve the crisis between Neto and Chipenda, and succeeded in reconciling them, by proposing the following new MPLA leadership: President, Agostino Neto; Vice-President, Daniel Julio Chipenda.

To defend the Angolan case, President Mobutu took some diplomatic actions towards Portugal,

²² Facts confirmed by our informers, Angolan intellectuals who were refugees in Brazzaville.

²³ Read, Dossier: *Report of the 23rd session of the Coordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa of the OAU CM/572, Mogadishu from 16 to 11 June 1974* (Unclassified archives of the "Africa Division" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Congo in Brazzaville).

and on 15 September, at his own request, Mobutu went to the island of Sal, Cape Verde, where he met the Portuguese Head of State, General Antonio de Spínola, who was visiting the island. The aim was to prevent Angola from falling into the hands of the "pro-Soviet and Communist" MPLA, the majority in Luanda, the capital of Angola. During their meeting, the two Heads of State, "anti-communists", acted together without success. President Mobutu, who had been coveting, for years, the oil resources of the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, was this time seeking to gain control over the oil fields of this "African Kuwait"; as a result, he thought that this could be possible if Cabinda were to separate from Angola. He proposed to General de Spínola a secret deal that should allow the Angolan province of Cabinda to obtain independence separate from Angola, while Holden would become Head of State in Luanda.

It was not clear, in the end, what exactly the two men wanted, since a month earlier, in August, Spínola and Mobutu had signed an agreement, kept secret until the end of 1975, providing for the creation of a Zairian-Angolan federation led by Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Alvaro Roberto Holden of Angola. In fact, it was the elimination of the MPLA from the Angolan political arena that was at stake.

The pro-Western sympathies of general Spínola, who had previously met with the American President, Richard Nixon, in the Azores, to whom he had confessed his fears about the rapid progress of the Portuguese Communist Party, played in favour of Mobutu's diplomacy. Unfortunately for Mobutu, General Antonio de Spínola, President of the Republic of Portugal, who opposed the "left forces", was forced to resign, on 30 September, in Lisbon

The Movement of Armed Forces (MFA) which was very leftist was in charge of the decolonization process, following the change at the top of management team in Lisbon, and would largely contribute to the modification of the decolonization schedule²⁴. The officers, members of the MFA coordination commission, were in power in Lisbon, and were sensitive to what they called "the intrigues and interference of imperialism». Without wanting to take sides, they were not at all willing to give the FNLA or any other Angolan movement an a priori advantage. In the same vein, they informed the OAU that they did not want to see one of the Angolan liberation movements, regardless of its past, left behind in the process of Angola's accession to independence. This strong warning against the OAU, which seemed to favour only the MPLA and the FNLA, was aimed at UNITA, a newcomer into the "nationalist arena". That is how the Portuguese authorities imposed UNITA on Africans, on the one hand and on Angolans, on the other.

The Portuguese military junta gave the green light to the decolonization train to continue its journey in Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome and Principe, the OAU, which also did not want to delay Angola's process of accession to independence, was finally forced to recognize UNITA, alongside the MPLA and the FNLA. It was also in this context that UNITA was part of the Angolan liberation movements that were to negotiate Angola's independence²⁵.

As far as the MPLA was concerned, there was not a single drop of hope for an understanding between Neto and Chipenda, due to two violently and contradictory positions: Neto, in his own way, had nothing to share with the other members of the MPLA Steering Committee. He thought he was the only BOSS of the movement. Often, he made decisions without consulting MPLA management. On the other hand, Chipenda demanded and wanted everything to be done on the basis of consensus.

Agostino Neto and representatives of the Portuguese authorities signed a ceasefire agreement in the MPLA maquis, on 21 October, in Nshana Lukata, eastern Angola. A few hours later, after the announcement of this event, which had surprised him again, Chipenda once again protested

²⁴ Read Journal, *Jeune Afrique*, n° 718 of 12 December 1974, "Portugal: Antonio Spínola's lost bet"

²⁵ Read Journal, *Jeune Afrique*, n° 733 of 24 January 1975, "Angola: three movements meeting the people".

against his president and accused him of illegally signing a ceasefire agreement on behalf of the MPLA, without consulting him or the other members of the steering committee. From that moment, a new disagreement was born between the two men, which led this time to the final break-up. The MPLA thus divided into two wings: Neto's "direction of absolute authority", a term used by Neto's detractors, and Daniel Chipenda's "Eastern Revolt" wing, "accused of regionalism", an accusation formulated "freely" by Neto's followers. There was also a third, smaller faction called Mario de Andrade's and Joaquim Pinto de Andrade's "Active Revolt". This group quickly disappeared completely²⁶.

This fratricidal war within the MPLA offered Mobutu a good opportunity. He tried again to seduce Chipenda, but the leader of the "Eastern Rebellion", this time, did accept Mobutu's offer. He left Brazzaville where the MPLA headquarters were located and moved, accompanied by his followers, to Kinshasa where he opened another MPLA headquarters in October, the representation of the "Eastern Revolt". Four thousand MPLA fighters in the liberated areas of eastern Angola accepted to be under Chipenda's leadership - with the exception of a few hundred soldiers who would remain loyal to Neto. Chipenda, President of the MPLA/Eastern Rebellion, travelled twice a month, by plane provided by Mobutu, to the maquis in eastern Angola, via the border town of Dilolo, in the Zairian province of Katanga, to visit his fighters. On December 15, the MPLA, through Lucio Lara, the influential mulatto of the movement and considered Neto's very close confidant, announced the exclusion of Chipenda from the movement, which did not cause any stir.

Neto and Savimbi signed an agreement on 19 December 1974, with view to ending the rivalry between MPLA and UNITA and to preparing for future cooperation between the two organizations. It was in Algiers that Major Melo Antunes, Minister of State, in charge of supervising the decolonization file, met Neto, the head of the MPLA. This contact was described as "positive" in official Lisbon circles, as it allowed progress to be made in the preparation of the "round table". However, a rapid worsening of the situation in Angola, which could lead to armed clashes in the short term, was highly feared by the Portuguese leaders in December. There was particular concern that the FNLA, which enjoyed the full support of President Mobutu, would engage in armed action to muddy the waters and try to regain the lead at a time when its rival, the MPLA, was scoring serious points both within Angola and on the international arena.

Meanwhile, the FNLA had first accepted in early November, with eagerness, the principle of a "round table" to bring together representatives of Lisbon and delegates from all Angolan nationalist movements, in order to prepare a transitional government to be established before the end of the year in Luanda. In December, the FNLA no longer showed much enthusiasm for this conference, which the Portuguese leaders had hoped for, insisting on its urgency and on their desire not to take sides with either of the Angolan liberation movements.

On several occasions, since mid-December, President Mobutu was calling for the return to Zaire of some five thousand former Katangese gendarmes who had been refugees in Angola since November 1965, from where they continued to oppose the Mobutu regime, calling again for the secession of Katanga, southern Zaire province, a secession that had not been obtained in the sixties by Moïse Tshombé (Prime Minister from 1964 to October 1965). It goes without saying that Mobutu naturally feared that this force, albeit modest, would join the MPLA troops against the FNLA.

Faced with this situation, Mobutu asked the Portuguese authorities to persuade the Katangese to return to Zaire. But the five thousand former Tshombé supporters, who seemed to doubt Mobutu's good faith and the real effects of his amnesty promise, decided to stay in Angola. The Katangese did not have a short memory: they had never forgotten that the amnesty granted by

²⁶ Read Journal, *Jeune Afrique*, n° 714 of 14 September 1974, "Les trois leaders du MPLA s'expliquent".

Mobutu at the end of the secession in 1967 actually resulted in the systematic massacre of several thousand of their colleagues who had agreed to return home. Not only did they reject the amnesty offered, but they considered themselves "political refugees". This was an important pawn that escaped President Mobutu and his ally Holden, in this chess game followed with discretion, but also with the greatest attention first by the United States, the USSR and China, and also by American, Belgian, English, Dutch, French and South African firms. The Portuguese authorities then discovered that a number of these firms were indeed engaged in intrigues that could jeopardize the peaceful decolonization of Angola.

Jonas Savimbi, head of UNITA, announced on Saturday, December 28, 1974, in Lusaka, that a "summit" bringing together the presidents of the three Angolan liberation movements and representatives of the Portuguese government would be held "somewhere in Portugal" on January 10, 1975, to discuss the conditions for Angola's accession to independence. He added that the three leaders of the liberation movements would meet in the coming days to agree on a common position. But at that time of year, Savimbi was not very sure they would succeed, as the quarrels between the MPLA and the FNLA were so intense.

Some African Heads of State, even the most moderate, openly declared themselves in favour of Agostino Neto, the leader of the MPLA, because they were disappointed by President Mobutu's attitude and his repeated interference in the internal affairs of Angolan nationalists, each time taking sides with Roberto Holden. Omar Bongo President of Gabon, who was, up to that time, hostile to the MPLA, officially invited Neto to his country. In the same vein, several contacts were established between the head of the MPLA and some representatives of Lisbon.

Of course, the FNLA was not satisfied by such move in favour of Agostino Neto, and continued to insist on the post of "Prime Minister" in the future Angolan provisional government. This was one of the FNLA's requirements when Holden accepted, in early November, the principle of a "round table" proposed by the Portuguese authorities. The FNLA leaders were thus faced with an alternative: agree to participate in the "round table" with their "enemy number one", Agostino Neto, or break off the dialogue and seek to register some gains in the field to offset their diplomatic failure.

The Portuguese authorities saw the game of the superpowers as complicating the implementation of an already complex puzzle. China was clearly supporting the FNLA: 200 Chinese military instructors had been training FNLA reserve commandos in Zaire since June. President Mobutu, a key figure in this party that was just beginning, had just returned to Beijing for the second time, at the beginning of December 1974, counted on the support of both the United States and China, whose objectives in Africa were to eliminate Soviet influence.

While Moscow, had suspended its assistance to MPLA, since September 1974, five months after the "carnation revolution", it was not prepared to commit itself again into Angola.

Within the framework of preparing a common position for a summit with the Portuguese authorities to define the terms of Angolan independence, Neto for the MPLA, Holden for the FNLA and Savimbi for UNITA met on 3 January 1975, in Mombasa, Kenya. On Sunday, January 5, 1975, after three days of talks, the three Angolan liberation movements managed to reach an agreement to negotiate together the constitution of a transitional government that would lead Angola to independence. They also agreed that each of them should have three portfolios in the transitional government of 12 ministers envisaged by the Portuguese leaders.

At the end of the Mombasa conference three communiqués were issued. In the first joint communiqué, the two main rivals, MPLA and FNLA, who had not yet reached agreement, indicated that they had established "the basis for cooperation in order to avoid further deterioration of their relationship at this stage of decolonization". The second communiqué referred to a "common platform" in which were recorded "issues relating to the formation of a transitional government, the situation of the armed forces in Angola and the creation and installation of the country's future institutions". Finally, in another "declaration of principle", the subject of the third communiqué, the Angolan nationalists announced that the Cabinda enclave was "considered an integral and

inalienable part of Angola".

After three days of in camera discussions and the publication of these series of communiqués suggested that, for lack of agreeing on anything better, the Angolan delegations had agreed on the minimum. As one of the FNLA representatives pointed out: "There is no common front". Even less was there any question of unifying the three movements or even providing them with a steering body. The hugs at the closing of the deliberations did not eliminate the list of problems to be solved: everyone kept their own ties, maquis and a few secret spare cards.

The Portuguese leaders and the leaders of the three Angolan liberation movements met, on 10 January 1975, in Alvor, Algrave, southern Portugal, to define the modalities for Angola's accession to independence and to finalize the transitional government.²⁷ The "round table" had four main objectives: to reach an agreement on the composition of a transitional government on the basis of the elements designated by the Portuguese government and by the three Angolan movements; to integrate the military forces of the three nationalist movements into a single army with a unified command; to establish a timetable for the departure of the Portuguese armed forces from Angola; and to determine the date of the elections that would establish the independence of the territory.

Finally, after six days of discussions, the agreement on the process leading to independence at the end of 1975 was signed on 15 January 1975 between the State of Portugal and the three Angolan nationalist groups: MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. In this agreement, the State of Portugal, on the one hand, solemnly reaffirmed the right of the Angolan people to independence (Article 2), and on the other hand, set the date of 11 November 1975 (Article 4). In addition, general elections to appoint a Constituent Assembly were scheduled for October 1975 (Article 40). It is this body that would be responsible for electing the Head of the future independent Angolan State. The power would be exercised until the proclamation of independence by the High Commissioner and a transitional government, which would be installed on 31 January 1975 (article 5). This government would be led by a college comprising a representative of each nationalist movement. The leadership of this college, called the "Presidential Council", would be carried out, on a rotational basis, by each of the movements.

The integration of the armed forces and the departure of the Portuguese troops were regulated in such a way as to ensure that the Portuguese authorities had some control until Independence. Portuguese troops would leave Angola in February 1976. The command of this army would be ensured by a national defence commission (Article 28) in which Portugal would be represented by a High Commissioner; having the confidence of all, he would be appointed by the Portuguese government and would thus replace Admiral Rosa Coutinho, who was accused by Holden and Savimbi of pursuing the MPLA policy.

The conference discussed also the status of the future Angolan citizenship. It would consider as Angolans all those born in Angola and those who settled there after their birth and who accepted the principle of independent Angola.

Portugal officially transferred, on Friday 31 January 1975, its powers in Angola to a transitional government, which was responsible for governing the country until full independence scheduled for 11 November 1975. The ceremony was not attended by either Neto, Holden, or Savimbi, the leaders of the three Angolan nationalist movements. The four members of the Presidential Council - General Antonio Sylva Cardos (new Portuguese High Commissioner to Angola), Johnny Eduardo (FNLA), Lopo Do Nascimento (MPLA) and José Ndelé (UNITA) - took the oath. At that time, unfortunately, there were still many difficulties due to the rivalries between the

²⁷ See *Elima Journal* of 26 February 1975 in Kinshasa, "L'accord d'Alvor".

three liberation movements, appetites aroused by the enormous wealth of this territory, foreign pressures behind the scenes on the three liberation movements and a complexity engendered by the multiplicity of ethnic groups²⁸

3. Mobutu's interference during the transitional period

It was obvious that President Mobutu of Zaire played a negative role during this period: by working for the secession of the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, by his involvement in favour of Holden, by taking side in the dispute between Neto and Chipenda and in the civil war, by engaging the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ) in the conflict, alongside the FNLA.

Mobutu and the Cabinda case

Mobutu, President of Zaire, haunted by the enormous oil wealth of the Angolan province of Cabinda, did not stop interfering in Angola's internal affairs. And quickly he found a subterfuge: on 7 May 1975, he recommended holding a referendum in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda, under the pretext "to leave to the inhabitants to decide their future". Mobutu also assured that he had in his possession documents in which Angolan nationalist leaders recognized that the enclave was not an integral part of Angola. When Mobutu defended this idea, he quickly received a dry reply from Neto:

You say that the Cabinda is not part of Angola. Oh, really? I stick myself to that statement. This brings us back to revisiting our borders arbitrarily drawn by the colonialist powers at the Berlin Conference (1884-1885). And you will see if the Cabinda is not part of Angola.

The documents allegedly signed by the nationalist leaders to which Mobutu referred were never published to identify the likely signatories. If these documents had really existed, it is very likely that they were signed by Holden and Savimbi, the two leaders who used to make deals with Mobutu. And Holden and Savimbi might have signed such documents for him, in the euphoria of money promises made by Mobutu.

During a few rare meetings with Mobutu, Neto never missed the opportunity to raise or clarify this element frankly with Mobutu, face to face. And Mobutu was silent.

Chipenda's "betrayal"²⁹

One week after the installation of the transitional government Daniel Julio Chipenda came to Luanda, in February 1975, to set up an office of his group "La Révolte de l'Est". This event attracted many MPLA militants and supporters; even those of FNLA and UNITA were singing in favour of Chipenda. In fact, while Neto had a wide international audience, Chipenda was very popular and enjoyed great support from many MPLA militants in particular, and from many Angolans in general. Some saw him as the future president of Angola. Clearly, Neto was not at all happy by Chipenda's success: on February 13, MPLA military elements attacked by surprise the headquarters of "La Révolte de l'Est" in Luanda, killing several people. Representatives of "La Révolte de l'Est" were expelled from Luanda and their offices were destroyed. The MPLA accused "La Révolte de l'Est" of receiving reinforcements in men and equipment from Zaire and of benefiting from a "strange passivity of the FNLA and UNITA".

Serious differences would also emerge over the attitude to be adopted towards "La Révolte de l'Est" which had not participated in the Mombasa and Arvor negotiations. Therefore, UNITA offered, on 15 February, to "welcome into its ranks" La Révolte de l'Est". It was expected that Chipenda would accept this offer made by UNITA, given the matrilineal ties between him and Jonas Savimbi, but the proposal received no favourable response from Chipenda. In the evening, Mobutu tried to convince Chipenda of the need to strengthen Holden troops by integrating into the

²⁸ See Journal, *Jeune Afrique*, n° 736 of 14 February 1975, "Angola : équilibre de transition".

²⁹ "Chipenda/Neto case": Oral surveys among former members of the PCT (Parti Congolais du Travail-Parti-Etat) External Relations Department in Brazzaville. See also, André Kisalu Kiala, op. cit. p. 103-121.

FNLA. But Chipenda rejected Mobutu's proposal. Indeed, he still remembered the political imprisonment he had been subjected to by Holden in July 1963: when the Kinshasa government banned the activities of the MPLA on its territory, following the disputes with the MPLA Chipenda remained in Kinshasa and tried to convince Holden of the need for reconciliation between the FNLA and the MPLA, while proposing to the leader of the FNLA the establishment of a common front between the two liberation organizations, in order to make life impossible for the Portuguese colonialists in Angola. But Holden had not accepted at all the idea and had ordered the arrest of Chipenda, who was detained in the Ndolo military prison in Kinshasa. After six months in prison, Chipenda had managed to escape and join the MPLA leadership in Brazzaville. Twelve years later, he had not forgotten.

This charm operation with regard to "La Révolte de l'Est" in which Mobutu had embarked since mid-January, with Holden's approval, had displeased Chipenda, who had considered it inappropriate to integrate any structure. In the days that followed, Mobutu kept on insisting, more and more, by putting pressure on Chipenda. Finally Chipenda let himself be convinced, but reluctantly and he announced on 21 February, in Kinshasa, to the press the integration of his military forces and political leadership into the ranks of the FNLA, from where he became Deputy Secretary-General.

This "betrayal" caused a great turmoil among MPLA (and "La Révolte de l'Est") militants in Kinshasa who were very reluctant to rally. However, a day before, on the eve of the announcement to the press, Chipenda had taken care to explain to them the circumstances that had led to this decision. Despite the explanations given, many militants had not accepted that "La Révolte de l'Est" would merge into the FNLA, especially since they continued to hope for reconciliation between Neto and Chipenda, despite their differences. But it was well known that President Mobutu, who was anti-Neto and hosted Chipenda in his country, was an obstacle to his reintegration into the MPLA, while Neto had always hoped the return of Chipenda to MPLA. In a move to reduce tensions among his many disappointed militants, Chipenda told them: "We will go to the FNLA with our own military and political strategy. There is no way we're going to blend into the ranks of the FNLA."

It was a victory for President Mobutu when Chipenda joined the FNLA. Mobutu, who had powerful financial resources, was very firm in preventing a "communist" regime supported by Moscow, i.e. the MPLA, to be established in Angola.

The integration of "La Révolte de l'Est" was a severe blow to the MPLA as a whole, and to some Angolans who felt both betrayed and very embarrassed. The popularity and support for Chipenda declined.

Chipenda's departure with 4000 trained soldiers had seriously reduced the military strength of the MPLA, which decided then to requisition the "Katangese gendarmes", who were then considered armed opponents to the Mobutu regime.

Mobutu and the Holden/Savimbi coalition

Jonas Savimbi was commuting between Neto in Luanda and Holden in Kinshasa to try to bring them together at a negotiating table, with view to restoring the seriously disrupted peace during the transitional period.

After the signing of the Arvor agreements, Roberto Holden, head of the FNLA decided to continue to reside in Zaire. This decision complicated several things at once. First, Holden made a miscalculation. He should have broken his Zairian exile by returning permanently to Angola and settled in Luanda, as the other two leaders had done. But he preferred to return to Kinshasa, hostile to the MPLA. This would undermine the already strained relations between the MPLA and the FNLA. Second, obliged to commute regularly between Luanda and

Kinshasa, Savimbi gradually got used to having interaction with Mobutu and, finally, fell under Mobutu's charm and influence. That is how, slowly but surely, the Mobutu/Holden/Savimbi axis against Neto was formed.

President Mobutu, Holden's "ally" in the civil war

Jomo Kenyatta, President of Kenya, tried to get involved in the Angolan situation in order to prevent the country from sinking into civil war even before independence. He succeeded in bringing the three Angolan leaders together on 16 June 1975, to his country, in Nakuru³⁰, located at 150 kilometres northwest of Nairobi. But in fact Savimbi was behind the initiative. The UNITA military forces had been victims, for the first time, on 9 June in Luanda, following the bloody clashes between MPLA and FNLA forces. It seems that it was the MPLA forces that shot UNITA soldiers. The Nakuru conference initially scheduled, for 15 June, had been postponed by 24 hours due to the delay of the MPLA delegation. The meeting almost did not take place: Neto, who still had in mind the assassination of MPLA militants and supporters by FNLA soldiers, at the beginning of May, in the cities of Mbanza-Kongo, N'Zeto, Tombaco and Uige, no longer wanted to sit at the same negotiating table with the FNLA leader, whom he called "criminal". Some African Heads of State, such as the Congolese (Brazzaville) Marien Ngouabi, the Tanzanian Julius Nyerere and the Zambian Kenneth Kaunda, had to intervene to convince Neto, taking into account their close relations with him. Finally, Neto accepted to come to Nakuru. It was also a way for Neto to say that he was "ready for dialogue".

Several newspapers titled the meeting as the "summit of the last chance", which took place from 16 to 19 June 1975. The three liberation movements agreed to unify their forces and create a national army and on the need to disarm civilians. An agreement was reached even to settle the fate of former "Katangese gendarmes", long accused of being in the service of the MPLA.

The Nakuru summit did not improve the relations between the MPLA and the FNLA. The atmosphere between the two movements remained tense. There was no understanding between the two formations. The Nakuru agreements they had just signed certainly held them captive, in their desire to rekindle the fire of armed hostilities. After Nakuru, neither of the two groups wanted to be singled out, nor did they want to be guilty in the eyes of Africa of the resumption of the war in Angola.

Unfortunately, at the beginning of July, when the three Angolan liberation movements were trying to re-establish contacts with each other in order to create a single army within the framework of the Nakuru agreements, the American Intelligence Service, the CIA, came to put fuel on the fire by sneaking in military aid to the FNLA. This irritated the MPLA, which considered this secret American aid, not only the USA willingness to take control of Angola, but above all an imminent danger of its annihilation. The MPLA then decided to expel all FNLA units stationed in Luanda.

Consequently, on 9 July, three weeks after Nakuru, violent fighting resumed in Luanda; on 14 July, the MPLA emerged victorious. The FNLA headquarters buildings were destroyed; some of the movement's leaders had to flee to Kinshasa. The transitional government collapsed like a sandcastle. The toll of these clashes was more than a thousand deaths. The scale of the fighting was such that the few UNITA soldiers could not stay or resist and would flee to the southern regions of Angola.

The Americans then decided to quickly come to the rescue of the FNLA. In order to avoid a

³⁰ Read the Journal, *Jeune Afrique* n° 756 of 4 July 1975, "Angola, after the Nakura Meeting, Can we finally talk about peace?"

- Read also the *Elima Journal*, of 6 February 1976, Kinshasa, "The Nakura Agreements".

United States physical commitment, Washington encouraged Pretoria to engage directly in Angola and asked Kinshasa, i.e. Mobutu, to provide FNLA with some units of the Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ).

After the bitter failure it had just suffered, the FNLA withdrew to the north of the country, very close to the border with Zaire. To strengthen Holden's movement, President Mobutu sent 1200 Zairian soldiers to FNLA. Already, on 14 July, the Zairian government accused the Portuguese forces of helping the MPLA forces, and even fighting alongside them. Kinshasa denounced "Portugal's duplicity" and urged Portugal to strictly respect active neutrality towards the three Angolan liberation movements. However, it was rather "Katangese gendarmes" who had fought alongside the MPLA. In a message to Lisbon, President Mobutu mentioned the possibility that Zaire could abandon its neutral attitude if Portugal did not stop supporting the MPLA.

The rest of the history of the civil war would show that Mobutu had, since then, been involved in the civil war alongside the FNLA and UNITA, which in turn benefited from South Africa's strong military, material and financial contribution.

4. President Mobutu in the Angolan civil war (1975-1996)³¹

During its summit held in Kampala, Uganda, from 28 July to 2 August 1975³², the OAU called for peace and understanding among the three Angolan leaders and proposed the establishment of a conciliation commission to that end to find a peaceful solution to the Angolan conflict, because the Continental Organization was aware of the dangerous conflagration in which Angola was on the eve of independence. The ten-member commission, which was immediately set up, went to Angola, but encountered a climate of reluctance on the part of the Angolan liberation movements; the results, exploited both by an extraordinary meeting of the OAU Defence Commission, were not as expected.

South African troops entered Angola and occupied a 35 kilometre deep strip of territory in the south of the country on August 9. Pretoria admitted its action which was carried out with Washington's approval³³. There were two reasons for this South African decision to attack Angola³⁴. The first one: for Pretoria the north-western border of South Africa, was not the border with South Africa and Namibia, but much further north, on the border of Namibia with Angola. However, SWAPO (South West African People's Organisation), the liberation movement in Namibia, operated mainly in Ovamboland, in the north of the country, and in the "famous" Caprivi corridor. Neutralized

³¹ On the subject of the Angolan Civil War, read: the Journal, *Jeune Afrique*, No. 760 of 1 August 1975, "La seconde guerre d'Angola",
- Le Journal *Jeune Afrique*, n° 767 of 19 September 1975, "Angola: A position war today, an inevitable conflagration tomorrow";
- the interesting article by B.Lanne Published in 1978 in the *Revue Afrique Contemporaine*, n° 106, "Angola from 1975 to 1979".

³² Read the Journal, *Jeune Afrique*, n° 762-63 of 15-22 August 1975, "OUA: Les heures folles du Sommet de Kampala".

³³ See J. G. Bender, 1975, "La diplomatie de M. Kissinger et l'Angola", *Revue Française d'Etudes politiques africaines*, Paris, February

³⁴ Read, R. Manning, 1976, "South Africa's Intervention in Angola", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, n° 263, February; -. R.A.Manning, 1976, "Condemnation of South Africa", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, n° 263, February.

in Zambia, where its main support was located following the "opening" made by Zambia towards South Africa, SWAPO could expect an independent Angola (especially with MPLA in power) to successfully carry out its fight against South Africa's occupation of Namibia. No diplomatic or judicial action on the validity of South Africa's mandate on Namibia had ever changed this fact.

The second reason was that the MPLA represented for the leaders in Pretoria the communist peril. With the approval of Washington haunted by the prospect of an African power (the MPLA) Marxist-inspired and powerfully supported by Moscow, it was considered a major danger, at their door (Angola). Based on this premise, South Africa was not contented with invading southern Angola to "protect its borders", but sent units far north to fight against MPLA forces. Savimbi, leader of UNITA, who controlled the southern part of Angola, warned SWAPO fighters against any attack on South African troops.

The South African intervention would turn the Angolan conflict into a truly modern war for which none of the liberation movements were prepared at all. In order to push back the South African army, the MPLA requested Moscow to provide it with weapons³⁵. This time, Moscow sent heavy weapons including the conventional arsenal, plus unmanned anti-tank missiles, Mig 21 fighter aircraft and Sam 7 anti-aircraft missiles. The MPLA soldiers, supported by the "Katangese gendarmes", did not know how to use these devices. Very quickly, at the request of the MPLA, a contingent of some 4000 Cubans, perfectly familiar with Soviet weapons, arrived in Angola in mid-August. Since 1965, about 100 Cuban soldiers had been fighting alongside the MPLA in the anti-colonial war.

During the last week of August, MPLA attacked the FNLA and recaptured the city of Caxito, and thereafter to the south west on the Atlantic, where it settled in the ports of Benguela and Lobito, and opened a new front against UNITA, this time to dislodge it from the coast and the border with Zambia, where Savimbi was collaborating with Pretoria. UNITA entered into an official alliance, in October, with the FNLA against the MPLA. The American CIA provided funds that would enable the FNLA to recruit many mercenaries.

The various camps involved were accused or accused of being assisted by foreign forces: white mercenaries (English, South African, West German, French, Belgian...), FAZ elements from Mobutu, Chinese military instructors and CIA military advisers alongside FNLA; South African soldiers alongside UNITA; Soviet, East German, Czechoslovak and Cuban military experts alongside MPLA³⁶.

In October, the military clashes led once again to the victory of the MPLA. Seriously disappointed by this new failure of the FNLA, Mobutu decided to supply UNITA. The Savimbi movement then began to receive arms, notably through an airlift between Zaire and Huambo in south-central of Angola territory. The "Hercules" planes sold by the United States to Zaire unloaded Panhard delivered by France to President Mobutu at Huambo and Cuito airports. While the FNLA attacked, with limited success, in the Caxito region, in a more ambitious offensive, the FAZ tried to force the MPLA to withdraw to the Central part of the country, its most traditional area of influence.

At the initiative of President Idi Amin Dada, current President of the OAU, a restricted conference of the OAU Conciliation Commission was convened on 1 November, in Kampala, with the presence of the three Angolan liberation movements, but the respective leaders of these movements were not present. As soon as this restricted conference opened³⁷, the USSR sent a message to the current President of the OAU warning him that Moscow "would not remain indifferent to developments in Angola".

³⁵ See S. L. Vanzyl, 1976, "Le point de vue de Moscou sur le règlement du problème angolais", *Le Monde*, n° 9649 du 20 janvier, Paris.

³⁶ Lire, R. Lefort, 1975, "Les interventions étrangères en Angola", *Le Monde Diplomatique*, n° 261, Paris, December.

³⁷ Read S. Malley, 1975, "Three military invasions characterized, designed, financed and implemented by imperialism since the Second World War", *Africa-Asia Journal*, No. 95, Monday, November 3.

The deliberations of the restricted conference lasted four days. The representatives of the three Angolan movements agreed on 4 November to form a government of national unity. But differences that remained between them prevented the constitution of the government. On the ground, fighting was raging. MPLA forces, supported by the Cubans, were going to succeed in repelling the troops led by the white mercenaries who were trying to seize Benguela, on 5 November. On the night of 5 to 6 November, the MPLA took control of Luanda airport. A breakthrough attempted on November 6 by FAZ and FNLA military units on the Bengo River to surprise the MPLA ended in failure. The next day, November 7, the Cubans and MPLA troops replaced the Portuguese military in Luanda. Thus, five days before the D Day of November 11, Dr. Agostino Neto was guaranteed to be invested President of the Republic.

Meanwhile, FNLA and UNITA created a 24-member National Revolution Council, on the evening of November 10, in Kinshasa, Zaire, in the magnificent and luxurious American Intercontinental Hotel. It was actually a coalition government. Its President "would belong to the FNLA and would have the rank of Head of State"; the Prime Minister of the coalition government "would be appointed by UNITA". In addition, they decided that Luanda remained the capital of the Republic, but that, under the circumstances (referring to their dislocation from Luanda by the MPLA), Nova-Lisboa, and renamed Huambo, would be the temporarily political headquarters.

The Portuguese Prime Minister, Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo, had announced, on 11 November at midnight, in Lisbon that "on behalf of the President of the Portuguese Republic, I solemnly acknowledge Angola's independence". In Luanda, the MPLA proclaimed the independence of the People's Republic of Angola. In Ambriz (now Soyo), an Angolan city in the northwest was under the control of the FNLA. The two movements, FNLA and UNITA jointly proclaimed the city of the People's Democratic Republic of Angola. A few days later, perhaps with Washington's admonitions about the connotation of the word People's that sounds communist Holden and Savimbi would quickly delete the french term "*Populaire*". Thus, the name of their State became the "Democratic Republic of Angola".

Fighting continued on the front between the three belligerents, during the Independence ceremonies. Angola was independent, but in the midst of a civil war. The death toll of this war, from the beginning to this month of November, was 40,000. Several African countries recognized the People's Republic of Angola.

The OAU decided to organize an extraordinary summit on Angola from 10 to 13 January 1976 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in order to find a solution to the bloody tragedy in Angola. African countries were then divided into two (22 so-called "progressive" and 22 "moderate" countries). They had to admit their inability to find a solution to the Angolan problem in the Final Communiqué reflecting the deliberations of the meeting, while expressing the bitterness and distress of most States³⁸.

³⁸ See Dossier *Draft Resolution on Angola* submitted by the called "progressive" OAU Member States to OAU the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, extraordinary session, from 10 to 12 January 1976 (Unclassified archives of the "Africa Division" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Congo in Brazzaville);

-File *Draft resolution on Angola* presented by the called "moderate" OAU Member States to the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Addis Ababa, extraordinary session from 10 to 12 January 1976 (Unclassified archives of the "Africa Division" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation of the Congo in Brazzaville).

-See - *Le Journal Jeune Afrique*, n° 784 of 16 January 1976, "Angola: the most difficult ordeal for African Unity";

- *El moudjahid*, No. 3313 of 27 February 1976, Algiers, "Le problème angolais et la division de l'Afrique".

However, violent fighting between the three formations continued and caused havoc: on the ground in Angola, with thousands of people killed. In mid-January, the FNLA suffered a severe defeat and had to flee to Zaire. Mobutu welcomed it in the hope that one day it would return to Angola with arms to overthrow the MPLA regime. MPLA troops then proposed the idea of chasing FNLA soldiers on Zairian territory. Mobutu threatened, on January 17, to declare war on the MPLA if Neto's troops entered his territory. A few days later, the MPLA led a vigorous offensive in the centre and south of the country that forced the South Africans to withdraw; UNITA lost 600 men in Huambo. At the beginning of February, the last Angolan cities fell into the hands of the MPLA, while UNITA was leaving for Namibia. The MPLA thus emerged victorious from the long and harsh confrontation, without, however, putting an end to South Africa's aggression against Angola.

However, 41 out of 46 OAU Member States had recognized the MPLA government by the end of February 1976. On the other hand, the FNLA/UNITA coalition that created the Democratic Republic of Angola with the capital Huambo had not been able to gain international legitimacy, because the South African intervention had had a disastrous effect on African opinion. Indeed, as soon as the *Washington Post* announced the presence of South African troops on 22 November 1975, many African governments reconsidered their position. No one was ready to accept two states for a single Angolan "nation". This seemed irresponsible in the eyes of some Heads of State and, despite the support; no one on the ground seemed to accept it either. The MPLA, regardless of its small national base, had won its political adventure by its international recognition.

Mobutu's reconciliation with Neto³⁹

Zaire and Angola share a common border of 2,600 kilometres. They were condemned to reach an agreement. Zaire contested, a little late, on 13 February 1976, the legitimacy of Angola's admission (since 1 December 1975) to the United Nations. But the Angolan Head of State, Agostino Neto, was a clear-sighted pragmatist. Two days later, Neto proposed to Mobutu of having "normal relations". President Mobutu, aware that Angola was hosting hundreds of thousands of "Katangese gendarmes", opponents to his regime, had every interest in seizing this opportunity offered by the Angolan President. He then made signals of reconciliation by prohibiting the transit through Zaire of FNLA and UNITA mercenaries. The two Heads of State met on March 2, in Brazzaville. Immediately after this meeting, the activities of the FNLA were put on hold in Kinshasa and throughout Zaire. Despite a rise in tension in August, Zaire officially recognized Angola on 7 January 1977. The activities of the FNLA were therefore prohibited in Zaire. A few days later, Roberto Holden received an official notification from the Kinshasa government ordering him to leave Zaire territory. France welcomed him.

The FNLA collapsed rapidly after Roberto Holden's expulsion. Jonas Savimbi, on the other hand, was both alone and sad; his movement was also on the verge of collapsing. But he was not discouraged and he found his salvation by deciding to collaborate with South Africa.

On his part, President Neto urged the "Katangese gendarmes" and their leader Nathanaël Mbumba to travel to Zambia, in March 1977, in an effort to maintain very good relations with Kinshasa. The "Katangese" turned a deaf ear and instead crossed the border into Zaire by attacking Kapanga, Dilolo, Mutshasa, cities located in Katanga, then Shaba, southern Zaire. The Zairian army, which gave the impression of being the strongest and best organized in black Africa, faced with the ordeal of confrontation with the "Katangese gendarmes", proved to be non-existent: the Zairian soldiers fled in big number from a handfuls of "Katangese rebels" by abandoning their weapons, only to disappear into the bush. It took the arrival of Moroccan troops - about 1,500 men, carried by the French Transair, a DC 8 and a Boeing 747 - at Mobutu's request, to take over the Shaba. However,

³⁹ Cf. Journal, *Jeune Afrique*, No. 816 of 16 July 1976, "Zaire et Angola: l'heure est à la réconciliation"; - *Le Monde Diplomatique*, n° 1423, from 29 January to 24 February 1976, Paris, "President Mobutu reviews his position towards Angola".

the "Katangese gendarmes" were actually returning home to Katanga, which Mobutu had renamed "Shaba". Mobutu, for his part, accused Angola of having facilitated this operation to invade the Shaba. This would call into question the agreement between Zaire and Angola.

In order to induce anti-Cuban sentiments in the Western world, Mobutu decided to act: he said it loudly and clearly that he had seen Cuban soldiers alongside the "Katangese gendarmes". This created anti-Cuban psychosis in the West: Zaire had to be protected against communist danger at all costs! This worked in favour of UNITA: Paris then decided to provide weapons to UNITA. And Mobutu, who took the opportunity, tried to make his friend, King Hassan II of Morocco, understand the need to support UNITA. Savimbi, the head of UNITA met the King of Morocco in October, in Rabat. This meeting would completely change Savimbi's situation: UNITA's military cadres would be trained at the Benguerir base, not far from Marrakech, and Savimbi would then have a real external headquarters in Rabat; the Moroccan government would provide Savimbi with weapons. Through King Hassan II, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Shah of Iran would provide Savimbi with money, a lot of money. Egypt would also provide him with weapons and train his officers.

But there was a problem: from where should the weapons supplied by France transit? through Morocco? through Egypt? Zaire! It was not possible. This country, which had just experienced the Shaba war against the "Katangese" from Angola, which proclaimed its neutrality, had no intention of allowing the transit through its territory of weapons destined for UNITA. This could be used as a pretext for the Angolan government to grant other logistical facilities to the "Katangese gendarmes". Political realism and economic imperatives (the reopening of the Benguela railway would allow Zaire to export its copper at a lower cost) prevailed. By South Africa, Savimbi proposed. But neither France nor any other country wanted to deal with this apartheid country. Savimbi went alone to try to talk to the South Africans. But the latter were reluctant and blamed Washington for pushing them into Angola in August 1975 and then letting them down. They said "no". Savimbi insisted, implored and finally South Africa gave in. It allowed logistics for UNITA to pass through its territory. After the time of despair, Savimbi's time of re-conquest began. And he was no longer alone this time facing his destiny. At the head of the kwachas (Savimbi guerrillas) were South African forces. From March 1978, the Savimbi rebel really went on to (re) conquer Angola. And Luanda now had to face the UNITA guerrillas, who were supported by South Africa. Thus, Angola slipped into one (other) civil war. As illustrated in the above chronology, from February 1979 (South African bombings in the Lubango area and a deadly South African army raid on the Namibian refugee camps in Cassinga) to 31 May 1991, date of the signing between the MPLA and UNITA of the ceasefire agreement, as well as the political liberation process leading to elections in 1993, and the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, during which the South African army and UNITA suffered an unforgettable defeat.

Mobutu's policy shift⁴⁰

From 1985, Mobutu was again involved in the Angolan conflict. He was given the opportunity, when the United States decided to save UNITA, because Savimbi's movement was cornered in southern Angola. For UNITA, redeployment to the North was then a matter of life and death. Mobutu allowed this reorganization with American support. Thus, it was from the American base at Kamina, in south-central Zaire, that UNITA troops were trained, a few hundred kilometres from the border with Angola. The joint American-Zairian manoeuvres known as "Flintlock 88" left stocks of weapons in the military bases of Kitona, Kikunzu, Dilolo and Kamina, which were later transported to the UNITA maquis. Zaire had remained the hub for arms transport to UNITA-controlled territories. On 18 December 1995, a cargo plane belonging to Trans Service Airlift, owned by Seti Yale, one of the "baron" of the Kinshasa regime, special adviser to Mobutu, most often residing in Portugal and

⁴⁰ Our development is based on the chapter by André Kisalu Kiala in his book, *Le drame angolais*, and p.171-208.

managing the President's personal fortune, crashed in Jamba, the "capital" of UNITA, Angola. And on 8 January 1996, Kinshasa experienced one of the most spectacular, absurd and deadly disasters in the history of aviation. Overloaded, full of weapons for UNITA, an Antonov aircraft - which the Zairian population calls "flying garbage" - from the SCIBE airline of Bemba Saolona, another "baron" of the Mobutist regime, crashed into the Type K market, near the "Simba zikita" market, shortly after its takeoff from Ndolo airport, killing 350 people!

Mobutu's support for Savimbi was most evident in January 1993. For refusing the result of the presidential and legislative elections of 29 and 30 September 1992, civil war between government forces and UNITA had resumed. Since mid-January, UNITA fighters, supported by the FAZ of Mobutu who came by boat from the nearby border, surrounded the town of Soyo, in the northwest of the country, at the mouth of the Congo River, the main rear base for oil exploitation in Angola where five foreign companies had facilities: Petrobras (Brazil), Elf-Aquitaine (France), Texaco (USA), Agip (Italy) and Fina (Belgium). Meanwhile, in Huambo, where violent fighting continued, the government army headquarters had captured three Zairian soldiers fighting alongside UNITA.

In conclusion, it appears in fact that Mobutu's investment was not "free" in the Angolan case. Zairian ambitions towards Angola were profound and historic: Mobutu kept an eye on the rich mineral resources (especially diamonds) that abounded in the northeast of Angola and on the rich oil-producing enclave of Cabinda. He was firmly and maliciously counting on a "Zairianization" of Angola, which would have allowed him to gain control over the future Angolan government. This could justify Mobutu's effective participation in all the conciliation/reconciliation commissions of the three liberation movements throughout his reign.

In addition, the vast border region had always been a relatively open passage, where the Kongo traders in the region, maintained close relations on both sides of the border. In fact, 300,000 Angolans crossed the border between the two countries and traffic between the two countries was intense. Much of Luanda's supplies came from what was then Zaire, in Luanda, the capital, as the "Zaires", which are in fact the Angolans who lived in Zaire. Moreover, in the border regions, especially since the Angolan economy had practically ceased to function since the 1970s, the border regions were *de facto* integrated into the Zairian economy.

The socio-economic assistance that Congo-Kinshasa/Zaire provided throughout the anti-colonial war to the Angolans cannot be overlooked. Congo-Kinshasa had welcomed more than one million Angolan refugees to its territory. He had given them shelter and land. Angolan refugees were admitted to hospitals, clinics, schools and universities. In fifteen years, from 1961 to 1975, Congo-Kinshasa had trained more technical staff for Angola than Portugal in four centuries of colonization, including engineers, agronomists, doctors, high school and university teachers⁴¹.

⁴¹ See information acquired from Angolan intellectuals who were refugees in Brazzaville and who have decided not to return to Angola at the end of hostilities.

2. Congo-Brazzaville in the history of Angola's liberation struggle⁴²

As far as the history of the liberation struggles in southern Africa is concerned, it appears; from the abundant written and oral documentation that Congo-Brazzaville could be considered as one of the countries of French-speaking black Africa that had been most actively involved in the struggle for the liberation of southern Africa. Indeed, Congo-Brazzaville supported the liberation struggles of Angola, Namibia, Mozambique and South Africa against apartheid.

Congo-Brazzaville, like Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire), was directly and actively involved in the history of Angola's liberation struggle, at the diplomatic and military levels, since 1960.

Congo-Brazzaville had taken a position in the Angolan case as soon as it became independent. Indeed, the government of Father Fulbert Youlou, through his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stéphane Tchichelle, expressed the following Congo's position at the United Nations, on 15 October 1960:

Can President Salazar be less generous than General De Gaulle and Queen Elizabeth of England? The African people of Angola are asking to be considered as men, citizens, voters and that their elected representatives can discuss, on an equal footing, with the Portuguese settlers who certainly have rights, but no more than the indigenous population⁴³.

In other words, Minister Tchichelle had spoken out against the inquisition procedures applied by Portugal in its African colonies: imprisonment of people who expressed peaceful ideals, destruction of radio equipment to prevent the hearing of foreign broadcasts, brutality endured due to merciless Portuguese officials. In his conclusion, the Congolese Minister called for United Nations intervention and spoke out in favour of the development of genuine nationalism, not a nationalism that would lead, in reverse, to xenophobia and racism. Congo-Brazzaville had made every effort to demonstrate that Angola was a colony, not a "Portuguese province", and therefore an extension of the kingdom of Portugal, as claimed by Portugal.

Congo-Brazzaville demonstrated, in 1961, at the 16th session of the United Nations, contrary to Portugal's allegations at the time, that Angola was indeed at war⁴⁴: the two Congo were constantly receiving hundreds of refugees from Angola every day: between 120,000 and 180,000 for that year 1961. These refugees were even hunted beyond the borders of these two countries and often arrested. During that session, Congo-Brazzaville and 23 other African States requested the Security Council to meet specifically on the question of Angola's decolonization; it was also invited to stop the war in Angola. But this approach did not succeed, because the "Western" countries led them to believe that the situation in the Portuguese territories did not constitute a serious threat to peace and security in Africa and the world.

The governments of both Congo met in June 1963, in a boat on the Congo

⁴² This chapter, based on the abundant written documentation presented in the Annex, has benefited from the annotations of former Congolese ambassadors from the "Frontline States", former Congolese administrative and political leaders of the MNR (Mouvement National de la Révolution) Massamba-Débat era, the PCT...

⁴³ See Journal, *La Semaine Africaine*, n° 424 of 16 October 1961, Brazzaville, "Mr Tchichelle speaks about Angola at the UN".

⁴⁴ See *Revue Présence africaine*, n° 42, op. cit., p.101-103.

River, to discuss the "Angolan problem". In the final communiqué published at the end of the meeting, they invited Portugal to begin the process of Angola⁴⁵ decolonization. In July 1963, President Fulbert Youlou invited the nationalist parties to unite in a more effective struggle against the Portuguese colonizer:

You have the right to do everything, to choose your policy, your tactics, but you do not have the right to fail; you have the duty to succeed, and even to succeed quickly⁴⁶.

Portugal recalled its Ambassador from Congo as an immediate reaction to this speech and decided to cut off all diplomatic relations with Congo. The aim of the speech was to unite again the MPLA and the FNLA, a step that had started on July 7, 1962 but failed. At that time, diplomatic support and the representativeness of political parties were necessary for the credibility of the Angolan Revolutionary Government in Exile (GRAE), formed in Kinshasa on 5 April 1962, following the unification agreement between the UPA and the PDA (these two parties had merged on 26 March 1962 and formed the FNLA).

It became impossible for the MPLA leaders to stay in 1963, in the Democratic Republic of Congo: its militants were persecuted or attacked by the leaders of the GRAE. It was under these conditions that the MPLA had to leave Leopoldville for Brazzaville where President Alphonse Massamba-Débat, of "socialist" obedience, welcomed it. The leaders of the MPLA were granted, that time, Congolese diplomatic passports issued by the Congo-Brazzaville authorities, in order to facilitate participation in UN or OAU meetings. The MPLA used Radio-Congo every night to raise awareness among its militants, Angolan national opinion and international opinion about its liberation struggle.

From 26 to 30 August 1966, Brazzaville hosted the meeting of the Governing Council of the Organisations Nationalist Conference of the Portuguese Colonies (CONCP). On that occasion, the President of Congo-Brazzaville, Alphonse Massamba-Débat, received the following message:

The CONCP warmly welcomes President Alphonse Massamba-Débat and expresses its thanks to the Congolese people, the government and the National Movement of the Revolution (MNR) for having hosted the meeting of our Council; expresses its deep gratitude for the fraternal solidarity it has shown towards the struggle of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies and, in particular, the Angolan people against colonialism, expresses its sympathy, solidarity and unconditional support for the struggle led by the brotherly people of the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville for progress and social well-being, as well as its important contribution towards the total liberation of Africa⁴⁷.

This message demonstrated the Congo-Brazzaville's firm commitment to support the Angolan people in their fight against Portuguese domination.

Agostino Neto, President of the MPLA, announced on 3 February 1968, at a press conference in Brazzaville, the transfer of the MPLA headquarters inside Angola.

Under the mandate of President Marien Ngouabi, Brazzaville hosted on 9 December 1968, a meeting of the Angolan Committee of Good Offices aimed at forming a common front of nationalist movements. This Committee had not been

⁴⁵ See F. Kimina Makoumbou, 1963, "Neither dialogue nor rupture with Portugal, declare the Heads of State of the two Congo", Journal *La Semaine Africaine*, n° 564 of 23 June.

⁴⁶ J.P. Essah, 1963, "Les attaques concentrées contre le Portugal et l'Afrique du Sud", *La Semaine Africaine* du dimanche 21 juillet.

⁴⁷) Quoted by R. Davezies, 1968, *La guerre d'Angola*, Bordeaux, ed. Ducrot, p. 77.

able to achieve its objective, because not all the movements ever agreed on the reunification of the fronts. This Committee eventually dissolved and became part of the MPLA.

Congo-Brazzaville government agreed to organize, in February 1969, demonstrations marking the 8th anniversary of the outbreak of armed struggle in 1961 by the Angolan people. In the same year, the Congolese Armed Forces compelled a Portuguese plane to land in Pointe-Noire. The government made a declaration to this effect to reiterate its continued support for the "heroic struggle" of the Angolan people.

During the celebration of the "Day of Solidarity with African Peoples in Struggle", on 24 April 1971, in Brazzaville, Congo strongly condemned Portugal, denounced the massacres perpetrated in Angola by the Portuguese armed forces and protested also against NATO.

Following the OAU recommendation, Presidents Marien Ngouabi of Congo-Brazzaville and Mobutu of Zaire organized a meeting on 8 June 1972, in Brazzaville, with the participation of Roberto Holden, President of the FNLA and Agostino Neto, President of the MPLA. The purpose of this meeting was to set up a common platform between the FNLA and the MPLA. The final communiqué noted the willingness of the two movements to unite their forces to liberate Angola from Portuguese domination.

Still under the auspices of the OAU, Congo-Brazzaville, represented by its President, Marien Ngouabi, participated in the meeting in Bukavu, South-East Zaire, on 27 July 1974. These meetings were led by the OAU Secretary General, Eteki Mboumoua. The meeting was attended by MPLA Neto, Chipenda and Mario de Andrade and FNLA Roberto Holden. The objective was to build a unified national movement to accelerate the decolonization process. Unfortunately, this objective was not achieved.

Another conference was held a month later, in Brazzaville, from 31 August to 2 September 1974, with the participation of the following countries: Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zaire.

There was only one item on the agenda: the decolonization of the African territories of the Portuguese empire, including Angola.

Three months later, on 3 January 1975, the Mombasa Agreement (Kenya) reduced Congo and Zaire's claims to the Cabinda Enclave. In this Agreement, MPLA, FNLA and UNITA recognized, after having agreed on a common platform, that the Cabinda Enclave was an integral part of Angola.

Unfortunately, all these diplomatic efforts never brought the Angolan problem to a successful conclusion: Portugal and the nationalist movements continued the war of liberation until the victory of the Angolan nationalists. Angola's independence was proclaimed on 11 November 1975 in the midst of a civil war between the MPLA and the FNLA/UNITA coalition. The problem that arose from that moment was the recognition of the People's Republic of Angola proclaimed by the MPLA in Luanda and the Democratic Republic of Angola proclaimed by the FNLA/UNITA coalition in Huambo. Congo-Brazzaville played a very important role in the recognition of the People's Republic of Angola. It contributed to the resolution of the dispute between Angola and Zaire, which supported the FNLA. It all began at the OAU Summit in Addis Ababa in January 1976, when the Congo adopted a conciliatory attitude: which led the OAU to let it mediate between Angola and Zaire. To maintain a policy of good neighbourliness, Angolan Prime Minister Do Nascimento made a solemn appeal to Zaire on 2 February 1976 with a view to normalizing relations between Angola and Zaire. After several meetings between the technicians of the two countries, the

following prerequisites were established to achieve the normalization of their relations:

- Zaire shall refrain from interfering in Angola's internal affairs;
- Zaire shall recognize Angola within its borders, that is, including Cabinda;
- Zaire shall accept the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, as this issue is solely a matter of the sovereignty of the Angolan State.
- These three prerequisites were not incompatible with those formulated by Zaire's representatives in Brazzaville, namely:
- the demobilization and repatriation of the 6,000 "Katangese gendarmes" who served in the MPLA ranks;
- guarantees shall be given that Cuban troops do not constitute a threat to Zaire, and will not seek to export "their revolution";
- Settlement of the issue of Angolan refugees living in Zaire.

Presidents Agostino Neto and Mobutu had a one-to-one meeting, on February 28, 1976. At the end of which a joint communiqué was drafted and signed. It was based on three points: the composition of a permanent ministerial commission to ensure the demobilization and repatriation of the "Katangese gendarmes" who constituted a danger to the Kinshasa regime; both countries undertook to pursue a policy of good neighbourliness based on peaceful coexistence to the implementation of the agreements. The repatriation of FNLA/UNITA coalition fighters also constituted a danger to the power of the MPLA. The assistance of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees was required for this repatriation operation. By this agreement, Zaire recognized the People's Republic of Angola.

Congo continued to support the Marxist power in Luanda until the official recognition by the OAU and the UN of the People's Republic of Angola.

Congo's firm commitment was also important and decisive in military terms. Since 1964, Congo had been used as a fall back base during the anti-colonial liberation war. In addition, Brazzaville hosted the political-military headquarters of the MPLA. The building still exists today in the south Brazzaville, in a district known as Makelekele, and remains the property of the Angolan State. From 1971 to 1991, we lived next to the villa called Neto, his residence in Brazzaville located in the industrial district called Mpila, near the private residence of the current Head of State Denis Sassou N'guesso. Near the town of Dolisie, southwest of Brazzaville, the MPLA military base known as "Mafubu" was established in 1964. The choice of Dolisie was strategic and tactical for the guerrillas who operated in the forests of North Cabinda where the MPLA maquis were located.

At the height of the armed struggle, Congo had made its airports available to the Angolan armed forces. War materials were transported through the international airports of Maya-Maya in Brazzaville and Pointe-Noire, which is now known as "Agostino Neto". The Pointe-Noire seaport was also used for this purpose.

In conclusion, it is important to note that it is the divergence of political options of the liberation movements that never allowed the unification of nationalist forces: the MPLA, with its "progressive" tendency, was naturally supported by the "Marxist" Congo and the FNLA/UNITA coalition, with its "moderate" tendency, was supported by Zaire, and then considered as "anti-communist". And Africa was thus divided in these years of Angola's liberation struggle into "progressive" and "moderate". This did not facilitate the OAU's task at the height of the civil war, during the extraordinary summit it convened in Addis Ababa, from 10 to 13 January 1976.

The following countries were considered as "progressive": Algeria, Benin,

Burundi, Cape Verde (Islands), Chad, Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritius (Island), Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Sao Tome and Principe (Island of), Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania.

The following countries were considered as "moderate": Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia.

The "Brazzaville Protocol" of 13 December 1988⁴⁸

This diplomatic act could be considered as a major act of President Denis Sassou Nguesso in resolving the problem not only in Angola, but also in Namibia's accession to independence. It was even a prelude to the evolution of the South African regime and the various democratization processes under way in southern Africa and, finally, to the release of Nelson Mandela.

It was on May 13, 1988, to everyone's surprise, that Brazzaville hosted the special meeting between Angola and South Africa, two parties directly involved in tripartite negotiations between Cuba, Angola and South Africa, under the mediation of the USA. Surprisingly, it is true that, according to corroborating sources, it was neither Cuba nor Angola, friends of the Congo, that chose Brazzaville, but apartheid South Africa. Denis Sassou Nguesso's struggle throughout his tenure at the OAU against apartheid and for the liberation of the Continent, far from generating South Africa's hostility towards Congo, had rather aroused admiration and respect.

South Africa felt it was time to get rid of its marginalising and inhuman system before it sounds their death knell. South Africa had made it clear that, its entry to Africa and the world, as a new nation accepted by the international community, was through Brazzaville and that it was no longer acceptable for negotiations to be held outside Africa. Despite opposition from other parties, South Africa had insisted that this should be the case, and it was.

The negotiations generally focused on the "linkage" between UN Resolution 435/78 on Namibia's independence under the South West Africa mandate and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. The negotiations that began in London in May 1988, around a timetable for the simultaneous withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angolan territory, culminated on 13 December 1988 with the signing of the historic "Brazzaville Protocol" in the Banquet Hall of the Presidential Palace, after several phases of difficult and laborious negotiations. It was in New York, on 22 December 1988, that the agreement between Cuba and Angola on the modalities for the withdrawal of Cuban troops was finalized.

This ceremony took place in the Security Council Chamber. Vernon A. Walters, Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, addressed a

⁴⁸ Read, on this subject: J.M. Kamba, "Les grands moments de la diplomatie congolaise sous Denis Sassou-N'Guesso", in *Le regard diplomatique. Revue congolaise d'études et de pratiques diplomatiques*, n° 1, October-November 2008, p.21-37.

- the interview with Herman Cohen, former Director for African Affairs at the National Security Council (1987-1989), former US Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs (1989-1990): "American mediation and quadripartite negotiations on peace in Southern Africa", in *Le regard diplomatique. Revue congolaise d'études et de pratiques diplomatiques*, n° 2, janvier-février 2009, p.77-80.

letter to his colleague, Ambassador Martin Adouki, Permanent Representative of the Congo to the United Nations, on 20 December 1988, which was an invitation from the United States Government to the Congo to attend the above mentioned ceremony.

Denis Sassou N'guesso had to get personally involved, day and night, to achieve this result and to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion. It will be recalled that London, Cairo, New York, Cape Verde and Geneva, the cities where the first phases of negotiations took place, had not succeeded in bringing them to a successful conclusion. It was in Brazzaville that the issue of southern Africa and apartheid was resolved.

For the record, it should be recalled that the United States Government, which had doubts about the Congo, expressed its satisfaction by transmitting official congratulations and thanks to President Denis Sassou N'guesso and to his Government for his personal investment that had enabled the conclusion of the negotiations. Appreciating the positive role played by Congo in the "tripartite", President Ronald Reagan's former Security Advisor, Herman Cohen, observed at the time that it was not the tradition of the United States to congratulate people, especially in foreign policy, and that Denis Sassou N'guesso's efforts in this area had been warmly welcomed by the American administration. Under-Secretary of State, Chester Crocker, who led the mediation, was personally impressed by Denis Sassou N'guesso's substantial and decisive support throughout the negotiations. After each round of negotiations, a briefing was made to President Denis Sassou N'guesso. Whenever there was a stalemate, he was used to persuade both sides on the need to narrow differences.

Thus, the Congo had not only hosted the decisive phases of the negotiations, but had also contributed effectively to their successful conclusion.

B- Congo-Brazzaville's support for the liberation movements in southern Africa (ANC, SWAPO, FRELIMO)

The "Brazzaville Protocol", which marked the successful conclusion of these long and difficult negotiations, made possible to achieve the following: the end of apartheid, the liberation of Nelson Mandela, the withdrawal of Cuban and South African troops from Angola, the Namibia's independence and the advent of the new South Africa.

Given the scope of this diplomatic act, we publish below the interview of President Denis Sassou-N'guesso with the French journalist Michel Aveline⁴⁹. The President of the Republic of Congo, Denis Sassou-N'guesso, reveals for the first time, in this exceptional interview, "the practical art of diplomat in the field", on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the "Brazzaville Protocol" (13 December 1988-13 December 2008).

This interview allows us to appreciate both the place of Congo in the history of southern African liberation movements, such as the ANC, SWAPO, FRELIMO, and even in the liberation of Nelson Mandela.

Michel Aveline: Mr. President, can you tell us how you entered the process of the 85-90s that would lead to Mandela's liberation and the end of apartheid, a flashback in time?

Denis Sassou Nguesso: It must be said that it was a long struggle, a great event of global significance with the end of apartheid and the liberation of Mandela. Around the years 1986-1987, we witnessed a kind of acceleration of history. Fortunately, this

⁴⁹ Interview with H.E. Denis Sassou-N'Guesso, President of the Republic of Congo, "My contribution to the quadripartite negotiations on peace in Southern Africa (1988)", in *Le regard diplomatique. Revue congolaise d'études et de pratiques diplomatiques*, n° 2, janvier-février 2009, p.13-26.

coincided with the period during which we modestly assumed the OAU chairmanship. Indeed, we placed this mandate under the banner of the struggle against apartheid. It was necessary to conduct a campaign to win the idea of economic sanctions against South Africa. During our mandate, we participated in this campaign through a series of initiatives: to travel across the world to raise awareness in the international community of the negative effects of the heinous apartheid system. Attentive to the cry of the hearts of the "Frontline States", we organized a "Literary Symposium against Apartheid" in Brazzaville, from 25 to 31 May 1987, which was a very important event. All writers from Africa and around the world gathered in Brazzaville and took part in this "Literary Symposium against Apartheid", under the theme: "Writers Blame Apartheid".⁵⁰ In the final Communiqué of the meeting, the writers recommended the creation of an anti-apartheid committee in each country and the organization of "Nelson Mandela" sports tournaments, just as the first lesson of the new school year in all African schools should be devoted to apartheid.

At the same time, we had been comforted by the decision of the American Senate, which supported this dynamic by voting in 1987 for economic sanctions against apartheid, which was a very important turning point. I must also recall that during the same period, at the 8th Summit of the "Non-Aligned Movement" in September 1986, in Harare (Zimbabwe), the Heads of State and Government took, on the basis of our initiative, an important decision by the establishment of the "Africa Fund" to support the struggle of the Frontline States against the apartheid system.

In this regard, I recall that the establishment of this Fund attracted support around the world. In the case of India, for example, there have been donations of equipment such as rails to rehabilitate the railways of the "Frontline States." As far as our country is concerned, we launched a vast popular movement in addition to the Government's contribution. All Congolese, including children, contributed as a sign of solidarity to this vast international movement.

Michel Aveline: A few words on the OAU and liberation struggles: Can you explain this process and the institution of the "Africa Fund" to us?

Denis Sassou-N'guesso: We took over from President Abdou Diouf, who had taken good initiatives throughout his term of office. At the level of the OAU, there was a committee to support all liberation struggles, not only the struggle against apartheid, but also the struggle for the decolonization of the former Portuguese colonies.

With regard to the "Africa Fund", it must be said that it was at the Harare Summit that all the "non-aligned countries" solemnly decided to mobilize financial and material resources to support the "Frontline States". This is a major political decision. During this summit, an Africa Fund management committee was set up. The Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, was entrusted with the chairmanship of the management committee of this Fund.

In January 1987, the summit of the Fund's management committee was held in New Delhi to define the concrete modalities and management mechanisms of the Fund. Each State had to mobilize, according to its possibilities, various resources from States, people or companies.

⁵⁰ We took part in this Symposium as a "Member" of the Scientific Committee and submitted a paper, see Bibliography, in Annex.

It was a vast movement that culminated; it must be said, with support for the "Frontline States". So for the OAU, it was a major political action. At each summit, we received liberation movements that reported on their actions such as: SWAPO, MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO, ANC and PLO.

I think the high point was when it came to persuading the international community to impose sanctions against the heinous apartheid system and the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435/78 on Namibia.

It should be recalled that a link was established between the implementation of resolution 435/78 and the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola. After President Diouf's term as OAU chairman from 1985 to 1986, we took over. I believe that President Diouf had focused on holding a United Nations special session on the economic situation in Africa. It will be recalled that the United Nations devoted a special session of the General Assembly to this subject. Important decisions were made. After Diouf, our mandate, as I said earlier, focused on accelerating the process of implementing resolution 435/78 and eliminating the heinous system of apartheid.

Michel Aveline. Let us return to the quadripartite negotiations. The first meeting took place in London and you remember, and very quickly we talk about Brazzaville. How Brazzaville has established itself as the geographical and geopolitical point of this sensitive issue from the late '80s?

Denis Sassou-Nguesso: I was saying earlier that there has been a kind of acceleration in history. The US Senate adopts economic sanctions against apartheid, the effects of which are being felt in South Africa. Many observers thought that the conditions were in place for more initiatives to be taken in this direction. You could feel something moving in South Africa. After welcoming the initiative of the US Senate, we were looking for a kind of trigger. Brazzaville was not chosen at random. After some signals observed in South Africa, some friends felt that it may be necessary to promote direct contact between Angola and USA.

This was not easy at the time, because of the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. We agreed to promote this direct contact between the USA and Angola. We received Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, whom we met in Brazzaville to discuss this matter.

In the absence of President Dos Santos of Angola, we took the initiative to invite Minister Rodriguez Kito to establish direct contact with Mr. Chester Crocker. I think that this was also an important trigger. So we succeeded in this first contact at a governmental level. Contacts continued in Luanda. I think that these contacts made it possible, in part, to accelerate the development of the situation until the organization of this first meeting in London.

Michel Aveline: The secret services, like some retired South African diplomats, confirm that they had indeed suggested that this meeting be held in Brazzaville, that their choice was dictated by the fact that you were the only person able to influence the American position on Angola. According to my sources of information, the Angolans were sometimes a little reserved about the choice of Brazzaville, whereas they are your friends?

Denis Sassou Nguesso: The choice of Brazzaville was not easy because before Brazzaville, there were meetings in London, Cairo, Geneva, New York and then Cape Verde. We have taken risks, including in terms of our domestic policy, to foster contacts and to be confident that South Africa is truly ready to move forward. We could not take bold initiatives if we were not sure that South Africa was ready. That is when we made the decision, I think, historic; our people being totally opposed, because they were fighting on the front line against apartheid.

Despite this opposition, we took the decision, in total secrecy, to send to South Africa, I believe this is the first time I have spoken publicly about it, Foreign Minister

Ndinga Oba, in early 1987, together with the officer in charge of my security, Colonel Pierre OBA, to contact the South African authorities so as to be sure that the time had come to move forward. I did not give the information to the people, to the leadership of my Party, the Congolese Labour Party (a single party at the time very powerful), or to the Government. So I decided to make this secret contact.

My two envoys brought me back elements that convinced me that South Africa was in the right spirit to take part in these negotiations in Brazzaville. Other elements undoubtedly contributed to the choice of Brazzaville, since after various consultations on the choice of location, it had been specified that after Cairo, negotiations could take place in Brazzaville. There were probably reservations from some of them, I don't know! Maybe our Angolan friends too! Finally, we are simply saying that all parties agreed to hold the negotiations in Brazzaville.

Michel Aveline: these negotiations led to the Brazzaville Protocol?

Denis Sassou-N'guesso: Yes, the Brazzaville Protocol was concluded on 13 December 1988 at around 1 p.m., after four rounds of negotiations.

Whenever there was a pitfall, no one wanted to rush things. We preferred to stop everything and ask the parties to consult their respective Governments rather than to venture down a path that could lead to failure. As soon as there was any difficulty, the delegations consulted us and we gave some advice on the spot. There were times when, at the request of the Americans and South Africans, a meeting was suspended to allow them to cross the Congo River and contact President Mobutu in Kinshasa. The same was true of President Houphouët-Boigny in Abidjan, who was closely following the outcome of this case. In this regard, President Houphouët-Boigny had permanently assigned his Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr Siméon Ake, to Brazzaville to follow these negotiations. There was also the representative of the United Nations Secretary General on Namibia, Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, who was also based in Brazzaville. Similarly, the Soviets had their representative who was not directly involved in the negotiations.

The negotiations concerned Cuba, Angola, South Africa, with the USA as mediator. In reality, the USA did not only play the role of mediator. They were indirectly involved in this issue from the "linkage" they established between the implementation of resolution 435/78 on Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of Cuban troops. So it was a real challenge.

This process, which began in May 1988 in London, continued in Cairo, New York, Cape Verde and Geneva and ended in Brazzaville, after several rounds, with the signing of this "Brazzaville Protocol".

The Brazzaville negotiations began in August 1988 and the "Brazzaville Protocol" was signed on 13 December 1988 in the Banquet Hall of our Presidential Palace. The negotiations did not go so smoothly. They lasted several months. We would contact the South African authorities and then establish contact between the Angolans and the Americans.

In the meantime, there were several negotiations. Negotiations were held at the Mbamou Palace Hotel. We had our employees there who were there all the time. During the negotiations, they provided us with each other's positions, which we should carefully pass on to the other delegations. We saw Pick Botha, Mallan, arrive in the South African delegation.

For the record, we had to engage in lengthy negotiations with our youth who wanted to oppose the arrival of Pick Botha and Mallan. For these young people, it was out of

the question to receive in Brazzaville the figures of the heinous apartheid system. This was a delicate situation for our internal policy. We had to stop the demonstrations that Congolese youth wanted to organize at the airport against these South African leaders. So it wasn't that simple. It was necessary to get involved consistently, in order to reconcile the positions of both sides. It was necessary to be informed and to remain attentive to the progress of the negotiations. In this regard, we found here a note that was sent to us at the time by officials about South Africa's concern that, in the midst of negotiations, South Africa had been informed by their security services about the movement of Cuban warships bringing in new troops to massacre them towards southern Angola, as this sensitive information was likely to block the negotiation process. So we had to manage all this.

Similarly, there was the internal Angolan question with the "Savimbi case" which, at one point, was introduced as one of the negotiating points by South Africa. This issue was the subject of a special meeting in Franceville (Gabon) between the negotiations. The question of Nelson Mandela's release was raised for the first time. These are therefore elements that were coming to us and that we should move wisely to the delegations in order to move the talks forward. It was therefore a long process and the successful conclusion of this process with the signing of the "Brazzaville Protocol" on 13 December 1988 is to be welcomed.

Michel Aveline: Mr President, in the same vein, I would like you to recall this little trial of strength you had with François Mitterrand at the dawn of the France-Africa Summit in Lomé on the possible visit of the South African President, Peter BOTHA, to Paris for a commemorative ceremony in memory of the South Africans who died in the 1914-1918 war.

Denis Sassou-N'guesso: As I said, the struggle against the apartheid system had accelerated between 86-87 and 88. In Congo, since we were campaigning for economic sanctions against the apartheid regime, we opposed, for example, the stopover in Brazzaville for the flight of the French airline UTA from Paris to Johannesburg. The Government had to take a decision to stop the UTA stopover in Brazzaville. It may have been very difficult for our French friends, but we remained firm on this position. As a result, UTA had to decide to make a stopover in Kinshasa.

When we were the current Chairman of the OAU, in 1986-1987, President Peter Botha, in agreement with the French Government, intended to visit France to commemorate the event. In Africa, we felt that President Mitterrand could not receive Peter Botha, the apartheid leader, in Paris and meet African leaders at the France-Africa summit. I informed François Mitterrand that such an event could seriously compromise the France-Africa summit in Lomé. I believe that we had managed to defeat President Botha's visit to France and thus promote the success of the France-Africa Summit in Lomé.

Michel Aveline: How do you feel about the question of the business world under apartheid at the time?

Denis Sassou-N'guesso: I think that in Africa, before we took the straight line, the generally accepted idea was that of sanctions. It was excluded that Africa would have economic and trade relations with South Africa. These are not measures that have always worked 100%. The "Frontline States", South Africa's neighbours, could not, for reasons of isolation, avoid economic relations with this country. We thought that was obvious. In Africa, other distant countries maintained economic relations with South Africa during this period. But many countries have remained firm. Congo was one of the group of African countries that maintained the principle of not maintaining economic and trade relations with South Africa. When we came to the straight line, I think of that period, 86, 87, 88, with the vote on economic sanctions against South Africa by the

American Senate, there was a hardening of positions and perhaps even mutual monitoring. We could feel things moving in Africa. Companies had started to leave South Africa and move elsewhere. In short, everyone was following this movement closely. At the African level, and increasingly, there had been a growing awareness among many leaders that positions need to be strengthened. This was a period marked by stronger positions at the level of all States; South Africa felt this quite harshly in economic terms.

Michel Aveline: So before being recognized, the ANC was in hiding?

Denis Sassou-N'guesso: Congo has generally supported the liberation movements in southern Africa. More precisely, before Mandela's liberation, the Congo provided support in various forms to Namibia, through SWAPO, which had part of its headquarters in the Congo. SWAPO was on our radio almost every day to spread its message about the liberation struggle. We had, with the help of Norway, opened a school in Loudima (southwest Brazzaville) for Namibian children who were in southern Angola to escape South Africa's bombing on Angola.

We have therefore provided direct support to Namibia and Mozambique. We had political and diplomatic contacts with the ANC. It was especially after Mandela's release that we provided material assistance to the ANC, especially when it came to supporting the reintegration of ANC militants who were abroad. We also intervened on behalf of the «Frontline States», in particular Angola, Namibia and Mozambique.

Michel Aveline: What is the meaning of Nelson Mandela's visit to Brazzaville on February 11, 1991 after his release?

Denis Sassou-N'guesso: It was an honour and a great pleasure for the Congolese people to welcome President Mandela to Brazzaville on 11 February 1991, an astonishing coincidence with his release on 11 February 1990. I remember, we were to make a State visit to Washington at the invitation of President Bush. I believe that the Americans were satisfied with the role played by the Congo in these negotiations, and President Bush invited me to make a State visit. It was over the Atlantic, before landing in Washington, that the pilot announced the release of Nelson Mandela on February 11, 1990.

We organized a party by holding a meeting on the plane. All the passengers were overjoyed. It was great excitement. When I saw this spontaneous movement of people coming and going, I was worried about the balance of the plane. But it was a party. After that day that we lived over the Atlantic, a year later, on February 11, 1991, Mandela would visit Brazzaville. The whole population was on the streets. I remember that moment, after the big reception here at the Palace, we found ourselves somewhere in a small circle to express our joy more.

President Mandela got up to dance. The image was so moving that Miriam Makéba broke down into tears. She said she was very moved to see this free man share his freedom through dancing and body expression. It was therefore a very important moment for us to have this direct contact with President Mandela. We have experienced it as a great moment in the history of Africa and of our own country. I immediately saw him again in Windhoek, during the celebration of the anniversary of Namibia's independence. There too, it was a great moment for me. That evening, we were, all the African leaders standing with Mandela in the middle, to witness the descent of the South African flag and the rise of the flag of independent Namibia. We lived these moments with Nelson Mandela, free.

Michel Aveline. Do you feel that Nelson Mandela knew that during his

detention, there was this official or parallel diplomacy that worked for his release?

Denis Sassou-N'guesso: I don't know if President Mandela in his prison was aware of everything that was being done to secure his release, certainly yes. I do not think that these negotiations that led to his release were conducted without contact with him. We knew that from time to time, he would ask some prerequisites. I think he was aware of some of the things that were going on. In truth, President Mandela is in a better position to answer such a question.

Michel Aveline: What was Europe's attitude towards this issue?

Denis Sassou-N'Gnesso: Not much interest. It was an American case. The case was managed by the United States. But its outcome was welcomed by everyone, including Europe, because the question of apartheid presented itself as a challenge for the international community. All peace-loving nations and justice welcomed the successful outcome of peace in southern Africa.

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8.3

The Contribution of North Africa in the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa

By Mahmoud Abul-Enein

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Introduction

This study examines the evolution of the policy of the North African states in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa between 1952 and 1994. The former include Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, the latter include Portuguese colonies of Angola and Mozambique, Zimbabwe (then Southern Rhodesia) and the Republic of South Africa and its former colony Namibia. We discuss also their role against Belgium and its allies and also the big power conflicts that followed the independence of Congo in 1960 as well as Guinea Bissau albeit outside the main focus. The North Africa States began to engage in the anti-colonial movements of the colonized in Africa against colonialism, racism and anti-white minority governments in Southern Africa in the 1950s. We discuss their role and standpoint of each country in the liberation struggle of Southern Africa countries as follows.

Egypt

Egyptian Support of the Liberation Struggle in the Portuguese Colonies (Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau)

Egypt established diplomatic representation with Portugal on legation level, which was elevated to the level of Embassy on December 31, 1959. Portugal showed neutral position in the 1956 tripartite aggression against Egypt, and non-recognition of Israel, but this situation began to change since the early sixties with the beginning of the United Nations discussion of the conditions of the Portuguese colonies. In March 1961 on the light of the revolution and the upheavals that had occurred in Angola at that time, the Security Council met and issued a decision in June 1961 calling on the Government of Portugal to stop repression and oppressive actions taken in Angola.¹ Egypt took a tough stance against Portuguese colonialism since the beginning of the discussions in the Security Council. Egypt was among the countries that made it clear that the Portuguese government had decided to arbitrarily and unilaterally take Angola as an integral part of Portugal without consulting the Angolan people. Egypt also participated with both the Ceylon (later Sri Lanka) and Liberia in the draft resolution calling on Portugal to give urgent consideration to actions and reforms in Angola, aimed at the implementation of resolution 1514 (15) issued on November 14, 1960. It was the declaration on granting of independence to that country. The draft resolution contained an appointment of a subcommittee on Angola to discuss the situation. The draft resolution was rejected for not having a majority of votes.²

On 3 April, 1961, 36 Afro-Asian countries (including Egypt) presented a draft resolution, like the previous resolution, to the UN General Assembly. It was adopted

(1) For more details about this issues and the role of South Africa in Namibia (formerly South West Africa) For further information see Abdel Malek Oda, *United Nations and the African Issues* (Cairo: Egyptian Anglo, 1967), pp:116-117.

(2) United Nations and the Portuguese Colonies: Publications of the UN Office of Information No. 2, Cairo, 1970, pp.14-17.

in April 20 by a majority vote of 73 countries, with opposition from Spain and South Africa.³ Egypt, Liberia and Ceylon submitted another draft resolution to the Security Council on June 6, stating that the continuation of the situation represented a threat to international peace and security. It demanded Portugal to desist from policies of repression and violence, and to provide facilities to the Sub-Committee on Angola to be able to perform its functions. The resolution also expressed the hope that a peaceful solution of the Angolan issue would be found in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.⁴

In July 1963, the Security Council discussed the Portuguese colonies, at the request of 32 African countries including Egypt. It issued Resolution No. 380 on July 31 declaring that the situation in the Territories was a serious concern for peace and security in Africa. The UN urgently demanded Portugal to recognize the right of the inhabitants for self-determination and independence. It also called on all the States to prohibit any aid to Portugal, which might enable it to exercise a policy of repression, including the prevention of the sale or supply of arms and military equipment.⁵

At the level of the Organization of African Unity, Egypt played a leading role to pressure Portugal to give independence to her colonies in Africa, especially after the decision of the Founding Conference of the Organization in Addis Ababa (May 1963). Egypt demanded a boycott of actual foreign trade with Portugal through an import ban and the closure of ports and airports in Africa. It encouraged the coordination of the efforts of liberation movements to intensify their struggle, in addition to the establishment of a Coordination Committee, Africa Liberation Committee for the Liberation of Africa in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, composed of 9 countries in which Egypt was served as a member.⁶

At the First Conference of the Heads of State and Government of Africa held in Cairo in July 1964, the President's speech in the opening address was directed to aspects of the issue of the Portuguese colonies. He also paid tribute to some leaders of the liberation struggle who were attending the conference, in particular Holden Roberto. Nasser said "We extend our hands to the Prime Minister of Angola Holden Roberto, who is sitting here with us for the first time after the recognition by most countries in the African Organization of the legitimacy of his government and as the brave leader of the Angolan people; brave against the last castles of the abhorrent colonial domination on the continent".⁷ At the level of the Council of Kings and Heads of Arab League countries, in the first meeting in Cairo from 13 to 17 January 1964, expressed its initial situation towards the Bandung principles and the Charter

(3) Shorma, D.N., *Afro-Asian group in the UN*. (Mahabad: Chou tama Publishing House, 1969, pp.36-38 & p.232.

(4) Annual Report of the United Nations on the Organization Activity, June 26, 1960 – June 15, 1961, Official Documents, New York, V. 1, p.200.

(5) The decision was issued with the consent of 8 members without objection but with 3 abstentions.

(6) The Arab Republic of Egypt, Foreign Ministry, The resolution, recommendations and declarations of the Organization of the African Unity 1963-1983, pp.10-11.

(7) United Arab Republic, The Ministry of National Guidance (General Association for Information) set speeches and statements of President Nasser (Section IV: February 1962 - July 1964.

of Addis Ababa. It also emphasized the justness of the struggle for national liberation from colonialism and racism; and expressed its hope to gain support of all free nations that believe in peace, based on justice, as well as the justice of the national struggle in Angola, South Africa and everywhere in the world, where the issues of freedom and justice are indivisible unit.

The Second Arab Summit Conference held in Alexandria from 5 to 11 September, 1964, endorsed the decisions of the struggle of African peoples and came up with the following statement: "This Council supports the struggle of Angola, Mozambique, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and so-called Portuguese Guinea and South Africa for freedom, as denouncing the attempts of foreign interference in the Congo".⁸

The Third Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca, held in Morocco from 13 to 17 September, 1965, declared its full support to the struggle of peoples in Angola and Mozambique for freedom, and the so-called Portuguese Guinea. It denounced apartheid in South Africa and attempts to condemn the declaration of Southern Rhodesia independence in a way of the exclusive minority governance, and supported the efforts of the Organization of African Unity to resolve the problem.⁹ The Sixth Arab Summit Conference in Algiers from 26 to 28 November, 1973, supported the Arab- African political cooperation and the promotion of Arab diplomatic representation in Africa. Also, it resolved to boycott all diplomatic, consular, economic, cultural and other relations with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal from all Arab countries which have not yet done so. It also resolved to apply a total ban on exports of Arab oil to those three countries; and to carry out special arrangements to continue supplying fellow African states with Arab oil, as well as to support and expand economic, financial and cultural cooperation with their institutions, either on bilateral or on regional level.¹⁰

The Position of the Arab States Towards the Political and Economic Boycott of Portugal:

Egypt had continued to condemn Portuguese colonization until the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa (May 1963) that declared a decision regarding the boycott of Portugal. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry's devices paid a considerable attention to this subject, especially the Department of Western Europe, which prepared on July 23 a report on the status of the relations between Egypt and Portugal, and how to deal with Portugal in the light of the Africa Summit decision. The report focused on the importance of having opinion of the Government of Portugal in response to the summit decision. This could be done by two ways; one was through the Egyptian ambassador to Lisbon to inform the Portuguese Government about the summit decision and receiving its formal reply. The second way was to wait for the return of the Ethiopian Minister of State, the Emperor's envoy to Lisbon, who had travelled on

(8) Statements of the Second Arab Summit in Alexandria September 5-11, 1964.

(9) Statements of the Third Arab Summit in Casablanca, Morocco (13-17 September, 1965).

(10) Statements of the Sixth Arab Summit in Algeria (26-28 November, 1973).

June 17 for the same purpose. In case of non-response by the Portuguese Government, the report recommended the boycott of diplomatic and consular relations with Portugal.¹¹

On June 29, 1963, the same day in which the President of Portugal replied to the Ethiopian Emperor on his message, Cairo decided on the boycott of Portugal. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry summoned the Portuguese ambassador in Cairo on the same day to inform him of the decision of the boycott of Portugal. It also announced in a statement about the reasons of the boycott namely, continuation of the Government of Portugal in its colonial and non-response to the United Nations resolutions on decolonization, repression and terror against the African peoples under the Portuguese colonies, refusal of the Portuguese colonialists to implement the declarations of the African Summit in Addis Ababa (May 1963), United Nations Resolutions and the Conferences of Belgrade and Accra. ¹² The Portuguese ambassador in Cairo received the declarations with complete surprise. He expressed the very good relations that his country had with Egypt, and regretted that it was the first time that Egypt had severed relations with Portugal.¹³ On July 11, 1963 he said, “We have had relations with Cairo, always friendly... It is not a secret that the Egyptian constitution is taken from the Portuguese Constitution; I do not think it makes sense for Cairo to draw criticism to the political regime in Portugal, the same system that Egypt has quoted its image.¹⁴

It should be noted that the statement of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry on boycott of Portugal had been devoid of statement for severing economic relations or closing ports and airports. It was necessary to consult the departments of economics, commercial, aviation and maritime ports before action could be taken. Some of them notably the Public Institution of Marine Transport suggested non-marine boycott of Portugal due to the importance of Lisbon port for the Egyptian marine fleet.¹⁵ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Economy for the economic boycott of Portugal and on 1st September, 1963, the Minister of the Egyptian Economy, in the Resolution No. 690 of 1963 declared the economic boycott of Portugal immediately. In the same vein The Civil Aviation Authority issued a “Declaration of Pilots” on September 7, 1963, preventing Portuguese aircraft from crossing the Egyptian territories or landing in the airports.¹⁶

(11) *Ibid.*

(12) See the statements of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry on diplomatic and consular boycott of Portugal on June 29, 1963. Department of Information – Documentation and Research Center, Documentation Newsletter, Year 11, March-June 1963, p.20.

(13) Egyptian Foreign Ministry, African Administration Archive, Where it is stated that the ambassador, Nabih Abdel Hamid, who informed the Portuguese ambassador by the decision of the boycott.

(14) Ahmed Yoosef Al- Koraey, *Egyptian Foreign Policy toward decolonization of the Portuguese and racist regimes in Africa 1952-1967*, MA Thesis, Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, 1978. Pp.109-110.

(15) *Ibid.*, p.111.

(16) The devices reported in Egypt that after it had been the continuation of low rates commercial relations between Egypt and Portugal, until October 1967. The Egyptian exports of raw cotton were worth 155 thousand Egyptian pounds. Corn was imported from Mozambique, worth 304 thousand Egyptian pounds and some wooden boxes and Volyn boxes to cast metals from Portugal, worth 213 thousand Egyptian pounds. *Ibid.*, pp.112-113.

1. Support for Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies

Egypt initiated, since the end of the 1950s, the recognition of the liberation movements and African resistance, especially after the African People's Conference held in Accra in 1958. The national delegations and the African liberation movements, which were banned from doing business within their own countries, were flocking to Cairo, where the African Association was founded in Zamalek

– Cairo, in 1957. Cairo was turned into a base for political offices representing the African national movements, including the liberation movements from the Portuguese colonies. It accepted only one office for each colonial territory, but later it expanded to more than one to represent the liberation movements against colonialism in the same region. The Portuguese colonies were represented by five offices for Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau as follows:¹⁷ They include the Nacional de Mozambique, The Democratic National Union of Mozambique

(UDNMO), *Govêrno revolucionário de Angola no exílio*, (GRAE) representing a government-in-exile led by the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), The Front for the National Independence of Guinea (FLING), *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde*, PAIGC).

2. Egyptian Military, Material and Media Support for the African Liberation Movements

Egypt considered the members of the liberation movements' offices resident in Cairo as political refugees, and offered each of them a monthly stipend (40 Egyptian pounds, which was increased later. The Office of African Affairs under the chairmanship of the Republic bore the expenses of the Office of the Government of Angola in exile (GRAE), as well as The Front for the National Independence of Guinea-Bissau, and The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO). The Egyptian Intelligence was paying salaries and expenses of the officers of the African Association in Cairo. Also, it provided them with air tickets for traveling when required to do so. Moreover, Egypt provided scholarships for the African students of Portuguese colonies among other 31 countries. This was under the training program approved by the UN General No. 808 (17) issued on 14 December, 1962. With regard to military assistance and training, Egypt was the first country to open its doors - the doors of military institutes for the training of members of African liberation movements. Although there is no accurate inventory of the Egyptian military aid to Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau; the Egyptian press sources, some foreign sources and the statements of some heads of movements, all confirmed the Egyptian contribution and the main military support to the Mozambique Liberation Front, especially after the reception of the leaders of FRELIMO (Mondlane, do Santos, Liomilasi) in Cairo in April 1963. Egypt agreed to arm rebels with Egyptian machine guns

«Port Said», where the rebels began their revolt on September 25, 1964 and

(17) *Ibid*, pp.115-119.

used these guns. Mondlane said during his visit to Cairo in September 1965 «Liberation Army troops are currently receiving military training in Egypt, Algeria and Ghana.»¹⁸ He also mentioned on another occasion that the nucleus of the National Liberation Army in Mozambique had received military training in Egypt, Tanzania and Algeria.¹⁹

Egypt also played an active role in reconciling the conflicts between different national movements in each region either individually or through the Coordinating Committee of the Organization of African Unity. For example, Egypt served in the Tripartite Commission which included Ghana and Congo Brazzaville formed by the Organization of African Unity to reconcile the Revolutionary Government of Angola then in exile and the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola since 1964.²⁰ At a meeting of the Commission in Cairo, October 10- 13, 1969 which was chaired by Najib Al-Sadr, Director of African Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and attended by the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and the Assistant Executive Secretary of the Coordination Committee, it was resolved that, the detained members of the two Fronts be released immediately; all forms of hostile propaganda be stopped immediately; a Military Coordination Commission be formed to reinforce and strengthen the armed struggle and activate it and a joint committee of representatives from the two movements be formed to study ways of military and political cooperation between them:²¹

3. Egyptian Media Support

Immediately after the diplomatic and consular boycott of Portugal, the Egyptian Administration of Africa-Oriented Radio Program wrote a memorandum on July 2, 1963, to the Director of Radio and Television Authority to broadcast a radio program to Mozambique and Angola in the Portuguese language. The broadcast was started in the Voice of Africa from Cairo, on a daily basis; this was welcomed by the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. Simanju, the Representative of the Mozambique Liberation Front, in a message to the Director of Radio Cairo on the day following the broadcasting said, "The people of Mozambique have been eager to listen to the developments of their sons, in the struggle, inside and outside the country, and Radio Cairo has resolved this problem." The radio began broadcasting to both Angola and Mozambique for forty-five minutes a day. The broadcasting time was increased to an hour from 1966.

(18) *Al Ahrām*, Sep. 18, 1965.

(19) *Al Ahrām*, July. 13, 1966.

(20) Arab Republic of Egypt, Egyptian Foreign Ministry, *The Resolutions, Recommendations and declarations of the Organization of the African Unity*, 1983s, Foreign Ministry 1185. AHG/RE5118, p.50.

(21) Ahmed Yoosef Al- Koraey, Egyptian Foreign Policy toward decolonization of the Portuguese and Racist Regimes in Africa 1952-1967, *op.cit.*, 1978, p.121.

Egypt commissioned representatives from Angola and Mozambique, in Cairo, to write comments and broadcast them by their voices. The radio was targeted to cover Guinea-Bissau as well, but the short-wave did not reach there for technical reasons.³⁵ All the leaders of the African movements were received including Cairo; (Holden Roberto, Augastinho Neto and Amilcar Cabral), All leaders of the African liberation movement among when were, Holden Roberto were received in Egypt in the 1960's.

Egyptian Support to the Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe (Formerly Southern Rhodesia)

The issue of Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, was out of the general discussion of decolonization in the United Nations until 1961. Britain did not identify it as a non-self-governing territory, although some nations had referred to it from time to time when talking about the conditions in the colonies. However, Egypt had succeeded in raising the issue at the United Nations, the Arab League, the Organization of African Unity and the rest of the international fora. Egypt also supported the liberation movements through political and material assistance, and also helped in the conciliation between them.

Egypt and a number of other African and Asian countries had raised the issue of Rhodesia in the United Nations. This was in defiance of Britain's position considering that the United Nations was legally competent to look into the affairs of Rhodesia, especially after 13 days of adoption of the constitution by the Rhodesian Parliament's Constitution, which raised concerns about the possibility of the independence of Rhodesia under the rule of the white minority. In December 19, 1961, three weeks after the establishment of the Decolonization Committee, 10 days after the National Democratic Party (NDP) was banned, and two days after its re-birth as "the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)", 11 countries, including Egypt and Yugoslavia, raised the question of whether Southern Rhodesia had already reached the rank of full self-governance. They introduced a draft resolution proposing that the General Assembly of the United Nations requests the Decolonization Committee to study the Southern Rhodesian issue.²² This was the legal and political basis for the discussions and decisions that followed regarding Rhodesia in the United Nations, including resolution 1747 (16) on June 28 1962, submitted by Egypt with 37 other countries. It approved the report of the Special Committee on Rhodesia that confirmed that it was not an autonomous province in accordance with Chapter 11 of the Convention.²³ However, Ian Smith took over power in Rhodesia in April 1964, and in October the same year Harold Wilson, the British Prime Minister, failed to resolve the issue. Egypt

(22) Ahmed Yousef El-Koray, *The 23rd of July Revolution and the Decolonization in Africa* (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, July 1978), pp.156-157.

(23) Attia Abd El Moneim Attia, *Egypt's Foreign Policy Toward Africa With Reference to Decolonization & Apartheid Within The United Nations, 1952-1970*, Master Thesis, Center For African Studies, St. Johan's University, New York 1973, pp.334-338.

with 34 other African countries drew the attention of the Security Council to the gravity of the situation maintaining that it represented a threat to international peace and security. After discussion, the Security Council adopted Resolution No. 202 on May 6, 1965; the day before the Rhodesian election. The Council demanded Britain and all Member States not to accept the unilateral declaration of independence and that Britain should not help by withdrawing her sovereign powers....²⁴ Egypt and its Permanent Representative (Awad Kurani) played an important role in the formulation of the draft resolution which was submitted by Côte d'Ivoire to the Council of Nations on November 24, 1965 condemning unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith's Front Government, and called upon all States not to recognize the illegal minority racist regime.²⁵

The Egyptian leadership did not leave any international forum without calling for the liquidation of racism in Rhodesia and pointed to the responsibility of Britain in the deterioration of the situation there.²⁶ Egypt was behind the debate on the issue of Rhodesia during the 21 Session of the General Assembly. The sanctions had failed to overthrow Ian Smith because both Portugal and South Africa, among other countries did not apply the sanctions. Egypt called for the application of measures under Chapter 7 of the United Nations Charter against countries that do not apply sanctions. In the framework of the Arab League and Arab-African relations in general, Egypt was the core dynamo and engine of the Arab position and the joint Arab African position against racism in Southern Rhodesia. This was demonstrated in the Third Arab Summit at Casablanca, Morocco on September 13-17, 1965 when the Summit reiterated its position on the illegality of the Ian Smith Government and condemned 'the declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia'.²⁷

In subsequent stages, and in the light of what seemed to be clear by the regime of Ian Smith and his intentions in the unilateral declaration of independence, Egypt was fully alert to what could happen there. In the Accra Summit held on October 21-25, 1965, President Nasser emphasized the responsibility of Britain in the deteriorating situation in Rhodesia pointing out the similarities between what was done in Palestine by Israel and what could happen in Rhodesia as a result of the white minority backed by South Africa and Portugal governments.²⁸ As a result, the Accra conference decided to form a committee of five African countries including Egypt, Zambia, Tanzania, Kenya and Nigeria to follow up the implementation of the resolutions of the Accra

(24) Ahmed Yoosef Al-Koraey, *Egyptian Foreign Policy Toward Decolonization of the Portuguese and Racist regimes in Africa 1952-1967*, *op. cit.*, 1978. p.211.

(25) *Ibid*, p.213.

(26) In the Conference of the Non-Aligned countries held in Cairo (5-10 October, 1964), the decision of the conference to condemn Britain for failing to comply with UN resolutions on Rhodesia and called for Britain to hold a constitutional conference immediately calling all the forces and political bodies in Rhodesia to declare a new constitution for the country, *Ibid*, pp.277-278.

(27) The statement of the Third Arab Summit in Casablanca, Morocco on September 13-17, 1965, Archive of Arab resolutions.

(28) Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the resolutions and recommendations *op.cit* pp.74+.

summit and the need to review the African position visa-a-vies Britain, should her pressure on the settlers in Rhodesia diminish.²⁹

Support to the African Majority

Immediately after Ian Smith declared independence unilaterally on 11 November, 1965, the Egyptian Prime Minister (Zakaria Mohy El-Din) issued a statement regarding this matter in the Egyptian Parliament, on December 22, 1965. He asserted that British colonialism enabled the white minority to seize power in Southern Rhodesia, and tortured millions of struggling people. The Prime Minister mentioned also that what was being done by the colonial powers and racists inside Africa at that time was what was done by the same forces in Palestine, on the borders of Africa. He ended his statement saying, “We believe that the cause for freedom is indivisible; our respect for the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers of African States on 3-5 December, 1965³⁰; based on our firm principles of international relations, and our dedication to the principles upon which the United Nations Convention and the Convention of the Organization of African Unity, the United Arab Republic has severed diplomatic ties with the British government on Thursday 16/12/1965.”³¹

The Egyptian Parliament made a resolution on December 22, 1965, endorsing the move decided by the Government of Egypt in the fight against colonialism in all its ancient and modern forms and manifestations; a confirmation of the Egyptian commitment towards the African Unity, and positive contribution in meeting the concerns of the continent and assume its responsibilities. The Parliament also requested the continuation of consultations with the African States to detect the plot, and called the government to notify the African Parliaments of this decision.³²

The African position was divided on the actions that should be taken about the situation in Rhodesia, particularly among the countries that were likely to take military action against Rhodesia and the conservative states preferring only economic sanctions and to cut off diplomatic relations. Egypt was one of the first group. The Egyptian Foreign Minister said at the Conference of Foreign Ministers of African States in Addis Ababa (December 1965) “I do not imagine how to end the fake situation in Rhodesia without the use of violence, we all know that the United Nations with its decisions cannot end this situation ... but if everyone agreed to cut diplomatic ties I hope we can determine the time that we will cut off the relationship, and make it clear whether we want to pose pre-conditions in call for England”.³³

(29) Its in the sixth extraordinary session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity (Addis Ababa: 3-5 Dec., 1965) CM/RES/13 (V1), a resolution on the province of Southern Rhodesia by African States for a complete boycott.

(30) The statement by the Prime Minister of Egypt on the crisis in Rhodesia in the National Assembly (parliament) on December 22, 1965s (*Al-Ahram*. Cairo December 23, 1965).

(31) *Ibid.*

(32) The statement of the decision of the National Assembly of Egypt (Parliament) of the Egyptian-British relations to cut off about the situation in Rhodesia, December 22, 1965s (*Al-Ahram* on December 23, 1965s).

(33) The General Egyptian Book Association, The National Archives of Egypt - the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The first statement on the Egyptian economic boycott of Rhodesia came out on 12 November, 1965. Egypt decided to confiscate all the Rhodesian goods passing through the Suez Canal, as confirmed by President Nasser, the Suez Canal would be closed to vessels and cargoes of Rhodesia on 19 November.³⁴ In general, British newspapers attacked the Egyptian decision, as a political decision designed to support the Egyptian-African relations. They also underestimated and understated these actions on the Rhodesian situation.³⁵

Egypt continued, within the framework of Arab-African relations, the promotion of anti-racist minority regime in Rhodesia. In the speech of President Nasser in the National Assembly in Dar es Salaam in September 1966, he spoke of the alliance between the traditional colonialism, the new colonialism and the racist regimes. He said that was the alliance that brought together the remnants of collapsed empires and conspiracies of neo-colonialism and the abhorrent regime of Ian Smith's, as well as the inhuman dictatorship in South Africa, in addition to the wicked Portuguese colonization.³⁶

President Sadat continued on the same line. He said in a speech at the African Summit Conference in Khartoum in 1987 "My dear brothers, we cannot ignore the fact that the continuation of the racist regimes in the challenge of our will ..., our sense of freedom cannot be completed if our brothers in South Africa and Zimbabwe have provision under the yoke of colonialism and oppression ..., we cannot leave our brothers in the frontline states alone, exposed to racist aggression in Rhodesia....., we must determine - in all honesty and sincerity ... what we can offer these brothers as real help beyond the posturing and slogans, to provide material and concrete assistance, which can change the balance of power in the confrontation.³⁷

Egypt, particularly after the October War in 1973, played an important role in achieving Arab-African solidarity and in developing an institutional framework for this cooperation. These efforts resulted in the first Arab-African Summit in Cairo in March 1977. In this context, the Arab League put the issues of racism and Zionism within the proper context, since it considered the confrontation with them as a cause of common national liberation important to African and Arab peoples together, in the same class. This was clearly demonstrated since the Ninth Arab Summit in Algeria, on 26-28 November 1973, which declared breaking all diplomatic, consular, economic and cultural relations with South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal through Arab countries that had not implemented boycott yet; and applying a complete ban

(34) The statement of President Abdel Nasser, in an interview with the youth of the European Socialist Party (Ruling Party) in November 18, 1965 (*Al-Akhabar* newspaper, 21 November, 1965).

(35) In fact, the trade balance achieves deficit for the benefit of Rhodesia capacity of 400 thousand Egyptian pounds in 1964, according to the sources in Egypt.

(36) United Arab Republic, State Information Service (Center for Documentation and Research Bulletin), Documents: 15th ed., No.1, July - December 1966. Address of President Nasser in the National Assembly in Dar es Salaam, in September 27, 1996, p.4.

(37) The statement of the speech of President Sadat in the session No. 15 of the African Summit in Khartoum, 18-12 July, 1978 (Cairo: State for Information service) A set speeches and conversations of President Sadat in the period from July.

on exporting Arab oil to these three countries, and multiplying the political and material support for African liberation movements.³⁸

In the Arab-African Summit in Cairo on 7-9 March, 1977 .three important documents were issued setting the style of the Afro-Arab cooperation. They emphasized the Afro-Arab agreement in the face of racism; they also stressed the need to strengthen the front and their peoples in their struggle for national liberation, and the condemnation of imperialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, the racist regime and all other forms of racism and religious discriminations, in particular, manifestations as seen in Southern Africa, Palestine and other Arab territories. The Political Declaration also confirmed the full support of the struggle of the peoples of Palestine, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa; and the French proclaimed the coast of Somalia (Djibouti) to restore the legitimate national rights and carry out their right to self-determination.³⁹

The Egyptian Support of African Liberation Movements in Zimbabwe:

Egypt opened the doors of military schools, especially the military academy and a commando's school for training of cadres of liberation movements of Zimbabwe, as well as Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. There was a chance for the patriots in these countries under colonialism for training or promotion, to the rank of officers, which was confined to Europeans. Egypt also provided the national movement of weapons. The Bureau of African Affairs of the Presidency in Egypt received the stores of arms upon the signing of the Convention on the British evacuation. Egypt started being armed with Soviet weapons in the mid-fifties. Therefore, it had a large surplus of British weapons appropriate to arm the African liberation movements, especially in the English colonies.⁴⁰

In the case of national liberation movements in Zimbabwe, the national leader Joshua Nkomo who opened an office in Cairo for the National Democratic Party (DP) received weapons and explosives and sent them to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, by air or sea. The office of African Affairs and Egyptian Intelligence secured the transfer to that country. The leader, Joshua Nkomo and his followers smuggled the arms into Rhodesia. This was the first shipment used by the Rhodesian nationalist movement in the resistance.⁴¹ Since 1963, just after the entry of Nkomo into Rhodesia where he was arrested, for 11 years, there was an agreement with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), declaring that the Egyptian planes were to bring down large quantities of weapons and explosives in areas agreed upon in Rhodesia in preparation

(38) The resolutions of the Sixth Arab Summit in Algeria, 26-28 Nov., 1973.- Arab Summit.

(39) Political Declaration of the Arab Summit in Cairo, the first African (documents and decisions of the Conference of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and the League of Arab States in Cairo from 7-9 March, 1977).

(40) Adel Sayed Abd El-Razik., (1993), *The role of Egypt in the African Organization Unity*, Master Thesis, Institute of African Research & Studies. pp.135-136.

(41) Mohamed Fayek, *Abdul Nasser and the African Revolution* (Cairo: Dar Al Mostakbal Alarabi, 2nd ed., 1982, p.47.

for expansion of the resistance movement. This had been agreed upon between President Nasser and Sithole, the deputy of Joshua Nkomo. The plan was based on making use of the Egyptian aircraft in Yemen. However, these operations did not take place because of the split of Sithole from Nkomo and the forming a party called the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); but this proved the extent to which Egypt went in supporting the national movement in Zimbabwe.⁴²

Despite the lack of accurate data on who was trained in Egypt, Egypt had been the only source for arming and training the national liberation movements, until they knew the way to establish contact with the Eastern bloc countries. Algeria became independent and began to contribute in that direction. After the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, and accepting Dar es Salaam as the headquarters for Committee for the Liberation of Africa; President Julius Nyerere opened his country to be a platform for the liberation movements. The weapons flowed from many places for the liberation movements, and the training was ongoing in Egypt and other countries.

On May 14, 1966 some newspapers reported the arrest of 20 Africans who were sentenced to prison for entering the territory of Rhodesia for a guerrilla war after receiving training in China, North Korea, the Soviet Union and the United Arab Republic (Egypt). Egypt was generally one of the four countries continually training members of ZAPU and ZANU parties. The Egyptian support was not only for the military t and training, but it included political and media support, among others. In political terms, Egypt received cadres of liberation movements from Zimbabwe. Joshua Nkomo opened the first political office in Africa in November 1960, just after the Bureau of Lthun, which opened in January of the same year.⁴³

The office represented the National Democratic Party (NDP) that was initially managed by George Cillondika who was named general secretary of the party. Washington Maleting took over management of the office in January 1961. He was called to work in the ZAPU party, so a number of officials took over to manage the Cairo's office, such as Nasiana Mutizoa who released a flyer called "Zimbabwe News" in 1962. He was followed by Turnos Makumbi, who subsequently joined ZANU; then Morton Malenja, who founded a party that was called the Council of People's Guard PCG. There was a rival office directed by Sibanda for two years, that is 1963 and 1964. He was followed by Stephen Nkomo, Joshua Nkomo's brother, who arrived in Cairo on April 17, 1964. He was followed by David Maiongo, who served as acting in charge of the Cairo office for several years (1). As a result of the great facilities granted to the offices of the liberation movement in Cairo, the office was able to hold press meetings, and issue the required publications and periodicals, such as "Zimbabwe News" as well as "Review Zimbabwe". The ZANU Office issued "Zimbabwe Today". The African patriots were able to address large sectors in Zimbabwe using their local languages,

(42) *Ibid.*

(43) Ahmed Yoosef Al- Korae, *Egyptian Foreign Policy toward decolonization of the Portuguese and racist regimes in Africa 1952-1967*, op.cit., p.240.

through oriented broadcasts. They started with the Nyanja language on July 1961. The officials agreed at the request of the liberation movements in Zimbabwe for the production of new radio stations using Shona language, which started on October 1964.⁴⁴

The offices of the liberation movements also supervised repeated visits of the liberation movement leaders in Zimbabwe, including Joshua Nkomo, Ndabaningi Sithole, and Robert Chekerema, the Vice-President of ZAPU and others.

Liberation, Anti-Racism and Anti-Apartheid Struggle in South Africa and Namibia

Egypt was a constant support of the struggle of the African people against colonial rule and against the white minority rule in the Republic of South Africa and Namibia, its fifth province since 1965. Gamal Abdul Nasser, the President of Egypt perceived himself as a partner, in regard to the conflict of the black majority and the white minority in South Africa in the 1950's, and assumed the responsibility to fight it. President Nasser's opposition to apartheid policies in South Africa go dates back to the tripartite invasion on Egypt in 1956. This policy started to escalate, in particular, after Sharpeville Massacre in 1960. It was reflected at various levels namely the racist government of South Africa, the South African National Liberation Movement, collective diplomacy in the different regional and international levels, and even at the level of Egyptian bilateral relations with other countries in different parts of the world.

The Sharpeville Massacre, which took place on 21st March 1960, is considered the beginning of a new phase for the escalation of the Egyptian campaign against the Apartheid, and against the white minority regime in South Africa. This massacre resulted in the killing of 67 people and the injury of 160 black Africans while they were demonstrating against traffic laws. It marked the beginning of a new phase of resistance and struggle of the black majority in South Africa. It also marked the escalation of Egyptian political and media campaigns against the regime of the vicious white minority governments. From then on Egyptian position against the apartheid regime continued to escalate at the African, Arab, and Asian regional and international fora levels. On 23rd March 1960, the Deputy Minister of the Egyptian Council of State made a statement in which read, "The United Arab Republic clearly denounces the brutal massacres from which the population has suffered in South Africa". He added, "These unarmed civilians have no fault but their belief in human rights, and they passively oppose the racist discrimination inflicted upon them by force and terrorism"... "Shooting the African masses is a part of the policy of extermination of Africans in their own countries". The United Arab Republic announces its disapproval of this brutal crime in which hundreds of Africans were

(44) Arab Republic of Egypt, Egyptian Radios & T.V. Union, *External services of Radio Cairo*, 1993, pp.45-51. Also, Mohamed Fayek, *Abd El Nasser and the African Revolution* (Cairo: Dar Al Mostakbal Alarabi, 2nd ed., 1982, pp.106-107.

killed and wounded. Also, the United Arab Republic declares its support to all the African peoples in their position against these brutal crimes”. The Egyptian official expressed that the Egyptian delegation in the United Nations had come together with the delegations of African countries to analyse the issue after the massacres which were considered a violation of human rights and a complete breach of UN Resolutions against racial discrimination.⁴⁵

Egyptian position, to be sure, extended beyond denunciation and condemnation of the Sharpeville Massacre. The Egyptian Foreign Ministry declared in a formal statement on 30th May 1961, that it was breaking formal and diplomatic relations with the minority white racist regime in Pretoria and was also withdrawing its diplomatic delegation from Pretoria and denounced the government of South Africa for violation of the human rights of the Africans there and declaring that Egypt keenly looked at the triumph of the free popular struggle in South Africa.⁴⁶ The statement of the Foreign Ministry made clear the basis on which Egypt established its decision to end the relations. It read Racial discrimination policies in South Africa went too far in its violations of the human rights of the Africans and limiting the elections to the white minority is a violation of the rule of law in South Africa. Egyptian belief in higher principles, and coinciding with the international customs and values, make it ahead towards denying the recognition of the new government in the Republic of South Africa. Egypt looks forward to the victory of the popular struggle. The statement also refers to the fact that the relations will remain abridged except after the establishment of a legitimate government which rightfully represents the people.⁴⁷

This diplomatic statement was the starting point in the breaking of the relations with the South African regime albeit the accusations of Great Britain and South Africa which maintained that economic and trade relations would not be affected by such statements. However, later events followed a different course as shown below.

The Bandung conference, in 1955, represented the first encounter between President Nasser and the National Liberation Movement of South Africa. During this conference, President Nasser met with Moses Kotani, the head of the delegation of the African National Congress, who was attending the conference as an observer.⁴⁸ Also, after the conference ended, Kotani visited Egypt during a set of visits to a number of Socialist, Asian and European countries.⁴⁹ The All-African Peoples’Conferences were the first conferences to witness outside contact with others, especially with Cairo. At the beginning of the year 1959, Tetoson Makuani, one of the leaders of the African

(45) Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Kora’y, *The 23rd of July Revolution and the Decolonization in Africa*, op.cit pp.124-125.

(46) Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Korasy, «Egypt and the Diplomacy of Liberating South Africa», *Alsseiasa Al-Dawlia* (journal of International Policies), Egypt, No0116, April 1994, p.171

(47) Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Kora’y, “Egypt and the Diplomacy of Liberating South Africa”, in *op.cit.*, p.176.

(48) He Has Been Referred to previously in the research.

(49) Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Korasy, *The Egyptian Foreign Policy aimed at the Elimination of Portuguese Colonialism and Racist Regimes*, *Ibid*, pp.177-178.

National Congress, escaped from a trial in South Africa, and he also intended to represent his party in the conference of African and Asian Youth.⁵⁰

During 1960, a group of seven representatives from South Africa from different liberation movements visited Cairo to solicit Egyptian support for the struggle in South Africa. This visit signalled the beginning of the end for the bilateral official relations with South Africa and the beginning of the Egyptian support for South African liberation movements which continued for decades⁵¹. Egypt began to establish public relations that gave prominence to African liberation movements that were struggling for the freedom of their countries and their people. The most important of these institutions by which these relations were established was the “African Association” which was established in Cairo in 1956 and later became the “African Society” and the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) which was founded in Cairo 1957. It was through them among others, that Egypt began to make contacts with national liberation movements and to receive delegations of them and lead to the establishment of offices for them in Cairo. The inauguration of the office of the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa took place for the first time in 1960; the same happened for the Pan African Congress (PAC). Needless to confirm that contact began between Egypt and these groups long before that time; some of them visited Cairo as early as 1953 to attend the celebration of African Day with the African Association in Egypt.⁵²

The members of the two offices, namely of the ANC and the PAC, were considered as political refugees, whereas, each of these offices was given monthly payments. Added to that, the administration of the Egyptian Intelligence Agency paid for the salaries and travel expenses of the members of the two offices, when necessary. The office of the African National Congress in Cairo included a number of national figures such as Ferowandle Bilisso, a of the executive committee of the ANC, representing his party in Cairo, since he arrived from exile in London, until he left on the 20th of November 1965 heading for Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, to undertake the same mission. His wife represented the Women’s Movement of South Africa in the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization in Cairo. Bilisso participated, along with members of the ANC office in Cairo, in large number of political activities; she participated in conferences, seminars and meetings related to African affairs. Among them were the first African Summit Conference in Cairo, 1964, and the non-aligned countries summit during the same year. He also contributed by writing in the African Association Magazine and in some Egyptian journals and magazines.⁵³

(50) Makuani traveled from Egypt to London to supervise the campaign of boycotting South African commodities, as well as supervising the British movement against the Apartheid. In January 1960, he was elected as a member in the preparatory committee of the All-African People’s Conference as Egypt was represented in it. *Ibid*, p.178.

(51) The Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, Documents and Settings Forum (Internet: Desktop/Egypt and South Africa/history).

(52) Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Koray, Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Portuguese decolonization and ending racist regimes in Africa (1952-1967), p.179.

(53) *Ibid*, p.180.

At the same time, members of the political office of PAC, in Cairo, represented their party and participated in many activities, the most notable of them was “Fose Maki” who praised the work of the African Association in Cairo as he said in a statement, “The generous facilitations of the African Association has enabled me to publish and disseminate different writings, assign broadcast directed to South Africa, make friendships, and gain scholarships for many South African students”.⁵⁴

Various leaders of the National liberation movements of South Africa visited Cairo since then; on top of the list was Oliver Tambo who was the Deputy President of the African National Congress. He was warmly received in Cairo in May 1961, along with three members of his party, in addition there were the Secretary General of the Pan- African Congress (PAC), the president of the “Conference for South Africa” party, and the president of the National Party of South West Africa (SWANO). President Nasser welcomed them, and after the meeting was concluded, Tambo stated that President Nasser “showed his utmost sympathy for the struggle of Africans against racial discrimination policies adopted by the government of South Africa”. He added that “our visit to Cairo turned out to be very fruitful”.⁵⁵

In 1962, Nelson Mandela who was one of the important leaders of the ANC at the time visited Egypt; unfortunately President Nasser was not able to meet him because his visit coincided with the visit of the Yugoslavian President. Mandela said about this visit, “I have informed the officials in Cairo about the articles which appeared in “The New Age” referring to Nasser’s confronting Communism, and I told them that “The New Age” does not necessarily represent the policy of our movement. I also said that I will raise a complaint against “The New Age” and pressure it to change its policies”.⁵⁶ The National Secretary of PAC Potlako Leballo” visited Egypt continuously. He said, after the coup d’état against “Nkrumah” and closing the office of the party in Accra, that the U.S., Great Britain and Israel were behind this coup. He revealed the methods of cooperation between the international imperialism, Zionism and racism.⁵⁷ Moreover, Egypt contributed in the trust fund made for the support of the resistance movements against racist regimes in Southern Africa, branching from the Organization of African Unity.

Military Training in Egypt:

Concerning the Egyptian military training and aid to the South African liberation movements, cadres from groups from South Africa mainly from the African National Congress (ANC) came to Egypt for military training in Egyptian military schools. Mr

(54) Tareq Y. Ismael, *The U.A.R. in Africa: Egypt’s Policy under Nasser*, (London: Ann Arbor reprinted on demand by university Microfilm International 1971), pp.154-156.

(55) It’s important to note that a few days after this visit, Egypt announced breaking off its relations with the government of South Africa on the 30th of May 1961.

In this regard, see: Ahmed Yousef El-Kora’y, *Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Portuguese decolonization and ending racist regimes in Africa (1952-1967)*, p.179.

(56) Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Kora’y, *Ibid*, p.179.

(57) Navim Qaddah, *Racial Discrimination and the Liberation Movement in South Africa and Algeria*, (Cairo: The National Company for Publishing and Distribution, 1975), p.80.

Mohamed Fayek, President Nasser's Assistant for African affairs, informed the author that there was a sort of coordination between him and Mr Oliver Tambo, regarding the way of bringing these groups to Egypt and the way of returning them back to South Africa. Mr Mohamed Fayek added that most of these South African groups that came during the 1960s received military training in "AL SAAKA Military School in Egypt for specialized Commando troops.⁵⁸

Financial Aid to the African Liberation Movements:

Egypt contributed the largest share to the special fund for Africa Liberation Committee, which was affiliated to the Organization of African Unity. Table1 shows the contributions of the nine most important countries giving aid to Africa within the period of 1964-1974.⁵⁹

The Cairo-based Media Material Support of the Liberation Movements:

President Nasser directed some radio broadcasts from Cairo to areas under colonialism and racial discrimination in Africa. They were transmitted in the African native languages. Offices and members of liberation movements were given the chance to address their people directly through these broadcasts. All this was done with the aim of breaking all barriers forced on the occupation of the African people. Thus, Egypt became the only state in the world, speaking for the African revolution against colonialism and racism through the broadcasts of "The Voice of Africa" established similar to the broadcast of "The Voice of Arabs" since 1954

Table 1: The Financial Assistance from Some African Countries to the Special Committee for the Liberation of Africa (1964-1974) in \$1000

No	Country	Year									
		1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
1	Egypt	87.5	100.0	100.0	100.0	10.0	90.5	90.5	86.6	129.9	566.7
2	Nigeria	73.5	84.0	84.0	84.0	84.0	67.6	67.6	65.2	97.9	591.7
3	Morocco	46.0	20.0	56.0	56.0	56.0	57.0	57.0	55.0	83.0	
4	Algeria	35.5	40.0	40.0	40.0	40.0	53.3	53.3	53.3	79.9	115.5
5	Guinea	14.0	16.0	16.0	16.0	16.0	11.5	11.5	11.5	17.2	11.8
6	Ethiopia	17.5	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	26.2	26.2	26.2	39.3	105.8
7	Libya	14.0	16.0	16.0	16.0	16.0	13.1	13.1	13.1	19.6	59.7

(58) The Experience of military training in Egypt had been shown by some individuals and groups that underwent trains in Egypt 1962-1965, particularly from Pac in. Prof.Mamoud Abul-Enein, *The Egyptian Role In The Anti-Apartheid struggle and supporting National Liberation Movements in The Republic of South Africa*, A chapter by the writer published in a book titled: *The African Solidarity in Anti-Apartheid struggle* (South Africa: South African Democracy Education August, 2008).

(59) After. Ibrahim Ahmed Abd El-Mon'im, *the Namibian case in the United Nations*, MA. Thesis introduced to Cairo University: Institute of African Research & Studies, 1977, Attachment No. 19, p.291.

8	Zaire	24.5	28.0	28.0	28.0	28.0	28.7	28.7	28.7	43.0	53.7
9	Tunisia	17.5	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	24.9	24.9	29.9	37.4	89.6

Source: Ibrahim Ahmed Abd El-Mon'im, *The Namibian case in the United Nations*, MA. Thesis introduced to Cairo University: Institute of African Research & Studies, 1977, Attachment No. 19, p.291

The first programs of the Egyptian broadcast directed to Africa began on 29th July 1961. These programs were carried out in English and directed to South, Middle and East Africa -as English was considered a common language in these areas previously occupied by Great Britain. The transmission started for a period of 45 minutes per day.⁶⁰ In addition, beside the transmission in English, Egypt set up six African services to oppose racial discrimination in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia in the African local languages, such as Zulu.⁶¹

The programs transmitted in the Zulu language began on 15th February 1965 and served many tribes whose inhabitants were around 15 million. There were other broadcasts in the language of Shona to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) which was started on 20th March 1964 and also the language of Ndebele to Zimbabwe on 29th October 1964. The objective of these broadcasts was to inform the African people of their primary rights (human and political) and to support their patriotic efforts against racism. They also called for the support of the people of South West Africa (Namibia) in their struggle for independence and autonomy, until Africans in both Namibia and South Africa were able to achieve their goals.⁶²

The number of hours for the daily broadcast to the areas of South, Middle and East Africa reached an average of 7 hours and 42 minutes of the sum of all broadcasts to the continent, which was 18 hours and 75 minutes daily, up till the year 2005. It was a broadcast which aimed at strengthening friendship ties between Egypt and the Republic of South Africa as well as increasing the consciousness of current events.⁶³

Media Role for Liberation Movements in Cairo:

After prohibiting the activities of the African National Congress in 1960, the Cairo office of the party issued a publication called “South African Freedom News” starting from 1962. This publication was released but not sequentially. Some of its volumes were printed in Al-Hana print house in Cairo; however, most volumes were released

(60) See: Muhammed Fayek, Abd El-Nasser and the African Revolution, pp.26-27, see also Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Kora'y, *Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Portuguese decolonization and ending racist regimes in Africa (1952-1967)*, p.181.

(61) Dr Nagy El-Halawany, *An Introduction to the Broadcasts Directed from Cairo*, (Dar Al-Fikr Al-Araby, 1983), pp.130-131.

(62) Egyptian State Information Service, *Al-Nil Magazine*, “Egyptian Broadcasts Directed to Africa”, Year 10, Vol. 42, July 1990, p.32.

(63) Arab Republic of Egypt, Egyptian Radios and TV Union, *External Services of Radio Cairo*, 1993, pp.45-49. Also see: Arab Republic of Egypt, *Egyptian Radios and TV Union, External Services of Radio Cairo*, the General Administration of the Broadcast to Africa, Zulu Program, the Report of the first Radio session for the year 2004. Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Communication & Information, State Information Service, “The Media Role of Egypt in the African Continent”, pp.12-13.

from the office of the party in the African Association Office in Cairo, at Zamalek. This publication continued to be released until 1969, and then it stopped for a number of reasons, among them was the desire of the Congress to combine all publications and newspapers issued by them. There was another publication called “Soehaba” which was printed in Eastern Germany, and released from Dar es Salaam in Tanzania, starting 1967. The Pan African Congress, after the ban of its activities in 1960, started releasing a publication called “Pan Africanist News and Views” from Cairo, starting in 1964.⁶⁴

Table 2: The Number of Hours of Daily Broadcast to Southern Africa

No	Language of transmission	Daily duration broadcast
1	English	2 hours
2	Zulu	45 minutes
3	Ndebele	45 minutes
4	Shona	45 minutes

(Source: Arab Republic of Egypt, Egyptian Radios and TV Union, External Services of Radio Cairo, 1993, pp.45-51)

Boycott and Regional and International Strategy of combating racism in 1960s and 1970s:

Since the beginning of the Sixties, Egypt went beyond condemning and rejecting the racist regime of South Africa to the level of taking practical measures and stances towards the disgraceful situation of the racist government. This was done in order to coerce the white minority government to change its position towards the black Africans. The Egyptian delegation in “The Conference of Independent African States”, held in Addis Ababa in 1960, stated that: Egypt is quite ready to break off the diplomatic relations and impose boycott on the Republic of South Africa until the regime in South Africa abandons its racist policies.

It became clear that taking practical measures and arrangements against the vicious white minority regime of South Africa was an essential matter in order to coerce it to change its policies. The trend eventually led Egypt to issue a statement, through the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, declaring its boycotting of the government of South Africa on 30th May 1961. Since then, the revolutionary government in Egypt started to follow a gradual strategy of imposing pressure on South Africa. So, it started to break off its diplomatic relations gradually and ended with a total boycott, and the formation of regional and international groupings to organize the boycott and reinforce the roles of African countries in order to reach the desired goals.

(64) Ibrahim Ahmed Abd El-Mon'im Nasr El-Din, *The African Liberation Movements in the Face of the Political System of South Africa*, PhD Thesis, (Cairo University: Center for African Researches and Studies, 1980), p.402.

The process of breaking off the relations took a new gradual turn; it began with being limited and continued to broaden. The trend was governed by a number of elements; the most important of which was the desire to leave a space for an Egyptian presence in South Africa to assist the liberation movement; second, to present of itself as a role model for other states to follow its orientation, especially when Egypt deliberately tried to strengthen the African, Arab and Asian public opinion to boycott the minority government and forced it to change its policies against the African population of South Africa.

Intensification of Egyptian Boycott of South Africa through the Governmental and Non-Governmental Institutions

Following the Egyptian Foreign Ministry's declaration on breaking off its relations with South Africa on May 30th 1961, the government of South Africa, and also the British media, tried to spread the idea that the Egyptian boycott was limited to diplomatic aspects, and that economic and commercial relations would not be affected by the statement. The British correspondents of the Times in South Africa expressed this conviction at the beginning of June 1961.⁶⁵

Despite the fact that the size of trade and transactions between Egypt and South Africa was limited, the Egyptian Ministry of Trade and Industry released its directive to ban imports from South Africa. The general administration also issued a periodical for the banks, including the condition that the payments for commodities exported from Egypt to South Africa must be made in advance or by irrevocable documented funds.⁶⁶

On the 14th February 1962, the Economic Affairs Department of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry issued a document concerning the situation between Egypt and South Africa in the light of the inaccurate news published by some British newspapers, in which they claimed that "Egypt had ceased its economic boycott to South Africa". That issue had a negative impact in African circles. It was also mentioned in the document of the Economic Affairs Department that the Egyptian Presidency agreed on breaking off the economic relations with South Africa, and preventing all ships' journeys and all flights between the two countries, excluding those crossing the Suez Canal, as well as preventing special services for passing South African ships such as loading and unloading shipments, and providing them with fuel and water. A number of ministries were informed of this document such as the Ministry of Treasury, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Ministry of Transportation, and Ministry of Defence and Military Production. They were advised to carry out the directives in

(65) *Ibid.*, p.171.

(66) The General Egyptian Book Organization, The National Archives of Egypt, the highly classified archive of the Foreign Ministry, the document of the Economic Affairs Department in the Egyptian Foreign Ministry concerning the economic boycott to South Africa, January 31st 1962.

the document, guided by the rules of the law of boycotting Israel No. 506, and what was suitable for the situation from these rules.⁶⁷

On the 23rd September 1963, the Egyptian Minister of Economy issued the ministerial decree No. 718 on ceasing of the economic relations between Egypt and South Africa, especially after the release of the decisions of the African Summit Conference that was held in Addis Ababa May 1963. They demanded the break of the diplomatic and consular relations between African countries and the government of South Africa, and the call for member states to cease their economic relations and trade with South Africa due to its conduct of occupational policies and racial discrimination.⁶⁸ The Egyptian Ministry of Economy also declared that the economic boycott was an integral part of the political boycott.

The Position of Egyptian Workers in Boycotting South Africa

The Egyptian workers responded to the decision of the boycott, and they even initiated a boycott to South African ships in Egyptian ports. Many workers and ship agents, in the ports of Port-Said, Suez and Alexandria, stopped offering the necessary services for ships carrying the flag of South Africa while they were passing through these ports. They announced that their situation came as a practical application of the decisions of the UN General Assembly, in its 17th session, towards the persistence of the South African government on adopting policies of racial discrimination. Also, the workers in Port-Said boycotted the South African ship (Nobel Marine) that arrived in Port-Said at the beginning of May 1963. They announced that the step was a reflection of the UN General Assembly decisions that advised member states to shut down their ports in the face of South African ships.⁶⁹

Complete Boycott:

Adhering to the Egypt strategy towards a gradual boycott, and in concert with the international decisions and the resolutions of the Organization of African Unity in which Egypt contributed and helped in forming groupings of different powers for issuing them, the President of the United Arab Republic (Egypt) issued a decree on 31st March 1964 on the boycott of South Africa's Federation through maritime and aviation. The decree included the following articles:⁷⁰

All seaports and airports of the United Arab Republic will be shut in the face of ships and planes carrying the flag of South African Federation.

(67) The Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs -the Economic Affairs Department, a document on the situation between Egypt and South Africa, February 14th 1962.

(68) Ministerial Decree No. 718 for the year 1963 on ceasing the economic relations between Egypt and the Republic of South Africa on September 23rd 1963, *Ibid*.

(69) Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Koray, Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Portuguese decolonization and ending racist regimes in Africa (1952-1967) pp.173-174.

(70) The United Arab Republic, The Encyclopedia of Arab Politics, the Archives periodical, The Decree of the President of the United Arab Republic No. 1066 for the year 1964 on boycotting South Africa –maritime and aviation- on March 31st 1964, State Information Service, The Center for Archives and Researches, Year 13, Vol. 4, March-April 1964, p.103.

All ships and planes carrying the flag of the United Arab Republic will be prevented from entering the seaports and airports of South Africa.

Applying the previous 2 Articles does not interfere with the freedom of maritime activity in the Suez Canal and the direct arrangements related to the safety of the Canal and navigation.

In this sense, Egypt embarked on its complete boycott of the government of the racist white minority in South Africa. It headed towards creating groupings of Arab, African and Asian countries, non-aligned countries, and socialist powers for the purpose of actualizing an international boycott of the Apartheid regime. Moreover, Egypt continued to expose the atrocities of the racist white minority's internal policies as well as its bilateral relations, hoping that the racist regime would abandon its unjust policies.

At the regional levels, Egypt opposition to apartheid and boycott of South Africa began at the regional level with the Bandung Conference in 1955, which reached the conclusion of recognizing the equality of all mankind and all nations.⁷¹ After that, Egypt's role continued at the African level in the conferences of Independent African States, and the meetings of Sub-Regional organizations that preceded the existence of the Organization of African Unity such as "The Casablanca Group", "The Monrovia Group", and so forth. In addition, the role at the Arab level was exemplified in the meetings and the conferences of the Arab League that were summoned to support the anti-Apartheid policies. At the African regional level Egypt exerted efforts to surround the white minority regime in South Africa in particular, and all other racist regimes in Southern Africa in general. The Egyptian efforts started to mount following the position of the Pretoria government from the Tripartite aggression on Egypt and its position from Israel, as Egypt considered both of them to stand for a form of vicious occupational colonialism.

In the first Conference of Independent African States which was held in Accra on 15th to 22nd April 1958, Egypt participated in this conference along with 7 other African countries from Northern Africa and South of the Sahara. The conference declared war on colonialism and on the Apartheid policies in South Africa. In this manner, the conference issued a resolution Number 4, which was not confined to condemning racial discrimination in South Africa, but went further to calling on the members of the United Nations to eradicate the effects of racial discrimination from their respective countries and fight the disgraceful treatment.⁷²

In the resolution, it was mentioned that:⁷³

(71) Colin Legoum, *Pan -Africanism: A Brief African Guide*, trans.to Arabic by: Ahmed M. Soliman and Dr Abd El-Malik Auda, (Cairo: The Egyptian House for Publishing and Distribution), *Periodical of African Studies* No.19, p.216.

(72) *Ibid*, pp.52-53.

Countries that participated in this conference were: Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan, Ghana, Liberia, and Ethiopia.

(73) *Ibid*, pp.222-223.

whereas having heard shocking accounts of the brutal operation of racism and discriminatory laws and denial of human rights on the continent of Africa from representatives of the participating organizations; whereas Africans in the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Mozambique, Angola, Kenya, Camerouns, Belgian Congo, Basutoland, South West Africa, and Cameroon were victims of racialism that has reached alarming proportions; Whereas the recognition of, and respect for human dignity are the bases of a decent society; whereas those who practice racialism and discrimination are therefore out of step with the law; Whereas colonial authorities do not respect international conventions;

Be it resolved that this Conference registers its vehement protest against this ugly system;

Condemns the pernicious system of racialism and discriminating laws, especially as expressed in its extreme and most brutal forms in the Union of South Africa, Rhodesia, the Portuguese Territories of Angola, Mozambique, Principe, and Sao Tome, where the indigenous populations exist under a regime of apartheid;

Condemns racial segregation, reserve systems and all other forms of racial discrimination and colour bar;

Calls upon the religious institutions and world religious leaders to exert all possible efforts for the purpose of eradicating racial discrimination

The All-African People's Conference calls upon the United Nations to reconstitute the Committee on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa;

Recommends that all members should take measures to eliminate the effects of racial discrimination, each one in its respective country, if it exists;

Demands all members of the United Nations to increase efforts for fighting and eliminating this type of unjust disgraceful treatment".

In the second Conference of Independent African States which was held in Addis Ababa in June 1965, the head of the Egyptian delegation in the conference, Hussein Zu Al-Fuqqar Sabry - who was the deputy of the Foreign Affairs Minister, declared that Egypt was ready to join any initiative for a complete boycott to South Africa until it abandons its racial discrimination policies against its citizens. In this regard, he said "The United Arab Republic (Egypt) will carry out any decision of the conference against South Africa". He added that, "The United Arab Republic is to realize the independence of all African countries and their liberation from all forms of colonialism". The head of the Egyptian delegation called for putting an end to the trusteeship of South Africa on South West Africa saying that "Great Britain cannot acquit itself from this issue because it received the trusteeship in its name and then referred it to South Africa".⁷⁴

The conference resolved on calling upon the member states to break their diplomatic relations with South Africa, and boycott all its commodities, and bans all

(74) The Egyptian Newspaper *Al-Ahram*, June 18th 1960.
Dr Colin Legoum, *Ibid.* p.263.

its airplanes from flying over the lands of member states”. He added that, “All ports of the Suez Canal are excluded from this matter so that we conform to the principle of the freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal for all countries, specifically with the countries that are not in a state of war with the United Arab Republic such as Israel”.⁷⁵ On the occasion of the inauguration of the Third All-African Peoples’ Conference, -which was held in Cairo from 23rd to 31st March 1960⁷⁶ President Nasser said, “Did Colonialism give in ? Is this true whereas racial discrimination is practiced in its worst forms resulting in more humiliation and disgrace for Africans? Is racial discrimination but a façade for colonialism? And at the closing of the conference, President Nasser referred to the success of Afro-Asian countries who are members of the British “Commonwealth of Nations” to banish the government of South Africa from its membership in the Commonwealth. This issue contributed greatly in shedding more and more light on the problem of racial discrimination. It, also, mobilized a strong international public opinion against the government of South Africa that follows a course of action contradictory to all human principles that people struggled for since the earliest phases of history”.⁷⁷

In the conference of Al-Dar Al-Baidaa, in Casablanca on 3rd to 7th January 1961, which included a number of countries called “The Casablanca Group”, Egypt was one of the six founding countries of this group and it was very active in it.⁷⁸ The conference attacked colonialism and racial discrimination, it called for the unity of Africa as well as preserving its peace and integrity. Concerning the racial discrimination practiced by the government of South Africa, the conference opposed it, and it affirmed the decision of the Security Council issued in April 1960 that considers racial discrimination policies, practiced by the government of South Africa, a threat to international peace and security. It, also, condemned the policies of colonial states that were still supporting the government of South African Federation and its racial policies morally, politically and militarily. The conference demanded the United Nations to impose sanctions referred to in article 40 and 41 of the United Nations Convention, if the government of South African Federation did not put an end for its racial discrimination policies.⁷⁹

(75) Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Koraxy, *Egyptian Foreign Policy towards Portuguese decolonization and ending racist regimes in Africa (1952-1967)*, pp.166-167.

(76) It is the conference that affirmed the resolutions of the first All-African Peoples’ Conference held in Accra (December 1958), and the second conference which was held in Tunisia (January 1960).

See: Colin Legoum, *Ibid* p.388.

(77) The United Arab Republic (Egypt), *A collection of statements, speeches and declarations of President Gamal Abd-Nasser, Part three*, (Cairo: Ministry of National Guidance, State Information Service), pp.427-430.

(78) This group was a sub-regional group, and it included: Egypt, Kingdom of Morocco, and the Algerian government. And after the establishment of the Organization of African Unity, other countries joined this groups which are: Ghana, Guinea, and Mali. It was a revolutionary organization that supported military struggle against the French occupation of Algeria, and support Lumumba in Congo-Kinshasa, as well as supporting the idea of forming a political alliance between African countries. This was stated in the convention of Casablanca in December 1960.

See: Ahmed Sekou Toure, *United States of Africa*, (Arab Republic of Egypt: State Information Service, 1981), p.36.

(79) Colin Legum, pp.287-288.

In a speech given before the Foundational African Summit Conference that established the Organization of African Unity, in May 1963 in Addis Ababa, the President focused on the issue of racial discrimination in the continent in general, and in South Africa in particular, to which he referred many times. He said, "From outside our continent, there is colonialism which was not fully eliminated from all parts of the continent... There is also racial discrimination and suppression that are imposed in some parts of the continent... and there are operations of usurping the lands of the people and prohibiting its original owners from using them, while giving them to occupiers coming from far-away."

In another part of his speech, he asserted on the importance of fighting racial discrimination, as he said, "Condemnation will not be sufficient to overcome suppression and racial discrimination... it is an insult to all humanity in this current age and throughout all ages. We have to fight fiercely with all possible ways and methods until we reach the level of complete boycott. This will enable us to turn those who imposed isolation on African people in their lands to become isolated parts from the whole humanity, and left out of the realm of international cooperation. We have to impose boycott with all possible means, depending on intellectual capabilities and organizing as well as effective actions".⁸⁰ Generally speaking, the Foundational Summit Conference (Addis Ababa, May 1963) took many decisions.⁸¹ It discussed all forms of segregation and racial discrimination, and agreed, consensually, to organize and unite all efforts for the purpose of putting an end to the criminal policies of racial discrimination practiced by the government of South Africa. These efforts included the following: Giving internships and scholarships to researchers from South Africa, sending a delegation from Ministers of Foreign Affairs to be informed of the changing situation in South Africa, supporting the recommendations proposed to the Security Council and the General Assembly through the United Nations Special Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in South Africa, calling upon all countries to break their economic, consular, and diplomatic relations with the government of South Africa, and to end all forms of encouragement to racial discrimination.⁸²

President Nasser condemned and opposed racial discrimination policies practiced by the government of South Africa in almost all the African conferences he attended. In the First African Summit Conference, in Cairo in July 1964, the President said that the occupation conspiracy of Israel resembles the one in South Africa. And he said about Israel that, "It is a part of a conspiracy to usurp the lands of the people through what is called "settlements", that which you have come to know in other examples in the African continent in South Africa". He demanded a complete boycott and

(80) The United Arab Republic (Egypt), A collection of statements, speeches and declarations of President Gamal Abd El-Nasser, Part two, pp.355-360, p.430.

(81) On the decisions of the conference and its importance, see in this book: Elias J. Tarimo and Dr Elias Songagi, *The Role of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its Liberation Committee (SADET)*.

(82) See the decisions of the conference in details in: The Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Resolutions, *op.cit.*, (Cairo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1985), p.19.

besieging to the areas of racial discrimination in South Africa and Rhodesia.⁸³ In his speech, at the end of the conference, President Nasser said, “Your conference was a clear indication of the efforts of freedom champions in the continent, such as Mandela (South Africa) and Nkomo (Rhodesia) who were put behind bars by the colonialists, and the people who are still struggling bravely with honour to break off their chains”.⁸⁴ The First African Summit Conference reached the conclusion in its resolution (AHE/ RGS/531) that the situation in South Africa represents a large threat to international peace and security. It also condemned the government of South Africa and its policies that do not conform to the political and moral duties of the member states of the United Nations. These policies form a great threat on stability and peace in Africa and in the whole world. The Conference called for the release of Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Mongoliso Sobukwe as well as all other African patriots who were put in prison as a result of the notorious laws of South Africa. It called upon all the countries producing oil to immediately seize their exports of oil and its products to South Africa.⁸⁵ President Nasser condemned the racial discrimination policies applied in South Africa in all of the African conferences and events. During his meetings and talks with Hamani Diori (President of Niger), President Nasser condemned the fascist occupational policies that some governments were still following, especially the racial discrimination policies in South Africa that were still practiced despite of the United Nations resolutions issued in this regard, and all international conventions on human rights.⁸⁶ In an open letter to the African peoples on the occasion of “Africa Liberation Day” on the 17th of September 1963, President Nasser said, “We are working now for a well-established clear purpose and that is the complete elimination of colonialism and the demolition of racial discrimination”.⁸⁷

Additionally, in a dinner party held for honouring the President of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev on the 9th of May 1964, President Nasser expressed his belief in the agreement between the two countries to eliminate colonialism and struggle against racism. He said, “Our efforts have met to fight colonialism and all its forms... and to demolish racial discrimination”.⁸⁸ Also, on the occasion of the dinner party held by the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in honour of the delegations that attended the African Summit Conference in Addis Ababa on 6th November 1966, after thanking God for the blessing of the increased number of African countries that were able to gain its independence, the President said, “This does not hold us from carrying our

(83) Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Kora'y, Egyptian Foreign Policy Towards Portuguese..., *op.cit.*, p.168.

(84) *Ibid*, p.163.

(85) The Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Resolutions, *op.cit.*, pp. 44-45.

(86) The United Arab Republic, The Arab Political Encyclopedia, The Archives Publication, (Cairo: State Information Service, The Center for Archives and Researches), Year Twelve, Vol.1, July 1963, p. 45.

(87) The letter of President Gamal Abd El-Nasser to the African peoples on the occasion of celebrating the «Africa Independence Day», September 17th 1963, *Ibid*, p.438.

(88) The speech of President Gamal Abd El-Nasser on the occasion of holding a dinner party to honour the Soviet President Nikita Khrushchev, May 9th 1964, *Ibid*, p.593.

duty towards our fellow African brothers who are struggling for their independence and freedom against racial discrimination that is imposed upon them”.⁸⁹

In the mutual statement issued on the occasion of the visit of the Emperor Haile Selassie to the United Arab Republic on 18th October 1966, it was mentioned that “Both parties express their condemnation of the British policies that led to the usurpation of power in Rhodesia by the ethnic minority imposed by the occupation on the people of Zimbabwe... The two parties condemn the occupation of the government of South Africa to the South West Africa and violating the rights of the people of this region to self-determination and eliminating this occupation. Also, both sides condemn the decayed racist policies of the government of South Africa that still work on depriving the absolute African majority from their natural rights, and they condemn the vicious alliance that exists between this racist government of South Africa and the racist minority government in Rhodesia on one hand, and the existing Portuguese occupation that is based on former colonial policies”.⁹⁰

In his speech in the African meeting in Cairo, that was comprised of Algeria, Guinea, Tanzania, Mauritania and the United Arab Republic, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, to discuss the problem of Rhodesia in 1966, President Nasser said, “This is a common meeting to discuss a case that represents one of the most dangerous threats to our continent... there was a coalition that was formed gradually within this context; it included the British occupation, the minority regime of Rhodesia, the interests of neo-colonialism, the Portuguese exploiting system, and the racist government of South Africa. It is a coalition between traditional colonialism and new colonialist elements along with the centres of racial discrimination and exploitation that deepened its existence in the South of the continent”.⁹¹ At the closing of the conference, a mutual statement was made in which the states severely condemned the coalition and coordination between the racist minority in Southern Rhodesia and the colonial and racist powers in South Africa and Portuguese colonies. The statement mentioned that “this coalition that acquires new dimensions is the main enemy of the African peoples”.⁹²

In the year 1968, Egypt threatened to withdraw from the Olympic Games if South Africa participated in it. This action was a consolidation with national liberation movements in South Africa and an opposition to racism.⁹³ He also expressed the continuity of the Egyptian position to reject and condemn racist policies. By this Egypt was giving a model of intensifying the boycott exemplified in the decision of

(89) The speech of President Gamal Abd El-Nasser on the occasion of the dinner party held by the Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie in honour of the delegations that attended the African Summit Conference in Addis Ababa (November 6th 1966), *Ibid.*, Year Fifteen, Vol.1, July-December 1966, p.59.

(90) The mutual statement on the occasion of the visit of the Emperor Haile Selassie to the United Arab Republic (October 18th 1966), *Ibid.*, p.167.

(91) The speech of President Gamal Abd El-Nasser: The Opening Session of the African Meeting in Cairo, April 14th 1967, *Ibid.*, p.67.

(92) The mutual statement of the African Meeting in Cairo, April 14th 1967, *Ibid.*, pp.155-156.

(93) Africa Contemporary Record (1968 – 1969), (Annual Survey and Documents), edited by: Colin Legoum, (London: Africa Research Limited, 1969), p.128.

President Nasser No. 1606 on 19th March 1964, on boycotting all conferences and activities that were attended by representatives of South Africa.⁹⁴

During the nineteen-seventies, the policy of the late President Anwar Al-Saddat continued to follow the same path of President Nasser. In the ordinary session number 15 of the African Summit Conference held in Khartoum in 1978, President Saddat addressed the attendees of the conference saying: “Our brothers, we cannot ignore the standing reality of the continuation of racist regimes to challenge our will...these racist regimes that are still violating and transgressing the dignity of our fellow brothers who were put in the dark circumstances of terrorism, suppression and exploitation, through occupation and colonialism that is based, at its core, on the exploitation of native people who are owners of the land. This occupation became a means for serving vicious colonial interests, and it has become a barrier for these people preventing them from their basic human rights. Strangely enough, the United Nations Decade against Racial Discrimination, which it declared in 1973, and almost half of the decade is over and there is still no tangible progress in the cause of our brothers in South Africa and Rhodesia. We will seize the chance of the international conference organized by the United Nations in Geneva, in the middle of the next month, to fight racial discrimination through setting a practical and a timely schedule to eliminate the racist occupation in our great continent”. He added, “Our feeling of freedom will never be complete if all our brothers in South Africa and Zimbabwe are facing occupation and oppression. We cannot sense hope or security in the future if our African brothers are still worried about their future and their lives”.⁹⁵

In the year 1975, Egypt announced that the Declaration of Dar es Salaam on South Africa expresses the Egyptian position, and is considered a historical document on the path of struggle towards independence. Needless to say that it affirms to the whole world the dangers and crimes of racist occupational colonialism, practiced against people who were usurped from their lands and freedom. Thus, Egypt decided to agree with all the content of the declaration. It also supported African states in their attempt to issue a resolution to suspend the membership of the racist government of South Africa in the International Organization for Weather Forecasts, and endorse the invitation of Namibia to attend the meetings of this session as an observer.

At the Arab Regional Level

The Egyptian as member of the Arab League was active in confronting racism and Apartheid in South Africa. This was in response to the mutual challenges and injustices that both the Arab and the African sides faced namely, European colonialism and settler racist regimes in both areas; the racist white minority in Rhodesia and

(94) Nabil Abd El-Hamid Hasan, *The Republic of South Africa Following the Apartheid and Possible Effects of the Egyptian Policies in Africa*, MA Thesis, Faculty of Economics and Political Science – Cairo University, December 1995, p.154.

(95) The Arab Republic of Egypt, State Information Service, *A Collection of Speeches and Statements of President Anwar Al-Saddat*, the period between July to December 1978, p.17.

South Africa in the African continent, and Israel in the Arab world. Therefore, both Arabs and Africans stood side by side to face these critical mutual challenges. Arabs opposed the racial discrimination in South Africa, and Africans supported the Arabs in their conflict against Israel. The Arab League condemned the policies of racial discrimination in Africa and the suppression of the African majority in the hands of the white minority in South Africa since its establishment in the year 1945 condemned the policies of racial discrimination in South Africa. Additionally the Arabs condemned this policy, both as a group inside the Arab League led by Egypt, and as individual states. They moved as an organized group to coordinate their efforts inside the United Nations and constituted the first step to an Afro-Asian coordination inside the United Nations considering that the League was founded before the Organization of African Unity. They were the ones condemning racial discrimination policies in South Africa, called for imposing sanctions as well as boycott of South Africa. The Arab position inside the United Nations had an effective role in the issuing of the General Assembly Resolution No.1514 for the year 1960 which gives independence to occupied countries and peoples.

Fighting racial discrimination in South Africa

In addition to the resolutions of the Arab League since its early meetings in 1946, which opposed racial discrimination, the Arab League conferences showed concern and discontent with the racist practices of the government of Pretoria, since the first conference of the Summit which was held in Cairo in January 1964. The statement of the Summit expressed that, "Arab leaders call for the support of all independent states that believe in the values of peace and justice"... "They believe in the just Arab struggle against colonialism...and in the national struggle of Angola and South Africa and everywhere else in the world. Issues of freedom and justice are one integral unit".⁹⁶

The Second Arab Summit that was held in Alexandria during the same from 5th to 11th September 1964, supported the decisions of the African Summit that was held in Cairo (July 1964), and stressed on the belief of the Afro-Asian consolidation, and raised hopes in the increasing strength of the African unity. It also confirmed the necessity to stand for the just causes of the people, and their right in self-determination and the elimination of colonialism and racial discrimination... and those issues of Afro-Arab cooperation represent one of the bases for the policy of the Arab world".⁹⁷

As for the Third Arab Summit held in Casablanca in 1965, Arab Presidents and Kings affirmed the struggle of the Africans for freedom in the Portuguese colonies, and "they condemned the racial discrimination in South Africa, and also condemned

(96) Resolutions of the First Arab Summit in Cairo (13-17/1/1964), available on:
<http://www.fatehforums.com/showthread.php?>

(97) Resolutions of the Second Arab Summit in Alexandria (5-11/9/1964), available on:
<http://www.fatehforums.com/showthread.php?>

the attempts declaring the independence of Southern Rhodesia in the way which enables the white minority to seize power solely”.⁹⁸

The Sixth Arab Summit held in Algeria, in November 1973, was a clear sign of the Arab support to the cause of opposing racism and the process of international boycott to the white minority regime in South Africa. This is true especially when we take into consideration the timing; as it was held after the October 1973 war, in which the Egyptian and Syrian armies succeeded in defeating Israel and the African countries broke their relations with Israel. In that Summit, the Arab countries expressed “their gratitude and appreciation for the fellow African countries for the decisions they took to break their relations with Israel which increased its isolation in the world.” The statement issued from the Summit expressed the full support of the Arab countries to African countries in their struggle for the purpose of national liberation and economic progress, and in their struggle against occupation and racial discrimination. The Summit Council resolved to break all diplomatic, consular, economic and cultural relations with South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia by countries that had not done so, apply complete ban on exporting Arab oil to those three countries and carry out special arrangements to continue supplying fellow African states with Arab oil.⁹⁹

Confronting racism at the international level in the 1960s and 1970s:

Egypt moved for this cause through collaborating the work of the Arab group and the Afro-Asian group since the Bandung Conference in 1955, and the African group since the Conference of Independent African States held in Accra in 1958. It incited the different groups of Third World countries to put increased international pressure on the government of the white minority in South Africa, following the Sharpeville Massacre.

After the Sharpeville massacre occurred on the 21st March 1960, Egypt along with 28 African and Asian countries informed the Security Council about this issue, which led the Council to discuss the Apartheid for the very first time. It took a decision on the 1st April 1960, Resolution No.134, in which it states that the situation in South Africa had resulted in an international dispute, and in case of its continuation, it might endanger international peace and security. The Security Council called upon the government of South Africa to take the necessary precautions to reach a racial consensus based on equality...and to abandon the Apartheid policies.¹⁰⁰

On the 13th April 1961, the General Assembly issued its resolution No.1598, which was proposed by Egypt and a number of African and Asian states. This resolution stated in its third article on the demand to all countries to take individual and collective measures in order to put pressure on South Africa to cease its racial

(98) Resolutions of the Third Arab Summit, Casablanca (Morocco), (13-17/9/1965), Arab Decision Archive, available on: <http://www.fatehforums.com/showthread.php?>

(99) Resolutions of the Sixth Arab Summit Conference, (Algeria – November 1973), Arab Decision Archive, available on: <http://www.fatehforums.com/showthread.php?>

(100) Dr Ahmed Yousef El-Korayy, *The 23rd of July Revolution and the Elimination of Colonialism in Africa*, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, July 1978), pp.126-127.

discrimination policies. In the seventeenth session of the UN General Assembly, Dr Mahmoud Fawzy, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on 12th October 1962, confirmed the Egyptian position on the problem of Apartheid in South Africa. In this regard, he said “The government of South Africa is still adhering to the policies of racial discrimination, in addition to the position it follows towards South West Africa, and it is a situation that implies a challenge to the United Nations”.¹⁰¹

The General Assembly agreed on the resolution No.1761 in November 1962 that considers the racial discrimination policies a threat to international peace and security. The resolution demanded all countries to take proper individual and collective precautions that would pressure South Africa to abandon this policy.¹⁰² The United Nations also demanded the imposition of a voluntary ban to the production of weapons exported to Rhodesia.¹⁰³

In response to the General Assembly resolutions, Egypt informed the Secretary General in a letter dated October 3rd 1963 that it broke all its diplomatic relations with the government of South Africa since May 1961, and it broke its economic relations as well since September 1963. Egypt had also prohibited all Egyptian ships from entering the ports of South Africa, and it closed its ports to all ships carrying the flag of South Africa. It refused to give any facilitation for taking off and transit for all South African and South African registered airplanes. Egypt was asserting the resolution of banning the supply of weapons and military equipment to South Africa.¹⁰⁴

Moreover, the Egyptian delegate in the special political committee of the UN General Assembly, announced that Egypt was educating 20 students from South Africa in Cairo yearly. The Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs on 10th October 1963, requested from the General Assembly, in the name of Egypt, to take an immediate decision against the trial of 11 people for the attempt of toppling the government in South Africa. The Egyptian official said that the United Nations should work on releasing the political prisoners who were wrongly accused by the government of South Africa, which used the most brutal methods to arrest them.¹⁰⁵

On the 27th April 1964, Egypt, along with 57 African and Asian states, demanded holding an emergency meeting for the Security Council to look into the heated situation in South Africa in the light of the report of the United Nations Secretary General on 20th April 1964, asking the Security Council to take urgent procedures for preventing the problem of South Africa, as they opposed the assassination of patriotic leaders in South Africa which was considered a threat to peace in Africa and in the

(101) *Ibid*, p.127.

(102) Gaber Selim, South Africa: A New Perspective, A paper presented to a seminar under the title “African Arab Relations” organized by Center for Political Researches and Studies at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University, 8-11/11/1992, p.25.

(103) *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 16th – October 15th 1993, p.14-21.

(104) Ahmed Yousef El-Kora>y, The 23rd of July Revolution and the Elimination of Colonialism in Africa, *op.cit.*, p.127.

(105) *Ibid*, p.127.

whole world. On the 9th June 1964, the resolution of the Security Council No.190 was issued. It condemned the government of South Africa concerning the trial of the leaders of the liberation movement. It is important to note that this was the last resolution issued by the Security Council on this conflict until 1970.¹⁰⁶

In the General Assembly, Egypt was a member of the UN Committee of Credentials that was tasked to check papers of accreditation of the state representatives delegated to New York. Furthermore, the Egyptian delegate Ismail Fahmy proposed, on behalf of Egypt, Syria and Madagascar, the project of the resolution to the committee speaking of not recognizing the validity of the accreditation presented from the actual government of South Africa. This suggestion was approved by the Soviet Union. Despite the fact that this suggestion did not mention the approval of the other five countries in the committee, namely Australia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Iceland and the U.S., it proposed representation of the first attempt to reveal such illegalities.

The Egyptian Role in Supporting the Process of Change in South Africa and Namibia (1989-1994)

By the end of the nineteen-eighties, and in the context which led to the end of the Cold War between the two superpowers, Egypt continued its policy towards the government of South Africa; a policy which was based on the commitment to the general African consensus to oppose the white minority regime in South Africa, support African liberation movements and assist the front-line African states. This was done for the purpose of forcing the white minority government to abandon its apartheid policies internally, and liberating Namibia that it occupies externally. The context of the Cold War's end allowed for a Détente for Namibia, which was occupied by South Africa, especially after the international agreement between the United States and the former Soviet Union, which was a primary step for the process of Détente.

It is important to note that the international context, around the end of the Eighties, started to change, particularly after the Soviet Union ceased to be confrontational with the United States in different parts of the world. Instead, the Soviet Union showed willingness to negotiations and peaceful solutions in the area of Southern Africa. One of the most significant implications for this was to facilitate reaching Angolan-Namibian agreements in December 1988 that were directly related to the departing of Cuban forces from Angola, which, eventually, opened the way to Namibia's independence on 21st March 1991.

There were a number of elements and conditions that contributed to increasing the likelihood of the collapse of the vicious Apartheid regime in South Africa, such as the international environment, which prevailed at that time; international and African pressures that were led by Egypt in this stage, as Egypt presided over the Organization of African between 1989-1990; and of course the brave struggle of the

(106) *Ibid.*, p.128-129.

African people of South Africa. As for the Egyptian support for the process of change, by the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, we can observe that the Egyptian diplomacy re-evaluated the position from the situation in South Africa, in the light of the developments and changes that took place internationally, regionally and inside South Africa. This process of re-evaluation drove Egypt to participate in the process of change for the interest of Africans. This led Egypt, eventually, to restore its relations again with South Africa; a position which we can analyse through the following remarks:

Egypt and Independence of Namibia

Egypt followed with interest the case of Namibia because it represented an African national liberation case in the first place; and secondly because it was related to the racist situation imposed by the occupying country, South Africa. Egypt established a political office representing Namibian revolutionaries in Cairo. It, also, took the initiative to establish direct relations with SWAPO which meant acknowledging the organization, the legitimacy of its struggle and its representation of the Namibian people. This acknowledgement came years before many countries started recognizing the legitimacy of this organization. Since 1992, SWAPO was able, through these facilities in Egypt, to send more than 200 members of its cadres to receive military training, methods of resistance and guerrilla warfare in Egyptian military colleges. Those members were the core of military struggle in Namibia afterwards.¹⁰⁷

Additionally, the Egyptian diplomacy supported the Namibian people either in the realm of the United Nations or in the Organization of African Unity, as Egyptian diplomats took part in the international mobilization for Namibian interests. The Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations travelled to Japan as an envoy of the Security Council in March 1979 to ask for the support of the Japanese public opinion, and send a report to the Secretary General of the United Nations. Also, Egypt presided over the United Nations Council that travelled in 1983 to Latin American countries, namely Costa Rica, Haiti, San Domingo, and Nicaragua, for increasing the awareness of the Namibian case in these areas. It was a member of the United Nations Fund for Namibia since 1977, to finance the preparations for Namibia's state reconstruction and enforcing it. This was a program that intended to cover the pre-independence phase. Egypt was chosen as a member of the administration board of Namibia's Institute affiliated to the United Nations Council for Namibian Affairs based in Lusaka to train the Namibian youth technically and culturally.¹⁰⁸

Furthermore, Egypt tried, throughout the 1980's, using its contacts with the United States and other Western countries like Great Britain, France, Italy and Western Germany, to invite them to support African demands for independence, in particular. Through the efforts of the Western contact group, there was an agreement to start

(107) Adel Sa'id Abd El-Razek, op.cit p.175.

(108) Idem.

a new round of negotiations which began in London in May 1988 between the quadruple parties, namely Angola, South Africa, Cuba and the United States.

Asserting the Egyptian interest of the Namibian cause, Egypt hosted the third round of the quadruple negotiations, in the period from 24th to 26th June 1988, for the purpose of overcoming the problems that faced the negotiations path. Although Egypt was not a party in the negotiations, and also it was still boycotting South Africa, it agreed to the request of the Angolan President Jose Eduardo dos Santos to hold this round of negotiations in Cairo. This was to remove any obstacles in the face of implementing the United Nations Resolution on Namibia's independence. The delegation of South Africa arrived in Cairo to participate in the negotiations according to the rules of the special envoys pacts that were issued within the realm of the United Nations in 1969, which allowed for the communication between states that have no diplomatic relations. This was done also in accordance with all other African states involved in this case. Egyptian diplomacy followed up on these negotiations. It used its influence to counter the efforts that were against proceeding with the negotiations at this important stage. Hence, a mutual work-plan was made and all parties agreed that experts would implement it to ensure the progress of these negotiations. Negotiation rounds continued after that in New York (11/07/1988), and then in Geneva, Brazzaville, New York until the final agreement "Independence Pact" was signed in New York in December 22nd 1988.¹⁰⁹

With the victory of SWAPO in the November 1989 elections and the realization of Namibian independence, another strategic goal of the Egyptian policy goals in eliminating the occupation in the whole continent, was achieved. President Mubarak attended the celebration of Namibia's independence on 21st March 1990 as the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the President of the Organization of African Unity during that year. This event had important significance to the Egyptian perception that headed the campaign of eliminating colonialism in the continent for long. Egypt considered the independence of Namibia as the beginning of a complete liberation wave for Southern Africa from racism.¹¹⁰ President Mubarak, also, had a meeting with the President of South Africa de Clark, at that time, during the ceremonies of celebrating Namibia's independence.¹¹¹

(109) *Ibid.*, p.177-181. Also see: The Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Information, *Achievements of the Egyptian Diplomacy in 1988*, (Cairo: State Information Service, 1989), p.15-16.

(110) Al-Ahram, «Mubarak's Meeting with the Coordinating Committee for Liberating South Africa: Egypt Continues Helping Namibia», 15/02/1990.

Also see: Adel Abd El-Razek, *op.cit.*, pp.180-181.

And: Dr Khaled Mahmoud El-Koumy, *Egypt and the Issues of Southern Africa: A Perspective of the Current Circumstances and a Future Vision*, (Cairo: The General Egyptian Book Organization, The Series of Egyptian History, 1989), Vol. 33, pp.172-173.

(111) Nabil Mohammed Hasan, *Post-Apartheid South Africa and Possible Influences on the Egyptian Policy towards Africa*, Cairo University 1995 p.161.

2. *Freeing Nelson Mandela in the Context of the de Clark Reform Program:*

It's important to refer to the active Egyptian role in putting pressures on Pretoria government to release Nelson Mandela. In a meeting with the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, in February 1990, President Mubarak declared that Egypt's diplomatic efforts were exerted for more than two years, in collaboration with various partners, and they contributed in the release of the great African leader Nelson Mandela, who is considered a symbol for the national struggle of South Africa. In the opening of the Third Conference for Pan-African Parliaments, he said, "Nelson Mandela was worthy of becoming a symbol for human resistance everywhere. All the free people and the freedom fighters all over the world look up to his victory as it is a victory of the good over the evil." He added, "We remind the minority regime in Pretoria once again, the inevitability of submitting to the rationale of history, and the rule of law so that the vicious racial discrimination policies will not remain, except as an obsolete phase of human history, which radiates with the greatness of human resistance against aggression and injustice."¹¹²

The following month, President Mubarak, in the opening session of Meeting the Special Committee on South Africa held in Lusaka on 19th March 1990, he said, "We are concerned with the positive developments that are taking place in South Africa, on top of which is the release of the African hero Nelson Mandela, and removing the prohibition of national liberation movements and national organizations. This is something which is apt to be considered a victory for human rights all over the world".¹¹³

Releasing Nelson Mandela coincided with the first wave of a wide range of reforms that de Clark declared in February 1990. These reforms included: ending the prohibition imposed on political parties and organizations, the intentions of the government to participate in the negotiations to eliminate what was left from the apartheid. This process met the demands of the international society, including the United States and George Bush Senior administration; as its electoral campaign involved the willingness to meet with black and white leaders in South Africa for the purpose of stirring the situation there.¹¹⁴

Also this concurred with the transformation that started to take place in Africa, and in the whole world, after the end of the Cold War age and the beginning of a new international system. President Mubarak invited the South African leader Nelson

(112) The Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Information, State Information Service, *Egypt under the Presidency of Mubarak and the Republic of South Africa*, November 1993, p.76.

(113) *Ibid*, p.77.

(114) The United States appeared, in the Post-Cold War era, as the only super power in the world. The Congress also had enacted the comprehensive law for the elimination of the Apartheid in 1986 which forced the minority government to release Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners so that they remove economic sanctions imposed on South Africa. In this regard, see:

George Bush, «The U.S. and Africa: The Republican Platform», *Africa Report*, Vol.33, No.4, July-August 1988, p.15. See also: J. Schroeder, *United States Foreign Policy towards Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), p.329-348.

Mandela to visit Egypt, and he did accept the invitation. He came to Egypt from 19th to 22nd May 1990, and he received official, popular and media attention. Cairo University also gave him honorary PhD. President Mubarak declared, during that time, that Egypt will continue to support the people of South Africa until the full elimination of racial discrimination in the Southern part of the continent.

Re-Evaluation of Relations with the New South Africa

Since the of the 1990s of the 20th Century, and with the détente that took place inside South Africa, as well as the issuance of the United Nations General Assembly Resolution No. 38 of December 1991, that is related to the efforts of eliminating the apartheid, Egypt started to re-evaluate the situation as for what could enable it to mobilize the situation in the positive direction aiming for the interests of the African majority. This was important specifically since the General Assembly resolution, as mentioned earlier, was issued under the title of “International Efforts to Eliminate the Apartheid”. The resolution had such a moderate and balanced discourse, that even the government of South Africa welcomed it. All of this indicates a turning point in the perspective of the international society towards the situation in South Africa.

Egypt had a number of observations on this General Assembly resolution which included the following: First, the resolution did not mention the condemnation of the government of South Africa. Second, it did not include the declaration of the government of South Africa of its intentions to end the policy of racial segregation. Third, it avoided the issue of inducing states to stop its academic, cultural and athletic cooperation with South Africa. Fourth, it ignored the indication to oil ban. Fifth, it did not use the phrase of “economic boycott” but it rather mentioned “economic procedures” and the prohibition of weapons. In spite of these observations, the Egyptian diplomacy began to realize that the forces of change in relations to the international society with South Africa had just begun, and that the different parties of the international community as well as regional groupings started to revise their positions from the situation in South Africa. Thus, Egypt started to re-evaluate its position from the government of South Africa in the light of these new variables. It is important to note that in 1991-1992, Egypt reconsidered its position from South Africa as the African department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs introduced two official documents in this matter, the first one was dated 11th January 1991 pertaining to the deliberations of the issue of racial segregation in the 45th session of the United Nations General Assembly, and the second one was in 1992 pertaining to the evaluation of the different positions of states from the political and economic boycott to South Africa and Egypt’s evaluation of the current situation.¹¹⁵

a. Positive signs and the convenient developments:

(115) The Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Egypt’s Memorandum on the evaluation of the positions of different states from the political and economic boycott to South Africa and Egypt’s evaluation of the current situation (Cairo: the African department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the record of racial discrimination, 1992.

The official documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have determined them to be as follows:

- de Clark's policies of constitutional reform and ending the emergency status in KwaZulu-Natal region, as well as eliminating the policy of racial discrimination in different institutions and social and entertainment forums.
- The decision of the European group to lift the ban on the new investments in South Africa to address unemployment, economic and social conditions and encouraging the eliminate racial discrimination. Hence, the European Council decided on the 15th December 1990, that European countries group will begin reducing the group of measures agreed upon in 1986, as long as the government of South Africa is taking legislative measures to eliminate the Group Areas Act and land laws.
- The United States began gradual reduction of boycott procedures gradually aimed to end boycott.
- The development of the relations between some of the African states and the Pretoria government, in addition to the beginning of talks over regional integration and cooperation between the countries in Southern Africa. This trend led the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity to address a letter to a number of African heads of state, during December 1990, including President Kenneth Kaunda who met with the Foreign Minister of the Pretoria government many times. He also invited him to attend a special event with President Kaunda and President Museveni.

b. Extant challenges

The Challenges and difficulties that the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that the following challenges still existed:

- The continuation of the violent incidents in the Homelands and Black townships from the supporters of the National Congress movement and Inkatha Movement. There were also radical trends in the African National Congress movement. This issue led the leadership to take on the conception of the continuation of imposing penalties in exchange of agreeing to negotiations with the White government over the new constitution. Therefore, there were fears that such radical trends would threaten the process of negotiations entirely.
- The continuation of violent acts and the deteriorating situation, which came as a result of the internal fight between the Inkatha movement and the African National Congress movement affect the negotiations with the Pretoria government which might lead to an increased support for the white minority's idea to establish a smaller state restricted only to the Whites according to what the pragmatic wing of the Conservatives party called for.
- The Pretoria government rejection of the idea of holding a foundational assembly based on the assumption that such a call conforms to the cases in which the

countries are on their path towards independence, so they are creating a new constitution for the first time, which does not apply to South Africa.

- The competition and cooperation between the Black African organizations and their leadership due to the transition from military actions to political actions intensified as a result of political manoeuvres between the different forces.

c. The Document of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs resolved:

The belief that the information was available to our permanent delegation in New York where the Pretoria government was to apply on February 1991, a proposal for a law concerning the terminating of the land laws and Group Areas Act which were waiting for ratification before June 1991. Through this, the government responded to the American conditions to lift the ban on economic transactions with South Africa as well as to cease all other bans imposed by the European group and Japan. It was also expected that all those who were deported and exiled, and their numbers ranged from 30,000 to 40,000 including 8,000 combatants, were to be assisted and given aid from the European countries to be successfully integrated in the society. Indeed, the beginning of the 1990's, constituted a major element in the process of Egypt's re-evaluation of its position with respect to South Africa which remained in the same course since the 1950's. However, the outcome of this re-consideration hung between Egypt's complete endorsement of all the positive steps achieved. They included the level of the détente witnessed internally in South Africa, the context of the new negotiations between rivals in South Africa, the new perceptions of the international society of the conditions there, on one hand, and Egypt continuing with breaking diplomatic relations with the white minority government on the other hand. Egyptian conduct towards the events that occurred in South Africa during the 1990s was preceded by the political trend that adhered to the collective decisions of the Organization of African Unity in its support for national liberation movements on the one hand and encouraging constructive negotiations between the government and liberation movements underway in order to reach a real democratic society which would put an end to racism and constitute a non-racist society.

On the 17th June 1990, Dr Boutros Ghaly, the Egyptian State Minister for Foreign Affairs, had a meeting with the South African Minister of African Affairs, in which the latter asked the former to reconsider the request of sending an Egyptian delegation to take part as observers, in the negotiations between his government and the representatives of African national organizations. 116 Egypt still adhered to the position of condemning the Pretoria government through the resolutions of the Organization of African Unity, particularly for its conduct in instigating the destructive violent rage that covered Southern Africa. Egypt, also, welcomed the mutual historical meeting between the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress in Harare, from 15th to 16th April 1991, as it considered it a turning point in the struggle against

(116) Nabil Abd El-Hamid Hasan, *Ibid.* p.162.

racist oppression. It praised the decision both movements had reached in August 1991, as they agreed to hold a national conference that was comprised of all national groups and divisions for the purpose of establishing a national front.

Egypt, also, stood by African states in the 28th Summit Conference held in Dakar, in July 1992, which called upon the Security Council to investigate the violent acts in South Africa, based on the request of the African National Congress, and to put pressure on the Pretoria government to resume the process of negotiations and establish a non-racist democratic government.¹¹⁷ Reacting to Nelson Mandela's and the African National Congress request to re-impose sanctions on South Africa; and the call to perform an international investigation in the political violence events, in an attempt to punish de Clark for not accepting the demands of the African National Congress, Egypt called for a UN Security Council Special Session which was held on 15th – 16th July 1992.

In the Egyptian statement presented by Amr Moussa, the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, before the Security Council, he mentioned, "Egypt was keen to participate in this meeting as an expression for our call, which we confirmed invariably, for the necessity of giving a priority for the situation in South Africa in this critical and vital stage. We believe that this situation has affected the conditions in Africa, in addition to our belief that eliminating racial discrimination is a distinguishing border between one age and another, and once it takes place, it will be a major departing point for Africa's individuals, communities, peoples and states."¹¹⁸

Egypt determined its position and demanded, in its statement in the Security Council, a number of procedures; the most important of them were:¹¹⁹

- i. There is no alternative to eliminating the Apartheid regime and replacing it with a non-racist democratic regime.
- ii. CODESA negotiations should be reinstated as soon as possible, and Egypt demands all the parties involved to join these negotiations.
- iii. Egypt conceives violence as the main impediment in this path towards democracy.
- iv. The main party responsible of confronting violent acts is the government.
- v. Cooperation between all sides is an essential matter.
- vi. The goal of this phase is to resume the negotiations and the desired final goal is to spread peace, democracy, equality and majority rule.

Emerging relationships between Egypt and South Africa

The immediate post 1992 period witnessed gradual normalization of relations between Egypt and the new South Africa that was emerging. They began with exchange of commercial delegations, businessmen and investors between both countries. Many

(117) *Idem*.

(118) The Arab Republic of Egypt, The statement of Mr Amr Moussa, the Foreign Minister before the Security Council concerning the Situation in South Africa, 15/07/1992, (Cairo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, African Department).

(119) *Ibid*.

Also see:

The Arab Strategic Report 1992, (Cairo: Al-Ahram Institution, 1992), p.427.

commercial and economic agreements were signed; the one with the most profound effect among them was a special agreement which lifted the ban on airline operations between the two countries and establishing a new branch office for Egypt Air in Johannesburg. The first Egyptian plane flew on the Cairo/ Johannesburg route on 5th February 1992 after suspension of flights that lasted for 19 years. Also, the year 1993 witnessed exchanging visits of media and athletic groups, in addition to some trade fairs.¹²⁰

To be sure, Egyptian actions towards the restoration of relations gradually with South Africa were in concert with the general context that started to dominate inside the Organization of African Unity, especially in relation to creating economic, financial and commercial channels with South Africa, in order to promote the transformation process. On 26th September 1993, the Organization of African Unity officially declared its decision to lift economic sanctions against South Africa, especially after Nelson Mandela announced it in his speech, before the Special Committee against Apartheid, affiliated to the General Assembly, to lift the sanctions against South Africa. He asserted, “The time has come to lift economic sanctions...”. However, at the same time he called for the maintaining of the weapons prohibition until the national government was formed, after the elections set for April 1994. The United Nations reached its decision to lift commercial sanctions and travel restrictions for South Africa on 8th October 1993, and by this, ending the isolation that was imposed on South Africa.¹²¹

In this setting, economic relations began to be restored through the visits of Egyptian businessmen to South Africa, and by participating in the fairs and visiting showrooms there to open new horizons for Egyptian commodities. So, 17 Egyptian companies took part in the 15th round of the fair called “Design for Living” held in Good Hope in the city of Cape Town. Also, the first company was established in South Africa for trade and contracts between both countries for marketing Egyptian commodities, it was called “*EgyCape*”. This company acquired authorizations for marketing and distribution in all African countries. Some tourist companies such as Flamingo opened offices for Tourism in South Africa.

Despite of this ongoing motion between both countries, Egypt followed up on the process of negotiations and its integrity. And once the conflict between political parties and competing elements reached a certain critical point that threatened to result in violent acts and secessionist claims, President Mubarak, who was the President of the Organization of African Unity 1993-1994, held a meeting of the Permanent Committee on Southern Africa in Harare on 19th March 1994, for the purpose of providing all required assistance to save the negotiation process and to support them in attaining freedom. President Mubarak confirmed, in his opening speech of the Southern African Summit Conference, “It takes the participation of all national forces

(120) The Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Information, State Information Service, Egypt under the Presidency of Mubarak and the New Republic of South Africa, p.11.

(121) *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 16th – October 15th, 1993, pp.114-120.

in the election process as a major and important step to achieve the hopes we look for in these transformational historical models". He added, "From our side, we will never hesitate to exert all efforts sincerely for enforcing this perception because we consider our mission inside this committee to be continuing and connected. It will remain so until the outcomes of our great struggle are realized. We are quite ready to contact all parties and groups to encourage them to participate positively so that a democratic state can be established in South Africa and acquire its place in our large African family".¹²²

The committee condemned, in its final statement, all sorts of violence or threats, and it requested from all leaders and parties not to boycott, or threaten to boycott, the electoral process but instead to be part of it."¹²³

When the United Nations Resolution No.894 was issued on the 15th January 1994, which was concerned with the supervision of elections by the United Nations, Egypt contributed 32 observers out of the 180 observers from the UN, governmental and non-governmental institutions, as well as other international organizations. Dr Mona Amr, the head of the Egyptian representation office in South Africa, in a statement

for *Sawt Al-Arab* broadcast on 27th April 1992, asserted that the Egyptian presence was an efficient and an active presence. She said that there were over 50 Egyptian observers spread all over South Africa to supervise the electoral process.¹²⁴

The success of the elections had very good implications for all the Egyptians. Mr Amr Moussa stated on 25th April, before the elections, with just one day to go, "Egypt is glad with the developments taking place in South Africa, particularly, that they are occurring at the same time that Egypt is presiding over the Organization of the African Unity".¹²⁵

While the first signs of true normalization appeared in 1991, when the Egyptian Ambassador to Mozambique announced that he would react favourably to visa applications from South African citizens; the formal relations came at the end of 1993, with the opening of South African and Egyptian Representative Offices in Cairo and Pretoria, respectively. On the 11th October 1993, the Egyptian Foreign Ministry announced that full diplomatic relations would be resumed, following the April 1994 general elections in South Africa. Shortly after the elections, both governments announced the upgrading of their respective Representative Offices to Embassies.¹²⁶

(122) The Arab Republic of Egypt, Ministry of Information, The Archives Periodical, President Mubarak's speech in the opening session of the Southern African Summit Conference in Harare, 19/03/1994, (January-December 1994), pp.84-85.

(123) *Al-Ahram*: 20/03/1994.

(124) *Middle East Press Association* (Cairo), I, 27/04/1994.

(125) *Ibid.*, 25/04/1994.

(126) Republic of South Africa, Department of Foreign Affairs, (web: <http://www.dfa.gov.za/>).

Algeria

The Algerian Role in Supporting the Liberation Struggle in Southern

Africa Algeria had the longest and the most brutal European colonization in the continent. Since the arrival of French colonization in the territory of Algeria in 1830, the Algerian people were subjected to all kinds of multiple oppression, torture, destruction and obliteration of identity. Therefore, the Algerian people had to struggle against colonialism for about 132 years of colonialism. The most important of these stages and the most decisive was the national resistance led by the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), that was set up on 1st November 1954 to obtain independence for Algeria from France. The revolution swept across Algeria. France resorted to the use of violence and displacement to hit the national movement and role models, prompting some of them, such as Farhat Abbas and others, to resort to seeking asylum in Cairo.

As the Algerian revolution continued, and with the constant support of Egypt, the Algerians were able to take away the recognition of France in their right to self-determination. They agreed to negotiate in the Evian Conference in June 1961, but the Algerians rejected the French conditions, forcing France to recognize the full independence of Algeria as a sovereign state, in 1962.

Algeria's independence was nowhere to be effective, leading to a convergence between African States, especially the revolutionary and moderate countries in Africa. It also had an impact in advancing the process of the liberation of the continent, and support of liberation movements throughout Africa, including in the Southern Africa region. This was due to the successful revolutionary model of the Algerian revolution and the national liberation movement that led the struggle against colonialism.

The Algerian Patriotic Front for Liberation succeeded in doing the most important national liberation war against French colonialism in Africa and the Arab World. It introduced an inspiring model for all national liberation movements, after its success in achieving independence for Algeria in 1962. In addition to that, Algeria adopted socialist revolutionary road and an attractive economic experience in its economic development, by which Algeria was able to depend on its reserve of oil and gas resources, to support its choice of foreign policy, particularly towards the African liberation movements, which Algeria provided with material and military training.

Thus, the story of the Algerian struggle, from the time that the armed revolution started in 1954, was the burning torch that lit the way for African activists to get rid of colonialism, slavery and racism. Some thinkers who had been affected by the Algerian revolution, such as Franz Fanon, shared in fuelling revolution against the colonists in many parts of Africa. His writings "*Black Skin and White Masks*" in 1952, and "*Wretched of the Earth*" in 1961, contributed in continuation of the revolution.

Some of those who were affected and became his standard bearer were Amilcar Cabral, Walter Rodney, Claude Aké and others. Franz Fanon also criticized Patrice

Lumumba of DR Congo, for his confidence in the United Nations. He also commended the idea of a “colonial violence” and creation of black man with white masks, and other ideas that inspired him from Algeria and its revolution. He was a speaker who had great feasibility and impact on behalf of the Algerian revolution in Africa and its fora.¹²⁷

The Algerian revolution also paved the way for an important country in North Africa like Algeria, that played a full role in supporting the liberation movements in southern Africa in general. Algeria was helped to carry out this role by its abundance of resources from nineteen sixties to eighties. It enhanced this role by the successful experience of the development strategy adopted by Algeria since independence.

Revolutionary Algeria followed the state socialism path and adopted as a remarkable experiment in the development based on a centrally planned economy¹²⁸, and the policy of nationalization and comprehensive focus on manufacturing, especially in heavy industry and manufacturing. Algeria also used the exploitation of oil resources in bridging her needs for food despite of its foreign policy; particularly as the African and international liberation movements were receiving financial assistance and training from Algeria.¹²⁹

In addition to the above, the Algeria population had shot up from 9 million in 1968 to 15 million in 1973, and to more than 20 million in 1983.¹³⁰ The average per capita income was around 4,500 dinars per year in the late seventies. Furthermore, sustained growth was for the prestige of Algeria in the early seventies at the international level, especially as it represented a revolution taking the context of a national anti-imperialism and dependency on capitalist organization of society; and supporting the spirit of independence of the peoples.¹³¹

It can be said that Algeria became an example to the liberation movements, and that the role of the Algerian liberation of the continent became an active role to promote and add to the role of Egyptian and North African descent in general, as will be seen in the following three key dimensions:

(127) Helmy Shaarawy, *Political and Social Thought in Africa* (Cairo, Mahrosa Center for Publication, Press Services and Information): 2010, p.185-187.

(128) Allan Findlay, the Economies of North west Africa in the 1970's: Introduction, in : Richard law less and Allan finally (eds), *North Africa: contemporary politic and Economic Development* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p.151. Also: Hugh Roberts, the politics of Algerian Socialism in Richard lawless and Allan Findlay, *Ibid*, p.52.

(129) However, we note some differences between the model of economic development from the eras of Ben Bella and Boumédienne and Chadli Bendjedid, See: Richard I. Law less, «Algeria: The contradictions of Rapid Industrialization, in : Richard Lawless Allan Findlay led) *Ibid*, pp.153-161 & p.183-186.

(130) U.N. Demographic year Book 1983, p.132.

(131) Dr Abd-el-Kader Djalol, *The Modern History of Algeria: A Sociological study*, Translation of Faisal Abbas and reviewing of Dr Ahmed Khalil Bou Khalil (Beirut: Dar al-Hadatha Printing, Publishing and Distribution, 1981), p.220-221.

First: the Algerian National Liberation Movement and the Creation of Colonial Imbalances in the Continent:

The Algerian National Liberation movement had contributed to the events of the great imbalance in the colonial architecture on the continent, since the revolt began in Algeria from November 1954. The Algerian revolution was able to present itself, from the beginning, as an Africa revolution, along with being an Arab-Islamic revolution, where its relations were relevant to the national organizations in the French Africa. The French attempts could not isolate the revolution that was taking place in Africa.¹³² The Algerian Revolution, especially after the success in 1962 to win independence, was able to spoil the French plans advocated by de Gaulle, and contributed towards the acceleration of the liquidation of French empire in Africa; and the liberation of large parts of the continent, although some had thought that de Gaulle had merit in it.

The Algerian Revolution had accelerated a wave of independence that was spread in parts of Africa, which were controlled by France. This was expressed by Edgar Faure, the French Prime Minister, in 1955 by saying, “We have to win the race with time, and the problems of black Africa will impose itself on us just like the problems of North Africa”.¹³³

When de Gaulle described his policy between 1958 and 1962, it became clear about the impact of the Algerian revolution and self-determination, to the African people in French West Africa, when he said, “Our former colonies in the black continent, as well as the Big Island on the Indian Ocean, meaning Madagascar, became democratic republics with our help, because I estimated how much of a revolution might cost, in the former possessions if we refuse to have what are equality and justice; this is not inevitable, but would be an inevitable reality on the other hand in the stream of psychological and political realities of the continuing war in Algeria.”¹³⁴

In general, de Gaulle’s plan did not succeed in Africa because of the war in Algeria, where there was failure of Federal Union between France and its colonies. The Executive Board had only seven meetings between February 1959 and March 1960. The Parliament of the union did not meet but twice: first when it was created, and the second in June 1960. Then independence of African States Accord (Dahomey - Niger - Upper Volta - Cote d’Ivoire) was in August, and ended up with the independence of all countries in the French West Africa and tropical Africa. France called the United Nations in 1960 for the membership of twelve African countries.

In fact, the main reason for the changing of de-Gaulle’s African policy, was the evolution of the war in Algeria and his conviction that France was not able to end that war militarily, there was no way to save France from the bleeding, but the

(132) From the French attempts in this regard, it is referred to the French organisation, established by France in 1957 - to manage the exploitation of Sub-Saharan Africa as the “Common Organization of the Saharan Regions (OCRS)”: See Mohamed Fayek, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

(133) National Center for Historical Studies, *The Algerian Revolution and echoed in the world* (Algeria: Algerian International Forum, 24-29 November 1984, p.158-159.

(134) Mawlod Belkasim Night Belkasim, *The Role of First November in independence of Libya, Morocco and Tunisia and the whole Africa*, « in *Culture, Algeria and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism*, 1984, p.97.

independence of Algeria; especially that the liberation movements and opposition groups to France in the other French provinces had started gathering in Guinea and Ghana, and those from the Niger and Côte d'Ivoire had begun to receive military training, and collect weapons in preparation for the resistance. Egypt had welcomed the opening of a new front against France in the French regions to ease pressure on Algeria.¹³⁵

The outcome of this important development was the liberation of many regions of the continent. It enabled the countries to besiege colonial influence and apartheid in South Africa, in which Algeria played an important role using People's Revolutionary ideology, and an active role as a liberal country.

Model of the Algerian Revolution, and the African Coalition on the Model:

The impact of the Algerian revolution extended to a number of areas in Africa under colonialism. The African liberation movements found a model in the struggle of the Algerian Revolution, with which to face colonialism in their countries, where the majority of the movements began to realize that the editorial battlefields were helping to gain international recognition and solidarity. Some of the main stations in the itinerary of the Algerian revolution reinforced this perception, applied and highlighted it at the African level.¹³⁶

The Algerian revolution succeeded in taking the issue of Algeria to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1955. When France opposed it and threatened to withdraw from the General Assembly and its sub-committees, the Afro-Asian States insisted on the need to include the Algerian issue on the agenda of the General Assembly in 1956 and 1957. So it was no longer possible for the colonial powers to prevent the application of self-determination, especially after the liquidation of colonialism in the African continent was considered to be in the forefront of issues of concern to the United Nations.

The emergence of the Provisional Government of Algeria on 19th September 1958 in Cairo, to give the Algerian revolution, an important African dimension, in a way that later enabled it to play a prominent role in raising the issue of colonialism and its resistance. It considered that the unity of the armed struggle for all who were fighting for their independence as a natural alliance. The Algerian revolution followed two major means for the sake of this alliance:

Separation of Africa from France condemned the dual French-African framework, known as the "French Union" an imitation of the British Commonwealth.

Working to involve Africa in the liberation struggle waged by Algeria against France. When France applied the policy of autonomy of the administrative model, the Algerian revolution opposed it and considered it as an apparent form as long as the regions were still managed by a general governor who received orders from Paris. It raised the

(135) Mohamed Fayek, *op.cit.*, p.40-41.

(136) Mohamed Al-Mabrouk Yunus, *The history of the political development of Arab-African relations 1952 – 1977*, Cairo: Institute of Arab Research and Studies, 1988, p.48-52.

slogan “You Africans to arms, the death for French colonialism”. It was confirmed to attract attention to the African Algerian revolution in African conferences held in the period between 1958 and 1961.¹³⁷

Liberational Ideology of the Algerian State

The Algerian state adopted a popular ideology of post-independence liberalism, both in the form of documents and in the external behaviour, particularly in the African continent. The foundations and the main components of this ideology can be determined as follows:

Confirmation of Algeria belonging to Africa, where the Algerian National Charter 1979 (Article 7) states, “Algeria, as an African country, included its foreign policy within the scope of African solidarity for the political emancipation of the continent, and development of its economic and social affairs.” Thus, the full emancipation of Africa was an integral part of the struggle of the Algerian people for independence and dignity. For Algeria it meant that the commitment to stand by the African peoples struggle against colonialism and racial discrimination also meant to stand by the African countries that were fighting for their emancipation and the domination of neo-colonialism. Algeria adopted all the fair African issues... This direction of our policy was not a terminal choice but it was derived from belonging to Africa and the need for solidarity among all struggling peoples of the continent.¹³⁸ The same meaning in the Algerian Constitution in 1989 was confirmed, where the Constitution provides that Algeria was in solidarity with all peoples struggling for political and economic liberation and the right to self-determination and against all racial discrimination.

The Constitution refers in its introduction that “Algeria is the land of Islam and is an integral part of the Great Arab Maghreb, Arabic land, Mediterranean and Africa and country that is proud of the radiance of its revolution, the first of November, and honoured by the respect that it has made, and knew how to keep its commitment to the just causes in the world.¹³⁹

The statements and actions of senior Algerian leaders have been reflected this liberal approach, particularly towards the African countries and peoples under colonialism, and in particular to the Portuguese colonial systems of racial discrimination in Southern Africa; as reflected in Algeria’s adherence to the unitary correlation of the African continent, and in resistance to the separation between the North African Arab, and South African non-Arab.

Since the reign of Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria adopted a policy diametrically opposed to the colonization of the old and new policies based on the chapter devoted to North African and South, and resisted the policy of cultural hegemony, which contributed to the convergence and integration of the continental shelf and non-convergence within national frameworks or national origin.

(137) *Ibid*, p.51.

(138) Algeria, *The National Charter*, 1979, (Art. number 7).

(139) Algeria, *The Algerian Constitution of the Socialist People’s* 1989, Article 26.

President Houari Boumediene continued on the same lines. He considered it as a liberal and a sacred duty, and said in this regard, "To perform the sacred duty, Algeria stresses its determination to continue ongoing cooperation with organizations in which Algeria is a member; and its mission, which is based on coordinating the efforts of all its members, and the creation of appropriate terms and conditions, to complete the liberation of some parts of the Arab world and Africa, which are still suffering from the nightmare of colonialism."¹⁴⁰

Second: Algerian Efforts supporting the Liberation of Southern Africa in Regional and International fora:

Based on the experience of the revolutionary model of national liberation, after her independence in 1962, Algeria continued to support the African liberation movements in southern Africa, either in the Portuguese colonies against Portuguese colonialism, or in the face of the odious racist regimes in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Namibia, in addition to the Congo, Kinshasa.

The political situation in Algeria was strong in supporting these countries and regions, particularly through regional organizations, such as the Arab League, Organization of African Unity, Non-Aligned Movement and institutions of Arab-African cooperation, in addition to the United Nations.

Algerian position through the Arab League:

Algeria stood through the group of Arab States in support of the African liberation and anti-apartheid. The excellence of Arab summits reflected such a clear position since the First Arab Summit Conference in Cairo in 1964, where the closing statement of the Conference announced the support of all free nations that believe in peace based on justice ... "And fairness of the national struggle in Angola and South Africa and the entire entity in the world. The issues of freedom and justice are indivisible unit".¹⁴¹ The Third Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca, Morocco in 1965 registered the Arab position towards Africa and against the Israeli infiltration in it. It reaffirmed "the support of the struggle of peoples for freedom in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. It disapproved the racial discrimination of South Africa, and condemned the attempts to declare the independence of Southern Rhodesia on the face of the exclusive minority rule".¹⁴²

Algeria hosted the Sixth Arab Summit Conference from 26 to 28 November 1973, which issued the strongest Arab resolutions, where it was paying tribute to the brotherly African countries on the decisions taken to break ties with Israel. The resolution voiced support for Arab-African cooperation. "It has also decided to sever all diplomatic and consular relations, economic, cultural and other relations with

(140) Houari Boumediene, speeches *From the Blood to Vein*, Algeria, the Ministry of Media and Culture, 1979.

(141) *Idem*.

(142) Final Declaration of the First Arab Summit Conference held in Cairo in the period 13-17/1/1964, Arab Resolution Archive.

South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia by the Arab states that have not yet done so; as well as the application of a total ban on the export of Arab oil to the three countries, with the adoption of special procedures to continue to supply natural brotherly African countries with Arab oil, and double the diplomatic and financial support for the organizations of African liberation struggle”.¹⁴³

The Algerian position was formed in support of the African struggle against colonialism and racism in southern Africa. It was a position that represented the cornerstone, either in the African context, or in the framework of the Non-Aligned and the United Nations.

The Algerian position through the Organization of African Unity and African fora:

Algeria contributed in the founding of the Organization of African Unity in May 1963 and participated in the African Conferences prior to the organization, whether conferences for the African peoples, or for independent African States. Algeria had played a main and active key role in the various African fora, which was reflected positively on the African struggle in the southern African region.

1. Conferences of the African People:

A series of African People’s conferences were held, including organizations and associations in Africa which were not necessarily for independence. Algeria had participated in these conferences since the first conference held in Accra, Ghana in 1958, which focused on the extent of adherence to the African unity, and the need for the establishment of the United States of Africa, not based on discrimination of sex, race, colour, or territory. The conference linked the Algerian people’s struggle and the struggle of peoples of South Africa, through its emphasis on the support of all the peoples just struggle against colonial and racial powers. It raised the slogan of “Africa for Africans”.¹⁴⁴ The Second African People’s Conference November 1960, attended by delegates representing 32 African countries, emphasized the same meaning and added that the development and economic growth of African countries can only be achieved through the full emancipation of the countries. The third conference, held in Cairo, in March 1961, was attended by delegations representing 69 African people’s organizations. It continued to confirm the support and assistance to the Algerian liberation movement, as well as the African people’s struggle in Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique and South Africa, facing the worst kinds of oppression and violence in the hands of colonialism. It also called for providing financial support to these people, through the Liberation Fund contributed by the independent African states.¹⁴⁵

2. Independent African States Conferences:

(143) The resolutions of the Sixth Arab Summit in Algeria on 26-28 November 1973, Arab resolutions Archive.

(144) Essam Mohsen Ali Jibouri, *Arab-African Relations 1961- 1977*, (Baghdad: Dar El-Horia for printing, 1981). pp.304-309.

(145) Idem.

Several conferences were held by the independent African States, before the founding of the Organization of African Unity, in order to achieve the objectives of the continent in completing the liberation and unity, where the first conference was held in Accra, Ghana from 15 to 22 January 1958. Eight independent African States participated, in addition to the African liberation movements. The conference addressed issues of liberation and independence in Palestine, Algeria and South Africa. It also stressed the policy of non-alignment and full support to the Arab and African struggle. The Second Conference of Independent African States was held in Addis Ababa on 24 and 25 June, 1961. Different streams emerged from the conference for the unitary trends. The Conference stressed the support to the liberation struggle at the level of international organizations, such as the United Nations, particularly with regard to the case of Algeria. The third conference which was scheduled to take place in Tunisia in April 1962 was postponed, due to lack of response to attend from a sufficient number of States.¹⁴⁶

3. *Non-Aligned Movement and the Algerian Position:*

The Afro-Asian solidarity was the basis for the Non-Aligned Movement. The Bandung Conference which took place from 18 to 24 April, 1955 in Bandung, Indonesia, was the beginning of the emergence of African States on international political stage, and taking a positive role in global issues besides Asian States. It was known the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, which had become the largest group of its collections. It was used for the service of African issues before the United Nations on the decolonization.

Algeria was not an independent state, while holding the Bandung Conference, which was attended by only four African countries, namely Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia, plus Ghana and Sudan, as observers, which had not obtained the independence at that time. But the Bandung conference that was the solidarity of peoples in Africa and Asia, included a large number of liberation movements and various political consulates from the two continents¹⁴⁷, Algeria was among them.

Also, in 1961 the Provisional Government of Algeria participated in the Belgrade Conference. Yusuf Ben Khodda, the Algerian Interim Prime Minister, said in this conference, explaining the concept of non-aligned as, «The right to choose the system of government and freedom of choice do not agree with involvement in any military alliance.»¹⁴⁸

After the independence, Algeria, adopted the general principles of the Non-Aligned Movement. This was reflected in the Algerian foreign policy. The texts and official instruments of the state included the principles and the decisions of the movement. The Algerian National Charter of 1979, emphasized that, “The Non-Aligned Movement is the result of a sense of the deficiency and imbalance

(146) Idem.

(147) Mohammed Fayek, Abdel-Nasser and the African Revolution, p 41-42.

(148) Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism, A Brief Political Directory*, translated by Ahmed Suliman and Abdel Malek Auda (Cairo, Egyptian Editing and translation) p.162-163.

in the international relations.” It also added, “The Non-Aligned Movement is the expression of our will to complete independence from any foreign power. It demonstrates the determination of the revolution to be free from all external constraints and to determine domestic and foreign policies according to the interests of our people and ideals that guide the activities at the international level. The policy of non-aligned forms a solid base for an act of solidarity struggle against any foreign domination on the third world countries, which express their will to struggle for full independence and political freedom and to defend their economic interests.¹⁴⁹

In general, the Non-Aligned Movement was used to defend the Southern Africa’s issues at the United Nations. The Algerian National Charter considered the United Nations, for the non-aligned countries, as an appropriate framework in which they contribute for strengthening security reasons in the world and establishing a fair balance, where the system for international relations was lacking.¹⁵⁰

Algeria organized the Fourth Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries in 1973. It was hosted by representatives of 76 countries, in addition to the African liberation movements as observers.¹⁵¹ It was one of the main stages of the development of Non-Aligned Movement and the beginning of adulthood, where the important decisions were made and statements issued to oppose the racism in South Africa. Among the most important decisions was the one regarding the establishment of an African Fund that had among its objectives the supporting of the economic and financial capacity of the frontline states, so that they can fight against apartheid in South Africa and support the liberation movements in Namibia, as well as helping them to withstand any retaliatory economic measures that might be exposed by the racist regime.¹⁵²

4. *Algeria’s Support through the United Nations:*

Algeria had continued in the framework of Arab coordination and the Arab Group at the United Nations¹⁵³, and through the Non-Aligned Movement as well as coordination with the African Group at the United Nations,¹⁵⁴ in pressure,

(149) Algerian National Charter, 1979.

(150) Al-Manar, Algeria between 1919 - 1989 - The impact of Algeria and its contribution to the world liberation movement, No. IV, p.214.

(151) The African liberation movements which attended the conference belong to Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Rhodesia, South Africa, Namibia, Angola, Seychelles, Comoros, and French Somalia.

(152) Dr Khairy Mahmoud Issa (Supervisor), *Arab-African Relations: An Analytical Study of its Various Dimensions* (Cairo, Arab Organization for Education, Culture and Science - Institute of Arab Research and Studies, 1978), pp.287-293.

(153) The Arab Group is the oldest group used in the United Nations. It was the basis of the Afro-Asian solidarity, because it includes countries in Asia and Africa. It has started its work since the San Francisco in the beginning of the emergence of the United Nations.

(154) The African Group was founded in the United Nations after the foundation of the Organization of African Unity. It has begun its work late in 1963, preceded by attempts of African coordinates since 1958.

through the United Nations mechanisms to defend freedom of the African peoples in southern Africa. Algeria also participated in the Group of 77, which was founded in June 1964 on the sidelines of the International Meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). The first ministerial meeting of UNCTAD was held in Algeria in 1967, and came out with a statement called "Statement of Algeria", where the organizational structure of the group was formed.

Algeria has contributed through its regional and international levels, rising in the seventies to ask many of the initiatives to reform the international system, support and advocacy for oppressed peoples in southern Africa and Palestine. This was manifested on several occasions, including the Arab position on apartheid in South Africa in 1979 in the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth session chaired by the Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika, where the Arab position was headed by Algeria. The coordination with the African position had a great effect in voting to prevent South Africa from attending the other sessions, especially after using the right of veto by both the United States and France, in the Security Council, to prevent the proposal made by African countries, to expel South Africa from the General Assembly. This decision was regarded as a significant shift in the history of the World organization, demonstrating the importance of concerted Arab and African countries on common issues in the General Assembly.¹⁵⁵

The initiative taken by the Algerian President Houari Boumediene in 1974, as Chairman of the session of the Non-Aligned Movement, was recorded to Algeria, when he called for a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to discuss the subject of raw materials from 19 April to 2 May, 1974. This was marked as the first time for third world countries to have an opportunity to coordinate their positions on an international level, to discuss response to the establishment of the rich developed countries what is called "International Atomic Energy Agency" and coordination between the oil-consuming countries. In general, due to the Algerian and Egyptian positions, it was possible to coordinate all Arab positions towards the issues of South Africa at the United Nations. The Twenty-seventh Session of the General Assembly in 1972, showed a high percentage of Arab support for the issues of the African continent, particularly towards the support of the liberation movements and anti-racism, which continued throughout the seventies. The percentage of Arab support for the issues of southern Africa was ranged between 94% and 100% until 1986¹⁵⁶,

(155) Dr Salwa Mohamed Labib, Arabs and apartheid in Africa, Arabs in Africa: *The Historical Roots and Contemporary Realities* (Cairo: Culture House). p. 211-214.

(156) This percentage was relatively low, in 1978, when it got to 86%, see Dr Salem Hussein Albaroni, *The Arab-African Cooperation Strategy 1967 - 1986* (Libya - Tripoli: World Center for Studies and Research of the Green Book, first edition 2005) pp.81-83.

which refers to the Arab continuous support of the southern African issues, in addition to a clear Algerian role and support in the crowd.

5. *Algeria's Support through the Organization of African Unity:*

Algeria was one of the most active African countries that participated in establishing the Organization of African Unity, in May 1963 and setting its charter. While Ghana, Nkrumah for example, focused on the goal of achieving a political union among African countries, the movement of Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella was important, where he sent a mission to a small number of the most important African countries to explain that his first interest in the Summit is to ensure a continental support for the liberation movements in the African countries that were not yet liberated.¹⁵⁷

Although the Ghana's proposal was not successful, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, which was released in the Addis Ababa Conference, was crucial in its self, but more importantly, it reflected the vision of Algeria, and that for the first time, the African countries had unanimous opinion to achieve an active program to support the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, South Africa, South-West Africa (Namibia) and the three regions of the British High Commission and Southern Rhodesia.

The speech of the Algerian President Ben Bella had a magic effect in the hearts of his counterparts in the founding conference of the Organization of African Unity, He said, "I have spent my life in prison, I do not want to start great deal of talk now," adding that "my fellow Africans have agreed to die for the Algerian independence, therefore, let us agree that we die to liberate the countries that are still under colonial domination, and so it does not become an empty word of African Unity". These words had great impact on the other leaders' speeches.¹⁵⁸ Ben Bella was very felicitous, in accordance with the unanimous, to justify the policy of violence in the regions that had not yet attained independence.

Supporting of liberation struggle became a path for friendship between Africa and the West. The founding African Summit adopted two resolutions for supporting the liberation movements in Africa:

The first resolution was to receive the national liberation movements, to train them in the independent African states, and to empower the African youth through training and vocational education. It was decided to form a mechanism for that, which was the establishment of "the Struggle Fund" to which all Member States contributed 1% of national income to support the Fund. That was through the "Coordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa", and Dar es Salaam was the base. The Committee was known as the Committee of Nine, and Algeria one of its members. The total contributions in 1963 amounted to 600,000 pounds. All States participated except Ghana who objected to joining the Committee. So

(157) Colin Legum, *op.cit.*, p.186.

(158) *Ibid.*, p.188.

the first African Summit in Cairo in 1964, decided to make the contribution from Member States compulsory, but without specifying any amount.¹⁵⁹

Third: The Nature of the Algerian Financial and Military Support for the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa:

In addition to full political support to liberation movements in Southern Africa, Algeria provided financial and military support as well as training for liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. It also provided support for movements against apartheid and racism in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia.

Through the Organization of African Unity, Algeria provided financial support through a Special Fund of the Africa Liberation Committee from the time the Committee was established, in 1963. If we review the published data, we will find that Algeria is ranked third in importance among the African States providing financial support through the Liberation Committee, after Egypt and Nigeria. In the first ten years (1964 - 1974), Algeria submitted to the Fund US \$35,000, \$40,000; \$40,000; \$40,000; \$40,000; \$23,295; \$53,265; \$53,295; \$79,942; and \$115,475 in each of the ten years, respectively.¹⁶⁰

Algeria also opened offices for the liberation movements, especially for the movements that were fighting against Portuguese colonialism and racial discrimination in South Africa. Algeria came second after Egypt in providing assistance.¹⁶¹ Algeria received a number of prominent personalities in the freedom struggle, including Nelson Mandela, Desmond Tutu, Robert Mugabe, Samora Machel, Patrice Lumumba, Amílcar Cabral and others. In addition to that, Algeria provided aid in the form of training for the liberation movements in its camps. It also provided military assistance including hardware, weapons and ammunition. The experience gained by the Algerian revolution in the struggle against the French, as well as the available wealth from oil and natural gas, together contributed towards helping the Algerians to provide assistance in the coordination with regional and international parties, especially Cuba, and in some cases (Namibia).¹⁶²

(159) The nine member countries are: United Arab Republic (Egypt), Tanganyika, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Congo (Leopoldville), Senegal, Algeria, Uganda, and Guinea. See *Ibid*, p.189.

(160) See Table 1 in this chapter.

(161) Dr Salwa Mohamed Labib, *Ibid*, p.394.

(162) About the role of the Cubans, and coordination with the Algerians in some battles for the liberation of Namibia, see: Public lecture on the occasion of the 20th Anniversary of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, Polytechnic of Namibia, Auditorium 1, 19 March 2008. http://www.parliament.gov.na/cms_documents/33_lecture_on_cuito_cuanavale19.03.08.pdf.

Libya

The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and its Support to the Struggle of Africans Against Colonialism and Racial Discrimination in South Africa

Since Libya attained its independence in 1951 under the monarchy, it stood on the conservative side of the continent, which means the side that does not embrace the principle of armed struggle to be free from colonialism or racism in Africa. Therefore, it was not in the “progressive”, revolutionary wing; which included the revolutionaries in the continent at that time, such as Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Ghana, Mali and Guinea¹⁶³. Some even criticized the monarchy in Libya, which allowed the use of a U.S. base in Libya, “Hobuls” to attack the national movement of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.¹⁶⁴ But with the revolution of 1st September 1969, which abolished the monarchy and the old system, it was clearly evident that Muammar al-Gaddafi was the powerful one, who was embraced by the Revolution Command Council. He was also the main focus in the new system. His role has increased and confirmed day after day, including the Libyan foreign relations on the African side.

The following address Libyan support for the struggle of Africans against colonialism and racism as follows:

The ideology of the new regime in Libya and the principles of Libyan policy in Africa;

Libya and support of liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies;

Libya and the liberation struggle in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa and Libyan Aid to Liberation Movements in the Seventies.

First: The Ideology of the New Regime in Libya and the Principles of Libyan Policy in Africa

With the Revolution of September 1, 1969; the leadership, including the process of formulating foreign policy, was focused in the hands of Libyan Leader Muammar al-Gaddafi and the inner circle around him. Despite the presence of a number of formal bureaucratic devices such as the secretariat of Foreign Affairs that was responsible for the implementation of the policy, there were some other secretariats or ministries such as security, justice, intelligence services, military, and the Revolutionary Office secretariats; as well as a number of non-official public bodies. Each of these played roles of different levels of importance in the expansion of Libyan foreign policy plan; but the President was still the backbone of the process of making the foreign policy. Hence in short the importance of the definition of his personality lies in the factors

(163) Dr Mahmoud Mahmoud Abul-Enein, Libyan foreign policy towards sub-Saharan Africa in the era of al-Qadhafi, In: Amin Howeiidi and others, *No for the Zionist-American threats to the Jamahiriya* (Cairo, the World Islamic People's Leadership, 1996, p.184.

(164) Mohammed Saleh Omar Makkawi, *African orientation in the Libyan Foreign Policy 1969 - 2002*, Master Thesis in Political Science - Department of Political Science. Academy of Graduate Studies in Tripoli.

influencing his ideas and ideology, as this represents the basis for the ideology of the whole system.¹⁶⁵

President al-Gaddafi was born in 1942 in Sirte, near Tripoli, in a Bedouin family. He grew up with a desert Arab tribes «al-Qadafi», and was educated in that environment. In general, he was affected by the Arabic nature, and religious faith, which was the central element in his psychological composition. Also, he has retained a passionate thought of the Egyptian leader «Gamal Abdel Nasser».¹⁶⁶ His cultural revolutionary ideologies have been crystallized in the following important elements:

1. *El Nasserism:*

El Nasserism became a model for the new system in Libya since the beginning, especially with regard to the position of colonial Western powers, the position on the issue of the Arab unity, the independence of the Arab and African countries, the position of anti-Israel, the racist regimes in Southern Africa and others. This makes al-Gaddafi see himself as a complement to the carrier to the message of Abdel Nasser.¹⁶⁷

From here, the cluster arrangement, movement of State to Libya has been largely influenced by the Chambers adopted by Abdel Nasser, since the beginning of the seventies, in his book *Philosophy of Revolution*,¹⁶⁸ which means of the Arab and African Services, the Islamic one, then the Non-Aligned Movement and the World Service. Although the Libyan leader did not say so officially, the

Jamahiriya's moves were to reflect this trend, i.e., looking at Africa as the Arabic Service. Although this changed in the last period, for the benefit of the African continent came second after Libyan interests.¹⁶⁹

2. *Islam:*

Islam is a source of reference for the thinking of Muammar al-Gaddafi; and one of the key factors shaping his psychological motives. It should be noted here that the new regime in Libya has clashed with the traditional religious institutions on the role of religion in the new system where the system no longer recognizes the use of government as a tool in the hands of Islam, as in the concept of fundamentalist and traditional groups.¹⁷⁰

This trend is behind the establishment of the World Islamic Call Society in 1971. It is an association based on Islamic advocacy and dissemination of Islam in Africa and Asia, and is working with members of the Revolutionary Committees to strengthen the role of Libyan Foreign policy. This trend explains the Libyan

(165) Harris, Lillian Graig, *Libya: Qadhafi's Revolution and the Modern State*, Westview Press, 1986), p.83 & pp.85-86.

(166) *Ibid.*, pp.45-50.

(167) About the form of Nazareth, especially with regard to America, see: Mohammed Fayek, Abdel-Nasser and the African Revolution: (Cairo: Dar al-Mustaqbal Al Arabi in 1982).

(168) Gamal Abdel Nasser, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Cairo: World Edition, no date).

(169) Ronald Bruce St. John, *Qaddafi's world design: Libyan foreign policy, 1969-1987...* London: Saqi books, 1987, p.93.

(170) *Ibid.*, pp.45-50.

attempt to configure “Islamic Cluster” within the framework of the Third World, in which Libya represents a model and an example.171

3. *Socialism:*

Socialism is one of the components and sources of the ideology of the new system. Its assets occur in the “Green Book” or the Third Universal Theory, which was issued in 1972, and explanations and details of the theory, which was issued in several volumes. The socialism here is different from that in the Marxist concept. It does not believe in the class, but believes in religion, nationalism, and social justice; a concept that made the new system stand as a striker for both communism and capitalism, together.172

4. *The Principles of Libyan policy in Africa in the Cold War:*

The Revolution of September 1, crystallized in the ideological framework, referred to a number of basic principles, which we can say were governing the Libyan policy in Africa, since the early seventies until the end of the Cold War, at least. These principles are:

i. Supporting National Liberation Movements, Anti-racism and Apartheid:

At the time of the Libyan revolution, most African countries had been liberated from colonialism and had gained political independence, except the Portuguese colonies in Southern Africa, the racist regimes in both Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and the Republic of South Africa and Namibia controlled by South Africa, as well some few other countries and islands.

In line with the basic principles of the revolution, and following the approach of Egypt, especially in the era of the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser; Libya supported the national liberation movements in these countries, in various forms of overt and covert, political and military, bilateral and collective assistance through the Organization of African Unity and the Liberation Committee. It also supported the African and international efforts to combat racial discrimination in the countries facing racial discrimination; and supported the African Frontline States in the face of attacks by the racist regimes.173

ii. Opposition of the Israeli Existence and its Expulsion from Africa:

The Libyan revolution and its leader were the main factors influencing the isolation of Israel from Africa in the seventies. They also contributed greatly to the cessation of Israeli infiltration in countries of the continent, as a racist colonial-settler. The Libyan revolutionary regime believed that

(171) Harris Lillian, *op. cit.*, p.54 & p.102.

(172) William Zartman With A.G. Kluge «the Sources of Gaddafi's foreign policy «in *American Arab Affairs*, Indiana State University, Nov. 17, No 3, Fall 1983, pp.38-41.

(173) Libyan Arab Republic - Ministry of Information and Culture, the Arab people's revolution (Tripoli, c. 1 in 1973), pp.204-205 See also the Encyclopedia of the National Register, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya to mark the second anniversary of the evacuation of U.S. forces in November 11, 1972.

Israel was a state of colonialism, and its presence in Africa was a «Fifth Column Movement» that should be liquidated and eradicated, especially after its growing presence in the late sixties, and spreading in most parts of the continent. This had become a risk for the security of Arab countries in general, especially under conditions of the ongoing war with Israel after the attack of June 1967.¹⁷⁴ In that context, many African countries severed diplomatic ties with Israel after the war of October 1973. Among them was Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo, under Mobutu, especially after Mobutu's visit to Libya from 9 to 11 September 1971.¹⁷⁵

It was the result of the role played by Libya, interdependently with other Arab states that had a clear effect in the African states and caused them to sever ties with Israel. In his assessment of this achievement, Gaddafi said "We have reduced the influence of the Zionist state and made it the size of Taiwan".¹⁷⁶ In the eighties, Libya continued with the same approach, especially when some African countries began to re-establish contacts with Israel, as Zaire did in May 1982 and Liberia in August 1983. These countries faced a sharp attack from Libya and intense pressure from a number of Arab countries that prompted most African countries to continue boycotting Israel until the beginning of the nineties, especially after the Madrid Peace Conference. The African countries that continued to have relations with Israel, like Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi, were all under direct influence of the apartheid South Africa, at that time.

iii. *Resistance to European colonial influence and the American imperialism in Africa:*

Despite the great economic relations that continued between Libya and both the United States and Western Europe, the attitude of both sides had been marred by doubts, fear, and fantasies, in many cases.

Al-Gaddafi continued to look to Western Europe and the United States as the largest obstacles to achieving his goals and political ambitions.¹⁷⁷ He described the United States as the country seeking to dominate the world. Al-Gaddafi also mentioned that the US policy in favour of Israel and its policies in the Third World, as a whole, constituted international terrorism; and they fell under the influence of the Zionist, resulting in the furthering of its own interests in the whole world and causing disaster.

There were occasions when al-Gaddafi offered to improve his relationship with the United States and open a new page, but for a very long period during his reign, that did not happen. In general, the hostility prevailed

(174) Dr Mohabat Imam Sharabi, *Israeli and Arab presence in Africa: economic and political study* (Cairo: Dar El Maaref, 1982), p.49 and after.

(175) Colin Legume *Africa Contemporary Record 1971/1977*, Annual Survey and Documents, p.43.

(176) *Africa Contemporary Record 1973/1974*, *op.cit.*, p.64.

(177) This is despite the fact that Libya was less African countries - in general - in terms of the western colonial time span of Italian (1911-1941) and England (1941-1951).

between Libya and the United States, since the US withdrawal from the Libyan Wheelus Air Base in 1970, because of the American support for Israel; the circumstances and the developments of the Cold War. The Libyan role in Africa, from the Libyan point of view, was one of the main reasons that caused the deterioration of the relations between the two sides. In this context, the Western countries, especially the United States, accused Libya of working to destabilize the African states. It is mentioned in a U.S. report that Gaddafi finds in Africa a hotbed of his ideas.¹⁷⁸ There are many examples of obvious and hidden confrontation between Libya and the West, in Africa, particularly in Central and West Africa, in the seventies and eighties, until the transition took place in the international system after the Cold War. Libya began to reduce the pressure against the West in general after the liberation of the Portuguese colonies, and later the independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia. The standoff was then confined to the white apartheid regime in South Africa, which collapsed in 1994.¹⁷⁹

Second: Libya and the Support of the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies:

Libya started supporting African liberation movements in southern Africa in the era of the new revolutionary regime. The African liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies were the most important movements that received the backing of Libya in various forms in the seventies. This support led to the establishment of the good relations between Libya and those African countries after the independence in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau, as follows:

1. Regarding liberation movements in Angola, Libya assisted the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, MPLA in all forms, in terms of material, political and media support; that was done on the bilateral and regional levels in the Arab and African fora, through the Arab League, conferences of the Afro-Arab Cooperation, as well as the Organization of African Unity and the Liberation Committee.

Libya met with representatives of the MPLA in Libya, and offered to support their movement, and cut off assistance to the other movements such as UNITA which was backed by South Africa and the United States. The financial support to MPLA in 1976 amounted to 55.1 million dollars¹⁸⁰

(178) Mustafa Bakri, *the night of Green Tent - Secrets of the American raid on Libya* (Cairo: Arab Thought Center for Studies and Publishing, November 1991) pp.83-84.

(179) Libya has declared its role in Africa in a new way, especially in light of the end of the conflict with Chad, and the conditions of international isolation under the Lockerbie crisis. The Libyan initiative to establishment of the Community of Sahel and Sahara in 1998, is considered as one of these being new role, as well as the initiative to establish the African Union in 1999/2001.

(180) Marwa Adel Shukri Mohammed Amin, *The Libyan liberation policy in Africa and the situation of the United States of America (1969-1989)*. Master Thesis, History Department, Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2009, pp.158-160.

Following the victory of the MPLA and power after independence, very strong ties were established with Libya, where three economic and technical agreements, and others for trade exchange, were concluded, in addition to a joint ministerial committee to follow up on other aspects of cooperation between the two countries¹⁸¹.

Colonel al-Gaddafi also received a telegram from Dr Augustine Neto, President of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola on 24 January, 1976, expressing the movement's appreciation to the Libyan positive role towards the Angolan case in the Emergency Summit of the Organization of African Unity, and its support for the struggle by the liberation movement, and the unity of Angola¹⁸².

2. Regarding the Movement for the Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde Islands, there was a close relationship between al-Gaddafi and the leader of the movement, the African freedom fighter, Amílcar Cabral, who expressed this by saying "We have strong hope and believe that the Libyan revolution and the Libyan people are our partners in the struggle. They are doing their best to provide effective assistance to promote the revolution and to achieve victory against the colonizer".¹⁸³

Libya continued to support Guinea-Bissau following the assassination of Amílcar Cabral, the movement leader in 1973, where Libya provided weapons and a number of men for the resistance movement in "Portuguese" Guinea.¹⁸⁴ The Libyan leader received a telegram from the President of the Executive Committee of the Movement for the Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde, Aristide Pereira in 1973 stating, "Following the brutal assassination of Amílcar Cabral, the founder of his party and its Secretary-General, the African people considered the cable that we have received is conclusive evidence of the solidarity of the Libyan revolution for the liberation of Africa, until fully liberalized. It also represents for our fighters and activists of national leadership of the Party, encouragement to follow up on the tremendous work that was initiated and led by our beloved leader."¹⁸⁵

Libya acknowledged the new system in the country, which led to independence in 1974. Luis Cabral, President of the Council of State, thanked the Libyan leader for recognizing the independence of Guinea-Bissau, which joined the

(181) Dr Abdel Meguid Khalifa Al Kut, *Libyan foreign policy towards the non-Arab Africa since the end of the Cold War* (Libya - Garian: University House for Publication and Distribution and Printing, 2008), pp.46-47.

(182) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*, a cable from the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola to Brother Muammar al-Gaddafi, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, in January 24, 1976.

(183) Salem Hussein Omar Barqawi, *Afro-Arab Cooperation Strategy* (1967-1986), Libya: Global Center for Studies and Research of the Green Book, 2004, p.88.

(184) Colin Legum (ed.) *African Contemporary Record*, 1973/74, p.64.

(185) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*, a cable to the Leader of the Executive Committee of the Movement for the Liberation of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde., May 9, 1973.

Organization of African Unity, as member No. 42. Libya announced an assistance of one million pounds sterling for the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.¹⁸⁶

Regarding Mozambique, Libya announced its support for the Mozambican people's struggle against Portuguese colonialism since the early nineteen seventies, and supported it in all African, Asian, and Islamic and other fora. In the Ninth Council of the Organization of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity, al-Gaddafi said in a speech to the Council, "We support the struggle of the peoples of Asia and Africa for freedom, and support the struggle of African liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia; and other liberation movements against the apartheid, and direct and continuous colonialism¹⁸⁷. Libya supported the liberation movement, FRELIMO, in its struggle against the Portuguese presence, until the independence of Mozambique in 1975.¹⁸⁸

The Libyan support for Mozambique continued after independence, especially the country's exposure to the aggression of South Africa "racism". In this regard, in the 30th meeting of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, in Tripoli, 1978 al-Gaddafi said, "The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is prepared to fight publicly beside Mozambique as an independent state subjected to attack from time to time. Also we are with Angola that is also subjected to attack from South Africa, along with the rest of the countries exposed to the aggression of the racist regimes, which are still on African soil.¹⁸⁹

Libya continued to support Mozambique in the nineteen-eighties, as one of the states that were in confrontation against the apartheid regime in South Africa, as well as a revolutionary state that associated with the Libya; and this was endorsed in the Nineteenth Summit, of the Organization of African Unity in Libya in 1982. This conference did not get a quorum required to be held because of the division of Africa due to the crisis of Libyan intervention in Chad, and the Western Sahara problem. It was then that Mozambique, became one of the three countries, which starting in 10 September 1988, received financial support in the form of loans, and material support in the form of crude oil, from Libya. The loans, given to Mozambique, Tanzania and Ghana by Libya reached about US \$189 million, in addition to the 11.1 million tons of crude oil provided; the oil and the loan for the three countries, cost about US \$228.567 million.¹⁹⁰

(186) Marwa Adel Shukri Mohammed Amin, *The Libyan liberation policy in Africa and the situation of the United States of America (1969-1989)*. Master Thesis, History Department, Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2009, p.210.

(187) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*, and a speech by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in the Ninth Council of the Organization of Afro-Asian People's Solidarity. (Tripoli - Libya, November 11, 1971).

(188) Dr Abdel Meguid Khalifa Al Kut, *Libyan foreign policy towards the non-Arab Africa since the end of the Cold War* (Libya - Garian: University House for Publication and Distribution and Printing, 2008), p.41.

(189) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*, and a speech by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in the meeting No. 30 of the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, who started in Tripoli on February 14, 1978.

(190) Dr Sobhy Qansuh and others, *Libya: The revolution in twenty-five years (1969-1994)*, political, economic and social transformations, (Libya - Misurata: Libyan Publishing House, 1994), p.179.

Libya and Mozambique also established an agreement of friendship and cooperation in August 5, 1982, as one of the Frontline States in Southern Africa, which had to bear a substantial burden as a result of the application of economic sanctions against South Africa, and as a support of its defence against the South African attacks.¹⁹¹

It came during the second session of the conference “Nineteenth African Summit”, Tripoli in August 1982, which was attended by Mozambican President Samora Machel; al-Gaddafi said, “We are ready to work side by side with the Frontline States and the African and I want to mention that; but I swear by my honour, domestic and military, I am personally ready to go to the fighting immediately, at the head of any of the forces, myself.¹⁹² Al-Gaddafi sharply condemned South Africa in 1986 for its deliberate plot to assassinate President Samora Machel.¹⁹³

At the opening of the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers in 1987, Colonel al-Gaddafi proposed to include Mozambique and a number of other African countries, which include considerable Muslim minorities such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Tanzania to the Organization of Islamic Conference.¹⁹⁴

Third: Libya and the Liberation Struggle in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa:

Libya was in support of the liberation struggle against racism in Zimbabwe, formerly Southern Rhodesia, and South Africa, as well as the colonization of Namibia.

1. In the case of Zimbabwe, Libya agreed to the resolutions of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, in its third regular session in Cairo, in 1964, on Southern Rhodesia,¹⁹⁵ which registered objection on the decision of the independence of Rhodesia from the minority government supported by colonialism; and the Decree No. 15 of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity held in Dar es Salaam, on 7-10 April 1975, regarding South Africa, which stressed that the objective of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to Zimbabwe was independence on the basis of majority rule.¹⁹⁶

Colonel al-Gaddafi stressed on many occasions that the solution imposed by colonists in Zimbabwe, was a fake and sick resolve. At that time, the delegates of the liberation movements of Africa demanded not to recognize the results

(191) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*, “Agreement of friendship and mutual cooperation between the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and Mozambique, 25/8/1982.

(192) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*, and a speech by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in the second session of the Ninth Conference of the African Summit in Libya, in August 1982.

(193) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*, for a leader of the revolution with the Irish Radio Network on November 6, 1986.

(194) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*; Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers in 1987.

(195) Arab Republic of Egypt Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *The Resolutions and Recommendations. op.cit.*, pp.46-47.

(196) *Ibid*, p.330.

of the colonial solution. Libya contributed in the establishing of the OAU Assistance Fund for the Struggle Against Colonialism and Apartheid. The fund was established for humanitarian purposes from outside the continent, and the money was used for the preparation of the areas liberated from colonial rule by providing them with food, clothing and educational services, among others. The funds were also used for assistance to refugees who had left the Rhodesian land to neighbouring countries on the continent as a result of brutal raids by the authorities of racism in Rhodesia at that time. Libya also contributed to the unification of ZAPU and ZANU-PF movements in an effort to form a common front for the liberation of their country, in Benghazi, Libya.¹⁹⁷

Colonel al-Gaddafi received Joshua Nkomo in Libya in 1979, to coordinate for the next stage after the independence of Zimbabwe, and to conduct elections in February 1980, which were won by ZANU-PF led by Robert Mugabe who became the Prime Minister. Al-Gaddafi travelled to Zimbabwe, and addressed the Zimbabwean military delegates, where he said, “The Libyan people stood with all their capability, with the people of Zimbabwe, and thanked God that this alliance had led to final victory... Colonialists were aware of the Zimbabwean liberation forces on our territory, so they blacklisted us in order to stop our support for our brothers in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, and we rejected that ... We had the support of the Irish Republican Army and created a big problem for Britain near its border ... Since that time, Britain began considering partially lifting its hands on Zimbabwe ... Our arms extended to you will not stop at this point, but we are ready to support Zimbabwe’s economy as well, and you can count on your friends and your allies, the Libyans”.¹⁹⁸

Regarding Namibia and South Africa, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi marched on the same line, which was followed by the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt about the link between the racist regime in South Africa and profaned the Zionists in Palestine. Al-Gaddafi was saying “There is a white racist regime in South Africa and racist Zionists in Palestine ... Why is this bridge between them? Because they are one type. They are racist enemies of humanity. If we spent on one of them, the other will stand on one foot. This is why we direct our efforts to eliminate the white racists in South Africa just as we direct our efforts to eliminate the racist Zionists in Palestine ... The Arab and African people are paying the price in the face of this common enemy that is an enemy to them and the whole world.”¹⁹⁹

(197) Marwa Adel Shukri Mohammed Amin, *The Libyan liberation policy in Africa and the situation of the United States of America (1969-1989)*. Master Thesis, History Department, Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2009, pp.267-268.

(198) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*, the speech of the Revolution Leader to the military trainees in Zimbabwe in March 13, 1980.

(199) Speech of Colonel Muammar al- Gaddafi in the International Symposium on the Dismissal of the Issue of Zionism and Racism, Tripoli, July 22, 1976, pp.15-16.

Al-Gaddafi's vision of the struggle against the settlers was marred by lack of familiarity with the realities at the beginning. Based on his words, he said in 1972, "I was surprised when I spoke with the brother President Mokhtar Weld Daddah of Mauritania, about the South African issue. President Mokhtar showed me that the problem was now the Government of South Africa seizure of the territory of Namibia; and this was on top of Africa's concerns. Because I think that the work for Africa was the liberation of the whole of the southern Africa region from the control of white invaders."²⁰⁰

Libya continued to support the struggle for Namibia's independence from South Africa "racism". In the Nairobi Summit, 1981, Libya promised to provide financial support to SWAPO, that was struggling for the liberation of Namibia from South Africa, by half million dollars, in addition to in-kind assistance, such as weapons, food among others. At the same time, it also promised to provide assistance to the African National Congress (ANC) as well as Pan-African Conference (PAC) that were struggling against the apartheid inside South Africa.²⁰¹ Also, Libya joined the African and international anti-racism and racial discrimination for both Rhodesia and South Africa, as a form of abhorrent colonialism.²⁰²

In the campaign against racism in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Libya provided assistance to both Zambia and Tanzania, the neighbouring countries, giving support to the fighters. Libya also contributed to the international campaign for a boycott of the racist regime in Pretoria, and demanded in all the international meetings of al-Gaddafi, to fully respect the resolutions of the United Nations regarding boycott against the racist regimes in South Africa.²⁰³ Libya condemned on many occasions, the prison sentences given to the freedom fighters of the African national liberation movements.

At the 19th Africa Summit, November 26, 1982, in his speech al-Gaddafi said, "Libya will carry out its duties towards the liberation movements in South Africa, the Pan African Congress (PAC), the African Congress (ANC) in this list; we pledge to you that we will provide all necessary support. Also, Libya will take the international obligation regarding the achieving of the functions of social and economic programs for South Africa."²⁰⁴

At the 8th Summit of the Non-Aligned States in 1986, in Harare, Zimbabwe, Gaddafi said "We came to you to boost the morale of the fighters of South Africa and the freedom fighters headed by Mandela, but I announce from here that the

(200) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*. A speech of Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi in the Ninth Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, Tripoli - Libya, November 11, 1970.

(201) *Africa Contemporary Record* 1981, 1982, p.61.

(202) Nathan Alexander, op.cit., p.840.

(203) Marwa Adel Shukri Mohammed Amin, *The Libyan liberation policy in Africa and the situation of the United States of America (1969-1989)*. Master Thesis, History Department, Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2009, pp.249-251.

(204) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*, The final session of the Conference of the XIX African Summit, November 26, 1982 (Libya Tripoli).

potentials of my country, the moral and material are under the command of the liberation forces all over the world.”²⁰⁵

In his speech to the Defence Committee of the Organization of African Unity, in 1989, al-Gaddafi said, “We must win the fight in South Africa for the benefit of the black people of South Africa; it is a shame that an European system remains hosted by white racists in South Africa, it is shameful that African countries exchange visits, negotiations or confessions with this system, the dirty racist regime against the black. Therefore, we should depend on our own to destroy the racist regimes.”²⁰⁶

Fourth: Libyan Aid to Liberation Movements in the Seventies:

Libya’s contribution to the support of the liberation movements in African countries, either through the Organization of African Unity that is the Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, in which Libya’s Contribution amounted to about 6.51% of the Committee’s budget.²⁰⁷ The assistance to the African liberation movements was supported by the internal popularity in Libya, where the Libyan People’s Congresses, including the General People’s Congress or Parliament, issued Law No. 11 of 1981 in support of liberation movements in Africa and the world. The governmental General People’s Committee also made a decision to support African Frontline States on 26 November, 1981.²⁰⁸

At the same time, some other African countries, in the seventies, received loans and grants from Libya, such as Guinea-Bissau, which received a loan of \$3 million during the period of 1975-1976, and the DR Congo, which received loans worth \$93 million to fund projects in 1974. Angola received about \$150 million in 1974 as a loan from Libyan.²⁰⁹ The Libyan leadership announced in the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its 27th Ordinary Session, in Port Louis, Mauritius, from 24 June to 3 July 1976, that it invited Member States of the Organization of African Unity to provide effective assistance to the Government of the Republic of Mozambique; and then the resolution No. 475 was issued to provide a grant of \$30 million from the Special Arab Aid Fund for Mozambique, and to support the Zimbabwean people’s struggle for liberation.²¹⁰

(205) Encyclopedia of the National Register. Addressed by Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi in the 8th Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, September 4, 1986, Harare, Zimbabwe.

(206) *Encyclopedia of the National Register*, addressed by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi at the opening of the tenth session of the Commission of Defense, March 28, 1989 (Tripoli - Libya).

(207) Mohammed Saleh Omar Ali Matary, *African Orientation of the Libyan Foreign Policy (1969-2002)*, Master Thesis, Graduate Studies Academy, Benghazi Branch, 2004, p.79.

(208) Secretariat of the People’s Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation - Report of the Libyan Foreign Policy, 1981, p.24.

(209) Khaled Hanafy Mahmoud, *Libyan foreign policy towards non-Arab African countries since 1969*, Master Thesis, Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, 2004, pp.156–157.

(210) Arab Republic of Egypt - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the resolutions, *op.cit.*, p.374.

Morocco and Tunisia

Morocco and Southern African Struggle against Colonialism and Racial Discrimination

The Kingdom of Morocco had adopted an active African policy since the beginning of its independence from France in 1956. The African continent was one of the core constituents of the foreign policy of Morocco due to many links, including the geography, historical link with the Sahara, cultural ties, where the African component is one of the main constituents of the Moroccan identity. In addition, there was the common struggle for liberation from European colonialism; all of which linked Morocco with the African continent.

Three main phases can be identified in the framework of the Moroccan African policy, particularly the position of the Kingdom of Morocco and its support of the liberation struggle in southern Africa. The first phase, covering the period from 1956 to 1961, a period of King Mohammed The V; the second phase, extending from 1961 to 1975, a stage at his successor, King Hassan The II - specifically by the African position on the issue of the disputed Western Sahara; and the third phase, lasting from 1975 to 1994, the second term of the reign of King Hassan The II, especially after Morocco's withdrawal from the Organization of African Unity, and his taking to an independent stance.

1. The First Phase: The King Mohammed V Morocco's Accession to the Axis of the Revolutionary States in Africa:

Morocco sought to pursue a policy of African revolutionary, since its independence from France in 1956, especially in the period of King Mohammed V, from 1956 to 1961, who joined the Revolutionary wing of the continent, which believes in using all means to liberate colonized territories, including armed force. This was reflected in the Moroccan position towards the Algerian revolution. It was also reflected in the position of Morocco towards the Congolese (Kinshasa) Revolution, as well as in joining and in founding the Organization of Casablanca, which included the revolutionary countries on the African continent at that time. The reign of King Mohammed V was marked by his support of the national liberation movements against colonialism in Africa and Asia, whether in Algeria, Palestine, Indonesia or Congo. This trend was an extension of the experiment, which was led by King in Morocco itself. The French colonialists wish the King had joined the French colonialists against the national movement in his country. However, King Mohammed V chose to support the internal national movement. As a result he was exiled from the country to the island of Corsica, south France, in August 1953. He was later transferred to the island of Madagascar in January 1954.(211) The national movement continued fighting colonialism, and received

(211) Dr Ragaa Mahmoud Taha Mohamed, His Majesty King Mohammed the V symbol of struggle and sacrifice in: Publications of the High Commission and members of the former resistance fighters imprisoned freedom, His

support from Egypt, where Abdel Nasser gave arms to The Liberation Army of Morocco, until the King returned from exile on 16 November 1955 and Morocco gained its political independence from France on 2 March, 1956.

Further, there was friendship between King Mohammed V and the late Egyptian leader Abdel Nasser, and there was broad consensus between the two leaders who were gathered through Arabism, Islam and the liberation of Africa and the Arab world. They were also involved in supporting of the Algerian Revolution, and the establishment of coordination among the independent African states at the United Nations, which had helped in getting several decisions passed, that helped in liberation of many African countries. One of most important of these resolutions is the UN Resolution Number 1514 of the General Assembly, in 1960 of the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonized Countries and Peoples”, as well as the resolution establishing the Decolonization Committee that was created in 1961 by the General Assembly of the United Nations, with the purpose of monitoring implementation of the former resolution. (212)

The King Mohammed V charged Abdul-Karim al-Khatib, Minister of African Affairs, to establish contacts with African liberation movements, particularly the African National Congress, and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola. The King Hassan II did the same in the early years of his reign.

King Mohammed V Support of the Revolution of the Congo (Leopoldville):

The Congo crisis at the beginning of 1960's landmark in the history of the struggle and the liberation of Africa, where it led to a terrible conflict between the forces of colonialism on one hand and national liberation forces in Africa on the other.

The King Mohammed the V, with courage and clarity, made a stand with the leaders of African liberation, namely Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Sékou Touré, Kwame Nkrumah, Modibo Keita) in support of Congolese national independence leader Patrice Lumumba.

On 11 July, 1960, Lumumba asked the United Nations to send international force to maintain law and order in the Congo to stop the Belgian intervention. He also asked his friends in Africa, including King Mohamed V, to participate in the force. The King Mohammed the V responded immediately and sent a force of some battalions of the Moroccan army. Morocco was the first country to respond to the UN resolution, where it sent two battalions in July 1960. It also sent the third battalion, for a total of up to 3,250 soldiers under the command of General Hamo El-Kettani who was appointed to succeed the President of the General Command of the United Nations.(213) The Moroccan troops spread in all parts

late Majesty Mohammed The Fifth, *Struggle for Independence and Support for African liberation Movements* (Rabat: An International Academic Seminar, 14 - 15 November 2005, pp.95-98.

(212) Mohamed Fayek, *His Majesty King Mohammed V and his role in the liberation of Africa and achieving unity*, in *Publications of the High Commission of former resistance fighters*, *Ibid*, pp.115 to 117.

(213) Abdul Haq , Marini , *The Moroccan Army through History* , (Rabat: Dar Almasrif for publication , fifth Edition , 1997) p.05.

of the Congo and the most important mineral sites in the territory of “Katanga”. The first task assigned to them was to contact the rebel soldiers to disarm and return them to their barracks as well as the protection of factories and farms. The United Nations had also assigned them the task of organizing Congolese forces as soon as possible. So that the Ministry of Defence and the Chief of Staff were organized, also three battalions of paratroopers were formed. That was the first nucleus of a real Congolese National Army.

The Congolese police was also reorganized. They also supported the troops in the restoration of the factories and farms, as well as the resumption of special researches and construction of Enka Dam. The Puma Port on Congo River, and Matadi Port, were reopened, as part of the important work carried out until March 1961, when the troops were returned to Morocco. The speech of King Mohammed V to them was, “It is something to be very proud of to see that the whole world respects the great role that you have played for the good of the Congo and service that you rendered with sincerity to the people, conserving the traditions of military, and having magnanimity, nobility and generosity of self and high vigor.”²¹⁴

In general, the situation in Congo seriously deteriorated after President Kasavubu responded to the colonial schemes. He issued a decree deposing Lumumba as Prime Minister and leader of the majority in the parliament, based on the support of General Mobutu, an army commander of the garrison located in Leopoldville. Lumumba refused that and became one of two authorities in the country, as well as the United Nations force. King Mohammed V was worried about using the African military forces, including the Moroccan troops, in purposes other than they were sent for. Given this situation of complexity, the King made an initiative, calling for the Casablanca Conference on January 1st, 1961, which was attended by leaders of African countries that had troops in the Congo to examine the situation.⁽²¹⁵⁾

King Mohamed V and the Casablanca Conference (January 1961):

The summit meeting was in Casablanca at the initiative of King Mohammed the V of Morocco. The conference brought together African countries, revolutionary at that time, like Egypt, Morocco, Guinea, Ghana and Mali, in addition to the interim Algerian Government, as well as leaders of African liberation movements. They declared Casablanca’s charter that established the first African organization from the five States and the interim Government of Algeria. It was an organization bringing together countries from North Africa, Arabic-speaking and sub-Saharan African countries which were non-Arabic speaking. The Charter was prosecuting the unionist revolutionary thought, emphasizing on the liberation of African territories still under foreign domination. It also declared that the economic

(214) - Abdul Haq, Marini, *Ibid* p.405 to 406.

(215) - Mohamed Fayek, His Majesty King Mohammed the V and his Role in the liberation of Africa and to Achieve unity, in *Ibid*, pp.120-121.

and social policy for African countries should be in the form that ensures the exploitation of national wealth for the benefit of their peoples and to ensure that the wealth was distributed equitably among their own nationals.

The Conference adopted a resolution on racism in South Africa and denounced the policy of Government of the Union of South Africa disregarding the UN resolutions and the Afro-Asian conferences. It condemned also the policy of colonial powers that still supported the moral and military Government of the Union of South Africa, and affirmed the determination to implement the resolutions of the Bandung Conference, as well as Accra and Monrovia on this subject. The conference called the United Nations to apply the penalties that are set in the Articles 40, 41 of the UN Charter if the South African government did not put an end to its racial segregation policy.(216)

2. **The Second Phase: King Hassan II period, 1961-1975**

During this phase, we have witnessed an extension of the first phase to a certain extent, especially in the first few years. The African policy of Morocco continued to support the African peoples and the liquidation of colonialism and anti- racism. These were, in fact, the foundations built by the Moroccan politics under King Mohamed V.

Morocco continued to provide training and material support to revolutionary movements, including Nelson Mandela who visited Morocco in April 1962. Mandela was asked to send his men to Dar es Salaam, and then they would be trained in Morocco. Mandela received £5,000 from Abdel Karim Al-Khatib. However, some developments began to impact on the Moroccan position as an Arab-African revolutionary state. The most important of these developments was the claim of Morocco's sovereignty on Mauritania, as part of the historical empire of Morocco. The conflict extended over the Western Sahara, especially since 1976, which contributed to the limitation of Morocco's African policy.

Mauritania gained its independence from France in 1960. King Mohammed V presented this event to the African public as an example of work against colonialism and imperialism, focusing on Moroccan policy of anti-dependency. He assured the support of radical leaders of the African revolutionary in demanding sovereignty over Mauritania.(217)

The Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs presented the Mauritanian issue at the United Nations in 1960 as similar to the issue of secession of Katanga from the Congo. After Mauritania gained its independence, the King Hassan III boycotted the founding Summit of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa because Mauritania was called to attend the conference. Morocco delayed the signing of the Charter of the OAU for four months. It kept a precaution when

(216) - Colin Ljum, *The Pan-Africanism, Brief of political guide*, p.287-288.

(217) *Miguel Hernando de Larramendi, Foreign policy Morocco*, translated from Spanish by Abdel-Aal Roky, Casablanca: Al Nagah Algadida: The 9th Book, 2005, p.153.

signing the Charter, saying that His Majesty King's Government had no intention in any way to abandon its legitimate historical rights regarding to peace and the preservation of the territorial integrity of the country within its borders.(218) However, Morocco was obliged to accept the independence of Mauritania de facto. Morocco amended its approach in African politics since the mid-sixties. It began to strengthen its relations with moderate African Francophone countries, or conservatives, like Senegal, Cote d'Ivoire and Zaire, which made Morocco to get into the Western Sahara conflict, without enough support from the African States, especially after 1975.(219)

Before that, the African States were supporting the Arab-African parties in the dispute sustaining them against Spain as decolonization case that was an African goal which had always attracted unanimous support.

The African States continued to adopt this position until the issuance of the advisory opinion in 1975 by the United Nations and the International Court of Justice. The feud began among the African countries, particularly after the Madrid Agreement that partitions the territory, which was rejected by some of the committees of the OAU. They considered that the Territory was still in the rule of colonial domination. The Organization of African Unity emphasized on the inalienable right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination.(220)

These events had influenced on the Moroccan policy towards Southern Africa. With regard to the Moroccan position for the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, the Morocco has always engaged in the approach to the Organization of African Unity, based on the recognition of the three liberation movements in Angola, namely the People's Liberation Movement of Angola (MPLA); the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FLNA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Until the mid-seventies, Morocco shared with the Organization of African Unity, the option of calling Portugal to hand over power to all the three movements. It also believed that the three movements, before or after independence, should work to resolve the outstanding problems among them in the framework of forming a government of national unity, and organize free elections within a year after independence.

The assembly of Heads of State and Governments held in Kampala, Uganda from 28 July to 1st August 1975, discussed some issues including the deteriorating situation in Angola. It adopted a resolution (AHG/Res.72 (XII)) requesting the Chairman of OAU, after consultation with Members of the Bureau, to appoint members of the Fact-Finding Commission of Enquiry and Conciliation in

(218) Mahmoud Mohamed Ibrahim Abul-Enein, *The Right to Self-Determination with a comparative study of Eritrea and Western Sahara problems*, PhD Thesis, Institute of African Research and Studies, Cairo University, 1987, p.539.

(219) *Ibid*, p.407-412.

(220) *Idem*.

Angola; the Commission included Uganda, Somalia, Nigeria, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Ghana, Algeria Lesotho, and Burundi.(221)

In the framework of the Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation, Morocco had stood with Uganda, Upper Volta, Niger, Ghana, and Lesotho, while Algeria was with Somalia, Burundi and Nigeria, that is, on a line completely in the opposite. The representative of Morocco, Mohammed Besbs, Head of African Affairs, Foreign Ministry of Morocco; said that “Morocco does not support the recognition of the People’s Liberation Movement in Angola”. He also said that “Morocco cannot be on the same side with a movement that was treating others systematically as traitors”.(222) Despite that both the MPLA and the FLNA were started in Morocco, according to Moroccan Foreign Ministry sources.(223)

The Algerian trend was supporting the USSR in its position on the Angolan movements. Algeria was accused in playing a key role in supporting the Soviet efforts in Angola by allowing the departure of the aircraft from its land to Angola. This situation strengthened the Algerians position in their bargaining with the Soviets, resulting in the tendency of the Soviets supporting Algeria in the Sahara conflict.

The Moroccan Minister of Information, Dr Taieb ben Hema, expressed the Moroccan viewpoint on Angola in his talks with the US Ambassador in Morocco on 26 December, 1975. He said,“Morocco will continue its current policy to avoid recognition of any movement in Angola”.224

Perhaps the link between the situations of the Western Sahara and Angola have become clear both from the viewpoint of Moroccans or Algerians, or even from the point of view of other African states. Nigerian diplomatic officials announced that the Nigerian envoys who visited Morocco with a message from the Nigerian President Murtala, faced a difficult time there. Moroccans did not give them warm reception because of the relatively negative attitude of Nigeria towards the Sahara issue. This was in contrast to the delegation of Zairean President Mobutu to Morocco. It was warmly welcomed because of the strong support of Zaire to Morocco at the United Nations on the Sahara issue. (225)

In general, the African Summit held for the situation in Angola ended without reaching a compromise on Angola. The States supporting the government of (MPLA) rejected the draft resolution submitted by the Ugandan President Idi Amin. Thus the second round of collective diplomacy in Africa failed, and the African nations were split into two equal (numerically) sides, one led by Algeria

(221) Egypt - Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Decision, Resolutions and Declarations of the Organization of African Unity 1963 - 1983, *op. cit.*, p.351 - 352.

(222) See more informations about developments in the conflict in Angola in the line of international information, (web: Almoqatel, www.moqatel.sn/onensre/rehath/siasia?war-angola/sec04doc.4119/2009)

(223) *Ibid.*

(224) Algeria facilitated the Soviet control in Angola in exchange for the Moscow position in the Sahara issue (21/11/2008). (Web: www.attajdid.info/def.asp).

(225) Web.: www.moqatel.com/war-Angoloa.

and supporting the government of MPLA, and the other led by Morocco, calling for a coalition national government in Angola formed by the three movements,. In fact, the second group was supporting the Alliance of UNITA and FLNA, which was against the MPLA.

The Third Stage: King Hassan II's accession to the moderate centre of the Continent in 1976 – 1994:

The support of the Algerian proposal to the problem of Western Sahara by majority of the African states in the Organization of African Unity, led to the recognition of The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), by a number of African countries, in the Freetown Summit, of 1980. It joined as a participant in the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa, in February 1982. The Secretary- General of the Organization Adam Kodjo, announced the admission of the SADR under the leadership of the Polisario.(226) The Moroccan delegation withdrew from the meeting, followed by delegations of a number of African countries that threatened to boycott the organization's conferences in the case of participation of the Polisario. Indeed, when the delegation of the SADR admitted as a member of the Organization (No. 51), attended the 20th Summit in Addis Ababa, in 1984, the Moroccan delegation withdrew from the meeting.

The President of the Moroccan delegation, the representative of King Hassan, said, "Waiting to be overcome by wisdom and prudence, we are leaving". The Moroccan membership in the organization was suspended. The King Hassan II concluded that "the Organization of African Unity had acted improperly, and that the standards of the United Nations are in high degree of accuracy". (227)

Morocco tried to gain the western support and to ensure moderate African support; it tried to give the conflict as a conflict between East and West. Therefore Morocco used the political tools as well as military ones. Among the most important tools, was engaging in the activities of the Francophone countries, hoping to give it more room to move, especially towards the neighbour Algeria, which was then seen to be on the socialist camp. The extent and the most important cause behind Morocco's involvement in the Francophone countries was the "Group safari" made up of two parts, intelligence and military, with the aim of making rapid intervention to support friendly regimes.

It was the military arm that intervened more than once in the DR Congo (formerly Zaire) to support Mobutu's regime; in Somalia to support Siad Barre against the ruling Marxist Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia. The other attempts were

(226) -The Polisario, Polisario Front, or Frente Polisario, from the Spanish abbreviation of Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro ("Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro") is a Sahrawi rebel national liberation movement working for the independence of Western Sahara from Morocco. <http://en.wikipedia.org>.

(227) - Mahmoud Mohamed Ibrahim Abul-Enein, *op.cit.*, pp.412-416.

to support moderate coalitions in Africa which were pro-West, against the radical coalitions supported by the socialist camp that tended to favour Algeria.

1. *The First Western intervention in Zaire (Shaba), 1977*

In early April 1977, a Moroccan band composed of 1,300 men and their equipment on board using French aircraft went to the Republic of Zaire to help to sustain the liberalization of Shaba (previously Katanga) province, which was attacked by Cuban mercenaries from Angola. The campaign was led by Col. Abdel Qadir Lubares, supported by Col. Abdel Wahid the commander of military operations.

The Moroccan band was able to recover the mining city of Kolwezi, Lualaba Province, South DR Congo. It was also in cooperation with the forces of Zaire to recover Kananga, Lulua Province, Muchacha. The Mercenaries fled beyond the border of Zaire. The Moroccan force took control of the cities of Kankura, and Vankova. It caused heavy losses and got spoils. It enlisted Zairian volunteers who were using poison arrows. The Moroccan force retrieved the Kazagy town, which forms a junction for roads and railway; and the Dilolo city, which was the last stronghold for the invading mercenaries; thus returned the independence of the territory and ended the war. (228)

2. *The Second Morocco's intervention in Zaire, 1978*

The second Moroccan military Battalion including 1,500 soldiers, and a unit of armoured forces, was sent to Zaire in June 1978. It was led by Col. Major Lubares. This was based on the call from the Organization of African Unity to restore security after the turmoil of the security situation in Zaire. The Moroccan troops participated alongside a number of African Union forces led by Moroccan Commander Lubares. It completed its work and returned back to Morocco in August 1979.(229)

3. *Moroccan Support of Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies and South Africa:*

King Mohammed V had put a strong foundation to support the liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies. He supported the National liberation movement in Mozambique“Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO)” led by Samora Machel. The FRELIMO had struggled until Mozambique got independence on 25 June, 1975. The independence of Mozambique was followed by the independence of islands of Cape Verde, Sao Tome and Principe. The Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) was founded in 1975 following Mozambique's independence as an anti-Communist political organization. It fought against the FRELIMO in the Mozambican Civil War from 1975 to October 1992 with the Rome General Peace Accords between FRELIMO and RENAMO.

(228) Abdul Haq, Marini, *The Moroccan Army Through History*, *op.cit.*, p.415.

(229) Idem.

In 1994, Mozambique held its first-ever democratic elections, based on multi-party system.(230)

Mr Abdel Karim Al-Khatib, who served as minister for African Affairs since the reign of King Mohammed V, organized the training of cadres for the liberation movements in Mozambique, South Africa and Portuguese Guinea. Morocco also provided financial support for the political resistance to apartheid and racial discrimination in South Africa. In this regard, at the beginning of the reign of King Hassan II, Nelson Mandela visited Morocco in April 1962. Mandela requested a meeting with the King to ask for help for his men because he wanted to establish an army. He also wanted money, weapons and training. Abdel Karim Al-Khatib asked Mandela to bring soldiers to Dar es Salaam, and Morocco was going to provide an aircraft to transfer them to Morocco for training. They also agreed for arms to be sent to Dar es Salam. When Mandela asked for £5,000 as a financial assistance, Al-Khatib handed him a check for that amount to put it in one of the London banks, without taking a receipt. Nelson Mandela still remembered the incident and commended it on every occasion, as a sign of what was done by Morocco in supporting the resistance movement against apartheid in South Africa.(231)

Thus, Morocco played an active role in support of African liberation movements, since its independence; including the liberation movements in southern Africa, and in the anti-apartheid and decolonization. Morocco always supported the decisions approving the independence and freedom of African peoples in the summit meetings and regional and international conferences.

However, Morocco's support to African liberation movements in Africa in general, and in southern Africa in particular, became limited due to the alliance of Morocco with the Western powers. After the short-term association with African revolutionary leaders or radicals who formed the Casablanca Group, Morocco chose the moderate or pro-Morocco African regimes due to the Sahara conflict. This type of conservatism had contributed to reduce the Moroccan support for liberation movements in the revolutionary, patriotic and anti-Western South African movements.

Tunisia and the Southern African Struggle

The role of Tunisia in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa was relatively less important. Habib Bourguiba was the father of Tunisian Independence who forced France to leave his country. But the method that was adopted by Tunisian National Movement in the struggle against France was based primarily on political and diplomatic means. The Tunisian's Liberation Army didn't have the chance to reach the same degree of maturity and breadth of influence that was reached by the

(230) USAID/Mozambique, Strategic objective close out report, 2005, p.2.
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/62/36133961.pdf

(231) Abdel Karim Al-Khatib, *Resistance to French colonialism*, p.1, 10/1/2005.

Algerian Liberation Army, for example, or even by the Moroccan Liberation Army. This referred to the short duration of the Tunisian armed struggle. That period ranged from March to December 1954.

These conditions helped Habib Bourguiba, in the declaration of Tunisia's independence on 20th March, 1956; as a sovereign nation running its foreign affairs and self-defence with some concessions to France.(232)

Bourguiba stayed in office until 1989 when he was succeeded as president, by Zine El Abidine Ben Ali.²³³ So the most important and decisive period through which the Tunisian side could have help the liberation movements in Southern Africa passed through Bourguiba rule, that focused on the political dimension and efforts through international organizations and also the financial support, through the OAU, to help the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.

In fact, the alliance of Tunisia under Bourguiba, with the West put it in a group of moderates and conservatives, and got it out from the camp of fighters and revolutionaries who believed in the importance of armed action in the liquidation of colonialism and resistance to apartheid. Bourguiba was one of the first politicians in North Africa and the Arab world, in general, who did not welcome any cooperation with the former Soviet Union or the socialist bloc countries. He used to say, "The entry of one cartridge of this camp is able to open the door wide to experts and destructive ideas". In a speech in May 1968, he said, "We believe that the influence of the United States of America constitutes an element of stability that protects the world from any kind of totalitarian regimes."

Bourguiba's relations with Egyptian President Abdel Nasser witnessed continuous tensions, where he disagreed with him in his direction, ideology, and many issues including unity, nationalism, and the Palestine. He preferred, in some speeches, the Atlantic Alliance instead of the Arab League. He also criticized radical systems of the Arab world such as the Baathist regime and the Libyan regime. (234)

However, Tunisia in the era of Bourguiba provided moral and material assistance to support the national movement in South Africa, led by Nelson Mandela, as well as the revolutions of Angola and Mozambique. The Tunisian support was through the Organization of African Unity, Committee for the Liberation of Africa Fund. Tunisia was ranked eighth in terms of the financial support through the Fund of Liberation Committee, after Egypt, Nigeria, Algeria and Guinea, Ethiopia, Libya and Zaire. (235)

(232) This, along with recognition of the national struggle waged against the French by Habib Bourguiba and his flight across Libya to Egypt at that time, and the formation of a team of Tunisian fighters reached about 2514 men, which made the French felt that their life was in danger.

See: Dr Nawal Abdel-Aziz Riyadh, *Liberation movements in the Arab Maghreb* (Cairo, Dar Al Arab Thought, Culture Encyclopedia of Historical, Archaeological, Cultural, Modern and Contemporary History No. 22, 2007, p.41, 49.

(233) Bourguiba died in the April 16, 2000.

(234) <http://www.moqatel.com/moqatel/dats/wathaek/wazerafrica>.

(235) See Table 1 in this chapter.

Although Tunisia did not participate in the African groupings such as Brazzaville, Casablanca, and Monrovia Group, prior to the OAU, it joined the Organization of African Unity. Tunisia supported the liberation movements in Southern Africa through the African collective action, the Arab summit conferences, and the conferences of Non-aligned Movement. It provided political and moral support to the liberation movements and the liquidation of apartheid in South Africa; which was attended to by the Tunisian President Ben Ali, until the change in South Africa in 1994.

Conclusion

Thus we can say that the tide of supporting the Liberation movements in Southern Africa against apartheid in South Africa started to rise from the North African countries that continued to work until the achievement of the objectives. Cairo was the major centre for African liberation movements, including the liberation movements in Southern Africa, in terms of providing places for political leadership, military training, financial assistance, political support, media and diplomatic support. Algeria and Morocco, especially after 1961 and 1962 provided support and assistance; Libya also started giving support since the beginning of 1970's but to a lesser extent than Egypt, because of the potential difference; this was because of Egypt's better understanding of Africa and its ability to mobilize Arab, regional and international support for the liberation movements which were struggling for liberation and for elimination of apartheid from Southern Africa countries.

8.4

Against the Grain: Support-Work for Southern African Liberation in Canada and the United States

John S. Saul

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The struggle for Southern African liberation really began in earnest in the region itself in the early 1960s. At that point, liberation movements had come to a shared awareness that the independence from direct colonial rule won by their African counterparts elsewhere on the continent was not to be so readily won south of the Zambezi - in the stubborn redoubts of both white settlerdom and a particularly recalcitrant Portuguese colonialism. As a result they began to craft the more assertive policies of popular and armed struggle that they felt to be necessary in order to lay claim to their freedom.

The regional war that resulted – at its most dramatic in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia (to become Zimbabwe), South-West Africa (to become Namibia), and South Africa – has been described by others elsewhere in this collectively-prepared SADC study. But well beyond the region itself, the drama of the southern African struggle also had enormous resonance; focusing the energies of large numbers of people in a host of countries world-wide. Indeed, even in those countries whose governments and corporate sectors tended to find themselves, from the outset, on the side of white power and of tried and tested sources of profit, citizens organized, from below, to take noteworthy initiatives to challenge their countries' support of racist rule – and to give such succour as they could, to those on the ground in southern Africa who were struggling for liberation. This chapter will focus on the North American front of such a challenge and of such support – specifically on Canada and the United States.

Defining the Terrain of Support

We shall be looking, then, at what I have termed elsewhere the “thirty years war for southern African liberation.” This was a war waged, in the first instance, against continuing racial/colonial rule and it was one waged on a number of territorial fronts throughout the region, most dramatically in the thirty years from 1960 to 1990. This period, when southern Africa became a theatre of war, was one bounded, in its beginnings, by the 1960 banning of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) which, in turn, would precipitate attempts by these movements to launch armed struggles in South Africa. It was also a beginning marked by a further build-up in Angola of the pressures that erupted into violent confrontation there in 1961, and by Dar es Salaam's emergence as the central staging ground for liberation movements from Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa dedicated to struggles further south. The period spanned the ensuing conflicts that brought independence to both Angola and Mozambique in 1975 and the establishment of majority rule in Zimbabwe in 1980. And it closed, in 1990, with the political liberation of Africa's last colony, Namibia, and with the release, in South Africa, of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the ANC that set the stage for a period of negotiations (1990-1994) towards establishment of a democratic constitution there and, ultimately, the holding of the “freedom elections” of 1994 that brought the ANC to power.

It is true that the struggle so defined did not come to an end until this latter date, 1994, when, after four further years of political stalling and physical confrontation, the white power-holders were finally displaced from formal control of political power. It is also the case that the struggle for liberation in southern Africa did not really begin in 1960 but rather in the very first resistances to imperial trespass decades, even centuries, previously. Moreover, the struggle, as we will emphasize, had not really come to an end by 1994, but instead, when properly construed, can be seen to continue to the present moment.

However, in order to see clearly the on-going nature of the “liberation struggle”, as well as to make any real sense of the thirty years war for southern African liberation itself, it will first be necessary to further clarify the terms of our inquiry. Since our topic is “liberation support” we must begin by considering the very concept of “liberation” itself. What exactly are we to take “liberation” to have meant and to mean in southern Africa? There is also a related question, as we will see: in what ways, and to what extent, has liberation actually been attained - and in what ways does the struggle for it still continue?

Let us be clear. The starting point of the analysis here is that “liberation” must be considered as being a multi-dimensional concept, one that implicates four different dimensions: race, class, gender and (democratic) voice. Each dimension needs to be emphasized and reflected upon. There can be no denying that the struggle for southern African liberation has been, principally, a struggle for liberation from racial domination, as epitomized, in South Africa for example, under the name and in the practice of apartheid. Nonetheless, it remains true that for many of the participants in these struggles, there was also an equally important struggle to be waged for liberation on several related fronts: on the class front (for the overthrow and/or strong qualification of the capitalist system, defined as it crucially is by class differentiation and exploitation, both locally and globally) and on the gender front (with claims centering on the demand for a much greater measure of gender equality) in particular.

There was, as well, a fourth dimension to the struggle, one for “voice” - for a high degree of “liberation” in *popular* terms, (in terms, that is, of the local population actually gaining genuine and sustained democratic voice and exerting real and institutionalized control over their new governments). In fact, even if rhetorically

asserted, this latter goal was much less passionately advocated and pursued in southern Africa. Thus even the most exemplary and committed of the liberation movements in the region (one thinks here of FRELIMO in Mozambique and even, perhaps, of the ANC) were overwhelmingly “vanguardist,” and hence tendentially authoritarian, both in perspective and too often in practice. Moreover, all had within their leaderships many who would quickly become content with primarily applauding their own rise to power rather than seeking the effective empowerment of the people themselves than one had hoped would be the outcome of such struggles.

It is also true that the precise balance between these various liberatory goals (cast in terms of race, class and gender and voice) struck by the different liberation movements during their struggles was diverse, with such a balance also subject to shifts over time. Of course all the leading movements were united in their resistance to white minority rule (if not, as noted, in many cases looking to any very strongly democratic aftermath to such contestation). Moreover, virtually all such movements did in fact pay at least lip service, initially, to socialist goals, as well as (albeit with marked variation amongst them) to aspirations to a significant degree of gender equality as well.

Yet all - and each of the founding movements/parties still in power in the region - have come to abandon virtually any attempt to transform fundamentally the "capital-logic" and class differentiation inherent in their inherited economic structures, while all have also been far stronger in their rhetorical, as distinct from practical, commitment to gender equality (read: the realization of women's interests). An advancement of the interests of black southern Africans there has certainly been but even this has been qualified markedly by the differential progress made by different strata of the black population under the various now hegemonic capitalist systems in the region. In short, without trivializing or understating in any way the achievements, both practical and meaningfully symbolic, that have been realized, the actual content of "liberation" in Southern Africa must be carefully and critically scrutinized.

This becomes all the more true when careful account is also taken of the shifting perspectives of players on "the other side" of such struggles, not merely the white settler communities themselves but, even more markedly, the global forces that were arrayed, both for capitalist and for racist reasons, on the side of white minority rule. This is especially true with respect to the present chapter since its main focus will be on movements for support for southern African liberation/anti-apartheid struggle that grounded themselves in two of the most unapologetically capitalist of powers (the United States and Canada) and - especially as regards the United States - which were also marked by domestic policies of significantly racist-tilt.

Indeed, of the essential support, over many decades, of the strongest western states and economies for the white minority regimes there can be no doubt. For, however much tinged with "merely" Cold War calculations and by residual racism, it is especially true that the protection and advancement of the economic "interests" of their countries and corporations were at the forefront of the minds of most western political and business leaders. Thus it is not surprising that much of the energy of liberation support/anti-apartheid activists in these countries was at least as often directed towards seeking to confront corporate complicity in the profits of oppression (through loans, trade and investment) as to challenging the entanglement of their respective states with the racist regimes (whether these latter 'entanglements' be manifested through NATO-support for Portugal for example, or, vis-à-vis South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Rhodesia, as part of some Reaganesque/Thatcherite anti-communist crusade). In any case, the involvement of real popular energies in

campaigns of support designed to lift the weight of western countries, both politically and economically, to be found on the side of white power was dramatic and is well worth chronicling - involving, as it did, political and cultural assertions in such countries by both blacks and whites that were of real merit and magnitude.

But it is also important to emphasize that it proved much easier for the supporters of liberation movements, within churches, trade unions, and autonomous support groups, in western capitalist countries to confront the enormities of racist rule than to assail, with any sustained purpose, the capitalist premises that moved western societies to play the damagingly negative role they did. In part this was a realistic reading by anti-apartheid militants at the time of what was really feasible (in order to avoid their being glibly dismissed as “mere ultra-leftists”) in such profoundly capitalist countries, in part a comfortable, perhaps even unthinking, embrace by even some anti-apartheid militants of the capitalist premises that moved their own societies. In sum, capitalism, it was felt by such latter militants, would merely have to be “reformed” in order to realize the overthrow of racial rule.

It is, therefore, no accident that much of the hitherto existing alignment with pro-southern African hopes and demands tended to fade away as a popular cause in the West in the latter part of the 1980s (and with respect to South Africa in particular).

For by then western capital itself had begun to recalculate the mounting potential costs to capitalist continuity of continued attachment to the once profitable but increasingly vulnerable (even “unnecessary”) racist/apartheid structures with which it was entangled. Moreover, with racist rule abandoned/defeated, the various territories throughout the region that had until then experienced such racial oppression now proved, disappointingly, to be ready candidates for capitalist resubordination. But that was not all. Rather startlingly, the mere removal of the racist “distortions” of western capitalist control seemed also to be a signal for the liberation support/anti-apartheid movement in western capitalist centres, with all the energy that had once sustained it, merely to disappear - as did any particularly outspoken and active commitment to the fate of the poorest of the poor in the region! Any continuing commitment merely bottomed out, in fact, at the present extremely low level, where one currently finds it.

All this must be part of the story of both the successes and the failures of the struggle for liberation both in southern Africa and, as regards southern Africa, more globally. Of course, there are those who would tell this story differently, seeing it as exemplifying a pretty unqualified victory for the cause of “freedom.” There are also those who, even if they glimpse that there have been unrealized hopes for “liberation” in southern Africa and that “the struggle continues,” would still like to tell the story of the southern African struggle in fairly one-sidedly positive terms. Let us, they say, concentrate for purposes of an historical account like the present one on something they then call “the first phase” of liberation struggle – the struggle for “national liberation” – with other so-called “phases” (struggle cast in terms of class, gender and

voice) to come later.

One problem with such a formulation should be clear right from the start. One phase does not follow from another automatically or ineluctably. Quite the contrary. The victors in the first phase (the new cadre of [mainly black] national leaders in the recently “liberated” countries of southern Africa), as well as their new allies at the heart of global capitalism, are not likely to push on eagerly to the realization of new “phases” of liberation (as defined in terms of emancipations from constraints defined by the redress of dominant class and male power and the correction of the present distortions of claims to any effective assertion of popular and democratically- expressed voice). Yet, note carefully, a preoccupation with a more expansive notion of liberation against which to measure the success of liberation movements in southern Africa is not merely the product of the fantasies of western ultra-leftist commentators. For many observers who might be rather demagogically so labelled, in fact learned their “expansive” definition of liberation from those struggling for liberation in the region itself: that is, from the stated concern for a multi-faceted, multi-dimensional, liberation, that came from the likes of Eduardo Mondlane and Samora Machel and from many of those in other of the movements in southern Africa. For this was the mood of the time in southern Africa, more real and tangible in some places perhaps (notably in Mozambique, however briefly) rather than others, but it was by no means absent throughout the region. Moreover, it is important to emphasize here one final, but absolutely essential, point.

For the fact is that a significant number of those most active in the liberation support/anti-apartheid struggle in the United States and Canada were committed, against the pull of the “common sense” of their own societies, to emancipation in its broadest sense: not only to racial emancipation (as important as that was), but also to anti-imperialist/anti-capitalist emancipation, to the fight for gender equality, to the struggle to give democratic voice to the poorest of the poor. It would therefore be impossible to write the present chapter - to tell the story of the movement in North America, its victories and defeats, its strengths and weaknesses, its unity and divisions

- without framing such a story around the diversity of liberations it sought to support. But this will all become clearer as we proceed.

I. Canada, for example

Canada was and has remained a firmly capitalist country whose dominant classes have had great difficulty in seeing beyond the western imperial calculus that has rendered the country a junior partner in maintaining the profitable “northern” grip upon the Global South. This is as true as regards Africa as it is vis-à-vis other parts of the southern world. In fact, while never a major player, Canada stood firm in defence of a primarily market driven support for institutionalized racial superiority in southern Africa over many decades. True, a measure of racism was a determinant as well. Canada’s stance as partner of South Africa within the British Empire was a particularly galling instance of the important link established between shared

economic interests on the one hand and shared racial solidarity with the white elite on the other, in defining the country's policy.

Note, in this regard, that Canada's treatment of the original native inhabitants of its own country, through its reservations policy and denial of the franchise, served as a quite self-conscious point of reference for South African policy-makers in forging the patterns of segregation and rigid control of its own African population that would form, eventually, the building blocks for apartheid. There was, in fact, a pattern of "learning from each other," from the very beginning of the twentieth century, that the Canadian governmental elite was happy to facilitate vis-à-vis South Africa.¹

Canada, after World War II, was also an uncritical party to the western defence network that found its fullest expression in NATO, an alliance that, in fact, also formed a tacit support network for Portugal in that country's wars to maintain its own hegemonic colonial control in Africa, not least, in southern Africa, in Angola and Mozambique. Even more important was the continuing involvement, throughout the region and over decades, of Canadian-based corporations, notably in the mining sector, in both exporting capital to and repatriating substantial profits from southern Africa and back to Canada. Both government and corporate ties to racist rule in southern Africa and other links of civil society to the (white) rulers there would, of course, become targets of liberation support and anti-apartheid mobilization in Canada, as we will see.

For the fact is that not all Canadians have agreed, over the years, with their country's official stance of acceptance, both tacit and active, of racial hegemony in southern Africa. True, signs of significant resistance were to surface more slowly than in the United States, no doubt in part because, until fairly recently, the black population (a population group potentially more alert than others to the racial injustices being perpetrated in southern Africa) in Canada did not comprise the same proportion of the population as there; moreover, while targets of racism in Canada, blacks were without quite the same desperate incentive to assert a claim to rights of their own as American blacks had, notably in the southern (but also in other) parts of their country.

For the rising tide of black assertion in the United States did actively stimulate a growing awareness of white control as an unacceptable world-wide phenomenon, including in southern Africa, as we have occasion to emphasize in a later section of this chapter (one devoted to an account of the resistance to southern African racism in the United States). Here it is important to emphasize that, in Canada as in the United States, there were both blacks and whites involved in the liberation support/anti-apartheid movement – and it is to a recording of the activity of such activists in Canada that this section of the present chapter is devoted.

(1) See Ron Bourgeault, "Canada Indians: The South African Connection," in *Canadian Dimension*, January 1988, pp.7 and 8; and John S. Saul, "Two Fronts of Anti-Apartheid Struggle: Canada and South Africa," paper presented to the South African Association of Canadian Studies, Cape Town, SA, May, 2009 (subsequently published in *Transformation* [Durban], 2010).

The issue also reveals a cultural fissure in Canadian society to which it is difficult to give a correct weighting. Of course, cultural analysis is notoriously complex and scientifically unsatisfactory, more poetry than science in fact. Still, Canadians, at least in the latter part of the twentieth century, seemed for the most part (we will return to the signal, and not unimportant, exceptions) to have come to evidence a lack of enthusiasm for racial tyranny and for firmly institutionalized racial inequality. We even began, as the twentieth century wore on, to allow a greater measure of equality to our brutally colonized and marginalized indigenous peoples than we had in earlier decades, granting them (albeit rather shockingly late in the day) the unqualified franchise in 1960 and also beginning to deal slightly more openly and equitably with a number of land claims and with a history of abuse of native children in various, often church-sponsored, residential schools. Nonetheless, the recent statement (in October, 2009!) by the current Prime Minister Stephen Harper suggests a willful ignorance of our own history that is truly shocking: “We ... have no history of colonialism,” he said. “So we have all of the things that many people admire about the great powers, but none of the things that threaten or bother them.”²

Nonetheless, it was still rather easier for official Canada to clean up its act and step away from institutionalized racism than it was for white South Africa to do so, since, by the time these changes in Canada’s official thinking began to emerge, the native people of Canada were so marginalized in terms of numbers and means of ready resistance that they could eventually be granted the franchise without any great trepidation as to its having “negative” effects. Not so easy, perhaps, for whites in power in South Africa to do so when blacks actually represented over 80% of the population as well as comprising a valuable pool of cheap labour. To be sure, it was reassuring that many Canadians would ultimately react – as many anti-apartheid activists were to find, as they themselves became more active and effective in the 1970s and 1980s

- with a real degree of outrage towards the continuing existence of white tyranny in southern Africa - once the situation there was explained to them and once their own lack of knowledge and the weight of misinformation arising from the negative impact of biased media and governmental sources began to be challenged.

There is a crucial reality being underscored here in fact: the existence of a gap between many Canadians’ gut instincts and potential understanding of the enormity of the outrage perpetuated by white minority rule in southern Africa on the one hand, and the actual policies the dominant classes in Canada and of the government and corporations that represent them have tended to pursue on the other. From this tension sprang the numerous liberation support and anti-apartheid organizations that emerged in Canada. For these latter sought, often impressively, to redress precisely the existent imbalance of influence in Canada by building an informed public capable

² Stephen Harper speaking to a press conference at the G-20 Summit in Pittsburgh, October 2, 1980, as quoted in John Barrera, “Atleo [National Chief of Canada’s Assembly of First Nations/AFN] rejects explanation of PM’s remark on colonialism: AFN leader says that Harper must be held to higher standard,” (Canwest News service on <canada.com>, 10/4/09).

of mounting a measure of pressure from below on those in power. In the end such attempts were important. Of course, one might have hoped also to see more members of the Canadian establishment than was ever to be the case also answering the same call of morality and humane purpose regarding southern Africa that many other Canadians did.

But in fact, when not merely crudely racist, most members of this “establishment” did seem tightly locked within an iron grid of class interest, *raison d'état* and the pursuit of profit. As Prime Minister Trudeau once said - and in doing so illuminated this basic reality starkly - of his government’s apartheid policy (or, rather, lack thereof):

“It’s not consistent. Either we should stop trading or we should stop condemning.” In the event, as one might have feared, Trudeau and the Canadian establishment continued to do, precisely, both!³ In any case, as Linda Freeman has forcefully argued, Trudeau’s statement was merely the tip of the iceberg:

In 1970, a government white paper had openly supported Canadian capital in its bid to take advantage of “the better than normal opportunities” of trading and investing with the apartheid state as a “balance” to Canada’s interests in social justice. One minor gesture to reduce official promotion of Canada’s economic relations with South Africa in the late 1970s in the aftermath of the Soweto riots had almost no impact on patterns of Canadian trade and investment. In addition, while Canada had adopted United Nations sanctions against military exports, enforcement of these rules was quite slack. A Canadian firm, Space Research Corporation, helped South Africa develop an artillery gun, the G-5, which has the capability to deliver tactical nuclear weapons and has been an important military export. Thus, in the Trudeau years, Canadian policy in South Africa – with its flourishing economic relations, loopholes on military exports and full diplomatic relations with the white regime – left the Canadian state open to charges of insincerity if not hypocrisy in its claim to be supporting the struggle against apartheid.⁴

Canada’s record vis-à-vis Portugal’s continuing colonial presence in Africa and Rhodesia’s racism was no better. Indeed, it was this kind of “hypocrisy” that defined the moral morass within which the Canadian liberation support/anti-apartheid movement sought to navigate throughout the years of its existence.

Moreover, when a major shift in Canada’s policy towards South Africa did finally occur it came not primarily because of pressure exerted from below by progressive social forces in Canada – however admirable and important these forces may have been in mounting considerable popular pressure. It came only when resistance on the ground had reached a high level in southern Africa itself (and, in particular, in South

(3) Trudeau’s reply was to a student at Carleton University who asked how Canada’s policy of trading with South Africa could be reconciled with Canadian condemnations of apartheid (as quoted in the *Toronto Telegram*, February 25, 1970); Trudeau further stated in response to the question that “I have a very poor answer to that. We are keeping on with our trade despite the fact that we condemn the policy [apartheid] in the United Nations. We are not very proud of this approach.”

(4) Linda Freeman, “Canada, Aid and Peacemaking in Southern Africa,” in Robert Miller (ed.), *Aid as Peacemaker: Canadian Development Assistance and Third World Conflict* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1972), p.37.

Africa). As we will see below, at that point and no sooner the Canadian government, and even corporate Canada, began, at the eleventh hour and led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, to, cautiously, switch sides: the better, it was felt, to co-opt the South Africa forces of liberation themselves into a shared commitment to continuing capitalist exploitation.

Of course, to repeat, there were Canadians, white and black, who had resisted the coexistence of the twin logics of racism and capitalist exploitation in southern Africa from a much earlier hour and felt themselves to be fighting against both. There is no doubt, too, that Canadians of various ideological hues ultimately helped move official Canada to abandon its tacit support of racial tyranny. Yet just how important the considerable energies that some Canadians devoted to this cause actually were in the overall equation of forces that determined such an outcome and just what impact their exertions had, more specifically, upon their corporate and governmental foes in Canada itself, is extremely difficult to say. A valuable complement to the drama of the internal struggle in the region itself they certainly were, helping the forces on the ground who were working to realize a non-racial order to win out. They were also a factor that helped move Canadian capital and state to shift their own calculations. Yet that result was paradoxical, as we have suggested, representing at least in part a pyrrhic victory: a victory over racism no doubt but leaving the urge for liberation unfulfilled on a number of other fronts.

Yet the failure to achieve a broader, more meaningful, liberation was not, somewhat surprisingly, much bemoaned by many of those in either the Canadian or the American liberation support movements. For them, racial liberation was sufficient and very few would seek, at the end of the day, to help southern Africans to push further forward to seek to expand the meaning of their liberation – in terms of class, gender and voice. Who really won the struggle for southern African liberation, then? The question is more complicated than one might think, and one to which we will have to return. Nonetheless, a careful recounting of the record of opposition, opposition to both racial rule in southern Africa and to Canadian complicity in its perpetuation, remains, as far as it went, an inspiring one - as it also has been in the United States.

Canada: Into the 1960s and the 1970s

Canada's overall track record vis-à-vis southern Africa was scarcely so inspiring of course, the country, as noted, having served quite willingly as a model to South Africa in shaping segregation and apartheid there. With the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, however, it became more difficult to ignore entirely what was happening in that region of the world. Moreover, the Canadian government itself was under additional pressure, not yet from within Canada itself but from within the sphere of its external involvements, most notably in the Commonwealth. Self-evidently, the balance of voice (if not quite of power) in that organization - an organization that linked the then "White Dominions" with Great Britain and that, in effect, succeeded the British Empire itself by virtue of the Statute of Westminster in 1931 - had begun to shift

markedly in the post-World War II years. For then, in the wake of the independence of India and its entry into the “New Commonwealth,” there were soon to be seen many other freshly independent countries, not least from Africa, joining.

Here, in fact, was a novel new constituency within the Commonwealth that Canada – loyal, apparently, to its “British heritage” and hence to its Commonwealth membership – had to take seriously. Indeed, it was on such a stage that Canada’s position on southern Africa would begin to be put to its first significant tests. For the new members of the “New Commonwealth,” especially those from Africa would not yield easily to the posturing of the UK vis-à-vis South Africa nor, in particular, to Harold Wilson’s pussy-footing around the issue of Ian Smith’s defiance of Britain’s presumed overlordship in Rhodesia. However, South Africa provided the first moment when the new diplomatic dilemmas that would face Canada with reference to southern Africa were exemplified.

Thus, almost immediately after Sharpeville, the issue of South Africa’s continuing membership in the Commonwealth arose when that country sought to shift its status to that of a republic within the Commonwealth. This moment provided the opportunity for those hostile to the country’s apartheid to speak up. In such a situation Canadian Prime-Minister John Diefenbaker, at the Commonwealth Heads of State meeting in 1961 was amongst those who helped create the context within which it proved impossible for South Africa to continue its membership on the old terms. Indeed, even if Diefenbaker’s role in “driving South Africa out” of Commonwealth was less crucial than some at the time presented it as being, it was not ignoble. Nonetheless, it was a gesture that, for the moment, had little or no spill-over into other policy spheres (the very negative pattern of our economic exchanges with South Africa, for example) and also found only relatively muted echoes in the broader society – although some voices were beginning to be heard within both Canada’s white and black communities (this latter still relatively small but increasingly active, especially in Halifax and in Toronto).⁵

Next up was Lester B. Pearson, the Liberal Party’s successor to Diefenbaker as Prime Minister. The issue this time: Rhodesia. Under Ian Smith the Rhodesian government had declared, in defence of white supremacy, a “Unilateral Declaration of Independence” from still existing British overrule – despite the fact that Britain remained formally in charge of Rhodesia and at least notionally responsible for the well-being of its entire population, not least the large, but disenfranchised, majority of black residents, the country’s original and brutally colonized indigenous inhabitants. Yet Britain was extremely reluctant to intervene to bring Smith’s “rebels” – Britain’s “kith and kin” – to heel. Instead, the meekest forms of sanctions were pursued by the U.K., and further negotiations, disconcertingly concessionary towards Smith, were floated

– to the considerable and continuing outrage of many Commonwealth members.

⁵ The Diefenbaker “legend” is discussed (and debunked) at several points in Linda Freeman’s *The Ambiguous Champion: Canada and South Africa in the Trudeau and Mulroney years* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997).

Elaine Windrich has effectively summarized the interplay within the Commonwealth and Pearson's momentary positive role vis-à-vis the issue:⁶

The Labour Government's negotiations efforts were also condemned by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, at a conference which turned out to be one of the most bitter encounters ever experienced by a British government...[As regards sanctions] other African delegates joined the Zambians in demanding that if sanctions were to be effective, they had to be made mandatory, and also comprehensive, by United Nations action.

But sanctions were a secondary consideration compared with the issue of Rhodesia's political future. Most of the delegates (including the Afro-Asian-Caribbean bloc, with the support of Canada) were strongly opposed to the bilateral negotiations with the Smith regime, which they considered incompatible with the commitment of a previous Lagos Commonwealth meeting to convene a constitutional conference representative of all sections of Rhodesian opinion. Nor could they accept any agreement with the Rhodesians that did not guarantee that majority rule would be established - the so-called NIBMAR [No Independence Before Majority Rule] pledge.

With Britain backed only by Australia, New Zealand and Malta the difference "appeared to be irreconcilable, so long as Mr Wilson refused to give an unequivocal pledge on NIBMAR or to agree to abandon his negotiations with the Smith regime on any other basis." As Windrich continues:

Feelings between the African delegations and the British became increasingly bitter, with the Zambian Foreign Minister [Kapwepwe] walking out of the conference and charging Mr Wilson with having become a racialist. It was probably due to the mediation efforts of the Canadian Prime Minister, Mr Lester Pearson, that any joint communiqué was possible at all. While there were no dissentients, the differences of view recorded revealed how wide the gap between the two camps was. Had it not been for the view of most delegates that a breakup of the Commonwealth over Rhodesia would only bring comfort to the Smith regime, it might well have occurred.

As for Pearson himself he remained a bit bemused by it all, noting of his formulation of the draft resolution to commit Wilson to NIBMAR: "I wasn't sure whether I was being asked to commit polygamy or incest, but whatever it was, I did it."⁷ Meanwhile, despite the resolution, Wilson continued to extend further offers to Ian Smith - which, as it happened, Smith was to reject.

Back in Canada, however, the Rhodesian issue had begun to stir the pot of protest. A group calling itself the "Canadian Committee on Zimbabwe" formed in Toronto under the leadership of Cranford Pratt, a professor of African Studies at the University of Toronto and formerly the first principal of the new University College in Tanzania. The group pressed for a much further widening of Canada's commitment to the mounting of effective pressure on both Wilson and Smith's illegal Rhodesian

⁶ Elaine Windrich, *Britain and the Politics of Rhodesian Independence* (London: Croom-Helm, 1978), pp.89-90.

⁷ Lester Pearson, as quoted in Robert C. Good, *UDI: the International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p.175.

regime, and even, briefly (in the late 1960s), mounted a journal, entitled, appropriately enough, *NIBMAR*, to help make that happen. It bears noting that this was still largely an issue within the dominant classes themselves – the voices of a genuinely liberal commitment to multi-racialism and democracy coming primarily from the academy, from various members of church bureaucracies, from some journalists as well as a few independent spirits within the wider citizenry now added to the political mix. The popular base for related activities was to widen considerably in the following decades, however.

Meanwhile, many of the NIBMAR group pressed forward with their critique, with Pratt and the admirable churchman Garth Legge (of the United Church of Canada) being particularly prominent in this regard. A crucial moment was the convening, in May 1970, of a workshop of various concerned Canadians “with a major and continuing involvement with Africa” at Carleton University in Ottawa at which a “wide consensus for a stronger Canadian policy” surfaced strongly.⁸ At the same time a group came together briefly around Pratt and others in Toronto called the “Committee for a Just Canadian Policy Towards Africa,” with a membership that included “churchmen, officials of voluntary organizations, trade unionists, businessmen, academics and returned CUSO volunteers.”

This Committee, in turn, asked Pratt and Legge, together with two other co-authors, Hugh Winsor, a *Globe and Mail* journalist, and Rick Williams, an exemplary activist from Nova Scotia (temporarily studying in Toronto), to produce a response to the Canadian government’s recent foreign policy *White Paper: Foreign Policy for Canadians* (insofar as the latter bore on Africa). This was to become *The Black Paper: An Alternative Policy for Canada in Southern Africa*.⁹ In fact, Williams, who had worked with CUSO in Tanzania, had himself been an activist (alongside David

Cayley, Janet Torg, Jackie Seaton and others) with the bold, if short-lived, Project Mozambique in Toronto - a group that reached its high-water mark when, forty of its members having become Alcan shareholders, it lectured the company’s Annual General Meeting in 1971 as to the inappropriateness of Alcan supplying \$4 million of materials to the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam in northern Mozambique. No doubt Williams was thus able to make an especially useful contribution to the *Black Paper* as regards so-called “Portuguese Africa” - and could also help it to further define the broader terms of struggle in South Africa and Canada. In addition, Linda Freeman (who would remain a central protagonist in related southern Africa work for decades¹⁰) was listed in the *Black Paper*’s foreword as providing important editorial work as well as “major assistance with the sections on Mozambique and Angola.”

(8) Garth Legge, Cranford Pratt, Richard Williams and Hugh Winsor, *The Black Paper: An Alternative Policy for Canada in Southern Africa* (Ottawa: CCIC, 1970).

(9) The government’s White Paper was entitled *Foreign Policy for Canadians* (Ottawa, 1970); the answering *Black Paper*, discussed here, is cited in the preceding footnote.

(10) She would, for example, eventually author a magisterial book on Canada and Southern Africa, *The Ambiguous Champion* (*op.cit.*), and she also authored, over many years, an annual survey on Canada-South Africa relations in *Southern Africa Report*.

The resultant *Black Paper* was a powerful document, being a clear a response to the federal government's aforementioned *White Paper's* sections on southern African policies. It clearly analysed the situation on the ground in the region and, turning to Canada, saw the government's own document as offering "no rationalization whatsoever for the admitted inconsistencies in Canadian policy [towards southern Africa] other than to state that the government has arrived at some balance, by a process as yet unexplained, between its supposed moral position and what it perceives as the country's economic interest."¹¹ Indeed, the original *White Paper* was actually found to demonstrate "a declining interest in Canada's role in preventing [the] destructive polarization" in the region.

The *Black Paper* then analysed Canada's negative record, in terms of both economic and other linkages (through NATO support to Portugal, for example) that tied Canada to white power in the region. Its conclusions are circumspect – calling only for "partial economic disengagement" but with this nonetheless to include such things as "the withdrawal of Canadian trade commissioners from South Africa" and the stepping up of sanctions on Rhodesia and "discouraging" investment in illegally occupied (by South Africa!) Namibia. Moreover, noting the Canadian government's own admission that it expected the white regimes in southern Africa to resist political and racial inequality "to the bitter end," the authors called on the government to recognize and give support to the "legitimacy of the struggle of the liberation movements." Yet, as the *Black Paper* then acknowledges, the prospects for enlightened governmental policies on any of the fronts mentioned in the paper itself were not bright.¹²

Unfortunately, it remained possible to echo exactly the same charges several years later, as the present author, just back from seven years spent in Tanzania, wrote in an article about official Canada's role in southern Africa published in the *Canadian Forum* in 1973, one entitled, advisedly, "Both Sides of the Street."¹³ Concluding that "Canada's policy towards southern Africa has been, over the years, a fundamentally dishonest one," I then asked, rhetorically: "Why raise this issue again when a small handful of Canadians have been raising similar points for years with little effect?"¹⁴ My answer: "Quite simply because the contradiction that lies at the heart of Canadian policy will be a much more difficult one to straddle in the future than it has been in the past." In fact, I wrote, the struggle in southern Africa was escalating to such a degree that the separation of "the rhetoric from the reality of Canadian foreign policy" was proceeding in "a particularly graphic manner" – and more Canadians

(11) *Black Paper, op.cit.*, p.9.

(12) Nonetheless, as Robert Mathews and Gerald Helleiner observed, in their "Further notes on an Alternative Policy for Canada Towards Southern Africa" (*Canadian Journal of African Studies*, V, ii [1971]), "some 15000 copies of this Black Paper had been sold [in the first year] and a growing number of Canadian organizations [various national church bodies are specifically mentioned] are adopting policy positions that are in keeping with its recommendations."

(13) John S. Saul, "Both Sides of the Street," *Canadian Forum*, March, 1973.

(14) Here I specifically cited the "The Black Paper," which had itself also been published in the September 1970 number of the *Canadian Forum*, as a key example.

were beginning to take the full and indefensible implications of that contradiction seriously.

Thus, additional and somewhat broader constituencies within Canadian civil society were already beginning to raise critical questions (as seen in Project Mozambique's above-mentioned action vis-à-vis Alcan) as to Canada's stake in racist rule in southern Africa as exemplified by the activities of Canadian corporations in southern Africa. For such corporations were even less apologetic about their economic exploitation of that region than was the Canadian government (though that government too remained profoundly conscious throughout the period of its own class base deep within an essentially capitalist and globally exploitative Canada). Crucial seeds of a critique of Canada's corporate sector were sewn in a key document, *Investment in Oppression*,¹⁵ one of the first initiatives to present this southern African issue and its Canadian connection clearly to a wider audience. The well-researched pamphlet was prepared by a team led by Renate Pratt (who, with her husband Cranford, had spent a number of her formative years in Africa, notably in Julius Nyerere's Tanzania) and was published by the YWCA of Canada. (As we will see below, Pratt herself was later to also take a key role as staff-person, motivator and writer for the important Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility/TCCR; this latter group was launched in 1974 with an active executive group composed, significantly enough, of key representatives of most of the mainstream churches in Canada.)

With *Investment in Oppression*, one way (it was to be the way of TCCR as well) of attempting to influence Canada's corporate sector had begun to be exemplified – working both through exposure of the facts of corporate linkage to the oppressive politico-economic systems of South Africa in particular and through polite but persistent lobbying and similar pressures.¹⁶ After tracking the grim nature of the apartheid regime and beginning of an important sketch of some of Canada's questionable economic links to it, the document put the chief point clearly:

The central policy recommendation that emerges {from our study} and which we now urge is that there ought to be no new Canadian investment and no expansion of existing Canadian economic operations in South Africa. Increasing Canadian investment would reinforce the strength of the white economy...[A] categorical Canadian policy to dissuade Canadian investment would demonstrate a concern not to acquiesce in or benefit from racial oppression and would achieve a greater harmony between our economic policies and our basic political and social values. Such a policy also would break the existing pattern in which the predominantly rich and white nations align themselves with the rich, white minorities of southern Africa to profit from the exploitation of the black people.

Important here too, as anti-corporate consciousness linked to the southern Africa struggles for liberation came forward more assertively in the 1970s, was a series of

(15) *Investment in Oppression: Report of the Study & Action Committee of the World Relationships Committee of the YWCA of Canada on Canadian Economic Links with South Africa* (Toronto: YWCA, 1973).

(16) *Ibid.*, pp.39-40.

exposes written by Hugh Nangle, a deputy editor of the *Ottawa Citizen*, of Canadian businesses (notably Ford, ALCAN, Massey-Ferguson, Bata and Falconbridge) involved in enriching themselves through the low wages they were able to get away with through the systematic racial oppression of the populations in the region. These articles first appeared in the *Citizen* in 1973 and they were then widely distributed as a booklet (entitled *The Nangle Report*) by the CCIC17 and the Southern African Information Group in Ottawa. This publication had a very real impact at the time.¹⁸

Of course, in addition to such initiatives, there already existed, by the early years of the 1970s, the beginnings of an organized constituency of Canadians concerned about southern Africa, one that was increasingly becoming a significant part of the political landscape. This reality was captured by Alex Brown and his co-authors in

their punchy booklet of 1973, *South Africa: Some Questions for Canadians*.¹⁹ In the overview (chapter 8) that they provide of the emergent national movement they spotlight, they note that, even by 1971, there was “no lack of groups across Canada whose members are concerned about the issues of southern Africa” with “no less than eight groups arriving...with briefs,” for example, to present to the House of Commons External Affairs Committee’s hearings on Southern Africa.

True, “the Committee had time to hear representatives of only three such groups” (The Committee for a Just Canadian Policy for Africa, the YWCA and CUSO), but the fact remains that by now, in most large cities, groups were forming, with Vancouver, Winnipeg and Saskatoon being cited as examples by Brown and his colleagues in this respect. In Toronto as well several initiatives are mentioned, Project Mozambique being said to now to be “dormant” but the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal’s African Colonies (TCLPAC) now described as “organizing methodically.” Ottawa’s Southern African Information Group was also singled out, as were some Montreal organizations and a number of national church structures. At the same time, they concede solemnly, for “all the concern of these special groups, the general Canadian public is not kept well informed on southern Africa” – such was the weakness of the media in this respect.

Support work did continue to expand throughout the ‘70s, however. Numerous groups emerged in a range of diverse centres and engaged in a substantial range of parallel initiatives: the lobbying of various levels of government, a growing array of anti-corporate actions, the hosting of the visits of representatives of the liberation movements, some fund-raising on the latter’s behalf, and various forms of “propaganda” work (talks, film-shows, publications). True, it was often up-hill work since many of these groups began to take on more publicly assertive forms than even

(17) The acronym of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation – an organization self-described as a national forum of Canadian civil society organizations involved in international cooperation.

(18) *The Nangle Report: Canadian Businesses in Southern Africa* (Ottawa: CCIC and SAIG, 1973), comprising articles by Nangle for the *Ottawa Citizen*, June-July, 1973; see also reports of Gordon Pape’s extensive tour of southern Africa for the Southam News Services in early 1973.

(19) Alex Brown, Peter Bunting and Clyde Sanger, *South Africa: Some Questions for Canadians* (Ottawa: CCIC, 1973), pp.27-8.

church-persons of good will could easily permit themselves to adopt; for example, very direct links were to now be made between a range of activist groups in Canada and the region's liberation movements.

Of course, this also implied a simultaneous (and especially challenging) attempt to gain acceptability, both in ruling political circles and in much of the mainstream media, for the very demands and the activities of these movements. For, otherwise, the latter were being caricatured or merely ignored in establishment circles. Thus, in Canada, much was made by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mitchell Sharpe, and others of the need for "peaceful solutions" – even when to so argue was, in fact, merely to lend comfort and support to the white minority regimes themselves. It also proved inordinately easy for conservative voices in Canada (as in the United States) to misrepresent such movements manipulatively, either as proto-communist fronts (in part because of Eastern military assistance to them) and/or as mere "terrorist organizations."

A great deal of time was therefore spent by liberation support movements throughout the continent in hosting delegations from the liberation movements, both in New York during relevant UN sessions and, more generally, on various tours highlighted by diverse speaking engagements, and also in broad-ranging advocacy work on their behalf. Such support, it was hoped, would further inform North American public opinion but also, perhaps, would help to empower the liberation movements themselves by contributing to their ever burgeoning sense of their own importance and of the growing international credibility of their cause.

Thus, TCLSAC, one of whose activists had actually had the opportunity to visit the liberated areas of Mozambique in 1972 with FRELIMO guerrillas, hosted, in turn, a number of FRELIMO representatives in Toronto - one such public meeting even becoming the target of a brutal, physical attack by right-wing Canadian ruffians of the self-styled "Western Guard." Nonetheless, sufficient money was collected, on this and other occasions, to purchase several trucks for FRELIMO to be used for ferrying supplies around, behind the lines of their on-going war. In this and other ways the links between Canadians and Mozambicans, via FRELIMO, were solidified. As for official Canada, which stood firmly on the other side as Portugal's largely uncritical NATO partner, the links to FRELIMO were virtually non-existent. As Marcelino dos Santos, a senior FRELIMO leader and the movement's Vice-President, would succinctly note on the CBC-Radio:

Really, Canada has made many statements but...I must say frankly that, knowing and having heard what Canada has said several times...but knowing that Canada is doing nothing real to help the liberation movements, one should at least ask: is...the Government of Canada sincere? We don't believe it, and we hope that Canada will try to show us that it is really sincere. [As he continued:] I'm forced to think that Canada

continues to think it preferable to have relations with colonialist and fascist regimes than with people who are fighting for their freedom and their dignity.²⁰

Small wonder then – in light of the vast discrepancy between the concrete solidarity shown towards their struggle by various groups in Canadian society, on the one hand, and the little offered by the Canadian government itself on the other,

- that two delegates from TCLSAC were invited to comprise the official Canadian representation at Mozambique's independence celebrations in 1975 – with these delegates then finding themselves on the podium sitting in the exact same row as an array of Heads of State from around the world.²¹ It was also in TCLSAC's offices, then in St Paul's Church on Avenue Road, Toronto, in 1974 that, at the exact minute that MPLA's president Agostino Neto and a number of other members of his soon-to-be Angolan cabinet were sitting down to a formal luncheon, word came by phone of the coup in Portugal, effectively ending Neto's Canadian tour and sending the entire entourage back to Africa in order to play out the end-game of their struggle at home. A substantial literature had also begun to appear in North America on these movements and their wars of liberation, a whole range of these being prepared by the Liberation Support Movement based in British Columbia, for example, and by and other like-minded groups in both the United States and Canada. Of special importance in both countries was the making and wide-spread showing of American activist Bob VanLierop's exemplary film shot in Mozambique, *A Luta Continua*.²² Such links were being made quite self-consciously with the liberation movements in order both to high-light their legitimacy and to underscore the parallel nature of struggles occurring in both southern Africa and in North America. For example, a counter-conference on "Zimbabwe: the Missing Delegation" held in 1973 simultaneously with an official Commonwealth Conference in Ottawa was addressed by both ZANU and ZAPU representatives, as well as representatives of other southern African liberation movements. Similarly a trip to Canada was facilitated for SWAPO militants who then met with Canadian Native groups to share their histories vis-à-vis the Hudson's Bay Company (and other exploitative resource-hungry corporations), the HBC then being engaged in the raising of Karakul sheep in colonized Namibia just as it had once recklessly pursued beaver pelts in Canada itself.²³

Needless to say, there were also complications and contradictions in linking North Americans to southern African struggles. Some of these we will have to return to below (the issue of the nature and degree of ANC centrality to the struggle in South Africa, especially as it presented itself, most clearly, during the 1980s, for example). Here, however, it is worth noting that even as the liberation support movement focused

(20) Dos Santos statement came in a CBC-Radio interview in 1973 and was first cited in my *Canada And Mozambique* (Toronto: DEC/TCLPAC, 1974), p.69.

(21) "Invitation to a Celebration: John Saul in Independent Mozambique," *This Magazine*, 9, 5&6 (Nov-Dec, 1975).

(22) Indeed, the present author showed this film so often to various groups around the continent that, eventually, he could almost repeat the sound-track in his sleep!

(23) Susan Hurlich, "Native Peoples in Canada and in Africa: Two more reasons why it's hard not to think of the Bay," *This Magazine*, 9, 4 (October-November, 1975).

on what seemed clearly to be the central issue, the manner in which white minority regimes and white western governments and corporations cruelly subordinated the vast majority of the population in southern Africa, there were also certain limitations in the practices of the liberation movements themselves that were downplayed, even ignored, by the ranks of liberation support workers.

Thus the bona fides of a movement like FRELIMO were taken pretty much for granted because of the movement's generally exemplary aims and practices and in spite of its rather too high-handed and vanguardist approach towards any democratic expression of the voice of its own citizenry, something that would most clearly reveal its negative impact upon the movement's ostensible radical purposes only after liberation.²⁴ So too a far more compromised SWAPO leadership in Namibia revealed even more clearly than did the leadership in FRELIMO - and during the very years of struggle against South Africa - a particularly grievous set of authoritarian practices (as did the MPLA in Angola); yet when various Namibians visited Canada to explain the facts as to cruel and unjust suppression of supposed dissidents they were given insultingly short-shrift by Canadian activists.²⁵ Equally grievous were the clear signs of long-term authoritarian tendencies on the part of the Rhodesian/Zimbabwean liberation movement, notably ZANU, that - so heinous was the Smith regime then in power - tended to be downplayed by the liberation support movement, even though these were to prove the almost certain seeds of the disastrous Mugabe regime to come.²⁶

Meanwhile, however, other central activities of the support groups that emerged across Canada involved an ever-widening range of exemplary anti-corporate assertions, Western corporations being increasingly seen, together with local white dominant classes, as the main pillars of repression in the region. Sometimes such resistance to corporate malevolence by Canadian activists sprang from genuinely socialist premises, with some seeing in the struggles in southern Africa seeds of a burgeoning socialist consciousness; they therefore viewed the exposure of the manner in which Canadian governmental and corporate support had settled in behind

(24) In this paragraph I reflect, not least, on some of my own writings in which I tried, both at the time and since, to make sense of the regional outcomes in the 1970s. For example, I agonized, with some confusion, over developments in Mozambique that I had witnessed, from their beginning and at quite close hand. My shifting reflections can be divined from the several first-hand accounts of developments in Mozambique that I penned over the decades and which are now included in my *Revolutionary Traveller: Freeze-Frames from a Life* (Winnipeg and Johannesburg, 2009).

(25) For an attempt, much too late, to make good this grievous shortfall in my own intellectual-cum-political project see my several works with Colin Leys: "Liberation Without Democracy: The SWAPO Crisis of 1974," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 20, 1 (1994), *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword* (London: James Currey, 1995) and "Lubango and After: 'Forgotten History' as Politics in Contemporary Namibia," *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 29, 2 (2003).

(26) Zimbabwe was one-place where, unfortunately, I think I did tend to get my line - on ZANU and on Mugabe - more or less right, even at the time: see my "Transforming the Struggle in Zimbabwe," *Southern Africa* (February, 1977), "Zimbabwe: The Next Round" in *The Socialist Register 1980* (London: Merlin Press, 1980) and in *Monthly Review*, 32, 4 (September, 1980) and, more recently, as co-authored with Richard Saunders, "Mugabe, Gramsci and Zimbabwe at 25," *International Journal*, 40, 2 (Autumn, 2005).

Portugal (and behind white power more generally) as having the potential to spawn a growing scepticism as to the moral bona fides of capital itself. Other activists were more inclined to emphasize specific corporate abuses of power, and worked to expose and redress them without necessarily advancing too far towards any more systemic critique of capitalism itself. In fact, in the short-run and for purposes of confrontation with Portuguese colonialism, white Rhodesian overrule and the power-wielders of an apartheid economy, this was more than enough unity to build active resistance in Canada – although it would prove less effective for sustaining a struggle around southern African issues in the long-run and particularly after the fall of apartheid.

Nonetheless, impressive work was being done throughout both the 1970s and the 1980s by, to take one very prominent example, the aforementioned Task Force on Churches and Corporate Responsibility (TCCR). Founded in 1974, TCCR's own story is well told by Pratt in her helpfully analytical account of the venture, *In Good*

Faith: Canadian Churches Against Apartheid.²⁷ But we will have to examine this

record more closely in the following section as well since TCCR's tireless efforts from the time of its founding and through the 1980s, are particularly instructive. For here was a connection formed between southern African activist work and a substantial, church-based constituency of Canadians that would be of increasing importance in subsequent years as the question of Canada's questionable links with white power, especially in South Africa, became ever more prominent as a political issue.

Some groups went further, both in strategy and tactics – taking up the cue provided by Project Mozambique whose activity vis-à-vis Alcan was mentioned previously. Thus the Toronto Committee for the Liberation of Portugal's African Colonies (TCLPAC) turned its efforts with special intensity against Gulf Canada and its Angola connection when it was found that Canada's imports of Angolan oil, questionable enough in themselves, were actually mere transshipments, the crude being brought to Canada to be cleaned before being sent on as a "Canadian import" to the United States. TCLPAC was able to underscore the negative implications, both developmental and environmental, that this kind of intermediary processing role held for Canada's Maritime Provinces – as well as the significance it held for Angola in bankrolling the Portuguese presence there.²⁸

The whole seamy business led, in turn, to a confrontation at Gulf Canada's AGM in Toronto when militants (having each purchased a single share in Gulf-Canada in order to enter the meeting) passed out to the assembled share-holders faked business brochure's with "Gulf Kills" logos (modelled on the corporate one) on the inside pages. An attempt to elect, with the protestors' handful of votes, TCLSAC's the Rev. Murray McInness (a Canadian who has once served as a missionary in Angola before being expelled by the Portuguese colonial government) to the company's corporate board, was defeated, needless to say, by many millions of votes. But a point had been

(27) Renate Pratt, *In Good Faith: Canadian Churches Against Apartheid* (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1997).

(28) See TCLPAC, "Larceny by Proxy: Gulf Oil Canada Ltd. and Angola," *This Magazine*, January, 1974).

made. Indeed, so sharp was that point that Gulf soon sought to infiltrate a spy (a man who had once also served undercover in an attempt to bust the union at Gulf just outside Toronto) into TCLSAC's ranks; only quick work by a progressive private eye working for the Committee, itself suspicious of the man's style and manner, served to foil that scheme.

About this time Jonathan Forbes, a particularly imaginative Toronto activist, floated another idea, a possible bill-board ad for which he had drafted an effective mock-up; unfortunately, the idea was never realized but with its spritely proposed signage - "Cigarettes Kill, So Does Apartheid - and Rothman's is into Both" - it nonetheless captured something of the spirit of the time. For anti-corporate campaigning continued, as stated, to assert itself as the heart and soul of the liberation-support movement. Here a graphic case in point was inspired by the revelation by activists (see below) in the United States of the substantial secret bank loans being made by American banks to apartheid South Africa. Canadian banks were also found to be closely involved with this practice and hence became prime targets for activist activity, activity that continued, as we will see shortly, well into the 1980s.

There were other fronts of the struggle as well - perhaps most notably in the sphere of demands for gender equality. Here North America was perhaps in some ways ahead of Africa and, in any case, this was not at first a front central to North American preoccupations regarding southern Africa. Nonetheless, as movements like FRELIMO began themselves to manifest progressive practices in the gender equality sphere, this issue also prompted additional support from both individual women and from women's organizations (as well as from some "progressive" men) for both southern African feminist activists as well as for the cause of women's liberation more generally in the region.

Here books like Stephanie Urdang's *And Still They Dance: Women, War and Struggle in Mozambique* from New York's Monthly Review Press,²⁹ films like Zimbabwean Deborah May's LA-crafted "You Have Touched a Woman, You Have Struck a Rock,"

and the continuing speaking tours and public advocacy of Urdang and others were of considerable importance in expanding the numbers of those who took the liberation movements more seriously once they glimpsed in such movements some parallel to their own level of feminist consciousness. Moreover such support helped in turn to reinforce the dawning claims to gender equity that were being made from within the various southern African movements themselves - notably, as Shireen Hassim has demonstrated for South Africa, during the period of negotiations over the drafting of the new constitution there.³⁰

(29) Stephanie Urdang, *Fighting Two Colonialisms: Women in Guinea-Bissau* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), *And Still They Dance: Women, War and the Struggle for Change in Mozambique* (New York: monthly Review Press, 1989) and her "The Last Transition: Women and Development" in John S. Saul (ed.), *A Difficult Road: the Transition to Socialism in Mozambique* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1985).

(30) See Shireen Hassim, *Women's Organizations and Democracy in South Africa: Contesting Authority* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).

Finally, on quite another front, one major decision was being made by the Canadian liberation support/anti-apartheid movement during this early period, even if not entirely self-consciously. This was the choice to rest satisfied with, and indeed to value the merely loose-limbed Canadian movement of diverse and relatively un-integrated local initiatives that were emerging. Here, in fact, was a movement united, in its diversity, primarily by a common cause rather than, prematurely, by some overarching nationally-focused organization or movement. For some this was a “choice” decided merely by happen-stance; for some a choice dictated by the realities of Canada’s size and diversity; for some as a much more conscious decision against the kind of constraints of orthodoxy and questionable political direction revealed by, say, the UK’s Anti-Apartheid Movement.

This latter alternative was in fact viewed as a hugely negative counter-example for many Canadian activists, the AAM seen as being much too slavishly subservient to S.A.’s African National Congress on the one hand and much too heavy-handed in its control over its base on the other. Of course, there were some attempted national initiatives floated in Canada, the Canadians Concerned about Southern Africa - as in England loosely linked to the (Canadian) Communist Party and also quite subservient to the ANC line - no doubt had such aspirations.³¹ Of course, the CCSA did useful anti-apartheid work, but it never realized any very dramatic national presence. As in the United States a loose and even quite divergent coalition was seen by a majority of activists as being the most that could or should realistically be aspired to, at least at the outset of building such a movement.

Quebec was a clear point of reference in this respect and for the very reason stated in the preceding paragraph, as an article of the time by Nancy Thede made quite clear. The province did have a variety of southern Africa-oriented support activities from early on, although as Nancy Thede has written, at first “Africa...was not seen by the popular movement in Quebec as potential partners [for the kind of] dynamic exchange that existed with Latin American movements.” True, this did begin to change “in the mid-1970s with the intensification of the struggle in Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe”; then various trade unions, the Parti Quebécois, the CCOOP (the Canadian Catholic Organizations for Development and Peace) and SUCO (Service Universitaire Canadienne Outre-Mer) showed much more interest and concern. Indeed the “Angola-Quebec: Zones à Libérer” was an imaginative early attempt to link struggles in Quebec and southern Africa and to further develop meaningful linkages. Nonetheless, as Thede continues:

A major turning point was the decision by SUCO to send cooperants to Guinea-Bissau in 1976 and to Mozambique in 1978: direct feedback from the region started to trickle into Quebec and more down-to-earth perceptions gradually developed.

(31) Indeed, a then Communist party member who was also a fellow southern Africa activist, was some years later to tell me that he and another party member were summoned, sometime in the 1980s, to the office of the head of the Party and instructed to start a new movement to “counter TCLSAC.” They refused to do this but, obviously, others were prepared to do so, with CCSA being the result.

Regular contacts were established with organizations in English Canada specializing in work on southern Africa (TCLSAC) or with direct contact in the region (Oxfam- Canada). The success of these formal links contrasts with the failure of other attempts coming from outside Quebec to set up a “provincial front” of a national organization: it is a clear fact of political life that any such initiatives must spring first and foremost from within Quebec itself.³²

As Thede suggests, the creation, in Montreal in 1982, of CIDMAA (the Centre d’Information et de Documentation sur le Mozambique et l’Afrique Australe) laid the basis for the creation of numerous regional committees throughout Quebec, for a province wide “table de concertation” chaired by CIDMAA (that included “trade unions, NGOs, solidarity organizations, the churches, human rights organizations and organizations of the black community” in the province), and for a burgeoning range of actions and educational activities throughout the coming decade. In fact, a similar choice for escalated activity was being made elsewhere throughout the country being made by, in effect, the Canadian liberation support/anti-apartheid movement as a whole. It was just such a movement – as much a network as a movement perhaps, and with costs as well as benefits arising from such a format - that, as we will see in the following section, would face the 1980s, and the dramatic playing-out during that decade of the apartheid end-game in both South Africa and Canada.

Canada: The 1980s to 1994 and Beyond

As suggested, a new southern African politics was now defined for the 1980s in the wake of both the liberation in the 1970s of the three key states of former Portuguese colonial provenance in Africa (Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau) and also of the formerly white dominated territory of Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe. Not that the chapter of southern African liberation was altogether closed. Apartheid South Africa’s active presence would continue to trouble Mozambique, Zimbabwe and, especially (with the connivance of the United States) Angola. Namibia’s fate would remain unresolved, increasingly a pawn in diverse schemes against Angola and, because still under South Africa’s illegitimate control, a part of that country’s own defensive perimeter. Nonetheless, South Africa’s apartheid system was to be in the 1980s the main focus of such energies as Canadians and Americans were prepared to devote to southern African issues.

This was true not just because it was now (together with Namibia which, in the eyes of the UN, it had long since occupied illegally as a quasi-colony of its own) the last redoubt of overtly racist rule left standing in southern Africa but because it had become even more than previously a site of concrete and substantive struggle by its own people for liberation and power on the ground. Here both the emergence of a renewed working-class activism and of vigorous township unrest (as epitomized most

(32) Nancy Thede, “Quebec and Southern Africa: Still Crazy After All These Years,” *Southern Africa Report*, 4. 5 (May 1989), pp.11ff.

dramatically in the student-centered uprising in Soweto from 1976 but spreading outward from there) was crucial in singling out the liberation of South Africa as the key focus of expanding support in North America, a support that could now, more than ever, move beyond “mere” moral outrage to see in South Africa an increasingly credible target for action.

Of course, by 1980s, strong and progressive voices had already been heard on the issue and they would continue to find clear expression through the coming decade. Thus, even by 1981, when the Taskforce on Churches and Corporate Responsibility met with and presented a brief to a brace of senior government ministers in Ottawa,

its record was already a striking one. Moreover, it had a great deal to do: a summary of their important brief, appearing in the *Canadian Journal of African Studies* (1982),³³ documented, in the Taskforce’s words, a remarkable string of “disturbing inconsistencies, long identified in Canada’s relations to South Africa, between strong rhetoric on the part of the Canadian Government and rather weak and half-hearted

policies and actions” and concluded, forcefully, that “it is hypocritical to proclaim that one is against violence and prefers peaceful change while neglecting to act in a manner most likely to result in peaceful change.” TCCR then documented, as they had been doing since their founding by a broad range of Canadian churches in 1975, a whole array of corporate and governmental practices that placed Canada quite self-consciously and all too firmly on the wrong side of the struggle in southern Africa.

Thus, the flaws in this respect of both the Export Development Corporation and the Canadian Development Corporation were well documented in TCCR’s brief, as were the feebleness of the “Code of Conduct” the government “recommended” to Canadian corporations in South Africa. Special mention was made of the shifty government handling of Krugerrand sales in Canada (and the Bank of Nova Scotia’s active involvement in them), for example. And particularly objectionable, TCCR specified, was the obscenity of the involvement in South Africa of such companies (including their involvement in the defence programmes of the South African state) as the Ford Motor Company of Canada and Massey Ferguson – without any noticeable unease being evidenced by the Canadian government.

Renate Pratt herself was to recount these and other enormities in her own previously mentioned and very potent volume, *In Good Faith: Canadian Churches Against Apartheid*,³⁴ published in 1996 – while also sustaining her account to embrace the 1980s and early 1990s. She emphasized the connection being formed between southern African activist work and a substantial, church-based constituency of

Canadians, as well as the diverse activities on the sanctions front of various member churches. Most importantly, she also details, in successive chapters, the scrupulously researched case to be made against the banks for their dealings with South Africa – as well as their increasingly pugnacious attitude to criticisms of their role. And she

(33) See Cranford Pratt, “Canadian Policy towards Southern Africa: Brief from the Taskforce on the Churches and Corporate Responsibility,” *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 16, 1 (1982), pp.113-126.

(34) Renate Pratt, *In Good Faith* (*op.cit.*).

recounts the sorry tale of the Canadian “Code of Conduct,” designed, ostensibly, to guide Canadian corporations toward the playing of some kind of more benign role in the implementation of their investments in South Africa. As she discusses fully for each case, this code’s ostensible “guidelines” were pretty much ignored by the entire range of familiar Canadian offenders: Alcan, Bata, Canada Wire and Cable, Rio Algom, Massey-Ferguson, Control Fata Computer Systems, QIT-FER et Titane Ltd and Falconbridge.

Pratt’s account is too rich in the detail of real struggle to attempt to summarize it here, though such incidents as the churches’ politely assertive presence at Alcan general meetings, notably in 1982, are exemplary of the kind of impact the churches were beginning to have.³⁵ Moreover, as Pratt demonstrates, the Taskforce also tracked the government closely throughout the decade of the 1980s. She notes its shift, under Mulroney, to a limited sanctions-accepting agenda in the mid-80s (see below), but also scrupulously identifies the severe limitations of Canada’s policies - and its considerable backtracking on its stated agenda after 1987 (one chapter [9] is actually entitled “The Taskforce and the Abandonment of Canada’s Sanctions Policy, 1988-90”!). In addition the continuingly negative role through the late 1980s of Falconbridge, Massey Ferguson-Verity (Pratt’s account of the company’s 1987 AGM when church representatives attempted to call the company to account is particularly revealing), Rio Algom and of several very resistant oil companies is outrageous – and Pratt’s painstaking documentation of the role played by such offenders provides an absolutely essential record of it.

On these and other fronts then, TCCR continued to give deeper perspective and resonance to novel energies that now burst upon the anti-apartheid scene. In 1980, for example, TCCR was joined within the churches by formation of a second ecumenical “parachurch” organization, the Inter-Church Coalition on Africa that was active over a wide range of fronts. As Gary Kenny has written (in reviewing the role of these church-related initiatives at the end of the 1980s), both were unapologetic about their “prophetic” role in shaping and educating their constituencies and were also vitally important: “Because [Kenny notes] they operate at arm’s length from the churches and often attract highly political staff, the role they have played in shaping both denominational and ecumenical policy on southern Africa has been significant.”³⁶

As Kenny further suggests “TCCR, well-known for its persistent style of work... [has] helped to decrease the number of Canadian companies from about 35 four years ago to nine as of May, 1989.” Indeed, “TCCR’s best known success was the major role it played to convince Canadian banks to stop making loans to the South African government and its state agencies.” Not that TCCR was alone in its bank campaign, of course. Other groups were involved in sanctions work vis-à-vis South Africa in the 1970s, and they, too, continued their efforts into the following decade. For far from

(35) Of course and as the reader will recall, this is where it all had begun with the exemplary action of Project Mozambique at an Alcan AGM a number of years earlier.

(36) Gary Kenny “Partners in Prophecy: Canadian Churches in Solidarity,” *SAR* (July, 1989).

ignoring the sanctions issue and shying away from confrontations with corporate Canada most anti-apartheid groups had actually been taking the need for such confrontations quite seriously. Indeed, anti-corporate work (together with liberation movement support) became the very centre of their activities.

At TCLSAC in Toronto, for example, a primary preoccupation of the committee was also very much with those Canadian banks who were deeply implicated in loans to the South African government.³⁷ Indeed, TCCR and TCLSAC worked effectively together to help facilitate the emergence of a majority at the Toronto City Council in support of withdrawals of city funds from offending banks. And TCLSAC also made its presence known at various bank (and other corporate) AGMs - when not picketing them, with many others, outside on the streets; it also spent hours engaged in such tricks as stuffing, for purposes of public enlightenment, the deposit and withdrawal tables of numerous Canadian bank branches with fake withdrawal slips that carried on the back injunctions against the practice of loans to South Africa and of “banking on apartheid.”³⁸ The banks were a key target, in short, but so too were various mining companies (e.g. Falconbridge in Namibia and Inco, Noranda and Alcan).³⁹ Moreover, such efforts were soon to have a much wider echo.

For, in the 1980s there were also new fronts, new struggles...and new constituencies, their numbers swollen far beyond those represented in the 70s by such activists of church and civil society who had heretofore been prepared to take a stand. These constituencies were now ready and willing to assume a more assertive role as the apartheid issue came more clearly into their sights, and they included, notably, students and organized workers, but also people of such social “categories” – who were now more inclined to speak out with their own voice, in addition to being part of a broader movement - as women and black Canadians. We will listen to these voices in turn, while also keeping an eye on the broader “anti-apartheid” movement as it evolved. We will also note the several fronts upon which action was increasingly required, not just as regards corporate activities (although, as seen, such activities still defined the most crucial terrain of Canada’s negative involvement in the apartheid system), but also on such continuing fronts as the sports boycott and the media (where a hard slog to achieve more fairness and honesty in the coverage of the South African struggle was on-going). We will take these various items in turn.

Notable, as a particularly important and novel site of anti-corporate mobilization, were the universities. Even in the late 1970s, amongst both students and faculty, there

(37) See, *inter alia*, John S. Saul, “Canadian Bank Loans to South Africa” in D. Anglin, T. Shaw, and C. Widstrand, *Canada, Scandinavia and Southern Africa* (Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Affairs, 1978); various activities linked to the bank campaign itself during the late 70s and early 80s are exhaustively surveyed in various issues of *TCLSAC Reports*, TCLSAC’s newsletter of that period.

(38) See TCLSAC’s periodic publication of the period “Bank Campaign News.”

(39) Indeed, TCLSAC hosted, in November, 1979, an Ontario-wide meeting of student organizations, churches, and development education and other groups to “renew” the bank campaign for the 1980s. But many such meetings, aimed at enhancing both clarity of purpose and coherence of action, were beginning to occur elsewhere in Canada around this and other related issues.

were strong signs of their lending a new momentum and visibility to anti-apartheid work. Thus Pat Baker (from the University of Toronto, who also happened to be a TCLSAC member) was able, as early as 1979, to speak as a representative of university disinvestment groups from across Canada to a New York meeting of the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid concerned with student disinvestment activities in the U.S., the U.K., and Canada. She itemized the questionable share- holding activities of Canadian universities vis-a-vis mining companies and the banks (here she singles out the University of Toronto, where she herself was an activist, and the University of Victoria for specific criticism with regard to their especially egregious entanglements with offending Canadian banks).

Baker also noted , “Students, teachers and support staff have been mounting campaigns across the country to protest the investment practices of the universities;” also their practices of maintaining banking arrangements with banks involved in making loans to South Africa. She cited actions of this sort from right across Canada: at Dalhousie, the University of Ottawa, the University of Manitoba, the University of British Columbia, Dawson College in Montreal, the University of Guelph and Trent. In short, Baker affirmed to the UN, “There has been a growing awareness by students and other members of the academic community that the question of Canadian corporate and banking responsibility with respect to South Africa can no longer be avoided or ignored.”⁴⁰

This was a momentum that would only deepen and gain further attention in the 1980s - and even spill over into other levels of the education system (Oakwood Collegiate in Toronto offering a particularly interesting case of student mobilization around the anti-apartheid issue). The results were mixed. At the University of Toronto, for example, and despite the best efforts of anti-apartheid activists, the issue was - as late as 1985 - merely fudged by University President George Connell and others on the board while at McGill at about the same time students overcame strong right- wing opposition to carry the day for divestment. Similarly successful, in part because of the role played by a willing president, Harry Arthurs were efforts at York University; the York Student Movement Against Apartheid, it bears noting, had previously campaigned successfully to remove Sonja Bata, herself deeply compromised by apartheid links, from the York University Board of Governors. Similar divestment success was achieved at Dalhousie, while at Queens a fierce struggle over the issue was also waged. And so the story went elsewhere, presenting a proud record of student and (some) faculty accomplishment; the full story of which still awaits its historian.⁴¹ Meanwhile, where was the working class to be found in the liberation support/ anti-apartheid mix? As Judith Marshall has written, the role of Canadian trade

(40) “TCLSAC Attends U.N. Meeting on Student Disinvestment Activities,” *TCLSAC Reports* (December, 1979), pp.6-7.

(41) See, *inter alia*, University of Toronto Divestment Committee, “Going Through the Motions: Divestment at U of T,” *SAR*, 1, 2 (October, 1985); “Divestment: Lessons from McGill,” *SAR*, 1, 3 (December, 1985); Gene Desfor, “Divestment at York University: The Student-Trade Union Alliance” and Paul Keen, “Dalhousie Divests,” both in *SAR*, 1, 4 (February, 1986); Laurie E. Adkin, “Divestment at Queens: The Pressure Mounts,” *SAR*, 1, 5 (April, 1986).

unions in the liberation support struggle of the 1960s and 1970s was indeed “modest,” in part because of “the propensity for the international affairs departments of the main trade union centrals in Northern countries to be fighting the Cold War in fairly stereotypical ways”- on behalf of the ICFTU (the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions)! However, “all this changed when South Africa and its then colony, Namibia, were the only bastions of minority white control and when trade unions emerged as one of the most important social forces [inside the country] fighting to dismantle apartheid.”⁴²

Thus the links of the CLC, Canada’s leading trade union central, to the most advanced sectors of South African trade unions, became even stronger as the decade wore on. But there was a level of complexity to such support as well. For another claimant to credibility on the issue of South African trade unions was the SACTU Solidarity Committee closely linked, through its involvement with SACTU (a South African trade union central, by now largely phantom inside South Africa itself, but closely tied to the African National Congress and SACP), to the ANC and to the Congress Alliance. The SACTU Solidarity Committee did solid work of course,

producing important material for trade unionists, like its *Trafficking in Apartheid: The Case for Canadian Sanctions against Apartheid*,⁴³ that was comparable to materials produced by TCCR for its own church constituency. And it carried out, in Marshall’s

words, “a sustained grassroots campaign in local unions, garnering financial support for SACTU activities and supporting local unions in looking at Pension funds and engaging in divestment campaigns.”

Less positively, the SACTU Solidarity Committee, like both the ANC and SACTU themselves, were very reluctant to grant the emergent South African trade unions

– representing a vibrant initiative with real mass involvement and resonance that was emerging so forcefully on the ground inside South Africa itself but outside the ANC’s direct control (e.g., FOSATU) - the kind of credibility and credit many other Canadian anti-apartheid activists sensed they warranted. Indeed, as such activists sought to reach out from Canada to such unions they found themselves dogged by the ANC/SACTU’s incessant reiteration (echoed by the SACTU Solidarity Committee) of the theme: “Direct links stink.” A dialogue of the deaf, indeed, with SACTU and the SACTU Solidarity Committee on the one hand and the Canadian Labour Congress on the other, talking right past each other, in their battle for the hearts and minds of Canadian unionists over South Africa.

Thus, the CLC did support the emergent movement inside South Africa (as did most Canadian support groups), with “trade union visitors... a prominent and regular feature of Canadian trade union congresses,” as Marshall notes. Moreover this was

(42) Judith Marshall, “Trans-Societal Linkages: Labour and Human Resource Development,” in Larry Swatuk and David Black (eds.), *Canada and Southern Africa After Apartheid: Foreign Aid and Civil Society* (Halifax: Dalhousie University, 1996).

(43) SACTU Solidarity Committee, *Trafficking in Apartheid: The Case for Canadian Sanctions against Apartheid* (Toronto, 1985).

increasingly accompanied by more assertive pressure, both by the CLC itself and by many of its affiliated unions, upon the Canadian government and corporate Canada to move them to firm up their position against the apartheid regime. Yet, the CLC, as led by such officials as John Harker, the union central's long-time Director of International Affairs, was a haven of right wing, text-book anti-communist, sentiment - suspicious of SACTU and the ANC for their supposed subservience to the "communist menace," for example. In short the CLC was right – in its support for the independent trade unions – but for precisely the wrong, Cold-Warrior, kind of reasons.

In sharp contrast, some of the best activists in the union movement - because of their justified suspicions of the CLC brass (and also because of their respect for the hard-work around sanctions and related issues being done by the SACTU Solidarity Committee) - came to support, all too exclusively, SACTU (and the SACTU Solidarity Committee), rather than the new trade unions on the ground! The up-shot: the trade union presence within the broader anti-apartheid movement a most difficult one at times,⁴⁴ despite the fact that some real support for South African liberation did come from both poles of this "dialogue." Moreover, with the emergence of a new trade union central, COSATU, inside the country much of this tension tended eventually to evaporate and the CLC itself proceeded with a range of useful programmes on the ground (as itemized by Marshall, for example⁴⁵).

Other constituencies were also important. As noted above, many women, often already key activists in a range of anti-apartheid organizations across the country, saw southern Africa simultaneously as a potential site of significant women's emancipation. They thus increasingly sought, as women, to articulate their own unique perspective, doing so in variety of fora, notably at an important national workshop; held near Toronto this was attended by "about seventy women from across Canada – from Terrace, B.C. to St. John's, Newfoundland – [who] came to the June [1988] workshop entitled "Women, Solidarity and Southern Africa 1988"⁴⁶ and it produced (in the words of a useful account of the time) "the strengthening of the national network of women in solidarity work." So too, in the 1980s, Black Canadians began ever more self-consciously than in the past to articulate their distinctive voice within the anti-apartheid mix. Here, as black Canadian professor and militant Fred Case suggested at the time, a key moment came in late 1985 when Lennox Farrell, a prominent Toronto black activist, was so outraged by the invited presence on the University of Toronto campus of the South African ambassador, that he threw the ceremonial mace at him. As Case writes:

During that period and since I have been surprised by the number of Blacks – people I have seen for years on my regular TTC routes or even some who live on my street but with whom I have never spoken – who have in some way or another made

(44) See "South African Trade Unions: The Canadian Connection," *SAR*, 2, 1 (June, 1986).

(45) Marshall, "Trans-Societal Linkages," *op.cit.*; see also her "Keeping Pace: Solidarity Work and the New Globalism," *SAR*, 10, 3 (1994).

(46) "Women, Solidarity and Southern Africa: Report of the National workshop," *SAR* (July, 1988), p.29.

their solidarity known. This was not unanimous solidarity with the action we took, but for once the University of Toronto had generated a topic of conversation in the homes, in the barber shops, in the churches and in the clubs of African Canadians. For once an event in this august institution had touched the lives of African Canadians in the wider community.⁴⁷

Moreover, “the example of South Africa is introducing a new militancy in our [own] ranks as we become increasingly impatient with a state of affairs [with respect to Canada’s own race relations] that has lasted for centuries in Canada.”

Meanwhile, the Canadian government remained firm in its resistance to the most deeply-felt claims to attention - in their beseeching of support for their countries’ liberation and for their use of armed means, if necessary, in order to achieve their goals - of the southern African liberation movements, and also to the imperative of imposing sanctions upon South Africa. However, Canada had always kept a hand in on the front of “humanitarian aid” to southern Africa in order to (mildly) counter-balance its less savoury set of policies for both domestic and international consumption. Indeed, “the 1980s saw the mainstreaming of the anti-apartheid movement with churches, students, women, labour, professional groups and other assorted citizens, all caught up in the world-wide movement against apartheid” – and in many cases encouraged to use “CIDA-matchable categories” in order to direct funds towards “humanitarian assistance” for affected indigenous population groups - to “victims of apartheid,” for example, and, within very strict limits, “liberation movements” in the region.⁴⁸

As suggested, to some this seemed to be as much conscience money (and public relations gimmickry for the consumption of other Commonwealth members) as it did anything more sincere or substantive in terms of any meaningful commitment – although, in Marshall’s words, “only a few grumpy voices like TCLSAC pondered aloud whether this embrace [however mild] of liberation in South Africa was not really a strategy to contain more revolutionary transformation.”⁴⁹ A case in point: the supportive reception, by an audience that included many ostensible anti-apartheid activists, of Joe Clark’s speech to a luncheon sponsored by the South African Education Trust Fund, a speech that “gave a persuasive rendition of Canada’s policy of soft options: actions on questions of censorship, dialogue, education and training.” It was in the wake of this event, a group of southern Africa solidarity activists wondered aloud uneasily as to just what was happening: “While Canada’s South African policy has stalled on sanctions and promoted soft options, has the anti-apartheid movement gone from boos to standing ovations? The politics of manners? Overseas

(47) Frederick Ivor Case, “South African Liberation and the Rebirth of Pan African Consciousness in Canada,” *SAR*, 2, 4 (February, 1987), pp.23ff.

(48) Marshall, “Trans-Societal Linkages,” *op.cit.*

(49) Judith Marshall, “Keeping Pace” (*ibid.*).

Development Assistance cuts? Buying silence? Those of us involved in the solidarity movement outside the hub of power in Ottawa are feeling uneasy.”⁵⁰

For Canadian NGOs that came to handle much of this money on behalf of the government, such funds did indeed represent just such a danger of cooptation, embodying a kind of fiscal dependence that could encourage them to dampen down their criticism of the Canadian government’s other much more unsavoury silences in its policies. Organizations like CUSO, SUCO and OXFAM, with noble records of principled resistance to apartheid, and to Canada’s role of tacit support of it, now entered into such perilous waters with trepidation, of course. Others were less cautious. For, as soon as they became apparent, there existed a wide range of opinion about how best now to conceptualize the role of the Canadian government (and indeed of Canadian capital) with respect to southern Africa, and what dangers, if any, such a role bore.

Thus IDAFSA (the International Defence and Aid Fund) of Canada, which undertook a wide range of useful and supportive policies in aid of political prisoners and other such “victims of apartheid,” as well as important informational work on conditions in South Africa, had an extremely good working relationship with the Canadian government – as regards the limited, if important, issues it concentrated upon. Not for them, however, the notion that a government like Canada’s, was a major part of the problem in South Africa. Although it had links with various progressive actors inside South Africa it also tended to steer clear of strong contacts with the liberation movements. Moreover, IDAFSA took as a point of pride the fact that it did not “officially advocate economic sanctions,” as Joan Fairweather has written in her survey of the Canadian anti-apartheid movements; although it did sometimes lend its voice to a few related campaigns.⁵¹

As we will see, the real costs of such a relatively cosy relationship with the Canadian government would only become more evident when the end-game of the apartheid issue in Canada came to be played.⁵² In any case the IDAFSA approach, certainly stood in sharp contrast to that of groups like TCCR, of more firmly liberal-left/ social-democratic persuasion, that were far more sceptical about Canada - both its government and its corporations - and acted firmly and forcefully (but politely) on the basis of such an understanding. Meanwhile, other groups, further to the left and even more sceptical as to the bona fides of both governmental and corporate Canada, were proud to be just plain “grumpy”!

(50) “Buying Silence,” *SAR*, 5, 4 (February, 1990).

(51) Joan Fairweather (2008), “Canadian solidarity with South Africa’s liberation struggle” in SADET, *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, Vol 3, *International Solidarity*, Part 2, Pretoria: UNISA, pp.825-906. Interestingly, Fairweather, who was herself an activist with IDAFSA for many years in Ottawa, gives a committed but generally quite moderate account of the Canadian anti-apartheid record overall. It is, in addition, rather startling to find that she devotes fully 10 pages of her 80 page chapter to reporting on an organization, IDAFSA. For IDAFSA’s work, though exemplary as far as it went, was by and large extremely cautious and establishment oriented – even though its main centre was in a setting (Ottawa) that was for so long a staging-ground of capitalist and governmental support for race rule.

(52) See Linda Freeman, “Canada, Aid and Peacemaking in Southern Africa” (*op.cit.*).

For there did remain an assertive anti-apartheid movement in Canada (TCLSAC in Toronto, for example, chose, jokingly, to think of itself as an AGO – an “Anti- Governmental Organization,” rather than a Non-Governmental Organization/ NGO) that stood firm until quite late in the day and this “movement” began to grope towards establishing a more effective and unified voice as the decade wore on. There had, of course, been previous national fora of collective solidarity, a 1982 “Canadian Conference in Solidarity with the Liberation Struggles of the Peoples of Southern Africa,” for example. This had been an event epitomized in one account of the time in extremely positive terms: “The silence in Canada concerning Southern Africa was shattered in Ottawa during the weekend of May 7-9 1982. More than 500 people, representing a large cross-section of Canadian and Quebecois organizations, met to discuss the latest developments in South Africa and Namibia, to investigate the role of the Canadian government, and to plan a course of action for future solidarity work.” There keynote speaker George Erasmus, President of the Dene Nation of the Northwest Territories, elaborated effectively on the links between the struggle of his own people and those in Africa, while emphasizing that “solidarity is not an act of charity but mutual aid between forces fighting for the same objectives.” And other delegations from the region itself – Alfred Nzo and Thabo Mbeki of the ANC and Hidipo Hamutenya of SWAPO – made much the same point. Meanwhile, many aroused Canadians continued, in various ways, to hammer home a point that became central to the Conference’s final communiqué: this being the “existence of two Canadas... One is the Canada of the owners of large corporations and controllers of chartered banks who, with the help of the Canadian government, support apartheid by investing in the South African racist regime. The other Canada is the ordinary working people who are beginning to see the connection between unemployment and inflation here and INCO, ALCAN and Massey Ferguson exploiting cheap labour in South Africa.”⁵³

Then, in 1987 a similar range of groups again came together - on two impressive occasions - to push the work of the national anti-apartheid network further forward. First off was the “Taking Sides in Southern Africa: A National Conference on Canada’s Role in international Action to End Apartheid and to Support SADCC,” held in Montreal in February and sponsored by the CCIC (with “445 delegates from every province in Canada and representing 197 organizations: trade unions, women’s groups, churches, non-governmental organizations and support groups, educational institutions and youth and community organizations”).⁵⁴ Soon to follow was a similarly well-attended “Consolidating Solidarity” meeting in Vancouver in October: a self-styled “Parallel Commonwealth Conference.”⁵⁵ Both sessions emphasized the need for the deepening and tightening of sanctions, for further support for the front-

(53) “SA – Solidarity – Two Canadas,” *TCLSAC Reports* (April-May, 1982), p.8.

(54) “Congress of the People’- Canadian Style,” *SAR*, 2, 5 (April, 1987).

(55) “Consolidating Solidarity: The Parallel Commonwealth Conference,” *SAR*, 3, 3 (December, 1987).

line states, and for much stronger and unequivocal diplomatic recognition of the ANC and SWAPO.

Yet there was still a great deal to be done – and anti-apartheid militants knew it. Thus an informal survey of activists from across the country (as reported upon in a trenchant article entitled “Anti-Apartheid Activism: A Cross-Canada Survey”⁵⁶) found “a need for more planning, more information about the struggle inside South Africa, more sharing of successful tactics, a tighter communication network among the Canadian group” - although “there was also a lot of optimism about the level of activity communities were able to generate”. What was evident, in short, was that, “despite the yearning to be more effective that almost everyone expressed...the accounts of what has been happening [were] heartening.”

One heard, for example, that “the Halifax network had begun a petition to urge the Bank of Nova Scotia to rescind its loan to Minorco,” that others on the west coast were concentrating on the Shell boycott, and that a representation by Newfoundland activists to the St John’s City Council had moved the Council to declare the city “apartheid-free.” And in this survey and in other written contributions of the moment one also heard accounts, sober but committed, of developments in other parts of the country, regions as diverse as Quebec and Western Canada and sites of a range of impressive activities,⁵⁷ where the distinct promise of an ever more effective national movement – one that was growing organically and from the ground up, rather than by fiat from on high - could be felt. As it happened, however, apartheid’s time was in fact running out and it was to do so, long before such issues within the Canadian anti-apartheid network could be fully confronted, resolved and acted upon⁵⁸ and the movement, in truth, finds its full potential. To this point we will have to return. But, before doing so, several other fronts of struggle merit discussion.

The kind of boycott and direct action activity undertaken vis-à-vis corporations by the groups surveyed above already had powerful precedents - in the sphere of sports; for here was a brand of struggle that would also be sustained throughout the 1980s. In fact sporting links to South Africa, from quite early on, was an issue - one that was also highly visible for whites, ever sporting minded, in South Africa - that tended to capture the public imagination. Moreover, as Joan Fairweather suggests, this was a front upon which official Canada could win praise and credibility for its “principles” and also advance on “its self-assigned task of preserving and strengthening the multi-racial Commonwealth” – upon a stage, we might add, where posturing to win

(56) “Anti-Apartheid Activism: A Cross-Canada Survey,” SAR, 4, 5 (May, 1989).

(57) Nancy Thede, “Quebec and Southern Africa,” (*op.cit.* [1989]) and Don Kossick, “A View from the West” (SAR, February, 1990).

(58) A particularly thoughtful and thorough analysis, one that underscored the difficulties, both in terms of tactics and strategic perspectives, that continued to do qualify the prospects any such movement was that by Pierre François, entitled “In a Lull: Canada’s Anti-Apartheid Movement” in SAR, (5, 3, December, 1989). Indeed, the SAR editors perceived the possibility that Francois’ article might “serve as a stimulus to further discussion and [welcomed] contributions in subsequent issues. The response was very good, including, in the February 1990 issue, Don Kossick’s article and the piece on “Buying Silence” (both cited above), as well as John Van Mossel’s “Toward a Common Strategy.” As noted, however, history was moving faster than we were (see below).

international credibility was much more cost-free to the government's class base than any form of economic boycott could be.

True, the initial Canadian approach to this issue was a faltering and uncertain one. South Africa had been banned internationally from participation in both the Olympic and Commonwealth Games from the early 1960s. Yet the Canadian government stumbled at the time of its own cherished hosting, in Montreal, of the 1976 Olympic Games; here the government badly misplayed its hand and was forced to experience an effective boycott of the Games, mainly by Africans, over a South African-related issue. True, now alerted to the extent of international concern about the issue, Canada did clean up its act on sports-related issues in the late 1970s, moving Fairweather to conclude her own account, without apparent irony, that "while foreign trade, tourism and cultural and academic contacts continued in the face of minimal sanctions, international competition in the major sports was virtually eliminated."

Yet the sports issue was by no means dead. As Bruce Kidd, one of Canada's best known and most successful Olympic athletes and a tireless anti-apartheid campaigner, would make clear in the 1980s, there remained much to be done. For example, Kidd exposed clearly the hesitation and verbal back-sliding of federal sports minister, Otto Jelinek, at the time of the ultimately successful African-led boycott (in response to Margaret Thatcher's continuing support of apartheid South Africa) of the 1987 Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh. Tennis was another focus of continuing attention with Tennis Canada still receiving, as late as 1988, federal support, despite its continuing to extend invitations to South African players for Canada-based events – although, moved by Kidd's writing about the issue, an effective campaign by members of the York University and Jane-Finch communities (Jane-Finch, where York University is located, was then the second largest black community in Canada) eventually forced the government to extend the boycott to tennis. But Kidd in other writings also pin-pointed the lack of a comprehensive policy (as promised by the federal government) that would have closed loop-holes on several sports fronts and could have seen Canada acting more effectively internationally to advance the issue.⁵⁹ As for the media, the simple fact is that throughout the anti-apartheid years they were a source of considerable frustration for anti-apartheid activists. For, with notable exceptions, members of the media seemed unable to make up their minds as to how seriously to take the southern Africa story and especially the claims to simple social justice (let alone to any kind of dispassionate hearing) made by the liberation movements. Small wonder, that the media became a target in the 1980s for South Africa's assertive ambassador to Canada, Glenn Babb, attempts to bend the Canadian press to his and South Africa's own purposes. Thus, he made hundreds of television and radio appearances and, in his occasional (and often sharply contested) invitations to

(59) See Bruce Kidd, "Jelinek's End Run" (*SAR*, February, 1987); his "Tackling Tennis" (*SAR*, Feb 1988); Gene Desfor, "Apartheid's Racquet: Extending the Sports Boycott" (*SAR*, October, 1988); Kidd again, "Adjusting the Sports Boycott" (*SAR*, March 1989) and his "The Sports Boycott: Old Ploys vs. New Players" (*SAR*, December 1989).

campuses and in other locales; he spoke in strident support of apartheid (although he simultaneously sought to imply that the system was “changing”). Babb also managed to stir up controversy (and media attention) by arranging a well-publicized invitation to visit their reserve from the leaders at the Peguis reservation in Manitoba.

Perhaps the main goal of Canada’s native people, in this instance, was to embarrass the Canadian government, but Babb turned the occasion skillfully to his own purposes, pointing out the grim, if somewhat divergent parallels between the practices of the two countries.⁶⁰ Other “native” leaders were prepared to play ball with apartheid, too, in pursuit of their own interests, as witness the tour of South Africa, courtesy of the South African Tourist Board, made by four senior Native Canadian politicians in August, 1987. True, and in sharp contrast, the bulk of native leadership in Canada – even as they pressed forward with their continuing claims and demands against the Canadian government – scorned the acceptance of any such invitation from or visit to South Africa, stating clearly, as Pierre Bourgeault’s epitomizes their position, “that the Indian people of Canada [choose] not to go down in history as allies of racist fascism.”⁶¹ There was some kind of parallel nonetheless, and momentarily Babb made the most of it.⁶²

Not surprisingly he found support for such tricks, and for the apartheid regime that sponsored them, in Canada more widely. Quite apart from the lack of imagination that permeated the main-stream media regarding the African claims to voice and power that the situation in South Africa had spawned, there was also a considerable network of backing for the combination of prejudice and profit that bred more active support for apartheid South Africa in Canada. Hence, there was a degree of organized pro-apartheid agitation, especially amongst the country’s privileged classes. The crudely racist, flamboyantly anti-communist, and vividly right-wing journalism of Peter Worthington of the *Toronto Telegram* was a particularly prominent perpetrator of this, to anyone living in Toronto during these years; Worthington was also the author of the vicious video, “The ANC Method: Violence,” designed, as was a whole series of South African embassy sponsored newspaper ads, to counter the visit to Ottawa of ANC’s Oliver Tambo in 1987.⁶³

But activists in the Canadian anti-apartheid network at the time were also well aware of the broader reach of a national network of racist sympathizers. For example, a well-researched 1988 article in the western Canadian journal *Briarpatch* listed a host of right-wing and business-related groups hard at work defending apartheid:

(60) For a retrospective article on Babb in Canada see “Apartheid envoy reviled in Canada,” in *Globe and Mail (Toronto)*, August 30, 2003.

(61) Bourgeault, “Canada Indians” (*op.cit.*).

(62) Babb may actually have overplayed his hand here, of course. Canadian leaders seemed quite unamused by his show-boating as regards the Canadian “native problem” and, in any case, were beginning to rethink their approach to South Africa on quite other grounds (see below).

(63) A particularly effective account of the activities in Canada of both Babb and Worthington (and of other media onslaughts that the Canadian anti-apartheid movement was forced to counter) is David Galbraith’s “Targeting Canada: Apartheid’s Friends on the Offensive,” *SAR*, 3, 5 (May, 1988).

the Western Canadian Society of South Africa, for example, and the extremely well-connected Canadian-South African Society. Indeed the husband of Canada's then Governor-General, Jeanne Sauve, was actually a member of the latter until shamed into resigning in 1985.⁶⁴ At one point, too, influential members of the capitalist class even founded their own short-lived Confederation of Church and Business People (CCBP), precisely in order to counter TCCR - and they no doubt felt they could draw on their great influence with the press in aspiring to do so. Indeed, the media presented enough of a problem that when Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark, sought, towards the end of the 1980s, to deflect attention away from the prospect of meaningful sanctions against South Africa that his leader, Mulroney, had seemed to promise (see below), a plausible alternative focus (to Clark's mind at least) was a fund to counter "South African propaganda and censorship."⁶⁵

However, the end-game of the anti-apartheid struggle as waged within Canada was at hand, and, as suggested above, it would be a startling one.⁶⁶ For Prime Minister Mulroney was to engineer an at least partial volte-face by "official Canada" on South Africa, a volte-face that was particularly revealing as to what was now increasingly at stake. More generally, as essential background to this move, it must be underscored that changes were afoot in the western governmental-cum-corporate sphere with respect to South Africa (including in Canada), changes of no small magnitude. The roots of such a rethinking lay primarily inside South Africa itself and in the continuing escalation of internal resistance there in the mid-80s. Yet it may be that the persistent moral force of twenty years of counter-corporate critique by Canadian anti-apartheid organizations (as recounted above) had had some cumulative impact on Canada's powers-that-be as well. In any case, the corporate mind began to shift.

Indeed, as we now know, meetings, much closer to the scene of the actual struggle, between business heavyweights and the ANC were re-writing the ground rules of "common-sense" in South Africa. For capital was beginning to realize, it now seems clear, that it would be foolhardy to get stuck on the racist side of a losing political equation and it began to think of cooptation of the ANC rather than of continued intransigence against political change as apartheid South Africa became more and more of a pariah. True, some support that indulged both in various euphemisms for racism and in uncritical cheer-leading for capitalism - together with judicious red-baiting - did grind on, but it also began to become apparent, during the 1980s, that

(64) George Martin Manz, "South Africa and Disinformation: The Lie Machine," in *Briarpatch* (Regina, February, 1989).

(65) Freeman, "Canada, Aid and Peacemaking in Southern Africa," (*op.cit.*), p.41; she does mention a second fund created at the time and designed to support "dialogue and negotiations among South Africans" which she takes rather more seriously - although she also quotes Zimbabwe's Foreign Minister as pointing out such "contributions to fighting apartheid" were mere "peanuts," equivalent to what Zimbabwe spent in a day in countering South African de stabilization.

(66) In the next few paragraphs I draw on my own recent account as presented in John S. Saul, "Two Fronts of Anti-Apartheid Struggle" (*op.cit.*).

the changes afoot in the western governmental-cum-corporate sphere with respect to South Africa, including in Canada, were of no small magnitude.

Interestingly, once again a key factor in this regard for Canada was the Commonwealth, notably its Eminent Person's Group mission that went to South Africa in 1986. Mulroney's own nominee for this delegation was the Head of the Anglican Church of Canada, the Reverend Ted Scott, a sober and centrist Toronto-based prelate, but it was the Australian delegate Malcolm Fraser who made the most noise – or at least the noise that Brian Mulroney heard most clearly. As noted above, a different kind of “common-sense” was already in the air: in South Africa, for example and at about this same time, Zac de Beer was advising that “We all understand how years of apartheid have caused many blacks to reject the economic as well as political system... We dare not allow the baby of free enterprise to be thrown out with the bathwater of apartheid.” This time, however – and despite the fact that the South African government thumbed its nose at the EPG - it was Fraser, the deeply conservative former Australian Prime Minister who wrote the mission's eloquent and tough-minded report, one calling for an extension of sanctions against South Africa in order to force it to its senses before the confrontation there escalated out of control. The EPG feared more violence and bloodshed, but Fraser warned that in an escalating conflict “moderation would be swept aside... The government that emerged from all of this would be extremely radical, probably Marxist, and would nationalize all western business interests.”⁶⁷

It seems clear that Prime Minister Mulroney responded warmly to this reading of the South African situation. To the goal of ingratiating himself with the Black Commonwealth was now added the role of spearheading the forces of enlightened capitalism. Mulroney sought unsuccessfully to convince Margaret Thatcher of the wisdom of pressing for change in South Africa at the August 1986 Commonwealth mini-summit convened to follow up on the EPG report. For he had hoped that Thatcher would link the U.K. to the new Commonwealth-sponsored package of sanctions that was now forthcoming. He was to press the same kind of case at the Venice G-7 meeting of the major industrialized countries in 1987, although again to little avail. As this suggested, Canada was somewhat ahead of the curve: after all, Mulroney was no racist and was thus far more able than either Reagan and Thatcher, with both of whom he would have testy exchanges on the subject, both publicly and privately, to begin to adjust the game-plan of “official Canada.”⁶⁸

During the 1980s, however, Mulroney also retained a residual suspicion of the ANC, as witness his very cool reception of Oliver Tambo in Ottawa in 1987 (according to

(67) Malcolm Fraser, “No More Talk. Time to Act,” *Times* (London), June 30, 1986.

(68) Jeff Sallot, “Commonwealth at Risk, Thatcher told: Unified action sought on apartheid,” *Globe and Mail*, October 17, 1986 (p.A16), in which article Mulroney is quoted as saying “In the present crisis it is imperative that we all signal together that there will be a common, world-wide and sustained pressure against apartheid, until apartheid is ended,” doing so, Sallot notes, “voicing a somewhat more moderate tone than some of the Third World leaders”!

the account of it that Tambo gave to a number of us the next day in Toronto⁶⁹). Moreover, as we have noted above in our account of TCCR's on-going critique of Mulroney's policies, Canada was soon to renege on its momentarily advanced position on the apartheid question. Indeed, as the heavy hand of the governmentally-declared Emergency in South Africa began, momentarily, to take its toll of internal resistance, Mulroney's enthusiasm for sanctions against South Africa, never substantively as strong as his rhetoric promised in any case, morphed into an even tamer kind of involvement. His devolving of the issue into the cautious hands of his External Affairs Minister, Joe Clark, and into a preoccupation with media coverage (as also noted above) being one indication of this. In any case, it seemed to be becoming a matter of rather less urgency with the momentarily successful internal crackdown by the apartheid government in the late 80s.

Nonetheless, capital continued to recalculate the odds in South Africa, and the ANC, for its part, began to seem an ever more likely partner for the recolonization of its own country. In such a context, Canada ultimately became active again too - at Mandela's urging, even standing behind its own (modest) sanctions until quite late in the day (1993). As the leading expert on Canadian policy, Linda Freeman, has effectively summarized the broader realities however:

While Canada moved steadily away from an earlier cordiality with the white regime in Pretoria, its shift to warmer relations with black African leaders was tardy and, until Mandela's release, quite tepid. Sanctions against South Africa were limited and late, support for the ANC minimal and even later. Throughout the last few decades, except for a brief period in the mid-1980s, Canadian trade with the apartheid regime flourished. When an opportunity to bolster Canada's international peacekeeping reputation arose in Namibia, Canadian officials seemed willing to ease up on pressure against South Africa. Even the impressive programs of development assistance in the region were initiated...as a way of avoiding the tougher alternatives of interfering with Canadian trade and investment with South Africa.⁷⁰

As she concluded, "A sober examination of the record...reveals a policy with many shortcomings, a contribution which was limited and equivocal - if the end of white domination, peace in southern Africa, and development for the region were, in fact, the primary goals."

Nevertheless, what Freeman may underestimate, both here and in her important book on the subject (*The Ambiguous Champion*⁷¹), is the strength of the presumed logic of "recolonization" that was exercising, willy-nilly, a gravitational pull both

(69) "Tambo, not Rambo: The ANC's President in Toronto," *Southern Africa Report* (October, 1987).

(70) Freeman, "Canada, Aid and Peacemaking in Southern Africa," (*op.cit.*).

(71) See John S. Saul, "A Class Act: Canada's Anti-Apartheid Record," in Saul, *The Next Liberation Struggle: Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy in Southern Africa* (Toronto, Scottsville, S.A., New York and London: Between the Lines, University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, Monthly Review Press, and The Merlin Press, 2005), for an extended review and critique of Freeman's work.

on Mulroney and upon the ANC.⁷² For Canada was soon to become quite content, along with other national centres of capital elsewhere, to again urge its corporations upon a deracialized South Africa – one that was increasingly deemed quite safe for capitalism. As one official hailed the strong signs of change in SA, in speaking to a Canadian trade paper: “I would think that the sky is the limit. Anything we like to do here and we do well we can also do in South Africa.”⁷³ “Business as usual,” then. In fact, after a brief flurry of enthusiasm for Mandela – hailed in Canada in his first official visit, with our own mixed record vis-à-vis apartheid conveniently forgotten amidst the prevailing rhetoric of the occasion⁷⁴ – South Africa became pretty much “an ordinary country” in Neville Alexander’s deft and telling phrase, an ordinary neo-colony in fact for Canadians interested in the spoils that might now be more “legitimately” on offer.⁷⁵ But otherwise the country largely drifted out of Canadian purview and official concern. In fact, whatever way this may have all played out in South Africa, it was difficult in Canada to escape the sense that a recolonization - by Capital itself and not by any one colonialist state - was what our own powers-that-be now saw as being the heart of the matter.

This was indeed a fact to be underscored - although the full range of its implications became very much clearer in retrospect than it was at the time. Still it did begin to underscore for many of us in the Canadian anti-apartheid movement (including the present author) just how modest our role had, in many ways, actually been. True, we had, from time to time, brought some useful pressure to bear on the Canadian establishment, corporate and governmental. And we had manifested the sort of solidarity – as we were assured by the movements who were struggling for liberation on the ground in southern Africa – from which they could draw real succour. No small thing then, but had we not, primarily, merely disturbed capital and its less racist apologists just enough to help encourage it to become a more reformist force than it might otherwise have been? This was, perhaps, a victory of sorts, albeit one with its

(72) Indeed, we could also see, even in Canada itself, that the ANC was, for its part, rapidly moving rightwards. For the fact that, in the renewed context of power and profit in South Africa, the ANC itself seemed to be changing, was a fact quite clearly on display at a York University workshop in Toronto, in 1992, where the ANC representative (Tito Mboweni, soon to be both Minister of Labour in the post-apartheid government and subsequently governor of the Reserve Bank) exemplified in both his deportment and his comments in the workshop itself just how far to the right the ANC elite seemed comfortable with situating themselves in readiness for the new phase in South Africa (as discussed at greater length in John S. Saul, “Two Fronts of Anti-Apartheid Struggle,” *op.cit.*).

(73) In Philip Gawith, “South African exporters come out into the open,” *Financial Times*, October 4, 1990.

(74). See “Of Real Heroes...and Realpolitik,” *SAR*, 14, 1 (December, 1998) which both hails Mandela’s visit and ecstatic reception by about 40,000 school children at the Skydome in Toronto (on September 25 1998) but also notes that “it was a bit galling to [see] just who was sitting there preening themselves in the front row of this and other events, politicians and business people who had had little good to say about, and even less help to give to, the ANC during its long years of struggle against apartheid.” Mandela also returned to Toronto to attend a ceremony when, on Saturday, November 17, 2001, the Toronto District School Board officially changed the name of Park Public School in one of the city’s poorer neighbourhoods in order to honour “President Mandela’s legacy and his fight to help those who are less fortunate, [while also recognizing] the rich heritage of the already existing school and its community.”

(75) Neville Alexander, *An Ordinary Country: Issues in the Transition from Apartheid to Democracy in South Africa* (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 2002).

own very real limitations – unless, that is, one were to take the subsequent uncritical adoption, throughout the southern African region, of an extremely dependent and inequitable capitalist mode of production, albeit a relatively “deracialized” one, as marking an impressive degree of liberation.

For those of us who, however much we hailed the overthrow of apartheid, could not quite see things that way, the struggle did indeed continue: *Southern Africa Report*, for example, kept its own flag of resistance to the recolonization of southern Africa flying until 2000. But enough had been done in both South Africa and Canada to confuse and even demobilize the anti-apartheid movement. An account of what was to be the

last meeting of Canada’s nation-wide anti-apartheid movement helps demonstrate this fact. The event? A further (and final) national “Forum” of anti-apartheid activists, entitled “Taking Strides: Towards a Non-Racial Democratic South Africa.” Held in Ottawa in May of 1990⁷⁶ it was organized by IAWGSA/Inter-Agency Working Group on Southern Africa; this body having been established as a committee of the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC) and composed primarily of some twenty NGOs; a steering committee for the forum was one on which both IWAGSA and IDAFSA played, in the persons of Ted Scott and Ann Mitchell, leading roles.

Scott, former Anglican Church Primate and, as noted above, government-appointed to 1985’s Commonwealth Eminent Persons’ Group had, despite his long and honourable history of anti-apartheid work, always been seen by church militants as something of a mixed blessing. True, his commitment to the southern African cause had helped legitimate anti-apartheid work in the eyes of government and parishioners. But it was also testimony to his “acceptability” with government that he now held a number of key positions in the proliferating range of “house” NGOs: he was, in effect, considered the de facto church representative to External Affairs (at least by the government itself), was on the board of the South African Education Trust Fund, president of the IDAFSA, and had ascended, more recently, to be chair of IAWGSA. Moreover, he had remained conservative in his political outlook and something of a “loose cannon” in his political style. Were the benefits he brought to the movement (not least the credibility he lent it) outweighed by his role in helping, however unconsciously, to domesticate it?

As for Mitchell, she was the executive director of IDAFSA, which (as suggested above) had, on her watch, been well known for its rather restrained approach to the Canadian government even in the darkest days of apartheid – whatever other important contributions it may have been making. Moreover, both Scott and Mitchell by the time of the Ottawa meeting were frank to reveal in private conversation their feeling that a “conciliatory” approach to the Canadian government was in order, rather than what they felt to be the old-fashioned “confrontational” approach – this at the

(76) See “The I Love Lucy Show: The ‘Taking Strides’ Consultative Forum, May, 1990,” in *SAR*, 6, 1 (July, 1990). I have drawn extensively on that article in composing the account of the Ottawa meeting presented here.

very moment when the Canadian government had begun to feel most comfortable with a deracialized “false decolonization” of South Africa.

In contrast the other delegates at the Forum were drawn from the full range of NGOs and anti-apartheid groups; moreover, some of the “resource persons” and “facilitators” chosen for the working groups into which the Forum was to break from time to time were amongst the most radical persons in the overall movement. In fact, for this very reason, the Steering Committee briefly entertained the idea of cancelling any participation by such resource people, although this tactic was rejected in favour of warning them, in a most patronizing manner, against “dominating” discussions. Meanwhile, in arranging the opening session the Steering Committee, honoured, appropriately enough, two speakers who had come from the region itself. Yet it could find room for no spokesperson from the Canadian anti-apartheid movement to serve as a third speaker. Indeed, the other speaker chosen by the Committee for the opening panel was Lucie Edwards, the Canadian government’s official “Southern Africanist” (as head of the “Southern African Task Force” of the Ministry of External Affairs!).

Edwards did not say much that had not been heard before. Instead, she presented Canadian sanctions in the most positive light, ignoring statistics that showed trade with South Africa continuing to increase. And she milked the government role in establishing a Mandela Fund for all it was worth, while also suggesting that there was money for “non-political” ANC activities. 77 In short, on the very eve of “victory” in South Africa, many of those in attendance at the Forum felt they were witnessing, simultaneously, a calculated insult to the record that had been established by Canada’s anti-apartheid movement. In fact, for many, as they departed the conference, it was difficult to avoid a feeling that, at best, the movement, created and nourished by grass- roots activists since the late-1960s, was now in serious danger of being carefully and rather unscrupulously domesticated.

True, some critical questions for Ms Edwards did come from the floor at the conclusion of her talk and Peter Mahlangu, the ANC’s representative in Canada who was also at the dais, took the opportunity to query some of her more outrageous claims as to the exemplary nature of Canada’s sanctions performance. There was strong criticism, too, from the next day’s working groups of the decision to give Lucie Edwards such a platform, and the Conference’s steering committee did admit a “mistake” had been made. But the evidence suggests it was more than a mistake. Indeed, something of the ambiguous feelings the movement had towards the roles played both by IWAGSA/IDAFSA and Scott surfaced in the Forum when Edwards herself announced that Scott would be briefing Joe Clark on the Monday following the Forum on the results of its deliberations. Most delegates seemed to feel Scott’s quite arbitrary appointment as sole conference spokesperson to the federal government

(77) Indeed, myself an attendee at the Forum, I was moved, as seen in the previous footnote, to (mis)title the article I subsequently wrote on the sessions, “The I Love Lucy Show” (Ms. Edwards name was actually “Lucie,” not “Lucy”), so smug, self-satisfied and controlled was the opening session (and, indeed, many of the subsequent proceedings).

was not quite adequate as a way of representing the views of the assembled anti-apartheid movement.

In any case, the major loss to the conference was the fact that virtually none of these issues were really debated by the delegates, despite some efforts to introduce them. Perhaps part of this was due to the Forum's structure. In the laudable pursuit of a genuine democratization of the proceedings, emphasis fell upon the six to eight workshop sessions for doing the bulk of the Forum's work. As suggested, in many of these workshops questions about the underlying premises of our activities did surface. But the energy generated in the groups rarely found its way back to the brief plenary sessions interspersed throughout the two full days of the Forum.

It's true that by the end of the conference some momentum had been recouped from the first day. The basic mood of the delegates, particularly from the broad anti-apartheid network and from Canada's regions, was much more sceptical of the Canadian government's southern Africa record and consequently more confrontational than some of the Steering Committee may have wished. In its final communiqué, the Conference did "call on the Canadian government to adopt a clearer and bolder approach in support of democracy in South Africa," including "maintaining and extending the economic sanctions against South Africa; downgrading diplomatic relations with official South Africa and upgrading relations with the ANC and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa." And, as it happened, the Canadian government did stick by (certain) sanctions until 1993 - though perhaps, as noted above, primarily thanks to Nelson Mandela's own request to the Canadian government that it does so. And so - finally and despite the fact that some groups stood firm in monitoring South Africa's difficult transition period to formal non-racial democracy (1990-1994) - the Canadian anti-apartheid movement had now drawn close to its end-point. Was the movement's to be a cry of victory? Or did it pass away, primarily, as a proverbial whimper? It depended a lot on who you thought had won, of course. Unfortunately, the answer to that wasn't quite as clear as one might have hoped it to be. As I have written elsewhere:

We know who lost: the white minorities in positions of formal political power (whether colonially in the Portuguese colonies or quasi-independently here and perhaps in Zimbabwe). And thank fortune, and hard and brave work, for that. But who, in contrast, has won, at least for the time being: global capitalism, the West and the IFIs, and local elites of state and private sectors, both white and black? But how about the mass of southern African populations, both urban and rural and largely black? Not so obviously the winners, I would suggest, and certainly not in any very expansive sense. Has it not been a kind of defeat for them too?⁷⁸

Not that being a supportive party to the end of apartheid and the demise of diverse racist colonialisms had been a small accomplishment. Still, whether in victory

(78) John S. Saul, "Liberation Support and Anti-Apartheid Work as Seeds of Global Consciousness: The Birth of Solidarity with Southern African Struggles" in Karen Dubinsky, et. al (eds.), *New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness* (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2009), p.139-40.

or defeat, the Canadian movement now did slowly evaporate - even though some militants, in bold defiance of the region's "strange death,"⁷⁹ endeavoured to sustain support for a struggle against the recolonization of southern Africa rather longer than others: *South Africa Report*, as noted above, soldiered on publishing until 2000 and some exemplary attempts, notably that by Africafiles/Africa InfoServ (both in cyber-space and in their Toronto home-base) to keep a sense of southern Africa-related possibility alive in Canada, to continue.⁸⁰ The questions raised here are troubling ones, nonetheless, like victory or defeat? The glass of liberation half-empty or half full? Perhaps we will be in a better position to answer them once we have examined the American liberation support/anti-apartheid movement as well. To this task we now turn.

II The United States Front

Much of what has been said about Canada could also be said about United States. Both are explicitly and aggressively capitalist countries and they operate in the wider world to a considerable degree, and particularly through their private corporations, in such a way as to extend their influence in these terms. Taking a position for racial equality was difficult enough in both countries, given their own shared colonial records vis-à-vis their indigenous inhabitants and, especially in the United States, its own history of extreme racist practices (notably vis-à-vis their own black populations). Taking a position in support of gender equality could also be daunting. But taking a position against both the class interests vested in the capitalist system on the one hand, and the "commonsensical" nature of its hegemony in the eyes of most of its domestic population on the other, has been and remains especially challenging.

True, drawing their cue from the southern African movements themselves many (though by no means all) liberation support workers in the United States found their own tendencies towards a left, egalitarian, even socialist, vision of what might be possible and/or necessary components of a real struggle for liberation in southern Africa to be reinforced by the apparent leftward direction of the regional struggle itself. This did give rise to some tensions within the liberation support/anti-apartheid movements of course, tensions that, in both countries, fell along ideological lines: the principled distance between those of liberal as distinct from socialist persuasions as to the nature of the social good for example (a reformed capitalism? socialism?). But there were also tactical differences: what would be a lowest common denominator of shared position upon which effective unity within the liberation support movement could be built, and effective messages, on that basis, then delivered to a broader populace? How might the relative claims to "liberation" – cast in terms of race, class, gender and voice – be balanced, articulated and pursued?⁸¹ How overtly, in particular,

(79) John S. Saul, "The Strange Death of Liberated Southern Africa," *Transformation*, 64 (2007).

(80) See AfricaFiles/Africa InfoServe at infoserv@africafiles.org.

(81) John S. Saul, "Race, Class, Gender, Voice: Four Terrains of Liberation," *Review of African Political Economy* (March, 2010).

should any sense that socialist transformation, either of the sites of struggle in southern Africa or of the countries (the United States and Canada in the present case) in which liberation support was being mobilized, be part of an agenda of shared resistance? Needless to say, the answers to such questions became all the more difficult to define as the countries of southern Africa themselves were themselves seduced and/or beaten away from any more sweeping definition of liberation and eventually ceased to be, in the most obvious of ways, ready points of reference for support-workers, both in the region itself and beyond, who felt that the struggle must continue.⁸²

We have witnessed the wearing effects of such contradictions upon the liberation support/anti-apartheid movement in Canada, the movement, in spite of its “victory,” being effectively neutralized from playing any major long-term role in social transformation and in helping give a more expansive meaning to liberation either at home or abroad. Much the same can be said of the United States. Of course, the latter is a very much larger country with a very much more powerful economy and an even more privileged population and therefore has been, and remains, far more central to the imposition of a “capital logic” upon the world. But both countries do play a similar role. At the same time, and this is the point of the present chapter, both are large enough and diverse enough countries to be home to other voices and other values that claim a say of global resonance, and some of these have been voices that speak out for justice and against exploitation in southern Africa.

True, the US, unlike Canada, has not had the court of the Commonwealth to appear before in order to have its southern African policies judged and put under pressure - although given the US's arrogance of size and purpose it would not necessarily have made much difference if it had had such a point of reference. After all, far more than Canada the US has had the world as its arena and that, by and large, has not made any dramatic contribution towards staying actions that, much more often than not, placed the U.S. firmly on “the wrong side” during most of the period of “the thirty years war for southern Africa.”⁸³

Of course there were other variables at work. As noted (but it bears repeating), the US has been, like Canada, a colonizer and oppressor vis-à-vis the native peoples in the territories it would come to claim so high-handedly as its own. But, as further suggested, it has also had a far larger role than Canada as a slave-holder (largely of peoples of African extraction) and hence had, from the beginning (and despite the Civil War), a much stronger cultural legacy of extreme racism, something that would help shape (most dramatically in the person of President Ronald Reagan) its approach to southern Africa in important ways. This has also meant, however, that there was a potential link to be made between blacks in the United States and those fighting to

(82) John S. Saul, “The Strange Death of liberated Southern Africa” (*op.cit.*).

(83) This in spite of the fact that the U.S. did not have the power to merely dictate outcomes successfully in southern Africa! In Angola, for example, the Angolans (and the Cubans) managed to reduce the role of the United States to that of mere wrecker rather than allowing it to impose its own preferred agenda on that country.

realize the aspirations of African for freedom in southern Africa. Consequently, it was no accident (as we will see below) that among the first and most active proponents of a positive commitment on the part of the United States to a more enlightened stance vis-à-vis southern Africa were militants from the country's African-American community.

Of course, the rising tide of egalitarian domestic demands (the Civil Rights Movement and the like) created an atmosphere in which many whites could also be moved to see and to act upon the obvious parallels with southern Africa. Moreover, significant numbers of Americans, both black and white, were also caught up in a more general mood of resistance both to oppression in general and to the unfettered global reach of white and capitalist America in particular. After all, a good deal of the early militancy of the southern African support movement surfaced during the period of America's overseas actions in Vietnam and elsewhere and of resistance to such activities. Moreover, as popular resistance in southern Africa itself grew from 1960 on and the struggle there became more "real," so too did resistance in the US both to white rule in that region and to America's state and corporate links with it. Moreover, there were other dimensions of struggle to be forged: as mentioned in our earlier discussion of Canada, the freshly assertive women's movement in North America could also find ways to bond with southern African women in campaigns that deepened the overall struggle for liberation more generally. This will have to be part of our story too.

As suggested, there were also real costs to be borne for having to mobilize support for liberation in southern Africa on such stony ground as a corporate, Cold War and semi-racist United States had to offer. As we will see, the first American militants for southern African freedom tended to be of the socialist, even communist, left. This would not prove to be a popular position, as such militants were forced to pay a price for such effrontery both by the US government, and even – thanks to the permeation of red-baiting and Cold War rhetoric – by the relatively passive American public prone, we have argued, to accept a merely "commonsensically" conservative view of the world. Not that this stymied the work of liberation support/anti-apartheid activists. But it did warp it.

For (as in Canada) there was always to be a tension in American southern Africa- related political work as to just how far to push a line deeply hostile to capitalism per se – even though the movement did feel forced, inevitably, to deepen dramatically its range of attacks upon links, both corporate and government, to the structures of white power and capitalist exploitation in the region. Interestingly, much the most vibrant and thorough account of American anti-apartheid work⁸⁴ – that by Bill Minter and Sylvia Hill – ends on an extremely uncritical note, with an unqualified celebration of "victory" in South Africa. Yet Minter well knows things were quite not so simple and

(84) William Minter and Sylvia Hill, "Anti-apartheid solidarity in United States-South African relations: from the margins to the mainstream" in South African Democracy Education Trust (eds.), *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, Volume 3, "International Solidarity," Part 2 (Unisa: University of South Africa Press, 2008).

that there were already clear signs that a “New South Africa” would be under fierce pressure to conform to global capitalism in the brave new world of supposed freedom after 1994. Indeed, in another useful book Minter has edited with Gail Povey and Charles Cobb he gives a much more cautious reading (as I myself did in concluding the preceding section of this chapter) as to just who it was that won the struggle in South Africa.⁸⁵ Still, the complexities of this very issue may, again, provide a useful point of reference as we now turn to assess the victories and defeats of the American support network’s struggles to advance the cause of liberation in southern Africa.

There is, however, one further dimension of complexity that bears noting. For would-be progressives with regard to southern African issues were divided on another count as well. This turned on the manner in which a kind of Cold War-spawned shorthand had come to be employed in order to encapsulate and characterize the chief political and ideological divisions of the world at large. The Soviet Union and Communist China, for all that they were overbearing authoritarian states, also claimed, misleadingly, to be socialist ones as well. Moreover, they could also be presented as hostile powers eager to support “violent extremists” around the world. Eager, in their turn, to defend each and every dimension of their own capitalist projects, domestic and global, the key opinion-makers, of both press and politics, in the United States had the reverse tendency: to present manifestations of both socialist demand and advocacy of armed liberation struggle as being profoundly suspect in Cold War terms. Of course, most liberation support activists were willing to support liberation movements both in their felt need to fight for their freedom and in their often radical demands. But, in consequence, they often found themselves under attack by the wielders of willful Cold War sloganeering.

The United States: Through the 1960s

As suggested above, the beginnings of liberation support in the United States antedate the thirty years war for southern African liberation that began in earnest in the region itself in the 1960s. The most active expression of this political thrust in the

U.S. came from initiatives framed in such a way as to link popular resistance to racial oppression world-wide to a simultaneous interrogation of the class realities of global capitalism – this to include, not least, the white racist supremacy that, at the time, still ruled over virtually all of Africa and not merely its southern region. Efforts to view Africa in such terms were, from the 1930s on, primarily the provenance of black militants (W. E. B. DuBois, Paul Robeson and Alpheus Hunton come most readily to mind); fortunately, the importance of this radical movement has been painstakingly

documented by Penny Von Eschen in her exemplary book *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937- 1957*.⁸⁶

(85) See William Minter, Gail Hovey and Charles Cobb, Jr. (eds.), *No Easy Victories: African liberation and African Activists over a Half Century, 1950- 2000* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2008).

(86) Penny M. Von Eschen, *Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1997).

Equally revealing, however, is Von Eschen's grim account of the Cold War repression, led by the likes of Truman and McCarthy, of any such radicalization. Of course, there can be no doubt that some of the early anti-imperialist crusaders were unduly naïve in their enthusiasm for Stalin's Soviet Union as a bastion of world-wide progressive hopes. But the Cold War anti-communist crusade in the United States was not really about punishing people for political naiveté. Rather, it was designed, quite self-consciously, to exact an ideological conformity from the American population as a whole – with this population's participation in the economic affluence contingent upon capitalist development at home and imperial activity abroad also playing some part, no doubt, in pre-empting the attractiveness of radical questions during the post-war period.

In any case, the fact is that the American state acted in a vigorously "McCarthyite" manner swiftly to pre-empt the possibility that any anti-racist mobilization that might be forthcoming could also, simultaneously, embody anti-capitalist understandings and aspirations. In this campaign of silencing genuinely radical dissent the American state was largely successful, although never entirely so. However, the trajectory followed by Max Yergan, a black activist of considerable direct experience in South Africa who moved from solidarity with left nationalism in southern Africa to the most extreme sort of Cold Warrior perspective, is particularly instructive here.⁸⁷

True, Von Eschen does see the 1960s, and especially the 1970s (no doubt fuelled in part by simultaneous mobilization against the Vietnam war), as a period of recuperation – although only to a limited degree – of the ideological ground lost to Cold War machinations. Yet she also underscores the long-term costs to the black community in the United States of the siege by the right against "anti-imperialist understandings" and against any expressions of scepticism about capitalism. For this ultimately affected negatively, she argues, even domestic agendas, since, as "the inequitable social relations of empire rebounded back home they eventually eroded the situation in the industrial and public sectors where African American workers had made significant gains"⁸⁸

As Van Eschen continues, it is nonetheless the case that the militant assertions of the 1940s did leave some positive residues. For example, "the global vision of democracy developed by Malcolm X, in the 1960s and just before he was slain, embraced anti-imperialism, [and he also] joined forces with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), explicitly linking his internationalism with the fight for civil rights in the United States." Moreover, if, by the end, Malcolm had become ever more radically anti-imperialist in both race and, increasingly, class terms, so too did Martin Luther King. Yet King's fate – as he moved in the 1960s to radicalize the terms of the link he continued to assert between African (and other international) struggles

(87) See David H. Anthony, *Max Yergan: Race Man, Internationalist, Cold Warrior* (New York: New York University Press, 2005); Bayard Rustin, another noted black activist, provides, somewhat later, a not dissimilar case.

(88) See Van Eschen, *op.cit.*, p.187 and also Brenda Gayle Plummer, *Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1969* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996).

and that of blacks in the United States - is even more instructive as to the limits of the acceptable in Cold War America. This too is extremely well documented by Van Eschen: "As King attempted to reconnect the international and domestic politics that had been so thoroughly severed during the Cold War, he was increasingly isolated and chastised, abandoned by both white liberal and black establishment allies." In sum, "the intellectual and political culture and the forms of institutions and alliances necessary to sustain his vision...had been lost in the early Cold War."⁸⁹ Moreover, this history is essential to our understanding of the strength and limitations of the anti-apartheid movement in the United States – and elsewhere.

Of course, as noted, it was sometimes difficult in those days to disentangle anti-imperialist sentiments and understandings from pro-Soviet ones – although, in retrospect it is quite evident that they were very far from being the same thing. Yet the Trumans and the Joe McCarthys were working overtime to blur the lines of this distinction (manipulatively eliding anti-imperialist consciousness exclusively with "Soviet-lining") in the interests of their own reactionary political and economic ends. As a result, as the anti-apartheid movement regrouped for action in the 1960s, it did so on an ever more congealed Cold War terrain and in the context of an ascendant capitalism that made the raising of more systematic anti-imperialist claims neither credible (to most) nor viable - despite their absolute appropriateness.

In the black community this tended to mean that either black-centric cultural nationalism or a kind of liberal reformism became the more common forms that African-focused liberation support took. Yet it was also true that progressive black Americans never lost sight of the saliency of African/southern African issues, with a series of initiatives seeking to give voice to this sensibility. In this regard Willard Johnson, in an eloquent article on the importance of black Americans to the struggle in the United States to support rather than hinder southern African assertions for freedom, name checks a number of pertinent examples of organized effort: the American Negro Leadership Conference, the American Society for African Culture (despite its having, it would appear, a measure of CIA funding), the African Heritage Studies Association, the Congress of African People, The African Liberation Day Committee, and The National Black Political Convention.⁹⁰ He also states (perhaps somewhat overstates) an equally pertinent conclusion:

(89) The quotations in this section are from Penny M. Von Eschen, *op.cit.*, pp.185 and 188-9, where she also quotes, tellingly, from King's February, 1968, address "Tribute of Du Bois by Martin Luther King Jr," as found in Phillip Foner, *W. E. B. DuBois Speaks* (New York: Pathfinder Press,1970). As Von Eschen writes (p.188): "In the last years of his life, Martin Luther King Jr. developed a critique of American capitalist economy and embraced anti-imperialist politics, challenging the United States to address its gross disparities in wealth and condemning its intervention in Vietnam as immoral." For both tactical and other reasons, few activists in the U. S. liberation support/anti-apartheid movement would, subsequently, feel they could go so far.

(90) Willard R. Johnson, "Getting Over by Reaching Out: Lessons from the Divestment and Krugerrand Campaigns," *The Black Scholar*, 29, 1 (1999), p.3. Most of the varied initiatives itemized by Johnson are given somewhat fuller treatment in Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004).

[It] has been rare that African-Americans have been able to lead the rest of American society in determining its general foreign policy stance regarding any issue. But that was one of great achievements of the anti-apartheid movement. Clearly, African Americans came to determine the goals, the means, the timing, even the frame of reference for U.S. policy regarding an issue.

As Johnson admits, such a distinctive and powerful black voice as these various initiatives prefigured, was to find its most effective expressions only later, in the activities of the Black Congressional Caucus from the late-1960s and those of TransAfrica from the late-1970s; to these initiatives we will return in due course. Yet Johnson is also careful to affirm that the black voice had also to be amplified by the parallel white one in order for it to be fully effective in the United States. In short, there was, from the 1950s on, the exemplary building, slow but sure and across racial lines, of a strongly articulated American movement, one specifically directed and with increasing effect against the enormities of racist hegemony in southern Africa.

As we know, in this regard 1960 was itself a crucial year. For it was during that year, and in the immediately succeeding ones, that movements in southern Africa itself either repositioned themselves (the ANC in South Africa) or were created (FRELIMO in Mozambique) in order to take up armed struggle as a necessary component of their pursuit of liberation – this commitment constituting, in and of itself, a significant escalation of things. But 1960 was also the year when the United Nations, in a General Assembly resolution, declared colonialism to be “illegal.” The stage was thus set for some further internationalization and expansion of the constituency in support of the struggle for freedom in southern Africa – as has been well documented elsewhere.⁹¹ This was no less the case in the United States. True, the first wave of southern Africa support may have broken on the reefs of the Cold War but such a movement-in-the-making was far from being exhausted. No doubt it was the case that the energies which now found expression in support of change in southern Africa’s racial order were less “anti-imperialist” and anti-capitalist than were those of, say, Robeson and Du Bois, and less outspoken (less Marxist?) as to any systemic propensity on the part of capitalist America to back the side of the entrenched power-wielders in diverse global settings. Moreover, the support movement in the United States, while quite prepared to take on established capitalist practices that helped entrench oppressive structures of power, could now be said to be most often principally framed by a firm resistance to racism, institutionalized and otherwise, and by a variety of humanist- pacifist sensibilities (if also by a not unreasonable suspicion of Soviet manoeuvres). Nonetheless, importantly, any such overall trajectory did not imply abandonment of a continuing criticism of capital’s propensity to reinforce, in southern Africa, both the class and racial essentials of established power there.

(91) See Robert Kinlock Massie, *Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years* (New York: Doubleday, 1997); Francis Njubi Nesbitt, *ibid.*, and Roger Fieldhouse, *Anti-Apartheid: A History of the Movement in Britain* (London: Merlin, 2005).

Quite the contrary, for the network that emerged in the United States, and at both local and national levels, proved more than willing to confront and oppose the negative role of various American firms directly profiting from the white-dominated territories of southern Africa and from the region's mineral wealth and cheap black labour. Indeed, as often as not, this radical network would seek to force such companies to withdraw from the territories concerned - although this goal, as we will discuss below, was itself sharply contested within the network, notably by advocates of what became known as the "Sullivan Principles." In the main, however, the advocacy of disinvestment campaigns, and the sharp confrontation with corporate America which they entailed, would become a crucial component of liberation support and anti-apartheid strategy in the United States over the decades. Moreover, the emerging movement twinned such activities to an equally assertive confrontation with the negative role (one generally complementary to that assumed by capital) so often played by the American government.

We will want to emphasize, as well, the wide and diverse reach of a movement that had, as its vibrant base, a range of local and regional assertions. As with the Canadian case, we will have to record carefully the full range of this diversity, both geographical and ideological. Once again, as also argued above for Canada, this was in many ways a very real strength of the movement, allowing for a rich and diverse range of assertions outside the imperatives and the control of some overarching organization.⁹² At the same time and much more significantly than in Canada, there were a number of national-level organizations and initiatives that did help to complement such energies by giving the movement a more focused clout both in the key centre of capitalist activity (New York) and at the key centre of political power (Washington). In this regard, no account of the US movement can fail to give prominence to the roles played by the likes of the American Committee on Africa, the American Friends Service Committee and, somewhat later, The TransAfrica Forum to each of which we will have to turn our attention in due course.⁹³

In short, the story of the American movement must be told at different levels with a legitimate focus falling as much on the organizations of national assertion as on the range and diversity of local initiatives. We will now turn to exploring this movement. But note as well that we must be very careful not at the same time to overstate the strength of the American liberation support movement that only became a major player in the 1980s when it was also spurred further forward by events in South Africa itself. True the 1960s and the 1970s were not without significance in their own right, even if they can perhaps best be seen, perhaps as laying the ground-work for the more weighty surge of the 80s to which we will soon turn.

(92) For an account that highlights the local and regional basis of movement self-assertion see Janice Love, *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1985).

(93) In fact, such national organizations form the main focus of David Hostetter, *Movement Matters: American Antiapartheid Activism and the Rise of Multicultural Politics* (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), thereby providing an essential complement to Love's account cited in the preceding footnote.

Meanwhile, back in the 1960s, there did begin to flower - and much more fully than previously - a new kind of national movement linked to African concerns, one that found voice not only amongst black Americans but also in the white community. The American Committee on Africa, based in New York, was the strongest example of this initiative to focus new Africa-related energies. The ACOA actually had its beginnings in the 1950s, growing directly out of an immediately preceding ad hoc initiative, Americans for South African Resistance (AFSAR) established in 1952 to support the ANC's Defiance Campaign. However, AFSAR's mandate was soon generalized in order to now support African anti-colonial efforts elsewhere on the continent, leading quickly to the foundation of ACOA in 1953. A closely-related initiative, the Africa Fund (specified, for tax purposes, as mounting charitable and educational activities) was founded soon after, in 1966. So constituted, the ACOA would remain a vigorous force for southern African liberation from 1953 right up until apartheid ended in 1994.

True, such was the temper of the then Cold War times that the ACOA began by distinguishing itself rather sharply from the "communism" of the CAA (the Council on African Affairs of Robeson, DuBois and Hunton); moreover, and "despite [its] efforts to mobilize African-American activism" and facilitate the involvement of many blacks in its campaigns and activities, it "suffered censure" in the eyes of some critics for "being directed by whites." Nonetheless, under the leadership of, first, George Hauser and, from 1981, that of his tireless successor Jennifer Davis (who had already served as the organization's research director since 1966), the ACOA forged an extremely strong record. As Hostetter summarizes it:

The early coalition of ACOA supporters who gravitated to the emergence of independent Africa matured after the Sharpeville Massacre, March 21, 1960. Though not always successful, ACOA experimented with different arrangements for recognizing the demands of Pan-Africanist activists and cooperating with a variety of black-led organizations. ACOA refined liberal internationalist opposition to apartheid through innovative tactics including pressure for institutional divestment, boycotts, and stock holder resolutions. In doing so, ACOA served as a movement halfway house on an international scale and a movement leader, cultivating specialized allies to further anti-apartheid efforts while providing information and guidance to a national network of localized activism. ACOA grew beyond the expedience of its early anti-communism to a position that emphasized the moral commitment of the civil rights movement to the corresponding struggle against apartheid, thus creating a new blend of transnational advocacy.⁹⁴

The ACOA had other important and direct spin-off effects, and there were also other national organizations that paralleled it in its work. There was, first off, the Washington Office on Africa, so important in servicing Congressional debate as

(94) Hostetter, *ibid.*, p.15; see, especially, ch. 1, "'For the Freedom Struggle is One': The American Committee on Africa."

to the wisdom and propriety of American activities in southern Africa, which was originally an institutional offshoot of the ACOA. Only gradually did it move towards establishing its own, largely church-based, funding base and, under the leadership of such committed activists as, over the years, Ted Lockwood, Jean Sindab and Aubrey McCutcheon, its own more independent status. Meanwhile, engaged in related work, there was the Friends Service Committee, an organization of true national reach that also took a principled interest in southern African developments and of American involvement there.

In this latter case it is worth noting – for it was an issue of more general import – a stormy debate that took place almost from the outset of its involvement in southern African matters within the Friends movement itself. This was the question of the liberation movements themselves and their (quite understandable) choice of violent means (“armed struggle”) to counter the violence employed by whites in power to ensure their continuing racist rule. Note that George Hauser and other early ACOA activists had themselves come from a pacifist background and they themselves only cautiously embraced the reality that the struggle against ruthless racial dictatorship in southern Africa would have to be “violent” in nature, with liberation movements in the region being literally forced by their oppressors to (together with the use of other tactics) take up arms to end their oppression. Such a position was even more difficult for the Friends to adopt – their ethical commitments being premised on non-violence – than for others in the liberation support/anti-apartheid movement. In fact, Hostetter gives a particularly intriguing account of how the Friends – an organization possessed of a network of contacts and of potential sympathizers in quite diverse and scattered areas of the country - processed this issue. Yet not only did many of the Friends begin to move to embrace the liberation struggle imperative, but they also became, once again after much internal debate, supporters of divestment and disinvestment initiatives.⁹⁵

For economic sanctions, especially against South Africa, were beginning, even in the 1960s, to move to centre-stage. Here William Kinlock Massie’s argument, in his magisterial study of the American anti-apartheid movement, is particularly pertinent. He highlights the key role played by George Hauser of the ACOA in defining the terms of an economic campaign that would help make that campaign the centre-piece of the American liberation-support effort. In this regard, he highlights the seminal nature of Houser’s 1966-67 document, “Rationale for the Protest against Banks Doing Business with South Africa” which, in Massie’s opinion, “stand as one of the most succinct arguments for economic disengagement from South Africa.”⁹⁶ For in setting out his case, “Houser advanced a claim that would be hotly debated for the next two decades”:

(95) Hostetter, *op.cit.*, chapter 2, “Liberation in One Organization: The American Friends Service Committee.”

(96) Massie, *op.cit.*, pp.218-219.

If American companies did not withdraw from South Africa, he insisted, American citizens should withdraw from these companies. His [immediate] focus was on closing accounts at banks, but in the next decade the notion would be expanded into divestment, that is, purging stock portfolios of the equities of offending companies. In linking divestment (the sale of stock) to disinvestment (the withdrawal of U.S. firms from South Africa) Hauser outlined the argument that would vex policymakers in thousands of American financial institutions, foundations, universities, religious groups, pension funds, city councils, state legislatures and corporations for the next quarter century. The debate could be simplified into two questions: first, would the disinvestment of American companies lead to the elimination of apartheid? Second, would divestment cause those companies to disinvest? Though Houser acknowledged freely that the [the current] bank campaign by itself was not likely to do either, he believed that, cumulatively, over time, the answer to both questions would be yes.

Already, in the 1960s such thinking began to have resonance, especially, at this stage, amongst the churches. This was extremely significant since their various initiatives in support of such principles, marked the deepening commitment of the churches, with their large constituencies, to the liberation initiative underway in South Africa - and in particular to the push towards active criticism of the role of American corporations in southern Africa. One of the first targets of Hauser and his colleagues was Charles Engelhard, an American entrepreneur with vast mining interests in South Africa. But Engelhard had also “arranged a thirty-million-dollar American bank loan to South Africa and then set up the American-South African Investment Corporation to help shore up the South African economy after the Sharpeville crisis.”

It was a clear step for Hauser and others to then mobilize many church members and students to campaign against the lenders, the banks, themselves, and by 1967 the Methodist Board of Missions, the largest wing of the Methodist Church, had seen fit to yank its deposits from the First National City Bank over this issue. Some churches acted similarly while others, like the United Church of Christ, hemmed and hawed. Thus, the latter body, which appeared close to effective divestment policies in 1969, found their will to so act sapped by the counsel of the very man whom they had themselves recently hired to coordinate such activities, the extremely moderate Howard Schomer. As a result, the church itself did not actually move to fully divest

– half a billion dollars worth - from companies doing business in South Africa until 1985! Despite such occasional setbacks, by 1969 Houser and Davis of the ACOA had (as Massie recounts) planned ambitious steps to compel a consortium of leading banks not to renew a 40 million dollar revolving loan to South Africa:

Houser and Davis enlisted the support of the network of anti-apartheid activists to stop the bank loans. The officers of the Union Theological Seminary, the Methodist Church, The Episcopal Church, the United Presbyterian Church and the United Church of Christ all announced officially that they would withdraw church funds from the banks in the consortium if the loans were renewed. A New York State assemblyman called on the controller of the state of New York to pull out all government accounts.

Nine U.S. congressmen wrote to the bank presidents urging no loan renewal. The bank executives hedged. Suddenly, in late November, officials of the South African government announced that they would not renew their request for the loan. Though the South African spokesman insisted that his government had no further need for the loan, Houser, Davis and the other activists believed that the anti-apartheid forces has scored a significant victory.⁹⁷

Unfortunately, as time would tell, the ACOA had merely succeeded, for the moment, in driving the banks and their morally suspect dealings underground. But the movement would live to fight another day on this issue – as on many other disinvestment/divestment fronts.

On the churches part, such a focusing of effort as their early actions demonstrated very soon led to the establishment, in 1971, of another new national organization of some importance: the Inter-Church Coalition Against Racism (ICCR), quarterbacked, for many years, by Tim Smith. Smith and his colleagues became, in fact, a further set of eloquent champions of both disinvestment and divestment within the churches and beyond, paralleling scrupulous research with imaginative action and “[playing] an important role in supplying research and information to divestment proponents and in securing church cooperation in campaigns to withdraw accounts from banks making loans to South Africa.”⁹⁸ Indeed, it was actually Smith himself who obtained and facilitated the widespread dispersal of hitherto publicly unrevealed information (the “Frankfurt Documents”⁹⁹) on new loans that were being made secretly by both American banks and others to South Africa. And this began another round of vigorous campaigning focused upon banks in the 1970s, one that would produce, by the late 1970s, a broadly-based national network, the Committee to Oppose Bank Loans to South Africa.

Such actions were also forerunners of further action at universities in the 1970s and within local, state and even the federal government in the 1980s. In fact, even in the sixties there were already clear signs of the beginning of campus actions that would become much more prominent as they evolved even more clearly into divestment activities in succeeding decades. Thus, Minter cites significant demonstrations at Madison (where Minter himself was active), Princeton, Cornell, Spelman College and the University of California. Finally, an action at Harvard, as the new decade dawned, was a particularly important harbinger of things to come. It was focused, as were parallel initiatives of the time in Canada, on the role of Gulf Oil that stood alongside the Portuguese in exploiting colonial Angola. At Harvard the demonstrations saw the University’s President Derek Bok dodging and weaving to parry student assertions although also facilitating the taking of some steps by the university’s trustees to question corporate activities in southern Africa more generally. Significantly, the Harvard protests also witnessed the emergence on the liberation support scene of

(97) Massie, *ibid.*, p.250.

(98) Love, *op.cit.*, p.25.

(99) Love, *ibid.*, and Smith, personal communication.

Randall Robinson, an effective student leader of the Harvard campaign, who would become a key figure in the later TransAfrica/Free South Africa initiatives to which we will return.¹⁰⁰

There were other voices as well that were heard over a broad spectrum of fronts of struggle in a country as diffuse as the United States. Many of these were locally-based but multiply-focused initiatives that took southern Africa as the main focus of self-consciously anti-imperialist work. The link to the general mood of the times – notably the hostility amongst many Americans to their country’s war in Vietnam – is palpable. Thus, one of the most impressive documents that sprang from this nationwide assertion was entitled *Race to Power*. Published by a grouping of activists, the Africa Research Group (ARG), that came together in the late-1960s in the Boston/Cambridge area, it noted in its introduction, that

This book was written with the memory that popular ignorance once allowed massive government commitments to go unchallenged until it was too late. We have written this in the hope that Americans will never have to say “It was a mistake to get involved in Southern Africa in the first place, but now that we are there...” The war in Indochina was the world’s major conflict in the 1960s. The growing crisis throughout Southern Africa may come to claim that distinction for the 1970s. Continued White minority domination of that region rigidly confronts the struggles of oppressed African people to regain control over their lives and homelands.¹⁰¹

Carefully scrutinizing, in turn, Portugal’s continuing imperial role in Africa, the Rhodesian situation, and South Africa’s apartheid regime the ARG then documents American capital’s role in the region - while also clearly explaining and supporting the liberation movements’ resort to guerrilla warfare as a necessary means of gaining their freedom and, in a context of global capitalism’s commitment to white power, such movements’ sympathy towards possible socialist development strategies for the future.

Moreover, the ARG was very far from being alone in taking the stance they did. Visits by leading liberation leaders like Amilcar Cabral of (Portuguese) Guinea-Bissau’s PAIGC movement and Eduardo Mondlane of Mozambique’s FRELIMO, highlighted, on the Eastern sea-board (in New York, Washington and Syracuse, where, in fact, Mondlane had once taught), their struggles. Elsewhere in the country parallel initiatives were afoot: at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, for example, and in Los Angeles,¹⁰² these latter being examples of a burgeoning and diverse roster

(100) Minter, in Minter, et. al, *op.cit.*, p.28 and, especially on the Harvard/Bok/Robinson case, Massie, *op.cit.*, p.321-330.

(101) Alan Kellock, Margaret Marshall and others, *Race to Power* (Cambridge, Mass: Africa Research Group, 1971).

(102) I myself remember being invited, sometime in the early 1970s, to speak at a workshop organized by a UCLA student group, which also produced the militant *Ufahamu* magazine. In addition to having more “scholarly” presentations on southern Africa, the workshop was also addressed by community activists, black and Latina, from the L.A. area (as well as by Mohamad Abdul Rahman Baby, who had only recently been released from a Tanzanian jail where he had been held for some time, without formal charge, for allegedly subversive behaviour there in his native country). Two of the community activists, Reverend Al Darch and Deacon Jones engaged us

of assertive discord at the local level that would grow impressively in the following decades. Just as importantly, a group at Union Theological Seminary mounted, in the late 1960s, the South African Committee of the University Christian Movement that became a seedbed of activists who would soon fan out across the country. In fact, two veterans of this same student/church milieu, Tami Hultman and Reed Kramer, would go on, once relocated to North Carolina in 1972, to found and edit the Africa News Service which, along with the New York-based magazine *Southern Africa*, became, for many years, crucial fora of information and action news.

There was one additional front for anti-apartheid work that opened up in the 1960s and that also bears noting: the field of sport. South African activists, who had begun effectively to organize sports-related campaigns in South Africa, had also long noted that South Africa was particularly vulnerable, both practically and psychologically, on this front and that the impact, on South Africa white, male amour-propre in the first instance, of effective international boycotts might be especially dramatic.¹⁰³ Here, either from inside South Africa or, like the indefatigable Dennis Brutus, from exile, organizations like SACOS (the South African Council on Sport) and SANROC (the South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee) did exemplary work in bringing the issue to the international table. Acting militantly against, among other things, international rugby and cricket ties with South Africa, they also moved to put the ostracism of S.A. from the Olympic movement on the agenda.

Now, by the time of the 1968 Games in Mexico (which American sprinters Tommy Smith and Lee Carlos would galvanize with their own symbolic gesture in the name of racial equality more generally), Americans were active on this front too. Jackie Robinson spoke out strongly for the exclusion of South African athletes from the Mexico games Olympic, for example, and a number of American “monitors” of the Games were also present in Mexico City (baseball star Jim Bouton on behalf of the American Committee on Africa for example¹⁰⁴). All so involved thus became part of a growing international chorus, from already liberated Africa and beyond, that would see South Africa expelled from the Olympic Games entirely in 1970.

Not even rugby, by no means a major sport in the United States, escaped the attention of anti-apartheid forces: as Love writes, in 1980-1981 a group called Stop the Apartheid Rugby Tour organized a range of actions of protest against the tour in New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Rochester, Albany, Washington and Racine, Wisconsin, with elected officials in both New York and Chicago even withdrawing previously

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with a lively account of their recent actions in disrupting a Davis Cup match with South Africa. Appropriately, the workshop ended not with some closing plenary but with a march into nearby Westwood where we, the delegates, concluded our proceedings by picketing a local branch of the Bank of America in opposition to the bank's on-going loans to South Africa!

(103) See *Apartheid: The Real Hurdle: Sport in South Africa* (London: International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1982) by Sam Ramsamy, himself a noted South African activist (along with Dennis Brutus and others) on this front.

(104) Francis Nesbitt, *op.cit.*, p.87.

granted permissions to the Springboks to use facilities in their cities.¹⁰⁵ But, much earlier, tennis had already become a key terrain of contestation, albeit with the United States' tennis establishment only reluctantly coming onside with the anti-apartheid international actions that were afoot.

Here the role of black tennis star (and winner of the United States and Australian Opens and Wimbledon), Arthur Ashe, was particularly important. After, somewhat controversially, seeking a visa to South Africa rather than boycotting it (thinking, at the time, that the “demonstration effect” of his presence might make some positive difference) and, on several occasions, being refused one, he then committed himself unreservedly to the boycott cause, while also seeking to ensure the barring of South African participation from the Davis Cup competition. These latter actions had significant resonance, and led to South Africa being barred from the Davis Cup – (although, later, it was readmitted, and then barred again!) Moreover, although South Africa might occasionally juggle its international practices to gain external advantage, “internal sports apartheid,” as Richard Lapchick observed, remained “the same.”

The sports boycott strategy, even when not entirely successful, did help keep the anti-apartheid question visible, of course. However, mention of Lapchick, a vigorous anti-apartheid writer and activist (especially so on the sports front), also raises one final consideration of a more general nature. For anti-apartheid work of the kind he and others were engaged in could sometimes become quite dangerous for those involved. In 1978, for example, he visited the Vanderbilt University in Nashville, Tennessee, to speak out, at a lecture and press conference, against a South African tennis team to soon come to play a Davis Cup tie there. Given the positive reaction from those assembled Lapchick “thought that maybe for the first time in my life I'd done something worthwhile.” However, when he returned to his university office in Virginia late the next night it was not to a hero's welcome:

[My] office was in the school's library which closed at 10:30. At 10:45 there was a knock on the door and I assumed it was the campus police who would routinely check if they saw a light on after the building had closed. But instead it was two men wearing stocking masks who proceeded to cause liver damage, kidney damage, a hernia, concussion, and carved “Nigger” in my stomach with a pair of office scissors.¹⁰⁶ Needless to say, North America would never, even remotely, provide as dangerous a terrain for southern African-related liberation support/anti-apartheid work as did the white-dominated southern African region itself. Yet in North America there were many who, like Lapchick, showed both genuine moral and even physical courage in support of the cause when called upon to do so.

(105) Love, *op.cit.*, p.20.

(106) Richard Lapchick and the Race Against Racism,” as heard on “The Sport Factor,” ABC Radio National, January 21, 2004. See also Lapchick, *The Politics of Race and International Sport* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975).

The United States in the 1970s:

Ambiguous Victories and Signs of Escalation

The 1970s opened in a depressing way on the southern Africa liberation support front. The election of Richard Nixon heralded a severe setback across the board, not least in southern Africa. True, Nixon was not greatly engaged with southern Africa and was prepared to let other conservative politicians take the lead, the most striking example being that of Senator Byrd who became point-man for a variety of vested interests, both racist and capitalist in provenance, that saw in Ian Smith's Rhodesia a racial tyranny worth defending. The racist dimensions of Rhodesia's support in the United States is well-documented in all its diversity in Gerald Horne's chapter (3) on

“White (Cultural and Ideological) Power” in his *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War Against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980*.¹⁰⁷ The economic dimensions of such support are even more revealing, demonstrating as they do the bed-rock

economic interests that tied the United States, more often than not, to the wrong side, in Southern Africa - while linking up closely with Cold War and racist themes and prejudices with complementary resonance of their own.

For Nixon's predecessor in the presidency, Lyndon Johnson, had sought to lend support to Harold Wilson's attempt to tame UDI in rogue Rhodesia by means of sanctions - with himself ratifying an array of such sanctions on behalf of the United States. Clearly, this was at some short-term cost to the interests of those American companies that had mining interests in Rhodesia. Enter Senator Byrd - himself a southern senator with no very enlightened views on race matters - to champion the cause of such corporate interests, and, simultaneously, to thumb his nose at the United Nations under whose auspices some of the (fairly modest) sanctions upon Rhodesia stood. His was to be an amendment designed in the first instance to facilitate the import of chrome, but one that, in the event, cleared the way for entry of a much wider array of incoming metals: Of course, Byrd, while tacitly wearing his white supremacy colours in doing this, was much more verbal about his Cold War preoccupations. After all, wouldn't the isolation of Rhodesia put the Soviet Union in the driver's seat as the unchallenged world leader in chrome production and export?

Of course, on all these fronts Byrd was tapping into the deepest and dirtiest mud-sills of American politics: the world inhabited by the likes of Senator Jesse Helms into whose hands so much of this “controversy” played. For Helms, a staunch and politically powerful conservative and a fiery Cold Warrior of note was also a

dedicated racist who supported white minority rule in southern Africa *on principle*. Helms made his position entirely clear on any number of occasions, even arguing at the time of Rhodesia's UDI (1965) that “It's a good thing there was no United Nations at the time when Patrick Henry and some other rebellious souls decided to declare

(107). Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: The United States and the War against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001).

the independence of a new nation back in 1776.” What, he wondered aloud, about those “African tribes in the back bushes of Rhodesia that have no knowledge of or appreciation for civilized society. If that absurd position had prevailed in 1776, the American Indians would own and be running America today.”

As Gerald Horne notes, “it was such coarse racial appeals that catapulted Helms into the U.S. Senate in 1972,” from which position he would, like others of his ilk (Senators Strom Thurmond and James Eastland for example), be a firm spokesman for institutionalized racism in southern Africa for several decades. Indeed, fifteen years later at the time of Zimbabwean transition to independence in 1979 he could “joke” that “the new president of one of these [African] countries was elected [not long ago] after he finished his [jail] term for eating his mother-in-law.” Moreover, even if this ugly jest did come from a Senator from the “White South,” there was much at least tacit sympathy with such thinly veiled hatred of black assertions elsewhere in the country that could not be ignored. And there was the kind of Cold War frame of reference highlighted by Thurmond’s own attack upon sanctions against Rhodesia as “a sad moment” and “a vicious vendetta,” as well as being “anti-American and anti-capitalist”!¹⁰⁸

In short, the American policy process over Zimbabwe was a nasty mess, though one for which there were just too few activists, and too little public awareness, to actively redress. As Minter admits, such efforts as were made in the 1960s and 1970s on certain fronts of several struggles for a free southern Africa – as regards Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe certainly but also Portugal’s African colonies - were, at best, intermittent. Nonetheless, he does grant that

The ACOA and the Washington Office on Africa worked with both congressional allies and longshoremens to try to block imports of Rhodesian chrome. Journalists from Southern Africa magazine and African News Service exposed the involvement of U.S. companies in providing Rhodesia with oil and helicopters. Both ZANU and ZAPU fostered support groups in cities around the United States. In 1979 Congress came close to lifting sanctions, after Ian Smith successfully persuaded Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Congregational pastor Ndabaningi Sithole to break with other nationalists and serve in token roles in his white minority regime. Nevertheless, most U.S. church people involved with southern Africa, with multiple ties to the liberation movements and their own sources of information, stood firm for keeping sanctions.

Yet, Minter concludes, “the scattered efforts of activists still added up to [having] only marginal impact on national public debate or policy regarding Zimbabwe.”¹⁰⁹ Moreover, he sees this to have been at least as true as regards popular support for the struggles in Portugal’s African colonies, to which we will return below. Thus,

(108) The quotations in this paragraph are all taken from Horne, *ibid*, pp.144 and 151.

(109) Minter, *op.cit.*, p.35; however Minter also adds that “this history has been little researched.” See also Anthony Lake, *The “Tar Baby” Option: American Policy Towards Southern Rhodesia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976).

although some voices were raised, it was only with the ascension of Jimmy Carter to the presidency, Cyrus Vance as Secretary of State, and, during the period in which he served as Ambassador to the UN, Andrew Young (a former associate of Martin Luther King), that they were really heard. For now Carter saw to the congressional repeal of the Byrd Amendment, while Young in particular helped the administration avoid being lured, by rightist congressional pressure, into support for any so-called “internal solutions”(Muzorewa and the like) being proposed for Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Only thus did some kind of sanity return to American policy circles on this issue and the Rhodesian episode in American politics reached its conclusion.

As it happens, the exact role of the Carter administration in helping facilitate the independence of Zimbabwe is open to debate.¹¹⁰ No doubt the overall impact of global sanctions against Smith’s regime, however spotty their implementation may have been, also played some role in shaping the outcome there. Nonetheless, the issue was settled principally on the battlefield in Rhodesia as both ZANU and ZAPU, the key liberation movements, slowly but surely gained the upper hand. What is of most interest in American terms, however, is that Robert Mugabe of ZANU, much more of a “race-man” and ideological free-floater than his rival Joshua Nkomo (the latter’s ZAPU being quite vaguely and circumstantially aligned with the Soviet Union), won rather greater support than did Nkomo from African-American middle-class influentials of the time, a reflection of the hegemony of both Cold War nervousness and, as Horne suggests, of African-American “cultural nationalism.”

In any case, in Zimbabwe itself Mugabe soon swept to power (in 1979) in the first free election in Zimbabwe, in part by ruthlessly playing the ethnic card (Shona vs. Matabele!). Later Mugabe also orchestrated a “development” policy of Zimbabwean subservience to the World Bank – and when the hardships of that black elite-driven policy ran up against seemingly intractable opposition from civil society organizations inside Zimbabwe itself Mugabe and the Zimbabwean political elite merely became increasingly more authoritarian in their rule - while also, most opportunistically, taking a much more overtly racist (ostensibly around the land question) and, rhetorically, “anti-imperialist” stance in an apparent effort to arrest Mugabe’s failing credibility.

This latter ploy did not work at home, but it is perhaps some index of his previous success in winning a kind of culturally assertive support in the U.S. that, at a gala 2000 Washington dinner in his honour (an evening of homage to the African dictator that is pungently described by Horne¹¹¹), and one well attended by dignitaries from his long-time African-American constituency, he could still be singularly lionized. It was left to the dissenting voice of, among others, Bill Fletcher, well-known black

(110) Horne’s case is made in his book, cited above; Andrew de Roche takes strong and explicit issue with Horne in the introduction (p.4) to his own book that tracks, historically, US-Zimbabwe relations and is entitled *Black, White and Chrome: The United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998* (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2001). Both books are well worth reading.

(111) Horne, *op.cit.*, p.285.

trade-unionist, liberation support activist, and, in the new century, TransAfrica Forum president, to put all this in proper perspective. Thus, in an article in the *Black Commentator* (2006) entitled “My friends are being tortured in Zimbabwe” he made clear that Mugabe was not a leader to be uncritically supported by anyone in the U.S. who wished Zimbabwe well.¹¹²

Nonetheless, the key issue had, all along, been the tacit support for Byrd – and Rhodesia – shown by the Nixon Administration, a rightward tilt that was now further echoed in Nixon and Kissinger’s policies across the southern African sub-continent. For their part, Kennedy and Johnson, while not necessarily active enthusiasts for Portuguese colonialism, had been quite prepared to let geo-political considerations (NATO solidarity and the presumed strategic importance of the Azores mid-Atlantic airbase) trump any concerns they might have had about the obscenities of Portugal’s continuing colonial presence in southern Africa (namely in Mozambique and Angola). The Nixon team had an even more unvarnished reasons for following the same passive line towards Portugal, reasons spelled out in its National Security Memorandum #39 (1969-70) on southern Africa policy more generally. For of the possible regional scenarios spelled out there the one adopted by Nixon and Kissinger as springboard for their policies asserted quite baldly that the dominant white autocracy [in the Portuguese colonies, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa] is “here to stay in southern Africa”!¹¹³

To be sure, other Americans had been trying to say otherwise, both about southern Africa generally and about Portugal in Africa, for some time – albeit with limited success. Nonetheless some energies did stir in effective ways, a notable contribution to enlightenment and popular mobilization being Bob Van Lierop’s exemplary film

on Mozambique – *A Luta Continua*. This was also a much used resource in Canada as we have seen, but in the U.S. too it became an even more standard point of reference for sowing solidarity in the United States - with Van Lierop himself and other activists like Prexy Nesbitt¹¹⁴ and Stephanie Urdang (both writing and speaking about novel

(112) Bill Fletcher, “My friends are being tortured in Zimbabwe,” *Black Commentator.com* (November 16, 2006). Fletcher’s continued commitment to clear thinking about Mugabe has taken courage: he and “a number of other African American individuals” have “come under attack for our public criticism of Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe and his repressive regime” - unfortunately, he writes, “some African American activists who have been outstanding champions of the struggle for national liberation thought it was, at best, inappropriate and at worst treasonous”!¹ Also of relevance here are Fletcher and Salih Booker, “Statement Released by TransAfrica,” including “Open Letter to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe” signed by eight such leaders (all with important institutional standing), and also Fletcher’s own statement, as a then-President of TransAfrica Forum, “Why We Spoke Out On Zimbabwe,” *ChickenBones: A Journal for Literary and Artistic African-American Themes* (2003); and Fletcher, “Mugabe Sworn in Officially... Simultaneously Loses His Legacy,” *Black Commentator.com* (July 3, 2008).

(113) A revealing gloss on NSSM #39, and compiled in response to it, was eventually obtained and published in the UK, under the editorship of Barry Cohen and Mohamed El-Khawas as *The Kissinger Study on Southern Africa* (Nottingham: Spokesman Books, 1975).

(114) See Prexy Nesbitt, “Towards Understanding National Liberation Movements: Conclusions and Otherwise,” *Africa Today*, 19, 4 (Autumn, 1972).

gender-based assertions in Portuguese-controlled Africa¹¹⁵) becoming widely-travelled expositors of FRELIMO's cause throughout the US.

In addition, as Minter further suggests, FRELIMO representative Shafrudine Khan, based in New York from 1969-75, "reached out effectively to black and white constituencies." It is not surprising, therefore, that "many new groups did get involved in the period, from the Committee for a Free Mozambique in New York to the Committee for the Liberation of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau in Chicago and the Southern African News Collective in Washington.." Still, Minter concludes, "Solidarity with the movements fighting Portuguese colonialism never gained mainstream media attention," not least because (as he puts it) of the absence of, "any ideological or rhetorical formulas for transplanting [the image of] a revolutionary united front [as existed in Mozambique] from an African to an American environment."¹¹⁶

True, the American government itself waffled, torn, as suggested above to have been the case for Kennedy, by the tension between a sense of the redundancy of Portugal's archaic colonialism on the one hand and the strategic and Cold War imperatives of such pawns as the Portuguese controlled Azores mid-Atlantic air-base on the other.¹¹⁷ For no-one, not Kennedy or Johnson, not Nixon or Kissinger, could quite foresee how rapidly military defeat and collapse of the Portuguese empire (in 1974) were coming. In consequence, and as was also the case for Canada, when FRELIMO officially celebrated Mozambique's freedom from Portuguese colonialism in 1975 representatives from among liberation support activists were invited to represent the United States at independence day and not the American government.¹¹⁸

In Angola, the story was more complicated. The MPLA (much the most serious and least compromised of Angola's three leading liberation movement's) proved – and very much unlike their FRELIMO counterparts - no more adept in actively winning supporters in the US than it had been in Canada. There were voices to be heard however, and, already in the 1960s, there was, for example, that of Don Barnett. Barnett - author, with Roy Harvey, of an important book on Angola based, in part, on

(115) See Stephanie Urdang, *A Revolution within a Revolution: Women in Guinea-Bissau* (Somerville, Mass: New England Free Press, 1969) and her *And Still They Dance: Women, War and Struggle for Change in Mozambique* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989).

(116) Minter, *op.cit.*, p.31.

(117) See Jose Freire Antunes, *Kennedy and Salazar: o leão e a raposa: 1961* (Lisbon: Difusao Cultural, 1992); Jose Freire Antunes, *Nixon: promesas e abandonos: 1969-1974* (Lisboa: Difusao Cultural, 1992; and Whitney W. Schneidman, *Emerging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire* (Lanham, Md: University Press of America, 2004), with carefully researched chapters on, in turn, the roles of Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Kissinger's vis-à-vis Lusophone Africa. Little is said in Schneidman's book about the saliency of any strong or active American voices in support of the voices of liberation in the African colonies.

(118) It bears noting, however, that the South Africans seemed to take Reagan's election and his rabid anti-communism as a cover for their own launching of raids upon Maputo, Mozambique's capital, and escalation of other destabilization activities against Mozambique via their Mozambican cat's-paw (inherited from the Rhodesians), RENAMO. Indeed the South Africans became very adept at framing their aggressive policies against both Mozambique and Angola, policies they based exclusively on regional calculations as to how best to defend white supremacy in their own country, in Cold War terms massaged for Washington's own consumption – the better to sustain the latter's continuing support.

their own visit with MPLA to the country's liberated areas¹¹⁹ - launched the Liberation Support Movement (LSM), focused primarily on a US constituency though based, for its own tactical reasons, in the Canadian province of British Columbia. The LSM's published interviews with MPLA cadres and its pamphlets on the southern African struggle more generally were well circulated. Nonetheless, Angola surfaced as a particularly important issue only in the late-1970s and then, as we will see, primarily as a point of contestation amongst more establishment politicians. By then the issue had become whether, in a post-Vietnam context, there was any more merit to America's Cold War-driven adventurism in Angola than there had been in Vietnam? For American intervention in Angola there certainly was – and that of a particularly ugly and dramatic kind – as underscored in an important book (entitled *In Search of Enemies*¹²⁰) by John Stockwell, the former head of a CIA operation who had then firmly turned against his erstwhile employers. The CIA's operation closely linked to similar undertaking by the South African military, its goal was to overthrow the MPLA which had now moved into positions of formal power in Angola and to support, first, Holden Roberto's FNLA but, ultimately, Jonas Savimbi and his UNITA movement, in doing so. In such a context, some American "civilians" found space for active resistance, informed academics like Gerry Bender and John Marcum for example who spoke out, alongside Stockwell, against American policy at a congressional hearing of the time. At the same time, some, within the black American community, were put off by the MPLA's stern mien and found themselves jollied (in part thanks to an extremely expensive PR campaign on behalf of UNITA in the U.S.) into support of the charismatic Jonas Savimbi – although it soon became entirely clear that he was both Pretoria's and Washington's man in Angola, and a tyrannical one to boot.

But it was the Congressional players themselves, notably Dick Clark, a Democratic Senator from Iowa, who took control and were able to oversee an amendment (the "Clark Amendment" as it became known) to the U.S. Arms Control Act of 1976, one that forbade any American aid to private groups engaged militarily in Angola, an amendment that for some years thereafter stood against the most outrageous of American interventions in Angola.¹²¹ True, Clark's guiding premise was primarily an assertion of Congressional power vis-à-vis the imperial presidency (and thus reflected as well a sober backlash against another possible Vietnam-style American overseas adventure) rather than indicating any deeper understanding of the moral perils of siding with South Africa in the ongoing war for southern Africa. Moreover, the Clark Amendment was seized upon by Reagan and the ultra-right as a symbol of American weakness in the Cold War and was eventually repealed during Reagan's watch as

(119) Don Barnett and Roy Harvey, *The Revolution in Angola: MPLA, life histories and documents* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1972).

(120) John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: Norton, 1978); Stockwell is identified on the cover as "Former Chief CIA Angola Task Force."

(121) Although Jane Hunter does note, in her book *Israeli Foreign Policy: South Africa and Central America* (Boston: South End Press, 1987), that, at Kissinger's urging, Israel then stepped in as a key arms supplier to the contras in Angola.

President (July, 1985) – this move further contributing to the fearful destruction that the MPLA/UNITA war (and the legacies of U.S./South African arrogance) would inflict upon an independent Angola up to the very end of the century.

But what about South Africa itself? Having not been able to become a major player in affecting the fates of Zimbabwe and Angola, the anti-apartheid movement was determined to become such a player with respect to the outcome in this last redoubt of white autocracy. In this it would succeed. Of course, the basis of such success had been laid in the 1960s with the birth of the divestment/disinvestment strategy and the beginnings of a movement, especially within various church settings, to give life to that strategy. Now, in the 1970s and in part fuelled in the latter part of the decade by events (Soweto!) in South Africa itself, student anti-apartheid activism and trade union assertions became a more prominent part of the anti-apartheid mix. To these fronts we will return. But first it is important to note that all was not clear sailing on the counter-corporate front, even amongst some who were willing to concede that the issue of apartheid in South Africa could not merely be ignored.

Here the person of the Reverend Leon Sullivan steps into the spotlight. A Philadelphia-based pastor he was plucked by General Motors to become a member of its board when that corporation began itself to come under fire from various activists for the role played by its subsidiary in South Africa. Now, as the anti-apartheid movement and disinvestment campaign in the United States began to grow, Sullivan sought to offer, from within the bowels of American capitalism, a “reformist” approach to the issue – one that would prove to have great rhetorical resonance (though little real positive effect) within the corridors of corporate power for some years to come. Here the key ingredient was a “Code of Conduct,” a kind of self-denying ordinance, designed, it was said, to guide and monitor the conduct of corporations. It would soon become known, upon their formal promulgation in 1977, as the “Sullivan Principles.”¹²² In fact, as Gay Seidman correctly concludes, and despite the two decade struggle by Sullivan and other reformist-minded critics to pressure corporations to abide by the “Principles” they “had little demonstrable effect on the ending of apartheid and were open to abuse.”¹²³

They did have more effect in deflecting attention from the main issue, however, becoming, in effect, “corporate camouflage,” as Betsy Schmidt shows them to be in her trenchant expose not only of the Sullivan Principles themselves but also of the half-hearted manner in which, in the 60s and into the 70s, most American corporations present in South Africa implemented them (if at all). Indeed, as South African journalist John Marquard (as quoted in Schmidt) summarized the situation as of 1979: “The pressures to get out of South Africa, coming from student and church quarters in particular, are staggeringly strong. And from what I can see there is only one stumbling block to the dominance of this point of view. That stumbling block is

(122) These are described and discussed in Massie, *op.cit.*, p.408 *et passim*.

(123) See Gay Seidman, “Monitoring Multinationals: Lessons from the Anti-Apartheid Era,” *Politics and Society*, 31 (2003); (p.26).

the Reverend Leon Sullivan”!124 In any case, it was quite evident to most serious anti-apartheid activists of the time that even in the unlikely event that some mild reform to American corporate practices in South Africa were it to be achieved, this could in no real way qualify the substantive impact of vast investments from abroad on the white power side of the equation in South Africa. Thus, as Massie writes,

George Hauser and Jennifer Davis at the American Committee on Africa instantly attacked the principles as “an exercise in triviality.” They argued that the workplace reforms, even if they could be implemented, could not make up for the massive material, financial and psychological support American corporations provided to the South African government. ‘There is no demand for any fundamental change in the structure of apartheid, no demand for black political rights...,’ wrote Davis a month after the announcement [of the Principles]. As a result, she concluded, “there is no way that a continued U.S. corporate presence in South Africa can serve any purpose except to reinforce white rule.”125

“Tim Smith and the members of ICCR substantially agreed with Hauser and Davis,” continues Massie, but Smith also felt that the “differences between ICCR and Sullivan could be used to increase pressure on corporate executives.” Accepting the spirit of the Principles Smith in turn obtained Sullivan’s agreement to raise certain more structural questions about apartheid with company executives. Not too surprisingly, corporate response to both the posing of such broader questions and also to the actual implementation of his own Principles were to bring Sullivan – albeit some years later (in 1987) - to admit the marginal impact his own “Principles” had had. In fact, at that point, he announced that “he now supported total U.S. corporate withdrawal from South Africa, a breaking of diplomatic ties and a U.S. trade embargo”! To this Jennifer Davis, a few days later, merely responded, “the last fig leaf has been stripped from U.S. corporations.”126

But this final concession from Sullivan still lay some distance in the future; his modestly reformist approach would certainly trouble the movement in the interim. Yet the main thrust of the movement’s programme would not be derailed. Churches were still engaged in debating and acting upon the issue, but the worker and student activist fronts were also heating up. Take, first, the trade unions. At the very outset of the decade a particularly resonant move was made against Boston-based Polaroid, targeting its involvement in South Africa (not least in servicing the country’s security grid) and begun by two of the company’s African American employees (who launched the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers’ Union). Leaned on savagely (including a firing) by the company, the two activists (Ken Williams and Caroline Hunter) had

(124) Elizabeth Schmidt, *Decoding Corporate Camouflage: U.S. Business Support for Apartheid* (Washington and Amsterdam: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980). The Marquard quote is from *The Johannesburg Star*, March 31, 1979 (in Schmidt, p.14).

(125) Massie, *op.cit.*, p.409.

(126) To which Tim Smith of ICCR added, “U.S. companies remaining in South Africa are really standing in a morally exposed position right now.” Reference to Sullivan’s 1987 position, as well as the quotations from Davis and Smith in this paragraph, are to be found in Massie, *op.cit.*, p638.

nonetheless launched, with some success, what Willard Johnson describes as “the first popular campaign to put pressure directly on a corporation regarding its involvement in South Africa.”¹²⁷ Such sentiments were also apparent in the aforementioned refusal of many shipyard workers to offload Rhodesian chrome along the Eastern seaboard in the early 70s. Meanwhile, “militant black employees [were] now making life hard for IBM, Dodge, Ford, Chrysler and General Electric” as regards the southern Africa issue.¹²⁸

Even more dramatic was the growth of student activism. Already, in the 1960s, there were stirrings on this front - but in the 1970s it continued. True, as Philip Altbach argued, during much of the 1970s campuses were more quiescent than they had been during the 1960s and the years of civil rights and Vietnam War (and anti-draft) protests. Yet Altbach admits in a seminal article on the decade that, against the main tendency towards student “apathy” that he seeks to capture in his essay, “students in California and in several other parts of the United States have protested against American policy in Southern Africa and against the investment policies of universities in particular” - although he then adds, quite erroneously in light of what was to become of anti-apartheid assertions in the 1980s, that “although these demonstrations resulted in several hundred arrests, they led to no lasting movement and were confined to a small number of campuses.” Nevertheless, he does conclude that “significantly, the only issue to arouse even modest concern on campus is Southern Africa, which is the most clearly moral question in contemporary American foreign policy.”¹²⁹

Alongside the Harvard actions and others mentioned earlier, and as also spurred on by the crushing in Soweto of South Africa’s own student protests, a much more wide-spread and assertive campaign of American students began to call on their universities to actually divest themselves of southern Africa-related holdings: “As a result of both strategic analysis and frustrated trial and error, the student activists of the late 1970s again focused on the investment practices of their universities.”¹³⁰ Those at Hampshire College in Massachusetts were the first, in 1977-78, to win complete divestment, but many similar struggles were in train. Thus, in 1978, Princeton students capped a twenty-seven hour sit-in at Nassau Hall with a bus trip to New York to hold a dramatic rally in front of the stock exchange there, while at such diverse sites as Columbia, Smith College, Stanford (where some 300 were arrested), Wesleyan University, Cornell and the like other actions burst out. And at Harvard too the university’s administration continued to twist and turn under the lash of student protest and real student pressure. In sum, there was anti-apartheid success in many places beyond Hampshire College, with the “total divestments by [U.S.]

(127) Johnson, *op.cit.*, p.6.

(128) Jonathan Steele, “White Mammon’s Burden,” *Guardian* (U.K.), July 21, 1971.

(129) Phillip.G. Altbach, “From Revolution to Apathy – American Student Activism in the 1970s,” *Higher Education*, 8, 6 (Nov., 1970), pp.615-6, 624.

(130) Minter, p.36.

universities jumping to more than \$25 million a year in 1978 and 1979.”¹³¹ And in all of this, it should be noted, the ACOA played an important role too, helping provide the intellectual infrastructure for many such initiatives and by the 1980s employing Dumisane Kumalo, an exiled South African (later to become SA’s Ambassador to the United Nations once the ANC had finally come to power in its own country!), to serve as a link man, nation-wide, to help service this growing divestment movement. Meanwhile fresh initiatives were stirring, emerging quite specifically from within the African-American community itself. Not that a distinctive African-American voice had gone entirely unheard in the wake of the suppression of the CAA described above. We have mentioned the positions taken by Malcolm X and Martin Luther King, and also, following the leads of Willard Johnson and Francis Nesbitt, the range of admirable, albeit somewhat more transitory, initiatives that sprang from within the black community itself throughout the entire period since the CAA’s high water mark. And, of course, there were many blacks active in the various national movements mentioned above (in the ACOA for example). Now, however, things began to escalate even more dramatically. The civil rights movement of the 1960s had begun to throw up not only a revitalized black consciousness as a national reality, but also a much wider cadre of African American legislators, not least in Congress itself. It was thus no accident that in Congress organized action vis-a-vis southern Africa began to make itself felt.

Here the key player was Charles Diggs, of African American background, who was Representative from Illinois, first elected to Congress in 1954.

As Nesbitt writes, he made apartheid one of his top policy concerns from the outset. He was the founding chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus, and became the first black chairman of the House Sub-committee on Africa in 1969. Diggs and CBC led many congressional inquiries into U.S. policy on southern Africa that gave anti-apartheid activists the opportunity to address Congress on the issue. He served on the Foreign Relations Committee for over twenty years, became the committee’s expert on Africa, and established relations with the leaders of newly independent African states. Nicknamed “Mr Africa” by colleagues, Diggs became apartheid’s most powerful opponent in the U.S. congress. Reuter’s correspondent Raymond Hearst wrote that Diggs had turned his position in the Foreign Relations Committee into the main channel for anti-apartheid pressures.¹³²

Already, by 1969, he had taken a trip, as part of a congressional delegation, to southern Africa, the delegation deciding to avoid South Africa itself because of the degrading restrictions that that country proposed to place on the movements of both Diggs and the other black member of the congressional team. Reporting back on the trip, Diggs and a white Representative, Wolff, from New York (who had himself been

(131) Once again, Massie, *op.cit.* (Part Three, “The Challenge to Legitimacy, and Part Four, “Accommodation and Rebellion” [chapters 6 to 11]), is an important source on actions that occurred during the 70s, especially at Columbia, Princeton and Harvard (see especially pp.433-442).

(132) Francis Nesbitt, *op.cit.*, p.74 *et. passim*.

granted an unrestricted visa!), argued for “a new U.S. policy on southern Africa that recognized the legitimacy of the African liberation movement, for ‘time and history is on the side of revolutionary forces.’” It was in that spirit that Diggs and the growing membership of his Congressional Black Caucus would continue to work throughout the 1970s – repeatedly challenging the Byrd amendment, for example, and raising many other questions.

Moreover, there was also an emergent group of black American intellectuals who met first in Puerto Rico in 1972 to discuss, among other things, American/southern African relations and to coordinate their activities; by 1975, with Diggs encouragement, they had moved to establish the Black Forum on Foreign Policy. But they did not stop there, recognizing, with Diggs, that a vibrant black lobbying voice was also needed that could mobilize opinion, particularly black opinion, and could focus popular energies and political pressure on southern African-related issues. The circumstances, in the immediate wake of the Soweto uprising and its brutal repression by the apartheid government, were certainly ripe. And the launching of TransAfrica was the result. Indeed, as Nesbitt writes, “TransAfrica would succeed where the CAA had failed because of the high level of black consciousness, the presence of a critical mass of African Americans in Congress, and the mobilization of black leadership on the question of South Africa.”

Nesbitt then cites Willard Johnson, one of its founders, who further affirms that “the impetus for the formation of TransAfrica came from the sustained mobilization of African-American groups through the 1960s and early 1970s, combined with the dramatic success of the armed struggles in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau and the intensification of the struggle in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. [For] the revolutionary movements in southern Africa had a major impact on African-American activists... [contributing to] a resurgence in pan-Africanist thought.”¹³³ And the impact would be crucial; as Hostetter also summarizes the TransAfrica story: Based in Washington, D. C., TransAfrica grew from a mandate established by the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), as the African-American lobby group for African and Caribbean concerns. Led by activist lawyer [the aforementioned] Randal Robinson, TransAfrica represented a coming of age for African-American involvement in foreign policy. Utilizing a network of black elected officials to mobilize opposition to policies favourable to apartheid, TransAfrica combined high profile direct action in Washington, DC, with grassroots lobbying and support from other prominent African-Americans, TransAfrica conveyed Pan-Africanist concerns with a politically viable voice, positioning itself to take advantage of the political space

(133) Francis Nesbitt, *ibid.*, p.99; as Nesbitt continues, TransAfrica (which would become the most important lobby for Africa ever created by African Americans” and, in his judgment, “its emergence marked a turning point in the anti-apartheid movement and signaled the coming of age of African Americans in foreign policy.” More generally, Nesbitt’s ch. 5, entitled “TransAfrica,” bears reading.

created by the legacy of the civil rights movement and the 1984 presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson.¹³⁴

With Robinson's leadership, and with the TransAfrica vice-chair, the famed singer Harry Belafonte, also playing an important role, TransAfrica fought effectively - both against any further softening of the Carter administration's wavering stance and against the Senate's temptation to call off sanctions against Rhodesia prematurely

- against the last minute manoeuvring by Smith, Muzorewa and others to ward off any real transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe.¹³⁵ True, the 1970s also saw a less "middle-class" (to use Nesbitt's descriptor of TransAfrica) and more militant surge of other African Americans (like Stokely Carmichael) in the several African Liberation Day marches of the decade, but, with time, TransAfrica would move to the streets as well with its sponsorship of the important Free South Africa Movement of the mid-80s. Moreover, by 1980 TransAfrica and over three hundred other organizations around the country had already adopted the "National Black Agenda," one that called on the U.S. government to "sever all economic, diplomatic, political and cultural ties with South Africa."¹³⁶

The stage was thus set and ground was well laid, in both the black and white communities in the United States, for an even more dramatic surge of resistance to apartheid in the 1980s. True, by the end of the 70s (as Minter admits), and despite real "achievements," "the means to turn anti-apartheid support into sustainable solidarity with Africa continued to elude activists." Moreover, other aspects of the general situation were far from being entirely in the anti-apartheid movement's favour. For there was, at the very same moment, the emergence, in the person of Ronald Reagan, of a conservative, even racist, politics at the very highest and most influential levels of power. Nonetheless, there was now to be a major confrontation on the national stage - one that would finally consolidate an ever more meaningful anti-apartheid movement and also help produce, in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986, a rather startling outcome.

The United States in the 1980s (to 1994): The Sanctions Struggle and After

To summarize: two conflicting strands of American theory and practice about southern Africa were now to come into head-on confrontation during the 1980s. One was a burgeoning anti-apartheid movement, with principles that were, variously, either quite left-wing or more cautiously liberal in provenance, but with activists across the spectrum nonetheless united in shared moral outrage at racist rule. This

(134) Hostetter, *op.cit.*, p.66; Hostetter's useful chapter (4) on TransAfrica is entitled "Black Power on Embassy Row: TransAfrica." For a tracing of Robinson's own career of continued activism from Harvard days on see Francis Nesbitt, *ibid.*, chapter 5.

(135) Francis Nesbitt, *ibid.*, pp.106-110, provides a useful account both of the faltering of the Carter administration's resolve on Rhodesia and of TransAfrica's role in resisting any such waffling.

(136) Francis Nesbitt, *ibid.*, p.111.

movement was also buoyed up by recent accomplishments elsewhere in the region (in Mozambique and Rhodesia and, most recently, in Zimbabwe), by the reawakening of popular resistance in South Africa (as symbolized by the events in Soweto and throughout that country), and, as noted, by the growing resonance of counter-corporate stirrings against apartheid in the United States itself. Here, in short, was a political force that had come to stay.

But so too had a right-wing backlash, one that witnessed, to repeat, the consolidation, as the decade dawned, of Ronald Reagan's ferociously right-wing team in the White House and the offices of administrative power. Such a team could and would do incalculable damage in southern Africa but as anti-apartheid forces grew and matured throughout the decade they would work effectively to check, on some fronts, such a sinister force. There was a third force as well, one of which we must also take careful note. For it was comprised of significant sectors of corporate power that, by and large, had uncritically backed the Cold War plays of the American state over the years, confident that the latter's muscular show of western power served to lock into place compliant governments, including in apartheid South Africa, in support of the global writ of capitalism.

Indeed, it was only as the price of having such a stake in apartheid began to rise in South Africa – the considerable embarrassment inflicted upon corporate America by increasingly visible anti-apartheid (and anti-corporate) protest in the United States, for example, as well as by the threat posed by the rising tide of popular resistance in South Africa itself, resistance that threatened there to place not just race rule but capitalism itself in jeopardy – that any change came. Now, however, there began to be some softening of the resistance of American capitalists both to change in South Africa and to its own treasured practices of prior corporate activity. True, there was in the United States no politician at the centre of things to play the role that Mulroney played in Canada in easing some real shift in southern African policy on the part of the major wielders of state power. But there were certainly other forces at play – in Congress, in the cultural sphere, on the streets – that had significant resonance in their own right, as did the continuing revolutionary surge in South Africa itself.

To such themes we will return. Indeed, the growth of an anti-apartheid movement that was to find full flower in the 1980s has already been glimpsed in our account, above, of the 1970s. As for Reagan's electoral ascendancy – encompassing far broader processes than any kind of implicit referendum on his likely South African policies of course – perhaps the tenor of the overall position of his administration towards apartheid can be grasped from reminding ourselves of several of his statements made in his very first days in office. Thus, as he said in an interview with Walter Cronkite in March, 1981: "Can we abandon a country [South Africa] that has stood beside us in every war we have ever fought? A country that, strategically, is essential to the free [sic] world in its production of minerals that we all must have." Similarly, Alexander Haig, Reagan's new Secretary of State, greeted South African Foreign Minister Roelof Botha on May 14 of that year with a fresh post-Carter toast: "Let this be the new

beginning of mutual trust and confidence between the United States and South Africa – old friends who are getting together again.”¹³⁷

True, Reagan did qualify his unquestioning support somewhat, telling Cronkite that he expected “a sincere and honest effort” from South Africa to solve its racial problems. Yet leaked Department of State documents of the time underscored the new willingness of the Reagan administration to work towards ending South Africa’s “polecat status” in the world and to restore its place as a legitimate and important regional actor with whom we can cooperate pragmatically.” Indeed, as Chester Crocker, on the eve of his becoming Reagan’s newly appointed senior Africa hand (as Assistant Secretary of State for Africa), specified Reagan’s position as merely being one that looked to “amelioration” rather than any such “escapist” notion as “full political participation”! Indeed Crocker found not crisis but instead “fluidity and pragmatism” in South Africa’s white polity and “increasingly confident experimentation” as regards its approach to pliable blacks like Chief Gatsha Buthelezi! But forget the rhetoric: both whites in power in South Africa and blacks in opposition there could see much more clearly where the Reagan administration was now choosing to line up vis-a-vis South Africa.¹³⁸

Closely linked to the relatively unfettered racism of such positions were Cold-War preoccupations also at play in the mapping of specific administration policies. Even Carter’s mild and momentary waffling towards an MPLA-hegemonic Angola ceded too much to Soviet “aggression” – its support for [or, in the lexicon of the Right, sponsorship of] the MPLA - for Reagan and his right-wing coterie as led by the blustering but powerful Senator Jesse Helms. But it was really the Clark Amendment that, as regards southern Africa, stuck in the craw of this gang of aggressive counter-revolutionaries - as did the role of the USSR and, in particular of Cuba. They were determined to tear that amendment down (as eventually they did), but also to expel Cuba from the region’s fray. Here they were much less successful, Cuba’s withdrawal from Angola being twinned, by the end of the 1980s, not only to the reluctant acceptance of MPLA’s (not Savimbi’s) continuing centrality in that country but also to South Africa’s ceding its illegal control over South-West Africa/Namibia – and, as proved to be the case, to the beginning of the end of apartheid’s own sway in South Africa itself.

Of course, there were many other factors at play in producing these outcomes: the decay of the Soviet Union as a principal global player for example, the rising tide of anti-apartheid sentiment within the United States itself (which we will discuss further below), and the extremely dramatic and fast growing resistance to white hegemony inside South Africa. But before turning to the South Africa case and the American struggle with regard to it that marked so dramatically the 1980s, something more

(137) See “Reagan’s views on South Africa praised by Botha,” *The New York Times*, March 5, 1981 and “U.S. Seeks to End ‘Polecat Status’ of South Africa,” *The Globe and Mail* (Toronto), May 30, 1981.

(138). Chester A. Crocker, “South Africa: Strategy of Change,” *Foreign Affairs*, 54, 2 (Winter, 1980-81).

must be said about the Angolan and Namibian fronts themselves, for here too the drama was quite intense.

The centre piece to this drama was the “constructive engagement” initiative hatched by Reagan’s new Under-Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker. Its central thrust: to tie some real change in Namibia (requiring some concessions from South Africa, the illegal holders of governmental power there) to a *quid pro quo* that was the most central goal of Crocker’s Cold War-premised initiative: the withdrawal of the Cuban military presence from Angola where it had come to the aid of an MPLA government much beleaguered by South Africa and by Savimbi and his UNITA movement). Crocker also chose occasionally to imply an additional tantalizing dimension: the encouragement of some process of change inside South Africa itself that removal of the “external threat” embodied by Cuba might represent! On this entire issue – the nurturing of a Cold War-centric trivialization of the anti-racist struggle in southern Africa – the South Africans actually played Crocker and Reagan like a violin. Moreover, insofar as any move for change in South Africa was actually envisaged by Crocker and his cronies the initiative was assumed to rest entirely in the hands of the white minority government; certainly it was not thought of as possibly involving the black majority in any significant ways – nor, even more categorically, the “terrorists,” like the ANC, who claimed to speak on the vast majority’s behalf. As Davies has noted, “Unfortunately for Crocker, he did not seem to appreciate the extent of desperation and anger in the black community. His insistence on gradual white-led change infuriated the black population.”¹³⁹ Indeed, with no real outreach made to the black “other side,” the Cold War was all the more clearly revealed to be name of the game for the Americans, with the fates of Namibians (not to speak of those of Angolans and virtually all black South Africans) merely being arbitrarily subordinated to the United States’ own hyperbolic global geo-political calculations. The “constructive engagement” initiative also completely overrode the initiative then being undertaken, at the behest of the United Nations, to resolve the Namibian issue – undertaken by representatives of several leading Western countries (to whom, however, the idea that there might be some kind of necessary “linkage” between developments in Namibia and Angola apparently had never occurred!), Moreover, when Reagan and his congressional cronies finally did manage, in 1985, to have the Clark Amendment repealed and aid to UNITA restored it became even more obvious, not least to Angolan leaders and their Cuban allies, just what a wrecker’s role the U.S. would continue to play in Angola. Yet the Angolans and the Cubans soldiered on, holding out at Cuito Cuanavale in southern Angola long enough to

(139) J. E. Davies, *Constructive Engagement: Chester Crocker and American Policy in South Africa, Namibia and Angola* (Oxford: James Currey, 2007), p.202. For the fact was that, under Botha, “Pretoria was simply not ready to undertake a fundamental reform of apartheid.” Indeed, when U. S. Senator Cranston outlined the human rights abuses still in place at the end of Crocker’s experiment of constructive engagement, he suggested, accurately, that “Many are still the victims of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. Church and labour groups remain banned. Housing remains segregated and unequal. The homelands policy, which compels blacks to live in the least desirable areas, remains intact. The black majority still has no vote and no representation” (Davies, p.204).

finally defeat the South Africans there and to thus launch a process that would lead to Namibia's liberation in 1980 – although Savimbi's savage assaults, now fueled by his access, behind his own battle-lines, to diamond fields there, would continue to bedevil Angola for another decade.

In short, there was no doubt that this was a victory for Angola, for Cuba and, ultimately, for Namibia – and a defeat for Crocker and for Reagan. Yet it was not, in truth, a particularly signal victory for the American anti-apartheid movement *per se*. Voices had long been raised over the Namibian question in the U.S. of course, even as early as 1946 when “Alphaeus Hunton of the CAA provided UN delegates with critical

information they needed to stop South African annexation of South West Africa (later Namibia).”¹⁴⁰ There was also an on-going measure of concrete engagement with the struggle there (as itemized by Janice Love¹⁴¹), as well as the ACOA's close involvement over many years with SWAPO representative Theo Ben-Gurirab in New York and at the U.N. (where, given the formally illegal nature of South Africa's occupation of South-West Africa and Namibia and the UN's necessary involvement in that much of SWAPO's struggle was in fact waged). And voices continued to be raised against the U.S.'s tacit aggression in Angola and in support of SWAPO's claims in Namibia: But the American movement could never quite strike sparks with a broader public with this issue.

Indeed, the movement had primarily chosen merely to move on, cognizant not only of the much greater vulnerability of South Africa itself, its image and its domestic actions, in the U.S., but also of the fact that this was really where the “Great Game” of the 1980s was ultimately to be played. For against the grim illogic of the supportive posture towards apartheid South Africa taken by Reagan, Helms and their ilk, there was a very strong counter-current. We have seen this latter to be gathering strength during the 1970s as the movement for sanctions and disinvestment slowly grew. But this was a force that would pick up momentum during the 1980s and culminate both in the passage of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986 and in the override of Ronald Reagan's veto of that act.

As in Canada, as suggested above, there was no single anti-apartheid movement or organization; instead, following Minter's summary account, there were “diverse and hard-to-track currents involved – students, politicians, trade union groups, church groups, celebrities and many others – [who] were part of no unified organizational structure.” “Yet,” he suggests, “all were central to the movement's history.” The escalation of the divestment struggle in the churches continued along these lines, of course, but so too did it in the universities: if universities, by the end of 1979, “had divested over \$50 million in stocks of companies involved in South Africa...[o]ver the next five years universities divested over \$130 million more, and in 1985 alone more than 60 universities divested some \$350 million. The African Fund counted

(140) Minter, *op.cit.*, p.17.

(141) Love, *op.cit.*, p.19 *et passim*.

more than 150 universities involved in divestment campaigns during the 1980s.” Nor were campaigns to realize these ends entirely straightforward and easy to carry to successful conclusions. Here the account by Claudia Gastrow which tracks the divestment struggle at the University of Illinois is relatively unique in its detail and enormously informative as to the texture of a decade that saw such results as activists managed to attain at Urbana-Champaign.¹⁴²

More novel although every bit as significant was action on another front – beyond churches, beyond campuses – that began to further open up in the 1980s and that would carry the issue even further into broader public fora: the realm of state and local government. True, as Willard Johnson has shown, this kind of activity had already begun with the MASS-DIVEST campaign in Massachusetts¹⁴³ (and to some extent elsewhere) in the early 70s but now it was to become a much more wide- spread phenomenon. A range of examples of struggle at both state and municipal governments could be cited. But this is also a terrain carefully explored by Janice Love

in her book *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics* in which she provides an impressive litany of such actions. Moreover, she focuses her fine-grained analysis principally on detailed, effective and valuable case-studies of two states – Connecticut and Michigan.¹⁴⁴

Thus in 1981 in Connecticut, assertive campaigning produced “the most far-reaching divestment legislation ever passed up to that time by any government body in the United States,” legislation ensuring that “no state funds were to be invested in corporations or banks doing business in South Africa.” And in Michigan, with a strong push from both the Southern Africa Liberation Committee at Michigan State University and the Washentaw County Coalition Against Apartheid, important divestment outcomes also proved possible. True, as Love makes clear, there were often ideological differences amongst the various campaigners in Michigan, some being more radically sceptical than others as to the virtues of capitalism itself. Nonetheless, as Love states in summary, both campaigns

“succeeded in getting legislation adopted that curbs each state’s economic ties to South Africa. Although significant compromises were required to get them past, these laws stand as some of the toughest and most far-reaching sanctions-related legislation in the country. And they stand as further evidence that state legislatures are willing to make laws with important foreign policy implications that are counter to official national policy.”

Indeed, as Love suggests, “this is precisely what divestment activists wanted: visible, legitimate, and responsible voices from across America objecting and providing alternatives to continued United State governmental and corporate support for

(142) Claudia Gastrow, “Struggling for Freedom: The Divestment Movement at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1977-1987,” *Safundi*, 20 (2005). The several quotations from Minter in this paragraph are from Minter, *op.cit.*, pp.43-4.

(143) Johnson, *op.cit.*, p.9 (section II, entitled “The ‘MASS-DIVEST’ Campaign”).

(144) Love, *op.cit.*, and, as quoted in the next several paragraphs, from pp.99, 236, and 245-6 of her book.

apartheid.” Indeed, states Love, “for the national anti-apartheid movement, divestment campaigns targeting state and local governments demonstrate that, even though there is little receptivity in national governmental bodies to the policies advocated by the anti-apartheid movement, there is high receptivity in sub-national governmental bodies!”

Most importantly there is also, beyond Love’s case-studies, a long and impressive roster of cities and states where parallel accomplishments proved possible of realization. Love, by 1985, can already cite “[governmental] actions taken in Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska and Wisconsin as well as several cities [as being in] with the U.S. government policy of constructive engagement,” while Minter, writing later, references a list compiled by the Africa Fund that shows 28 states (from New York State to California), 24 counties, and 92 cities as having enacted legislation for divestment from South Africa. And, as he adds, “in each of these cases, and in an unknown number where the legislation failed, local coalitions placed South Africa onto the local political agenda.”¹⁴⁵ Love herself concludes:

For over three decades the international anti-apartheid movement had tried to isolate South Africa economically because of its apartheid policies. This study has shown that a significant new thrust of sanctions-related activities among state and local governments in the United States is having an interesting and important impact across many arenas: U.S. business and business groups, The U.S. government as well as the sub national governments directly targeted; South African[s], both those supportive of and those opposed to apartheid; and the U.S. anti-apartheid movement itself. The degree of success demonstrated by both cases in this study has also shown that people can effectively use institutions locally available to address international issues.¹⁴⁶

Moreover, as she anticipates (and despite her aforementioned acknowledgement that there was as yet “little receptivity in national governmental bodies” as regards proposed action against apartheid), it was not to be very long after the 1985 publication of Love’s book that this situation would itself begin to change at the national level - as the anti-apartheid struggle was now carried ever deeper into the U.S. Congress itself! But before turning to that development it bears noting parenthetically that, on the cultural front, there was also, in the country at large, a further crystallization of popular mood – as epitomized in the song “IAin’t Going to Play Sun City” that became the mantra of a growing number of American musical artists anxious to join, in their own persons the boycott of South Africa - which helped deepen the resonance of these activities. It is, of course, impossible to measure the impact of the range of cultural resistances that now, quite literally, found their voice. Nonetheless, a sentiment of distaste for the very premises of the South African social order seemed increasingly to seep into the attitudes of many Americans and to an unprecedented degree. For

(145) Minter, *op.cit.*, pp.43-4.

(146) Love, *op.cit.*, p.245.

the anti-apartheid sentiment within the circles of liberal culture-makers now gained, more widely, a certain commonsensical cachet - a sentiment that echoed the attitude that anti-apartheid activists had had from the beginning, of course. For now it was the likes of Little Steven, Bruce Springsteen, Darlene Love, Bonnie Raitt, Lou Reed, Miles Davis and a host of other major musical names who would come together as "Artists Against Apartheid" to make the influential album "Sun City."¹⁴⁷ Similarly with Stetasonic's A.F.R.I.C.A. ("featuring the Reverend Jesse Jackson and with its single "Free South Africa) and with Gil Scott-Heron's anthemic "Johannesburg."¹⁴⁸

True, it's a long way from Johannesburg to New York, although, paradoxically, it is probably even further from New York and the liberal artists of Tin-Pan Alley to many of the denizens of the American South and South-west, as far apart, no doubt, on issues related to South Africa as they are on many other issues. How then are we to evaluate the relative resonance in the United States of, on the one hand, Reagan's racism and his parodic support of South Africa until very late in the day, and, on the other hand, Little Steven's "I Ain't Gonna Play Sun City" ("Constructive Engagement is Ronald Reagan's plan. Meanwhile people are dying and giving up hope. This quiet diplomacy ain't nothing but a joke")?

Difficult to say; nonetheless, we might want to consider the subliminal impact of such developments in the sphere of progressive liberal culture upon the successful push to achieve passage of a sanctions bill through Congress - and over President Reagan's own veto. By then of course there were those within corporate and ruling circles who, in light of the activities both of the American movement and of near-revolutionary resistances of the mid-80s in South Africa, were, like Mulroney in Canada, beginning to rethink the premises of a tacit acceptance of apartheid policies - in the name of safeguarding the long-term interests of capital. Here we need merely affirm that there was also plenty of push against apartheid from below in the United States. It is to the climax of all this activity, the passing of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 (CAAA) that we can now turn.

For, indeed, players were now gathering in Washington - as the focus of struggle shifted both to the streets of the nation's capital and to Congress - for the most dramatic single event in America's several decades of confrontation with South African apartheid. Of course, groups across the country had been and continued to be engaged, both as an active and a symbolic conscience at the elbows of national legislators. Certainly the ACOA, so important a continuing force within the sanctions movement, remained important as the focus of the struggle shifted to Washington in the mid-1980s. And the progression of events in South Africa - the extraordinary peaking of popular protest inside the country itself - was of particularly critical

(147) Artists United Against Apartheid, *Sun City* (Manhattan Records, ST 53019). For a strong, well-written account of the recording project itself see Dave Marsh, *Sun City - The Making of the Record* (New York: Penguin Books, 1985).

(148) Stetasonic, *A.F.R.I.C.A.* (Tommy Boy, TM 899), which also includes the song "Free South Africa" and Gil Scott-Heron, "Johannesburg" on the album of the same name *Johannesburg* (Arista, 12527); the song "Johannesburg" is also included on *The Best of Gil Scott-Heron* (Arista AL8-8248).

importance in giving additional urgency and purpose to the sanctions question. Nonetheless, momentarily, parallel developments in Washington were of great weight and significance. And here, not least on Washington's very streets, TransAfrica was an absolutely key force.

Charles Diggs himself had been forced to retire from Congress (amidst charges of personal peculation) in 1980 but the Black Congressional Caucus, especially in the person of Representative Ron Dellums, carried on, and was soon helping to quarterback the CAAA through Congress. Every bit as important was TransAfrica, however. Worried that the anti-apartheid movement was momentarily flagging (not least in the context of Reagan's recent re-election as President), on 21 November 1984, Robinson now determined to escalate matters dramatically was orchestrating a well-publicized sit-in at the South Africa Embassy, together with Congressman Walter Fauntroy, Mary Frances Berry, a member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and Professor Eleanor Holmes Norton, a former official in the Carter Administration. Arrests of Robinson, Fauntroy and Berry ensued (Norton was delegated to leave the site in order to brief the press); the three spent the night in jail, and daily demonstrations (and further arrests) quickly escalated outside the Embassy. Indeed, there now occurred a ratcheting up by many notches of the entire South Africa issue, not least as TransAfrica and others moved almost immediately to create an instantly prominent Free South Africa Movement, the dramatic emergence of which has been effectively described (by Francis Nesbitt) as follows:

After spending the night in jail, [Robinson, Fauntroy and Berry] announced the formation of a Free South Africa Movement and began daily demonstrations outside the embassy. The sit-ins took hold in more than two dozen other cities, including Chicago, New Orleans, Seattle, New York, San Francisco and Cleveland, with weekly demonstrations at South African consulates, federal buildings, coin shops that dealt in gold Krugerrand coins¹⁴⁹ and businesses with South African interests. Hundreds of celebrities, including Gloria Steinem, Harry Belafonte, Amy Carter, Detroit mayor Coleman Young, Coretta Scott King, Jesse Jackson, and at least twenty-two congressmen were arrested outside the embassy.

The movement, which was a coalition of church, student, civil rights, and women's groups, also spread to hundreds of college campuses across the country, where rallies and sit-ins questioned the investment of companies that did business with South Africa. Hundreds of students were arrested at Harvard, Columbia, UCLA, University of Wisconsin, Northwestern University, the University of Illinois and other schools. Over five thousand people were arrested across the country in a twelve month period.¹⁵⁰

(149) On the Krugerrand issue and the campaign around it (said to "have reduced Deak-Perera's Krugerrand market by half...and reduced South Africa's Krugerrand sales by \$400 million") see Johnson's effective account in his article, *op.cit.*, pp.10-15.

(150) Francis Nesbitt, *op.cit.*, p.124. TransAfrica's role in all of this has also been clearly epitomized by Hostetter (*ibid.*, pp.66) as follows: "TransAfrica's initiative galvanized the US antiapartheid movement at the outset of the second Reagan administration in a way that linked protest to legislative action to impose economic sanctions

Moreover, it was soon clear, states Nesbitt, that, “coordinated by FSAM, TransAfrica, and the Congressional Black Caucus, this upsurge in anti-apartheid activism influenced Congress to adopt the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act over President Reagan’s veto in 1986.” Of course, it was equally clear that the cumulative weight of actions by large numbers of citizens and organizations over a number of years – of the kind we have traced above – also firmly enframed the Congressional debate regarding South Africa that now took place. For a sanctions bill imposing new constraints in terms of any foreseeable American trade with or investment in South Africa, was soon passed by the House (in 1985) and, albeit in somewhat watered-down form, the Senate – in both cases with hefty majorities. As this suggested, the bill actually had significant bipartisan support, so much so that senior Republican Richard Lugar now warned the President “that his own personal leadership [was] really at stake. We really need to be on the right side of history in this case.” But Reagan voted to veto the bill anyway, with Congress then moving to override Reagan’s veto of the bill. “The 78-to- 21 vote [in the Senate; the House vote was 313 to 83!] was the most serious policy defeat for Ronald Reagan and the first time Congress had overridden his veto”¹⁵¹ – and this also marked the first time in the entire twentieth century that Congress had overridden a presidential foreign policy veto.

It was at this point Reagan really seemed to lose his cool and the “Great Communicator” his touch, delivering a particularly ugly speech (July 2, 1986) claiming that more change was afoot in South Africa than could possibly be discerned and that in any case “In defending their society and people the South African government have a right and a responsibility to maintain order in the face of terrorists.”¹⁵² On the terrain of debate about southern Africa, Reagan, in his racist maunderings, had now set himself against an unlikely (but entirely comprehensible) alliance of anti-apartheid activists on the one hand and, on the other, of big business-oriented reformers who, like their more canny South African counterparts, were suddenly aware that their once profitable alliance with apartheid had now rendered them more vulnerable to attack both within and without South Africa.

Reaction to the speech was dramatic. The headline in the New York Times the next day was “The Speech That Launched A Thousand Critics” and the Washington-based British journalist Simon Barber wrote: “Indeed it seemed deliberately calculated to provoke the worst responses from all sides: it gave Pretoria comfort, black South Africa

on South Africa. The prominence of an African-American foreign policy lobby at the centre of the national anti-apartheid coalition made clear the identification of black Americans with the struggle against South African racism and helped illuminate a wide range of anti-apartheid activities.”

(151) Francis Nesbitt, *ibid.*, p.142.

(152) As quoted in J. E. Davies, *Constructive Engagement (op.cit.)*, p.65. As Reagan then also argued, stunningly and in the very teeth of the hard evidence as to extreme ferocity of South Africa’s internal crackdown on its black population: “Indeed, it’s hard to think of a single country in the Soviet bloc, or many in the United Nations, where political critics have the same freedom to be heard as do the outspoken critics of the South African government”! On the Reagan Administration’s positions on both “constructive engagement” and the question of sanctions see also Alex Thompson, *Incomplete Engagement: U.S. Foreign Policy Towards the Republic of South Africa, 1981-1988* (Aldershot, U.K.: Avebury, 1996).

reason to despair and Congress no choice.” The main problem, [Alex] Thompson suggested, was that Reagan “simply failed to convey any sense of understanding or sympathy for what the black South African population was suffering.” A New York Times editorial spoke for the views of many when it accused Reagan of being deaf to “one of the great moral issues of our time.”¹⁵³

Needless to say, the sanctions, so achieved were significant but also flawed, as Richard Knight of ACOA was not slow to point out. Firms were pulling out, of course, and trade was falling but a careful accounting of the true impact of sanctions showed gaps aplenty: “More than 130 firms still [as of 1990] have subsidiaries in South Africa. And products of U.S. companies are available via licensing, franchising, and distribution agreements.”¹⁵⁴ Thus, as Knight would later write,

Many companies that divested from South Africa continued to do business in the country. For example, GM cars were made under license and IBM computers were sold by a distributor. As a result in January 1987 five national anti-apartheid organizations issued Guidelines for Divestment which stated that when companies withdraw from South Africa they should sever non-equity ties such as licensing and franchising agreements. The organizations were [the “usual suspects”!] ACOA, the American Friends Service Committee, the Interfaith Centre on Corporate Responsibility, TransAfrica and the Washington Office on Africa. The guidelines were subsequently endorsed by a number of leading union and religious leaders.¹⁵⁵

Meanwhile, in Congress (Knight continues) Charles Rangel did manage to introduce and to pass a bill “eliminating the ability of U.S. companies to claim tax credits in the U.S. for taxes paid in South Africa.” Moreover, Ron Dellums and others in Congress attempted to deepen the prescribed sanctions, actually getting a tougher set (“far more radical than the sanctions imposed on South Africa two years ago

over President Reagan’s veto,” wrote the *Los Angeles Times*¹⁵⁶) through the House of Representatives in 1988 only to have the proposed legislation fail on the Senate floor. The economic impact of what had been accomplished continued to be great nonetheless, the General Accounting Office informing the Senate’s Foreign Relations

(153) Davies, *op.cit.*, pp.65-6. As Republican Senator Richard Lugar said at the time: “I would not have persisted in opposing the President if after all these conversations, debates and statements I had developed reasonable confidence of his comprehension of what the South African situation was all about.” Indeed, as Chester Crocker himself was to write: “The President tended to discredit his case by sounding so much like the government [of South Africa] from which he was so reluctant to distance himself.”

(154) Richard Knight, “Sanctions, Disinvestment, and U.S. Corporations in South Africa” in Robert Edgar (ed.), *Sanctioning Apartheid* (Trenton, N.J.: Africa World Press, 1990) and, in a somewhat up-dated version (2002), at <richardknight.homestead.com/files/uscorporations>.

(155) Richard Knight, “Documenting the U.S. Solidarity Movement – with reflections on the sanctions and divestment campaigns,” paper delivered to the conference on “A Decade of Freedom: Celebrating the Role of the International Anti-Apartheid Movement in South Africa’s Freedom Struggle,” Durban, S.A., October 10-13, 2004, p.5.

(156) The *LA Times* continued (as cited in Francis Nesbitt, *op.cit.*, p.150): the bill would “virtually halt trade and cancel all U.S. investments in South Africa,” a virtual “declaration of economic war” in the words of the *Washington Post*. The several pages in Nesbitt (pp.148-154) on the brave effort to achieve this deepening of sanctions legislation, an effort reinforced by the advocacy of Jesse Jackson, then pursuing the Democratic Presidential nomination, are strong ones.

Committee merely two years later that South African exports alone had already been cut by \$417 million; moreover, “by the end of 1987 more than 200 U.S. companies had withdrawn from South Africa. Net capital movement out of South Africa was Rand 9.2 billion in 1985, R6.1 billion in 1986, R 3.1 billion in 1987 and R5.5 billion in 1988.”¹⁵⁷

Beyond this, the symbolic value of CAAS was, if anything, even greater. For it lent considerable weight (alongside the escalating resistance in South Africa itself and the threat to profitability that that entailed) to a growing understanding among South Africans and, especially, within some of the most perceptive of business circles that the time for continuing to seamlessly combine racial oppression with the structures of capitalist exploitation was fast running out. Not surprising, then, that (as noted earlier) elements of capital, both domestic and international, was already in negotiations with the ANC in hopes of sealing into place a firmly capitalist future for a post-apartheid South Africa. True, P.W. Botha’s successor as Prime Minister, F. W. De Klerk, was less than confident that this would work to the continuing advantage of white privilege in the country and therefore, despite freeing Mandela from prison and unbanning the ANC, sought to manipulate the outcome of the “transition,” even after Mandela’s release, for three long years.

As a result, elements of the U.S. anti-apartheid movement did work to maintain increased pressure on both American business and government throughout these years – well after passage of the Sanctions Bill and even up to the very point of the ANC’s ultimate electoral victory. As Knight wrote in 1990, “Recent events have demonstrated how vulnerable the South African government is to international pressure. Now is the time to increase that pressure until the end of apartheid and the installation of a unitary democratic state.”¹⁵⁸ This was not easy to do, however. True anti-apartheid militants like Knight were well aware that the apartheid regime was still far from finished and, indeed, the years from 1990-1994 would remain deeply contested ones, a contestation that did allow for some real skirmishing in the U.S. and other western countries regarding the possible maintenance of sanctions and the timing of their ending.

Yet George Bush, freshly ensconced in the White House was, like other representatives of capital, alert to the investment opportunities that the ANC – by now well advanced towards fully embracing a dramatic capitulation to business as key to its strategy - appeared set to offer to global capital in order both to ease the transition to majority rule and to craft a capitalist future for itself and for its country. He was, concomitantly, eager to help American capital avail itself of this tempting opportunity for recolonization - without the continuing inconvenience of sanctions – and therefore, in July, 1991, declared South Africa’s progress towards democracy

(157) Knight, “Documenting the U.S. Solidarity Movement,” *op.cit.*, p.5.

(158) Knight, “Sanctions, Disinvestment and U.S. Corporations in South Africa,” *op.cit.*, p.12.

“irreversible.” At that point, and much more quickly than in Canada, sanctions began to be lifted.

For the ANC now knew exactly where it was going and who its new friends were; as a result, Randall Robinson and many other erstwhile anti-apartheid militants were quickly downgraded on the ANC A-list of friends and fixers. Not that many or even most such American anti-apartheid activists (and ANC supporters) were socialists. But the alacrity with which the ANC moved past them to draw ever closer to the heart of American capitalist power was startling to them, nonetheless. In this respect, Hostetter’s account of Randall Robinson’s last anti-apartheid days (an account largely

drawn from Robinson’s own memoir, *Defending the Spirit*¹⁵⁹) is particularly poignant, and revealing:

One of the first major events at the centre [officially dedicated, along with its library named in honour of the recently deceased Arthur Ashe, on June 4], an elite group of TransAfrica supporters shared a luncheon with the South African leader and his entourage. . . . According to Robinson’s memoir, toward the end of the meeting Mandela aide Barbara Masekela informed the group that the ANC had approached American corporations for support for their election efforts. Among those contacted had been J. Wayne Fredericks, who, as a spokesperson for Ford Motor Company, has long resisted divestment and sanctions. Randall Robinson took offense at this, and told Masekela “To seek their support is prudent and desirable [!]. But for us to have heard nothing about this initiative from the ANC is an affront.” When asked, “After all our efforts, how could you do this?” Masekela replied, “That was then, this is now and we must move on.”

Robinson’s disappointment with the ANC grew in 1994 when another planned fundraiser featuring Mandela was cancelled with little notice. After returning the donations solicited for the affair TransAfrica landed in financial difficulty. Frustrated with this kind of treatment from those on whose behalf he had laboured so long, Robinson pessimistically contended [that] “once there was an army of Americans eager to push our government in a helpful direction. Now that well-meaning force has been all but dissolved – puzzlingly, by the hand of the ANC itself.¹⁶⁰

Other continuing supporters (including some amongst those who had been around the ACOA, for example) found themselves called upon by the ANC to play similar roles in its courting of American capital. This they did, for the most part, reluctantly if at all, while looking for other ways to help build a new South Africa. More generally, as in Canada, the movement simply melted away.¹⁶¹

(159) Randall Robinson, *Defending the Spirit: A Black Life in America* (New York: Dutton, 1994).

(160) Hostetter, *op.cit.*, pp.91-2.

(161) For a well-documented but sobering account of the waning years of the U.S. liberation support movement see Jim Cason and Bill Martin, “A Constituency for Southern Africa? The State of the U.S. Movement,” *Southern Africa Report*, 8, 5 (May, 1993). Recall also the tension, noted at the outset of this section on the U.S. movement, between Bill Minter writing, with Silvia Hill - their chapter on the American anti-apartheid movement in the SADET two-volume work on “International Solidarity” (*op.cit.*) that forms part of its *The Road to Democracy in South Africa* series - and the far more circumspect tone as to the outcome of the southern Africa liberation struggle

The North American Front: A Balance-Sheet

So it was over. But how, in the end, are we to evaluate North American support for southern African liberation? An important force surely, but the precise extent of its resonance and its success is most difficult to gauge. Clearly, though, the assertions of many activists - themselves buoyed by the victories of liberation movements in “Portuguese Africa” and in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe - did help to keep the issue alive in North America throughout the first decades of the “thirty years war for southern African liberation.” Then, as the pace of change kicked forward in southern Africa, particularly with the renewed vigour of resistance inside South Africa in the 1980s, the overall movement in North America was able to expand its numbers and its voice in such a way as to obtain a much larger resonance. Nonetheless, the hard-work and successes of the North American anti-apartheid movement were also stalked by the movement’s own weaknesses. For it proved all too easy, both in the region itself and globally, for capital to recolonize southern Africa and thus to seal “the strange death of liberated southern Africa.”¹⁶²

To this latter drama liberation support and anti-apartheid activists of the recent past were now, unfortunately, largely spectators. Was this a “strange death” for the North American anti-apartheid movement as well, then? Of course, a particularly noxious form of racial domination and of Northern colonialism had been defeated, in many of their particulars, in southern Africa. Reason enough for many to celebrate victory with a feeling of “mission accomplished.” Yet racism was still to be found in southern Africa. More importantly, colonialism had not really vanished since “recolonization”- continuing domination (economic and political and still, in essence, predominantly “white”) by the global North – became the overarching reality in the region.¹⁶³ Moreover, and quite paradoxically, in the very teeth of such a recolonization the liberation support/anti-apartheid movement was now gone - like a whisper and without any clear echo.

Not that the militants of yesteryear had disappeared, of course. As noted, a handful continued with southern Africa-related work, trying as best they could to keep in touch with, and stand in support of, southern Africa comrades on the ground who continue, often in most impressive ways, to keep alive an expansive theory and practice of liberation for their countries and their peoples. More have moved on to battle US and Canadian global activities and comfortably positioned elites of the Global South (and to support those the various venues, world-wide, who also so battle) on other fronts: the often dramatic campaigns against global neo-liberalism for example, and against North America’s pronounced proclivities, under the likes of Bush, Obama and Harper, for murderous military missions abroad. Others however - like those

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 (including in South Africa) Minter adopts in the volume he co-edited (with Gail Hovey and Charles Cobb Jr.), *op.cit.*

(162) John S. Saul, “The Strange Death” (*op.cit.*).

(163) See Salih Booker and William Minter, “Global Apartheid,” *The Nation*, July 9, 2001.

critiqued by Bill Fletcher – have instead basked in the comfortable glow, alluded to above, of “mission accomplished” in southern Africa.

Yet any such “accomplishment” can only be true – if it is true at all – of southern Africa in terms of national liberation and of some greater measure of racial equity. Not that these latter should be considered small accomplishments of course – as we have affirmed. But what of liberation, in terms of class, gender and democratic voice, goals that had seemed to form part of the original struggle in the region? To achieve them one suspects that a “next liberation struggle” will be necessary.¹⁶⁴ Where will North Americans find themselves if, as and when such a struggle further defines itself and, in time, unfolds and demands their renewed solidarity and sustained support?

(164) John S. Saul, *The Next Liberation Struggle*” (*op.cit.*). See also Saul, *Liberation Lite: The Roots of Recolonization in Southern Africa* (Delhi: Three Essays Collective, 2010).

8.5

East Asian Support to the Southern African Liberation Struggle,

1960s to 1994¹

By Alicia Altorfer-Ong

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This chapter gives an overview of the contributions of the People's Republic of China (PRC, China) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea) to the Southern African liberation struggle. Equally distant from the theatre of nationalist struggle in Southern Africa, both East Asian governments were nonetheless actors through their support to many of the liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. While their initial contact with many of the liberation movements was made through the Afro-Asian movement and Communist fraternity between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s, Beijing and Pyongyang's engagement in Africa became more defined and affected by their respective foreign policy objectives as the decades wore on.

A look at some of the broad similarities is useful at this point, before the respective sections examine their specific situations in detail. China and North Korea are culturally similar and there were close relations between the governments, which together with their geographical proximity, allowed for a certain level of coordination in their foreign policy. Both governments strove to increase their international standing and legitimacy: Beijing as the sole government of China against what it viewed as the 'breakaway' province of Taiwan and Pyongyang against the American-supported South Korean regime. The wave of newly independent African governments in the 1960s presented the opportunity to garner more support at the United Nations (UN), from which both East Asian governments were otherwise excluded. In that time, Beijing and Pyongyang were willing to cooperate with liberation movements and African governments of any political persuasion.² They shared some broad similarities: both were victorious revolutionary governments, and until around 1963 when the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified, both operated within the Moscow-led Communist fraternity. Their engagement with African governments and liberation movements heightened the Communist threat felt by Western governments. The close personal and official ties between Beijing and Pyongyang facilitated their cooperation on many levels and the latter was able to benefit from Chinese diplomatic inroads on a number of occasions in the 1960s and 1970s. However, as a small and faraway country, the North Korean government had to tread more carefully.

The main differences in their dealings with the liberation movements were mostly derived from scale. Overall the PRC was respected as a large power in spite of its economic backwardness and radical –and perhaps unfathomable– policies, particularly during the height of the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 till early 1970s. That was when Pyongyang also distanced itself from the increasingly problematic repercussions that arose, by emphasising its uniqueness as a socialist nationalist

(2) This was in contrast with the North Vietnamese, Soviet and Cuban governments, who focused their attention on quasi-Marxist and radical populist regimes. Thanks to Prof. Balazs Salontai for raising this comment.

model for developing countries. Beijing's shift to a more moderate stance in the post-Mao period and subsequent reforms under Premier Deng Xiaoping introduced new challenges into their foreign relations. North Korea's economic problems, in stark contrast to its rival South Korea's spectacular growth, made it a less attractive donor on the one hand (especially to already independent governments), while on the other hand it began using arms sales and military training as a way to gain hard currency. The converse is true in the Chinese case, as by the late 1980s, with the relaxation of Sino-Soviet tensions and increasing economic capacity, Beijing appeared an attractive partner.

This study draws heavily from secondary sources and a limited number of primary sources. It is a modest attempt to synthesise the available information and to appraise it against the Chinese and North Korean governments' broader foreign policy objectives. This work will hopefully shed more light on the important ties of solidarity and support for the nationalist struggle against colonialism and institutionalised racism. It should be noted, however, that while this study only covers China and North Korea, other Asian governments such as Mongolia and North Vietnam, also contributed to the Southern African liberation struggle.

I: China

Chinese Contributions to the Southern African Liberation Struggle:

This section on Chinese contributions to the Southern African liberation struggle highlights the key policy developments and events which affected Beijing's relations with the various African liberation movements. This evolved along with its broader foreign policy that had largely pragmatic motivations. It is essential to note that the Chinese government's actions were largely driven by domestic factors and the leaders' desire to create 'favourable external conditions' conducive to the implementation of its 'grand strategy.'³ This is the common thread that runs through the period under study, the 1960s till 1994.

A Successful Revolutionary Government

The founding of 'New China' by the victorious Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949 was a milestone in international history. Its significance was extolled by Chinese leaders, who believed that their successful, peasant-based revolution brought liberation movements the world over, into a new epoch. Beijing operated within the Moscow-led Communist fraternity and in its foreign relations projected itself as a stridently anti-imperialist, revolutionary country which heavily emphasised class struggle.⁴ This radical stance shifted to a more moderate one around the mid-1950s, most notably linked to the rising Afro-Asian trend in international politics. Chairman

(3) Jian Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, ed. John Lewis Gaddis, *The New Cold War History* (London, 2001), p.279.

(4) Ian Taylor, *China and Africa: Engagement and compromise* (Oxon, 2006), pp. 17-18. Jian Chen, "China and the Bandung Conference: changing perceptions and representations," in *Bandung Revisited: the legacy of the 1955*

Mao Zedong saw an opportunity for Beijing to strengthen its international profile and personally oversaw the Chinese delegation's preparations for the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, Indonesia. He charged the delegates with the mission to build up the united front for global peace and national independence, as well as to cultivate relations with the Afro-Asian countries.⁵ These ties would be anchored on the Five Principles of Mutual Coexistence which, briefly, captured the elements of mutual respect for territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, as well as peaceful coexistence.⁶ While Beijing's interpretation and re-interpretation of these elements would later evolve along with its leaders' political assessments, at the time the Principles were an effective introductory card to foreign governments which otherwise had few dealings with China.

The Bandung Conference offered Beijing the opportunity to establish contacts beyond the Socialist Bloc and an independent platform on which to pursue relations with the governments of newly independent countries in the 'intermediate zone.' Furthermore, a number of African liberation movements had sent delegations to attend the conference as observers. In the case of the delegates from South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) Moses Kotane and Moulvi Cachalia from the Indian Congress, they accepted an invitation to visit China immediately after the Conference.⁷ Indeed, at the 8th CPC Congress in 1956, Mao declared that the time had come for China to actively support African liberation movements.⁸ This was despite the reality of China's relatively low capacity to assist in anything beyond infantry weapons in small quantities at the time. Beijing's membership in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO), created after the 1957 Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in Cairo, was another important milestone as Beijing then had a new outlet for its pronouncements, expressions of solidarity and, essentially, contact with representatives of liberation movements. This will be discussed further in a later section.

Nonetheless, much of Chinese foreign policy and economic relations was still influenced by the Soviet government, though Mao was becoming increasingly disillusioned with Soviet policy, not least of all what he considered its niggardly aid programmes in China.⁹ His Great Leap Forward campaign in 1958 was an attempt to 'dramatically radicalise' Chinese foreign and domestic policy by placing China at

Asian-African Conference for International Order, ed. See Seng Tan and Amitav Acharya (Singapore, 2008), p. 133.

(5) Hua Huang, *Huang Hua Memoirs: contemporary history and diplomacy of China* (Beijing, 2008), pp. 154-155.

(6) Taylor, *China and Africa*, p. 18.

(7) At the time, the 'resurrection' of the South African Communist Party had not been made public, so Kotane represented the ANC, while Cachalia represented the Indian Congress (or Congress Alliance) because Indians could not become ANC members. Thanks to Prof. Shubin for this clarification.

(8) National Archives (NA), DO214/116, Chinese Aid to Tanzania. Economic Intelligence Group. Chinese Economic Penetration Activities in the Underdeveloped World with Special Reference to Africa.

(9) Moscow had demanded payment for most of the military assistance which it delivered to the PRC during the Korean War, which exacted a heavy economic toll on the struggling Chinese economy. According to Chen, 'Stalin's stinginess made the Soviets seem more like arms merchants than genuine Communist internationalists' to the Chinese. Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, p. 61.

the centre of world revolution.¹⁰ This ruinous campaign marked the end of Beijing's hitherto moderate foreign policy and made the country an economic wreck. At the same time, Mao stoked international tension by instigating the Taiwan Straits crisis, in order to garner domestic support and bolster China's reputation as a militant anti-imperialist power:

This will surely produce a shock wave in the world. Not only will the Americans be shocked, but the Asians and the Europeans will be shocked too. The people in the Arab world will be delighted, and the vast masses in Asia and Africa will take our side.¹¹

AAPSO as an Arena for Militant Solidarity, Late 1950s to Early 1960s

The AAPSO was a unique international platform which allowed liberation movements in colonial countries to participate as equal members, and not merely as observers, alongside government delegations from independent states. The Organisation issued strong anti-imperialist resolutions and condemnations and, following the establishment of its Solidarity Fund in 1960/1961, gave material and financial assistance to liberation movements. Unsurprisingly, the Organisation was eyed with suspicion by many Western governments. It was financed mainly by Egypt, the Soviet Union and China and its Cairo-based Permanent Secretariat embodied 'the hard political core of Afro-Asianism.'¹² AAPSO was an arena in which Beijing could forge contacts with many African liberation fighters, at the time when the Chinese leaders' attention were shifting from the Middle East, centred on Egypt from 1957, to Africa from the early 1960s.¹³ Africa was deemed the crux of the anti-colonial struggle and where the East-West battle for the 'intermediate zone' countries was taking place.¹⁴

The AAPSO Solidarity Fund was created in 1960 to provide assistance to Afro-Asian liberation movements and, significantly, a Chinese delegate was elected Second Deputy to the Fund Committee President.¹⁵ The Chinese government made a material contribution of \$40,000 to the Fund in early 1961 and provided scholarships for students, residence for the nationalist fighters' medical care and treatment in sanatoria, as well as visits.¹⁶ Many of the African representatives felt that the Chinese leaders' revolutionary experience and successful national liberation struggle allowed them to

(10) *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73 Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War.*, pp. 211-212. Chen, "Bandung Revisited." p. 136.

(11) Chen, "Bandung Revisited." p. 136. Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War.*, p. 347.

(12) NA, FO1110/1231, United States-United Kingdom Information Working Group Meeting, March 1969, United Kingdom Brief, Afro-Asianism.

(13) Yitzhak Shichor, *The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy, 1949-1977* (Cambridge, 1979), p. 97.

(14) *Ibid.*, p. 97.

(15) Taylor, *China and Africa.*, p. 24.

(16) Other commitments of support came from Indonesia, the United Arab Republic and USSR. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, *Afro-Asian Bulletin III* (10-13 April 1961, Bandung, Indonesia, 1961), p. 64. Receipt of the Chinese contribution was noted in this report: Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, "Report of the Activities of the Afro-Asian Fund Committee to the Executive Committee, Gaza 9-11 December 1961," *Afro-Asian Bulletin IV* (March-April 1962, 1961), p. 47.

identify with other liberation groups.¹⁷ Beijing's emphasis on its shared experience of oppression also fostered the rapport and had a strong visceral resonance. While the CPC did not have formal relations with non-Communist parties at the time, it took a flexible approach and dealt with governments and liberation movements regardless of the political system.¹⁸

The Chinese influence in AAPSO peaked in the early 1960s, as the Sino-Soviet dispute burst onto the international scene.¹⁹ The Organisation's strong Communist backing meant it was particularly affected by the growing rift and was even undermined in some cases, as Beijing tried to assert its dominance in related Afro-Asian groups. The Afro-Asian Writers and Afro-Asian Journalists Association, for instance, counted many African nationalists in their membership. Many of their events ended up in polemical arguments between the two communist camps, much to the frustration and disillusionment of the Afro-Asian delegates who had concerns of their own.

At its crux, the Sino-Soviet dispute was a political rather than ideological disagreement. It traumatised the international Communist fraternity and changed the external dynamics facing many of the African liberation movements. In a number of cases, Beijing pushed hard for the groups to adopt an anti-Soviet position and when this did not bear fruit, as in the case of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and African National Congress (ANC), Beijing suspended relations with them. For many liberation movements which continued to receive Chinese support, their relations with Eastern Bloc sponsors came under strain.²⁰ There are also anecdotal accounts of disagreements between African cadres over Sino-Soviet issues.

Institutional Developments to Facilitate Contact and Support with the Movements
Beijing's increasing ties with African governments and liberation movements were fostered through the establishment of a dense network of friendship and cultural organisations in the mid-1950s to early 1960s.²¹ Some organised mass demonstrations of solidarity and issued declarations of support for the struggles in Southern Africa, to raise the level of awareness amongst the Chinese people. Other official bodies which

(17) Abdul Rahman Mohamed Babu, *The Future That Works: selected writings of A. M. Babu*, ed. Salma Babu and Amrit Wilson (Trenton, New Jersey, 2002), p. xvii.

(18) NA, FO371/184298, Chinese Contingent to the Afro-Asian Conference, Algiers, 24 June 1965.

(19) Charles Neuhauser, *China and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, 1957-1967*, Harvard East Asian Monographs (Cambridge, MA, 1968).

(20) Hans Georg Schleicher and Illona Schleicher, *Special flights: the GDR and liberation movements in southern Africa* (Harare, Zimbabwe, 1998), pp. 95-101.

(21) These included the Chinese People's Association for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, Commission for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, All China Youth Federation, All China Students' Federation, All China Federation of Trade Unions, Chinese Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, Sino-African People's Friendship Association. The Institute of Foreign Affairs in particular, dealt with foreign non-communist parties. These supported Beijing's foreign policy through organising solidarity activities and visits or study tours to China. Weiyun Zhong and Sujiang Xu, "China's support for and solidarity with South Africa's liberation struggle," in *The Road to Democracy in South Africa*, ed. South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET) (Unisa, 2008). Fritz Schatten, *Communism in Africa* (New York, 1966), p. 219 Donovan C. Chau, "Grand Strategy into Africa: Communist China's use of political warfare, 1955-1976" (PhD, University of Reading, 2005), p. 47.

supported these activities were the main branches of the propaganda department: the New China News Agency (NCNA), People's Daily newspaper and the Foreign Languages Publications Bureau.²² As Beijing's formal African policy expanded, NCNA bureaus were set up Accra, Dar es Salaam and Algiers. NCNA representatives were useful points of contact for the liberation movements based there and the Agency as a whole played the dual role of gathering information for the Chinese government, as well as disseminating information about its policies overseas. Its representatives were authorised to contact local officials and liberation movements, particularly to assess local sentiments about the Chinese government.²³ Jonas Savimbi, who established UNITA in 1966, was given some financial assistance by the NCNA representative Gao Liang in 1965.²⁴ The Agency also hired local correspondents and filed news stories on the African liberation struggles, which were subsequently broadcasted by Radio Beijing.²⁵ Indeed, from the early 1960s, there were Africans based at Radio Beijing's headquarters in China.²⁶ Its extensive African service was reportedly the loudest and clearest signal of any foreign station broadcasting to Africa.²⁷

Military Supplies, Instruction and Ideological Training for the Liberation Movements Chinese assistance was channelled through the Organisation for African Unity's (OAU) Liberation Committee that was established in 1963. Viewing it as a marker of African opinion, Beijing valued its recommendations. However, the more prominent role that the Tanzanian and Zambian governments played in the Committee from the late 1960s and Beijing's close relations with both, even during the Cultural Revolution, led to more direct coordination for Chinese supplies and trainers between the Beijing and Dar es Salaam until the early 1970s.

The Chinese foreign ministry, defence ministry and People's Liberation Army (PLA) started coordinating their activities when military assistance to African governments and liberation groups began.²⁸ The military training methods at academies in Nanjing, Wuhan and Shanghai were reportedly of different duration and content, and

(22) Barbara Barnouin and Changgen Yu, *Chinese Foreign Policy during the Cultural Revolution* (London and New York, 1998), pp. 55-57.

(23) Chau, "Grand Strategy into Africa", p. 42. In his memoirs, Huang Hua, who was appointed China's Ambassador to Ghana in August 1960, mentions that he his preparation for the assignment included 'acquired a great deal of knowledge from Wang Shu, the NCNA reporter who had been working in Ghana for some time. He was not only familiar with the political and social situation in the country, but also had a lot of friends there and in other African countries.' Huang, *Huang Hua Memoirs.*, p. 167.

(24) Steven F. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy: the case of Angola and Mozambique (1961-1993)," *The China Quarterly* (June 1995, 1995). Savimbi left the FNLA in 1964 and established UNITA in 1966.

(25) Zanzibari Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu was NCNA's East African correspondent. He was also the Secretary General of the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) and received Chinese funds for the publication of their bulletin, *Zanews*, in the early 1960s.

(26) Red Guard Publication, *Long Live Mao Zedong Thought*, "Conversation with Zanzibar Expert M. M. Ali and his wife," 18 June 1964. Transcript also available from Maoist Documentation Project, www.marxists.org [accessed 30 May 2009].

(27) Soviet and East European broadcasts to Africa were apparently less loud and clear, but more extensive. NA, DO214/116, *Chinese Aid to Tanzania. Communist Chinese Activity in Africa (draft version)*; NA, FO371/150472, *Broadcasts in English: Peking Radio*.

(28) Zhong and Xu, "China's support."

focused on tactical rather than theoretical training.²⁹ Chinese instructors provided training on building up a militia, guerrilla warfare and tactics. However, Beijing was unable to provide large amounts of military equipment or advanced technology to create a modern army. Rather, it concentrated on contributing small arms, light and medium ground force equipment, which also had a greater political and symbolic effect.³⁰ In June 1964, a press report circulating in West Berlin mentioned that some young Africans from Nigeria, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, Cameroon and Congo were being trained in guerrilla warfare in Harbin, Nanjing and other locations in northeast China.³¹ Some of the trainees returned to military camps in Africa and taught alongside Chinese advisors.³² In Tanzania, Chinese military instructors arrived at the training camps in 1965. They focused on military tactics, technical planning, guerrilla warfare, the use of Chinese weapons, the establishment of rural revolutionary bases and ambush techniques.³³ The Tanzanian government was the first African government to accept Chinese military aid as a government-to-government transaction for its own forces and this relationship was crucial in Beijing's logistical ability to support the movements.³⁴ Consignments of arms and supplies from Chinese ships docked at Dar es Salaam were handed over to the Tanzanian armed forces, which managed the stockpiling and distribution of arms to the movements.³⁵ Dar es Salaam quickly became the main entry point for Soviet and Chinese arms bound for the liberation movements in southern Africa. Initially, the arms that were sent by Beijing were quite old, but the range and quality improved with the modernisation of the Chinese military industry from 1964, after which light and medium artillery were sent.³⁶ By March 1966, an estimated 11,000 tonnes of weapons and material had arrived on Chinese ships, a portion of which was designated for the liberation movements.³⁷ By 1970, Chinese instructors were the only foreigners working with the Tanzanian armed forces and also the largest contributor of material and training

(29) Bih-Jaw Lin, "Communist Chinese involvement with African liberation movements in Mozambique, Rhodesia and French Somaliland, 1964-1974," *African Studies*, National Chengchi University, Association of African Studies, Republic of China (1 December 1978, 1978).

(30) Anne Gilks and Gerald Segal, *China and the Arms Trade*, ed. Michael Leifer, Croom Helm International Politics in Asia Series (Kent, 1985), p. 32.

(31) Ian Greig, *The Communist Challenge to Africa: An Analysis of Contemporary Soviet, Chinese and Cuban Policies*, First ed. (Richmond, 1977), p. 146.

(32) Gilks and Segal, *China and the Arms Trade*, pp. 39-42.

(33) Lin, "Communist Chinese involvement with African liberation movements in Mozambique, Rhodesia and French Somaliland, 1964-1974."

(34) Twesigye, Christopher B. *Tanzania-Zambia Relations 1964-1979: A Case Study in Inter-African Cooperation*, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, University of London, 1980, p. 206. NA, DO214/116, Chinese Aid to Tanzania. Economic Intelligence Group. Chinese Economic Penetration Activities in the Underdeveloped World with Special Reference to Africa.

(35) Greig, *The Communist Challenge to Africa*. A 6,000 tonne freighter, the Heping arrived in Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar in May and September 1964. NA, DO214/116, Chinese Aid to Tanzania. 10 September 1964, No. 1374, Chinese Military Assistance.

(36) Gilks and Segal, *China and the Arms Trade*, pp. 37-38.

(37) *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.

to the African liberation groups based in Tanzania.³⁸ The types of weapons supplied by both communist countries were roughly comparable and Beijing also supplied second-hand Soviet weapons or copies. However, Soviet weapons were generally more sophisticated than Chinese and often included bazookas, mortars and anti-aircraft guns.³⁹

The Chinese government also provided political and ideological training which covered aspects of Mao's works, communist ideology, and in the case of the South African Communist Party (SACP), it tailored a programme to their request. The visits and study trips by representatives of the liberation movements also shaped their attitudes towards China through firsthand exposure to scenes of diligent work by a large, politically mobilised population. Probably the most potent and attractive aspect of Chinese military training for the liberation movements was guerrilla warfare, in particular, the importance of politicising the people prior to launching the armed struggle. In the case of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the adoption of these tactics fundamentally transformed their armed struggle in the late 1960s and gave it a decisive upper hand in its battle against the better equipped Rhodesian forces. The mobilisation of the masses along Maoist lines enabled ZANU to consolidate its power amongst the populace, which eventually allowed it to draw on that support base against ZAPU as well.

Diplomatic Crises in Africa, 1964 to 1965

Premier Zhou En Lai's tour of African states in late 1963 and early 1964 was controversial. On one hand, it demonstrated that Africa and African issues were a priority to the Chinese government. On the other hand, many western governments became increasingly concerned by the growing Chinese presence on the African continent. The Zanzibar revolution in January 1964 and army mutinies in East Africa fed into the 'hysteria' in London and Washington about China, 'a nation both Communist and coloured.'⁴⁰ Although it was later concluded that there was no Chinese hand behind these events, it was feared that Zanzibar would become a base for subversive communist influence 'from Kenya to the Cape' and result in a 'communist takeover of leadership of southern African liberation movements.'⁴¹

Chinese diplomatic gains on the continent came to a head in 1965 because its support for some opposition groups against independent African governments led to a general fear of Chinese subversion.⁴² Moreover, Beijing's hasty recognition of

(38) Weinstein, Warren, and Henriksen, Thomas H. *Soviet and Chinese aid to African nations* (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 187 in Gleijeses, Piero. *Conflicting missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, Envisioning Cuba* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 227. George T. Yu, *China and Tanzania: A Study in Cooperative Interaction*, vol. 5 (Berkeley, 1970).

(39) Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, *Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-1985*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (Oxford, 1987).

(40) Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington and Africa, 1959-1975* (Chapel Hill and London, 2002), p. 57.

(41) Ibid.

(42) Michael B. Yahuda, "Chinese Foreign Policy after 1963: the Maoist phases," *China Quarterly* (October-December 1968, 1968). The government of Burundi suspended relations with Beijing in January 1965 and relations

Houari Boumedienne's coup government in Algeria, which ousted Ben Bella, was heavily criticised by many African leaders. The subsequent postponement of the 2nd 'Bandung' Conference which would have taken place in Algiers was a setback for the Chinese who had canvassed so hard for it.⁴³ Overall though, many African governments maintained cordial relations with Beijing and were willing to look beyond these episodes because China was considered a big power, and thus, an important partner.

The height of the Cultural Revolution, 1966 to late 1960s

The launch of Mao's Great Proletariat Revolution in 1966 exacerbated the situation by throwing the Chinese Foreign Ministry into disarray and consequently, catapulting its policies into an ultra leftist direction. Mao launched the Great Proletariat Revolution in 1966, ostensibly to keep the county on its path of continuous revolution and to stave off 'capitalist restoration', a disturbing trend which he saw developing in the Soviet Union.⁴⁴ Although it was a domestic campaign, its effects were wide-ranging and deleterious on the Chinese government and highly radicalised Beijing's international perception and related decision-making.⁴⁵ Beijing situated itself at the core of the international revolutionary movement and churned out intense propaganda, lavishing the solidarity and support of the millions of Chinese people on selected anti-imperialist struggles.⁴⁶ Official propaganda published by the NCNA and in the People's Daily very quickly reflected the radical position as the Central Committee propaganda department was taken over by the Central Cultural Revolution Group (CCRG) at an early stage of the campaign.⁴⁷ The foreign ministry was crippled and in spite of Zhou's relatively moderate stance and attempts to limit its damage within the ministry, the campaign's effect on foreign relations was inevitable.⁴⁸ Official diplomatic relations contracted as Chinese embassies were rendered impotent: in early 1967 an estimated 2,000 embassy and foreign ministry staff left their posts and returned to China to 'correct' the rightist tendencies in the embassies.⁴⁹

The groups which received predominantly Chinese support like ZANU, PAC, SWANU and COREMO, were effectively cut off from AAPS following the Nicosia Conference in February 1967. SWANU had been a member from the late 1950s and the other movements had their applications for membership rejected. The southern

were resumed in October 1971. Congo-Brazzaville and in July [Year?] , an NCNA correspondent was deported from Kenya. Kenyatta's invitation to Zhou was cancelled because the latter's speech describing the African situation as being ready for revolution was considered incendiary. Alan Hutchison, *China's African Revolution* (Boulder, Colorado, 1976), p. 119. Mohamed A. El-Khawas, "China's Changing Policies in Africa," Issue: *A Journal of Opinion* 3 (Spring 1973, 1973).

(43) NA, DO185/4, Letter from Foreign Office to the CRO, 1 July 1965. NA, FO371/184302, Despatch No. 28, 8 November 1965.

(44) Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War.*, p. 243.

(45) Barnouin and Yu, *Chinese Foreign Policy.*, pp. vii-viii.

(46) Chen, "Bandung Revisited." p. 139-140.

(47) Barnouin and Yu, *Chinese Foreign Policy.*, p. 7.

(48) *Ibid.*, p. 58.

(49) Huang, *Huang Hua Memoirs.*, p. 197. El-Khawas, "China's Changing Policies in Africa." p. 26.

African liberation movements which were AAPSO members (ANC, ZAPU, SWAPO, MPLA, FRELIMO, MOLINACO and PAIGC) continued to receive Moscow's support and an appeal was issued after the AAPSO World Peace Council's Khartoum Conference, in January 1969, for them to be considered the 'sole and authentic representatives of their peoples' which allowed them access to more support.⁵⁰ This was despite the fact that ZANU, SWANU, PAC and FNLA, all had OAU recognition as well, and resulted in a greater dependence on Beijing as a source of support.⁵¹ In response to the Khartoum Conference, Beijing published condemnations of the meeting and allegedly sent a large group of correspondents to disrupt conference proceedings.⁵² The People's Daily had earlier published an article by COREMO, PAC, SWANU, and ZANU condemning 'Soviet revisionism' in 1966 and again in 1969.

Beijing withdrew from the AAPSO in 1967, its belligerent anti-Soviet position already been criticised by a number of Afro-Asian delegations, and now unable to extend itself because of the Cultural Revolution. The campaign reached the highest decision-making levels and diplomatic representatives from the field, effectively disabling Chinese diplomacy for a period. Moreover, African students on scholarships and training programmes in China were sent home.⁵³ From early 1967, this trend intensified, with the radical middle-level embassy officials actively propagating Mao Zedong Thought, armed with paraphernalia of publications and badges.⁵⁴ An NCNA article from December 1967 article claimed:

More and more of the oppressed African nations are recognising that Mao Zedong Thought is their strongest weapon for gaining true independence, and armed struggle is their road to gaining liberation ... in Congo (Kinshasa), Mozambique, Angola and Portuguese Guinea.⁵⁵

As an indication of the pervasiveness of this fervour, Quotations from Chairman Mao Zedong, popularly known as Mao's 'little red book,' was apparently translated into 25 different languages. The book reached its 51st edition and was circulated in 25 countries and regions between June 1966 and June 1969.⁵⁶

During this highly radical period, there was a rift between the government's policymaking based on 'national interest' with their embassies' actions overseas. These dramatic changes within China caused some consternation amongst foreign observers, who found it hard to reconcile Mao's stated intentions and what they saw on the ground. Even fellow communist revolutionary Kim Il Sung criticised the campaign and intellectuals such as ZANU insider Fay Chung, found themselves

(50) Scott Thomas, *The Diplomacy of Liberation: the foreign relations of the ANC since 1960* (London, 1996), p. 60.

(51) David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, *The Struggle for Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War* (London, 1981), pp. 14-15.

(52) NA, FCO45/69, The Khartoum Conference in Support of African Liberation Movements, January 1969.

(53) El-Khawas, "China's Changing Policies in Africa." p. 26.

(54) Barnouin and Yu, *Chinese Foreign Policy.*, pp. vii-viii.

(55) *People's Daily*, 9 December 1967.

(56) *Peking Review*, No. 40, 3 October 1969, p. 31.

marginalised by the Chinese position.⁵⁷ The effects of the campaign constrained the Chinese government's capacity to provide significant amounts of practical assistance during that time,⁵⁸ as it had disrupted China's military, industrial and technological capacity because of the purges of intellectuals and 'bourgeois' experts.⁵⁹ What was available was directed mainly to breakaway or splinter groups such as Mozambique's COREMO, Namibia's SWANU and South Africa's PAC. Although low-level contact was maintained with a number of the dominant, Moscow-supported groups like SWAPO, FRELIMO, ZAPU and the ANC, many of the splinter groups were in search of patronage and would publicly endorse Beijing's foreign policy positions and the wisdom of Mao Zedong Thought, while criticising the Soviet Union ('modern revisionists'). For some of these movements, recognition from an independent government –and more so by a large country like China– was a source of prestige and legitimacy. Beijing appeared to favour groups which appeared to be fighting, regardless of whether they were actually viable and capable liberation movements.⁶⁰ For example, although Beijing maintained ties with Mozambique's FRELIMO throughout the Cultural Revolution, it was COREMO which received exclusive mention in the Chinese press in 1967.

Beijing's emphasis was on nationalism (albeit a militant form) through the creation of a worldwide united front against imperialism, rather than the imposition of socialism.⁶¹ It was perhaps considered more acceptable to many of the national bourgeoisie in the newly independent African countries, as compared to the more 'sectarian' Soviet approach.⁶² Mao viewed the national bourgeoisie as an ally, which is why there was no contradiction in dealing with different kinds of governments. Indeed, unlike the Soviet and North Vietnamese governments, Beijing established ties with a range of African governments and movements, regardless of their political persuasion. This flexible foreign policy would eventually contribute to its success at the United Nations in 1971, which is discussed in a later section.

Beijing turned to Africa again after the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution, but with different underlying motivations. It would soon cast off its radical agenda and cultivate ties with African governments regardless of political persuasion and this period witnessed the success of its 'no strings attached' economic assistance programmes across the continent.⁶³ The American Assistant Secretary for African

(57) Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World interventions and the making of our times*, Second ed. (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 163-164. Fay Chung, *Re-Living the Second Chimurenga: Memories of Zimbabwe's Liberation Struggle* (2006).

(58) With one exception – the TanZam rail link, which is discussed further along in the chapter.

(59) Daewon Ohn, "The Challenge of a Resurgent Great Power: China's Grand Strategy and Military Modernisation, 1978-1998" (PhD, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2000), p. 116.

(60) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy," p. 400.

(61) From the China Today website. 'Grace Under Pressure: My Dance with Diplomacy', narrated by former Chinese diplomat Wu Jianmin (http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/ctenglish/se/txt/2009-09/27/content_219817.htm) [accessed 7 December 2009]. The South African Communist Party (SACP) was one of the few African communist parties that the CPC had official ties with in the 1960s. Zhong and Xu, "China's support," pp. 31-32.

(62) From conversation with AAPSO Secretary General Nouri Abulrazzak Hussain in Cairo, May 2009.

(63) El-Khawass, "China's Changing Policies in Africa," p. 26. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*, p. 238.

Affairs, David Newsom, observed wryly that from 1970, Beijing was ‘deemphasizing subversion’ in order to improve relations with existing governments.⁶⁴ This reassured the governments that Beijing would limit its revolutionary support to the southern African region.⁶⁵ Chinese ambassadors returned to their posts in the early 1970s. The emphasis was now on winning the support of the frontline governments and other African governments.⁶⁶ As a result, 15 African governments established (or resumed) diplomatic relations with Beijing between October 1970 and October 1972.⁶⁷

However, Beijing’s support for the anti-MPLA forces in Angola in 1975 was disastrous and eroded its standing amongst many African governments. Coupled with Mao’s death in 1976, it ushered in a much less vigorous African policy in Deng’s period of reform.

Tanzania-Zambia Rail Link – Chinese Support for a Massive African Nationalist Project The clear exception to Beijing’s otherwise decreasing volume of assistance was the TanZam rail link project. During Nyerere’s February 1965 visit to Beijing, the Chinese leaders offered to finance and construct the Tanzania-Zambia (TanZam) railway. Up to that point the project had been proposed to (and rejected by) the World Bank, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States and Japan, all of whom had assessed the massive project on its economic merit.⁶⁸ But more than for reasons of infrastructural development, the TanZam rail link was a revolutionary, anti-imperialist project raised by two frontline African governments. It would be an artery through independent African territory and reduce Zambia’s economic and political dependence on the Rhodesian regime, thus creating a more effective rear base for the southern African nationalist movements.

News of the Chinese offer raised alarm bells in many, mainly western, governments which feared that the new link would allow military supplies to be sent from Dar es Salaam to the liberation movement’s base camps.⁶⁹ In spite of the furore surrounding it, the project went ahead, was completed and handed over to the Tanzanian and Zambian governments in 1975. It is not clear however if it was indeed used to transport supplies directly to the movements, though the massive undertaking was a boost to Beijing’s image amongst many Africans and their governments.

International Affairs and the ‘One China’ Policy

From the start, a core aspect of Beijing’s foreign relations was recognition of its ‘One China’ policy regarding the Republic of China (RoC, Taiwan). The Taiwanese

(64) Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions*., p. 238.

(65) El-Khawas, “China’s Changing Policies in Africa.” p. 26.

(66) Taylor, *China and Africa*., p. 37.

(67) Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy.”

(68) Until 1965, all the surveys concluded that the project would be economically unviable. The Maxwell Stamp report, completed in 1966 after Rhodesian unilateral declaration of independence (UDI), was the only one which concluded that there could be economic feasibility. Mutukwa, Kasuka, S. *Politics of the Tanzania-Zambia Railproject: A study of Tanzania-China-Zambia relations*, University Press of America, 1977.

(69) Greig, *The Communist Challenge to Africa*. The proposed rail link also threatened British and Southern Rhodesian vested economic interests in the region.

authorities also had aid projects in African countries, though they were mainly limited to agricultural development and training, on site or in Taipei. Taipei's underlying objective was to entrench its position as the legitimate representative of China at the UN.⁷⁰ However, its effectiveness was constrained by the limited amount of technical aid it could provide and, more importantly, the fact that it was a significantly smaller power, hence commanding less respect, than Beijing.⁷¹ When the People's Republic of China replaced the Republic of China on the UN Security Council in October 1971, it was largely thanks to the support of many African governments. Beijing was thereafter able to use its UNSC vote to support a number of important resolutions on southern African issues. However Taipei's appeal was enhanced as its economic strength grew and it was able to offer more generous aid packages. In the southern African countries covered in this study, the Taiwan issue was most prominent in the South African case. The UN became the new platform for Beijing to articulate its foreign policy. Deng presented Mao's Three Worlds Theory at the UN General Assembly in April 1974. Socialist countries and 'oppressed nations' constituted the Third World and were the primary force in countering the hegemonic and imperialist superpowers. Significantly, Beijing categorised itself as part of the Third World.⁷² On a broader level, Mao's theory shattered the remaining vestiges of unity in the communist bloc, creating a new space for his plan for China's 'great transformation' that emphasised development.⁷³

In 1974 the OAU Liberation Committee sent a goodwill mission to the socialist countries and in April Zhou met the delegation led by Somali foreign minister Omar Arteh Ghalib.⁷⁴ The visit overlapped with the tail-end of Nyerere's state visit during which Zhou spoke of China's proletariat internationalist duty to support revolutionary struggles elsewhere, adding, "How can a communist party or a socialist country be worthy of its name if it does not support the people's revolutionary struggle?"⁷⁵ The OAU delegation toured some historical revolutionary sites, including

(70) American documents reveal that there was close coordination between the Taiwanese and American embassies in Africa. Beijing's growing engagement there were viewed by Washington as a direct threat to overall American policies in Africa and were of immediate important for their China policies. NARA, RG59 (General Records of the Department of State), Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records relating to the Republic of China: 1963-1966, Entry 5220 Box 1, Lot 69D28, Republic of China Technical Assistance Programme in Africa, 24 August 1964. NARA, RG59 (General Records of the Department of State), Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records relating to the Republic of China: 1963-1966, Entry 5220 Box 1, Lot 69D28, Countering Chinese Communist Inroads in Africa – Action Memorandum, 19 October 1964. Washington also provided some financial support for Taiwan's aid programme in Africa, Operation Vanguard, which was not publicised as it was considered 'imperative to preserve the unique Chinese image' of the programme. NARA, RG59 (General Records of the Department of State), Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records relating to the Republic of China: 1963-1966, Entry 5220 Box 1, Lot 69D28, Your Appointment with Republic of China Vice Foreign Minister Yang, 24 August 1964.

(71) Liang-Tsai Wei, *Peking versus Taipei in Africa, 1960-1978* (Taipei, 1982), p. 399.

(72) Barnouin and Yu, *Chinese Foreign Policy*, p. 50.

(73) Jian Chen, "China's Changing Attitude to the Third World" (paper presented at the Third World and the End of the Cold War: International Conference, London, London School of Economics and Political Science, IDEAS, 24-25 September 2009).

(74) *People's Daily*, 2 April 1974.

(75) Lin, "Communist Chinese involvement with African liberation movements in Mozambique, Rhodesia and French Somaliland, 1964-1974," pp. 55-56. *People's Daily*, 1 April 1974.

bunkers and underground facilities, and saw demonstrations of shooting, mortar fire and landmines, as well as tactics used during the CPC's struggle. It was given a consignment of military equipment and cash amounting to half a million dollars and a promise of material assistance, to arrive shortly after.⁷⁶ Omar Arteh Ghalib said that under Mao's enlightened leadership, China had given sincere and practical support to the African people's struggle.⁷⁷

Following Mao's death in 1976, the 11th Party Congress in 1978 shifted the Chinese government's attention to economic development and the diplomatic initiatives needed to create a peaceful external environment conducive to the modernisation process.⁷⁸ At the 3rd plenum of the CPC's 12th Central Committee from November to December 1978, Deng declared the Four Modernisations as China's paramount national goal. He was able to pursue his agenda of domestic economic development and 'profound de-revolutionisation process' unhindered.⁷⁹ The objective of military assistance shifted from 'an expression of Maoist proletarian internationalism' to more pressing concerns like obtaining hard currency and 'pragmatic interests.'⁸⁰ Deng observed that the international situation was 'moving towards relaxation' and even advocated to foreign friends that 'poverty was not socialism.'⁸¹ In the 1980s the supply of small arms to revolutionary movements was dramatically cut as the result of a reanalysis of Beijing's worldview and economic constraints.⁸²

Sino-Soviet negotiations to normalise relations began in 1982.⁸³ This paved the way for the normalisation of diplomatic relations with the MPLA-led government in Luanda. Premier Zhao Ziyang's tour of eleven African states in late 1982 to early 1983 committed new aid monies, including a \$33 million loan agreement and enlarged military cooperation with the newly independent (in 1980) Zimbabwean government led by Robert Mugabe. Across the board there was limited Chinese engagement with African countries as Beijing concentrated on fostering ties with developed countries to provide technological imports and generate valuable investment. Beijing's political and security priorities focused more keenly on the issue of Taiwan in Sino-African relations from the late 1980s until the early 1990s, most notably in South Africa, which was increasingly attractive to Beijing as a potential economic partner and source of

(76) The Committee unanimously agreed that the Chairman should send a letter of thanks to the Chinese government for the generous gesture. Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee, "Minutes of the Twenty-Third Session," (Yaounde, Cameroon, 1974)., p. 9. Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee, "Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Session," (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 1975)., p. 200.

(77) *People's Daily*, 31 March and 1 April 1974.

(78) Qichen Qian, *Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy* (New York, 2005)., p. 115.

(79) Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*., pp. 277-278.

(80) Ohn, "China's Grand Strategy", p. 199.

(81) Huang, *Huang Hua Memoirs*., p. 288. Deng also admitted that the Chinese government was unable to give much help to its third world friends because of her poor economic health. Remarks at a meeting with the Liberian Head of State, Samuel Kanyon Doe, 6 May 1982. Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Writings, Volume II (1975-1982)*, <http://web.peopledaily.com.cn/english/dengxp/vol2/text/b1570.html> [accessed 5 Feb 2009], edited by People's Daily Online.

(82) Gilks and Segal, *China and the Arms Trade*., p. 47.

(83) Qian, *Ten Episodes*., p. 1.

technology.⁸⁴ To the ANC and PAC, Beijing discouraged armed struggle and advised a united front approach instead.

Angola

Beijing provided assistance to all three major Angolan liberation movements at various times during their independence struggle. However, events on the ground in the run-up to independence in late 1975 exposed the severe rigidity of Chinese foreign policy when faced with the complex local and international dynamics in the Angolan situation. This provoked a backlash from many African governments and was a crisis for Chinese diplomacy on the continent.

This country study is organised into five sections: the first three present an overview of Chinese relations with the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA respectively, followed by a look at events in 1975 and finally, some concluding comments.

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)

The MPLA was formed in late 1956 and received its first contributions from the Chinese government indirectly via the Moscow-driven International Trade Union Fund.⁸⁵ Further connections were developed with a number of the movement's founding members through cultural and social solidarity activities. Viriato Francisco Clemente da Cruz, the first MPLA secretary general, and Mario de Andrade were active participants in AAPSO events where there were likely to have been many opportunities for contact with the Chinese representatives. One of the first MPLA delegations to visit China was invited by the Chinese Peoples' Institute of Foreign Affairs in August 1960.⁸⁶ Significantly, the MPLA's other wings also established valuable links with their Chinese counterparts. British records mention the presence of more than 30 Chinese military instructors at training centres belonging to the MPLA's military arm (FAPLA) in Congo-Brazzaville in the early 1960s. It should be noted, however, that the MPLA only moved there in 1963.⁸⁷ The MPLA's 'unofficial labour affiliate', UNTA, also had ties with the All China Federation of Trade Unions and sent delegations to China.⁸⁸ It has been suggested that Beijing's support was essential for the movement's survival during its early years.⁸⁹

(84) Wenping He, "The Balancing Act of China's Africa Policy," *China Security* 3 (Summer 2007, 2007).

(85) Beijing left the organisation in 1962 when Sino-Soviet relations soured. Vladimir Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War": the USSR in Southern Africa* (London, 2008), p. 9.

(86) John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: The Anatomy of an Explosion (1950-1962)*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1969), p. 44.

(87) This connection later suffered because of the Sino-Soviet split. FAPLA was heavy dependent on Soviet support. NA, FCO31/1866, Facts about Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) (Revised), August 1975.

(88) The Brazzaville-based association sent a delegation, led by Secretary General Pascal Luvuala, to China in April 1961. Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution I.*, p. 176. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy." Two years later, another UNTA delegation led by Emile M'Bidi Dongala attended the 1963 May Day celebrations in Beijing. John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare (1962-1976)*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1978).

(89) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy."

The Sino-Soviet split and the OAU's recognition of the FNLA/GRAE led to a shift in Beijing's focus to the FNLA and the Chinese press began reporting on the FNLA instead.⁹⁰ A minor factor that might have contributed to this was Da Cruz's dimming political fate within the MPLA, most starkly after his rival Agostinho Neto's installation as president at the December 1962 party conference. Da Cruz's defeat had been attributed to his radical position and 'Chinese connections', which he would later call on once again.⁹¹ Da Cruz attended the Beijing-sponsored Asian-African Journalists Association's (AAJA) conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, in April 1963.⁹² Shortly after, he left for China and worked for the AAJA and Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau in Beijing, marking the end of his direct participation in Angolan politics.⁹³

Beijing maintained contact with the MPLA even though it considered the group pro-Soviet and MPLA delegations continued to visit China.⁹⁴ Neto himself was adamant about steering clear of the Sino-Soviet fray and prioritised broad-based international support for the struggle.⁹⁵ Indeed, British records suggest that the Chinese Embassy in Brazzaville supplied the MPLA with a military advisor in 1965.⁹⁶ This nominal contact with the MPLA was sustained through the early phase of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, by which time Beijing was already in contact with the FNLA's Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi, who later founded UNITA. The MPLA's UNTA Secretary for Social Affairs, Moise Sebastien, visited China in June that year, after which there appears to have been a pause in relations until the early 1970s.⁹⁷ In July 1970, Neto assured the Soviets that there were 'no grounds for working closely with China' but within a year, relations with Beijing resumed.⁹⁸ By early 1971 the New China News Agency (NCNA) and Radio Beijing began mentioning the MPLA by name and a number of MPLA delegations visited China that year.⁹⁹ This included a delegation led by Neto, which met Premier Zhou Enlai and Chief of General Staff Huang Yungsheng. Their discussions led to the enrolment of twelve MPLA military commanders in a nine-month long political and military training course in China, as well as the training of other MPLA guerrillas by Chinese military instructors in

(90) David Kimchi, *The Afro-Asian Movement: ideology and foreign policy of the Third World* (Jerusalem, 1972), p. 184. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy." The Chinese sent a delegation to attend the opening of a local MPLA office in Luanda that year, officiated by Neto and Eduardo dos Santos. Lucilo Neto led an MPLA women's delegation to China in April 1965 which was followed soon after by a youth delegation the following February. Marcum, *Angolan Revolution Volume 2.*, p. 172.

(91) Marcum, *Angolan Revolution Volume 2.*, p. 27 and p. 121.

(92) *Ibid.*

(93) NA, FCO31/1866, Facts about Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) (Revised), August 1975. Da Cruz's speeches and statements occasionally appeared in the organisations' publications. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

(94) *Ibid.*, p. 172. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy."

(95) Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions.*, p. 242. In a 1972 speech, he dismissed allegations that MPLA was a communist organisation in either Moscow or Beijing's pay, calling them 'propaganda intended to fool our people.' Agostinho Neto, Commemorating the Fifteenth Anniversary of MPLA, Messages to Companions in the Struggle, Speeches by Dr Agostinho Neto, President Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Richmond, B. C. Canada, 1972).

(96) NA, FCO25/266, Angolan Resistance Movements, Africa Section, Research Department, 1 January 1969.

(97) Marcum, *Angolan Revolution Volume 2.*, p. 376.

(98) Westad, *Global Cold War.*, pp. 216-217.

(99) The delegation later visited North Korea and North Vietnam. *People's Daily*, 1 August 1971.

Tanzania.¹⁰⁰ This training gave the commanders a deeper understanding of Maoist guerrilla strategy and its emphasis on mobilising and politicising the people.¹⁰¹

It appears that Beijing-MPLA contact ceased from that point, only to resume in the post-independence period. This was due to a number of factors, not least of all the movement's internal strife, as evinced by its joint front with the FNLA in 1972, and tensions with its main sponsor, the Soviet Union.¹⁰² By the time of the Portuguese coup in April 1974, the MPLA appeared moribund.¹⁰³ Beijing was concentrating its assistance on the FNLA, to which arms and military instructors were sent from May 1974 until the end of that year. That summer, the breakaway MPLA faction also known as the Eastern Revolt faction, led by Daniel Chipenda, reportedly received some Chinese support as well.¹⁰⁴ His faction would later join the FNLA in February 1975.

National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA)

It has been suggested that the first contact Chinese officials had with the FNLA founder Holden Roberto was at the All-African People's Conference in Accra in December 1958.¹⁰⁵ The movement did not play a significant role in the solidarity organisations because of MPLA precedence and the latter's Soviet backing. Roberto was also more keen to solicit support from the Americans, Congolese and Tunisians, though the lack of response eventually pushed him to approach the Communist Bloc countries.¹⁰⁶ He met the Chinese Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, in Nairobi in January 1964 and according to British accounts, was offered 'all the assistance his organisation needed.'¹⁰⁷ Beijing viewed his group as a possible way to countervail Moscow's strong influence on the MPLA. However, it was logistically impossible for either Chinese personnel or supplies to be sent to the FNLA because it was based in Zaire, which recognised the Republic of China (Taiwan) and not the PRC. Therefore the little that was sent was transported via Algeria.

The situation changed once Sino-Zairean relations were normalised in November 1972, which was then formalised by Mobutu Sese Seko's visit to China the following January. This development was especially significant as it was a clear demonstration of Mao's willingness to work with incumbent African governments, even anti-communists.¹⁰⁸ During his China trip, Mobutu signed an agreement on economic and technical cooperation, which included a thirty-year interest-free loan of \$115

(100) The group that was trained in China included the future Chief of Staff of the Angolan Armed Forces, Joao Luis Neto (Xietu). Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions*, p. 242.

(101) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 22.

(102) Vladimir Shubin and Andrei Tokarev, "War in Angola: a Soviet dimension," *Review of African Political Economy* 28 (December 2001, 2001). Marcum, *Angolan Revolution Volume 2*, pp. 229-230. Shubin and Tokarev, "War in Angola."

(103) Westad, *Global Cold War*, p. 218. Shubin and Tokarev, "War in Angola."

(104) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy."

(105) *Ibid.*

(106) *Ibid.* *New York Times*, 4 January 1967.

(107) NA, FCO45/422, China/Portuguese Africa.

(108) Wolfgang Bartke, *The Economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries* (Hamburg, 1989), p. 145.

million. Mobutu was eager to marshal support for the FNLA and permitted Chinese instructors and arms to be sent directly to FNLA camps in Zaire.¹⁰⁹ An additional impetus to Chinese support for the FNLA was likely to have come from Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere as well, as he was frustrated with the MPLA's leadership problems and inactivity at the time.¹¹⁰ In December 1973, Roberto led a delegation on an 18 day trip to Beijing, at the invitation of the Chinese People's Association for Friendship in Foreign Countries. Their itinerary included visits to military, agricultural and industrial centres around Beijing, Canton and Shanghai. Most significantly, Roberto had the opportunity to speak with He Ying and Deng Xiaoping, and left China with the promise of substantial military aid.¹¹¹

Beijing supported the FNLA in order to guard against an MPLA victory, which would increase Soviet influence in the region.¹¹² Therefore a month after the Portuguese coup in May 1974, the first group of 112 Chinese military trainers arrived in Zaire.¹¹³ In early August, a second contingent of instructors joined them, reportedly with the task of training the guerrillas and creating a regular army of 15,000 soldiers, two-thirds of whom would be equipped by Beijing.¹¹⁴ This was followed by a shipment of 450 tonnes of arms in September and another of 30 tonnes at the end of the year.¹¹⁵ By then, there were an estimated 200 Chinese instructors training the FNLA forces in Zaire. Overall, the FNLA's military efforts were considerably limited and did not cause heavy damage on the Portuguese forces, though the movement's access to Chinese assistance magnified Moscow's concerns.

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA)

UNITA was formed in 1966 by Jonas Savimbi and Antonio da Costa Fernandes. Prior to the establishment of UNITA, Savimbi was with the FNLA until July 1965 and had undergone a brief training programme at Nanjing Military Academy in August and September 1964. When it became clear that he would set up a new liberation movement, he approached an old Chinese acquaintance for help. The NCNA agent Gao Liang, who was based in Accra when Savimbi first met him some years earlier, had been reassigned to Dar es Salaam.¹¹⁶ Savimbi contacted Gao and his request was forwarded to the Chinese government, which then sent \$1,000 through its embassy in Brazzaville. Savimbi travelled to China again in January 1965 to organise the training for UNITA's first recruits and to gain official Chinese recognition for the group.¹¹⁷ The Chinese government gave UNITA a donation of \$15,000 towards party funds, the first contribution that the movement received. Savimbi then took a more

(109) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 40.

(110) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy."

(111) Marcum, *Angolan Revolution* Volume 2., pp. 229-230.

(112) Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions.*, p. 238.

(113) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 40.

(114) Gilks and Segal, *China and the Arms Trade.*, p. 45.

(115) Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions.*, p. 238. Gilks and Segal, *China and the Arms Trade.*, p. 45.

(116) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy."

(117) Bridgland, Fred. *Jonas Savimbi: a key to Africa.*

extensive course in guerrilla strategy later that year and even overlapped for a while with the eleven guerrilla commanders who stayed till the following May.¹¹⁸ At some point during his China visits, though it is not entirely clear when, Savimbi allegedly had a planning meeting with Mao in Yunnan. The UNITA leader later claimed that that marked the movement's decision to return to Maoist principles and self-reliance, through mobilising peasant support as well as establishing a new base area in the area around their headquarters on the Lunge Bunge River.¹¹⁹ Mao had allegedly promised a shipment of arms and supplies through Tanzania, where Nyerere had agreed to accept them.

UNITA enjoyed the support of Tanzanian and, to a lesser extent, Zambian officials. Beijing had close ties with both frontline governments and this facilitated transportation of material through their territories. UNITA field commanders had allegedly been trained by Chinese instructors at Kongwa camp in early 1966, with the weapons having been supplied by Tanzania.¹²⁰ The eleven Nanjing-trained commanders returned to Dar es Salaam in June 1966 and were moved to a South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) camp outside the city. After a harrowing journey, they finally entered Angola on 26 October, the start of UNITA's armed struggle against Portuguese rule.¹²¹ However, the weapons which Beijing had promised were not sent, with the Chinese attributing this to the difficulty of transporting them through Tanzania and Zambia.¹²² Gao apparently managed to wire funds to Savimbi through Cassamba, in eastern Angola, instead.¹²³ Many of the 'Chinese Eleven' who were trained in Nanjing eventually held senior positions in UNITA's military wing, with the lessons in Maoist strategy having shaped their political and military strategies to some extent.¹²⁴ The group's ideological emphasis was on a strong revolutionary party in order to educate and mobilize the peasants.¹²⁵ UNITA representative N'Zau Puna went to Nanjing in December 1967, at the height of the Cultural Revolution, and returned to Africa in March 1968.¹²⁶ At the time he purportedly found some value in Mao's teachings on guerrilla warfare, but later recalled the Chinese trainers' attempts to indoctrinate him in Communist ideology.

According to British records, UNITA guerrillas captured by Portuguese forces in eastern Angola in early 1967 were found with weapons and demolition material of

(118) For a time their group also overlapped with the eleven ZANU soldiers who were led by Josiah Tongagora.

(119) F. Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa*, Macmillan, Braamfontein, 1986, pp. 74-75.

(120) NA, FCO25/266, Angolan Resistance Movements, Africa Section, Research Department, 1 January 1969.

(121) Jakkie Potgieter, "Taking aid from the devil himself": UNITA's support structures," in *Angola's War Economy: the role of oil and diamonds*, ed. Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (Pretoria, South Africa, 2000).

(122) Fred Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi: a key to Africa* (Edinburgh, 1986), p. 71.

(123) Potgieter, "Angola's War Economy," p. 256.

(124) These included Kapesi Fundanga, later UNITA Chief of Staff, Jose Kalundungo, later Head of Military Operations and Samuel Chiwala, future leader of UNITA's first core of Chokwe troops. Paulino Moises, one of the China 11, was UNITA's only mine expert, but was killed in battle very early on in the military struggle. However by 1986, only five of the original eleven were still with UNITA. Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, p. 67. Potgieter, "Angola's War Economy."

(125) Marcum, *Angolan Revolution* Volume 2., p. 195.

(126) Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi*, pp. 77-78.

suspected Chinese origin.¹²⁷ It is possible that this was connected to the funds sent by Gao, as the Chinese Embassy in Lusaka was suspected of having given UNITA funds to purchase arms, as well as a considerable amount of explosives and other materials required for producing the sabotage devices. British records suggest that, by February 1968, only 25 FALA members had received military training abroad, and of those the majority were trained in Egypt and the remainder in China.¹²⁸ After UNITA's bombing of the Benguela railway in 1967 and the loss of Zambia as a rear base in 1968 though, the movement received very little external support, save for nominal Chinese assistance.¹²⁹ According to British records, the Chinese Embassy in Lusaka appealed to President Kenneth Kaunda in April 1968 to rescind his decision to expel UNITA.¹³⁰ This intercession was futile and UNITA was only allowed to return to Zambia in 1974. If the Chinese did indeed make the request, it would have been a significant demonstration of Beijing's newly-won standing with Kaunda's government, largely derived from the Tanzania-Zambia rail link agreement signed in 1967.¹³¹

Through the mid- to late 1960s, NCNA articles highlighted UNITA as the leading Angolan movement, despite its low level of military activity. From the early 1970s, the Agency's reports turned its focus back to the MPLA, in line with the major shifts that were taking place in Chinese foreign policy.¹³² Savimbi revealed in an interview that Chinese assistance up to 1970 amounted to a very modest level of £5,000.¹³³ As the worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution passed and Mao made a more pragmatic assessment of the international situation, the Chinese government took a more even-handed approach towards the Angolan liberation movements and also channelled its support through the OAU Liberation Committee. As a result, its direct support for UNITA cooled.¹³⁴ Nonetheless, UNITA's 3rd Congress in August 1973 thanked the Chinese government for its continuous support and called Beijing's entry into the United Nations in 1971 a 'resounding victory ... for oppressed peoples of the world.'¹³⁵ There is little evidence on any further significant Chinese support for UNITA from this point on.

(127) NA, FCO25/266, Angolan Resistance Movements, Africa Section, Research Department, 1 January 1969.

(128) NA, FCO25/266, Angolan Resistance Movements, Africa Section, Research Department, 1 January 1969.

(129) Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions*., p. 238.

(130) NA, FCO25/266, Angolan Resistance Movements, Africa Section, Research Department, 1 January 1969.

(131) The technical agreement on the construction of the Tanzania-Zambia railway was signed in Beijing by the Zambian, Tanzanian and Chinese governments on 5 September 1967. The project was officially completed and handed over to the two African governments in June 1975. Xinhua News Agency, *China's Foreign Relations: a chronology of events (1949-1988)*, ed. Home News Library of the Xinhua News Agency (Beijing, 1989), p. 376. Prior to that, the Zambian government had also signed a cultural cooperation agreement with the Chinese government on 22 August 1966.

(132) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy."

(133) Marcum, *Angolan Revolution* Volume 2., pp. 229-230.

(134) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy."

(135) Marcum, *Angolan Revolution* Volume 2., pp. 229-230.

1975: The Alvor Agreement and Angolan independence

In early 1975, the OAU recognised all three Angolan movements and urged them towards a government of national unity.¹³⁶ The Alvor Agreement, signed by the Portuguese government and the three movements, set the date of Angolan independence for 11 November. On 28 January, Zhou sent identical messages to all three Angolan groups, congratulating them on their ‘victory’.¹³⁷ However, he gave ‘a very wary nod of approval to the recent turn of events’ and cautioned that it would take ‘continuous, arduous struggle to achieve full implementation of the agreement’s provisions.’¹³⁸ A post-mortem report that was prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office claimed that there was nothing specific about Chinese activities that could have provoked the subsequent Russian intervention in Angola:

Indeed, if anything the Chinese were in the process of limiting their already modest effort in Angola ... whatever the truth of subsequent Soviet press allegations that the Chinese sent military instructors for the FNLA to Zaire in the summer of 1974, Chinese financial help and arms for Angola at the start of 1975 was minimal and they had been in touch both with the MPLA and FNLA.¹³⁹

Officially, the Chinese government took an even-handed approach and received delegations from all three movements in the months that followed.¹⁴⁰

Armed confrontations between the three groups began in February and March.¹⁴¹ It is unclear if Beijing was aware that the Cubans were supporting the MPLA of their own volition and their presence was seen as an undesirable expansion of Soviet influence. Sino-Cuban relations were icy and their respective state media carried condemnations of each other’s actions.¹⁴²

In late March, UNITA’s general secretary Samuel Chiwala, who was trained in Nanjing in 1965, travelled to China and met with Secretary General Deng Xiaoping and representatives of the Friendship Association in Beijing.¹⁴³ He travelled onward to North Korea in early April and presumably requested military assistance. Around this time, Neto’s faction of the MPLA received greater support from the frontline

(136) The OAU’s position only changed with the entry of the South Africans in October 1975. Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy.”

(137) Ibid.

(138) NA, FCO31/1866, China and Southern Africa, British Embassy Beijing to Far Eastern Department, FCO, 20 January 1975; NA, FCO31/1866, China’s Attitude to the Angolan Independence Agreement, British Embassy Beijing to Far Eastern Department, FCO, 3 February 1975. The British Embassy in Beijing said the Chinese position remained that colonialists would never abandon their rule of their own accord, but had to be forced to do so principally by force of arms. NA, FCO31/1866, China and Southern Africa, British Embassy Beijing to Far Eastern Department, FCO, 20 January 1975.

(139) NA, FCO45/102, Angola Post-Mortem (Draft).

(140) NA, FCO45/102, Angola Post-Mortem (Draft).

(141) Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy.”

(142) In response to a NCNA despatch of 21 February that alleged Cuban massacres of Angolans, the Cuban press published a front page anti-Chinese editorial that attacked the Chinese in ‘exceptionally strong language’, condemning their ‘campaign of lies against the internationalist aid given by Cuba and the Soviet Union.’ NA, FCO31/1866, Cuba/China, Telegram from Havana to FCO, 129 of 16 March 1975.

(143) Shubin, *The Hot “Cold War”*, p. 40. People’s Daily, 5 April 1975.

states as well as the FRELIMO transitional government in Mozambique.¹⁴⁴ In May, Savimbi publicly criticised Beijing for not following through with its promises of support.¹⁴⁵ Lucio Lara, a founding member of the MPLA, led a delegation to Beijing. He reportedly obtained assurances that the Chinese government favoured tripartite unity, and not FNLA dominance, between the Angolan movements, although Beijing was not ready to withdraw their military instructors working with the FNLA troops.¹⁴⁶ The following month, another MPLA delegation visited China and was told that the Chinese government would cease all new forms of military assistance to all three movements until independence in November.¹⁴⁷ In late May, the American National Security Council interagency task force on Angola was created and its assessment, which was handed in on 13 June 1975, included a report that Beijing had recently agreed to continue assisting the FNLA until the end of the year.¹⁴⁸ Mobutu signed a military agreement with the North Korean government and 107 military instructors were sent to Zaire, where they also trained FNLA forces. This was followed by arms shipments from Pyongyang in April.¹⁴⁹

In July, Deng and He Ying received an FNLA delegation led by Pedro Vaal Hendrik Neto. The Soviets appeared to have bolstered the MPLA's success in the fighting through their steady weapons supply and Moscow appeared to expect the other two movements to join an MPLA-led coalition government. Moscow's main concern was Beijing's increased assistance to the FNLA from Zaire, exacerbated by North Korean and Romanian military assistance. These factors contributed to Moscow's decision to provide more military backing to the MPLA.¹⁵⁰ Following the visit by an FNLA delegation to China in July, Beijing instructed the Zairean government to release Chinese arms to the movement.

To put his movement on par with the better equipped MPLA and FNLA forces, Savimbi approached Pretoria for assistance and in August, South Africa entered the Angolan fray.¹⁵¹ Savimbi's decision proved politically disastrous for UNITA and was an acute concern for Beijing.¹⁵² It rallied previously divided African support behind the MPLA and generated sharp criticism about Chinese support for the anti-MPLA forces alongside the South African apartheid regime. Indeed, American Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's efforts to discuss Angolan issues with Qiao Guanhua in New York in late September 1975 did not arouse much engagement from the Chinese foreign minister. Instead, Qiao cautioned against involving Pretoria in the

(144) *Ibid.*, p. 35.

(145) Marcum, *Angolan Revolution Volume 2.*, pp. 229-230

(146) *Ibid.*, p. 265.

(147) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*.

(148) Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions.*, p. 293.

(149) North Korean support to the Angolan liberation struggle is covered in Part II(b) of this chapter.

(150) Westad, *Global Cold War.*, pp. 226-227. Shubin and Tokarev, "War in Angola."

(151) Gerald J. Bender, "Angola: left, right and wrong," *Foreign Policy* (Summer 1981, 1981).

(152) Potgieter, "Angola's War Economy," p. 258. The problem of South African support for UNITA was continually raised by Deng in his December meeting with President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

Angolan situation as that would be ‘short-sighted.’¹⁵³ Qiao had presented the Chinese government’s position on Angola at the 30th meeting of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 26 September. Citing the OAU’s recognition and support for all three Angolan groups, he said that the correct attitude towards the movements was to advise all three parties to unite and drive out the colonialists. He lambasted Moscow for prolonging the civil war through its continued arms supply to the MPLA. Beijing’s official position following the Alvor Agreement was that no new military aid had been granted to any of the groups, a message that was even disseminated and reiterated in bulletins by Chinese friendship associations overseas.¹⁵⁴ This is corroborated by British accounts, which suggest that the Chinese government had done ‘relatively little’ arming and training of the FNLA in the summer of 1975 and that there was no evidence of them having been active combatants.¹⁵⁵ Nonetheless, Chinese military instructors based at FNLA training camps at Kinkusu in Bas-Zaïre stayed on till 27 October. There was no official statement as to whether the arrangement was terminated by Roberto or if the Chinese team had decided to ‘exit gracefully.’¹⁵⁶ The group was reportedly sent off at Ndjili Airport by two members of the FNLA’s political bureau, Pinnock Eduardo and Tuba. The Chinese team leader gave a brief press conference at Kinshasa airport, expressing his ‘happiness over their pleasant stay in Zaïre’ and declaring that their task was accomplished.¹⁵⁷ FNLA radio apparently reported that the instructors were expelled for giving more ideological than military information, though observers in Kinshasa suspected the Chinese had become increasingly embarrassed about their FNLA connections.¹⁵⁸ It was most likely that the instructors’ departure at such a significant moment of the civil conflict stemmed from Beijing’s discomfiture at having any connection with Pretoria’s engagement in Angola.¹⁵⁹ Indeed, a British official considered Beijing’s attempts to extricate herself as rather timely, so that when the Soviet press began decrying Chinese support to the anti-MPLA groups, ‘the birds had long since flown.’¹⁶⁰

The Chinese government was criticised by many African governments for being in the same ‘camp’ as apartheid Pretoria and the United States. At the time, the MPLA’s Nito Alves regretted that China, ‘a country pledged in the framework of the international revolutionary struggle, to help the truly national forces, the working and peasant masses, to gain power, should have the attitude [it] has with regard to

(153) Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions.*, p. 293.

(154) Swiss China Friendship Association’s leaflet (translated from German). Basel Afrika Bibliographien (BAB), Registratur AA5, Archiv Medic’Angola und kaempfendes afrika, 1971-88, Gruppe III: Flugblaetter & Rundschreiben, III. 2, 2.4, ‘Freundschaft mit China’ (Zuerich: Flugblaetter, Einladungen, Presse Communiques, 1974-77).

(155) NA, FCO45/102, Angola Post-Mortem (Draft).

(156) NA, FCO45/102, Angola Post-Mortem (Draft).

(157) Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions.*, p. 330.

(158) NA, FCO31/1866, FNLA-Chinese Relations, British Embassy Kinshasa to East African Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 3 November 1975.

(159) Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions.*, p. 330.

(160) NA, FCO45/102, Angola Post-Mortem (Draft).

Angola.’¹⁶¹ The Chinese ambassador to Guinea, Qian Qichen, was summoned to meet President Ahmed Sekou Toure on 16 November. Toure said that while his country was ‘in step’ with Beijing in international relations and Asian matters, the situation in Angola was ‘beyond China’s understanding.’¹⁶² Qian concluded that this was ‘a local response to the effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute’, and attributed it entirely to the superpowers’ ‘scramble for domination.’¹⁶³ This understanding and analysis of the Angolan situation in a purely cold war framework was also evident from the Chinese foreign ministry’s statement on 15 November, which congratulated all three liberation movements and reduced the ‘unfortunate situation of division and civil war’ to superpower rivalry.¹⁶⁴ Qian later assured Toure that Beijing had stopped supplying military aid to any of the three groups since January 1975 in order to prevent a civil war.

By this time, Beijing was not enamoured by their dealings with the Americans, whom they now viewed as showing signs of ‘weakness.’¹⁶⁵ This was a stark contrast to the buoyant spirit which had greeted Nixon on his monumental visit behind the Bamboo Curtain only a few years earlier. President Gerald Ford’s visit to China in December 1975, accompanied by Kissinger, touched on the situation in Angola and both governments’ shared concerns about how the Soviets should be managed. Although the Chinese had used American material from the beginning of 1975 and urged increased American support for the anti-MPLA forces, there was very little actual coordination between them on the ground.¹⁶⁶ In the meetings, Mao said that Moscow could possibly be driven out through Congo (Kinshasa, Zaire), however Deng raised the complicating issue of South African involvement against the MPLA, which had ‘offended the whole of black Africa.’ While Mao was sceptical of an MPLA victory, Pretoria’s involvement was a thorny matter. Citing the responses of the Tanzanian and Zambian governments, Beijing could not assist the anti-MPLA forces except in the north, via Zaire.¹⁶⁷ Kissinger suggested that Beijing use its influence with Mozambique because ‘it would have a moral significance in Africa if Mozambique did not support the MPLA,’ but it was later agreed that this measure would be stillborn as FRELIMO was pro-MPLA.

Deng was non-committal about any joint initiative with the Americans, even as he mentioned Beijing’s good relations with Zaire as the most likely conduit, Beijing had limited capacity to provide any more than light weapons and there was, in any case, the intractable problem of how the weapons would be transhipped. Ford and

(161) NA, FCO31/1866, Facts about Movimento Popular para a Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) (Revised), August 1975. Alves would later emerge as Neto’s main rival for power within the MPLA.

(162) Qian, *Ten Episodes*.

(163) Ibid.

(164) Xinhua News Agency, *China’s Foreign Relations: a chronology of events (1949-1988)*, ed. Home News Library of the Xinhua News Agency (Beijing, 1989), pp. 321-322.

(165) Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions*, p. 293.

(166) Shubin, *The Hot “Cold War”*, p. 61; Gleijesus, *Conflicting Missions*, p. 238 and p. 293.

(167) Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976*, ed. David P. Nickles and Edward C. Keefer, vol. XVIII, China 1973-1976 (Washington). Also in Shubin, *The Hot “Cold War”*.

Kissinger attempted to prod the Chinese leaders to ask FRELIMO for assistance, but Deng declined once again, stressing to Kissinger:

Please understand this with regard to African countries – even the small ones: they are extremely sensitive on matters involving national pride. [Because of this] we have not raised the suggestion with them, despite all our assistance to them – as in Tanzania and Zambia in railway construction.

It should be noted that the Chinese government had, by this time, nearly completed the massive Tanzania-Zambia (TanZam) rail link. The project had required an immense investment of Chinese resources, funding and manpower, and was amongst other things, a demonstration of Chinese support and commitment to the liberation struggle. Very soon after Ford's visit, Beijing saw 'proof' that Washington was not a dependable ally in the face of Moscow's might, when the US Congress halted its government's covert programme in Angola.¹⁶⁸

Although Savimbi claimed that UNITA had received Chinese assistance during the post-independence civil war, it was unlikely that Beijing made any further contributions to his movement. Savimbi's claim was dismissed by the Vice-Minister for African Affairs, Gong Dafei, who retorted that the utterances were solely for Savimbi's propaganda purposes.¹⁶⁹ The level of Chinese assistance given to the FNLA during 1975 to 1976 was described by a British observer as 'hesitant, scanty and quickly terminated' when it seemed clear that the Soviet-backed MPLA was most likely to take over the reins of the government.¹⁷⁰ After all, the Chinese leadership was still consolidating itself internally after having emerged from the Cultural Revolution.¹⁷¹

Some Thoughts on the Chinese Contribution to the Angolan Liberation Struggle
China's experience in the Angolan liberation struggle exposed the rigidity of its foreign policy and worldview. Its anti-Soviet stance and projected self-image as a revolutionary power did not sit comfortably. Moreover, these concerns meant that Beijing was largely detached from the more specific concerns relevant to the local context and rivalry between the groups, such as ethnic and racial divisions and assimilation.¹⁷² Beijing's misadventure in Angola also revealed its limits as a military aid donor. Beijing's support for the anti-MPLA forces during the Angolan liberation struggle resulted in a strain in its relations with the independent MPLA-led government. This was also due to Neto's critical stance on the Chinese invasion of Vietnam in February 1979. Nonetheless, precipitated by the Beijing-Moscow and Beijing-Havana détente, both governments finally established diplomatic relations in January 1983.

(168) Westad, *Global Cold War.*, p. 245.

(169) Savimbi made the claim during a fundraising trip to the United States at the end of 1981. He also named Morocco, Senegal, France, Togo and Cote d'Ivoire amongst UNITA's sponsors. Potgieter, "Angola's War Economy," p. 260.

(170) Greig, *The Communist Challenge to Africa.*

(171) NA, FCO45/422, China/Portuguese Africa.

(172) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy."

Mozambique

Beijing gave support to FRELIMO, the most prominent Mozambican liberation movement, from the early 1960s until independence in 1975. FRELIMO's relations with China influenced its organisation as a militant political movement as well as the prosecution of its armed struggle.¹⁷³ However, Chinese assistance was not exclusively focused on FRELIMO and even prior to the Cultural Revolution, Chinese officials were in contact with other splinter movements. From the mid-1960s, it was COREMO which received the bulk of Chinese military assistance and coverage in the Chinese press. Nonetheless, FRELIMO's victory in constituting the transitional government prior to independence and the resumption of a more moderate Chinese foreign policy finally concentrated Chinese attention on the movement exclusively.

This country study is organised into four sections: the first two on FRELIMO and COREMO respectively, followed by a section on the transitional government and then some final comments.

Mozambican Liberation Front (FRELIMO)

Possibly the earliest mention of Mozambique in the People's Daily was in 1948, in an article condemning American exploitation and plunder of Africa's resources.¹⁷⁴ The early contact between Beijing and members of the Mozambican liberation movements also had roots in the international solidarity activities of the mid-1950s to early 1960s.¹⁷⁵ Indeed, Mozambican delegates had attended the World Federation of Democratic Youth Council Conference in Beijing in August 1954. As the Chinese government embarked on its diplomatic initiative in the third world, and specifically Africa, more visibility was given to anti-imperialist struggles.¹⁷⁶

FRELIMO was formed after Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere and Eduardo Mondlane convinced the three Mozambican movements in Dar es Salaam to unite: namely, MANU, UDENAMO and UNAMI.¹⁷⁷ Beijing was quite even-handed in its dealings with these groups, at least through offering recognition and coverage of their activities in the Chinese press. In FRELIMO's first year, British sources estimated the Chinese support at around \$3,000.¹⁷⁸ A statement by UDENAMO's Adelino Gwambe was published in April 1962 and that the movement was 'determined to rid the country of imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism through whatever

(173) Sergio Chichava, *Mozambique and China: from politics to business?*, ed. IESE Scientific Council, Discussion Paper No. 05/2008 (Maputo, 2008).

(174) *People's Daily*, 23 September 1948.

(175) *People's Daily*, 11, 13 and 17 August 1954; That was also when Marcelino dos Santos, later one of the founding members of FRELIMO, first visited China and met Premier Zhou Enlai. Joao M. Cabrita, *Mozambique: the tortuous road to democracy* (2001), p. 7.

(176) An entire article outlining the history of Mozambique, its colonial situation and the difficulties faced by its indigenous people appeared in the *People's Daily*, 28 January 1959. In February 1961, the *People's Daily* published a poem, 'We will not forget', by a Mozambican poet, hankering for the beautiful life in earlier times and condemning the evils of colonialism. *People's Daily*, 24 February, 1961.

(177) Harry G. West, *Kupilikula: governance and the invisible realm in Mozambique* (Chicago, 2005), p.136.

(178) From June 1962 to April 1963. NA, FCO45/422, China/Portuguese Africa, date???

means necessary to eradicate Portuguese control in the shortest time.’¹⁷⁹ After the establishment of FRELIMO in June 1962, its leader Eduardo Mondlane began appearing in the Chinese press. Beijing established relations with the Front fairly quickly and numerous high-level visits were made that year. Mondlane, who had close personal and professional ties to the United States, was depicted as a committed leader who condemned colonialism and NATO –and especially American- assistance to Portugal.¹⁸⁰

Unlike the fractious nationalist scene in Angola, FRELIMO was the dominant liberation movement in Mozambique. It was the only Mozambican liberation movement officially recognised by the OAU’s Liberation Committee, receiving the Committee’s entire allocation for the country, and also received assistance from many governmental and non-governmental donors. Nonetheless, it was beset by two contending perspectives within the organisation, as well as splintering outside.¹⁸¹

A number of former officers of the individual parties were excluded from running for office in FRELIMO, leading a number of them to form their own movements.¹⁸² Many of these groups were related through their members having, at one time or another, been disgruntled members of FRELIMO; though the bulk of these splinter groups only existed on paper and did not command much support.¹⁸³ The People’s Daily also reported on the different factions, including the withdrawal of

MANU and Gwambe’s UDENAMO from the Front in May 1963 which, together with the *Mozambique* African National Congress (MANC), resulted in the birth of FUNIPANO. The article stated that the new group, to be headed by Mmole and Gwambe, had the manifesto of creating a new people’s struggle and revolutionary battle line that would confront the enemies of Mozambique and all of Africa’s

enemies. British records suggest that Beijing had offered FUNIPANO assistance in 1963.¹⁸⁴ UDENAMO’s statements continued to be published in the People’s Daily and in April 1964 appeared in a report next to one about FRELIMO. Gumane was quoted as saying that UDENAMO was organizing and mobilizing domestic and overseas Mozambican patriots to prepare to battle for the motherland and the entire African continent though there was little to no actual guerrilla activity attributable to the group.¹⁸⁵ The article continued with a report from the NCNA Cairo Bureau that the FRELIMO defence and security secretary had stated that there was no option aside

(179) It also called for the unconditional release of the Mozambican patriots from Southern Rhodesia. *People’s Daily*, 23 April 1962.

(180) *People’s Daily*, 19 March and 28 May 1963.

(181) Chris Alden, *Mozambique and the construction of the new African state: from negotiations to nation-building* (Hampshire, 2001), p. 4.

(182) Baynham, p. 138.

(183) Annette Seegers, “Revolutionary Armies of Africa: Mozambique and Zimbabwe,” in *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*, ed. Simon Baynham (London and Sydney), p. 138. Alex Vines, *RENAMO: from terrorism to democracy in Mozambique?* (York, 1991), p. 13. West, Kupilikula. p. 137.

(184) NA, FCO45/422, China/Portuguese Africa.

(185) Department of State, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964-1968*, Africa, vol. XXIV (Washington D. C.). Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 MOZ. Secret; NoForN. Drafted on April 30 by Joanne Curtis of the Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The

from armed revolution to gain independence.¹⁸⁶ These groups would later be joined by Mmole's UDENAMO; another splinter group called MORECO, and be incarnated as COREMO in 1965.

This radical and militant rhetoric would have appealed to Beijing, at a time when it was attempting to assert itself as the true anti-imperialist stalwart in the developing world and to contain Soviet influence. The disaffected and marginalised anti-FRELIMO individuals could thus draw on Chinese support to fuel their own diatribes against the Front. Leo Milas, FRELIMO's first publicity secretary, was expelled from FRELIMO in August 1964, and travelled to Khartoum where he started putting out pro-Chinese, anti-FRELIMO propaganda using the name of MANU, which was no longer operative by then.¹⁸⁷

To its credit, in spite of the rise of splinter movements, FRELIMO was able to consolidate itself and maintain coherence in its armed struggle.¹⁸⁸ Its leadership did not take sides in the Sino-Soviet split and was generally successful in keeping that pressure at bay. There was a conducive convergence of factors which arose from being geographically adjacent to Tanzania: Nyerere's government was extremely supportive of the liberation struggle and the Tanzanian armed forces provided immense logistical and military support.¹⁸⁹ There was an intellectual climate in Dar es Salaam and 'the Hill' (University of Dar es Salaam) where 'Western liberal opinion' helped to form and shape ideas, and FRELIMO also benefited from the guerrilla ideology that had been applied relatively successfully in Portuguese Guinea.¹⁹⁰ Many FRELIMO officers had spent time there and observed the Tanganyikan/Tanzanian independence process and subsequent implementation of Nyerere's version of 'African Socialism.' Significantly, Tanzania also received Chinese military training and support and had a number of ministers in the government who advocated the Chinese model of armed struggle. At a CONCP conference in 1965 for instance, Abdulrahman Mohammad Babu, Minister of Commerce and Cooperatives, encouraged FRELIMO representatives to observe the Chinese and Vietnamese guerrilla techniques very closely and to plan a revolutionary strategy for their armed struggle.¹⁹¹ The first group of Chinese military trainers arrived in Tanzania in October 1964 and were soon training Tanzanian

source text is an attachment to circular airgram CA-11930 to Lusaka, London, Salisbury, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, and Nairobi, 10 May 1965.

(186) *People's Daily*, 3 April 1964.

(187) Vines, *RENAMO*., p. 11.

(188) David Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism in Angola and Mozambique (1993)*., p. 53.

(189) The Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF), formed in September 1964, was responsible for the training of liberation forces at bases across the country and providing security in Tanzania. The TPDF provided the troops, equipment and weapons; they escorted FRELIMO forces into the liberated zones and fought with them in combat areas. A. H. Mwanakatwe, "Identification of African Liberation Struggle Heritage Sites in Tanzania" (paper presented at the Road to Independence in Africa: the African liberation heritage project, Dar es Salaam, 2006). Mwanakatwe, "Heritage Sites in Tanzania".

(190) Birmingham, *Frontline Nationalism*., pp. 53-54.

(191) NA, DO213/102, Office of the High Commissioner for Canada in Dar es Salaam, to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, Mozambique: Activities of FRELIMO, 8 November 1965.

instructors to use Chinese weapons.¹⁹² The trainers were later sent to FRELIMO camps in southern Tanzania: the Portuguese government was aware of the presence of instructors and monitors from 1965.¹⁹³

There was a surge in relations between FRELIMO and Beijing in the latter half of 1963, most visibly in the number of visits to China. These included visits by the FRELIMO Women's League Secretary Priscilla Gumane in July and Secretary General David Mabunda.¹⁹⁴ Mabunda met with the Chinese leaders, military representatives and toured military facilities. It is probable that arrangements for the training of FRELIMO forces were discussed then, as the first group of Mozambicans trainees arrived in China that year.¹⁹⁵ Dos Santos, the Secretary for External Affairs, visited China in November and was received by Mao.¹⁹⁶ The most high-profile visit from FRELIMO was by its president Mondlane's at the end of the year. He was invited by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs and was received by Vice-President Dong Biwu and also had discussions with the Chinese AAPSO Committee Vice-President Bao Erhan.¹⁹⁷ Mondlane was reportedly impressed by the trip and said that Mao's work had inspired strength in the African liberation movement, 'enriching the theory by his rich experience.' He felt that the Chinese people had already undergone the struggle which presently faced Mozambicans. In particular, he praised China's theory and the educational system in which students also participated in productive labour during study.¹⁹⁸ Upon his return he said that he was 'very impressed by the enthusiasm of the Chinese toward the African liberation struggle and their willingness to assist.'¹⁹⁹

FRELIMO appeared to be adequately armed with Chinese weapons by the time their armed offensive against the Portuguese began on 24 September 1964.²⁰⁰ The material probably arrived on the Chinese vessel Heping which was observed by British officials to have docked at Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar ports respectively. Zanzibar had, by March 1964, already received 'large quantities' of Chinese-made weapons and two months later, the Heping was observed to have unloaded additional agricultural equipment and arms. It is possible that the arms were transported from Zanzibar to the coastal town of Mtwara, near the Mozambican border, by sea.²⁰¹ The Heping

(192) According to Brigadier Sam Sarakikya, Commander of the URMF. The Chinese trainers lived in the Officers' Mess at Colito Barracks. NA, DO213/101, British High Commission in Dar es Salaam to East Africa Political Department, CRO, 7 December 1964.

(193) NA, FCO45/858, Visit to Mozambique: Call on General de Arriaga, 20 October 1971.

(194) *People's Daily*, 15 July 1963.

(195) Amongst the Mozambican trainees was the future head of FRELIMO's department of defence, Filipe Samuel Magaia. Chichava, Mozambique and China.

(196) Taylor, *China and Africa*, pp. 93-94.

(197) *People's Daily*, 6 December 1963.

(198) *People's Daily*, 30 January 1964.

(199) *People's Daily*, 7 December 1963.

(200) Taylor, *China and Africa*, p. 94.

(201) The Zanzibari-FRELIMO connection was feasible because there is one account of a Zanzibari-owned ship Afrika which docked at Mtwara. However, on that occasion, British observers only saw Zanzibari PLA officers and Soviet advisors, not Chinese arms.

docked again in Dar es Salaam in August, though that might not have been sufficient time for the arms to be transported to Mozambique for the FRELIMO offensive. Nonetheless, there was circumstantial evidence suggesting that the weapons, which were unloaded under high security, were passed on to liberation movements though not which ones exactly.²⁰²

In November 1964, a FRELIMO delegation visited Beijing, followed shortly after by Mondlane in December who had discussions with Mao and Foreign Minister Chen Yi.²⁰³ Mondlane was quoted as appreciating the ‘historical struggle of the Chinese people’, which bore salient lessons for the ‘present struggle’ in Africa.²⁰⁴ In spite of the breakdown of talks between UDENAMO and FRELIMO in March 1965, FRELIMO was widely acknowledged as the major party in the country and one of the most tightly run movements in southern Africa. Mondlane remained dismissive of UDENAMO and its absence of clout.²⁰⁵ Comparing it with other groups based in Dar es Salaam, a November 1965 British report called FRELIMO ‘the best organised, best informed and most effective ... perhaps the only such organisation designed to subvert and eventually overthrow a government under European control.’²⁰⁶

Uria Simango, FRELIMO Vice-President, led a delegation including Jonas Namashulua and Francisco Kufa, to China in April 1965 at the invitation of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and met with Zhou.²⁰⁷ Deputy Secretary General Gumane visited later that month.²⁰⁸ The FRELIMO leaders were reported to have been greatly impressed by the enthusiasm and sympathy of the Chinese towards the liberation movement.²⁰⁹ FRELIMO lauded China’s explosion of its second atomic bomb in May 1965, calling it an ‘outstanding achievement.’²¹⁰ The message went on

(202) The British claimed to have evidence that an agreement existed between Burundi and Tanzania for the transit of Chinese arms, as well as circumstantial evidence was from the foreman docker who discharged the ship. He apparently verified that the cargo was earmarked into three lots: bound for Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar and an unknown destination. NA, DO214/116, Chinese Aid to Tanzania, 9 September 1964, No. 1375, Communist Influences. The Americans also suspected that large amounts of FRELIMO’s arms were probably from Russian and Chinese despatches to Tanzania, which were then passed on to the Mozambicans. Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964-1968, Africa. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 MOZ. Secret; Noform. Drafted on April 30 by Joanne Curtis of the Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The source text is an attachment to circular airgram CA-11930 to Lusaka, London, Salisbury, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, and Nairobi, 10 May 1965.

(203) Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy.” p. 398.

(204) Thomas H. Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique’s War of Independence, 1964-1977* (Westport, CT, 1983), cited in Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy.” p. 398.

(205) FRELIMO resisted Udenamo’s demand for Gumane to be made Vice-President of the joint party. The British mentioned that the Liberation Committee was becoming disillusioned by Mondlane’s ‘paper liberation activities’ which were not as active as his declarations made the Front out to be. NA, DO213/102, British High Commission in Dar es Salaam to East Africa Political Department, CRO, 17 March 1965.

(206) NA, DO213/102, Mozambique, Activities of FRELIMO, 8 November 1965.

(207) Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), “FRELIMO Delegation in China,” *Mozambican Revolution*, April 1965 1965. *People’s Daily*, 8 and 12 April 1965.

(208) *People’s Daily*, 7 April 1965 and 26 April 1965.

(209) Lin, “Communist Chinese involvement with African liberation movements in Mozambique, Rhodesia and French Somaliland, 1964-1974.” pp. 42-44.

(210) Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), “Message of congratulations from FRELIMO to the People and Government of the People’s Republic of China,” *Mozambican Revolution*, May 1965 1965.

to say that the ownership of similarly powerful weapons by the anti-imperialist and peace-loving countries was essential as a deterrent against the imperialists’ ‘genocidal war for global conquest.’²¹¹ Mondlane was committed to a broad united front domestically and internationally, and FRELIMO had strong secret links to the US.²¹² An American report estimated that there were 150 to 250 men of officer potential who were trained in guerrilla tactics in Algeria, the UAR, Communist China, or the USSR, though the number trained in communist countries was relatively small. The paper said that most FRELIMO recruits were trained at 2 or 3 camps in Tanzania, under the direction of Mozambican, Tanzanian, and possibly Algerian instructors. Although there was no mention of Chinese instructors, the Americans were aware that FRELIMO leaders were in contact with both Moscow and Beijing, having ‘frequent contact’ with the latter in Dar es Salaam and Peking.²¹³

FRELIMO sent its troops for training to several countries, including Cuba, but by 1970 the only foreign instructors who were permitted in Tanzania were Chinese and no foreign instructors were allowed into Mozambique.²¹⁴ The courses instructed participants on the use of weapons and tactics of Chinese-style guerrilla war, as well as political education emphasising the purpose of their struggle. Some candidates were sent to the People’s Liberation Army military academies for further training. Lisbon received unconfirmed reports that the Chinese were sending tanks, aircraft and other sophisticated weaponry to Tanzania, but had no evidence of any new weapons being used by the guerrillas.²¹⁵

The war in Mozambique had international interests and supply chains fuelling the struggle. An exhibition of captured FRELIMO and COREMO material organised by the Portuguese authorities in Lourenco Marques in 1968 had around 200 weapons on display, with Czech and Russian equipment topping the list in quantity, and Hungarian, British, French, German, Chinese and American material.²¹⁶ Amongst those on display were a Chinese mortar (82 or 85mm), with a large number of mortar bombs and a grenade launcher (92mm) that was made in China, based on Russian design.²¹⁷

In November or December 1968, Samora Machel, at the time head of the FRELIMO department of defence, visited Beijing and received ‘more aid and arms.’²¹⁸ The Portuguese political police, PIDE, viewed the leadership tussle after Mondlane’s

(211) Ibid.

(212) Westad, *Global Cold War.*, p. 210.

(213) The paper was prepared in the US Department of State on the projected course of the Mozambican rebellion in May. Department of State, ed., *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964-1968, Africa*. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23-9 MOZ. Secret; Noform. Drafted on April 30 by Joanne Curtis of the Office of Research and Analysis for Africa, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The source text is an attachment to circular airgram CA-11930 to Lusaka, London, Salisbury, Dar-es-Salaam, Kampala, and Nairobi, 10 May 1965.

(214) Henriksen, *Revolution and Counterrevolution.*, p. 187. Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions.*, p. 227.

(215) NA, FCO45/858, Visit to Mozambique: Call on General de Arriaga, 20 October 1971.

(216) NA, FCO25/271, Display of Firearms captured from guerrillas by Portuguese troops, 6 April 1968.

(217) NA, FCO25/271, Exhibition of Arms and Ammunition captured by Portuguese troops in Northern Mozambique, 16 April 1968.

(218) Chichava, *Mozambique and China*.

assassination as a struggle between the pro-Beijing and pro-Moscow factions, although FRELIMO ostensibly maintained a non-aligned position.²¹⁹ However, this was an inaccurate assessment as in reality, there were no such factions in the movement.²²⁰ Machel had applied the Chinese rural strategy and control of the countryside against the Portuguese in northern Mozambique. One of the biggest challenges facing the Front domestically was the creation of a viable rural cash economy in the liberated zones, to entrench the gains of their armed campaigns. Machel visited Beijing once again in August 1969, at the invitation of the Chinese African People's Friendship Association.²²¹ The delegation toured military academies and installations and met Zhou and the Chief of the PLA General Staff.²²²

Machel's visits to Beijing were indicative of the Chinese government's continued support and interest in close ties with Maputo. Indeed, Whitehall did not expect a reduction in Chinese aid to FRELIMO and reasoned that Beijing's interest in the splinter groups was to 'offset their defeat' by Moscow over FRELIMO leadership.²²³ Machel visited Beijing again from 24 August till 7 September 1971, which the British Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) suggested was to secure more support for the Front, 'circumvent Chinese support for the splinter groups' and to 'trim its sails a little more to the strengthening Chinese wind.'²²⁴ Machel's trip was organised by the China African Friendship Association and involved night-long meetings with Zhou, members of the PLA, Chief of Staff Huang Yongsheng as well as deposed Cambodian monarch Prince Sihanouk.²²⁵ The FRELIMO leader praised the friendship between the Mozambican and Chinese people.²²⁶ He said that the common struggle linked the two peoples in the same place. Samora spoke about Chinese achievements and that Mao led the Chinese people to carry on the Cultural Revolution, which had a profound impact on the Chinese people's thoughts. At around this time, there was also a concomitant increase in FRELIMO's relations with Moscow, which was a better placed donor which could provide the level of support necessary for continued armed struggle. According to Sergio Vieira, a prominent FRELIMO official and later Minister of Security, the delegation was informed that a shipment of 10,000 tonnes of weapons and ammunition was leaving for Dar es Salaam. This cargo later enabled FRELIMO to repel Portuguese attacks and to launch a general offensive in 1972.²²⁷ Assessments of the level of Chinese assistance to FRELIMO vary, depending

(219) That was the conclusion of the Portuguese political police, International State Defence Police (PIDE). Ibid.

(220) Thanks to Prof. Shubin for this clarification.

(221) The Soviets considered Machel the strongest leader in FRELIMO, above Marcelino Dos Santos and Uria Simango. Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 125.

(222) NA, FCO25/271, Display of Firearms captured from guerrillas by Portuguese troops, 6 April 1968.

(223) NA, FCO45/858, China/Mozambique, Office of the British Charge d'Affaires Beijing, to Far Eastern Department, FCO, 21 September 1971.

(224) NA, FCO45/858, China/Mozambique, Office of the British Charge d'Affaires Beijing, to Far Eastern Department, FCO, 21 September 1971. Machel travelled onward to Pyongyang.

(225) *People's Daily*, 6 September 1971.

(226) *People's Daily*, 26 August 1971.

(227) Shubin's discussions with Sergio Vieira, Robben Island, 13 and 14 February 1999; S. Vieira to Shubin, 1 February 2007. Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 128-9.

on the source. Some claim that the number of Soviet-trained FRELIMO troops still outnumbered the Chinese-trained ones. Chinese arms transfers amounted to only \$1 million compared to the Soviet Union's reported \$15 million.²²⁸ Reports of the arms build up and influx of Chinese instructors fanned concerns in the region.²²⁹

Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO)

COREMO had its headquarters in Lusaka and a representative based in Cairo. It was comprised of individuals with strong anti-FRELIMO sentiments and many of its key officers drew on their earlier contacts with the Chinese and courted Beijing for support.²³⁰ COREMO postured itself with an 'ultra-revolutionary image' and established links with another Beijing-supported organisation, the PAC in South Africa.²³¹ Its location in Cairo probably facilitated its access to Beijing, via the Chinese embassy.²³² The city itself, while being a rallying point for African nationalist exiles, was also a transit point for those travelling the 'Iron Curtain pipeline', the Cairo- Moscow-China or Cairo-Pakistan-China routes. The Chinese embassy was able to monitor regional developments and to establish contact with various nationalist groups from there. A number of the NCNA reports mentioning the group originated from Cairo. Out of all the splinter movements, COREMO as the only one which had some following within Mozambique and carried out militant activities against the Portuguese authorities there.

However, COREMO was never a credible challenge to FRELIMO's dominance or Lisbon. Mondlane was consistently successful in obtaining the cooperation of the Tanzanian authorities in interning or holding in preventive detention any leaders of the 'unrecognised freedom groups.'²³³ In July 1965, Gumane was reported as having led a COREMO delegation to Beijing at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, where they also met the Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee

(228) Cited in Taylor, *China and Africa*.

(229) On 30 September 1971, the *Pretoria News* reported a build up of Chinese arms and instructors in Tanzania, titled "Red China sends 400 tanks" which was toned down in a subsequent article published on 1 October. The claim was 'obviously untrue' and was disputed by Western diplomats who were not aware of any arms shipments in the past month. The article elaborated that all five Chinese freighters which docked in Dar es Salaam brought cargo for the TanZam railway project. On 25 September 1972, the *Daily Telegraph* quoted an estimate from the Portuguese Commander-in-Chief in Mozambique. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

(230) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy," p. 391. The Canadian government guessed that, in the absence of OAU support, Algeria and the UAR might have given COREMO funding as well. NA, DO213/102, Mozambique: Activities of FRELIMO, 8 November 1965.

(231) Vines, *RENAMO*., p. 13.

(232) Egypt was the first African and Middle Eastern state to establish diplomatic ties with China. The first Chinese embassy on the African continent opened in Cairo in 1956. This was a significant development for Beijing's policy of cultivating ties with regional powers because Egypt was regarded a political heavyweight in the region. Lillian C. Harris, "Myth and Reality in China's Relations with the Middle East," in *Chinese Foreign Policy: theory and practice*, ed. T. W. and Shambaugh Robinson, D. (Oxford, 1994), p. 330. The AAPSO was also based in Cairo. Ambassador Chen Yi's period of service from July 1956 till December 1965 was followed by Ambassador Huang Hua, often referred to as 'an Old Africa hand', who served from May 1966 to September 1969.

(233) As observed by the Canadian High Commissioner's Office. Mondlane considered the COREMO leaders similar to many other freedom fighters, who were merely trying to eke out a living from the charity of free African countries. NA, DO213/102, Mozambique: Activities of FRELIMO, 8 November 1965.

Chairman Liao.²³⁴ However, the AAPSO itself was inaccessible to COREMO because of FRELIMO's established place in the organisation. That October, COREMO submitted its first application for membership to the AAPSO Secretariat and not surprisingly, was unsuccessful.²³⁵

As the Cultural Revolution unfolded and the embattled and fractured Chinese foreign ministry succumbed to an ultra-radical track, COREMO received more attention in the Chinese press and there was little to no mention of Mondlane, who apparently had serious concerns about 'the excesses' of the Cultural Revolution.²³⁶ People's Daily articles on the Mozambican struggle referred vaguely to the 'patriotic armed forces' or guerrilla forces from 1968 till around 1971, when there was a shift to mentioning FRELIMO specifically, as the 'liberation front.' In any case, it was the upholding of an anti-Soviet position which interested Beijing more. The Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity sent telegrams to both groups, expressing solidarity and support for their battle against American and Portuguese imperialism.²³⁷ Many of COREMO's statements reflected Beijing's rhetoric: their head of delegation at the Afro-Asian Journalist Association Secretariat's fourth plenary said that Mozambique's only path to liberation was armed struggle and to use violence to overcome the reactionary violence. American imperialism was condemned as a paper tiger which must be overthrown without compromise, which would be impossible with the Soviet approach of 'peaceful coexistence.'²³⁸ It has been suggested that Beijing also contributed to another splinter group, the Partido Popular de Moçambique (PAPOMO), formed in November 1966, started by Gwambe after his expulsion from COREMO.²³⁹ In late 1967, Gwambe and several PAPOMO leaders such as Calvino Malhayeye visited Beijing at the invitation of the Chinese Institute of Foreign Affairs, where they received training for 'revolutionary leaders' and instruction in 'military enhancement.'²⁴⁰ The Portuguese authorities in Mozambique believed that Gwambe was in Beijing's pay to create confusion in COREMO' though, in reality, PAPOMO 'only existed on paper.'²⁴¹

COREMO itself was never recognised by the OAU and had a limited little international presence, only being supported by Zambia, Ghana and China. The Portuguese authorities believed that thirty COREMO guerrillas were being trained

(234) *People's Daily*, 29 July and 15 August 1965.

(235) COREMO's re-application for membership the next year was also unsuccessful. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, *Afro-Asian Bulletin* VIII (November 1966, 1966), p. 44.

(236) According to Shubin, Mondlane spoke harshly of Chinese policy to the Russians during his visit to the USSR, perhaps because he found it difficult to 'reconcile himself with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution.' Shubin's discussion with V. Zhikharev, Moscow, 22 March 1969. Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 124.

(237) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy," pp. 399-400.

(238) *People's Daily*, 24 April 1966. COREMO also expressed support for the third Afro-Asian Writers' Conference to be held in Beijing. *People's Daily*, 11 April 1967.

(239) Chichava, *Mozambique and China*.

(240) *Ibid.*

(241) *Ibid.*

in China in 1967.²⁴² Beijing's increasingly insular concerns stemming from dramatic developments and its withdrawal from the February 1967 AAPSO Executive Committee Meeting in Cyprus exacerbated COREMO's situation. The meeting rejected COREMO's re-application for membership, thus ending any possibility for access to an important solidarity platform and source of funds.²⁴³ Nonetheless, the *People's Daily* continued to carry COREMO statements and updates of their attacks in Tete province, including accounts of their troops studying Mao Zedong Thought and the PLA's Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points for Attention.²⁴⁴ COREMO leader Manuel Mahluza was quoted by the NCNA as saying that, "By arming ourselves with Mao's great thesis on people's war, we can defeat the Portuguese colonialists who are nothing but paper tigers."²⁴⁵

The Portuguese political police, PIDE, noted a meeting between the Chinese ambassador in Lusaka and COREMO president Paul Gumane in 1972, at which it was supposed that he would have requested for financial assistance, military training in China and study grants for his members.²⁴⁶ A JIC survey in September 1971 claimed that there were 'indications that Chinese support to COREMO would be restored'.²⁴⁷ However, COREMO's ties with Beijing ceased in 1971.²⁴⁸

Transitional Government

When the military coup was launched in Lisbon in April 1974, FRELIMO already had control of three of the country's ten provinces.²⁴⁹ FRELIMO established a transitional government after signing an independence agreement with the Portuguese government in September. Zhou sent a congratulatory telegram to Machel, calling it a victory for the armed struggle under FRELIMO's leadership, and pledging the Chinese people's support for the Mozambican people's just struggle.²⁵⁰ A *Peking Review* article mentioned FRELIMO specifically – 'in the past ten years, under FRELIMO's leadership, the patriotic armed forces fought valiantly against the Portuguese colonial troops.'²⁵¹ During the ceasefire, a rash of political parties appeared and COREMO merged with other groups in a national coalition party to rival FRELIMO's political domination. This time, however, the Chinese press kept its focus on Machel and FRELIMO, with no further mention of the splinter movements.²⁵²

(242) Chichava's paper draws on Mozambican archives (Services of Centralisation and Coordination of Information of Mozambique, SCCIM. Ibid.

(243) Neuhauser, *China and the AAPSO.*, pp. 67-68.

(244) The *People's Daily* published COREMO's communiqués till 1971, at times alongside FRELIMO's. Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy." pp. 399-400.

(245) *People's Daily*, 29 September 1966.

(246) Chichava, *Mozambique and China.*

(247) *People's Daily*, 28 February 1971. NA, FCO45/858, China/Mozambique, Office of the British Charge d'Affaires Beijing, to Far Eastern Department, FCO, 21 September 1971.

(248) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy.", p. 403.

(249) Simpson, "Transformation of FRELIMO." p. 311.

(250) *People's Daily*, 16 September 1974.

(251) *Peking Review*, "Round the World: Mozambique - A New Victory," *Peking Review*, 27 September 1974.

(252) Jackson, "China's Third World Foreign Policy."

Machel was invited to China in February and March 1975. The Chinese government provided a special plane to bring him from Dar es Salaam, a clear demonstration of their esteem for him and the importance of future relations.²⁵³ The trip was extensively reported in the Chinese media and included some background to the Mozambican struggle against Portuguese rule and FRELIMO's history.²⁵⁴ Machel took the opportunity to thank the Chinese leaders for their help, saying that their help to the Mozambican people's war was one of the factors of vital significance to the Front's victory – "Beijing contributed significant quantities of arms and other equipment at many decisive junctures, for instance, when we were consolidating our military victory."²⁵⁵ Machel had discussions with Deng and toured some cultural and historical sights.²⁵⁶ The delegation also travelled to Yanan in Shanxi Province, the 'holy land' of the Chinese Communist revolution and visited historic revolutionary sites such as the Mao Memorial Hall.²⁵⁷ After that they travelled to Chengdu, where he was also met by a crowd of 2000 people and had discussions with leaders of the local revolutionary committee, Chengdu Army Political Commissar, performances by ethnic minority groups, militia salute and others. In Dayi County they saw the 'class education exhibition hall' where the exhibits depicted the peasants' revolt against oppression.²⁵⁸ A communiqué was issued saying it was agreed that both governments would establish diplomatic relations on 25 June 1975, the day of Mozambican independence.

Machel believed that foreign policy and relations with other countries should be on an equal basis and without interference. Mozambique would continue to support the liberation struggle, specifically mentioning the Zimbabwean, Namibian and South African peoples' struggles. He added that the Mozambican government fully supported the Chinese people's attempts to liberate Taiwan. On domestic issues, Machel stressed self-reliance and that Mozambique's army should be the liberation front's armed wing and that this would continue under FRELIMO's leadership. Machel also spoke about modernising of the armed forces. He said to members of the armed forces that "[they] should not live in the city, but should stay in the countryside, and be organised."²⁵⁹

China sent a large delegation to the Independence Day celebrations, headed by its first Ambassador to Mozambique, Lin Chung. A People's Daily editorial that day welcomed the country's 're-birth ... out of the barrel of a gun' and said that the Chinese and Mozambican people were 'comrades-in-arms on the same front ... in

(253) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 129.

(254) *People's Daily*, 20 February 1975.

(255) New China News Agency, 25 May 1978. Cited in Taylor, *China and Africa*, p. 94.

(256) The itinerary included a cultural show about the PLA's life of struggle prepared by the Army's song-and-dance troupe, after which the troupe played a Mozambican song. *People's Daily*, 22 February 1975. The delegation also visited sites of development interest, such as the Capital Steel Corporation and a port oil field. *People's Daily*, 25 February 1975.

(257) *People's Daily*, 27 February 1975.

(258) *People's Daily*, 28 February 1975.

(259) *People's Daily*, 23 June 1975.

their common struggle against imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism.’ Shortly after, on 2 July, an agreement on economic and technical cooperation was signed. China made a soft loan of £25.5 million to Mozambique for a ten-year period and committed Chinese technicians and experts. At the time, it was the largest loan that the African country had received.²⁶⁰

So it appeared that in the immediate post-independence period, bilateral relations between the victorious FRELIMO and Beijing were firm. However, there were trials and travails to come. These had to do mostly with Chinese support for the anti-MPLA forces in the Angolan civil war, as FRELIMO and MPLA had close ties.²⁶¹ Marxism- Leninism was declared the Party’s official guiding ideology at its third congress in February 1977.²⁶² In September 1977, Beijing and Maputo signed a protocol on economic and technical cooperation, followed by a similar protocol the following May.²⁶³

Southern Rhodesia / Zimbabwe

Chinese assistance to the Zimbabwean liberation movement began with ZAPU in the early 1960s but shifted to ZANU from the middle of the decade. This was due to the Sino-Soviet split and it was perhaps in this case more than in the other Southern African countries that Maoist guerrilla strategy was adopted and proved successful for ZANU.

This chapter is organised into four sections: the first two on Chinese relations with ZAPU and ZANU respectively, followed by a section on Beijing’s rising international profile and finally, a few concluding comments.

Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU)

Rhodesia appeared in the People’s Daily prior to the establishment of New China, as early as June 1946, in general articles which described the ill treatment of colonial peoples at the hands of the British and American capitalists.²⁶⁴ In 1959, the paper mentioned the fledgling nationalist struggle and the activities of the Southern Rhodesian African National Congress (SRANC) which was established in 1957.²⁶⁵ It was probably in the Afro-Asian arena where Chinese representatives first encountered the Zimbabwean nationalists. SRANC was associated with the Afro-Asian People’s

(260) NA, FCO45/422, China/Portuguese Africa. However, tensions quickly surfaced and Mozambique’s disdain for Chinese activities in Angola were evinced by the fact that the \$59 million pledged by China in 1975 remained unused. Jackson, “China’s Third World Foreign Policy.”

(261) The Chinese ambassador was recalled in early 1976 and not replaced, and from this point onwards Chinese influence in Mozambique was supplanted by Moscow. Taylor, *China and Africa.*, p. 98.

(262) A high level Soviet delegation attended the Congress, the Chinese were absent. Chichava, *Mozambique and China.* Taylor, *China and Africa.*, p. 99.

(263) Bartke, *The Economic Aid of the PR China to Developing and Socialist Countries.*, p.92.

(264) *People’s Daily*, 20 June 1946; 22 October 1948, 25 January 1949, etc.

(265) SRANC president Joshua Nkomo’s criticised the British government’s repressive measures and appealed to various countries’ people to support their struggle, as well as protesting the ban on his organisation. *People’s Daily*, 2 March 1959. Congress Vice-President James Chikerema called Southern Rhodesia a police state and said that Southern Rhodesia would be the trigger point of any violent revolution in Central Africa. *People’s Daily*, 22 January 1959.

Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) and after being banned, the National Democratic Party (NDP) assumed its position. An article in the *People's Daily* hailed the NDP as an advocate of the elimination of colonialism, racism and tribalism, with the ultimate goal of achieving freedom for the Southern Rhodesia people.²⁶⁶ Chinese mass organisations sent messages of support and solidarity with SRANC/NDP that were heavily publicised in the media.²⁶⁷ Joshua Nkomo, Congress president and later NDP leader overseeing external affairs, was a member of the AAPSO Executive Committee.²⁶⁸ The NDP's membership in AAPSO facilitated the development of its international profile and important networks for support, which ZAPU subsequently inherited after the NDP was outlawed.

The Southern Rhodesian government banned ZAPU in September 1962 and the right wing Rhodesian Front's victory at the polls in December led to ZAPU's decision in early 1963 to pursue an armed guerrilla struggle.²⁶⁹ Initially, the movement received assistance from both Moscow and Beijing. The early 1960s was a high point for Beijing-ZAPU relations, as evinced by the visits by ZAPU officials to China, including M. B. Gumbo, Alfred Gondo, Moton Malianga and Transo Makombe.²⁷⁰ The first group of 15 ZAPU cadres was sent for military training in 1962 and ZAPU guerrillas used Chinese-made weapons based on Soviet designs including carbines, machine and sub-machine guns, recoilless rifles, rocket launchers and land mines.²⁷¹ Beijing also provided moral support through its observance of the AAPSO-designated 'Zimbabwe Day'. Chinese mass organisations assembled swathes of people 'from all walks of life' in Beijing in an expression of support and solidarity with the Zimbabwean people. The *People's Daily* called it a clear demonstration of 'the eternal support of 650 million Chinese people with the Southern Rhodesian people' and called for Nkomo's immediate release from incarceration.²⁷²

ZAPU vice-president James Chikerema visited Beijing at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs in January 1964 and reportedly received £7,000 from the Chinese government.²⁷³ Other ZAPU officials had also been in contact with Chinese representatives in Dar es Salaam and further visits were made to China,

(266) *People's Daily*, 22 July 1960.

(267) The Chinese Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee sent a supportive telegram in July 1960. The *People's Daily* called the international situation 'very advantageous' to the struggle being waged in Southern Rhodesia and, more generally, by the African people. The All-China Youth Federation also issued a letter of support for the Southern Rhodesia people and their independence struggle, and called for the release of NDP leaders who were imprisoned in Britain. *People's Daily*, 31 July 1960. In December 1961, ZAPU was identified as the biggest African political party in Southern Rhodesia. *People's Daily*, 24 February 1962.

(268) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 153. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, *Afro-Asian Bulletin III* (January-February 1961, Cairo, 1961).

(269) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 155.

(270) Taylor, *China and Africa*, p. 107.

(271) Greig, *The Communist Challenge to Africa*, p. 154.

(272) The article also described how the Zimbabwean people had launched a widespread and formidable mass movement under ZAPU's leadership. *People's Daily*, 17 March 1963.

(273) *People's Daily*, 5 January 1964. The delegation included Nyandono, Moyo and Silundika. *People's Daily*, 17 January 1964. In his speech, Chikerema's condemned the American invasion of Panama, lambasting it for seizing other people's countries, dominating their economies and establishing military bases, as was the case with

including the Zimbabwe African Trade Union Congress General Secretary in January and George *Silundika*, ZAPU publicity and information secretary, in September. This led to the Rhodesian authorities' view that ZAPU was 'turning to Communism.'²⁷⁴ However, relations between ZAPU and Beijing ceased from early 1965 as Moscow became the movement's primary communist supporter.²⁷⁵ In May, ZAPU circulated a pamphlet at the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation's (AAPSO) 4th conference in Winneba, Ghana, that accused its rival ZANU of being 'elitist, intellectual and pro- capitalist' and guilty of soliciting support from the 'Western imperialists' as well as Israel and South Africa.²⁷⁶ These allegations were mainly reflective of the intense rivalry between the two movements, as ZAPU attempted to forge a more populist image for itself.

Chikerema's report to the OAU in June 1965 touched on the foreign training that ZAPU troops had received and how they would contribute to the leadership's overall strategy.

196 liberation fighters who had specialised training in USSR, China and North Korea, had been brought into the country ... the total number including those already in the country comes to 236 trained personnel. They have all been trained in positional battlefield warfare and guerrilla warfare; among them are officers who have qualified as commanders after a period of nine months' intensive training. Others are guerrilla war experts.²⁷⁷

The report laid out ZAPU's plans to create a 'solid foundation for a guerrilla war.'²⁷⁸ The identified troops were well trained in sabotage and would assist with ZAPU's plans to take full control of the countryside. The objective was to engage the enemy on its own turf and to cripple Rhodesian communications and their capacity to escape. The report recognised the absence of physical conditions for sustained guerrilla warfare, the lack of facilities for continuous supply at the borders, as well as South African readiness to step in immediately with volunteers and increased material assistance to the enemy. Therefore it concluded that the major move had to be simultaneous, at the centres of stronghold and in the countryside. ZAPU's plan was to escalate the tension amongst Salisbury's white community, stir up the fighting spirit amongst its own forces as well as an advance operation of five trained men per military region. Their immediate task was to conduct isolated attacks on enemy personnel, installations and other properties. There were suggestions that Chinese-made weapons were issued to

'China's Taiwan Province'. *People's Daily*, 14 January 1964. J. R. T. Wood, *So far and no further! Rhodesia's bid for independence during the retreat from empire: 1959-1965*. (Victoria, BC, Canada, 2005), p. 212.

(274) *People's Daily*, 22 June, 12 and 23 September 1964.

(275) NA, FCO36/746, Extract from the Directory of African Liberation Movements and Related Organisations, received in registry 26 May 1971.

(276) Wood, *Rhodesia's bid for independence*.

(277) Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee, "Minutes of the Seventh Session," (Dar es Salaam, 1965), Appendix B, ZAPU, Dar es Salaam, Answers to Standing Committee on Defence – Committee of Nine, Questionnaire, 21 June 1965, pp. 91-92.

(278) *Ibid.*, Appendix B, Document No. II, General Planning and Operation, 18 June 1965, pp. 93-94. The Soviets trained ZIPRA in both conventional and guerrilla warfare. Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 174.

ZAPU, particularly in 1967, which might have been linked to reports that the OAU sent Rhodesian guerrillas Chinese rifles.²⁷⁹ ZAPU would persist with its 'blind rural insurgency' until 1969, by which time it was nearly moribund and had to take a year out to 're-group.'²⁸⁰

Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)

ZANU was formed on 8 August by former ZAPU officers: Ndabaningi Sithole became president, Leopold Takawira the Vice-President and Robert Mugabe the Secretary General. Sithole made contact with the New China News Agency (NCNA) representative in Moshi by 1961, while he was still ZAPU treasurer, and was presumably able to utilise that channel to seek support for ZANU.²⁸¹ Although both ZAPU and ZANU were recognised by the OAU Liberation Committee in December 1963, ZAPU was initially given a larger portion of contributions from the Special Fund.²⁸² Sithole visited China in the first half of 1964, while on bail for distributing a subversive letter.²⁸³ This was also a timely development for Chinese engagement with the Zimbabwean nationalists because it met a number of strategic objectives: with ongoing strains in its relations with Moscow, Beijing appreciated the alternative which ZANU presented as a countervailing force to the Soviet-supported ZAPU.²⁸⁴ ZANU also benefitted from the group of ZAPU cadres who were trained in China: upon their return to Dar es Salaam in 1963, these cadres divided between the two movements. By August 1963, ZANU had installed a representative in China, Transo Makombe, who made strident anti-American statements on the radio.²⁸⁵ His speech at a conference organised by the Chinese AAPSO Committee and Chinese Writer's Association was published in the People's Daily. Makombe expressed his wholehearted support for Mao's statement which condemned the 'white American fascists.' Kennedy was criticised for portraying the US as 'leader of the free world', while it continued to persecute black Americans.²⁸⁶

The first group of ZANU guerrillas to be trained at Nanjing Academy went to China on 22 September 1963.²⁸⁷ The six-month course included classes on military

(279) Lin, "Communist Chinese involvement with African liberation movements in Mozambique, Rhodesia and French Somaliland, 1964-1974.", p. 54.

(280) Bruce Hoffman, Jennifer M. Taw, and David Arnold, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies: the Rhodesian experience*, The RAND Publication Series, prepared for the United States Army (Santa Monica, CA, 1991), p. 20.

(281) Taylor, *China and Africa*, p. 107.

(282) Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p. 71.

(283) NA, FCO36/746, Extract from the Directory of African Liberation Movements and Related Organisations, received in registry 26 May 1971.

(284) William Cyrus Reed, "International Politics and National Liberation: ZANU and the politics of contested sovereignty in Zimbabwe," *African Studies Review* 36 (September 1993, 1993).

(285) Timothy Scarnecchia, *The Urban Roots of Democracy and Political Violence in Zimbabwe: Harare and Highfield, 1940-1964*, Rochester Studies in African History and the Diaspora (Rochester, 2008), p. 137.

(286) *People's Daily*, 11 August 1963. Makombe's anti-American pronouncements led to the American Consul General's visit to Sithole the next month, during which the latter criticised the Americans for not assisting ZANU in its fight against ZAPU. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

(287) The group included John Shoniwa, Eddison Shirihuru, Jameson Mudavanhu and Lawrence Swoswe. Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*.

science and ideological instruction. The group of five was led by Emmerson Mnangagwa.²⁸⁸ This group, which had already undergone basic training in Ghana, went to China in 1965 for advanced training as instructors.²⁸⁹ British observers noted that ZANU adopted an increasingly revolutionary and left-wing line from early 1964 and a number of officials had made statements in support of Chinese policy. ZANU's impetus to send as many cadres as they could overseas was driven by a Central Committee resolution made at its first Congress in May 1964 to carry out armed struggle. Therefore military training became a necessity in order to 'confront imperialism fairly and squarely.'²⁹⁰ When the trainees returned, however, the infrastructure and support –such as access to weapons- were insufficient for them to use their newly acquired skills and knowledge. This connection transformed ZANU's political and military strategy into a protracted guerrilla war based on mass mobilisation, rather than the hitherto sporadic tactics that were geared towards getting international support. Beijing provided support for this strategic shift and restructured its military assistance accordingly.²⁹¹

This increased contact and exchange between Beijing and ZANU very quickly gave the latter a more pro-Beijing image. After a disastrous start to its guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia, ZANLA troops were brought back to be re-trained by Chinese instructors in 'rural guerrilla warfare techniques.'²⁹² By the end of the year, and with Smith's declaration of UDI on 11 November, ZANU would depend more heavily on Chinese support. What was perceived as ZANU's Chinese proclivities and overemphasis on armed struggle strained its relations with Eastern bloc countries, already tense because of the Sino-Soviet dispute, even further.²⁹³

In early 1966, ZANLA's Josiah Tongogara led a group of eleven to Nanjing Academy, where they were trained in mass mobilisation, strategy and tactics, along the lines of Lin Biao's People's War treatise.²⁹⁴ The course began with a month of rigorous physical training, followed by military and political training. Basic military skills included stripping a rifle and shooting, and learning the technical aspects of operating more advanced weapons such as machine guns, bazookas and anti-tank mines.²⁹⁵ The use of explosives was an important component of the training, and the group was shown how to manufacture simple bombs for blowing up communication and transportation channels, as well as police and military stations. Other essential

(288) Reed, "ZANU and the politics of contested sovereignty," pp. 40-41.

(289) According to Martin and Johnson's interview with Ndongana, this second group included William Ndongana, Bernard Mutuma, Silas Mushonga and Felix Santana. Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*.

(290) Robert Gabriel Mugabe, *Our war of liberation: speeches, articles, interviews, 1976-1979* (Gweru, 1983), p. 122.

(291) Reed, "ZANU and the politics of contested sovereignty," pp. 40-41.

(292) Hoffman, Taw, and Arnold, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies*, p. 20.

(293) Berlin viewed ZANU primarily as a pro-Chinese separatist group. Schleicher and Schleicher, *Special Flights*, pp. 95-101.

(294) Pares Pandya, Mao Tse-tung and Chimurenga: an investigation into ZANU's strategies (Braamfontein, 1988), p. 88. Taylor, *China and Africa*, p. 107.

(295) Pandya, *Mao and Chimurenga*, pp. 88-89.

skills included radio communication and special training in mass mobilisation.²⁹⁶ Tongogara appreciated the versatility and applicability of Chinese military tactics to local conditions in Rhodesia, as well as the primacy of mobilising the people in order for a successful guerrilla struggle to be waged.²⁹⁷ Under his stewardship, many lessons were adopted, though not always adapted, from what the Chinese had taught. ZANLA's code of conduct, for instance, which was borrowed entirely from Mao.²⁹⁸ Aspects of the Maoist concept of rural support for the 'just war' appealed to intellectuals within ZANU's ranks as well, who found it 'the most practical model for Africa, a pre-industrialised continent with a peasant majority.'²⁹⁹ The ZANU trainees returned to Tanzania in November, after the April battle of Sinoia, the first major confrontation between Zimbabwean nationalists and Rhodesian troops which catapulted ZANU into the public eye.³⁰⁰ The Rhodesian troops found Maoist political tracts from China on the persons of killed or captured ZANLA guerrillas.³⁰¹

Many intellectuals within ZANU felt perturbed and marginalised by the Cultural Revolution in China. ZANU officials in particular were generally from a more intellectual background than their ZAPU counterparts and many had difficulty reconciling Mao's teaching with practice. The persecution of intellectuals, destruction of all aspects of traditional feudal culture and pursuit of continuous revolution was mystifying; at the same time, it was challenging to gain any deeper insights into developments within China because of the chaos that the Cultural Revolution unleashed.³⁰² Throughout this period, Beijing continued its assistance to ZANU. Selected guerrillas were sent to China to be trained as instructors and would then be despatched to train recruits in Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia.³⁰³ According to Sithole, from 1966, China also contributed significant amounts of arms and supplies to ZANU.³⁰⁴ ZANU formed an alliance with South Africa's Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in response to ZAPU's alliance with the African National Congress (ANC). Beijing had suspended ties with both the ANC and South African Communist Party (SACP) by this time and concentrated its support on the PAC during the height of the Cultural Revolution.

(296) Greig, *The Communist Challenge to Africa*.

(297) Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*. According to Fay Chung, he had entered the liberation struggle as a 'lowly soldier' and after the training stint in China, 'forever held the Chinese as his mentors in morality as well as in military skills and strategies. It was from Mao's thoughts and practices that Tongogara learnt that the guerrilla must merge with the people. He taught his soldiers that they were never to mistreat the peasantry.' Chung, *Second Chimurenga*, p. 130.

(298) Taylor, *China and Africa*, p. 110.

(299) Chung, *Second Chimurenga*, p. 67.

(300) Reed, "ZANU and the politics of contested sovereignty.", p. 39.

(301) This was confirmed to Dr Sue Onslow in an interview with a former Rhodesian military intelligence officer. Thanks to Dr Onslow for this comment.

Taylor, *China and Africa*, p. 110.

(302) Chung, *Second Chimurenga*, p. 67.

(303) Taylor, *China and Africa*, p. 110.

(304) *Ibid.*, p. 108.

Beijing was unable to consolidate its position against the pro-Soviet delegations at the 1967 AAPSO Executive Committee meeting in Nicosia, Cyprus. As a result, the ‘pro-China’ movements found themselves roundly excluded from the Organisation. ZANU, which was up against ZAPU’s stronger footing in AAPSO, had its membership application rejected. Nonetheless, the Chinese national AAPSO committee sent a telegram of support to ZANU on ‘Zimbabwe Day’ in March 1967.³⁰⁵ ZANU later issued a joint statement with the PAC, Angola’s UNITA and Mozambique’s COREMO denouncing the January 1969 AAPSO- World Peace Council’s Khartoum Conference in Support of the Peoples of Southern and Portuguese Africa as ‘a plot of the Soviet revisionists.’³⁰⁶

ZANU greatly benefitted from Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere’s support right from the start. Nyerere disliked Nkomo and there were claims that the Tanzanian government was responsible for ‘allocating’ ZAPU and ANC arms that were stored in Dar es Salaam and Mbeya to ZANU from the 1960s to early 1970s.³⁰⁷ Aside from ZANU, arms were also allegedly despatched to the PAC and COREMO as well. Itumbi camp, in southwest Tanzania, opened for ZANLA combatants in 1965 and Chinese instructors arrived in 1969.³⁰⁸ By the following year, Beijing sent 20 more Chinese trainers there and there were reports that ZANU was well equipped with Chinese- made AK47s, modern grenades and landmines.³⁰⁹ A new camp was established in Mgagao, southern central Tanzania, and from May 1971 the Chinese instructors trained ZANLA forces there instead of Itumbi.³¹⁰ The trainers, espousing the importance of political maturity in the struggle, emphasised the party line more than military aspects.³¹¹ This training role was subsequently assumed by Nanjing-trained ZANLA instructors.³¹² However, the bleak weather in Iringa Region, where Mgagao camp was situated, coupled with the demanding training regimen, was difficult for many new recruits.

The failure of ZAPU and the South African ANC’s operations in 1967 to 1968 and the internal strife leading to the split in ZAPU’s leadership in early 1970 crippled the movement.³¹³ This allowed ZANU to emerge at the forefront of the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. The Rhodesian Central Intelligence Office (CIO) noted ZANLA’s adoption of the Maoist strategy of politicising the people, but dismissed its level of efficiency because neither ZANU nor ZAPU had garnered much support around

(305) *People’s Daily*, 17 March 1967.

(306) NA, FCO36/746, Extract from the Directory of African Liberation Movements and Related Organisations, received in registry 26 May 1971.

(307) This allegation was made by a former ZIPRA high commander. Wood, *Rhodesia’s bid for independence.*, p. 191.

(308) Pandya, *Mao and Chimurenga.*, p. 87.

(309) Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe.*, p. 84. Also cited in Reed, “ZANU and the politics of contested sovereignty.” pp. 40–41. Gilks and Segal, *China and the Arms Trade.*, pp. 37–38.

(310) Pandya, *Mao and Chimurenga.*, p. 87.

(311) Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe.*, p. 84.

(312) Ulf Engel, *The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe, Hamburg African Studies* (Hamburg, 1994), p. 57.

(313) Shubin, *The Hot “Cold War”.*, p. 156.

the Zambian border up to that point. ZANLA's new Maoist tactics changed the rules of engagement, so to speak. The former CIO head, Ken Flower, admitted in his memoirs that they had underestimated the effectiveness of ZANU's Chinese-inspired mobilisation tactics in the well-populated and Shona-speaking region bordering Mozambique.³¹⁴ The local people could identify more with ZANU's agenda and goals and so were more cooperative with ZANLA – this became 'the decisive factor in the war.'³¹⁵ Indeed, from late 1971 until the armistice at the end of 1979 it was ZANLA and not ZIPRA which seized the military initiative. An illustration of the contradiction between the Soviet and Chinese strategy and tactics was highlighted by Nhongo, "The Soviet Union taught that the decisive factor of the war was weapons, while the Chinese instructors ... said that it was the people."³¹⁶ According to Shubin, this perception was actually contrary to the Soviet position, which viewed the fighters as the decisive factor.³¹⁷

ZANLA's first incursion from the Mozambican liberated zone was in December 1971 and, as a testament to the success of their strategy, their presence went undetected by Rhodesian authorities for nearly a year. Prior to sending their fighters into the area, advance teams would devote time and energy to acquaint themselves with the local culture, and helping to address problems or complaints. Essentially, ZANLA was able to deepen its intelligence network, which also enabled it to eliminate suspected informers and sympathisers, a potent mixture of 'fear and support.'³¹⁸ The Rhodesian government put out a written record titled *Anatomy of Terror*, which depicted the security threat posed by the 'terrorists' who were externally controlled by the Soviet Union or China.³¹⁹

Another sign of ZANU's pre-eminence over ZAPU was reflected in its improved relations with FRELIMO. Indeed, in August 1972, based on FRELIMO's observations of ZANU activities on the area around the Mozambican border, Machel advised both Kaunda and Nyerere of the prudence of recognising ZANU as a viable liberation movement. FRELIMO's army, the FPLM, discovered that ZANLA had pushed the war further than expected and outstripped the limits of their light weaponry. Up to that point, ZANLA's arms were mainly from China, with contributions from North Korea, Romania and Yugoslavia as well.³²⁰ The movement was geared to prosecute a protracted war, possessing neither the manpower nor weapons to engage in

(314) Ken Flower, *Serving Secretly: an intelligence chief on record: Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964-1981* (London, 1987), p. 110.

(315) Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p. 88.

(316) *Ibid.*, p. 88. Norma J. Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe: symbolic and violent politics, 1980-1987* (Cambridge, 2003), p. 23.

(317) Prof. Shubin was the Secretary of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee and Head of the Africa Section of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's (CPSU) International Department. He played an integral role in Soviet support for the Southern African liberation movements. African Activist Archive (<http://africanactivist.msu.edu/video.php?objectid=5>) [accessed 7 December 2009].

(318) Hoffman, Taw, and Arnold, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies*, pp. 21-23.

(319) Flower, *Serving Secretly*, pp. 121-122.

(320) Taylor, *China and Africa*, p. 108.

conventional warfare.³²¹ It was rather ZANLA's dependence on political mobilisation of the people which had supported an effective 'grassroots party infrastructure.'³²² FRELIMO assessed that ZANLA was in need of more sophisticated equipment if it was to effectively defend its bases. Following ZAPU's refusal to operate from Tete province in FRELIMO's liberated zone in Mozambique, Machel granted passage for ZANLA forces and arms and ZANU was then able to put its rural insurgency strategy into full swing.³²³ Nyerere and Machel encouraged the Russians and Cubans to come to ZANLA's aid because Beijing would not have had the capacity to provide the new equipment that ZANLA required. Machel felt that the Sino-Soviet dispute was intensifying the historical and tribal divisions among Zimbabweans, with Beijing and Moscow supporting rival movements.³²⁴ Finally, with assistance from FRELIMO and the Liberation Committee, Soviet-made weapons began to reach ZANU and nearly all the training provided at Mozambican camps was carried out by Chinese-trained ZANLA instructors.³²⁵

Beijing's Growing International profile

Beijing replaced Taipei as the legitimate Chinese government representative at the UN in October 1971, a diplomatic triumph that pointed to the success of its African policy. Soon after, the acting Chinese Foreign Minister Ji Pengfei addressed a letter to the UN Secretary General on 27 January 1972, which outlined his government's stand on the Zimbabwean situation.³²⁶ The Chinese government condemned British proposals for a constitutional settlement with the Rhodesian government. In a Peking Review article in March, Beijing argued that the sanctions against Rhodesia should be reinforced and broadened, and that there should be a withdrawal of South African police and military personnel from Rhodesia. The article pledged Chinese support for the Zimbabwean people in their anti-imperialist and anti-colonial struggle.³²⁷ Beijing criticised the American Byrd Amendment that had come into effect on 1 January 1972 and violated UN sanctions on Rhodesia.³²⁸

The Rhodesian issue was discussed at the United Nations Security Council session in September 1972. Chinese representative Huang Hua said that the crux of the matter was self-determination and the independence of the Zimbabwean people who were opposed to the white minority's racist rule. He denounced the British government as being in conspiracy with the Smith regime and expressed support for the resolution on Zimbabwe that was passed at the OAU's 9th summit in June, and condemned the

(321) Pandya, *Mao and Chimurenga*., p. 88.

(322) Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe*., p. 24.

(323) Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*., pp. 19-20. Hoffman, Taw, and Arnold, *Lessons for Contemporary Counterinsurgencies*., pp. 21-23.

(324) Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*., pp. 316-317.

(325) Taylor, *China and Africa*., p. 108. Pandya, *Mao and Chimurenga*., p. 88.

(326) Lin, "Communist Chinese involvement with African liberation movements in Mozambique, Rhodesia and French Somaliland, 1964-1974.", pp. 58-59.

(327) *Peking Review*, 11, 17 March 1972. Also cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.

(328) Andrew DeRoche, *Black, White and Chrome: the United States and Zimbabwe, 1953-1998* (Trenton, NJ, 2001)., p. 171.

American government's continued importation of Rhodesian chromium and nickel. In view of South African and Portuguese violations of the Security Council resolution, Huang said that the Council should extend sanctions to both countries.³²⁹ On 22 May 1973, a draft resolution proposed by Guinea, Sudan and Kenya to the UN Security Council requested effective action to deal with governments who refused to enforce sanctions on the South African and Portuguese governments. The proposal received two vetoes from the US and UK, both permanent Security Council members, while the Chinese cast an affirmative vote. The Chinese representative said that the second draft resolution was a demonstration that there were still forces which supported the Rhodesian, South African and Portuguese governments as a reactionary alliance that suppressed Zimbabwe and the southern Africa people's liberation struggle.³³⁰

In March 1974, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping met the ZANU delegation led by Vice Chairman Herbert Chitepo, on the invitation of the Chinese Foreign Friendship Association.³³¹ Aside from training ZANLA's forces at locations in Tanzania, Chinese military instructors were also stationed at two ZANLA camps in Zambia until Chitepo's assassination in Lusaka in March 1975. However, Mozambique's independence on 25 June made it possible for military training camps to be set up in Chibawawa, Chimoio, Tembwe and Nyadzonia. The training was done in tandem by FRELIMO and ZANLA instructors who had been trained in China and Tanzania.³³² In February 1976, the frontline states' leaders met at Quelimane, where Machel confirmed that the guerrillas from Tanzania and Zambia had arrived in Mozambique, as well as the arms from China which Tanzania had been holding.³³³ Moreover, aside from China, Mozambique and Tanzania, Ethiopia, Yugoslavia and Romania also started offering more training facilities.³³⁴

The combined army, Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA), was officially launched in late 1975, an initiative which was encouraged by Nyerere and Machel. Many ZIPA leaders were relatively younger than the 'old guard', more radical and better trained.³³⁵ ZIPA's Deputy Commissar Wilfred Mhanda, had received training in China and rose to become a member of the High Command. These leaders were adamant about the ideological emphasis in training, and aimed for the 'revolutionary transformation of the country's socio-economic relations', lest their forces succumb to the 'old nationalist contradictions' which arose from the Sino-Soviet dispute.³³⁶ ZIPA's troops resumed their battle against Salisbury in January and moved their troops from Tanzania

(329) *People's Daily*, 7 October 1972.

(330) *People's Daily*, 24 May 1973.

(331) *People's Daily*, 15 March 1974.

(332) Engel, *The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe*, p. 57.

(333) Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p. 224.

(334) Josiah Tungamirai, "Recruitment to ZANLA: building up a war machine," in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, ed. Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (London, 1995).

(335) David Moore, "The Zimbabwe People's Army: strategic innovation or more of the same?," in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, ed. Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (London, 1995), p. 79.

(336) *Ibid.*, p. 82.

to Mozambique, with an estimated 700 guerrillas crossing into Rhodesia.³³⁷ ZIPA established an institute for Marxist political and military education named Whampoa College.³³⁸

A tragic incident occurred in August 1976 involving an attack on ZIPRA troops by their ZANLA counterparts. This ‘extraordinary event’ occurred at camps in Morogoro and Mgagao in Tanzania and some accounts have suggested the involvement of the Tanzanian People’s Defence Force and Chinese instructors based there.³³⁹ ZAPU accused the Chinese military personnel of carrying out these targeted attacks, using machine guns, automatic rifles and their dogs, on ‘panic-stricken’ former ZAPU cadres.³⁴⁰ ZANU insider Fay Chung put the number of ZIPRA casualties at around fifty and does not mention the Chinese or Tanzanian elements in her memoirs, only that the ZIPRA cadres were annoyed by ZANLA’s use of slogans, probably a practice learnt from the Chinese to ingrain ideology and theory encapsulated in pithy slogans.³⁴¹ The violence in August marked the end of the integrated army, though ZIPA existed in name till the end of the year.³⁴²

In terms of ideology, ZANU’s official review conference in 1972 adopted Mwenge II, a policy statement which bound ZANU to reallocate ‘all means of production and distribution ... in the hands of the people of Zimbabwe’ and to build ‘a truly socialist, self-supporting economy ... organised on the principles enunciated by Marxism- Leninism.’ Additionally, ZANU saw itself as the ‘vanguard of a revolution for socialist transformation.³⁴³ Aside from the Maoist guerrilla tactics that ZANLA adopted, there were a number of other practices that the ZANU leadership implemented, such as self-criticism sessions at which the more junior commanders, particularly women, could raise any objections or identify shortcomings within the movement. However, the socialist rhetoric it espoused was probably more strategically used to appeal to the mass of its supporters, because the poor ‘identified with socialism as representative of their interests.’³⁴⁴ It was also an effective ‘mantra’ that attracted military and material assistance from donors.³⁴⁵ According to Chung, Marxism-Leninism was no longer a motivating influence in the movement’s leadership by 1976.³⁴⁶ Hence the movement’s formal adoption of ‘Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought’ at its congress in 1977 should be viewed as an attempt to consolidate its power amongst

(337) DeRoche, *United States and Zimbabwe.*, p. 211.

(338) It was named after Whampoa Military Academy in China that was established by the iconic Chinese nationalist Sun Yatsen in 1924.

(339) Kriger, *Guerrilla Veterans in Post-War Zimbabwe.*, p. 25. Taylor, *China and Africa.*, p. 113. Gerald Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun: the United States and the war against Zimbabwe, 1965-1980* (Chapel Hill, 2001), pp. 260-261.

(340) ZAPU also criticised the delay in the Tanzanian government’s investigations, accusing it of colluding with ZANU to conceal its tracks. Horne, *US and the war against Zimbabwe.*, pp. 260-261.

(341) Chung, *Second Chimurenga.*, p.148.

(342) Chung, *Second Chimurenga.*, p.148.

(343) Reed, “ZANU and the politics of contested sovereignty.” pp. 40-41.

(344) This rhetoric ‘lingered’ for a good ten years following independence. Chung, *Second Chimurenga.*, p. 265.

(345) *Ibid.*, p. 175.

(346) *Ibid.*, p. 265.

its domestic constituents and heighten its appeal to foreign sponsors as a disciplined and progressive group.

Beijing's military assistance never fully met ZANLA's requests and this gap grew in the post-Mao era, with Deng Xiaoping's focus on domestic economic development. Crucially, this was the time when ZANU's armed struggle was escalating.³⁴⁷ Nonetheless, Beijing's moral and political support was still highly valued and on his visit to China in June 1977, Mugabe expressed his thanks for the help that had been given to the Zimbabwean people's struggle. He added that Zimbabweans faced imperialism from the West, while having to be wary of Soviet machinations - 'social imperialist's so-called aid' - as well.³⁴⁸ Mugabe said that the Patriotic Front had been formed with a pledge according to Mao's teachings: to recognise the genuine enemy clearly and concentrate resources on the attack.³⁴⁹ The following month, Mugabe praised President Hua Guofeng's enlightened leadership in smashing the 'Gang of Four' and stressed that the Zimbabwean people would persist in their armed struggle to achieve final victory.³⁵⁰ From 1978, special pilot training facilities were made available for ZANU trainees in China, North Korea, Romania and Nigeria.³⁵¹ Chinese instructors still participated in the training of ZANLA forces at Mgagao training camp in Tanzania until independence in 1980.³⁵²

Mugabe began re-establishing ZANU in international affairs after consolidating his power in 1978 and articulated an explicit strategy for gaining international support. He expressed his desire to bring 'as many socialist countries close to us as possible

... as our endeavours continue, we hope to find ourselves in the orbit of all socialist countries, with the Soviet Union and PRC included in this solidarity.'³⁵³ In May, he embarked on a three week trip to China, Vietnam and North Korea.³⁵⁴ In an interview in 1978, Mugabe said that while ZANU was continuing to make other socialist friends and to obtain their support, "The fact that we get help from China doesn't make us to get married to Chinese as such!"³⁵⁵ By then the Chinese government appeared to be 'increasingly sympathetic to [British] efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement

(347) Taylor, *China and Africa.*, p. 108.

(348) *People's Daily*, 21 and 22 June 1977.

(349) Mugabe left China ahead of his delegation, which travelled onwards to Yenan, Shanghai, Nanchang and the Jinggang Mountains. *People's Daily*, 25 and 29 June 1977; 1 July 1977.

(350) This was at a banquet hosted for Mugabe and his goodwill mission by the Chinese embassy in Mozambique. The ambassador had recently returned to Maputo after the Cultural Revolution. *People's Daily*, 7 August 1977.

(351) Engel, *The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe.*, p. 57.

(352) Chung, *Second Chimurenga.*, p. 82.

(353) Interview with the Mozambique News Agency (AIM), 'Once again: a luta continua!' Mugabe, Our war of liberation., p. 171.

(354) Reed, "ZANU and the politics of contested sovereignty.", p. 45. In Beijing, he met Vice-Premier Geng Biao and Foreign Friendship Association President Wang Bingnan, as well as officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department of Defence, People's Liberation Army General Staff Department and External Liaison Department. *People's Daily*, 23 May, 1978.

(355) Interview with David Martin of the London Observer and Phyllis Johnson of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 'Our socialist programme will come from the people', 7 October 1978. Mugabe, *Our war of liberation.*, p. 197.

based on the Anglo-US proposals.’³⁵⁶ In August 1979, ZANU Vice President Simon Muzenda visited China and met with the Vice Committee Chief of the Committee of the National People’s Congress Ji Pengfei and Foreign Friendship Association Vice Chairman Luo Shigao.³⁵⁷

Huang was the Chinese government’s special envoy to the independence celebrations in Salisbury. Just prior to the independence celebrations in Harare, Huang met the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Benjamin Mkapa, during a stopover in Dar es Salaam. During their discussion, both he and Mkapa expressed satisfaction with the favourable development of Sino-Zimbabwean relations and with Zimbabwean independence, which Mkapa said had benefitted greatly from Chinese assistance.³⁵⁸ Huang responded that China would continue to cooperate with Tanzania to support the Southern African liberation struggle. In a subsequent meeting with Nyerere, the latter expressed his appreciation for Chinese support to Mugabe during the liberation struggle, which was especially important because Tanzania itself was unable to contribute adequately. Nyerere and Huang both agreed that their countries should continue their cooperation to help the Zimbabwean government consolidate its independence. In Huang’s meeting with Mugabe in Harare, the Zimbabwean leader thanked the Chinese government for its unwavering support during the struggle, without which victory would not have been possible. Huang extended his government’s wishes for ‘the unity and happiness of the Zimbabwean people, stability of the country, consolidation of the regime and economic development.’³⁵⁹ This culminated in the signing of a communiqué establishing formal diplomatic relations. In China, the People’s Daily published an article commemorating the event, titled *The Zimbabwean People Have Stood Up*.³⁶⁰

The Zimbabwean government’s foreign relations priority following independence was to maintain the ties with socialist countries and progressive organisations around the world that had been formed during the liberation struggle. Though the ultimate approach was one of ‘positive non-alignment’, China, North Korea, Yugoslavia and Romania, amongst others, would remain Zimbabwe’s ‘close friends’ through mutual political and economic cooperation.³⁶¹ Mugabe has spoken of the ‘hundreds of tonnes of military equipment’ from Beijing and its valuable technical assistance and

(356) In a briefing paper for the visit of Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua to London in October 1978, it was noted that, while Beijing was a major supplier of arms and equipment to ZANU and have ‘traditionally taken a radical, anti-imperialist line on Rhodesia’ there was a perceptible change to that in recent months. As it turned out, the topic of Chinese relations with African countries did not arise during Huang’s meeting with Prime Minister James Callaghan. NA, PREM16/1534, Visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister: 10-14 October 1978, Africa, Brief No. 8.

(357) *People’s Daily*, 28 August 1979.

(358) *People’s Daily*, 17 April 1980. Huang, Huang Hua Memoirs., p. 452.

(359) His delegation included the ambassador to Tanzania, He Gongkai, deputy director general of the Department of African Affairs, Zhou Mingji and division chief of the department, Xu Erwei. *Ibid.*, pp. 451-452.

(360) *People’s Daily*, 18 April 1980.

(361) This was explained ZANU’s its correspondence with a Swiss solidarity organisation. BAB, Registratur AA5, Archiv Medic’ Angola und kaempfindes afrika, 1971-88, Gruppe V: Zimbabwe, V.2.2 Korrespondenz Varia, E. G. Mandaza: Zimbabwe’s Foreign Policy, 26 February 1982 (2S).

that 'it was China that helped Zimbabwe the most in weapons and training' with no strings attached.³⁶² The Zimbabwean National Army (ZNA) experimented with a Chinese scheme that despatched personnel to agricultural and other non-military duties, to defuse tensions and to utilise the large numbers of former combatants.³⁶³ The Chinese Ambassador to Zimbabwe, Zhu Qiyuan, was reported as having offered to assist with the establishment of 'garrison farms' for former fighters.³⁶⁴ The project, named Operation SEED (Soldiers Employed in Economic Development), was eventually abandoned but it was an attempt to defuse a tense situation.

At ZANU's Second Party Congress in Harare 8 August 1984, Mugabe touched on China's contribution more specifically, "Without the arms that were annually supplied, enough each year to arm about six thousand men, our struggle would have proved extremely difficult. Beijing also generously offered to train our recruits, firstly in Ghana, then in Tanzania at Mgagao, Nachingwea and other camps, apart from the programmes of training carried out in China itself. In addition, our fighting forces benefitted immensely from the thoughts and ideas of Chairman Mao, which provided them with an ideological guide in the prosecution of the guerrilla war."³⁶⁵ At the same time, the Congress made the decision to drop 'Mao Zedong Thought' from its basic documents.³⁶⁶

Final Words

Chinese training methods and Maoist guerrilla warfare strategy had a great influence on key personalities who later became members of the ZANLA high command, such as Josiah Tongogara, Rex Nhongo and Josiah Tungamaria.³⁶⁷ ZANLA's military tactics underwent a transformation from a conventional military approach to the Maoist model of mass mobilisation of the population, which contributed to ZANU's comparably firmer base in the countryside. It was this stronger level of rural support and intimidation, rather than ZANLA's military capability that eventually proved to be of critical importance.³⁶⁸

Namibia

Beijing supported both SWANU and SWAPO from the early 1960s. Contact with SWAPO continued in spite of the Sino-Soviet dispute, though there was stronger rhetorical support for SWANU during the Cultural Revolution.

(362) *People's Daily*, 14 May 1981. Cited in Taylor, *China and Africa*., p. 108. Horne, *US and the war against Zimbabwe*., p. 41.

(363) Abiodun Alao, "The Metamorphosis of the 'Unorthodox': the integration and early development of the Zimbabwean National Army," in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, ed. Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (London, 1995), p. 113.

(364) *Ibid.*, p. 113.

(365) Zimbabwe African National Union Central Committee Report, presented by the President of ZANU Comrade R. G. Mugabe to the Second Congress of the Party, at Borrowdale Grounds, Harare, 8 August 1984, p. 9.

(366) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*. p. 188.

(367) Pandya, *Mao and Chimurenga*., p. 90.

(368) ZIPRA rather than ZANLA fighters were more respected by the Rhodesian security forces. Thanks to Dr Sue Onslow for this clarification.

This country study is organised into four sections: first, on Chinese relations with SWANU and SWAPO from the late 1950s till mid-1960s, then separate parts on SWANU and SWAPO during the Cultural Revolution, followed by Beijing's focus on SWAPO and some final thoughts on the topic.

Beijing's Relations with the Namibian Liberation Movements from the late 1950s to mid-1960s

Initial contact between China and nationalists from South West Africa was probably made through the AAPSO. Indeed, while South West Africa (SWA) was first mentioned in the Chinese press in December 1946, and it was only in the late 1950s that nationalist movements took a more organised form.³⁶⁹ The Ovamboland People's Organisation (OPO) was formed in 1958, followed by the South West African National Union (SWANU) the following year. Sam Nujoma, OPO co-founder, joined SWANU's Executive in September 1959 but quickly left and created SWAPO (essentially OPO re-named) the next year.³⁷⁰ From the start, SWANU stressed self-reliance and, disillusioned with the unresponsive UN system, began to criticise the UN for being Western driven and instead took a clear pro-Chinese stance as Beijing was perceived as 'the most radical of the superpowers.'³⁷¹

SWANU very quickly enhanced its profile and international network through its active participation in regional and international bodies.³⁷² Indeed, at the time it was viewed as an extremely viable and promising movement.³⁷³ Although SWANU was ostensibly non-aligned in its policies, its rhetoric was stridently anti-imperialist and found resonance in Beijing's standpoint as a 'militant and revolutionary' government.³⁷⁴ The SWANU president, Fanuel Kozonguizi, was particularly vocal in his statements and as a member of the AAPSO Executive, gave greater visibility to SWA issues through the Organisation's publications.³⁷⁵ In September 1960, Kozonguizi visited China. His statements condemned the continued American, British and French support for Pretoria, while praising China as a 'peace-loving country' and criticised the American military presence in Taiwan. In the prevailing cold war climate, that pro-Chinese stance did not go down well with external supporters.³⁷⁶ The circulation of Kozonguizi's statements by a SWAPO rival in the United Nations changed international opinions towards both SWA movements, fanning suspicions of Kozonguizi's – and SWANU's –

(369) *People's Daily*, 15 December 1946.

(370) Ronald Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa: regional dynamics of decolonisation, 1945-1990* (Geneva, 1994), pp. 33-34.

(371) Tony Emmett, *Popular Resistance and the Roots of Nationalism in Namibia, 1915-1966*, Basel Namibia Studies Series 4 (Basel, 1999), p. 316.

(372) Lauren Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia, 1960-1991: war by other means*, Second ed., Basel Namibia Studies Series 3 (Basel, 2000), pp. 33-34.

(373) Emmett, *Nationalism in Namibia*, pp. 326-327. Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 197.

(374) Emmett, *Nationalism in Namibia*, p. 327.

(375) The AAPSO Permanent Secretariat's Afro-Asian Bulletin carried SWANU reports on the oppressive situation in SWA and urged the Secretariat to impress on member governments the importance of united and effective action against Pretoria. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation.

(376) Emmett, *Nationalism in Namibia*, pp. 321-323. *People's Daily*, 6 September 1960.

communist links.³⁷⁷ This problem was compounded by the internal division within SWANU which arose from its withdrawal from the Chief 's Council, which ruptured the movement's relationship with an integral domestic support base.³⁷⁸

Through its membership in the South African United Front (SAUF) that opened offices in London, Accra, Cairo and headquarters in Dar es Salaam, SWANU had access to strategic locations and contacts.³⁷⁹ There were large Chinese embassies in both Cairo and Dar es Salaam, as well as NCNA staff based there. This was also evident from the number of interviews and press releases given to NCNA correspondents in both locations.³⁸⁰ This informed Chinese policymakers of the movement's activities and was also a channel for the dissemination of SWANU's statements internationally. The SWANU office in Cairo had its own monthly publication, *Freedom*, which was extremely critical of American neo-colonialism in Africa, sharing similar themes with the Chinese position.³⁸¹

There was a flurry of both SWANU and SWAPO visits to China in 1963. Two SWANU youth delegates, Kajimuina Vei and Moses K. Katjuongua, were invited by the All China Youth Federation and met Mao.³⁸² Upon his return to Cairo, Katjuongua was interviewed by the NCNA correspondent and said that China was a reliable friend of the liberation struggles in Asia, Africa and Latin America. He said that the visit made him aware of the Chinese people's revolutionary tradition and affirmed that the Chinese were a peace-loving people.³⁸³ After the second SWANU delegation visited China in November, they stopped over in Moscow. Their 'hostile' and 'openly pro-Chinese stand' convinced the Soviets that they were under Beijing's influence.³⁸⁴

Unfazed by SWANU's membership in AAPSO, SWAPO sent a delegation of observers to the 3rd Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika, in February 1963.³⁸⁵ The SWAPO representatives who attended were subsequently invited to China later in the year. In an interview with the Cairo NCNA correspondent, SWAPO representative Solomon Mifima said that the Chinese people gave moral and material support to Africans and other oppressed peoples in their anti-imperialist

(377) SWAPO's Mburumba Kerina circulated the statement at the UN. Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia*, pp. 32-33.

(378) Emmett, *Nationalism in Namibia*, pp. 321-323.

(379) Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa*, p. 32. Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia*, pp. 33-34. Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia*, pp. 33-34.

(380) *People's Daily*, 8 July and 29 December 1962.

(381) In September 1962, *Freedom* described American neo-colonialism as an insidious phenomenon that first gained economic control through investment and subsequently applied political pressure, citing the situation in the Congo. *People's Daily*, 11 September 1962.

(382) ZANU junior official Alfred Gondo was also at the meeting. *People's Daily*, 12 and 19 March 1963.

(383) *People's Daily*, 8 July 1963.

(384) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 197.

(385) The delegation comprised Solomon William Mifima, Theo Ben Suriras, Sam Nujoma and Putuse Appolus. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, "The Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, Moshi, Tanganyika, 4-11 February 1963," (Cairo, 1963).

and anti-colonialist struggle.³⁸⁶ He attested to having ‘seen’ this support with his own eyes, having met many officials as well as freedom fighters in Beijing from Africa, Asia and Latin American countries. Additionally, he said that for as long as imperialism and colonialism existed, it would be impossible to have ‘the so-called peaceful coexistence.’ This was a clear objection to Moscow’s position. SWAPO vice- president, Louis Nelengani, visited China in September and spoke to the NCNA Cairo correspondent en route from China to Dar es Salaam.³⁸⁷ His statement was decidedly anti-American, pointing out its militancy in dispatching troops to South Vietnam, South Korea and many other countries, not least of all the Chinese territory of Taiwan.³⁸⁸ He continued that the US wanted to dominate the world. He said that the Chinese people had similarly bitter experience with colonialism and were now a friend of the oppressed. He praised the Chinese people’s achievement since liberation, which was done through self-reliance and under the respected leader Mao. He said his trip was unforgettable. In November, Putuse Appolus from the SWAPO Women’s Council was invited by the All China Women’s Federation.³⁸⁹ Shortly after her trip, an article appeared in the People’s Daily about her impression of China. She said that the reason that the Chinese people could achieve so much was because they were already politically awakened and knew that they controlled their own destiny.³⁹⁰

In spite of the growing contact between SWAPO and Beijing, Moscow regarded the movement as ‘more cautious’ in its dealings with the Chinese, in contrast with SWANU.³⁹¹ By the end of 1963, SWANU’s perceived closeness to Beijing led to Moscow’s support for SWAPO instead, though the Soviet-SWAPO relationship itself was slow in developing.³⁹² SWAPO also benefitted from SWANU’s shortcomings and internal troubles and sought legitimacy in multilateral organisations, rather than criticised, the UN and OAU.³⁹³ Premier Zhou Enlai’s African tour in 1963-64 was a demonstration of Beijing’s African diplomacy and high regard. Kozonguizi considered this extremely important and that Zhou’s visit would strengthen ties between the Chinese people and various African nations greatly.³⁹⁴ By then the disagreements between the Sino-Soviet camps and their respective supporters were overtaking AAPSO meetings.³⁹⁵ Kozonguizi refuted Soviet criticisms of the Chinese position and said that the Soviet representative was attempting to use Africans against China, “If a Soviet representative speaks for Africa, then Africa must include South West Africa, but he had not discussed anything with me. We are not puppets

(386) *People’s Daily*, 3 September 1963.

(387) *People’s Daily*, 19 September 1963.

(388) *People’s Daily*, 19 September 1963.

(389) *People’s Daily*, 29 September 1963.

(390) *People’s Daily*, 14 November 1963.

(391) Shubin, *The Hot “Cold War”*, p. 197.

(392) Emmett, *Nationalism in Namibia*, pp. 326-327. Shubin, *The Hot “Cold War”*, p. 197.

(393) Emmett, *Nationalism in Namibia*, p. 316.

(394) *People’s Daily*, 24 March 1964.

(395) Neuhauser, *China and the AAPSO*, p. 49.

... and I do not like slanders on China's speech. I feel indignant about this."³⁹⁶ In September, SWANU representative Kajimuina Vei was interviewed in Cairo about his impressions of China during his recent trip. He said that he found the Chinese people peace-loving and devoted to national construction. Additionally, he spoke of the tradition of friendship and solidarity between Chinese and African people, who had the same enemy - imperialism.³⁹⁷

SWAPO leaders were similarly supportive of the Chinese government's position on international events. Following the riots and violence which broke out in Panama in January 1964, that was attributed to American aggression, SWAPO Vice-President Nelengani welcomed Mao's statement on the Panamanians' struggle against American imperialism and invasion, adding that it was this kind of 'morality and just support' which inspired oppressed people. Putuse *Appolus also spoke approvingly of Mao's* statement as a clear indication of the Chinese people's support for anti-imperialist struggles around the world.³⁹⁸ Sam Nujoma himself congratulated the Chinese government on the successful detonation of its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964, calling it an achievement for the Asian, African and Latin American people and a tremendous contribution to world peace. He added that the new Chinese atomic capability meant that imperialist nations would not threaten and intimidate African, Asian and Latin American countries again. Nujoma also pointed out that the continued refusal to give the PRC its legitimate seat in the UN constituted a flagrant disregard for world peace.³⁹⁹

The most significant event in 1964 which affected Beijing's support for SWANU was the OAU's recognition of SWAPO as the 'official' Namibian liberation movement. This came after SWANU declined the Liberation Committee's challenge to take up arms, which SWAPO had accepted. The Sino-Soviet dispute increased the tensions between both movements and was also responsible for the failure of the short-lived SWANU-SWAPO merger, SWANLIF, after 1964.⁴⁰⁰ By the middle of 1965, SWAPO had a monopoly on OAU assistance allocated for SWA.⁴⁰¹ In May, an interview with an NCNA correspondent, the SWAPO Algiers office deputy representative congratulated Beijing on its successful detonation of its second atomic bomb.⁴⁰² In July, Nujoma and Cairo representative Andreas Shipanga visited China at the invitation of the Foreign Relations Institute.⁴⁰³ They met with the China AAPSO Committee Chairman Liao Chengzhi and Institute of Foreign Affairs Secretary General Wang Yinpu and travelled

(396) *People's Daily*, 24 March 1964.

(397) *People's Daily*, 12 September 1964.

(398) *People's Daily*, 25 January 1964.

(399) *People's Daily*, 24 November 1964.

(400) SWANU, SWAPO and a number of minor parties formed the SWA National Liberation Front (SWANLIF) in October 1963, within which the parties would be able to forward common agenda. Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia*., p. 35.

(401) Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa*., p. 61.

(402) *People's Daily*, 17 May 1965.

(403) *People's Daily*, 12 July 1965.

to Nanjing and Shanghai after Beijing.⁴⁰⁴ It is possible that that was the occasion that Nujoma was given funds with which he purchased a Land Rover for SWAPO's exile work.⁴⁰⁵

Beijing's Relations with SWANU During the Cultural Revolution

At the Tricontinental conference in Havana in early 1966, Kozonguizi supported the Chinese delegation in opposing the use of 'peaceful coexistence' in the conference's resolution, denouncing the 'collusion' between Moscow and Washington.⁴⁰⁶ This probably contributed to his forced resignation from the SWANU External Council.⁴⁰⁷ Former SWANU chairman Kozonguizi continued his pro-Beijing rhetoric and in August he congratulated Mao on the convening of the National People's Congress in Beijing. He praised Mao as 'the guiding light of the world's revolutionary people' and stated that the Chinese people were crushing the reactionary culture to establish a progressive proletariat culture, in line with Mao Zedong Thought. He said that the Cultural Revolution was a good example for revolutionary people and that those who had studied Mao's work would 'defeat the imperialists and their running dogs and not be swayed by the Soviet Union's revisionist group.'⁴⁰⁸ Due to its own internal difficulties and the lack of a popular support base, SWANU's fate continued to dim in 1967. Its limited support network was hit hard by Beijing's insularity during the Cultural Revolution and this came to a head at the 8th session of the AAPSO Council in Nicosia, Cyprus. The pro-Soviet ANC representative called for SWANU's expulsion and the proposal received a unanimous vote, resulting in SWAPO's admission in its place. This catalysed SWANU's further decline and the loss of OAU recognition the following year.⁴⁰⁹ Following that, Beijing grew closer to SWAPO, though it continued providing token support to SWANU until the early 1970s.

Understandably irate after the disastrous outcome of the Nicosia meeting, SWANU Cairo representative Katjuongua disputed the legality of the Nicosia meeting and the 3rd session of the Afro-Asian Writers Association in Beirut, which had also had a poor outcome for the Chinese camp. He issued a statement in support of the 5th AAPSO conference that was proposed by the Chinese Committee in Beijing, and roundly condemned Soviet revisionism for splitting the Asian and African people by simultaneously announcing its venue in Cairo instead.⁴¹⁰ He reiterated that the SWA people were assured of the success of the event in Beijing and would send their representative. He appealed to all Afro-Asian revolutionaries to travel to Beijing –

(404) *People's Daily*, 17 July 1966.

(405) Gregor Dobler, "Old ties or new shackles? China in Namibia," in *Transitions in Namibia: which changes for whom?*, ed. Henning Melber (Uppsala, 2007), p. 97.

(406) Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa*, pp. 59-60.

(407) Ian Taylor, "China and SWAPO: the role of the People's Republic in Namibia's liberation and post-independence relations," *South African Journal of International Affairs* 5 (1997).

(408) *People's Daily*, 31 August 1966.

(409) Emmett, *Nationalism in Namibia*, p. 330.

(410) At the 4th Conference in Ghana, Beijing was chosen as the next venue, but this was later moved to Cairo. Thanks to Prof. Shubin for this clarification.

the bastion of anti-imperialism - to introduce the world to the greatest teacher of the world's oppressed people, Mao. The statement went further and denounced the AAPSO secretariat in Cairo as being under Soviet control and counter-revolutionary. Finally, attempting to soften SWANU's expulsion from the AAPSO, he said that, "... because the Secretariat adopted such a course of action, SWANU naturally has no relations with it."⁴¹¹

In May 1967, SWANU and the Basutoland Congress Party, Bechuanaland People's Party, Pan African Congress, Revolutionary Committee of Mozambique (COREMO), Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) and Angolan Revolutionary government in exile (GRAE) jointly issued a statement. These movements were generally regarded as being radical and pro-Chinese splinter movements. As 'militant and liberatory' movements, they denounced the criminal activities of the US and Soviet modern revisionists who attempted to sabotage and subvert the struggle of the world's people against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism and modern revisionism, declaring that 'it is the people and the people alone who are the motive force in the making of world history, as Mao correctly said.'⁴¹² This reciprocal solidarity, as evident from the SWANU press release in Cairo, stated that the Chinese AAPSO Committee strongly condemned the South African authorities for the arrest of acting SWANU president Gerson Hitjevi Veii and other illegally detained freedom fighters. Veii had been detained under the Suppression of Communism Act. The press release reiterated the Chinese people's support for the SWA people in their struggle for independence and liberation.⁴¹³

SWANU's newsletter, South West Africa Review, reflected a clear inclination towards Beijing in its content and may have received some Chinese sponsorship for publication. An issue from 1972 included articles on 'the prestige of socialist China in world affairs is growing with each passing day. The policies of encircling China are crumbling. The Chinese people have friends all over the world.'⁴¹⁴

Beijing's Relations with SWAPO During the Cultural Revolution

Shortly after the launch of the Cultural Revolution, SWAPO's Pan-African and diplomatic work Secretary Peter Katjavivi said that Mao's work had great value and gave infinite courage. He told the NCNA correspondent in Dar es Salaam that Mao's work helped to explain the contradiction between international imperialism and people in the current world situation, thus arming and enabling us to wage the struggle

(411) *People's Daily*, 31 March 1967.

(412) SWANU condemned Pretoria's actions and its foreign mission in Cairo read very much like an NCNA article. BAB, Zusatz AA3(12/98), SWANU Collection, copy from Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA., for SWAPO Archive, December 1998. Statement condemning the South African regime's actions against the SWANU, by foreign mission of SWANU, Cairo, 22 May 1967.

(413) BAB, Zusatz AA3(12/98), SWANU Collection, copy from Hoover Institution, Stanford, CA., for SWAPO Archive, December 1998. Katjuongua, Moses K., "SWANU President Gerson Hitjevi Veii in jail on Robben Island for 5 Years," in Gerson Hitjevi Veii – A true son of the people of South West Africa, May 1967.

(414) Basler Afrika Bibliographien, SWANU files, South West Africa Review, Vol. 4, No. 3, July-September 1972, pp. 7-8.

against propaganda, such as the so-called ‘peaceful coexistence.’ Katjavivi said that SWAPO’s cadres were studying Mao’s works, which helped them in solving day-to-day problems.⁴¹⁵ The People’s Daily reported that South West African freedom fighters had written a paper titled “Chairman Mao Zedong is today’s greatest Marxist,” which expressed their esteem and respect for Mao Zedong Thought. Mao Zedong Thought was hailed for simplifying profound concepts and making them more accessible to the masses, which put Mao in the same league as Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.⁴¹⁶

On 26 August 1966 SWAPO proclaimed the start of its armed struggle and its first clash with South African troops broke out in Ovamboland. However, it faced immense logistical challenges, not least of all in having to traverse the great distance between Dar es Salaam to its closest area of military operations in the Caprivi Strip. Dar es Salaam port was also the main point for the receipt of Chinese arms and material by the Tanzanian forces, which were then allocated to the liberation movements. Furthermore, swarms of Namibian refugees flooded into Dar es Salaam, but the pressure was alleviated when the SWAPO leadership was able to arrange for ‘the brighter ones’ to be sent to China and the Soviet Union for training.⁴¹⁷ SWAPO sent seven cadres to China for military training, probably sometime in mid- to late 1967. These ‘Seven Comrades’, as they came to be known, arrived in Tanzania’s Kongwa camp in mid-1968. However, they protested against what they claimed was PLAN’s weak understanding of military strategy, corruption, as well as the troops’ inertia and low morale.⁴¹⁸ Following instructions from SWAPO leaders, the group was detained by Tanzanian forces. It is unclear if this ‘loss’ of the Chinese-trained cadres had any effect on SWAPO-Beijing relations, if at all, though it is unlikely that Beijing would interfere in an internal SWAPO matter.

Even after SWANU’s displacement by SWAPO, the latter’s relations with Moscow developed only slowly.⁴¹⁹ SWAPO was a participant in the Soviet-sponsored Khartoum Conference in 1969, along with the MPLA, ZAPU, South Africa’s ANC and FRELIMO. Nonetheless, SWAPO’s contacts with China were fairly cordial, if its statements and visits were any indication. In July 1970, SWAPO’s statements were very much supportive of Beijing’s foreign policy position in Southeast Asia. The NCNA Algiers correspondent reported SWAPO’s declaration of support for the just struggle of the Indo-Chinese people. The article condemned American imperialism and the US troops which had invaded Cambodia. It was strongly worded and condemned the bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and expressed support for the patriotic and heroic South Vietnamese and Cambodian people.⁴²⁰ In September, a

(415) *People’s Daily*, 9 July 1966.

(416) *People’s Daily*, 20 July 1966.

(417) Emmett, *Nationalism in Namibia*., p. 332.

(418) Susan Brown, “Diplomacy by Other Means,” in *Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: the two-edged sword*, ed. Colin Leys and John S. Saul (London, 1995)., pp. 43–44. Shubin, *The Hot “Cold War”*., p. 202.

(419) Shubin, *The Hot “Cold War”*., p. 197.

(420) *People’s Daily*, 17 May 1970. SWAPO’s Lusaka office released a statement which expressed support for Crown Prince Norodom Sihanouk and condemned US imperialist aggression in Cambodia. *People’s Daily*, 2 July 1970.

SWAPO representative expressed support for the Chinese people's anti-imperialist struggle and congratulated them on the achievement of the socialist revolution and socialist construction. He said that the bulletin expounded on Mao's thoughts on the current world situation and its judgment was very correct and had great significance. It condemned American and NATO support for Portugal.⁴²¹ Nujoma sent Mao a telegram of fraternal regards and congratulations on the PRC's 21st anniversary, wishing him a long life and toasting their peoples' militant solidarity. The telegram said that the Namibian people had received concrete and helpful aid from the Chinese people, inspired by the Chinese people's internationalist standpoint and generosity.⁴²²

Beijing Focuses On SWAPO

The United Nations was a major arena for the battle for Namibian independence and, in spite of its waning position; SWANU persisted with that channel well into the 1970s. Godfrey Gaoseb, Secretary of SWANU's External Council, sent a cable to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim in September 1972, voicing the Union's concern at being excluded from deliberations on Namibian independence. It appears that Gaoseb, with a SWANU delegation, were cordially received at the UN and met Waldheim on 29 November 1972. The delegation spoke of the differences between them and SWAPO and the UN file note described their attitude as 'understanding and constructive'.⁴²³ Gaoseb sent another cable to the Chairman of the Fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly (UNGA) in October, requesting for a hearing when the 27th Session of the Fourth Committee discussed the Namibian question.⁴²⁴ The Fourth Committee began considering the Namibian question on 6 December, but SWANU had by then indicated that they were no longer interested in being heard during that session of the UNGA.⁴²⁵ The UNGA Resolution was passed in 1973 which recognised SWAPO as the 'sole and authentic' representative of the Namibian people. This was the point when Beijing terminated its support for SWANU to focus exclusively on SWAPO.⁴²⁶ In an attempt to discern Chinese sentiments towards SWAPO, Nujoma led a delegation to China in July 1973, at the invitation of the China Africa People's Friendship Association. Beijing now appeared more interested in SWAPO than SWANU, but Nujoma still suspected that the Chinese officials considered SWAPO pro-Soviet.⁴²⁷

(421) *People's Daily*, 15 September 1970.

(422) *People's Daily*, 7 October 1970.

(423) UN Secretariat Archival Item, Items-in-Africa, Question of Namibia – organisations and individuals – South West African National Union (SWANU), Note for the file: Meeting in the Secretary General's office on 29 November 1972 at 6.30pm.

(424) The SWANU delegates put forward for that hearing were Charles Kauraisa, Moses Katjuongua, Godfrey Gaoseb, Ambrose Kandjii and Nora Chase.

(425) UN Secretariat Archival Item, Items-in-Africa, Question of Namibia – organisations and individuals – South West African National Union (SWANU), Note for the record, 8 December 1972.

(426) As was reflected in its subsequent, exclusive press coverage of SWAPO. Taylor, "China and SWAPO."

(427) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 209. This visit was preceded by a stay in the Democratic Republic of Korea and was followed by a stop in Romania. *People's Daily*, 15 and 22 July 1973.

SWANU President Hitjevi Veii led a delegation to meet Waldheim again on 12 November 1974. Veii informed the Secretary General that unity remained a problem amongst representatives of the Namibian movements' external representatives. He also protested against the UN's continued preference of SWAPO. Waldheim pointed out that he had met representatives from each group during his visit to Namibia, but that SWAPO was the only one which was recognised by the OAU. Nonetheless, he agreed to raise this point to Nujoma when they next met.⁴²⁸ In December, as an OAU-recognised movement, SWAPO was invited by the UNGA to participate in the relevant work of the main committees of the UNGA and its subsidiaries, as well as related UN events pertaining to their countries. By that stage, SWANU was in serious decline, having lost most of its external supporters and international recognition to its rival SWAPO.⁴²⁹

By the end of 1974, PLAN was receiving three-quarters of its arms from the Soviet Union.⁴³⁰ Angolan independence in particular, availed more Soviet and Cuban support for SWAPO, which subsequently took up 'a commitment to scientific socialism' which reflected the strong ties that had grown between SWAPO and Moscow.⁴³¹ For the other southern African countries - South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia - its assistance was largely through diplomatic pressure for sanctions, boycotts of commodities and isolation by the international community.⁴³² Following Angolan independence in November (1975), Nujoma visited China with a SWAPO delegation. Against the large inflow of assistance from Moscow and the Eastern Bloc, which Beijing was unable to compete with, it 'faded into the background.'⁴³³ Additionally, as China had supported the anti-MPLA forces during the Angolan liberation struggle and was frowned on by Luanda, it became logistically impossible to provide material support to SWAPO through Angolan territory.⁴³⁴ Moreover, it is likely that the Soviet Union appeared to be more able to contribute the weaponry necessary for the continued struggle against the well-armed South African forces, though Nujoma persisted in cultivating good

(428) The other SWANU delegates present at the meeting were Secretary for Foreign Affairs R. Muundjua, Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the SWANU External Council Charles Kauraisa and SWANU representative in the Netherlands Siegfried Tjijorokisa. UN Secretariat Archival Item, Items-in-Africa, Question of Namibia – organisations and individuals – South West African National Union (SWANU), Note for the file: Meeting with the delegation of the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) on 12 November 1974 (<http://archives-trim.un.org>) [accessed 7 December 2009].

(429) Nonetheless, SWANU Secretary General R. Vekuii Rukoro sent another letter to the Secretary General on 16 May 1977, the start of the UN Conference on Namibia which opened in Maputo. The letter decried the inability of the Namibian liberation movement 'as a whole' to participate in the UN's decolonisation efforts in the country. UN Secretariat Archival Item, Items-in-Africa, Question of Namibia – organisations and individuals – South West African National Union (SWANU), Letter to UN Secretary General, 16 May 1977 (<http://archives-trim.un.org>) [accessed 7 December 2009].

(430) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 213.

(431) Taylor, "China and SWAPO."

(432) Gaudens P. Mpangala, "Tanzania's support to the liberation struggle in southern Africa," in *Sites of Memory: Julius Nyerere and the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa*, ed. Haroub Othman (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 2007), pp. 8-23.

(433) Taylor, "China and SWAPO."

(434) Ibid.

relations with Beijing. That year the UNGA adopted resolution 31/152 which granted SWAPO observer status in the international organisation. This led to a rise in external financial assistance to SWAPO from various donors, which created an impetus for the movement to maintain a non-aligned posture though, as the preeminent movement representing Namibians, 'it was also unnecessary.'⁴³⁵

SWAPO's condolence message to the Chinese government following Mao's death on 9 September 1976 called the late Chairman:

A great revolutionary hero [who] led a heroic struggle of the Chinese people against imperialist forces ... with foresight and wisdom leading the world's largest nation into a prosperous socialist society and stood at the front line in support of national liberation and independence of the peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the world over.⁴³⁶

SWAPO was extremely successful in soliciting support from a range of sponsors. Indeed, the Soviet Union was an important patron, as evinced from an article in SWAPO's publication, *Namibia Today*:

This support for and solidarity with the struggling peoples of the world have earned the Soviet Union a priceless admiration and recognition as the valiant champion of freedom, peace and justice in the world. SWAPO and the struggling people of Namibia have been and are today still the beneficiaries of diplomatic, political and most importantly, concrete material assistance from the Soviet Union in the fight against the colonial illegal occupation of our country by the military forces of Vorster and his henchmen. For example, the military efforts of PLAN would not be as impressive as they are today without this indispensable assistance and cooperation.⁴³⁷ On 27 July 1978 Beijing voted in favour of the UN Security Council Resolution which authorised the appointment of a Special Representative for Namibia and to make recommendations for the implementation of the proposal for a settlement of the Namibian situation. Beijing voted for the resolution, which had broad African support, in spite of its earlier material and military support for SWAPO.⁴³⁸ It is very likely that Beijing also viewed a peaceful settlement in Namibia as countering the expansion of Soviet influence in the region. Namibian independence would purportedly present fewer inroads for Soviet intervention there.⁴³⁹

Nujoma visited Beijing in January 1983 and met State Council Premier Zhao Ziyang. The SWAPO leader thanked the Chinese government for the material, political and diplomatic support for the Namibian liberation struggle.⁴⁴⁰ Zhao condemned Pretoria's racist regime and Washington's obstruction of the UNSC resolution on

(435) Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia*, pp. 64-65.

(436) SWAPO, *Namibia Today*, (official organ of SWAPO) (November 1976).

(437) SWAPO, *Namibia Today*, vol. 3, (official organ of SWAPO) (1977).

(438) The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia abstained, stating that they would have voted against the resolution if it were not for the views of SWAPO and the African countries. NA, PREM16/1534, Visit of the Chinese Foreign Minister: 10-14 October 1978, Africa, Brief No. 8.

(439) Taylor, "China and SWAPO."

(440) *People's Daily*, 28 January 1983.

Namibia by linking Cuban withdrawal from Angola with South African withdrawal from Namibia. In this new climate and Beijing's more domestic focus, Zhao said that the Chinese government gave political and moral support, as well as material aid within their means.⁴⁴¹ The Central External Liaison Department Minister Qiao Shi hosted a welcome banquet in the Great Hall of the People for the visiting delegation.⁴⁴² In his speech, Qiao affirmed Chinese support for the Namibian people in their just struggle for national independence.⁴⁴³ In August, another group visited at the invitation of the Foreign Friendship Association.⁴⁴⁴ The SWAPO delegation was assured by Chinese officials that the Chinese UN representatives would once again support the Namibian people's struggle for independence at the upcoming 38th UNGA session.

Nujoma visited China with Oliver Tambo in 1984.⁴⁴⁵ By this time, SWAPO had received much more assistance per capita than that of the other southern African liberation movements.⁴⁴⁶ Its list of contributors included Western governments, international agencies, solidarity and religious groups, as well as the socialist countries in even larger measure, 'estimated in 1984 to be providing 60% of the total funding to SWAPO, in addition to 90 per cent of its arms.'⁴⁴⁷ Beijing continued to provide modest material support and rhetorical support for SWAPO while persisting with its anti-South African position on international platforms. In June, the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference vice-president, All China Women's Federation President Kang Keqing met with SWAPO Party Women's Council secretary Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana.⁴⁴⁸

In March 1985, the International Liaison Department of the CCP Minister Qian Liren met Nujoma at the invitation of the Central Committee of the CPC. Central External Liaison Department Vice Minister Li Shuzheng joined the discussion. CPC Central Committee Secretariat Secretary Xi Zhongxun reiterated that the CPC and the Chinese people supported the Namibian people's just struggle and that the UNSC 435th resolution proposal would solve the independence question. Nujoma said that SWAPO as the sole Namibian movement, would continue the armed struggle if the resolution for a peaceful settlement was not passed.⁴⁴⁹ Nujoma also gave a public lecture at Beijing Normal University for 500 teachers and students, on Namibia's history and its independence struggle.⁴⁵⁰ He held a press conference and also met

(441) *People's Daily*, 28 January 1983.

(442) *People's Daily*, 25 January 1983.

(443) *People's Daily*, 26 January 1983. The SWAPO delegation continued onwards to Pyongyang after Beijing. *People's Daily*, 29 January 1983.

(444) *People's Daily*, 26 August 1983.

(445) Taylor, "China and SWAPO."

(446) Lauren Dobell, "SWAPO in Office," in *Namibia's Liberation Struggle: the two-edged sword*, ed. Colin Leys and John S. Saul (London, 1995), pp. 172-174. Dobell's use of 'per capita' probably means 'per SWAPO member', though this is not explicitly stated in the article.

(447) *Ibid.*, pp. 172-174.

(448) *People's Daily*, 21 June 1984.

(449) *People's Daily*, 16 March 1985.

(450) *People's Daily*, 17 March 1985.

with African diplomats stationed in Beijing.⁴⁵¹ In June 1986, Politburo member and State Council Premier Zhao Ziyang met Nujoma and his visiting delegation.⁴⁵² Zhao reiterated China's firm stand on support for the Namibian people's liberation struggle. Nujoma thanked the CPC and government for its diplomatic and material support, as well as assistance to the frontline states. He said the consolidation of these frontline countries' independence was a help to the Namibian people's struggle as well.⁴⁵³

The success of China's African policy became resoundingly clear in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square crisis in June 1989. Qian Qichen, the Chinese Foreign Minister at the time, recalls in his memoirs that, in spite of the 'strong movement to isolate China', its African allies remained constant and friendly.⁴⁵⁴ He visited the continent and, significantly, included a tour of Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique. Beijing's tenets of 'not yielding to external pressures' and 'non-intervention in other's domestic affairs' was perhaps most appreciated by those governments which had recently come to power, faced similar challenges, and needed to consolidate themselves. Qian would only visit Namibia in 1991, but at the time, Nujoma sent a message to the Chinese embassy in Luanda expressing his understanding of its actions in 'putting down the counter-revolutionary rebellion' and his congratulations on the CPC's 'victory' in overcoming it.⁴⁵⁵

In the run up to Namibian independence on 21 March 1990, Beijing sent 20 observers to participate in the international monitoring of the pre-independence elections.⁴⁵⁶ The Chinese government was one of the first to formalise diplomatic ties with Nujoma's government.

Final Thoughts

SWAPO communiqués and statements published in the Chinese press suggest a close rapport with Beijing throughout the period of the liberation struggle. There were mutual expressions of solidarity as well as vocal, almost militant, support for Chinese foreign policy. Beijing maintained relations with SWAPO and SWANU but gave more rhetorical support to the latter during the Cultural Revolution. The OAU's decision to recognise SWAPO over SWANU was eventually the deciding factor which concentrated Chinese support for SWAPO.

South Africa

This section is organised into five parts: the first three parts focus on Beijing's relations with the SACP, ANC and PAC respectively, followed by a fourth part on

(451) The delegation travelled to DPRK after. *People's Daily*, 20 March 1985.

(452) Nujoma also met with the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Vice Committee Chief Geng Biao, Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian and Central External Liaison Department Minister Zhu Liang. *People's Daily*, 4 June 1986.

(453) *People's Daily*, 3 and 9 June 1986.

(454) Qian, *Ten Episodes.*, pp. 201-202.

(455) Taylor, "China and SWAPO."

(456) Taylor, *China and Africa*.

Beijing, Taiwan and economic relations with Pretoria, and finally, some final words on the topic.

South African Communist Party (SACP)

The Communist Party of China (CPC) and SACP were already acquainted from the late 1940s through their membership in the Soviet-led communist fraternity. The peak of their relations was from 1960 till around 1963. SACP representatives contacted the CPC to request for military training in July 1960, just months after it was banned by the South African authorities.⁴⁵⁷ Formal party relations were established when SACP chairman Yusuf Dadoo, accompanied by Vella Pillay, paid a secret visit to Beijing in October 1960 and were received by Chairman Mao Zedong, Premier Zhou Enlai, CPC Secretary General Deng Xiaoping and Foreign Minister Chen Yi.⁴⁵⁸ Aside from their discussions on strategies for the struggle against apartheid, the delegates also inquired about China's experience in covert and propaganda work and made what would be the first of a number of requests for the CPC's political and financial support. According to Zhong and Xu, the SACP Executive Committee approached the Chinese because they encouraged the use of local materials rather than heavy equipment, which Soviet instructors tended to emphasise.⁴⁵⁹ However, this perception is disputed by Shubin, who claims that the Soviets emphasised the quality of fighters.⁴⁶⁰ Subsequent meetings between officials from both sides resulted in a customised training course that was designed according to the SACP Executive Committee's requests.⁴⁶¹ SACP cadres began their training in China in October and November 1961. The group included Raymond Mhlaba, one of the founders of the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), who had dual membership of the ANC and SACP. The military component was carried out in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) military academics in Nanjing and Hainan. There was also a political component which covered the history of the CPC's revolutionary experience, its ongoing socialist construction and Mao's works.⁴⁶² The Chinese received a further request for help with technical training and the production of plastic explosives from another SACP delegation in early 1963.⁴⁶³ Joe Slovo would later thank the Chinese for their support, saying that this first group of trainees included some SACP cadres who later became 'the backbone of the ANC and SACP.'⁴⁶⁴ The CPC also made small contributions towards

(457) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1222.

(458) *Ibid.*, pp. 1230-1231.

(459) *Ibid.*, p. 1232.

(460) Thanks to Prof. Shubin for this comment.

(461) January 1961 visit by SACP Central Committee members Michael Harmel and Joe Matthews, who were received by Deng. That April, in London, Pillay had a secret meeting with officials from the Chinese embassy and informed them of the SACP's decision to launch an armed struggle. He requested for military training, particularly in guerrilla warfare. Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1231.

(462) *Ibid.*, pp. 1231-1232.

(463) The MK organiser Arthur Goldreich and SACP Europe representative Vella Pillay, lodged these requests during their secret visit to China in early 1963. T. L. Deitsch and V. G. Shubin, *China and South Africa: the evolution of a relationship*, (translated from Russian) (Moscow, 1999).

(464) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1233.

the SACP propaganda organ, *New Age*, and organised mass events in solidarity with the SACP's struggle.⁴⁶⁵ Significantly, the CPC also monitored the SACP's political and party development.

What began as a very promising relationship between the parties – one of the few African communist parties that the CPC had formal ties with – quickly soured because of the strains of the Sino-Soviet dispute. As Beijing's relations with Moscow deteriorated, it sought support for its anti-Soviet line.⁴⁶⁶ While the SACP had initially hoped that this rift would quickly pass, when things got progressively worse, the SACP sided with Moscow and began publishing criticisms of Beijing's policies, most notably during the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s.⁴⁶⁷ To the SACP, it seemed as if it were 'a matter of principle for Beijing to counteract every force that is supported by the Soviet Union, even if it harms the oppressed peoples.'⁴⁶⁸ That led to a suspension of contact till 1982, when relations between Moscow and Beijing began to thaw and removed the main obstacle to the resumption of times between the Chinese and South African parties.

The CPC made some initial overtures to the SACP and, after consulting the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in November the latter contacted the CPC informally and began a gradual resumption of ties.⁴⁶⁹ In November 1985, Joe Slovo met a Chinese delegation that was visiting Zambia and was informed that Beijing was ready to supply weapons to the ANC and offer training in China. The ANC representatives agreed to receive the arms, but not the latter.⁴⁷⁰ The high level visits which followed in 1986 and 1987 fostered closer ties between the parties and led to financial and material assistance from Beijing for the SACP's struggle, although the overall volume was less than its assistance to Mozambique's FRELIMO, Zimbabwe's ZANU and Namibia's SWAPO.⁴⁷¹

In conclusion, Beijing's relations with and assistance to the SACP were concentrated into two periods, the early 1960s and from around the mid-1980s.⁴⁷² Beijing had given military and political training, as well as military and financial support in the first period. The two-decade long hiatus was entirely due to the Sino-Soviet dispute, which polarised the South African nationalist movement. It was only with the rapprochement between the two communist powers in 1982 that the CPC and SACP

(465) *Ibid.*, p. 1233.

(466) Deitsch and Shubin, *China and South Africa: the evolution of a relationship*.

(467) Vladimir Shubin, *ANC: A View from Moscow*, Mayibuye History and Literature Series No. 88 (Bellville, 1999), pp. 68-69.

(468) Deitsch and Shubin, *China and South Africa: the evolution of a relationship*.

(469) This was done through SACP member Vella Pillay who worked at the London branch of Bank of China. Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1224.

(470) Deitsch and Shubin, *China and South Africa: the evolution of a relationship*.

(471) Including one claim that the CPC gave US\$9,000 to the SACP for the purchase of two vehicles. From the website of South African History Online, paper on The South African Communist Party In Exile: 1963-1990 by Eddy Maloka, <http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/library-resources/online%20books/sacp-eddy-maloka/chapter5.htm> [accessed 1 October 2009]. Zhong and Xu, "China's support."

(472) *Ibid.*

resumed contact, though by that time Beijing was concentrating more heavily on the ANC.

African National Congress (ANC)

Beijing's first contact with representatives of the ANC came in the early 1950s, through mass organisations such as the All China Youth Federation, All China Federation of Trade Unions, etc. These groups frequently made expressions of solidarity with the South African people's struggle against the racist apartheid regime and invited a number of ANC delegates to visit China.⁴⁷³ In September 1953, Walter Sisulu, Duma Nokwe and Ismael Bhoola visited China at the invitation of the All China Youth Federation and inquired about the possibility of Chinese arms shipments for the ANC.⁴⁷⁴ Although Beijing was pursuing a revolutionary foreign policy at the time and the Chinese officials were generally supportive of the ANC's struggle, they cautioned against any hasty decisions on such a serious matter.⁴⁷⁵ This was probably due to the risks which would be involved in such a confrontation, given the lack of rear bases on South African borders and the overwhelming military strength of Pretoria's security forces.

As a front organisation, the ANC encompassed a broad range of political entities. Beijing continued its moral support and expressions of solidarity for ANC activities through the late 1950s, as the Congress planned its resistance to Pretoria's increasingly oppressive policies.⁴⁷⁶ The ANC was banned in 1960 and its leaders decided to commence their armed struggle the following year. They looked overseas for training opportunities for the ANC-SACP armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). This would tide them through until their own training facilities could be set up in southern Africa. The initial group of ANC cadres who were trained in China later rose to senior positions in the MK.⁴⁷⁷ The MK's first camps were established in the frontline states of Tanganyika (later Tanzania) and Zambia, following their independence in 1961 and 1964 respectively.⁴⁷⁸

ANC-Beijing relations continued to grow following National Executive Committee member Tennyson Makiwane's meeting with Mao in April 1961. The Chairman expressed his support for the anti-imperialist struggle and advocated a strategy for a united front of all African people for a concerted struggle.⁴⁷⁹ A number of high level ANC delegations visited China in 1963, a peak in relations.⁴⁸⁰ Most notably,

(473) Deitsch and Shubin, *China and South Africa: the evolution of a relationship*.

(474) Earlier that year, Sisulu and Nokwe had made a tour of socialist countries, including the Soviet Union, Poland and China. What he saw apparently led him to join the South African Communist Party (SACP) when he returned. <http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/sisulu,w.htm>.

(475) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1219.

(476) Ibid. p. 1221.

(477) Including the acting MK commander for a time, Wilton Mkwayi. Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid: the ANC and the South African Communist Party in exile* (London, 1992), p. 45.

(478) Thomas, *Foreign Relations of the ANC.*, p. 154.

(479) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1221.

(480) Greig, *The Communist Challenge to Africa.*, p. 59. Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1222. SACP leader and ANC special envoy John B. Marks in June 1963 to attend a rally commemorating South Africa's Freedom Day,

Oliver Tambo arrived with a high-level delegation that included ANC secretary general and SACP central committee member Duma Nokwe, ANC treasurer and SACP general secretary Moses Kotane, as well as ZAPU's Joshua Nkomo.⁴⁸¹ Tambo took part in the 1 October celebrations and the delegation met Mao and Zhou, who promised significant material assistance and training. This was partly fulfilled.⁴⁸² However this strengthening of relations quickly diminished following criticisms of Beijing's actions in the Sino-Indian border clashes in 1962 and more centrally, the Sino-Soviet split. While the CPC had already ceased its contact with the SACP around 1963, the ANC had initially distanced itself from the issue. However, ANC delegates at AAPSO conferences in 1964 and 1965 criticised the Chinese position and precipitated a break in ties with Beijing.⁴⁸³ Furthermore, the Cultural Revolution was launched at a critical time in the ANC's liberation struggle.⁴⁸⁴ There were 'heated disputes' between MK cadres who were trained in China and the Soviet Union.⁴⁸⁵ Although some individuals in the SACP appreciated the Maoist line, the ANC found internal developments in China unfathomable and leant towards the Soviets instead. ANC leaders, especially Tambo, grew more critical of the radical Chinese line during the Cultural Revolution. He was wary of Chinese influence in relation to the support that Tanzania and Zambia gave to the ANC's principal rival, the PAC.⁴⁸⁶ Despite the official freeze in relations for nearly a decade, there was still nominal contact between the ANC and the Chinese through the dissemination of publications and low-key meetings with Chinese diplomats overseas.⁴⁸⁷ Some ANC cadres even received military training from Chinese instructors in Tanzania, possibly at Kongwa camp.⁴⁸⁸ Owing to its alliance with the SACP, the ANC continued to receive support from the communist bloc countries, such as the Soviet Union's International Fund.⁴⁸⁹ The AAPSO was an especially important source of support for the ANC because of the OAU's push for a united front with the PAC.

It was only in 1975 that there was a rapprochement between the ANC and Beijing, when – according to Tambo – Beijing accepted that the ANC was close to Moscow and that there would be no conditions to their ties with them or anyone else.⁴⁹⁰ Prior

sponsored by the China Africa Friendship Association and a domestic branch of AAPSO's solidarity committee. Thomas, *Foreign Relations of the ANC.*, p. 156. A large, 20 member study group visited in July, as well as the ANC secretary at AAPSO, Mzwai Piliso.

(481) Nkomo was not a member of the ANC delegation: ZAPU later formed an alliance with the ANC from 1967.

(482) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1223.

(483) Ibid. 1223.

(484) Thomas, *Foreign Relations of the ANC.*, pp. 161-162.

(485) Ibid., pp. 161-162.

(486) Shubin, Vladimir. *The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa*, Pluto Press, London, 2008, p. 242-243. Relations with Tanzania were particularly important because the MK had no rear bases abutting South African borders in the 1960s. Arianna Lissoni, "Transformations in the ANC External Mission and Umkhonto we Sizwe, c. 1960-1969," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 35 (June, 2009).

(487) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1234.

(488) Ibid. p. 1223.

(489) Lissoni, "ANC External Mission and Umkhonto we Sizwe." Shubin, Vladimir. *The Hot "Cold War": The USSR in Southern Africa*, Pluto Press, London, 2008, p. 242-243.

(490) Shubin, ANC.

to that there had only been some informal contact between the ANC and Beijing.⁴⁹¹ The Chinese Friendship Association invited acting ANC head Tambo and Algiers representative Johnny Makatini to China in March 1975 during which the delegates were promised military and financial assistance.⁴⁹² In early 1978, Chinese vice-premier Li Xiannian communicated Beijing's interest in normalising relations to the ANC representative in Lusaka. However, Beijing's activities in Vietnam in early 1979 led to ANC criticisms and the condition that normal relations with the ANC could be pursued, but only when Beijing re-joined 'the forces genuinely fighting for the liberation of all oppressed people against imperialism, for national independence, democracy, peace and social progress.'⁴⁹³

Things finally moved forward in January 1983, with Premier Zhao Ziyang's meeting with Tambo in Zambia. Zhao assured him of Chinese support for the South African people's struggle.⁴⁹⁴ In May, at the invitation of the International Department of the Central Committee, Tambo led a delegation to Beijing. He acknowledged Beijing's assistance to the ANC and made a further request for weapons, military technology and training.⁴⁹⁵ In response, the Central Committee Secretariat member Qiao Shi said that, while foreign support was important, reliance on domestic efforts was of the utmost importance.⁴⁹⁶ Following from that meeting, party-to-party relations were established and Beijing's support continued throughout the 1980s. Following from what it viewed as a favourable resolution to the race question in Zimbabwe, Beijing began advocating a coalition government that included all ethnicities, as reflected by deputy foreign minister Gun Dafei's speech in 1983, that black South Africans should unite with the progressive members of the white South African community to change the system.⁴⁹⁷ Relations between Beijing and the ANC were cordial and secretary general Alfred Nzo led delegations to China in 1986 and 1988.

The ANC's international profile burgeoned in the 1980s, thanks in part to a hugely successful international solidarity network. Mandela's release in February 1990 concentrated most external support on the ANC. Namibia's independence in 1990, and international developments and internal developments within South Africa all fostered optimism that the apartheid system was no longer viable. As the focus also changed from liberation movements to political parties, Beijing maintained its united front approach and maintained close relations with the ANC, SACP and PAC.⁴⁹⁸

(491) The movement sent congratulations to the CPC on its 21st anniversary in October 1970 and Tambo also announce the ANC's hope for better relations with China.

(492) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1223. They met Vice Premier Chen Wu Kuei and Cambodian (Kampuchean) Prince Sihanouk. However, the visit was criticised by other ANC members because the Chinese had vetted the delegation list to prevent SACP members from joining. Thomas, *Foreign Relations of the ANC.*, pp. 168-169.

(493) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1224. Thomas, *Foreign Relations of the ANC.*, pp. 168-169. Shubin, ANC.

(494) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1224.

(495) Deitsch and Shubin, *China and South Africa: the evolution of a relationship.*

(496) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1225.

(497) Deitsch and Shubin, *China and South Africa: the evolution of a relationship.*

(498) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1227.

Already in 1988, foreign minister Qian had stated that the abolition of apartheid would pave the way for achieving 'peace, stability and development' in the region. Significantly, he added that China supported political dialogue between the South African authorities and 'the representatives of the black majority' to establish a country where all races would be equal. This expression of support for multi-racialism was a stark contrast to the more Africanist line that Beijing's propaganda had adopted in earlier decades.

To Beijing, the abolishment of the Group Areas Act, Land Act and Population Registration Act in 1991 meant that only one other hurdle remained, that of Taiwan. South African foreign minister Pik Botha made a secret trip to China with a high level delegation in October, where he met Qian.⁴⁹⁹ Their meeting took place at Beijing Airport and the South African delegation departed as soon as it was over. Qian expressed Beijing's hope that Pretoria would pursue the political settlement. Both parties agreed for indirect agencies to be created to work towards bilateral relations. In February 1992, a Centre for South African Studies was set up in Pretoria by China's Institute for International Studies and a reciprocal centre was set up in Beijing by the South Africans the next month. However, the ANC's ongoing relations with Taiwan remained a thorny issue. Qian met Botha again in January 1992 while he was in Johannesburg en route to Namibia. Qian also took the opportunity to meet with ANC vice-president Sisulu (at which time he issued the invitation for Mandela to visit China) and, significantly, Dikgang Moseneke, the vice president of –in Qian's words- the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania.⁵⁰⁰

It was clear that the ANC would play a leading role in the national government so Beijing made extra effort to court it. Mandela had by that time attained the status of an international luminary and icon. He visited Beijing in October 1992 and was accorded a grand welcome, equivalent to that of a head of state. He had meetings at the highest levels, with CPC general secretary Jiang Zemin, President Yang Shangkun and Premier Li Peng. However, Mandela's attempts to enact a 'dual recognition' policy were objectionable. Beijing made a generous contribution of financial and material support amounting to US\$10 million to the ANC, which was the largest amount ever given to a liberation movement.⁵⁰¹ Despite this, Mandela visited Taiwan soon after to receive a US\$25 million donation that the Taiwanese had similarly promised the ANC. From his discussions with Thabo Mbeki, whom Mandela had dispatched to explain his position, Qian concluded ruefully that the new South African government prioritised economic and trade relations and personal exchanges with China over their political relations:

(499) Qian, *Ten Episodes.*, pp. 204-205.

(500) *Ibid.*, pp. 204-205. The Chinese government and state press nearly always used the full name (Pan Africanist Congress of Azania) that was devised by Leballo in the mid-1960s.

(501) *Ibid.*, p. 210.

The ANC's idea was neither to abandon Taiwan nor ignore China's international status and influence. We were on high alert and well prepared for this situation. They wanted to resort to 'dual recognition'.⁵⁰²

Mandela's delay in recognising Beijing and in allowing ties with Taiwan to perpetuate led Qian to conclude that he was using the 'strength of his high reputation' to do what even the US, Britain and Japan had been unsuccessful at doing.⁵⁰³

Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)

The Pan Africanist Congress was formed in 1959 by a breakaway group from the ANC. Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe was the president and Potlako Leballo the secretary general. The PAC emphasised African interests and, in contrast to the ANC, rejected multi-racialism. This appealed to many African leaders who supported the Africanist trend that prevailed at the time rather than the 'ponderous dialectics of the communists.'⁵⁰⁴ Sobukwe's appeal to the movement's members to participate in a peaceful campaign against passes in March 1960 ended tragically with the Sharpeville massacre, though the media coverage boosted the PAC's profile by leaps and bounds.⁵⁰⁵ The PAC was in a short-lived union with the ANC in the South African United Front (SAUF), which was encouraged by independent African states.⁵⁰⁶ Its joint representation with the ANC overseas lasted till 1963 and allowed the PAC to draw on the ANC's established networks.⁵⁰⁷ This included links with international organisations and offices in many cities, including Maseru, Dar es Salaam, London, Cairo, Accra, Francistown and Leopoldville (Kinshasa).⁵⁰⁸

While it is not entirely clear how initial contact was established between the Chinese and PAC representatives, the Chinese embassies in Cairo and Dar es Salaam were likely channels as they were important points of contact with African liberation movements. A PAC member, Lionel E. Morrison, was based in Beijing with the Afro-Asian Journalists Association (AAJA), possibly in the early 1960s.⁵⁰⁹ That might explain the resolution that was later adopted by the AAJA's permanent secretariat, which stated that the Association considered the PAC the main force in South Africa's anti-apartheid struggle and called for all national liberation movements to unite around the PAC.

(502) *Ibid.*, pp. 211-212

(503) *Ibid.*, p. 217.

(504) Ellis and Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid.*, p. 44.

(505) Lissoni, "ANC External Mission and Umkhonto we Sizwe."

(506) Thomas, *Foreign Relations of the ANC.*, p. 77. Interview of Gora Ebrahim, PAC Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Member of the National Assembly, by Tor Sellström in Harare, 22 July 1995. Information from website of Nordic Documentation on the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa, <http://www.liberationafrica.se/intervstories/interviews/ebrahim/> [accessed 1 November 2009].

(507) Interview of Gora Ebrahim, PAC Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Member of the National Assembly, by Tor Sellström in Harare, 22 July 1995. Information from website of Nordic Documentation on the Liberation Struggle in Southern Africa, <http://www.liberationafrica.se/intervstories/interviews/ebrahim/> [accessed 1 November 2009].

(508) Tom Lodge, "The Pan-Africanist Congress, 1959-1990," in *The long march: the story of the struggle for liberation in South Africa*, ed. Ian Liebenberg, et al. (Pretoria, 1994.), pp. 117-8.

(509) <http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/people/bios/morrison,1.htm>.

Beijing was the first non-African government to establish formal ties with the PAC.⁵¹⁰ The PAC's first delegation to Beijing in 1964 was led by Peter Nkutsu Raboroko, Executive Committee member and education secretary, also included Gora Ebrahim, the PAC representative in Cairo. In their meeting with the Chinese leaders, they secured an agreement for the training of PAC cadres.⁵¹¹ This was followed by another delegation led by Potlako Leballo, who met Zhou in February 1965 and in April, by the military chief of the PAC's Central Committee, Templeton Ntantala.⁵¹² The PAC delegates mostly made official visits to China, rather than sending political and military training delegations.⁵¹³ By this time Beijing's ties with the ANC and SACP had ceased because of the Sino-Soviet split, and the PAC assumed greater importance as the South African movement for Chinese assistance. Additionally, in their meetings with Chinese officials, the PAC delegates often expressed their interest in China's revolutionary experience and their practice of socialist construction.⁵¹⁴ However, not everyone in the PAC was happy about the increasingly pro-Chinese stance, as illustrated by the dismissal of Patrick Duncan, the PAC representative in Algiers, in June 1965, because of his 'one man crusade against the PRC'.⁵¹⁵

The ANC had by this time successfully adopted a new 'African image', which was a shift from its initial multi-racial stance and this resonated with African governments and eroded the PAC's reputation as the only truly African movement in South Africa.⁵¹⁶ In Lissoni's words, 'politically and ideologically the PAC suffered complete rout in Africa.'⁵¹⁷ Therefore Chinese assistance to the PAC came at an extremely important time, when Beijing sought support for its anti-Soviet line. The launch of Mao's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in May 1966 radicalised Chinese foreign policy, and concentrated Chinese support on the PAC even further. This assistance was given in spite of the movement's internal problems and difficulties.⁵¹⁸

The PAC took up the radical Maoist line during the Cultural Revolution. Its delegation's meeting with Mao in 1966 accepted Mao Zedong Thought and this position was reinforced further during Leballo's visit in June the following year.⁵¹⁹ In February 1967, the PAC had its membership application for the AAPSO rejected, making it even more dependent on whatever few sources of support it still had. The PAC expressed its support for Chinese policies and sent congratulatory letters to the Chinese government on the successful detonation of its first H-bomb and nuclear

(510) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1240.

(511) Ibid., p. 1240.

(512) Leballo introduced the PAC's position, its strategy against the 'common enemies of South Africa and China' and its aim of 'establishing a socialist society.' Ibid., p. 1241.

(513) Ibid., p. 1241.

(514) Ibid., p. 1240.

(515) Lodge, "The PAC." pp. 117-118.

(516) Lissoni, "ANC External Mission and Umkhonto we Sizwe."

(517) Ibid.

(518) The Liberation Committee tried to broker solutions a number of times, but when these proved ineffective, 13th session in July 1968 terminated all financial support to the PAC which, together with Angola's GRAE, was deemed 'unrepresentative and inefficient.' Thomas, *Foreign Relations of the ANC.*, p. 78.

(519) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." pp. 1240-1241.

tests in 1967 and 1970 respectively.⁵²⁰ In the 1960s and 1970s, the PAC sent study groups to China and on their return, many of the members rose in the movement's political and military ranks.⁵²¹

In 1968, the PAC's military wing, Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) sent a dozen soldiers into Mozambique, accompanied by COREMO guerrillas, though the group was intercepted en route to South Africa.⁵²² APLA forces were trained by Chinese instructors at Chunya camp in Tanzania, which was resumed in 1970, though APLA remained weak and had an estimated 70 trained guerrillas only, by 1974.⁵²³ It subsequently received some assistance from Libya and after 1979, from the revolutionary government in Iran.⁵²⁴ The movement's leadership crises affected its cohesion, effectiveness and ultimately, external support. While the level of Chinese support could not match the ANC's support from Moscow, leaving the PAC 'hopelessly underfunded', the PAC placed 'a great deal of hope' on Beijing nonetheless.⁵²⁵ PAC leaders harboured high expectations for Chinese assistance and continually appealed to them for support.

The changes in Chinese domestic and foreign policy meant a more pragmatic approach to Africa. With the CPC now responsible for Chinese ties with the South African movements, its exchanges with the PAC, and later the ANC and SACP, encouraged a united front approach. This was first communicated by Vice Premier Ji Pengfei to visiting PAC President Vusi Make, in September 1980, that rather than investing itself in armed struggle, the movement should concentrate on 'mobilising the masses and restoring strength.'⁵²⁶ This stand was consistently reiterated by Chinese leaders to their PAC guests, as well as visiting Chinese leaders to PAC leaders in Africa until the early 1990s. While on a state visit to Tanzania to express solidarity with the Frontline States in 1983, Premier Zhao Ziyang met PAC and ANC leaders and urged them to unite in their struggle against apartheid.⁵²⁷ He expressed his esteem for the PAC's activities and assured that Beijing would continue supporting the movement. Formal relations between the PAC and CPC were established in August that year and the PAC sent a total of seven delegations to China from then until 1992.⁵²⁸

(520) Ibid., p. 1244.

(521) Ibid., p. 1244.

(522) Lodge, "The PAC." According to British records, one of the APLA guerrillas revealed that he had been trained in China. When asked why he had chosen Chinese as opposed to Russian Marxism, he said that he had 'no choice' because the Russian 'revisionists' were more dangerous to world revolution than capitalism. NA, FCO25/271, Terrorist Activity in Tete, British Consulate-General in Lourenco Marques to British Embassy Lisbon, 11 September 1968.

(523) Ibid.

(524) Ellis and Sechaba, *Comrades Against Apartheid.*, pp. 156-157. [Highly unreliable source]

(525) Dale T. McKinley, *The ANC and the liberation struggle: a critical political biography* (London, 1997), p. 48. Zhong and Xu, "China's support." pp. 1242-1245.

(526) Deitsch and Shubin, *China and South Africa: the evolution of a relationship.*

(527) Ibid.

(528) Premier Zhao Ziyang met Pokela in January 1983, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Huang Hua met Pokela in December 1984, amongst others. Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1248.

The ANC's rising importance in South Africa's political future did not go unnoticed by the Chinese government. The movement's regionally acknowledged status became even clearer when the June 1983 OAU summit passed a resolution heralding it 'the vanguard of the national liberation movement' and crediting the escalation of the armed struggle to the MK.⁵²⁹ Subsequent PAC meetings in Beijing were with CPCCC officials and party officials rather than government leaders, though visiting dignitaries did meet PAC representatives in Africa.⁵³⁰ Pokela's visit to Beijing that August and that of the newly elected PAC President Johnson Mhlabo in September 1985, both appealed for political, military and economic assistance and received the same moderate reply, with no commitment of aid. Interestingly though, on Mhlabo's next visit in November 1989, Vice Chairman Xi Zhongxun expressed his hope that the PAC could 'analyse the problems using Marxism and Leninism' in addition to the by now regular advice of domestic unity. That was perhaps a response to the Tiananmen Square protests that the Chinese authorities had faced in April, as well as the upheavals taking place elsewhere in the Eastern bloc. Seeing that it possessed very little leverage on its own, the PAC finally adopted a new approach and pursued cooperation with the ANC. Willie Nkonyeni, PAC representative to East Africa, informed Beijing about this new development when he visited in December 1986, adding however that Moscow's opposition was the biggest obstacle to any collaboration with the ANC. However, the ANC leaders had their own objections to incorporating the PAC into the Congress.⁵³¹

Overall, Beijing's strained relations with the ANC and SACP because of the Sino-Soviet dispute led to its focus on the PAC. While there were numerous visits by PAC delegations to China, particularly in the 1980s when the movement was ridden with internal troubles and was losing both domestic and international support to its rival ANC, Beijing was not effusive in its response. According to Zhong and Xu, the evidence suggests that Beijing only gave modest amounts of military assistance and limited military training for its cadres. This was despite repeated requests from PAC leaders.⁵³²

Although Beijing had officially thrown its lot in with the international sanctions regime against Pretoria in June 1960, official statistical data reported continued economic and trade relations with South Africa right throughout the period of the liberation struggle. Needless to say, this was the cause of some consternation to the ANC and a number of African governments.⁵³³ Beijing had regularly lambasted Taiwan's relations with South Africa, which dated back to the establishment of

⁽⁵²⁹⁾ Thomas, *Foreign Relations of the ANC.*, p. 86.

⁽⁵³⁰⁾ Premier Zhao Ziyang met Pokela in January 1983, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Huang Hua met Pokela in December 1984, amongst others. Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1248.

⁽⁵³¹⁾ According to Prof. Vladimir Shubin, during that period he had hinted once to an ANC leader that it would perhaps be better to incorporate the PAC, the latter objected to it.

⁽⁵³²⁾ Zhong and Xu, "China's support.", p. 1248.

⁽⁵³³⁾ Deitsch and Shubin, *China and South Africa: the evolution of a relationship.*

consular relations in 1962.⁵³⁴ However, their own economic and trade relations with Pretoria apparently grew quickly in the sanctions period, although Beijing always publicly refuted this.⁵³⁵ Unlike the other southern African countries which were left economically bereft by the colonial powers, South Africa had a strong economy and possessed advanced industrial technology which made it a desirable economic partner. Officially the Chinese government maintained that it observed the sanctions though trade relations continued to increase in the 1980s, as did the range of goods transacted. As Deng's modernisation process accelerated, so did China's thirst for strategic raw materials and knowledge, which was reflected in its importation of technology for industrial growth, such as coal gasification.⁵³⁶ In April 1989, the South African government sent an informal message to Beijing stating its wish to further bilateral ties which would lead to formal diplomatic relations.⁵³⁷ In response, Beijing expressed its appreciation of Pretoria's position as well as its hope that South Africa would 'conform to the trend of the times and adopt enlightened policies' and that it would take things further 'when the conditions were ripe'. The following year, Pretoria made more overtures to Beijing, even suggesting that it could 'tacitly, coordinate its diplomacy with China's.'⁵³⁸ Beijing maintained its position, that relations were contingent on the abolishment of apartheid and termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

After the resignation of state president Pieter Willem 'Pik' Botha in 1989, Fredrik Willem de Klerk took over and set in motion the negotiations that eventually brought down the apartheid system and installed the country's first democratic constitution in December 1993. From 1989 the Chinese government relaxed its restrictions on economic and trade ties with South Africa. Taiwan, which had close economic ties with the apartheid regime, started to court the ANC through giving financial and development aid and inviting ANC leaders to Taiwan. An ANC victory was Beijing's only hope for making inroads into establishing diplomatic relations with South Africa, but Mandela in particular was very keen on maintaining relations with Taiwan, even making a visit in July and August 1993.⁵³⁹ The following year, the Chinese government removed its 30 year trade embargo, which was then followed by the dismantling of other trade restrictions. Officially, direct and indirect trade links were then established.⁵⁴⁰

The Chinese government decided to participate in the UN Observer Mission for the South African elections, in Qian's words, 'to indicate our important role in

(534) NARA, RG59 (General Records of the Department of State), Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Records relating to the Republic of China: 1963-1966, Entry 5220 Box 1, Lot 69D28, Your Appointment with Republic of China Vice Foreign Minister Yang, 24 August 1964.

(535) Qian, *Ten Episodes*., pp. 219-220.

(536) Deitsch and Shubin, *China and South Africa: the evolution of a relationship*.

(537) Qian, *Ten Episodes*., pp. 204-205. (538) *Ibid.*, pp. 204-205.

(539) *Ibid.*, p. 212.

(540) Zhong and Xu, "China's support." p. 1213.

international affairs and expand our influence on South Africa.'As a result, 45 Chinese observers participated in the mission in April 1994.⁵⁴¹ Exchanges between Beijing and the ANC in the run-up to the elections were cordial, though when it was finally decided that Taiwanese official representatives should be invited for the inauguration ceremony, the Chinese delegation was downgraded to a non-governmental one. After the ANC victory at the polls, the 'One China' issue remained a thorn in Beijing's relations with the new government.

Final Words

Of all the southern African countries, the struggle against the racist regime in South Africa was the longest. Therefore it is possible to examine the effects that the twists and turns in Chinese policy had on Beijing's relations with the South African groups. Furthermore, there was the economic aspect which was absent in the other countries in the region, making South Africa an economic partner and source of essential technology and exports, particularly important to the rapidly industrialising China of the post-Mao era. The improvement in Beijing-Moscow relations and realignment of Chinese policy in the 1980s marked a change in the motivations for its support to the South African movements. Beijing was in contact with the ANC, SACP and PAC until the early 1990s and saw this as an endorsement of its united front approach. However the ANC's support from a majority of South African people was the final determinant in Beijing's 'courting' of the party. The US\$10 million given to Mandela in October 1992, in particular, was targeted at out-pacing the Taiwanese and securing official recognition for Beijing, though official diplomatic relations were only established on 1 January 1998.⁵⁴²

(541) Qian, *Ten Episodes.*, p. 213.

(542) *Ibid.*, p. 266.

II: North Korea

North Korean Contributions to the Southern African Liberation

Struggle⁵⁴³ The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) was founded in September 1948, after more than three long decades of Japanese occupation, and was shortly followed by a violent battle against American-led UN forces. Not surprisingly, North Korean foreign policy has been shaped by its specific historical experience as a 'victorious' revolutionary government. This was very much driven by its intense anti-Japanese and -American stand, its desire for the unification of the two Koreas and its support for the international anti-imperialist struggle.⁵⁴⁴ However, beyond that, very little else is known of the foreign policymaking process within the North Korean government and thus observations about its forays into Africa, particularly during the cold war, range from blatant exaggeration to speculation.⁵⁴⁵ The limited evidence available strongly suggests that Pyongyang pursued a revolutionary foreign policy in its approach to the southern African liberation movements on the one hand, while continuing its pragmatic use of international channels to further its own legitimacy. Existing studies on North Korea's African policy in this period have generally concentrated on the pragmatic strategy and international legitimacy, with less focus on the revolutionary aspect specific to assistance for the southern African nationalists. This study offers an outline of North Korean contributions which will hopefully be a useful guide to future studies on this aspect of international solidarity with the region's independence struggles.

North Korean Foreign Policy

Pyongyang's behaviour on the global stage has been described as bearing 'a striking degree of strategic rigidity, interspersed with episodes of tactical pragmatism.'⁵⁴⁶ Much has been written about this and for the purpose of this study, only the aspects of North Korean policy that affected its relations with the southern African liberation movements are discussed. From the late 1950s until the early 1960s, the point at which Pyongyang first encountered the nationalist groups, the reunification of North and South Korea was the central issue which linked the external and internal determinants of foreign policy. The major external factors were its ties with fellow communist bloc countries and patrons, the USSR and the PRC, and Pyongyang's strident anti- American (and Japanese) posture. It is generally agreed that Pyongyang negotiated a fairly independent and even-handed relationship with Moscow and Beijing, one which it maintained even after the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute from

(543) I would like to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Balazs Szalontai for his many detailed comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this section on North Korea. My appreciation and thanks as well to Dr Stefan Altorfer-Ong, Prof. Charles K. Armstrong, Dr Sue Onslow and Christine Whyte for their help.

(544) Hazel Smith, "The Democratic People's Republic of Korea and its foreign policy in the 1990s: more realist than revolutionary?," in *Renegade States: the evolution of revolutionary foreign policy*, ed. Stephen Chan and Andrew J. Williams (Manchester, 1994), p. 99.

(545) B. C. Koh, "Pyongyang's Foreign Policy: Continuity and Change," *Korean Studies* 15 (1991).

(546) *Ibid.*

1963. Nonetheless, it was generally more inclined to cooperate with China than the Soviet Union, especially in Africa. Moscow and Beijing both provided North Korea with much-appreciated military and economic assistance. While Soviet technological and resource capacity outstripped China's, Beijing and Pyongyang shared more cordial relations owing to their shared cultural and historical experiences. This played a role in North Korean assistance to the liberation movements and will be elaborated on further in a later section. The Chinese and Korean revolutions both occurred in the 1940s, and according to official accounts of history, Kim had spent 15 years in China (Manchuria) during the anti-Japanese struggle.⁵⁴⁷ He was certainly comfortable conversing in Chinese and often spoke it in his official meetings with Chinese leaders.⁵⁴⁸ Additionally, Chairman Mao Zedong's eldest son, Mao Anying, was killed in an American air raid while volunteering with the Chinese People's Volunteer Army in the Korean War in 1950.

The domestic determinants of North Korean foreign policy were the consolidation and perpetuation of Kim Il Sung's regime through a combination of statecraft and efforts at legitimisation. That process portrayed the North Korean government – under Kim's leadership- as the legitimate, authentic Korean government, versus the United States-supported 'puppet regime' in the South. During the liberation struggles in southern Africa, Pyongyang's engagement there had two observable threads: first, its revolutionary support to particular groups, and second, its broader pragmatic African policy. They were distinct but related streams which at times converged, but often one was more pronounced than the other.

In contrast to the scant information available on the formulation of North Korean foreign policy, there is a relative abundance on the compelling revolutionary rhetoric of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung.⁵⁴⁹ That is often cited as the underlying basis and justification for North Korean support to liberation movements the world over. Kim and, perhaps on occasion, in concert with a close group of advisors, was responsible for charting out the government's foreign policy.⁵⁵⁰ Pyongyang's political, military and moral support for liberation movements around the world underscored Kim's own credentials as the leader of a successful revolution and anti-imperialist struggle. Support for the movements added to the perceived revolutionary character of Kim's government and differentiated it from Seoul, within the growing community of Afro- Asian and Latin American countries.⁵⁵¹ In line with the needs and requirements of the liberation movements, North Korean assistance was mainly in the area of

(547) Chin-Wee Chung, "North Korea's Relations with China," in *The Foreign Relations of North Korea: new perspectives*, ed. Jae Kyu Park, Byung Chul Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak, IFES Research Series No. 33 (Boulder, Colorado, 1987), p. 172.

(548) Smith, "Renegade States," p. 98.

(549) Dae-Sook Suh, "The Organisation and Administration of North Korean Foreign Policy," in *North Korea in a Regional and Global Context*, ed. Robert A. Scalapino and Hongkoo Lee (Berkeley, 1986).

(550) *Ibid.*, p. 17.

(551) Charles K. Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations," North Korea International Documentation Project, Working Paper Series #1 (2009), Tae-Hwan Kwak, Wayne Patterson, and Edward A. Olsen, eds., *The Two Koreas in World Politics* (Seoul, 1983), p. 87.

military training and arms supplies, as well as expressions of solidarity. It should be noted, however, that the DPRK also provided military assistance to a wide range of governments, which were often the conduits to particular liberation groups as well expressions of solidarity. 552 The revolutionary timbre of North Korean assistance was distinctive, in setting it apart from other governments who lacked revolutionary credentials, but by virtue of being anchored in a unique historical and ideological school, also imbued a certain amount of rigidity to Pyongyang's foreign policy.

It was the pragmatic thread which accorded more flexibility and breadth of action to North Korean activities in the tumultuous southern African region during the period of the liberation struggles. Pyongyang's objective of maintaining independence through 'national integration at home and autonomous foreign policy abroad' was articulated by Kim at the Korean Workers' Party's 4th Congress in September 1961.553 He articulated the government's commitment to strengthening and expanding relations with those countries which had been 'fighting for independence and social progress,' an essential component of DPRK foreign policy. Anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and movements against racial discrimination were identified as priorities in North Korean foreign policy.554 Interestingly, the North Korean government was prepared to deal with African governments, whatever their political stripe, as was Beijing. This was in contrast to the Soviets, Cubans and Vietnamese who preferred to direct their assistance to the Marxist and radical populist regimes.555

This was taken further by the Supreme People's Assembly in October 1962 which emphasised the development of friendly relations with the independent nationalistic countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America.556 Hence, Pyongyang's policy towards increasing numbers of newly independent African governments was to cultivate their support in international fora, to erode American support for the South Korean regime, and to bring about the isolation of Seoul, and the reunification of the Korean peninsula under Communism.557 These were active measures to overcome Pyongyang's own international isolation from the international community. North Korea's African policy later included economic assistance and aid projects, which played a big role in winning new friends and forming closer ties with older ones. The North Korean government was not invited to send a delegation for the 1955 Bandung Conference, though it actively participated in the activities of the Afro-Asian and non-aligned groups which were subsequently formed. Pyongyang's outreach beyond

(552) Thanks to Prof. Szalontai for pointing this out.

(553) Jide Owoeye, "The Metamorphosis of North Korea's African Policy," *Asian Survey* 31 (July 1991, 1991), p. 631.

(554) Jae Kyu Park, "North Korea's Foreign Policy Towards Africa," in *The Foreign Relations of North Korea: new perspectives*, ed. Jae Kyu Park, Byung Chul Koh, and Tae-Hwan Kwak, *IFES Research Series No. 33* (Colorado, 1987), pp. 435-436.

(555) From conversation with AAPSO Secretary General Nouri Abulrazzak Hussain in Cairo, May 2009. Thanks as well to Prof. Balazs Szalontai for his comments.

(556) Owoeye, "North Korea's African Policy," p. 631.

(557) Suh, "North Korean Foreign Policy."

the socialist bloc was also strengthened by Moscow's peaceful coexistence policy which was announced at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956.⁵⁵⁸

Contact with African governments and liberation movements through AAPSO

As a staunch member of the socialist camp, the North Korean government also shared in the 'internationalist duty' to provide assistance to anti-imperialist movements in developing countries.⁵⁵⁹ A North Korean delegation attended the first AAPSO Cairo conference in December 1957 and nearly every major AAPSO event thereafter.⁵⁶⁰ Pyongyang was able to use that as a platform for articulating its policy statements on the reunification of Korea, anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism. Pyongyang's good relations with Nasser's government and its presence in Cairo also allowed it to establish contact with many African nationalists.⁵⁶¹ According to the South Africa African National Congress (ANC) representative, AAPSO 'took note of the individual situation in each colonised African country and adopted a specific resolution, corresponding to the demands and aspirations of that country.'⁵⁶² Furthermore, according to the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) Secretary General, AAPSO often shared its facilities, resources and expertise with the liberation movements and was instrumental in organising a network of contacts with Egyptian government officials and Cairo-based foreign diplomats.⁵⁶³ The African liberation movements participated more keenly starting from the 2nd AAPSO conference in Conakry, Guinea, in April 1960.⁵⁶⁴ At the conference, North Korea, represented by Han Sol Ya, a prominent writer and cultural cadre, was elected a member of the newly created Executive Committee of 27.⁵⁶⁵ This increased the visibility of Pyongyang's foreign policy, most clearly through the passage of a resolution on AAPSO's full support for the Korean people's struggle for the withdrawal of American forces from South Korea and for their reunification through peaceful means and on a democratic basis. The Conference also decided that 25 June 1960, the 10th anniversary of American imperialist aggression against Korea, would be a day of solidarity with the Korean people who were struggling against the American presence.⁵⁶⁶

⁽⁵⁵⁸⁾ Institute for East Asian Studies, "North Korea's policy toward the United Nations," (Seoul), p. 39.

⁽⁵⁵⁹⁾ Robert A. Scalapino and Hongkoo Lee, eds., *North Korea in a Regional and Global Context*, Korea Research Monograph (Berkeley, 1986), p. 329.

⁽⁵⁶⁰⁾ Park, "Foreign Relations of North Korea," pp. 446-447.

⁽⁵⁶¹⁾ Pyongyang had publicly supported Nasser's Egypt in the 1956 Suez Crisis. Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations."

⁽⁵⁶²⁾ Joseph Nhlanhla, "Africa ... 20 Years of AAPSO Solidarity Work," in *The 20th Anniversary of AAPSO (1957-1977), 20 Years of Solidarity Against Imperialism, Colonialism and Racism. 20 Years of Solidarity for Independence, Democracy and Social Progress*, ed. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (Cairo, 1977), p. 63.

⁽⁵⁶³⁾ According to the SWAPO Secretary General Andimba Toivo Ya Toivo. Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, "Afro-Asian Solidarity Organisation and the National Liberation Movements of Southern Africa," in *AAPSO: 30 Years of Struggle*, Part I, ed. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (Cairo, 1988), p. 73.

⁽⁵⁶⁴⁾ *Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization: fifty years of solidarity (1958-2008)* (Cairo, 2008), p. 34.

⁽⁵⁶⁵⁾ Neuhauser, *China and the AAPSO*.

⁽⁵⁶⁶⁾ Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, "Second Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, Conakry, 11-15 April 1960," (Cairo, 1960), p.100. The AAPSO Executive Committee

Kim sent a message of support to the 3rd AAPSO conference in Moshi, Tanganyika, in February 1963.⁵⁶⁷ At the 8th Plenum of the 4th Session of the Central Committee that year, Kim called for the isolation of American imperialism through strengthening the solidarity between international revolutionary forces, pledging his government's support for the Afro-Asian and Latin American people. Their victories would strengthen anti-American liberation movements and be a step towards Korean reunification.⁵⁶⁸ The first half of the 1960s saw a surge in the number of non-governmental delegations from African countries to North Korea, with Pyongyang hosting international events and conferences to increase its profile, such as the 2nd Asian Economic Seminar in June 1964. The event attracted 34 Asian and African countries and regions and, significantly, included representatives from liberation movements in Angola, Mozambique and South West Africa.⁵⁶⁹ The Seminar itself was dominated by a pro-Chinese, anti-Soviet line. The Pyongyang Declaration which followed emphasised self-reliance as 'the correct path for the Asian and other peoples to build independent national economies and thereby to free themselves completely from imperialist, colonialist and neo-colonialist control and plunder.'⁵⁷⁰ It also called for closer cooperation between the peoples of the three continents, to intensify their revolutionary struggle against the imperialists' aggression and enslavement and to achieve social progress.⁵⁷¹ It is possible that Pyongyang's active involvement could have also been encouraged by Beijing, which was also interested in the African nationalist contacts which AAPSO offered.

Parallel to the DPRK's participation in AAPSO, the revolutionary and militant solidarity group, was its courting of two multilateral organisations, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and United Nations. As Pyongyang was not a member of either group, its activities remained, at best, in the periphery through bilateral contact with professed non-aligned governments. Park refers to the 1960 to 1965 period of North Korea's African policy as the 'expanding and solidifying period' that largely involved exchanges of high-level friendship delegations which led to a growing diplomatic network. The non-aligned arena was a 'focal point' of North Korean governmental-level diplomacy in the 1960s as Pyongyang had official relations with only a handful of

reiterated this position in a supporting note in 1961. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, "Resolutions adopted by the Executive Committee Meeting for AAPSO, Beirut, 9-13 November 1960," *Afro-Asian Bulletin*, January-February 1961 1961.

(567) The AAPSO called on all national committees and popular organisations, as well as peace-loving peoples of the world to condemn the unjust agreements concluded with South Korea and to observe 'Korea Week' from 25 June, in support of the Korean people struggling for the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and reunification. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, "Third AAPSO Conference."

(568) Scalapino and Lee, eds., *North Korea in a Regional and Global Context*., p. 328.

(569) Park, "Foreign Relations of North Korea.", pp. 448-450.

(570) This was organised outside the auspices of the AAPSO Secretariat. Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, AAPSO: fifty years of solidarity., p. 32.

(571) Han-chen Nan, "Resolutely Struggle Against Imperialism and Neo-Colonialism and for the Economic Emancipation of the Afro-Asian Peoples" (paper presented at the Afro-Asian Economic Seminar, Algiers, Algeria, 23 February 1965).

developing countries up until then. Although North Korea had just joined the NAM in 1975, all the countries which established relations with it in the 1960s were members, many of which were from Africa.⁵⁷² Pyongyang's image of independence from both superpowers, as opposed to Seoul's clearly pro-American stance, was attractive to the Movement. Kim hoped to gather sufficient support to overcome American opposition to his hopes for Korean reunification under communism. Pragmatically, from around 1962 Pyongyang also tried to increase trade relations with non-communist countries, including Japan and western European countries, for economic reasons.⁵⁷³ At the United Nations, the African group was growing in number and their collective voice was increasingly powerful in the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The potential that this trend had to push resolutions on the Korean issue was evident at the 15th UNGA in 1960, when Indonesia proposed inviting the North Korean government to UNGA discussions without preconditions. While this resolution was not voted through, it was a rude awakening to Pyongyang's opponents of the crucial African constituency.⁵⁷⁴

In 1963, the creation of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU) by the independent African governments and its Liberation Committee facilitated external assistance to African nationalist groups, much in the way that the AAPSOL Solidarity Fund had done earlier. From the donor country's perspective, contributions to the Liberation Committee would be channelled to OAU-recognised groups and, implicitly, a positive reputation amongst the OAU member governments as a supporter of anti-imperialism. The Liberation Committee's headquarters was in Dar es Salaam, Tanganyika (later Tanzania), which also hosted many liberation movements' offices, and had the staunch support of President Julius K. Nyerere. It is at this point that Pyongyang exploited Beijing's rising profile in Africa, as Sino-Tanzanian relations were very strong, strengthened by the union of mainland Tanganyika with Zanzibar in April 1964 and the bilateral agreement on Chinese military instructors for the Tanzanian People's Defence Force in 1965. A North Korean goodwill mission visited Dar es Salaam in January 1965. Both governments agreed to formalise relations and a joint communiqué was issued which, amongst other things, agreed to take concerted action to assist the African liberation movements.⁵⁷⁵ Pyongyang reportedly provided military training for them in Africa, probably some of the training camps in Tanzania, as well as in North Korea. Trainees from various countries were invited to Pyongyang from 1966 for periods of between three to six months, or in some cases, up to one and a half years for guerrilla training and basic military training. The North Korean

(572) Byung-Chul Koh, *The Foreign Policy Systems of North and South Korea* (London, 1984), p. 219.

(573) Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations."

(574) This prompted the US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson to propose an amendment requiring the DPRK to first recognise UN competence to deal with the Korean Question. B. K. Gills, *Korea versus Korea: a case of contested legitimacy* (London, 1996), Kyoung Suh Park, "The Republic of Korea's Quest for an Autonomous Foreign Policy (1963-73): a critical analysis" (American University, 1976), p. 97. Park, "Foreign Relations of North Korea," p. 445.

(575) Owoeye, "North Korea's African Policy," p. 635.

government established 15 special camps for them, each of which could accommodate 30 to 40 trainees.⁵⁷⁶

Juche and Pyongyang's Revolutionary Posture

North Korean contact with the southern African liberation movements until the middle of the 1960s had mainly been established via AAPSO and, to a degree, with Beijing's help. The Sino-Soviet dispute which intensified from around 1963 had a devastating effect on AAPSO and changed the hitherto nearly identical paths of Chinese and North Korean relations with the liberation movements. Beijing, which had originally taken an even-handed approach to the various liberation movements, began to let its anti-Soviet position take precedence in determining which groups to assist. PRC-DPRK relations started to deteriorate in 1965 and were exacerbated further by the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China from 1966. At the bilateral level, Kim issued critical attacks on the Chinese, privately calling the Cultural Revolution 'unbelievable madness,' apparently worried that a similarly violent and chaotic situation might break out in his country.⁵⁷⁷ Therefore the late 1960s saw Pyongyang's relative 'alienation' from Beijing, short of a complete severance of relations.⁵⁷⁸ On the ground, the radical line that was sweeping through the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (and its embassies overseas) led to soured relations with many African governments and its support for smaller, more radical splinter movements. The negative effects of China's African diplomacy during the Cultural Revolution took its toll on North Korea's efforts and their earlier cooperation quickly became a liability as Beijing became increasingly isolated in Africa. Consequently there was a hiatus in Pyongyang's visits, though it was not long before it quickly re-established itself.

Kim's Juche ideology that stressed self-reliance in domestic and foreign relations, first articulated in 1955, was a useful 'springboard' to differentiate itself from other countries such as China and South Korea. It was promoted in the mid-1960s, peaked in the mid-70s and carried on till around the mid-1980s.⁵⁷⁹ According to Armstrong, Juche embodied the principles of self-reliance, cultural and economic independence, national sovereignty and the defence of the regime and its leaders, assuming its position as an officially propagated world outlook and 'way of life.'⁵⁸⁰ Pyongyang's pronouncements of anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and self-reliance resonated strongly with the newly independent African governments, in what has been called 'a coincidence of mutual interests.'⁵⁸¹ It was a revolutionary ideology and was incorporated into Pyongyang's broader cultural diplomacy, which included the

(576) Kwak, Patterson, and Olsen, eds., *The Two Koreas*., pp. 95-96.

(577) Suh, "North Korean Foreign Policy.", p. 228. Westad, *Global Cold War*., pp. 163-164.

(578) Charles K. Armstrong, *The Koreas* (New York, 2007)., p. 72.

(579) Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations."

(580) Armstrong, *The Koreas*., p. 58.

(581) Park, "Republic of Korea's Foreign Policy"., p. 99.

dissemination of Kim's works, film screenings and martial arts demonstrations.⁵⁸² The available primary evidence from Tanzania suggests that the promotion of Juche also brought with it some resources and funds, for the translation of Kim's works or the establishment of study groups.⁵⁸³ These Juche study groups were presented domestically as international recognition of Kim's stature – a leader of the third world- although the actual extent to which the African participants accepted the ideology beyond the conceptual level was probably minimal.⁵⁸⁴ Juche provided some rhetorical fuel for Kim's government, as it also implied the desirability and superiority of the Korean model and culture, and was often presented in its propaganda as the motivation for developing countries to seek North Korean assistance. This also set North Korea apart from the South, as the latter did not have an ideological basis to its foreign policy.⁵⁸⁵ It was around this time that Pyongyang began competing with Seoul for diplomatic recognition.⁵⁸⁶ North Korea had initially benefitted from Seoul's version of the West German Hallstein Doctrine. In this cold war approach to international relations, Seoul cut off relations with Mauritania in December 1964 after Nouakchott's recognition of North Korea, and later with Congo Brazzaville in May 1965.⁵⁸⁷ Without any strong economic incentive for the countries to ally themselves with the South at the time, Seoul's diplomacy on the continent took a hit leading to a reassessment of its strategy. Park Chung Hee's government dispatched two South Korean goodwill missions to Africa in August 1967, which visited 18 countries in all, to raise support for its position in the United Nations. The mission recommended that Seoul adjust its third world policy to stymie North Korean gains and to concentrate their efforts on economic assistance.⁵⁸⁸

Garnering International Support

In the late 1960s, Pyongyang concentrated its efforts on generating support for its unification position at the UN.⁵⁸⁹ Relations with the Chinese government improved with Premier Zhou Enlai's visit to Pyongyang in April 1970, during which he described bilateral relations as a 'blood-cemented military friendship' that was 'as close as lips

(582) Ambassador Song Gi Tai had sent out copies of Brief History of the Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Kim Il Sung and Kim Il sung. Let us promote the World Revolution, holding high the banner of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism, the banner of the anti-imperialist anti-US struggle to all leading Tanzanian officials. The Tanzanians were reportedly not particularly interested these works and felt in many ways that the North Koreans were detached from reality. The anecdote cited was of a Tanzanian official's shock at the North Koreans' refusal to believe that the Americans had landed on the moon. NA, FCO95/860, *Tanzania-North Korea relations*, 28 September 1970. NA, FCO95/860, *Tanzania-North Korea relations*, 28 September 1970.

(583) This is described in greater detail in the Mozambique section.

(584) This included the soliciting of support and well wishes for Kim Il Sung. AAPSO Archive, Country Files, North Korea.

(585) Drawing from the behaviour of North Korean delegates in AAPSO, they rarely debated with substance as nearly all their positions were about the Great Leader, which was also reflected in their correspondence to the Organisation. AAPSO Archive, Country Files, Cairo.

(586) Armstrong, *The Koreas.*, p. 75.

(587) Park, "Republic of Korea's Foreign Policy", pp. 102-103. (588) *Ibid.*, pp. 101-102.

(589) Park, "Foreign Relations of North Korea." p. 450-451.

and teeth.’⁵⁹⁰ These changes allowed Pyongyang to embark on a more ‘independent and practical’ foreign policy from the 1970s.⁵⁹¹ This was both out of economic and political necessity. At the start of the decade, the North Korean government purchased new technology and products from western countries, which it had intended to finance through its mineral exports and loans. As the prices of commodities dropped and interest rates shot up in the early 1970s, Pyongyang coffers were unable to honour the payments.⁵⁹² The large investment in the government’s diplomatic activities was also a huge drain on scarce resources.⁵⁹³

Pyongyang also tried to rectify its weaker diplomatic position in the United Nations vis a vis Seoul. Beijing’s admission to the UN Security Council (UNSC) in September 1971 strengthened North Korea’s position and Pyongyang qualified as an observer at the 28th UNGA in September 1973.⁵⁹⁴ Pyongyang joined a range of multilateral organisations, including the WHO and UNESCO.⁵⁹⁵ While North Korea threw most of its energies into the cultivation of ties at the governmental level, its militant rhetoric and expressions of solidarity with liberation movements persisted. Indeed, Kim received a Liberation Committee delegation led by Omar Arteh Ghalib, Foreign Minister of the Somali Democratic Republic, on 4 April 1974 and shortly after made a contribution of military material.⁵⁹⁶

In 1975, Kim made a number of official visits, beginning with China in April. His discussions with the Chinese leaders secured some military equipment and technology for North Korea. Furthermore he sought Chinese support for a pro-North Korean resolution at the imminent 30th UNGA discussion on Korea that would call for the dissolution of the UN Command in Korea and withdrawal of American forces.⁵⁹⁷ The trip appears to have been a success, with the joint communiqué expressing both governments’ support for the nationalist struggles in Africa and Latin America.⁵⁹⁸ They described the African situation as ‘excellent’ and congratulated the people of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola on their valiant struggles, while expressing support for the people of Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa and Latin America. In May and June, Kim travelled to the Eastern Bloc countries and also Algeria and Mauritania, to obtain further assurances of support from non-aligned governments

(590) Chung, “North Korea’s Relations with China.” p. 180.

(591) Park, “Foreign Relations of North Korea.” pp. 440-442.

(592) Smith, “Renegade States.” p. 101.

(593) Park, “Foreign Relations of North Korea.” p. 442.

(594) *Ibid.* p. 454.

(595) Armstrong, “Juche and North Korea’s Global Aspirations.”

(596) *People’s Daily*, 13 April 1974. The Committee’s Executive Secretary’s mission report subsequently mentioned a contribution of military material. In China, the mission were given a consignment of military equipment and cash of half million dollars. ALC, Minutes of 23rd Session, Yaounde, Cameroon, 13-18 May 1974, “Report on the OAU mission to Socialist and East European countries”, p. 9.

(597) Cold War International History Project, Virtual Archive, Collection: North Korea in the Cold War, Report, Embassy of Hungary in North Korea to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, XIX-J-1-j Korea, 1975, 83. doboz, 81-10, 002835/8/1975, obtained and translated for CWIHP by Balazs Szalontai. 30 July 1975. Chung, “North Korea’s Relations with China.” p. 182.

(598) *People’s Daily*, 28 April 1975.

for the UNGA discussion.⁵⁹⁹ Fortuitously for North Korea, it was voted in as a member of the NAM in August, while Seoul's application to join the organisation was rejected.⁶⁰⁰ Pyongyang later scored its first 'victory' at the United Nations in October, when the pro-North Korean resolution was passed by the General Assembly.⁶⁰¹ Despite the fact that a pro-South Korean resolution came shortly after, and there was no perceptible effect on the situation on the ground, that event was depicted in North Korean propaganda as evidence of Pyongyang's broad international support, in particular in Africa.⁶⁰²

By this time, Seoul had rejuvenated its approach towards third world governments and had also begun to increase its contact with friendly communist nations.⁶⁰³ This 'revolution' in South Korean foreign policy made it extremely attractive to African governments, no doubt impressed by Seoul's burgeoning economy as they battled their own post-independence development challenges. Although Pyongyang had its own trade and aid agreements with many African governments, the latter's growing inability to address the harsh economic challenges of post-independence development made Seoul a more attractive partner. There was also less interest in Kim's ideologically-oriented diplomacy. In spite of (or perhaps, because of) this, sometime in January to February 1977, Pyongyang made another contribution of military equipment to the Liberation Committee.⁶⁰⁴ Pyongyang's financial contributions to AAPSO from the late 1970s till mid-1980s were perhaps reflective of its desire to regain some recognition and affirmation from fraternal countries.⁶⁰⁵

Furthermore, any support that Kim could expect from the Chinese government in the African arena after 1975 was limited. Beijing had been burned by its involvement in Angola, where it was heavily criticised by African governments for having supported the nationalist groups alongside Pretoria.⁶⁰⁶ Moreover there were dramatic developments taking place within China following Mao's death in 1976. The Chinese Communist Party's (CPC) 11th Party Congress reappraised the international situation and announced dramatic changes in its economic policy. As war was no longer imminent (as distinct from being 'inevitable'), Beijing would use the opportunity to pursue the 'Four Modernisations'. As the new Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping consolidated his position and concentrated on domestic economic development, Chinese foreign policy was targeted at improving relations with key

(599) Chung, "North Korea's Relations with China.", p. 182. (600)

Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations."

(601) Armstrong, Charles K. "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations." North Korea International Documentation Project, Working Paper Series #1 (2009).

(602) Ibid., p. 14.

(603) Park, "Republic of Korea's Foreign Policy", p. 139.

(604) Archives of the African Liberation Committee, Notes from January-February 1977 Minutes, Report of the Secretary of the Standing Committee of Defence.

(605) AAPSO financial records show that North Korea contributed a total of US\$1,173 in the period 1977-1986, with a one-time payment of US\$1986 in 1986. Figures from AAPSO Accounts Officer, May 2009.

(606) This is described in detail in the preceding China section.

developed countries, such as Japan and the US.⁶⁰⁷ Specific to the Korean issue, in September 1978, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen told Kim that Beijing hoped for an amelioration of tensions on the peninsula.⁶⁰⁸ At the same time, relations between Moscow and Seoul appeared to be developing, undermining the previously close relations and support that Pyongyang could expect within the communist fraternity.

Losing Ground in the International Arena, Increasing Isolation

As a result of North Korea's dire economic situation and alarming trade deficits, Pyongyang's military assistance was shifting to military sales. Its main military exports were of small arms, training and consulting and elite guard services.⁶⁰⁹ The government's goal of rapid military growth had pushed the production of ammunition, small arms, artillery and small ships, at first based on Soviet designs. A number were later produced locally and there were a few attempts to upgrade the range to more sophisticated equipment in the 1970s to include submarines and fighter aircraft, though overall the range was never drastically changed.⁶¹⁰ Most of its technology was archaic and harked back to the 1950s to 1960s, though this probably made it an affordable source.⁶¹¹ North Korean total arms sales from 1986 to 1990 were estimated at more than \$500 million, which would have been an impressive chunk of its total exports in that period.⁶¹²

The joint meeting of the North Korean Political Bureau, Worker's Party and Central People's Committee, in February 1983, discussed the problems facing the NAM.⁶¹³ Specific issues were not mentioned in the report which was made public, but the main points cited were the significance of the Movement's 7th Summit. Pyongyang's position was that NAM members should demand:

the dissolution of all military blocs, the dismantling of all foreign military bases, the withdrawal of foreign troops and the building of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, thereby narrowing the area of confrontation between blocs, widen the peace zones and achieve a lasting and durable peace ... NAM member states

(607) According to Qian, Kim responded with full support for Beijing's diplomatic initiatives, denounced aggression, and raised some problems within the NAM and outlined Pyongyang's attitude towards diplomatic relations with western countries. Huang, Huang Hua Memoirs, Qian, *Ten Episodes.*, pp. 383-384.

(608) Qian, *Ten Episodes.*, p. 115.

(609) Marcus Noland, *Avoiding the Apocalypse: the future of the two Koreas* (Washington, D. C., 2000), p. 117.

(610) Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Transfers.*, pp. 117-118.

(611) The American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's 1997 report. However, missiles were apparently relatively inexpensive to design and produce. North Korea quickly emerged as one of the main actors in the propagation of missile technology. Jasper Becker, *Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 159-160. According to Jane's Defence Weekly, North Korean training was 'the cheapest available.' Jane's Defence Weekly, 4 April 1987.

(612) Estimated by the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in its 1997 report. Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations." However, as missiles were apparently relatively inexpensive to design and produce, North Korea quickly emerged as one of the main actors in the propagation of missile technology. Becker, *Rogue Regime.*, pp. 159-160.

(613) AAPSO, File 20/16, Korea (North), Report on the Joint Meeting of the Political Bureau of C. C., Worker's Party of Korea and Central People's Committee of DPRK, 18-19 February 1983.

should form a united front with the broad anti-war forces of the world and strengthen solidarity with them.

Significantly, the statement also expressed Pyongyang's support for the Namibian and South African peoples' liberation struggle. As Kim's attempts to portray himself as a leader of the third world dissolved, developments in the international system cast doubt on the relevance of the NAM as an effective platform for solving developing countries' problem, into question. North Korean delegations to international organisations had for some time been operating poorly, with third parties observing their 'less than adequate methods of information gathering and inadequate training in standards of diplomatic conduct in non-communist countries.'⁶¹⁴ This was compounded by the representatives' language limitations and unfamiliarity with the workings of international organisations.⁶¹⁵

Pyongyang hosted AAPSO's International Conference for De-Nuclearisation, Peace and Anti-Imperialist Solidarity in the Asia-Pacific Region in September 1987. This was attended by 61 delegations from 45 countries and 11 international organisations. Kim sent a congratulatory message to the conference and the Conference passed a resolution expressing serious apprehension at Korean peninsula's conversion into 'the most dangerous seat of nuclear war in the region.'⁶¹⁶ Although Pyongyang had the upper hand over Seoul in the diplomatic field until the late 1970s, much of that ground had since been lost.⁶¹⁷ The 8th NAM Summit Conference in Harare, Zimbabwe, failed to generate enough support for Pyongyang's bid to co-host the 1988 Summer Olympics with Seoul.⁶¹⁸ As it was, Seoul had already been selected to host the 1986 Asian Games.⁶¹⁹ At the close of 1986, the North Korean government had not announced a national economic plan for the second year running and after it was declared bankrupt by a group of western banks and a terrorist state by the American government, few financial options remained accessible.⁶²⁰

By the early 1990s, the independence struggles in southern Africa had been won, with the exception of the Apartheid regime in South Africa which persisted until 1994. The revolutionary rhetoric of the earlier decades had a shrinking audience as the liberation movements had to transition into national governments of independent countries. Pyongyang had established diplomatic relations with the governments of Angola and Mozambique (which became independent in 1975), Zimbabwe (1980)

(614) Suh, "North Korean Foreign Policy.", p. 16.

(615) Comment from the Hungarian Permanent Mission to the International Organisations in Vienna, to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. CWIHP, Virtual Archive, Collection: North Korea in the Cold War, Report, Permanent Mission of Hungary to the International Organisations in Vienna to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, XIX-J-1-j ENSZ, 1977, 154. doboz, V-73, 005665/1977. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Balazs Szalontai. 3 November 1977.

(616) Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, *AAPSO: fifty years of solidarity.*, p. 41.

(617) Park, "Foreign Relations of North Korea." p. 457.

(618) Dae-Sook Suh, "North Korea in 1986: strengthening the Soviet connection," *Asian Survey* 27 (January 1987, 1987).

(619) Chung, "North Korea's Relations with China." p. 186. Seoul was originally selected as the venue for the Asian Games in 1970, but the event was finally held in Bangkok, Thailand, due to security tensions with North Korea.

(620) Becker, *Rogue Regime.*, pp. 159-160.

and Namibia (1990) as they entered the diplomatic fold and in almost every case, increased its engagement with the new governments in the military field or in major construction projects. While these developments have in no way been as spectacular as Beijing's 'return' to the continent in the same period, it is nonetheless a testament to the close relations that were established with the African leaders during their independence struggle.

Against this overview of the external and internal factors affecting both the pragmatic and revolutionary aspects of Pyongyang's foreign policy, let us move to the specific cases in southern Africa.

Angola

Pyongyang's interest in the liberation movements in Lusophone Africa started in the early 1960s, through contacts made mostly through AAPSO activities. Angola featured prominently in North Korean pronouncements, with a December 1963 article in *Korea Today* noting that:

The people of Angola who have been oppressed and exploited for a long time at the hands of the Portuguese colonists have risen with arms in their hands to fight for national independence. Already they have liberated wide areas and Angola is becoming a crematory to reduce the Portuguese colonists to ashes.⁶²¹

The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola's (MPLA) Secretary General, Viriato da Cruz, attended the Asian Economic Seminar held in Pyongyang in June 1964.⁶²² Sometime that year, Jonas Savimbi, who established the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in late 1965, also visited North Korea but there is little evidence of further contact between him and the North Koreans until April 1975.⁶²³ An MPLA delegation visited North Korea for the 1967 May Day celebrations and the following year the Secretary General of the National Union of Workers of Angola, Luvualu Pascal, reportedly attended the DPRK's 20th anniversary celebration in September. The following month, October 1968, the Korean Central News Agency reported that Kim Il Sung had received Neto and Anibal de Melo, who was in charge of the MPLA's external affairs.⁶²⁴ Neto visited Pyongyang again in early August 1971, after meeting with Chinese leaders in Beijing.⁶²⁵ The Angolan delegation was given top-level treatment, including a welcome banquet hosted by

(621) NA, FCO45/1679, North Korea/Angola, Letter from Far Eastern Section Research Department to Far Eastern Department, 29 December 1975.

(622) NA, FCO45/1679, North Korea/Angola, Letter from Far Eastern Section Research Department to Far Eastern Department, 29 December 1975.

(623) Savimbi was at Nanjing Military Academy in August and September 1964 and could possibly have travelled to North Korea around that period. Bridgland, Jonas Savimbi. Marcum, *Angolan Revolution* Volume 2., p. 161.

(624) NA, FCO45/1679, North Korea/Angola, Letter from Far Eastern Section Research Department to Far Eastern Department, 29 December 1975.

(625) *People's Daily*, 7 August 1971. Glejjesus, *Conflicting Missions*, p. 242. While in Pyongyang, Neto also saw the Cambodian (Kampuchean) prince-in-exile Norodom Sihanouk. *People's Daily*, 13 August 1971. Sihanouk was ousted in a military coup in March 1970, after which Kim offered him sanctuary and had a grand residence constructed for him outside of Pyongyang. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IC15Ae01.html [accessed on 16 July 2009].

Kim and a mass rally.⁶²⁶ An MPLA report titled *Foreign Policy of the MPLA* dated 3 April 1972, expressed the leaders' respect for North Korea and their support for Kim's Eight Point Programme to reunite the country and end the 'illegal use of power by the American imperialists, using local puppets to maintain neo-colonial domination.'⁶²⁷ In the early 1970s, Pyongyang also supported the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), as did Beijing.⁶²⁸ While the latter government's contact with the FNLA was largely to countervail Moscow's dominant influence with the MPLA, Pyongyang had no such pressure. Nonetheless, there were some similarities in the implementation of their assistance, which was only possible after diplomatic relations were established with neighbouring Zaire in December 1972, whose President Mobutu Sese Seko supported the FNLA leader Holden Roberto. Kim and Mobutu had signed a military pact which led to the despatch of 107 North Korean military instructors to Zaire, who also trained FNLA forces.⁶²⁹ In early April, a ship loaded with North Korean arms docked at the Zairean port of Matadi. British observers suspected that the 110 visiting 'agricultural experts' who disembarked were military instructors, nearly all of whom were officers, with four Division Generals and several Brigadier Generals amongst them. Half of the group travelled to the military base at Kamina, in southern Zaire, and the others to Kitona base on the southwest coast. Kitona was to become the headquarters of the Zairean First Division and housed a large number of North Korean instructors who brought military equipment. British intelligence suspected that the instructors would train the Zairean armed forces and possibly the FNLA as well.⁶³⁰ By July however, a civil war tore through Angola and the increased assistance for the anti-MPLA forces from various other donors spurred additional Soviet military aid to Neto's group.⁶³¹

After a hiatus of almost a decade, relations between Pyongyang and UNITA were rejuvenated when a delegation led by the General Commander of UNITA's armed wing (FALA), Samuel Chiwale, visited North Korea in April 1975.⁶³² It is unclear if anything further came of those meetings, but soon after Pretoria's entry into the Angolan fray as UNITA's ally evoked a fiery backlash from many African governments. This enhanced the MPLA's legitimacy as the Angolan nationalist movement. Pyongyang remained relatively unscathed by the travails of the Sino-Soviet dispute in Angola and was able to re-establish itself with Neto's MPLA, the movement which went on

(626) NA, FCO45/1679, North Korea/Angola, Letter from Far Eastern Section Research Department to Far Eastern Department, 29 December 1975.

(627) Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Ruth First Collection, RF/1/15/8, *MPLA: People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola*, "Foreign Policy of the MPLA", 3 April 1972.

(628) Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations." p. 11.

(629) Owoeye, p. 641.

(630) NA, FCO31/1866, Russian Assistance to MPLA, 10 April 1975. The British felt that Mobutu would continue supporting the FNLA, including military instructors, in spite of being in dire need of financing at the time. NA, FCO45/2219, Angola, 27 May 1975.

(631) Westad, *Global Cold War.*, pp. 226-227. Shubin and Tokarev, "War in Angola."

(632) Chiwale himself was no newcomer to China. He had trained at Nanjing Military Academy in 1965 and prior to his visit to Pyongyang, had met with Chinese officials in Beijing. *People's Daily*, 9 April 1975.

to form the independent Angolan government. The North Korean Ambassador to Egypt, Lim Pyong-ho, led a delegation to the independence ceremonies in Luanda on 11 November 1975. Kim sent Neto a congratulatory message, announcing his government's recognition of the People's Republic of Angola and diplomatic relations were established on 16 November.

However a number of press reports in December 1975 alleged that Pyongyang was still supplying aid to the FNLA. The Korea News Review reported a claim by the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs that 450 North Korean soldiers were training FNLA troops in Zaire.⁶³³ Relations with Mobutu went awry the following year and led to the departure of the instructors, then numbering 454.⁶³⁴ Pyongyang insisted that their withdrawal was unrelated to their recognition of the MPLA, which might have possibly annoyed Mobutu, as it was decided long before Angolan independence. Rather, they cited the Zairean president's failure to keep to the terms of their agreement on the use of the military instructors.⁶³⁵ In the absence of any further corroborating evidence, it is difficult to know what to make of this. There are also anecdotal accounts which question the efficiency of Pyongyang's arms and training: in one particular mishap, the North Korean-made weapons malfunctioned and resulted in casualties amongst the FNLA/Zaire forces.⁶³⁶

Dos Santos visited Pyongyang as the Angolan head of state in 1981 and declared that the Angolan cadres trained in North Korea 'participated in the revolutionary task of the Angolan people.'⁶³⁷ Pyongyang subsequently made a major military commitment to the Angolan government during the civil war that pitted the MPLA against UNITA. Luanda signed a military aid agreement with Pyongyang in September 1983, which led to the dispatch of 3,000 North Korean combat troops and military advisers the following May. Pyongyang had purportedly sent 1,000 advisors and 3,000 regular troops to Angola as of 1988, training specialised units in activities such as hit-and-run, sniper squad and combat operations. These lessons were taken to the battlefield in the armed forces' offensive in early 1986.⁶³⁸

In conclusion, from the mid-1960s till Angolan independence in 1975, North Korea's contribution to the liberation struggle took the form of solidarity visits, expressions of support, military training and the supply of arms. Pyongyang initially focused on the MPLA but from the early 1970s assisted the FNLA when bilateral ties with Mobutu's government were established, allowing North Korean instructors into FNLA training camps in Zaire. Pyongyang's ability to distance itself from the Sino-Soviet dispute gave it the flexibility to work with the various groups without being entangled in the other issues, as Beijing had.

(633) NA, FCO45/1679, North Korea/Angola, 29 December 1975.

(634) NA, FCO45/2219, Angola, 27 May 1975.

(635) Owoeye, "North Korea's African Policy.", p. 641.

(636) Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 53.

(637) Scalapino and Lee, eds., *North Korea in a Regional and Global Context.*, p. 340.

(638) Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations."

Mozambique

As with the Angolan liberation movements, Pyongyang's relations with the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) were likely to have been initiated through the AAPSO and its activities. Probably the first FRELIMO delegation to visit North Korea was for the 2nd Asian Economic Seminar in Pyongyang in June 1964. In April 1965, Vice-President Uria Simango led a delegation to North Korea that included Jonas Namashulua and Francisco Kufa.⁶³⁹ FRELIMO's struggle against the Portuguese was also shaped by its close relations with Tanzania, its northern neighbour. Therefore North Korea's ties with Tanzania have some bearing on its relations with FRELIMO as well.

Bilateral relations between Pyongyang and Dar es Salaam warmed from the mid-1960s, paved by growing Chinese engagement in the East African country. As part of its active outreach to African countries during that time, there were high level visits as well as economic and development assistance to Tanzania. Second vice-president Rashidi Kawawa and Minister for Economic Affairs and Development, Paul Bomani, led a delegation to Pyongyang in June 1966 to explore possible fields of economic cooperation.⁶⁴⁰ In early 1967, the North Korean Vice President visited Tanzania and an agreement was signed for the donation of building materials and tools worth between £50,000 and £60,000.⁶⁴¹ A trade agreement was concluded with Tanzania for the supply of agricultural machinery, ceramic and metallurgical products and consumer goods.⁶⁴² In July 1967, a North Korean trade exhibition was held in Dar es Salaam. While Beijing was embroiled in the Cultural Revolution, Pyongyang re-affirmed its relationship with the Tanzanian government in 1968.

FRELIMO head Samora Machel led a FRELIMO delegation to Pyongyang in September 1971, after a visit to Beijing during which he had secured a commitment of weapons.⁶⁴³ In Machel's message to the Liberation Committee's 24th session in January 1975, he called the socialist countries FRELIMO's 'natural allies' for having taken up and honoured their internationalist duty.⁶⁴⁴ According to the movement's bulletin *Mozambique Revolution*, during the period of the transitional government Machel led delegations to five socialist countries 'whose vanguard parties, governments and

(639) *People's Daily*, 28 April 1965.

(640) Australian National Archives (henceforth ANA), Department of External Affairs, File No. 767/3/8, North Korea – Economic Relations with Tanzania, Australian High Commission in Dar es Salaam to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 27 July 1967.

(641) ANA, File No. 767/3/8, North Korean Aid to Tanzania, Australian High Commission in Dar es Salaam to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 5 January 1967.

(642) ANA, Department of External Affairs, Summary of World Broadcasts, File No. North Korea, 767/3/8, 16 February 1967.

(643) This was despite Beijing's concurrent support for the splinter group Mozambique Revolutionary Committee (COREMO), a symptom of both its dogmatic anti-Soviet stand and radical Cultural Revolutionary period. Ties with FRELIMO continued and Machel made a number of high level visits to Beijing from the late 1960s. NA, FCO45/858, China/Mozambique, Office of the British Charge d'Affaires Beijing, to Far Eastern Department, FCO, 21 September 1971. *People's Daily*, 8 September 1971. Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 128-9.

(644) These included the Soviet Union, China, East Germany, Romania, Bulgaria, North Korea, North Vietnam and Yugoslavia. Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee, "Minutes of the Twenty-Fourth Session."

peoples displayed exemplary internationalist solidarity' with the Mozambican people during the long years of armed struggle.⁶⁴⁵ These were East Germany, Bulgaria and Romania in 1974, China and North Korea in February and March the following year. The agenda for the visits was to meet Party and government leaders and strengthen political solidarity. These resulted in the signing of new agreements on future economic cooperation.⁶⁴⁶ As the primary nationalist movement, FRELIMO became the national government after Lisbon's departure and Pyongyang established formal relations with Maputo on 25 June 1975.

In conclusion, from the 1960s till Mozambican independence in 1975, Pyongyang's contribution to FRELIMO's liberation struggle took the form of military training at camps in Tanzania from 1965, as well as the supply of arms, the latter having been made through the Liberation Committee in 1974.⁶⁴⁷ While Pyongyang maintained an even keel between Moscow and Beijing, the Chinese government's close relationship with Nyerere's government, particularly from 1965 when a military training pact for the Tanzanian People's Defence Force was signed, probably played a role in cementing Pyongyang's ties with the Tanzanian government. This was buttressed by FRELIMO's close relationship with Tanzania, as well as its position as the major Mozambican liberation movement, which detached it from the Sino-Soviet dispute that affected many other movements. Indeed, Machel went on to sign a military pact with North Korea in 1978.⁶⁴⁸ On that occasion, there was a mass rally to welcome the Mozambican delegation and the presidents signed a friendship and cooperation treaty. In his speech, Machel expressed complete agreement with Comrade Kim Il Sung and full support for Kim's proposal for a peaceful unification through the three principles and five policies, condemning the legalisation of South Korea's puppet regime and requesting the withdrawal of American forces. Machel visited Pyongyang again in July 1986. On this occasion Kim called for a joint struggle for anti-imperialism and the promotion of south-south cooperation. Kim also noted Mozambique's support for North Korea's opposition to the creation of two Koreas, calling it an 'obligation of revolutionary comrades.' Machel thanked North Korea for its assistance and referred to bilateral economic relations as 'a model in economic cooperation.' He went on to voice support for North Korean policies, including the proposed tripartite talks and also for measures to strengthen the Non-Aligned Movement.⁶⁴⁹

(645) People's Republic of Mozambique, "Stronger links with Socialist countries," Mozambique Revolution (official organ of FRELIMO): independence issue.

(646) Ibid.

(647) After Liberation Committee representative Omar Arteh Ghalib's mission to Pyongyang in April 1974. Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee, "Minutes of the Twenty-Third Session," (Yaounde, Cameroon, 1974), p. 73.

(648) *People's Daily*, 24 May 1978. Owwoye, "North Korea's African Policy.", p. 642.

(649) Scalapino and Lee, eds., *North Korea in a Regional and Global Context.*, p. 342.

Zimbabwe

Very little has been written on the early relations between North Korea and the Zimbabwean nationalist groups, apart from some reports of military training and support that was given to cadres from the Zimbabwe African People's Union's (ZAPU) armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), in the early 1960s.⁶⁵⁰ Perhaps some impetus might have come from the Chinese government, which had trained a batch of ZAPU cadres around the same time. Beijing later shifted its support from the Moscow-supported ZAPU to the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), founded in 1963 when Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole created the breakaway group with former ZAPU officials. Pyongyang also supported ZANU, though this was also likely to have been influenced by Tanzanian President Nyerere, who had also urged the Chinese, Russians and Cubans to support ZANU.⁶⁵¹ Both ZAPU and ZANU were recognised by the OAU Liberation Committee in December 1963, but ZAPU initially received a larger portion of contributions from the Committee's Special Fund.⁶⁵² Unlike the other southern African liberation movements which eventually came to power, ZANU was never a member of the AAPSO. However, Sithole had led a delegation to the 3rd Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika in February 1963, while he was still with ZAPU, where it was possible that he had encountered representatives from the socialist bloc, including North Korea.⁶⁵³ Nevertheless, ZAPU's precedence at AAPSO and the rejection of ZANU's application at the Nicosia Conference in February 1967 snuffed out any possibility of the latter joining the Organisation and receiving its financial and material support. The ZANU leadership had few options, but this changed when the Sino-Soviet dispute intensified and allowed ZANU to cultivate favourable ties with Beijing, which became its major patron.

In March 1974, a North Korean newspaper noted the commemoration of Zimbabwe Day on 17 March and expressed the Korean people's support for the liberation struggles in Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.⁶⁵⁴ A Rhodesian report claimed that ZANU's armed wing, the *Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army* (ZANLA), received significant amounts of arms from North Korea, Romania and Yugoslavia during the liberation struggle, in addition to an estimated 25 percent from China.⁶⁵⁵ North Korea was one source

(650) ZIPRA cadres also were trained in Algeria, Czechoslovakia, Ghana, China and the Soviet Union. Daniel R. Kempton, *Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa: the national liberation movement connection* (New York, 1989), p. 104.

(651) Indeed, the Tanzanian and Zambian delegations at the 8th AAPSO Council Session in Cyprus had requested for their reservations on ZANU's rejection to be put on record. Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, "The VIIIth Council Session of the AAPSO, Nicosia, Cyprus, 13-17 February 1967," (Cairo, 1967), p. 174.

(652) Martin and Johnson, *Struggle for Zimbabwe*, p. 71.

(653) Permanent Secretariat of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, "Third AAPSO Conference."

(654) *People's Daily*, 19 March 1974.

(655) Taylor, *China and Africa*.

of the Soviet manufactured arms which ZANU received, the others being FRELIMO, Ethiopia (which was receiving huge Soviet support) and Romania.⁶⁵⁶

The existing literature does not mention if there were North Korean instructors training ZANLA forces in the frontline states, though this would not have been entirely unlikely. Nyerere was pro-ZANU and there were already Chinese instructors training ZANLA troops at Itumbi camp in southwest Tanzania from 1969, and later at Mgagao. ZANLA's arms were mainly from China, with contributions from North Korea, Romania and Yugoslavia.⁶⁵⁷ Mozambique's independence in June 1975 created a new rear base for military camps where training was conducted by FRELIMO and ZANLA instructors who had been trained in China and Tanzania.⁶⁵⁸

The most detailed account of North Korean assistance to ZANU is from Mugabe himself, who thanked the DPRK for the assistance given to ZANU's cause in a speech: We take pride and humility in saluting the people of DPRK under the leadership of their Great Leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung, for their Juche Idea and its internationalist dimension. We thank them most sincerely for their kind supply of arms to our liberation forces, including the provision of training for about 300 of our cadres. The Great Leader, seeing the justice of our cause, gave us large quantities of arms capable of arming about 3,000 of our fighting cadres.⁶⁵⁹

There is some disagreement as to whether special pilot training facilities were made available for ZANU trainees in North Korea from 1978.⁶⁶⁰ In May 1978 Mugabe, in an effort to intensify ZANU's relations with the socialist countries, embarked on a three week trip that included visits to China, Vietnam and North Korea.⁶⁶¹ Kim reportedly committed moral, diplomatic and material support for ZANU.⁶⁶²

Diplomatic relations were established on 18 April 1980. The Zimbabwean government's foreign relations priorities following independence was to honour the legacy of ties with socialist countries and progressive organisations around the world that were formed during the liberation struggle. This would be the maintenance and strengthening of links with, amongst others, China, North Korea, Yugoslavia and Romania who would remain Zimbabwe's 'close friends' through mutual political and economic cooperation, though ultimately its approach was one of 'positive non-alignment.'⁶⁶³

(656) Kempton, *Soviet Strategy toward Southern Africa.*, p. 126.

(657) Pandya, Mao and Chimurenga., p. 87. Engel, *The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe.*, p. 57. Taylor, *China and Africa.*, p. 108.

(658) Engel, *The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe.*, p. 57.

(659) If these numbers are to be believed, it is unlikely that 300 ZANLA cadres would have been sent to North Korea – the majority of them would have been trained at camps in the frontline states, as has been suggested.

Zimbabwe African National Union Central Committee Report, presented by the President of ZANU Comrade

Robert G. Mugabe to the Second Congress of the Party, at Borrowdale Grounds, Harare, 8 August 1984, p. 9.

(660) Contrary to Kwak et. al., Engel argues that ZANLA troops specifically were given pilot training. Engel, *The Foreign Policy of Zimbabwe*, Kwak, Patterson, and Olsen, eds., *The Two Koreas.*, p. 57.

(661) Reed, "ZANU and the politics of contested sovereignty.", p. 45.

(662) *Ibid.*, p. 45.

(663) This was explained ZANU's its correspondence with a Swiss solidarity organisation. BAB, Registratur AA5, Archiv Medic' Angola und kaempfendes afrika, 1971-88, Gruppe V: Zimbabwe, V.2.2 Korrespondenz Varia, E. G.

In conclusion, in the years following the Rhodesian government's unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) in November 1965 until Zimbabwean independence in 1980, the limited evidence suggests that Pyongyang's contribution to ZANU took the form of military training, expressions of solidarity and the supply of arms. Pyongyang's support for Mugabe's ZANU was most likely encouraged by the Tanzanian and Chinese governments, followed by the independent Mozambican government after 1975. Pyongyang's support for ZANU also demonstrated its independence from Moscow, which had thrown its weight behind Joshua Nkomo's ZAPU. However, Pyongyang's relation with ZANU during the liberation struggle is generally eclipsed by their collaboration in the post-independence period, making Zimbabwe North Korea's 'most ambitious effort.'⁶⁶⁴ What Mugabe saw on his visits to Pyongyang impressed him and in the post-independence years, North Korea was second to the United Kingdom in being Harare's most important partner, 'one of the most controversial defence policies' Mugabe's government made.⁶⁶⁵ Following independence, Mugabe and Kim signed a secret agreement in October 1980. This followed the footsteps of Luanda and Maputo, which had both signed military agreements after independence as well.

The North Koreans sent a special team of the North Korean military to train an elite brigade of the ZNA.⁶⁶⁶ This was apparently only revealed after the trainers' arrival in August 1981.⁶⁶⁷ In addition to the team, Pyongyang also gave \$16.5 million to the Zimbabwean government, but reports suggest that the training mission was disappointing, in spite of having been so costly.⁶⁶⁸ The Washington Post reported that a Major General's salary was \$32,000 per annum and the experts quickly came under scrutiny and public criticism.⁶⁶⁹ The team quietly departed for North Korea in August 1982. What was particularly attractive about the North Korean system was the political grounding that it would give the elite group, one that 'flowed from ZANU- PF's philosophy.'⁶⁷⁰ The ZNA was intended to be an integrated army comprised of forces from both guerrilla forces and the old Rhodesian army, but the Fifth Brigade, numbering 5,000, stood out as being mostly staffed with Shona-speaking ex-ZANLA troops. In spite of some protests by opposition members in parliament the North Korean team, numbering 106, arrived in Harare on 8 August 1981, bringing with them military equipment that included seven T54 tanks, armoured personnel carriers and artillery.⁶⁷¹ Kwak, Patterson and Olsen posit that Pyongyang also received \$21.5 million for the supply of arms and training for the Fifth Brigade in 1981, though it is

Mandaza: Zimbabwe's Foreign Policy, 26 February 1982 (2S).

(664) Becker, *Rogue Regime*, p. 149.

(665) Alao, "Metamorphosis of the 'Unorthodox'."

(666) Andrew Norman, *Robert Mugabe and the Betrayal of Zimbabwe* (North Carolina, 2004).

(667) Meredith Martin, *Mugabe: Power, Plunder, and the Struggle for Zimbabwe*, Third ed. (New York, 2002), p. 62.

(668) Kwak, Patterson, and Olsen, eds., *The Two Koreas*, pp. 93-94. Owoeye, "North Korea's African Policy." Alao, "Metamorphosis of the 'Unorthodox'."

(669) Kwak, Patterson, and Olsen, eds., *The Two Koreas*, p. 4.

(670) Martin, *Mugabe*, p. 66.

(671) Alao, "Metamorphosis of the 'Unorthodox'."

unclear if this amount was separate from the earlier \$16.5 million grant.⁶⁷² Mugabe later justified the pact with Pyongyang as being ‘solely for internal self defence’ in the face of battles with the South African-funded RENAMO.⁶⁷³ However, the Fifth Brigade’s activities and central role in the Matabeleland massacre from 1982 to 1985 was used to consolidate Mugabe’s regime.⁶⁷⁴ The brutality of the Fifth Brigade has subsequently been described as a blend of ‘the most atrocious of Rhodesian tactics, and added to them by a peculiar North Korean savagery.’⁶⁷⁵

The 7th Non-Aligned Summit Conference in New Delhi in March 1983 was another opportunity for contact between Pyongyang and African leaders. Vice President Pak Sung-Chol headed the delegation and reportedly conferred with the Zimbabwean representatives, possibly using that opportunity to promote his government’s arms sales and training missions. From that year, Pyongyang’s military role increased and brought in precious hard currency so desperately needed to alleviate its economic stagnation. The government of Zimbabwe had reportedly ordered \$640 million worth of arms and military instructors from North Korea in 1983.⁶⁷⁶

Parallel to the unstable security situation which ensued following Zimbabwean independence, were a number of factors which transformed Pyongyang’s military assistance. The country’s dire financial state meant that the military support it had given gratis prior to the 1980s would now be converted into sales for much needed hard currency. The shift was towards providing more ‘specialised and customised’ programmes as well as the transfer of major weapons. The development of North Korea’s arms industry and exports led to a reported \$500 million of military exports in the early 1980s, although this should be viewed against the knowledge that large consignments were probably re-transfers of Soviet and Chinese major weapons because of Pyongyang’s limited production capacity.⁶⁷⁷ Small arms and artillery ammunition could have come from North Korean factories.⁶⁷⁸ In Kim’s New Year speech in 1980, he declared Pyongyang’s desire to ‘strengthen the integration with socialist states and people and to develop friendship and cooperation with the third world and non-aligned countries.’⁶⁷⁹

Another lesson which Mugabe saw and appreciated in North Korea was the management of an official version of history and heroism. This eventually took the form of ‘National Heroes’ Acre’, which was financed by Pyongyang. North Korean artists were selected ahead of local Zimbabweans in rendering the commemorative

(672) Kwak, Patterson, and Olsen, eds., *The Two Koreas.*, pp. 95-96.

(673) It is possible that the North Korean instructors training the post-independence Zimbabwean army near the eastern border with Mozambique, may have also included FRELIMO troops who were fighting Pretoria-sponsored Renamo. Owoeye, “North Korea’s African Policy.”, p. 642.

(674) Armstrong, p. 11.

(675) Stephen Chan, *Robert Mugabe: a life of power and violence* (London, 2003)., p. 23.

(676) Suh, “North Korea in 1986.”

(677) These included rocket launchers, tanks, anti-tank recoilless rifles, four-barrelled mobile anti-aircraft guns, and battle ships. Kwak, Patterson, and Olsen, eds., *The Two Koreas.*, pp. 95-96.

(678) Brzoska and Ohlson, *Arms Transfers.*, pp. 117-118.

(679) Park, “Foreign Relations of North Korea.”, pp. 435-436.

sculptures, much to the indignation and ire of local artists.⁶⁸⁰ In this respect, to Mugabe's government, North Korea's projected image of a self-reliant, revolutionary, with 'its personality cult, autarkic industrial policies, ultra-nationalism, mass mobilisation, and militarism' was attractive.⁶⁸¹

Namibia

SWANU was an active member of the AAPSO and there is little evidence to suggest any contacts between SWANU and North Korean representatives in the Organisation led to anything further, though the 2nd Asian Economic Seminar hosted by Pyongyang in June 1964 was likely attended by a delegation from South West Africa comprising SWANU members.⁶⁸² Perhaps the OAU's recognition of SWAPO as the 'official' Namibian liberation movement in 1964 made it the more obvious candidate for support, given that Pyongyang was asserting its independence from Soviet and Chinese pressure amidst the Sino-Soviet rivalry that was tearing through the Afro-Asian movement. While most SWAPO cadres were trained in Africa and mainly in Tanzanian camps like Kongwa, a number were sent further afoot, initially to Ghana, Algeria, Egypt and the Soviet Union, and after 1965 to China and North Korea.⁶⁸³

According to North Korean sources, Nujoma first visited Pyongyang in 1965. That is possibly when some military training was arranged as by August 1966, there were reports of some North Korean-trained troops having participated. In the early 1970s, aside from the Soviet Union, assistance to SWAPO came mostly from East Germany, other Eastern European countries as well as North Korea, but also included Algeria and Egypt.⁶⁸⁴ This gave rise to problems from coordinating between the various military systems and guerrilla training and, coupled with the troops' inexperience, resulted in heavy casualties in the field.⁶⁸⁵ Beijing grew closer to SWAPO from the late 1960s, although it continued providing token support to SWANU till the early 1970s. Nujoma headed a delegation to North Korea in July 1973, followed by a stop in China and then onwards to Romania.

Pyongyang and Beijing issued a joint communiqué in April 1975 expressing support for the nationalist struggles in Africa and Latin America.⁶⁸⁶ Both governments declared that the African situation was excellent and congratulated the people of Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and Angola on their valiant struggles. They expressed support for the people of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, as well as the Latin

(680) *Sunday Mail*, 28 March 1982, 'Local artists take a swing at plan for heroes' statue'; *The Chronicle*, 22 May 1982, 'Heroes scheme forges on'; *The Herald*, 20 March 1982, 'Designing a hero'. Also cited in Norma J. Kriger, 'The Politics of Creating National Heroes: the search for political legitimacy and national identity,' in *Soldiers in Zimbabwe's Liberation War*, ed. Ngwabi Bhebe and Terence Ranger (London, 1995).

(681) Becker, *Rogue Regime*, p. 148.

(682) Park, "Foreign Relations of North Korea," pp. 448-450.

(683) Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa*, pp. 37-38. (684)

Shubin, *The Hot "Cold War"*, p. 205.

(685) Emmett, *Nationalism in Namibia*, p. 336.

(686) *People's Daily*, 28 April 1975.

American people's opposition to imperialism and external interference. It was also from 1975 that Pyongyang started providing arms to the southern African countries and liberation movements.⁶⁸⁷ A letter from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Far Eastern Research Department in 1975 concluded that the exact extent of North Korean aid to 'guerrilla movements' was unknown and 'probably unknowable,' though it seemed unlikely to have been very great.⁶⁸⁸

Anecdotal evidence suggests that, in addition to military training and arms supplies, North Korea provided propaganda support and, more specifically, in poster design. Pyongyang was well placed in this regard as art and culture performed a function which was 'subordinate to the revolution.'⁶⁸⁹ The military agreement signed between Luanda and Pyongyang in September 1983 brought large numbers of military instructors to training camps in Angola and Armstrong posits that the North Koreans gave given military and ideological instruction to SWAPO and ANC troops.⁶⁹⁰ However, this is disputed by Shubin.

The end of 1976 saw SWAPO's position at the UN entrenched, when UNGA resolutions confirmed its status as the 'sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people' and granted it observer status and led to rise in its support from various donors.⁶⁹¹ It is possible that SWAPO cadres were trained by the large number of North Korean instructors at those camps, following the agreement signed between Pyongyang and Luanda in September 1983. SWAPO was particularly unique in having drawn support and assistance from a broad range of sources, that included the OAU, Algeria, UAR, Tanzania, Tunisia, Zambia, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, USSR, China, East Germany, North Korea, Hungary, Yugoslavia and Mongolia as well as 'progressive organisations' in the Nordic countries, Britain, France, Switzerland and the US.⁶⁹²

After visiting China and securing political and moral support from Premier Zhao Ziyang, as well as 'material aid within their means', Nujoma visited Pyongyang in late January 1983.⁶⁹³ After a visit to China, Nujoma travelled to North Korea in late March 1985.⁶⁹⁴ In 1986, SWAPO official John Ya-Otto was quoted as saying that Pyongyang was providing substantial military assistance for the movement's liberation efforts.⁶⁹⁵ By this time, North Korea was also transitioning from a provider of military aid to military sales and specialised training, as it had done in Zimbabwe. Nujoma visited

(687) Kwak, Patterson, and Olsen, eds., *The Two Koreas.*, pp. 95-96.

(688) NA, FCO45/1679, North Korea/Angola, Letter from Far Eastern Section Research Department to Far Eastern Department, 29 December 1975.

(689) In North Korea itself, artists were trained in ideology as well as technical skills. Koen De Ceuster, "Banners, Bayonets, and Basketball," in *North Korean Posters: the David Heather Collection*, ed. David Heather and Koen De Ceuster (London, 2008), pp. 10-11.

(690) Armstrong, "Juche and North Korea's Global Aspirations." p. 11.

(691) Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia.*, p. 66.

(692) *Ibid.*, p. 40.

(693) Scalapino and Lee, eds., *North Korea in a Regional and Global Context.*, p. 340.

(694) *People's Daily*, 20 March 1985.

(695) Owoeye, p. 641.

North Korea many times prior to Namibia's independence: first in 1965 and a further six times as SWAPO head. This high level diplomacy would continue in the post independence period. Ambassadorial ties between Pyongyang and Windhoek were established on 22 March 1990. At the first SWAPO Party Congress after independence, tributes were made to the countries which had helped in the liberation struggle, in particular to North Korea, China, Cuba and the frontline states. The delegates from these socialist countries apparently responded with messages of solidarity in the 'revolutionary aura' of that event.⁶⁹⁶

In conclusion, from the mid-1960s till Namibian independence in 1990, North Korea's contribution had been to SWAPO, in the form of military training as well as the supply of arms, once again through camps in Tanzania.⁶⁹⁷ SWAPO was, uniquely, a well-resourced movement which effectively maintained a non-aligned posture (or rather, it had to because of its diverse support network). As much of the Namibian independence struggle occurred in the UN platform, Pyongyang was not able to participate in a tangible way because of its late entry (simultaneously with South Korea) that post-dated Namibia's independence, in August 1991. Bilateral relations were quickly consolidated and in September 1991, Pyongyang signed an agreement with Windhoek on economic and technical cooperation.⁶⁹⁸ After attending an OAU Summit in Harare in 1997, Nujoma wanted to construct a commemorative national monument, Heroes' Acre.⁶⁹⁹ This was probably not entirely coincidental as Harare had a similar project that was completed with (predominantly) North Korean design and assistance in the 1980s. Heroes' Acre in Windhoek was designed by North Korean experts together with Namibian authorities and was inaugurated in August 2002.

South Africa

North Korean contact with Apartheid South Africa occurred on its home turf, so to speak, as military adversaries in the 1950s. Pretoria had dispatched a squadron of the

South African Air Force (SAAF) to fight alongside the US-led UN forces following the North Korean 'invasion' in June 1950. The last South African force departed in October 1953 and in the course of the Korean conflict, the SA squadron made 12,067 sorties, with a total of 826 South Africans having served in the field.⁷⁰⁰

North Korean relations were predominantly with the ANC, although it too was in rivalry with Seoul. In 1964, the Tanzanian government permitted an ANC military camp to be established at Kongwa.⁷⁰¹ Tambo was heavily involved in the setting up of an ANC training camp in Morogoro, Tanzania, which became its base camp. By the mid-1970s,

(696) Dobell, *Swapo's Struggle for Namibia*, p. 130.

(697) After Liberation Committee representative Omar Arteh Ghalib's mission to Pyongyang in April 1974. [Hardly connected] Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee, "Twenty-Third Session," p. 73.

(698) In the same month, a similar agreement on economic and technical agreement was also signed with Beijing.

(699) Information from the website of the City of Windhoek, <http://www.windhoekcc.org.na/Default.aspx?> [accessed 5 November 2009].

(700) Information from the website of the South African Embassy in Seoul, http://www.southafrica-embassy.or.kr/eng/index_eng.php [accessed 4 November 2009].

(701) Shubin, *ANC*, p. 65.

Pyongyang's diplomatic overtures in central-southern Africa were bearing fruit, with official ties with Zambia, Zaire and Botswana. Accounts of ANC-Pyongyang exchanges are scanty and limited to the exchange of visits. North Korea was reportedly providing military support to the ANC in 1986, though it is unclear as to whether that was in North Korea or perhaps in the newly independent frontline states of Angola or Mozambique.⁷⁰²

In the late 1980s, in desperate need of international standing and domestic legitimacy in the face of its flagging economic situation made more acute by Seoul's successful hosting of the 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Summer Olympics, Pyongyang attempted to revive its international standing. The 1989 World Festival of Youth and Students had 177 delegations, including the ANC delegation, the largest number of countries ever represented.⁷⁰³ As part of its solidarity drive, students from the ANC School (SOMAFCO, Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College) attended events and congresses in the socialist bloc and sent a delegation to North Korea. The festival was attended by Kim Il Sung and Zimbabwe's Mugabe.⁷⁰⁴ This has led one scholar to remark that 'the circle of friends on which North Korea can rely for support and expressions of solidarity continues to diminish.'⁷⁰⁵

The South African liberation struggle was conducted predominantly by its groups in exile and diplomatically, through the United Nations mostly prior to Pyongyang's admission to the UN. Therefore North Korean assistance was largely indirect and in expressions of solidarity. Additionally, South Korea and Apartheid South Africa had active contact in international organisations as well as trade relations. This carried through to the ANC-led government and Seoul and Pretoria established diplomatic relations in December 1992, no doubt Seoul's economic power was very attractive and trade expanded rapidly.⁷⁰⁶ Pyongyang's ties with the post-Apartheid South African government, on the other hand, were slow to develop, with diplomatic relations established in August 1998.⁷⁰⁷

In conclusion, despite North Korea's direct encounter with Apartheid South Africa on the Korean Peninsula's battlefield during the Korean War, contact between Pyongyang and the South African liberation movements only began in the late 1950s. This followed the development in Afro-Asian relations in general, and probably through the AAPSO. The limited evidence available suggests that North Korea's

(702) Becker, *Rogue Regime*., p. 149.

(703) Information from the website of the World Federation of Democratic Youth, <http://www.wfdy.org/> [accessed 5 November 2009].

(704) Sean Morrow, Brown Maaba, and Loyiso Pulumani, SOMAFCO, the ANC School in Tanzania, 1978 to 1992 (Cape Town), p. 95.

(705) Koh, "Pyongyang's Foreign Policy."

(706) <http://www.southafrica-embassy.or.kr/eng/sankorea/bilateral.php>.

(707) This was done via an exchange of notes in New York, whereupon it was agreed to maintain non-residential relations at the ambassadorial level. South Africa's Ambassador to the People's Republic of China is accredited to Pyongyang. Information from the website of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa, <http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/bilateral/dprk.html> [accessed 4 November 2009].

contribution was given exclusively to the ANC, in the form of military training.⁷⁰⁸ As with the Namibian case, much of the anti-apartheid struggle took place in the UN throughout the 1980s and Pyongyang was unable to participate in a tangible way because of its late entry (simultaneously with South Korea) to the international body. Furthermore, because of the stronger, largely economic ties, which South Korea had with the Apartheid and later independent South African governments, bilateral relations between Pyongyang and Pretoria were comparatively slow to develop.

Final Thoughts

This section has examined North Korea's contribution to the southern African liberation struggle through the interaction of two key aspects of Pyongyang's foreign policy: first, a pragmatic African policy which courted African governments for diplomatic support in international arena in the UN and later the NAM, which ran parallel to the second aspect, a revolutionary support which had the dual purpose of reinforcing the regime's domestic legitimacy and the regime's international status as an anti-imperialist, militant force. This was done through the AAPSO and Pyongyang's support to liberation movements. Pyongyang emphasised one or the other, depending on the dynamics of the international situation.

Realistically speaking, from what evidence there is of the scale and scope of North Korean contribution during the 1960s till 1994, it was not a very grave threat to the Portuguese, Rhodesian or South African governments. However, in the cold war milieu, mere perception of an imminent communist threat was often enough to marshal a response. While Pyongyang was never the primary donor to any of the liberation movements during their struggles for independence, in a contested market of limited donors, its support was greatly valued by its recipients. Pyongyang's relations with the movements were largely unaffected by the Sino-Soviet dispute. While Kim Il Sung attempted to portray himself as a leader of the third world, it is unlikely that the propagation of Juche ideology went beyond the activities which were sponsored by North Korean embassies.

By the time Pretoria's cordon sanitaire had been completely shattered, with Namibian independence in 1990, North Korea was in a very different position from where it had been at the height of its African policy in the early 1970s. Its rhetorical support for 'revolutionary forces' was not necessarily followed up by material support, as it was in economic crisis. The transition of the liberation movements to parties leading national governments was the point where revolutionary rhetoric took a back seat to economic concerns. Pyongyang's pragmatism then re-engaged itself as an affordable supplier of specialised military training and construction projects.

(708) After Liberation Committee representative Omar Arteh Ghalib's mission to Pyongyang in April 1974. Organisation of African Unity Liberation Committee, "Twenty-Third Session.", p. 73.

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8.6

Cuba and the Caribbean's collaboration with Africa and SADC

by Hedelberto López Blanch

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It should be stated from the outset that for decades, the small Republic of Cuba provided assistance to many African countries in their struggles for independence as well as for the economic and social development of their peoples. The assistance had to be done discreetly due to the constant threats and aggressions of the main and most aggressive enemy of the Cuban people: i.e. the government of the United States.

Cuba is the right example to the world by providing its inhabitants, for the first time, full social, economic, political, human and democratic rights. This Cuban policy was seen by the different North American administrations as a dangerous precedent to maintaining the political and economic hegemony that for decades they have held over all the nations of the South American hemisphere. It is for this reason that they carried out mercenary invasions, attacks, acts of sabotage, economic blockades and many aggressive actions (which still persist) to try to destabilize the governments of the above mentioned countries. This situation was one of the reasons for not exposing the assistance that Cuba offered to the African countries struggling to get independence from the western metropolises or that which it offered to the newly liberated countries.

I should also mention two other factors explaining the Cuban' position as far as assistance is concerned. The new African governments were also in danger of being overthrown, if this collaboration was made public, and that the altruistic, disinterested and humanist international politics of the Cuban Revolution, under the leadership of Fidel Castro Ruz, since January 1, 1959, has as a moral principle to undertake such cooperation but not to publicize it to the world but to alleviate the needs of the nations of the South.

For five decades, Cuba has managed to overcome the obstacles imposed by the United States, and at the same time been able to offer its disinterested assistance to more than 50 African countries for their liberation first, and then for their economic and social development.

Against Racism and Support for Africa

In 1959, the Revolution had to face a huge problem of discrimination and Fidel immediately initiated a wide and strong campaign in different fields with the view to eliminating all forms of exclusion, including the abhorrent racism that characterized pre-Revolutionary Cuba.

The mixture of Africans, Chinese and Spaniards is a Cuban cultural reality. The inception of a Cuban nation came from the African continent, because more than a million of its nationals were forcibly uprooted from their motherland to work as slaves in the sugarcane plantations, farms and factories of this island. The league of Yoruba, Congos, Carabalies and other ethnic groups with Spaniards and Creoles contributed to the promotion of the Cuban nationality and many of their children fought in the wars for independence. The greatest general, Antonio Maceo and Grajales are the most outstanding officers and soldiers of the Liberation Army which

is composed of blacks

and half castes. Indeed, for Cubans, Africa is extremely cherished. Africa is one of the features of the identity and nationality of the Island: Cuba.

After the victory of the revolution, Fidel embarked on actions to sensitize the people immediately. He did so in all the acts and events carried out since 1959. He continuously spoke about the subject. Indeed, he seized every public event to explain that we, Cubans, were equal. When it came to defending the Revolution, we had to be united. Fidel's pedagogy had an effect on a Cuba that had suffered the slavery of blacks, for several centuries, and the subsequent hardships of racial discrimination. «Unfortunately, the problem of racial discrimination is one of the most complex and difficult faced by the Revolution. The problem of racial discrimination is not the problem of rent, it is not the problem of expensive medicines, it is not the problem of the Telephone Company, it is not even the problem of large estates (*latifundio*), which is one of the serious problems we have to tackle. Perhaps the most difficult of all the problems before us, perhaps the most difficult of all the injustices that have existed in our country, is the problem that calls on us to put an end to that injustice that is racial discrimination, even though it seems incredible." [...] And I wonder what difference there is between one injustice and another injustice, what difference there is between the landless peasant and the black who is not given the opportunity to work. Is it that the black who doesn't work like the peasant who doesn't have land doesn't die of hunger"?⁵¹

"We, who are a society, composed of human beings of all colours and of no colour; we, who are a people made up of different racial components, how are we going to commit the stupidity and absurdity of keeping the virus of discrimination? I see, here, in this crowd, whites and I see also blacks, because that's what our society is: the people are made up of whites and blacks and yellows. That must be Cuba. If we have to defend the Revolution and take up arms, let whites, blacks and mulattos do it..."⁵²

Based on that patriotic education, tens of thousands of Cuban fighters left the Island to defend countries, such as Algeria, Angola, Ethiopia, the two Congos and Guinea Bissau, to mention a few. These fighters moved out completely voluntarily. They were united as whites, blacks, Indians, mulattos, descendants of Asians. This is the mosaic of races part and parcel of the Cuban nationality with a highly humanitarian and internationalist vision and policy.

Cuba Raises its Voice for Africa

Under this section, an historical event should be recalled. Five months after the Bay of Pigs invasion (*Playa Girón*), in the province of Matanzas, orchestrated and led by the United States with the participation of 1,200 mercenaries fully armed and trained by Washington, and which was defeated in just 72 hours, Cuba's voice against South Africa's racist policy was expressed at the Inaugural Founding Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, from 1 to 6 September 1961.

⁵¹ *Pensamiento de Fidel Castro*, Tomo I, vol. 2. Interview on TV Channel 12. March 25, 1959.

⁵² Act in support of the Urban Reform, Güines, 29 March 1959. Two kinds of discrimination. *Periódico Granma*, March 21, 2009.

Oswaldo Dorticós Torrado, who was at that time president of the young revolution, stated on September 2 at the Plenary of the conference: "At this meeting, we plan to address one of the issues that primarily affect the interests of a considerable part of the world's population. I am referring to the problem of racial discrimination and especially to the apartheid policy. The voice of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba and that of the Cuban people can be raised unequivocally on this occasion, to urge this conference to strongly reiterate the condemnation and abhorrence of all forms of manifestations of racial discrimination that constitute for the colonialist and imperialist nations an instrument used for disunity and exploitation of peoples. "As a representative of a nation, of a government, of a people and of a Revolution that have forever abolished the vestiges of racial discrimination, I can therefore call for, at this Conference, the strongest condemnation of this discriminatory policy," Dorticos added.⁵³

From that moment, Cuba expressed its voice at all international and regional fora to strongly condemn the aggressions that African countries have suffered throughout these years from the former colonial powers and from developed countries, such as the United States; the looting they have been subjected to by transnational companies, the imposition of neoliberal and predatory policies, as well as the lack of development assistance to these nations. It should be recalled that the rich countries have become more powerful thanks to the extraction and exploitation of the resources of the African continent.

Due to the huge number of conferences, meetings, summits and other gatherings where Cuba had defended the freedom, independence and political and economic sovereignty of the African countries, there is no need to enumerate them all here. However, it can be said that the small Republic of Cuba, since 1959, had been constantly on the forefront in the world fora, supporting the struggles and demands of those nations.

Internationalist Education

The political awareness explained to the Cuban people by Fidel Castro through speeches, interviews, conferences as well as by citing his personal example of being the first to sacrifice and foresee the problems had been essential in this education process.

"The internationalist mind-set must be defended as a principle, I say that, in order to be an internationalist, you have to give something of what you have, and you have to be willing to give it.. The argument for internationalists is this: you have to help others, even if no one helps you. It is simply a moral duty, a revolutionary duty, a duty of principle, a duty of conscience, an ideological duty for that matter: to make a contribution to humanity, even if humanity had not made any contribution to us... We have to develop that internationalist consciousness, which has been our motto in our country."⁵⁴

53 . Notes from Oswaldo Dorticos speech delivered during the First Conference of the Non Aligned Countries, Periodico Hoy, La Habana 05-09-1961.

54 Speech by Fidel Castro at the IV Congress of the Union of Young Communists, 4 April 1982. *Fidel Castro, speeches in three congresses*. Political Editor. Havana 1982. p. 104.

Early Cuban Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa

The independence of many African countries, the struggle for their sovereignty and the victory of the Cuban Revolution contributed to the interaction of thousands of people in both directions. Cuban co-operation in sub-Saharan Africa started very early, with agreements signed between Cuba and the Republic of Guinea, in 1960 and others with Congo Brazzaville and Mali. Since that period, Cuba sent to those countries many teachers and doctors, and African scholars arrived on the island to study, all expenses paid by the Cuban government. In 1963, the first Cuban medical group of 55 doctors and paramedics went to serve in the newly liberated Democratic People's Republic of Algeria, followed by others in Guinea and Tanzania. For example, in Congo Brazzaville, Cuban doctors, together with the authorities of the country, carried out the first massive polio vaccination in Africa, in 1966.

According to the Ministry for Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation (MINVEC), 76,771 employees in the different branches have worked in 33 countries of the subcontinent, in 1999 and 28,809 scholarships holders from 43 countries from the African region have graduated during the same period.⁵⁵

There were 3 204 Cuban employees, in 31 countries, in North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa, of whom 2 321 were in the health sector, in 2009. A total of 57,210 Cuban personnel have served as professors, teachers, engineers, sports technicians, skilled workers, doctors, nurses and other professions over a period of 47 years. Up to this year, 31,031 young Africans originating from 44 countries (17,906 from middle level and 13,125 from higher level) have graduated in Cuba. In addition, there were

2 256 young Africans from 42 countries with scholarships in Cuba, 850 of whom were studying medicine, in 2009.

Liberation Movements

Cuban military aid to the African Liberation Movements started almost from the beginning of civil collaboration. In 1961, several headquarters were already established in Havana, with representatives of these movements, including that of the Nationalist Party of Zanzibar, composed of three persons: Ali Mafoudh, Salim Ahmed Salim and Mohamed Ali Fom. The following year, in 1962, a group of 18 zanzibaris arrived in Cuba for military training and they returned at the end of that same year and the beginning of 1963. On January 12, 1964, a rebellion overthrew the monarchical regime that had been in power since Independence, in December 1963, is reported to have taken over the island with the consent of Great Britain, a former colonial power. It is claimed that the group of newcomers played an active part in the events.

Mr. Ali Sultani, former Minister of Education of the new Zanzibar government, after the advent of the United Republic of Tanzania (when the Republic of Tanganyika joined the Republic of Zanzibar on April 26, 1964), mentioned, in an unpublished book, to which I had access, the relationship of the 18 members of the group trained in Cuba, including Ahmed Hillal, Ahmed Bajabir, Abdul Gedemy, Ali Yusuf, Abdul Rahim

⁵⁵ Cuban collaboration with other countries 1960-1999. Ministry for Foreign Investment and Economic Collaboration, March 2000.

and Salim Ahmed Salim, among others.⁵⁶ The US State Department, through its Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, immediately after the rebellion in Zanzibar, started exerting pressure on Britain (former colonial power) to send troops (which Britain did not) to that country to "control" the situation. The U.S. campaign against the new government of Zanzibar and Cuba was conducted through The New York Times. Only 3 days after the rebellion, the newspaper wrote: "American refugees left today Zanzibar. They claim to have seen Spanish-speaking soldiers in uniforms similar to the Cubans among the rebels who overthrew the government of Zanzibar"⁵⁷.

Other articles followed such as the one published on 23rd:

"The preparations for last week's pro-communist revolution in Zanzibar started discreetly in Cuba, at the end of 1961, when Zanzibar's political office was established in Havana. They reached their climax with the arrival, six weeks ago, of a Cuban chargé d'affaires in Dar es Salaam... Several hundred of African "students" were trained in Cuba. It is said that the training included guerrilla warfare tactics. Students were divided into four main groups. Special emphasis was placed on the first group, from South Africa, and on the second, from Kenya, Tanganyika and Zanzibar. This is believed to indicate that Cuba, working with the Soviet Union and possibly communist China, focuses its attention and activities on South Africa and the east region of Africa. The Cuban embassy in Dar es Salaam which suddenly began operating last month, could be one of the key elements in this endeavour."⁵⁸

Piero Gleijeses, professor and researcher at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, pointed out in his book: "Jorge Serguera, the Cuban ambassador in Algeria, flew to Zanzibar as soon as the rebellion took place to evaluate the situation. A few days later, he joined Fidel Castro in Moscow, who was visiting the Soviet Union from January 13-23. Castro was completely surprised by the revolt. Serguera remembers: "Fidel asked me: Is it true that (the revolutionary leaders of Zanzibar) speak Spanish? I replied: It's true, Fidel. Then he asked: Is it true that they say Motherland or Death, we will overcome? I told him: It's true, Fidel. And he asked: Is it true we trained them? I answered: It's true, Fidel. And he exclaimed, "And I thought it was CIA propaganda."⁵⁹

When Morocco threatened, in 1963, to take over areas of neighbouring Algeria, which had recently got independence from France, Cuba sent a military contingent of 700 fighters, heavily armed with rifles, tanks, cannons and anti-aircraft. Although they did not have to fight, their presence was critical to dissuading Rabat from launching the aggression. When the Cuban contingent left Algeria, they donated to the Algerian government all the weapons and military equipment transported from Cuba.

It should be pointed out that the Cuban struggle for the liberation of Africa began politically, together with Nkrumah, Sekou Touré, Gamal Abdel Nasser and other leaders. Later, when there were colonies fighting for independence, the political collaboration was transformed into support for the armed movement of those

⁵⁶ Interview conducted in Zanzibar by the author with Ali Sultani, 20 February 2009.

⁵⁷ *The New York Times*, 15 January 1964, p. 1.

⁵⁸ *The New York Times* 23 January 1964, p.1

⁵⁹ Piero Gleijeses, *Missions in Conflict*. Ediciones Ciencias Sociales, 2004. Havana. Page 99.

countries that were still colonised, such as Angola, Guinea Bissau and Mozambique, although for the latter, the support was fundamentally political. Assistance was also provided to the armed struggle of the people of Congo Leopoldville against the white mercenaries and traitors in the service of colonialism, Moses Tshombe and Mobutu Sese Seko, who had assassinated Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, in 1961, with the involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States.

Those services, always active from the very first moments against the Cuban Revolution, kept abreast of the events. "U.S. intelligence was aware that Africans were going to Cuba for military training. In May 1965, a CIA report noted, that for the period 1961 to early 1965, between 100 and 200 Africans had been trained in Cuba. The British Embassy in Havana, which served as the eyes and ears of the United States following the severance of diplomatic relations between Washington and Havana in January 1961, also reported that many Africans had been trained in Cuba."⁶⁰

Military Cooperation Development

The increase of Cuban assistance to African Liberation Movements was decisively boosted and expanded by Ernesto Che Guevara's visit to that continent. Indeed, Che Guevara left Cuba, on December 9, 1964, for New York to participate at the United Nations General Assembly. Then, he undertook a long journey to eight African countries (he also travelled to China), where he met with leaders of those nations and with leaders of the Liberation Movements.

The journey lasted three months, until March 14, 1965. The Heroic Guerrilla visited Algeria (on three occasions), Mali, Congo Brazzaville, Guinea Conakry, Ghana, Dahomey (today Benin), Tanzania and Egypt (twice).

In a speech delivered on December 11, 1964, at the XIX session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Che Guevara strongly underlined the facts that led to the overthrow and assassination of the Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba. At the same time, he also condemned the imperialist actions of the United States and Belgium. He criticized the passivity and guilt of the United Nations, which remained passive despite the presence of their contingent of troops in that country, which, paradoxically, had been requested by Lumumba himself to help him maintaining peace.

Che Guevara also summoned the international organization by pointing out the following: "Once again, we raise our voice to alert the world to what is happening in South Africa; the brutal policy of apartheid is being applied before the eyes of the nations of the world. The peoples of Africa are forced to endure the fact, that on that continent, the superiority of one race over the other is still being formalized, that one race is killing with impunity in the name of that racial superiority. Will the United Nations do nothing to prevent that?"⁶¹

Che Guevara's statement fell like a powerful bomb on the Western countries that supported the racial segregation regime, with which they had not only fluid

⁶⁰ CIA OCI, "Weekly Cuban Summary", 5 May 1965, FOLA; (British Embassy in Havana), "Communist Subversion Treat to Africa", April 1965. Quoted by Piero Gleijeses. Work cited. p. 54.

⁶¹ Ernesto Che Guevara, Works 1957-1967, Casa de las Americas 1977, vol.2, p.545

trade relations, but also delivery of weapons and equipment to repress the majority black population of South Africa. Che Guevara, by his intervention, questioned the timorous and submissive role that the UN Organization had played with the racial segregation system.

During his tour, Ernesto Guevara held meetings with many officials and Liberation Movements representatives, mainly in Congo (Brazzaville) and Tanzania where these Movements had their headquarters. He met also several Heads of States (Julius Nyerere, Alphonse Massamba-Debat, Sekou Toure and Ahmed Ben Bella. Abdel Nasser) as well as with leaders of the liberation movements, including Agostinho Neto, Amilcar Cabral, Laurent Kabila, Gaston Soumialot and Godefroid Chamleso (these three leaders of the Congolese insurrection).

Following these meetings, Cuban military cooperation became more effective in favour of the liberation of the countries of the region, especially Congo (formerly Zaire Leopoldville, today is known as the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Congo Brazzaville, Angola and Guinea Bissau. The first two countries currently are members of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).

With regard to civil collaboration with Angola, until then only four Angolans who had fled Portugal were studying in Cuba. The first came in 1962 (Nдалу who later became Angola's deputy defence minister) and the others in 1963 and 1964.

Immediately after his return to Cuba, and after his meeting with Fidel, Che Guevara began his preparation to join the National Movement for the Liberation of the Congo as a guerrilla. Kabila and Soumialot had accepted, in principle, the shipment of 30 Cuban instructors and weapons to help training their combatants, but Che Guevara raised the proposal to more than a hundred guerrillas of which he would be the head of that detachment.

Together with the combatants Victor Dreke and José Maria Tamayo (Papi), Che Guevara completely camouflaged left Cuba to Tanzania by air, with stopover in several countries, on the first of April of 1965. Thus began the embryo of the Cuban contingent in Congo Leopoldville. In the early hours of April 23, together with 13 other companions, they crossed Lake Tanganyika in boats from the village of Kigoma, in Tanzania, to Kibamba on the Congolese side.

The following days, they continued arriving to Tanzania by many ways and crossing different countries. Groups of future Cuban combatants that crossed the lake went to join the guerrilla led by Che Guvara. Their number had reached 123 between officers, sergeants and soldiers.

Cuba included black combatants, as from January 1965, following the request made by the leader simba Soumialot⁶² to begin preparation in camps located in the

⁶² The simbas (lions) are the Congolese guerrillas who rose up with Pierre Mulele in the west and Laurent Kabila in the east of Zaire. The simbas caused a total fear among Mobutu Sese Seko's soldiers, who joined them or fled them without a fight, and liberated almost fifty percent of the country. They put the corrupt, pro-American Congolese regime in a real abyss. Then the United States created an army of mercenaries to eliminate the rebels, with well-armed European and South African targets, supported by a "Congolese" aviation with South African and Cuban-American pilots.

western region of the Island.

Other 257 combatants of the five hundred that were training in the Pinar del Río camps of Piti 1 and 2 in Cuba, all of them were blacks, also left by different routes (air and sea) to Congo Brazzaville to form the contingent Patricio Lumumba that had, among its missions, to support Che Guevara's operations in the other Congo, if need be. Jorge Risquet Valdés was appointed chief.

"The arrival of these contingents expressed the critical strategic importance that our Party and our Commander-in-Chief have attached since then to the African revolutionary processes in their anti-imperialist struggle and to our identification with their just cause.⁶³

Che Guevara and his contingent stayed in the country for seven long months, until their departure on November 21, 1965, in the region of Kuilu facing several difficulties, trying to unite and train the Congolese guerrillas, defying the existing misunderstandings within the National Liberation Movement and carrying out ambushes and attacks against the enemy forces.

At the end of October of the same year, a meeting of the Organization of African Unity took place in Accra, Ghana. The president of Congo, Kasavubu, explained, during that meeting, the dismissal of the hated Tshombe as prime minister and that the white mercenaries (hired by the United States and other western nations to support the regime) would leave his territory. On the basis of this statement, it was agreed that the conflict in that country would be resolved exclusively by the Congolese themselves. Indirectly, the Cuban column came to know about this decision. Indeed, Nyerere was in charge of reporting it, and the Simba leaders of the Front accepted it. That marked the end of the presence of Che Guevara and his column in the motherland of Patricio Lumumba.

It should be noted that, in Congo, six Cubans died, four of them in the attack against barracks of the Front de Force, on June 29; one in combat on October 26 and the last one disappeared, after the departure of the fighters and which could not be found despite several explorations.

"I participated with Commander Ernesto Che Guevara's contingent in Congo, formerly Zaire. I acted as the link between him and Kabila. After the departure of the Cuban guerrillas, I travelled with them to Cuba where I studied Spanish and began my journalism career at the University of Havana. I am a product of friendship and solidarity because Cuba forged me, not only professionally but also politically and ideologically. I owe much to Cuba and I am offering my life today, tomorrow and at all times for Cuba.⁶⁴

⁶³ Speech by Army General Raúl Castro Ruz on the occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the creation of Columns One and Two, celebrated on November 7, 1985. Cited in *El Segundo frente del Che en el Congo*. Jorge Risquet Valdés. Editora Abril 2000. p.10.

⁶⁴ Interview conducted by the author, in Havana, with Godefroid Chamleso, March 23, 2009. Author's file. Following the founding of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chamleso has held a number of positions, including Minister of Defence and Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to Angola.

The ship Uvero left Santiago de Cuba on April 27, 1965, with the first 10 founders of Column Two (Patrice Lumumba Battalion), headed by Captain Norberto Normando Agramonte, in order to provide the guerrillas with the necessary supplies and at the same time to send aid to other liberation movements. On May 12, after overcoming the threat from the U.S. Navy that had invaded the nearby Caribbean island of the Dominican Republic, the ship arrived at the port of Conakry, Guinea. The instructors followed by air to Brazzaville.

In Conakry, the ship Uvero unloaded 315 boxes with weapons, ammunitions, mines, uniforms, medicines and food for the anti-colonialist fighters of Guinea Bissau who were fighting against the Portuguese.

Then the ship Uvero left for Algeria where another shipment was to be unloaded but could not do so because, during that very period, there was a coup d'état against Ahmed Ben Bella. The ship left for Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania, where it arrived in early July. The ship Uvero unloaded, in Tanzania, many weapons and different supplies for the fighters of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) and another part for Che Guevara's Column One.

Column Two

The aforementioned 10 instructors who departed in the ship Uvero were selected from the military contingent that had been training since January of that year in camps, in Pinar del Rio, from where the first members of Che Guevar's column left. It was the outpost of Column Two or *Patrice Lumumba* Battalion.

According to Jorge Risquet Valdés in the book *El segundo frente del Che en el Congo*, the head of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro Ruz, met with them to explain the situation of the two Congo and the struggle against Portuguese colonialism in Angola and in Guinea Bissau. Fidel did not mention to them about Che Guvara's presence in Congo Leopoldville. He only informed them about their destination Congo Brazzaville. By mid-August, the number of Cubans in Congo Brazzaville was about 50, who had travelled in small groups by air.

About 200 troops, which constituted the bulk of the column, had travelled by sea, during the first week of August 1965. To lead the mission, Fidel asked to look for Jorge Risquet, who, at that time, was the secretary of the organization of the United Party of the Socialist Revolution (PURS)⁶⁵ in the province of Oriente. During their meeting, Fidel understood that Jorge Risquet would be willing to carry out the mission. It was only then that the Commander in Chief informed him about Che Guevara's presence in the Congo Leopoldville, at the head of a hundred Cuban combatants. The leadership of the Cuban government assigned the following tasks to Column Two:

1. To act as a reserve of Che's Column One in the Congo Leopoldville, if need be. This eventuality depended on the development of actions in the Eastern Front, where

⁶⁵ The PURS was created in mid-1963. Previously, the Integrated Revolutionary Organizations (IROs) had been formed when the 26th of July Movement (M-26), the Popular Socialist Party (PSP) and the Revolutionary Directorate (DR) joined together. The PURS then gave way to the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC).

Column One operated, or in the Kuilu Front, headed by the Congolese fighter Pierre Mulele.⁶⁶ As part of the preparation for such a possibility, it was necessary to assist in the organization and training of the lumumbists who lived in Brazzaville, as well as to try to establish contact with Mulele.

2. To organize, to train and to arm militia units of Congolese youth, fulfilling the request of the government of Massamba Debat. Its main objective was to enhance the defensive capacity of the country against a possible aggression of the Leopoldville regime.
3. To participate, together with the Armed Forces and Militias, in the defence of the country in the event of a foreign military aggression.
4. To support the constitutional government in the face of any destabilisation acts.
5. To wage guerrilla war with the Congolese popular forces when faced with an adverse situation, in which a foreign aggression or a reactionary coup would succeed in defeating the country's legal government.
6. To provide assistance to MPLA according to its requests. This included participation with Cuban guerrilla instructors in the Second Military Region (Enclave of Cabinda, border with both Congolese States) and organizing, training, arming, guerrilla detachments and cooperating in the clandestine crossing of troops and weapons through Congo Leopoldville to the northern border of Angola.⁶⁷

From that moment, Risquet was appointed as the responsible of Cuba in Africa, with permanent residence in Brazzaville. It was decided to put an end to Che Guevara's Column One direct relations with Havana.

The Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro, Osmany Cienfuegos, Minister of Construction, who also attended to the Party's foreign relations, and Commander Manuel Piñeiro, Deputy Minister of interior, met, on the night of August 6, 1965, with the fighters of Column Two, before their departure, to Punta Negra, Congo Brazzaville, aboard the Soviet passenger ship *Félix Dzerzhinsky*. Its members were far from thinking that in June 1966, almost a year after their arrival at that country; they would face a Coup d'état carried out by commandos, who tried to take advantage of President Massamba Debat's participation at a conference in Madagascar. Risquet succeeded, without spilling a drop of blood, to defeat the Coup.

It should be recalled that during the presence of Column Two in Congo Brazzaville, the Cuban instructors trained more than two thousand Congolese and Angolan combatants and with the latter three columns were formed, Camilo Cienfuegos and Kami who joined the First Front, 100 kilometres from Luanda, (the latter was heavily decimated during their crossing through Zaire) and Ferrás Bomkobo, who with nearly 200 combatants, trained in Cuba and Congo, opened the Third Front on the Zambian border, after the frustrated attempt to reach the

⁶⁶ Pierre Mulele, was Minister of Education in the government of Patrice Lumumba. He led the liberation struggle in August 1963 and together with Felix Mukulubumbo, Thomas Mukuidi and Leonard Mituidi founded the guerrilla front in the Kuilo region, east of Leopoldville. They liberated almost fifty percent of Zaire's territory. U.S.-backed European and South African mercenary troops helped crush the revolutionary movement. In 1968, after a mock amnesty decreed by Mobutu, Mulele returned to Kinshasa (formerly Leopoldville), where he was captured, tortured and murdered.

⁶⁷ Extracted from Jorge Risquet Valdés. *El Segundo Frente del Che en el Congo*. Havana, Casa Editora Abril, 2000, p. 26.

First Front through Zaire, where Mobutu forces took them prisoners and disarmed them. They were subsequently released thanks to the OAU intervention.

« Che's Column One performance was heroic during the several months it remained inside the territory of Zaire, where he arrived after overcoming dangerous obstacles, he fought many and unequal battles...More than 50 military actions were carried out by Che Guevara's column...However, it was not possible to gather and unite the Lumumba's forces. There was a moment when the internationalist column fought alone in an unknown terrain. Faced with such adverse circumstances, the column had to leave that country".

"The conditions were more favourable for the Patrice Lumumba battalion. The support for the progressive Congolese government in the face of foreign threats was strong and at one point proved decisive. The militia battalions of Congolese youth organized, trained and armed themselves, reinforcing popular support for the democratic regime. This enabled the MPLA to consolidate its rear-guard base, and increased guerrilla actions on the Second Cabinda Front. Two columns, instructed and equipped by Cubans, moved towards the First Front, towards Luanda region. One of them bore the glorious name of Camilo Cienfuegos Squadron."⁶⁸

Message to the Tricontinental Conference

Che Guevara sent a memorable message entitled: Create two, three (...) many Vietnams, to the delegates attending the Tricontinental conference, held in January 1966, in Havana, only nine months after committing his life to the struggle for the liberation of Bolivia. Che Guevara analysed in his message the international struggle for liberation and in particular that of Africa: "...the political and social evolution of Africa does not foresee a revolutionary continental situation. The liberation struggles against the Portuguese must end victoriously, but Portugal means nothing on the imperialist agenda. The confrontations of revolutionary importance were those that put in check the whole imperialist system, although not for that reason we stop fighting for the liberation of the three Portuguese colonies and for the intensification of their revolutions.

A new era would begin in Africa, when the black masses of South Africa or Rhodesia would start their authentic revolutionary struggle. As a matter of fact, the impoverished masses of a country decided to claim their right to a dignified life, and to liberate themselves from the ruling oligarchies."⁶⁹ Che Guevara, with his in-depth analysis, already foresaw the struggles that were coming with the majority participation of the native populations of Rhodesia and South Africa. The new era in Africa was approaching.

Against Portuguese Colonialism in Guinea Bissau

Guinea Bissau is not a member of SADC. However, the struggle in this country and the aid that the Republic of Guinea (Conakry) and Cuba provided to achieve the liberation of the former was also indirectly relevant to the subsequent

⁶⁸ Speech by Army General Raúl Castro. Work Cited.

⁶⁹ Message to the peoples of the world through the Tricontinental. Ernesto Che Guevara *Works 1957-1967*. Ediciones Casa de las Américas 1977. p. 591.

independence of other Southern African nations. Sekou Touré's government, in spite of the risks it ran, opened its territory and borders to Cuban instructors, combatants and internationalist doctors who, since 1966, had been collaborating with the African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), under the leadership of the great Amilcar Cabral.

The PAIGC, founded in September 1956, started the armed struggle against Portuguese colonialism on 23 January 1963, with the attack on the Tite barracks. In August 1964, the Party requested the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in Conakry to provide assistance, so that five of its members would receive political and military training for a period of 6 months.

Che Guevara met Amilcar in Conakry, on January 12, 1965, and a request was made by the PAIGC leader in respect of Cuban instructors to be sent to his country. It should be recalled that while in Brazzaville, Che Guevara had received similar requests from Massemba Debat and Agostinho Neto. Cuba started recruiting volunteers for international cooperation, during the same month. The following year, in January 1966, Amilcar participated in the Tricontinental Conference in Havana and held long meeting with Fidel.

The first Cuban outpost, made up of three gunners and two doctors, arrived in Conakry, on April 29, 1966, and was reinforced on June 6 with 25 other companions. During that period and subsequent years, internationalists continued to arrive in Bissau, while dozens of Guineans were trained in Cuba. The combats against the colonialists took place constantly as well as the attacks against the barracks of Empada, Valare, Enralé, Olossato, Buba, Binta, Maro, Ganholha, Cufar, Mansoa, Sao Domingo, Guidage, Gamadel, Cameconde, Ganture, Madina de Boe and others.

In addition to the ship *Uvero*, other Cuban ships, such as the *Andrés González Lines*, the *Pinar del Rio* and *Conrado Benitez*, transported men, weapons, medicines, food and supplies for the PAIGC. In 1967, three schools for military improvement were set up in Guinea Bissau, under the direction of Cuban instructors. There was a small hospital for guerrillas in Boke (Guinea Conakry), and it was decided to establish nursing school.

The PAIGC did not stop the armed struggle despite the assassination of Amilcar Cabral on January 20, 1973, and Cuba continued to lend its internationalist support and aid with full intensity.

The Portuguese forces were completely exhausted and after the Carnation Revolution in April 1974, Portugal recognized the independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, in September of the same year, ending 528 years of colonization. On September 15, Cuban officer, Pedro Rodriguez Peralta, who had been detained in Portugal since he was seriously wounded in combat in 1969, was released.

In its report, the Ministry of the Armed Forces registered 682 combatants in Guinea-Bissau of all specializations, including doctors and nurses, and they cooperated internationally in those years. Nine Cubans offered their lives to that country, several of them died in combat against the enemy.⁷⁰

There is no doubt that the defeats caused to the Portuguese by the brave Guinean guerrillas, with the modest Cuba contribution, weakened the old colonial system, coupled with the Revolution of the Carnations, in April 1974, opened the

⁷⁰ Chronology of Cuban aid to Guinea Bissau. Defence Information Centre Archive (CID-FAR).

doors for the independence of Guinea Bissau, and the following year those of Angola and Mozambique (where wars of liberation were successfully carried out).

A military school run by Cuban advisers also operated in Guinea Conakry, in Quindia province, on the way from the capital to Boké. It was previously coordinated together with Sekou Touré's government. The aim of the school was to train fighters of the National Liberation Movements originating from African and other English-speaking Countries. According to Luis Delgado, first secretary of the Cuban embassy in Conakry, from 1966 to 1969, and Erasmo Vidaux, a combatant and later one of the heads of the Cuban Military Mission in the UK (1968-1969) stated, in their testimonies, that hundreds of combatants from Namibia, Ghana and other nations were trained in Quindia. The classes were taught by seven Cuban teachers who were part of the advisors of the Guinea militia school. At the beginning of the 1970s, the facility underwent many improvements and became an institution for the preparation of guerrilla cadres.⁷¹

Face to face with South Africans and Zairians

Cuban troops inflicted heavy blows on the regular forces of Pretoria during the years 1975-1976 and 1987-1988, which contributed to preserve Angola's independence, as well as opened the doors to Zimbabwe's and Namibia's independence and accelerated the collapse of the structures in which apartheid was sustained.

It is truly incredible that, over three decades, such a small country, like Cuba, economically blocked by the United States, having old planes, a modest merchant navy and only respecting its internationalist principles, had transported more than 300,000 men as well as huge volumes of equipment and armaments, to a distance greater than that existing between Cuba and Moscow. To reach Luanda in the old Britannia planes, the trip would take 14 hours, with two stopovers for refuelling.

It should be recalled that Cuba strengthened its relations with the Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in January 1965, when Commander Ernesto Che Guevara made his extensive tour to several African countries, an opportunity he took to meet Agostinho Neto, in Congo Brazzaville.

The outstanding Angolan leader asked Che Guevara to send six instructors for a period of six months to train and fight alongside the MPLA guerrillas in the Second Front of Cabinda. The request was met in May of that year, when Cuban instructors joined the vanguard group of the Patrice Lumumba Battalion, which was located in the Congo Brazzaville.

Neto and his military commander, Hoyi Ya Henda, met with Commander in Chief Fidel Castro during their visit to Cuba, in January 1966. At Neto's request, Cuba offered the necessary and possible assistance to intensify the struggle against Portuguese colonialism, including the training of military cadres in Cuba, and of columns both on the Island and in Congo Brazzaville (as explained above).

Cuba and MPLA cooperation was expressed in 1966-1967 with the revival of the Second Front of Cabinda and the First Front north of Luanda as well as the opening of a third Front on Angola's border with Zambia. It is worth mentioning the opening of a second chapter of this solidarity, in 1974, during the visit to the

⁷¹ Interviews with Luis Delgado and Erasmo Vidaux, conducted by the author on 23 March 2009. Author's file.

Island of a delegation of the liberation movement that participated in the celebrations for July 26⁷²

The delegation carried a message from Neto asking the Cuban government for economic aid, military training and delivery of weapons. In October, the Cuban ambassador in Dar es Salaam informed Havana that Neto was urgently requesting five Cuban advisors to help organize the FAPLA.⁷³

Following consultation with Neto, the Cuban government sent, at the end of December, Carlos Cadelo and officer Alfonso Pérez Morales (known as Pina and who had had an outstanding participation with the guerrillas of Guinea Bissau) to better appreciate the situation in Angola. Cadelo and Pina arrived in Dar es Salaam and met with Neto during the same month.

MPLA prepared documents for the envoys to travel clandestinely to the Angolan border via Lusaka. They arrived in Luanda in a truck loaded of Angolan refugees returning to their country. The envoys met with several military commands, and after returning to Dar es Salaam they spoke again with Neto who asked them to communicate to the Cuban government several requests, namely for arms, finance and weapons.⁷⁴

The Cubans envoys returned to Havana at the end of March 1975.

MPLA, UNITA and FNLA

The MPLA stood out, in 1974, as the only legitimate Angolan nationalist movement that faced the ambitions of two groups supported by the United States, South Africa and Zaire: the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) headed by Holden Roberto, the collaborator of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the National Union for the Independence of Angola (UNITA) led by Jonas Savimbi, collaborator of the Portuguese secret services, and later of the CIA and the racist South Africa.

Following the Carnation revolution in Portugal⁷⁵, the Alvor agreements were signed on 15 January 1975, after six days of negotiations between the government of Lisbon, MPLA, UNITA and FNLA, with the objective to organize the decolonization process of that African country.

It was agreed to set the date of November 11, 1975 as the date for independence. But before that, the FNLA began to launch strong attacks against the MPLA. By July 1975, an MPLA counteroffensive pushed the FNLA forces out of Luanda.

The FNLA, which maintained traditional and close relations with the regime of

⁷² On July 26, 1953, a group of men under the command of Fidel Castro attacked the fortress of Moncada, in the eastern province of Santiago de Cuba and that day is considered the beginning of the armed struggle against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista.

⁷³ Interviews conducted by Piero Gleijeses with Carlos Cadelo, who served Angola in the Central Committee of the Party, and with Héctor Ramos Latour, former Cuban ambassador to Tanzania. Piero Gleijeses, quoted work, p.385.

⁷⁴ Report of the visit to Angola. Carlos Cadelo and Alfonso Pérez. CID-FAR file. pp. 27-31.

⁷⁵ It is a Political movement that ended a long military dictatorship in Portugal. It was triggered on April 25, 1974 in the ranks of the Army and was supported by the majority of the Portuguese. The people offered carnations to the soldiers and the latter placed them in the barrels of their rifles.

Mobutu Sese Seko, also enjoyed the support of the RSA and the United States in July and August. The United States sent weapons and supplies to Kinshasa which were transported to Angola by South African aircrafts. Two dozen of officers, specialists and artillerymen from Pretoria flew to Kinshasa with heavy weapons to join the FNLA troops who would fight against Luanda.

In August, two Zairian infantry battalions joined the FNLA to launch the offensive in northern Angola, while South African troops penetrated the south on Aug. 9 and seized the Calueque and Ruacana dams, 30 kilometres inside Angolan territory. The U.S. government entered the conflict in July 1975, when President Gerald Ford authorized \$24 million for the CIA's secret plan in Angola, known as IAFEATURE, to support Zairian, FNLA and UNITA troops against the MPLA.

Fifty Instructors at the end of September

At the beginning of August 1975, a Cuban mission headed by First Commander Raúl Díaz Argüelles arrived in Luanda where it was received by Neto, who requested that 100 advisors be sent to train the MPLA forces. After the talks, the mission returned to Havana. After considering the mission report, the Cuban government authorized the dispatch of a strong group of advisors who would train thousands of Angolans over a six-month period.

On twentieth of August, Díaz Argüelles travelled to Luanda to inform Neto that instead of the 100 men requested, Cuba was willing to send many more: 480 for the Revolutionary Instruction Centres (CIR), whose number had risen to four, in addition to the group that would remain in Luanda, and that he would serve as head of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola (MMCA Spanish acronym). Neto and his collaborators immediately gave their green light for the offer.

By the end of September, about 50 members of the MMCA had arrived in Angola. Two Cuban planes transported a total of 142 instructors to Angola on the first and third of October, while between September 16 and 20, the vessels Vietnam, La Plata and Coral Island sailed from the port of Havana with almost 300 men with equipment and supplies for the four groups of instructors to be established in Cabinda, N'Dalatando, Benguela and Saurimo, and for the operative group that was the head of the Military Mission in Luanda.

On October 5 and October 8, the two vessels Vietnam and Coral Island arrived respectively, at an uninhabited beach, near Porto Amboim, while La Plata arrived at Punta Negra, Congo Brazzaville, on October 11. The CIRs were ready to start the projected work on the 20th of the same month.

The South African column Zulu had invaded the province of Benguela during the first two days of November, and in the vicinity of the town of Catengue faced two companies of Angolan students and 17 Cuban instructors reinforced with some artillery equipment. Faced with strong resistance, the aggressors retreated but turned around and in the afternoon attacked from the rear, forcing the defenders to move towards the city of Benguela. The invaders lost during these attacks four armoured and many of their troops were dead and others were wounded. The enemy never revealed the official figure of its casualties. Nearly two dozen Angolans lost their lives during this battle, while four were killed on the Cuban side, seven were injured and 13 disappeared. As Jorge Risquet put it, for the

first time Cuban and Angolan blood was spilled in combat.⁷⁶

Early South Africa Violation of Angolan Territory

On October 14, 1975, the apartheid regime carried a full and effective invasion when it carried out aggression against Angolan territory from occupied Namibia. Indeed, the Zulu column was advancing more than 60 kilometers per day and was destroying everything in its way. On October 19, it took the village of Pereira de Eca and Rocadas on the 20th. Faced with the real possibility that the MPLA would form a progressive government on November 11, Pretoria, with the blessing of the United States, invaded Angola with the aim of eliminating Agostinho Neto's movement in order to pave the way for a puppet regime with elements of the FNLA and UNITA.

The Zulu column was made up of more than 1,000 black Angolans who were FNLA guerrillas trained by Pretoria and members of Flechas, a special unit of Angolans, who had fought for the Portuguese regime, as well as Portuguese mercenaries and South African soldiers and officers.

Another group, known as Foxbat, was formed, by the end of October, consisting of 100 South African soldiers, 22 Eland-90 armoured vehicles and other war materials which were transported by South African aircrafts to Silva Porto, Savimbi's headquarters in central Angola, and which integrated UNITA members trained by racists in the same locality. South African material and human reinforcements began to arrive, within a few days, for Foxbat. It was estimated that more than 1 000 South Africans had invaded Angolan territory, at that time, and their numbers had increased rapidly.

The Prime Minister Vorster approved in late September 1974, the Savannah Operation which included four phases. The first three sought to eliminate the FAPLA from the border area; the southwestern and central regions. Phase 4 provided for full control of Luanda, the final military target.⁷⁷

These forces had taken over the city and port of Mozamedes, On October 28, which were guarded by 150 Portuguese paratroopers, who raised a white flag when they saw the South Africans. After threats from the commander Colonel Koos van Hereden of the Zulu column, they abandoned their position and left in a ship bound for Luanda. Everything was ready for the final attack on the Angolan capital. the FNLA and the Zairians were north of Quifangondo, but the Ninth Brigade of the FAPLA (the only one they had and its name was to mislead the enemy), which had been trained urgently in the former Soviet Union, launched, on September 4, a counterattack. The aggressors withdrew more than 90 kilometers from Luanda, leaving in the stamped boxes bullets and U.S.-made military equipment. The Brigade repelled another FNLA attack in Morro de Cal, five kilometres from Quifangondo on the 26th of the same month.

FNLA attacked Morro de Cal with 3 500 men, including 1 200 Zairians, on 23

⁷⁶ Jorge Risquet Valdés, "Discurso pronunciado en el ICAP con motivo el XXX Aniversario de la Independencia de Angola", May 2005. Archives of the CC of the PCC.

⁷⁷ Deon Geldenhuys, *Diplomacy of Isolation*, p.80, quoted by Piero Gleijeses in *Misiones*, p. 348.

October. The Angolans together with 40 newly arrived Cuban instructors from the Revolutionary Instruction Centre (CIR) of N'Dalatando confronted the enemy but before the superiority of numbers and armaments, they retreated to Quifangondo., They repelled another attack in that locality, on November 6.

Carlota, the Heroine Slave

Cuba, aware of the powerful South African-Zairean invasion, and at the request of the MPLA, decided during a meeting held November 4 and 5, under the chairmanship of President Fidel Castro, to send units of special troops to face the aggression, and thus began the famous Operation Carlota⁷⁸ composed, firstly, of around 650 men from the Special Troops of the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) and an artillery regiment of the Revolutionary Armed Forces that would reinforce the instructors.

It goes without saying that the authorities and the Western capitalist countries media tried to make the international public believe that this had been an act imposed on Cuba by the former Soviet Union. But several researchers and declassified documents in Cuba showed clearly that the USSR, the GDR and even the United States refuted such allegations⁷⁹.

Writer and journalist Gabriel García Márquez stated that Cuba was "sure of having the solidarity and assistance (material aid) of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, but also understood the implications that such action could entail for the USSR's policy of international détente and peaceful coexistence. It was a decision with irreversible consequences, and a problem too big and complex to solve in 24 hours. In any case, the leadership of the Cuban Communist Party did not have more than 24 hours to decide, and agreed on the course of action without hesitation in a long and serene meeting. It was an independent and sovereign act of Cuba, and it was after and not before taking the decision that the corresponding notification was made to the Soviet Union."⁸⁰

The first company of the reinforced battalion of MININT special troops arrived in Luanda by air on November 9, supported by 82 mm mortar squads, along with anti-tank equipment. After participating in the actions of Quifangondo, it left on November 11 for the South Front to face a much stronger and more dangerous enemy. The reinforcement arrived in the old Britannia planes of Cubana de Aviación (they had to make two stopovers for refuelling) conducted by courageous Cuban pilots. By ship, an artillery regiment of the FAR moved towards the place. Due to the urgency of the situation, trips were increased until they became a long convoy of merchant ships carrying armaments and men in sufficient number to face the invaders and liberate the entire Angolan territory.

Quifangondo is saved

⁷⁸ It was called Operation Charlotte in homage and remembrance of the black African of the same name that on November 5, 1843, died martyred in captivity after rising with a group of slaves in the old Triunvirato sugar mill, in the Cuban provinces of Matanzas.

⁷⁹ For more information, consult the work *Misiones en Conflicto*, by Piero Gleijeses, pages 481 to 483.

⁸⁰ Gabriel García Márquez: "Operación Carlota", *Tricontinental* magazine. No 53, November 1977.

The aggressors prepared a powerful group composed of members of the FNLA, 120 Portuguese mercenaries, two infantry battalions and several armoured personnel from the regular Zairean's army, 25 advisors of the apartheid regime led by General Ben de Wet Roos, equipped with heavy cannons flown in from South Africa, and several CIA officers had tried their last attempt to seize Quifangondo on November 10, just one day before the announcement of independence. South Africa also supplied planes to explore the positions of the FAPLA and three bombers who attacked, that very day, the Angolan-Cuban positions without success.

It should be noted that three days earlier, on 7 November, six BM-21s (multiple rocket launchers), mortars and cannons had landed in the port of Luanda. These armaments were transported from the Soviet Union to Punta Negra (Congo) and from there, with Cuban ships, to the Angolan capital. They were immediately sent to Quifangondo for the operation of Cuban instructors who arrived by plane that same day.

The capital was saved, when the reactive artillery and other artillery equipment entered in combat. Hundreds of attackers were killed or injured while armoured vehicles and transport vehicles were destroyed. FNLA officially revealed the loss of 345 persons, excluding Zairians and mercenaries.

On September 8, 1975 the first Cuban doctor arrived by air in Angola to provide his internationalist services. He described what he saw on the ground as follows: "The enemy had concentrated in the area of Cacucaco, near Quifangondo where it had been detained. At the end of the day, I went to the location because our troops (25 Cubans and the large number of Angolans) had to pass through this area, to continue the offensive towards the north, and it was necessary for me, as a doctor, to clean up the place. What I found was a real cemetery. The scene was horrible; big number of bodies inflated, floating on the river. I had the mission to clean quickly the whole area because otherwise the troops could not pass through that area"⁸¹

General Roos ordered the artillerymen to retreat, and later a South African frigate removed them from Angola through the port of Ambrizete.

The combined FNLA, Zairian, mercenary and South African forces registered their first major disaster. Faced with the uncontrollable situation of war, the Portuguese admiral Leonel Cardoso, who remained at the head of government of his country in the African nation, announced, on November 10, that, on behalf of the president of the Metropolis, sovereignty was transferred to the Angolan people (he did not mention the MPLA or another organization). At 6p.m the Portuguese flag was lowered to leave with the rest of the troops to Lisbon. The Portuguese abandoned their colony to free will.

At midnight on November 11, Neto announced to the world the independence of the former colony and the birth of the People's Republic of Angola.

The FNLA aggressors, Zairians, white mercenaries and South African advisors were stunned and terrified by the defeat of Quifangondo, and on December 5 the North Front went on the offensive. In the first days of January, the Angolan-Cuban

⁸¹ Interview with retired lieutenant colonel Dr. Abigail Dambai Torres. Hedelberto López Blanch. "Secret Stories of Cuban Doctors." La Memoria Editions. Pablo de la Torriente Brau Cultural Center. Havana, 2005.

forces, in unabated advance, liberated Caxito, Luenga, Camabatela, Negage and Carmona. On February 26, they reached the border with Zaire.

The Heroic Defence of Cabinda

The Cuban command was expecting that the greatest danger, at the time, would come from the Zairian army and the members of the Cabinda Enclave Liberation Front (FLEC) to try to take possession of this strategic and rich region where large oilfields were located. Hence, he took the decision to reinforce the CIR with nearly 200 men, the largest of the Training Centres.

It was noted before November 11, an unusual movement of regular troops from Zaire and the FLEC that gathered forces trained in Zairean bases established in Quitona, Techela and which would be joined by foreign mercenaries sent by the notorious French Bob Denard, who had directed with great fury the repression and killings of civilians and simba rebels in Congo. It should be noted the involvement of the United States in this attack by sending also weapons to Mobutu Sese Seko for incursion and subsequent control of Cabinda. Four FAPLA battalions were to be trained, but only one could hardly be formed and fought with great courage against the invaders. Attacks against positions protected by 1,000 FAPLA and 232 Cubans began on November 8. The defenders resisted the attacks and went on the offensive on November 12. During the numerous clashes that took place, more than 1,600 FLEC men, led by 150 mercenaries, plus a Zaire battalion, with some 200 men supported by tanks, were put out of action.⁸² The remnants of the invading forces, completely decimated and demoralized, crossed the border and fled into Zaire.

Southward Offensive

From November 10th, the strong Zulu column advanced, towards the South Front, from Lobito to Novo Redondo, with the intention of quickly entering Luanda. On November 11, Cuban instructors from CIR Benguela together with the FAPLA ambushed them, 24 kilometres south of Novo Redondo, causing several casualties which momentarily stopped their advance while the defenders withdrew to Novo Redondo. Strong combats took place in this city, until Zulu column managed to occupy it on the 13th, after the withdrawal of Angolans and Cubans.

The Queve River, which flows between the cities of Novo Redondo and Porto Amboim, was the place chosen to try to stop the Zulu column advance.

Finding the bridges destroyed, the South Africans left a small part of their forces in Novo Redondo and the group headed east in search of routes to Luanda.

Foxbat, another South African contingent, advanced from Silva Porto, occupied Cela, south of Quibala, near the road leading to Luanda. The group was supplied from Namibia through the Portuguese airport that existed in Cela and reinforced by the Zulu column. Ebo and Hengo were also occupied. Just six kilometers from Ebo, Foxbat was trying to reach Gabela via one of the embankments, Cuban officer René Hernández Gattorno, under the command of First Commander Raúl Díaz Argüelles, organized on November 23, a strategic ambush on a small bridge

⁸² José M. Ortiz. *An April like Girón*. Political Editor. Havana, 1980. p. 51.

leading to the Mabassa River.

A demolishing blow of reactive artillery and anti-tank destroyed the enemy 8 armored vehicles (?). The South African contingent suffered more than 30 dead people, and 60 wounded, according to their own sources. On their side, the Cubans had one dead and five wounded in the clashes, while the FAPLA did not get to fight because they were on the second rung.

The battle, known as Ebo's South African setback, marked a milestone in the war as it demoralized South African racist troops more than ever before, in the hundreds of years. They had not suffered such a violent disaster since the day they were invading the territories of southern Africa. "The war was decided in Ebo. It would have been very difficult to stop the enemy if he broke that line, very difficult to stop his advance in the direction to Luanda. That's why the battle of Ebo is so important. The enemy was stopped there, the enemy was defeated. It was a battle where the First Commander Argüelles demonstrated his great capacity of a leader".⁸³

At the beginning of December, the South Africans directed the offensive towards Santa Comba - Casamba - Catofe - Quibala and managed to seize the strategic Morros de Tongo, from where they launched, on 9, 10, 11 and 12 December, thousands of projectiles against the well-fortified Angolan-Cuban forces that were on the banks of the Nhia River. The South Africans were chased from the Morros of Tongo thanks to a strong FAPLA offensive. Cuban forces lost First Commander Diaz Argüelles, on December 10, due to a fatal accident. He was in his exploration vehicle The BRDM-2 travelling from Bimbe to the village of Calengo and exploded on a landmine. He died on the spot. Argüelles was posthumously promoted to Brigadier General.

Pretoria's troops, faced with the resistance, moved further east and took the villages of Cariango, Gungo and Tari and threatened the important road from Quibala to Dondo. The enemy was stopped along the rivers Longa and Pombuige, following further clashes. Another South African special force made up of 370 men, supported by UNITA troops, have occupied Luso, a strategic place located on the railway line that leads to Benguela and whose purpose was to control the line from Luso to Zaire, but they did not succeed as they were stopped halfway.

South African Prisoners

FAPLA presented, on 16 December, to the international media, four South African prisoners of war who had been captured. They were apprehended on December 13 when they were travelling in a truck along the route between Catofe and Quibala. The prisoners confessed, in front of the press, that many members of the South African regular army, equipped with modern light and heavy weapons, were participating in the direct aggression against the Angolan people. The prisoners were taken to Addis Ababa for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) Summit. Two of them were flown to Lagos, Nigeria, and presented to the press. The propagandistic coup bore fruit because when the racist invasion against Angola was

⁸³ Pedro Pablo Aguilera González: Testimony of Lucio Lara, First Secretary of the Assembly of the Angolan People. Olive Green in Internationalist Mission. Angola, 10 December 1987.

confirmed, several African countries understood the gravity of situation for the continent created by Pretoria. Two days after the conclusion of the Summit, the OAU recognized the RPA.

The Angolan-Cuban Counteroffensive

The Angolan-Cuban counteroffensive had yielded tremendous results in stopping the advances of racist troops. With the near stabilization of the Southern Front, the FAPLA went on the offensive, with the support of the continued arrival of Cuban troops, whose number, at that time, was close to 4,000. They launched a powerful artillery attack on 26 December, from Sanga, Mussende and Cambumbo to lock South African forces in Cariango. A Cuban-Angolan column attacked on January 6, a battalion composed of South Africans and UNITA, killing nearly 30 people, most of them white. In the village of Gungo, about 70 kilometres from Coerama, three more South African soldiers were captured.

The Cuban-Angolan forces liberated the city of Huambo, on February 8, 1976. Other cities followed such as Lobito and Benguela, on the 10th; Sá de Bandeira, on the 16th and Mozamedes on the 17th. Reinforcements - around 30,000 men, with heavy artillery, armour and aviation - continued to arrive from Havana. Defence Minister, P. W. Botha, announced on March 25, to the White Parliament that the government had decided to pull out all its troops from Angola on Saturday, March 27, 1976. About 3,000 South African soldiers and 60 military vehicles that controlled the area of the dam on the Cunene River and in Ruacaná, withdrew from Angolan territory.

Cuban-Angolan troops arrived at the border post on 30 March, and a meeting was held with a South African delegation on 1 April. The First Commander (Cuban ranks at the time) Leopoldo Cintra Frias (Polo) signed, on behalf of the MPLA, with the South African military the agreement that aimed to establish respect for the borders violated by Pretoria. The Agreement put an end to the first frontal war of Cuban-Angolan troops against the hitherto invincible racist South African forces.

An invincible barrier

The Army General Rail Castro Ruz held a meeting with President Agostinho Neto, on April 23, 1976, in Luanda, and they had agreed that the Cuban forces would gradually withdraw within a period of three years, considering that this would be a prudent time necessary to form a modern Angolan army, strong and capable of maintaining the integrity of the country. Unfortunately, after the victory, the climate of peace lasted only a few months. During the first years after the war, the contingent of more than 20,000 Cuban internationalist combatants, deployed in a line of about 700 kilometres from Mozamedes on the Atlantic coast to Menongue, more than 270 kilometres from the border with Namibia, constituted an invincible barrier to prevent a new South African invasion in the depths of Angola. This did not dissuade the racist troops, in the south, to carry out persecution actions against South West African People Organization (SWAPO) commandos and FAPLA units.

FAR Minister, General Raúl Castro, spoke with the eight South African military captured inside Angolan territory in June 1977, during a visit to Angola. In

September 1978, these prisoners were exchanged for three Cuban combatants captured by South Africa.

Five contingents of Cuban teachers arrived in Angola, among them 2,026 young people, with the aim of teaching hundreds of thousands of people to read and write, as part of the project to contribute to the rapid education of the Angolan people, from September 1978 and for several years to come. These boys integrated the well-known Internationalist Pedagogical Detachments Ernesto Che Guevara that defying dangers and facing difficult conditions, took the teaching to the most remote areas of the Angolan territory. More than 500 Cuban primary school teachers also participated in the project.

The Cassinga Massacre

On the morning of May 4, 1978, the Cassinga camp harbouring 3,068 Namibian refugees, located 250 kilometres from the border, inside Angolan territory, suffered a heavy bombardment, followed immediately with more than 500 South African paratroopers launched from U.S.-manufactured C-130 Hercules. The massacre was enormous. It was difficult to reach the Cuban troops located in Chamutete, at 15 kilometres from the place, due to landmines and the bombardments by the South African air force. These actions caused 16 deaths and 76 wounded. But, with the arrival of the Cubans, the South Africans quickly fled in helicopters. The internationalists found a desolation scene in Cassinga where more than 600 bodies were scattered and piled up everywhere, including pregnant women, elderly persons and around 300 children.

However, nearly 350 wounded Namibians whom the racists did not have time to finish off were saved thanks to the arrival of the troops, and rescued also hundreds of refugees who escaped into the nearby mountains and rivers. Many of the wounded were taken to Luanda and Havana for treatment and soon after, hundreds of young survivors arrived in Cuba to study in schools on the Isle of Youth.

"I arrived in Cuba with a gunshot wound to the leg. Since we only knew bad apartheid whites, at first we thought they had sold us to other whites. But here they cured me, they gave us cloths, fed us, educated us and above all they gave us love and affection. When the Cubans went to Africa to help in the liberation of the continent, they did not think about the dangers or the difficulties they would face, nothing stopped them. They played a pivotal role in the Namibia's independence. Their heroic blood was mixed with that of our people. We are going to be eternally grateful to Cubans, not just for helping us getting our independence, but also because of the knowledge we have acquired here, in Cuba, as engineers, doctors, economists or diplomats."⁸⁴

One of the main reasons for these attacks was that "Angola became a bastion of freedom in the Southern Cone of Africa. Twenty thousand guerrillas were trained there with the collaboration of the FAPLA, FAR, and the Armed Forces of the

⁸⁴ Interview of the author with Claudia Grace Uushona, survivor of the Cassinga massacre and Namibian ambassador to Cuba. Author's file

USSR."⁸⁵ And only during the period from 1984 to 1986, more than 60,000 Angolan soldiers were trained in centres created for that purpose and in the Cuban regular units.⁸⁶

Other Insidious Attacks

In early April 1977, everything went smoothly at the Zimbabwean combatant training camp in Boma, located at 30 kilometres east of Luso. 6,200 students were graduated in that school. Four Canberra planes and three Mirage planes bombarded the camp on 25 February 1979, at 7.15 a.m. 1 552 students were present at that time. The toll was 207 dead and 553 injured. Six Cubans lost their lives and 13 others were injured.⁸⁷

A South African air strike targeted, in mid-April of that year, a school located in Novo Catengue where Cuban instructors were training South African ANC fighters. The attack resulted in three deaths and eight injured. One Cuban was among the deceased.

An unidentified group ambushed a Zil 130 truck and a Waz 469 jeep On February 4, 1981, along the Lobito-Balombo-Huambo itinerary. The attack occurred at kilometre 9 of the town of Balombo to Huambo. Six Cubans perished and two were injured.

A strong Angolan-Cuban counter-offensive succeeded in August 1981, in stopping a South African offensive supported by planes, armoured vehicles and 15,000 troops, advanced 200 kilometres within the southern province of Cunene. The aggressions were steady and became more and more powerful.

Heroism in Cangamba and Sumbe

At the end of July 1983, the village of Cangamba, where a group made up of 818 Angolans and 92 Cuban advisors resisted all enemy operations was attacked by UNITA, after consolidating logistical support bases in the region of Cuando Cubango, and involving 6,000 troops grouped in 16 irregular battalions equipped with six artillery batteries, 60, 81 and 120 mm mortars and ground air rockets, attacked, at the end of July 1983, the village of Cangamba, where a group made up of 818 Angolans and 92 Cuban advisors resisted all enemy operations. From the rear base, South African troops were commanding and arming UNITA. In addition, expert pilots were informing UNITA, from the air, about everything that was happening on the ground. The defenders were reduced to a field, the size of a football pitch, where constant bombardments continued. They managed to resist all the attacks without giving up. The battles were practically hand-to-hand. Cuban aviation played an important role. After an 11-day siege, the enemy had to retreat, leaving more than 2,000 dead in the field. Eighteen Cubans died and 60 were injured. The Angolan casualties were greater. But once again, Cubans and Angolans gave their blood for

⁸⁵ Jorge Risquet Valdés. *Cuba and Africa, a common history of struggle and blood*. Editorial Ciencias Sociales, Havana, 2007. p. 98

⁸⁶ Report on the preparation of Angolan troops. CID-FAR file. File 3101.

⁸⁷ CID-FAR file. Files 1040 and 3002.

the sake of preserving the independence of the African country. Cuban troops and even civilian personnel had to face and repel many attacks and ambushes by the enemy.

In March 1984, the enemy carried out, with the participation of 1,500 UNITAS, another attack against the city of Sumbe, capital of the province of Kwanza Sur (where there was no Cuban or Angolan troops) with the aim of controlling the city and kidnapping hundreds of foreign staff. Cuban aid workers in health, education and construction (230 including 43 women) and Angolan civilians resisted the attacks for nine hours. There were no FAR or FAPLA bases in that area. The defenders held on with their rifles until the Cuban air force based in Huambo intervened. During the attack, seven Cuban civilians perished who, together with the Angolan people, knew how to stop the enemy until he was defeated.

Cuito Cuanavale

In 1985, FAPLA decided, as a precedent to the actions in Cuito Cuanavale, and only with Soviet military advice, to carry out an operation against UNITA to recover the town of Mavinga, located in the depths of the Angolan south. The source of supply and training of UNITA's troops were on the borders with Namibia, while the Angolans were far from Menongue, which made it difficult for them to have a safe rear-guard. When the Angolan forces entered further south, Pretoria helped its allies with artillery, aviation and the Buffalo Battalion, including mercenaries' participation under South Africa's umbrella.

The FAPLA, after fighting against UNITA, were stopped by the South African offensive a few kilometres from Mavinga that lasted 10 days and caused many casualties to the Angolans, who had to retreat to the town of Cuito Cuanavale.

Again under the advice of Soviet officials, the Angolans began Operation Greeting October to occupy the UNITA bases in Mavinga, on the border with Namibia, in July 1987. But the remoteness, the isolation from the region and the South African incursion that launched Operation Moduler with around 5,000 men, were the reason for the failure of the operation. The Angolans lost many fighters. Cuito Cuanavale was 200 kilometres southeast of Menongue, the last point of the Cuban line, and from there to Mavinga there was a distance of more than 250 kilometres, which made it impossible for the Cuban forces to offer any help to FAPLA.

The Cuban leadership had repeatedly stated that, if this operation was carried out, the forces would be separated from their supply lines and, in their prolonged advance, men and equipment would be reduced in terms of capacity and efficiency, enabling the enemy to obtain better results.

After the Cuban-Angolan victory in 1976, it had been agreed that the Soviet Union would provide the RPA with modern weapons and that its personnel would advise the Angolan Chief of Staff, as well as its main units. Cuba would advise the light brigades of the FAPLA and form their officers and combatants. The main task of the Cuban forces would be to maintain a defensive line in the south to prevent a deep penetration of racist troops.

In a speech, Fidel Castro stated: «We say to the Soviets: If you want to advise the Angolans about these offensives, you have to forbid South Africa to intervene (...) we told you again and again for three, four or five years, until at some point a

serious military crisis breaks out. The advisers (...) believed that they were fighting the battle of Berlin, with Zhukov at the front, which had thousands of tanks, with 40,000 guns. They did not understand and could not understand the problems of the Third World, the scenario of struggle and the kind of war that must be waged in that scenario."⁸⁸

The South Africans not only attacked the Angolan troops, but also tried their best, on that occasion, after a possible success in this confrontation, to weaken and practically destabilize the government of the Republic of Angola.

Meanwhile, Angolan President José Eduardo Dos Santos requested the assistance of the Cuban government in order to try to reverse the situation in the south. The Cuban government took the decision, on November 15, 1987, to reinforce the troops and to help in solving the serious problem that had been created. "Another thing that would have led to the possible elimination of the best grouping of Angolan troops; the consequences would have been unpredictable for the survival of the People's Republic of Angola; it could even have created a complicated situation for our troops."⁸⁹

It is against this background that the XXXI Anniversary Manoeuvre of the FAR began and its first mission, on November 23rd, was to transfer, by sea and air, thousands of men, hundreds of tanks, artillery equipment and dozens of airplanes that would complete a force of more than 50,000 men in Angola.

Cuba was making a big sacrifice because the United States did not stop, at that time, their threats against the island, under the administration of the ultra-conservative Ronald Reagan. The territorial integrity of Cuba was defended by its people grouped in different militias, and the rest of the armament and military forces that did not leave for Angola.

"From mid-November 1987 until the end of 1988, we did not take care of the government; we dedicated all our time to that struggle, to that war.

It could not be otherwise, we had to take responsibility for what was happening over there. The Revolution was even threatened there, because if apartheid was being played there, in a decisive battle and in a defeat of great proportions, the Revolution was also being at stake, which would have meant for the Revolution a defeat of great proportions, no matter how noble, and no matter how just, and no matter how altruistic is our cause."⁹⁰

Under the cover of Mig-21 and Mig 23, an outpost of advisors, artillery technical personnel, tanks and other Cuban weapons headed for Cuito Cuanavale, while South African and UNITA troops during the so-called Operation Hooper (started December 15, 1987) continued the constant bombing of Cuito.

Several Migs took off on 13 January, from Menongue, destroying 7 Olifant tanks, several Elands armoured vehicles and other vehicles together with the artillery. Grouping of tanks and infantry were discovered on January 16 and

⁸⁸ Fidel Castro: "Speech delivered at Mandela Park in Kingston, Jamaica on July 30, 1998, Granma August 7, 1998.

⁸⁹ Fidel Castro. *Vindication of Cuba*. Editora Política, Havana, 1989, p. 407.

⁹⁰ Fidel Castro. *Vindication of Cuba*. p. 408.

another blow was given to the enemy, by two Mig-23ML, during an exploration mission. They attacked them after receiving the reinforcement of six other Mig-23ML. The invader's losses were many.

It took one month for the enemy to recover forces, after the first failures. On February 14 the South African undertook a great attack, including three battalions of the SADF and six of the UNITA and more than 100 armoured that manage to break the defence to the east of the Cuito River. At the end, they had to withdraw with great losses. Mirage F1 SAAF-245 belonging to Major Edward R. Every (South Africa) was knocked down on 20 February, The Cuban Military Command reorganized the defence lines under the orders of General Leopoldo Cintra Frias, and with great effort it managed to move the majority of the forces towards the west zone, while maintaining a brigade heavily fortified to the east of the River, in addition to a staggered defence lines and tanks available in the rear-guard.

The latest South African attacks on the Cuito-Cuanavale front took place on 25 February, 1 March and 21-23 March, but their troops were repelled, in all cases, with heavy losses.

According to radio communications monitored from the Cuban side, the SADF lost 20 peoples and 59 other were wounded in the combat of March 1. In addition, the Cuban-Angolan aviation begun to dominate the skies, organized its own source of information and warning against the enemy. "The Migs were the big problem in Angola. We couldn't use anything against them and the FAPLA had air superiority. When the Migs were in the air, the war stopped. The G5 and multiple rocket launchers had to be used carefully when making fire on clear days, because the Migs can detect their positions and became an easy target."⁹¹

Towards the Namibian border

On March 10, the Cuban Command, which had in the south 40,000 Cuban soldiers, 30,000 Angolans and several thousand SWAPO fighters, began to advance towards the Namibian border, while the South Africans got bogged down in Cuito. The Cuban Command decided, on March 22, to transform Cahama's runway into operational readiness for combat aircraft. The construction ended in June with materials and equipment brought from Cuba.

According to intelligence reports, South Africa was studying the possibility of carrying out a massive air strike, and that that country had several atomic bombs. It was proposed to divide the forces into tactical groups, while maintaining, at all times, the maximum alert, protection of the troops and superior use of anti-aircraft equipment.

On May 4, occurred the first combat in the southwest direction, when an exploration company made up of 61 Cubans and 21 Angolans defeated, in an ambush, the Second Company of the 100 Battalion of the South West Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) and caused 30 casualties and one prisoner, as well as destruction of 5 Casspir and one captured. The company fled to the south but was intercepted by Mig-23ML that took off from Lubango and launched another resounding blow that caused great losses to the enemy. That grouping almost

⁹¹ Barry Fowler, "Pro Patria". United Kingdom: Sentinel Project, 1995.

ceased to exist. After the Cuban troops had advanced 200 kilometres and they were only 50 kilometres from the Namibian border, the operational theatre presented a different panorama in June.

From the beginning of their offensive, the South Africans were trying to give a strong blow to the Angolans so that they could make important concessions in the negotiations that took place with informal contacts between the United States and Angola. A meeting with the United States was held in July 1987, in Luanda.

Another meeting was held on September 7 and 8, with equally no results. Another meeting took place on January 28 and 29, 1988, where the Angolan side demanded Cuba's participation in the deliberations, under the item dealing with the withdrawal of troops, in addition to the item related to the cessation of U.S. support to UNITA. A Cuban delegation, led by Jorge Risquet, participated for the first time alongside with Angola, in discussions with United States, headed by Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa. Other tripartite meetings had taken place in Luanda, from 9 to 11 March and on 17 and 18 March, where Cuba proposed a comprehensive solution to the problem with the implementation of the UN resolution on Namibia and the withdrawal of units south of the 13th parallel towards the north. The South African-UNITA defeat in Cuito Cuanavale and the continued arrival of Cuban troops in southern Angola made Washington and Pretoria aware of the need to reach an agreement.

The first quadripartite meeting was held on May 3 and 4, with the interested parties, namely: Angola and Cuba, on the one hand; South Africa on the other; and the United States as mediator. Cuba stated that if South Africa would accept to implement fully Resolution 435, the meeting would have a purpose; otherwise it would be useless to continue with the meeting and be considered as over.

On their side, the South Africans confirmed their acceptance of the Resolution. It was also agreed that Pretoria would present a document at the next meeting, which was presented at the Cairo meeting on 24 and 25 June.

At this meeting, the document presented by the racists was unacceptable for their arrogance and requests; despite the fact that on the ground they had suffered heavy blows from the Cuban-Angolan-Namibian forces and that they were already very close to the border with Namibia. One day after the Cairo meeting, the South Africans who had displaced strong groups of troops towards the west to try to create the conditions for another Cuito Cuanavale, fired more than 200 cannon shots with their long-range artillery on Tchipa, where Cuban and Angolan troops were located. The Cuban authorities had given order from La Havana, to respond with strength to the enemy and to strike them in the camps and military installations of Calueque and its surroundings.

Cuban women were also represented in the collaboration with Angola and in the struggle against apartheid. Thousands of them worked as civilians and soldiers and in June 1988 a female contingent arrived in Luanda and returned to the Island in January 1989, after participating in the actions against the South African troops on the Southern Front. As artillery women they defended the Cahama airport, built with urgency by Cuban builders to give the final blows to the enemy.

Six Migs23ML took off from Lubango and two others from Cahama, on 27 June. The attack destroyed the head of the bridge along with the gates, the engine room

and the engines of the Calueque crane. The SADF had a camp at the base of the bridge that was bombed and one fell into the soldiers' barracks. Before leaving the place, a South African wrote in Afrikaans on a wall in Calueque: The Mig-23 broke our hearts.

The South Africans left completely the Angolan territory in August 1988.

This important military victory of Cuban-Angolan brought about a new and definitive turn to negotiations aimed at the search for peace in southwest Africa.

Several subsequent meetings were held in various cities around the world, and on December 22, at the United Nations headquarters in New York, the definitive agreements were signed that opened the doors to the implementation of Resolution 435/78 for the independence of Namibia, established the withdrawal of Cuban troops to parallels 15 and 13 and their complete withdrawal by July 1, 1991. On March 21, 1990, Namibia's decolonization process culminated in the triumph of SWAPO in the elections and the rise of Sam Nujoma as head of the nascent State, while the last Cuban fighters returned to the homeland on March 25, 1991, in other words 36 days before the deadline.

This had put an end to Carlota Operation, which began on 5 November 1975 and lasted for 15 years and 4 months. During that long period of time, more than 300,000 Cuban combatants volunteered their services in Angola, 2 077 perished in combat, in accidents or because of illness.

With its selfless internationalist assistance in favour of the African peoples, Cuba, had contributed to radical changes in the history of that continent that was taking steps towards the future eradication of the apartheid regime that occurred in April 1994 with the triumph of the ANC in South Africa's first multiracial elections and the accession to power of President Nelson Mandela.

From the early sixties to 1989, 2,289 Cubans gave their lives in military missions, and another 204 in civilian missions in Africa⁹². As Fidel and Raúl Castro stated in several speeches and interventions, "from Angola we will only take the bones of our heroes and martyrs".

Without Stopping

It is worth mentioning the outstanding role Cuba had played in supporting Liberation Movements and African nationalist governments during the decades of the sixties, seventies and eighties. Cuban's assistance and collaboration would not stop; rather it would expand in all areas. Special mention should be made of the unique case of the ANC and the South African Communist Party (SACP), with which Cuba extended its cooperation in fields that are in public domain today due to the recently declassified documents.

Cuba hosted from April 7 to 12, 1989, the VII clandestine Congress of the SACP following the request made by this important organization. Bearing in mind that at the time out of the 34 members of the ANC National Executive Committee, 27 were members of the SACP, it appeared that close links with the National Liberation Movement were strengthened with the holding of the above-mentioned Congress.

⁹² Total number of people killed during military and civilian missions as well as the causes of their death, Bohemia Magazine No.50, December 15, 1989, p.33

La Havana collaborated in the organization, transfer of the delegates from distant countries, and took in charge the food and accommodation of the participants. The Congress was held for six days in a remote area in the province of Matanzas, in the Yumirí Valley, with all the conditions. The delegates had also the opportunity to interact with leaders of the island. Everything was organized, prepared and held in strict secrecy, and not even the president of the former Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, who was visiting Cuba from April 3 to 5, learned that everything was ready to welcome the delegates attending the Congress.

The delegate Thenjiwe Mtintso told important anecdotes about that secret meeting. In 1989, she was head of the ANC unit in Uganda, and she was informed that she should move to Lusaka, Zambia, where she met several SACP militants, such as Ronald Kasrils, Azíz Pahad, Thabo Mbeki, John Nkadimeng, Joel Netshitenzhe, among others. "In Angola we were working very closely with the Cubans and their soldiers were our advisors in the struggle. The Congress was held after Cuito Cuanavale, so the excitement of reaching Cuba was very high. I think we landed at Jose Marti Airport, got into vehicles with dark windows and we were taken to a headquarters with facilities and a large swimming pool. It was a very beautiful place, and my room was upstairs. When I'm looking down, I see some men with dark glasses walking on the lawn, and one looked familiar. My emotion was great when I recognized my husband, Skenjana "Isaac" Roji, who was clandestinely inside South Africa and had not seen him for four years. "The organization was excellent. There were delegates representing the ANC in different countries and 12 who waged clandestine struggle within South Africa at times when it was impossible to leave the country. We all arrived clandestinely in Cuba and left the same way without any of us being subsequently arrested, including those who returned to South Africa to continue the fight, including my husband. This demonstrated the strict organization that exists between the two Communist Parties of Cuba and of South Africa."⁹³

A Top-Secret Military Collaboration

Military cooperation with the ANC and the SACP increased until the victory in April 1994 elections. Little or almost nothing has been known about the Cuban military advice and collaboration offered to South African patriots. Some facts are known about the training of South African personnel in Angola but not about those who were trained to go back to South Africa. In this regard, the Cuban Government had recently declassified several documents which contributed in clarifying an issue that remained in the strictest secrecy for years and which is briefly presented in this section.

Joe Slovo, secretary general of the SACP, and Joe Modise, chief military officer of the ANC, were most responsible for channelling the assistance on the South African side. Modise requested assistance from Cuban authorities during meetings held in Lusaka and Harare. Cuba, as expected, accepted to help in all aspects, as requested.

Jorge Risquet sent a letter on January 8, 1987, to the then Minister of the Interior of Cuba, Major General José Abrantes, in which he explained that "the preparation plan agreed with the ANC for its personnel is being completed by both parties. Now the

⁹³ Author's interview with South Africa's ambassador to Cuba, Thenjiwe Mtintso. 6-12-2005.

leadership of the Movement requests the continuity of the courses in similar numbers and diversity of specialties, which coincides with what was guided by comrade Raúl (Castro). Our comrades of the Special Troop have all the details⁹⁴.

A number of discussions were taking place in the course of that year, both in Havana and in Zambia. The requests included: "Continuity of military preparation by MININT in Cuba; Specialized collaboration in the senior management of the military wing for the preparation and execution of military actions against specific objectives, for which the designation of a DGOE man in Lusaka attached to the embassy is requested, and the request of some small arms weapons with their respective silencers, strippers tools, detonators, etc."⁹⁵

It is highlighted in a report on two meetings held in Lusaka and Harare that "Modise went beyond (the aid maintained until then) by suggesting the possibility of much closer collaboration consisting of advice on specific military operations.... Modise based his request on the imminent need to increase the activity and efficiency of the military actions of the Umkhonto We Sizwe (military wing of the ANC) in South Africa, since in spite of the rebellious situation in the country they have not yet managed to bring fear to the white population, who live quietly in their residential areas and hardly feel the heat of the struggle, which takes place in black, mulatto or Indian areas"⁹⁶.

The response of the Cuban side to Modise (accompanied by SACP member Msike Moloji) that they would submit these requests to the management, which included "training of their men in various specialties over the next three years as well as a request for urgent materials, including 1 000 strippers tools; 1 000 detonators; five guns with their silencers; assistance in setting up a small workshop for the manufacture of strippers tools (in Angola) and the training of personnel to work in it."⁹⁷

The Cuban embassy in Lusaka, Zambia, had sent a report, in November 1989, on Joe Slovo's visit to ratify a request for special weapons. In the interview, the Secretary General of the SACP stated that "given the political situation in South Africa and the need to rapidly increase the armed struggle as an important part that contributes to the triumph of the progressive forces and to respond to the popular demand, it is necessary to have the indispensable armament, among others: 10 R-1 (similar to the FAL used by the South African Armed Forces, two of these prepared for use by snipers, equipped with telescopes and if possible with night vision attachments), 20 R-4 (Galil), 10 G-3 with silencer, 20 mini Uzi or Ingram II with silencer, spare parts for delivered G-3 silencers, 20 calibre 38 barrel 3/4 or 1" revolvers with silencer, 20 Beretta 9 mm pistols with silencer, 10 Walter 32 calibre pistols with silencer, and all weapons with their ammunition modules."⁹⁸

The Cuban representatives held a meeting in May 1990, in Lusaka, with Chris

⁹⁴ Letter from Jorge Risquet to José Abrantes, 8-01-1987. Party Central Committee Archives.

⁹⁵ Idem. Communication from Jorge Risquet to José Abrantes. Document cited.

⁹⁶ Results of interviews with Joe Modise, military chief of the ANC, 8-06-1987. Party Central Committee Archives.

⁹⁷ Idem. Results of the interviews with Joe Modise. Document cited.

⁹⁸ Report of the Cuban Embassy in Lusaka, 21-11-1989. Party Central Committee Archives.

Hani, Chief of Staff of the ANC military wing, Timothy Makwena, Chief of Staff of the military wing and Rashik, Chief of Infiltration: "the ANC management asks officially for assistance in the training of officers for the future South African Armed Forces."⁹⁹

Hani stated, during the meeting, that Cuba meant a lot to the ANC and South Africa, and that the Caribbean Island was among the few friends the ANC had at the time. This explained the reason of his visit to Cuba, not only because of the high degree of technical and combative specialization, but also because of the ideological role that the personnel trained on the Island would play. In total, the request was to train 300 men for Battalion Leaders, Brigade Leaders and in 17 specialties: Special Forces, light, medium and heavy artillery, motorized infantry, tanks, military engineering, transport and logistics, communications, commissars, military intelligence, counterintelligence, military police, medical corps, radar and anti-aircraft defence, divers and pilots¹⁰⁰.

Another DGOE document detailed in July 1990 part of the armament delivered to the ANC during the years 1987, 1988 and 1989, as well as the number of South African personnel trained in different courses and the specialties. According to the report, in the three years mentioned above, 403 ANC combatants had been trained in Special Forces, Suburban Commands, Military Engineering, Explosives and Blasting, Homemade Weapons and Mines, Combat Swimming, Transmission and Reception, Communications Organization, Attack, Embutido, Clandestine Fighting, Barretines, Secret Structure, Locksmithing, Conspiracy and Counterintelligence Methods, Documentation, Masking, Personal Security, High-altitude Navigation and Basic Course for Combatants¹⁰¹.

Anti-apartheid Committee

There was a need to strengthen, in the second half of the 1980s, the international struggle against the racist South African regime. Hence, the government of Havana decided to set up on January 7, 1987, the Cuban Anti-Apartheid Committee (CCAA) headed by the Reverend Adolfo Ham, president of the Ecumenical Council of Cuba and composed of 10 vice-presidents and more than 80 personalities from the political, social, cultural and sports life of the country. Cuba had been secretly helping the ANC and SAPC fighters in all fields for several years, and it was high time to help with all propaganda means to consolidate an international environment of rejection of this abhorrent system.

The CCAA's activities in organising and participating in national and international events for the freedom of the South African people and for the freedom of its leader Nelson Mandela were manifold and varied. The Committee was in existence until 14 May 1997 following Namibia's independence and the ANC's victory in South Africa's first multiracial elections.

⁹⁹ Report on request for future South African Armed Forces, 18-05-1990. Party Central Committee Archives.

¹⁰⁰ Report on request for future South African Armed Forces. Document cited.

¹⁰¹ Means given to the ANC, courses taken and combatants trained, 11-07-1990. Party Central Committee Archives.

Cuba more united to the SADC

The Republic of Cuba had diplomatic relations with several countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) before this organization was founded at the meeting held on August 1, 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia where the historic declaration known as "Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation" was adopted. Nine founding States participated in the Summit (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The conditions for the Lusaka meeting were discussed and endorsed at a meeting, held a year earlier in Arusha, Tanzania.

It should be recalled that before that date, the Caribbean Island maintained relations with Tanzania (6-05-1962), Zambia (19-07-1972), Zaire (current Democratic Republic of Congo (11-04-1974), Madagascar (11-04-74), Mozambique (25-06-1975), Angola (15-10-75), Mauritius (18- 10-1976), Botswana (9-12-1977), Seychelles (12-04-1978), Lesotho (14-06-1979).

Later Cuba formalized its relations with Zimbabwe (20-04-1980), Namibia (23-03-1990) South Africa (11-05-1994), Swaziland (22-09-1995) and Malawi (10-12-1997).

Island of Youth opens its schools to African Students

The Cuban Government undertook many actions; the most noble and beautiful among them was the offering the possibility for African children and young people to study on the Caribbean Island all charges included, from food, care, accommodation and transportation.

A beautiful and picturesque place known as Isle of Pines was chosen to expand this humanitarian and educational work. In 1978, during a meeting held with President Fidel Castro the young people asked to be called Isle of Youth due to the number of students, both Cuban and foreign who were studying there. The People's Power Assembly ratified the proposal the same year, 1978.

The Isle of Youth, located 95 kilometres from that of Cuba, has received many names: Camaricó, Guanaja and Siguanea were called by the aborigines; La Evangelista, Admiral Christopher Columbus; Colonia Reina Amalia, the Spanish crown; Isla de Pinos was named for the predominance of those conifers; Isla del Tesoro, since Robert Louis Stevenson wrote the work of the same name, whose story was supposed to be the scenario; Isla de los 500 asesinatos, (island of 500 murders) in the stage before the Revolution and in 1978, Isla de la Juventud.

The so-called Model Prison through which numerous Cuban revolutionaries passed was built in 1931 and in 1953 Fidel Castro and other assailants from the Moncada barracks arrived at the prison, where they remained for 19 months, until the tyrannical Fulgencio Batista had to give them amnesty following popular pressure. A turning point in the history of the pine forest would mark 1966, when thousands of young people went to the Island to restore its economy, strongly damaged by the cyclone Alma, and in 1977 a singular and new experience in education was initiated in the Island: the first young Africans arrived there.

The ancient den of pirates, thieves and other bandits then acquired its true

treasure: the youth of Cuba, Africa, Asia and Latin America who studied there and worked for a better world. The initiative was launched during Army General Raúl Castro's June 1977 visit to Luanda. There he informed President Neto that by decision of the Cuban government headed by Fidel, Angola was offered four schools on the Isle of Youth of 600 students each, where Angolan children could finish primary school, attend secondary school and then enter the country's technology centres, cadet schools or continue pre-university education to finally gain access to university careers.

Immediately, a few days later, Mozambican friends learned of this offer and it was President Samora Machel himself, later disappeared by the murderous action of South African racists, who asked Fidel that Mozambique also have the opportunity to send his children to this Island, and a few weeks later (on September 11, 1977) the contingent of Mozambican students arrived¹⁰².

The following Secondary Schools in the Field (ESBEC) operated for Mozambican students:

"Samora Moisés Machel" on Septiembre 11, 1977.

"Eduardo Mondlane" September 1977, with 5th grade students. "January 28" March 1979.

" 25 de Septiembre " 1979.

The Organization of Mozambican Youth (OJM), grouped the students who studied in these centres. The OJM worked with a secretariat for the ESBEC and another for the polytechnic. They counted on the Coordination of the FRELIMO Party, which in turn worked in the orientation, and direction of the Mozambican Youth Organization, the Women's Section, the Popular Vigilance Group and the National Organization of Pioneers.

The Mozambican representatives during all the time were: Juliao Braga from 1977-1983; Antonio Saia from 1983 to 1985 and Mathias Manuel Kaphesse from 1986.

The representative was ultimately responsible for the Mozambican workers and students who lived on the Isle of Youth.

Schools for Angolans

Saydi Vieira Días (Minga) was the first school inaugurated on November 18, 1977, with 421 primary school students (4th and 5th grade). They promoted 418 students for 99.2 percent. The rest of the Angolans arrived in three groups and began their studies in the period 1977-1978 with the opening of the ESBEC Agostinho Neto, Hoji Ya Henda and Leovigildo Ramírez. The Evangelina Cossio School was also started in 1985, with the arrival of the last contingent of 5th and 7th grade students.

3 164 Angolan students were studying in Cuba, in 1985. The Youth and the rest of the student organizations in the schools were under the attendance of a general representative and a leader from their country. The aim of the project was to provide

¹⁰² Jorge Risquet Valdés. "Isle of Youth. "Ten Years of Internationalism." Political Editor. Havana 1987.

basic secondary and pre-university education and then university level.

The MPLA Youth was organized in such a way to directed all the political, cultural, sports and recreational activities of the students in the student centres and outside. This organization maintained a close relationship with the Union of Young Communists (UJC) and enjoyed prestige among the students, structured in a Municipal Direction with two working sections, one with the students of ESBECS and the other with those of Polytechnics.

On their side, the Angolan professors were constantly preparing themselves in the various courses taught at the Higher Pedagogical Institute. They studied Spanish in order to perform better in their classes.

President Agostinho Neto and the Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro Ruz, visited the ESBECS for Angolan students on January 25, 1979 and on March 19, 1980, by the new President José Eduardo Dos Santos, also accompanied by Fidel.

Schools for Namibians

Students from Namibia had also their schools, and November 16, 1978; the ESBECS 15 was converted into Hendrick Witbooi. The first students arrived in October. Those children still had fresh wounds caused by South Africans in Cassinga. The third group arrived in October 1984 and the last in September 1985.

558 Namibian students were studying Hendrick Witbooi, in 1985; among them 234 females and 334 were males. During the 1978-1983 school years, the levels were from primary to lower secondary. Pre-university started in 1984. For the 1981-1982 school year, some students who entered other careers in various Cuban provinces began to leave the Isle of Youth. Nearly 50 students graduated during the academic year 1984-1985, known as the first promotion to university studies.

The Namibian Youth was attended and organized directly by SWAPO. Some Namibian teachers taught language and history classes. Asses Musika was in 1985, the representative of Namibian students, and he was in charge of the internal organization of the students, i.e. discipline, academic performance and health. He also participated in the school boards of directors. Everyone learned the Spanish language quickly. ESBECS Hosea Kutaco was created, in February 1982, as new centre for newly arrived students. In the school there were six dormitories for females and two for males, as the females were the majority as many men were on the fronts of war in African lands¹⁰³.

"Carlos Manuel de Céspedes", University Pedagogical Branch: Zimbabwe and Angola.

The work of this university centre in the Foreign Schools Project began with the preparation of the teachers who had to face the whole organization, from the reception of the first African students in 1977 to their location, study programmes, etc. Subsequently, this branch was assigned the task of preparing students from Zimbabwe and Angola in the specialties of Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics and Biology, with the objective for the graduates to go back home and teach in their local Universities.

The first 400 students arrived on September 14, 1986, from Zimbabwe to

¹⁰³ African students. Archivo Dirección Municipal de Educación. Isle of Youth. 2004.

begin their studies; in November of that year, 200 Angolans arrived directly from their country. In the academic year 1990-1991, 285 Zimbabwean students graduated. The breakdown is as follows: Mathematics, 105, Chemistry, 48, Physics, 48 and Biology, 84. Other specialties were added such as Computing, Electronics and Geography, in the academic year 1998-1999.

The following is the number of Zimbabwean graduates by speciality until 1999.

Speciality

Mathematics. 384
 Computer Mathematics. 176
 Chemistry. 245
 Physics 141
 Electronic Physics. 72
 Biology. 341
 Geography 235

TOTAL 1594¹⁰⁴

In the 1990-1991 academic year, the following is the number of Angolan students graduated: Mathematics, 21; Chemistry, 25; Physics, 20 and Biology, 12 which makes a total of 78. Like Zimbabweans, in 1996, Angolans already had graduates in the specialties of Mathematics, Computer Science and Electronic Physics.

Figures of Angolan graduates up to 1996 in that Branch.

Speciality.

Mathematics 56
 Mathematics Computer 11
 Chemistry 58
 Physics 43
 Electronic Physics 3
 Biology 52
 Geography 50
 TOTAL 273¹⁰⁵

Mozambican, Saharawi and Cape Verdean students graduated in other specialities. The above-mentioned university had prepared a total of 1886 Africans.

Registration of foreign schools in March 1986.

¹⁰⁴ Statistical data provided by the Carlos Manuel de Céspedes University Pedagogical Branch. Archivo Dirección Municipal de Educación. Isle of Youth. January 2005.

¹⁰⁵ Data provided by the "Carlos Manuel de Céspedes" Pedagogical Subsidiary. Idem.

Angolan Schools Females Males Total.

Agostinho Neto. 66 / 507 / 573

Saydi Vieira. 90 / 503 / 593

Hoji Ya Henda. 68 / 535 / 603

Guinea - 5 5

Leovigildo Ramirez. 70 / 524 / 594

Evangelina Cossio. 69 / 336 / 395

Total Angolans 363 / 2410 / 2773

Mozambican Schools Females Males

25 de Septiembre. 68 / 535 / 603

28 de Enero. 76 / 478 / 554

Samora Machel 90 / 510 / 600

Eduardo Mondlane. 84 / 535 / 619

Total Mozambique 318 / 2058 / 2376

Schools with Namibian students

Hendrick Witbooi. 235 / 324 / 559

Hosea Kutaco. 311 / 285 / 596

Sub-Total: Namibia. 546 / 609 / 1155

Schools on the Isle of Youth for students of the SADC, during 1990-1991

Academic Year:

Primary

Total number of students

Angola

51-"Victoria Cuito Cuarnaval" 203

52-"Carlos Reyes Agramonte" 386

TOTAL: 589

Namibia

"Hosea Kutaco" 87

Secondary Schools

Angola

"Agostinho Neto" 455

"Leovigildo Ramirez" 443

"Evangelina Cossio" 359

"Hoji Ya Henda" 229

TOTAL: 1486

Mozambique

"28 de Enero" 375

"Eduardo Mondlane" 268

"25 de Septiembre" 269

"Samora Moises Machel" 391

TOTAL: 1303

Namibia

"Hendrick Witbooi" 249

"Husoea Kutaco" 106

TOTAL: 355

Namibia Mozambique

"Mikhail Frunze" 356

Pre University Students

Namibia and Angola

"Cristobal Labra" 529

Mozambique

"Andrei Greshko" 509

In the 1991-92 academic year, it was noted that students from different African countries were studying professional careers. Those who were originating from SADC countries were "in Inti Peredo" School of Economics. The students were from Angola, Congo Mozambique and Namibia.

In the "Ángel Galañena de Agropecuaria", the students were from Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Seychelles.

In "Micaela Bastida", (Veterinary section) learners were from Angola, Lesotho Mozambique and Namibia.

In the "Idilio Rodriguez" Veterinary Section, students were from Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia. In the "America Labadí" (Construction), young people were from Angola, Mozambique and Namibia¹⁰⁶.

It should be indicated that all students arriving in Cuba underwent a medical check-up. The main diseases noted were malaria, tuberculosis, gastric problems, intestinal parasites, kidney infection, hepatitis and others. Cuban authorities offered to those students immediate medical care until their rehabilitation. Two nurses were assigned to each school. In addition, a doctor visited each week the centre for consultations and, if necessary, referred patients, according to the pathology they presented, to hospitals in Nueva Gerona, Santa Fe or Havana.

One fundamental aspect should be mentioned was that the whole educational process maintained cultural customs and traditions of the students, which were very varied. They practiced them daily and participated in the events held at the centre and in the Municipal Festivals of Culture, where they had (and still have) the possibility of exchanging with Cubans and students of other nationalities.

It is worth noting that the First Festival of African Culture was held from 24 to 26 November 1978, on the Isle of Youth (since then they were held every year) with the participation of 400 students from Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique

¹⁰⁶ Statistical Information Municipal Directorate of Education Course 1990-1991.

which concluded with a gala evening at the Victoria Theatre in Nueva Gerona. Sports facilities were put at the disposal the young people since their arrival. Football was the main sport they practised.

On 30 November 1978, first Inter-School Football Championship between students from, Angola, Ethiopia and Mozambique was held the. It was decided afterwards that the competitions should be open, in different specialties¹⁰⁷, to boys and girls.

Brigadier "Raúl Díaz Argüelles" Inter- Armas School

Fidel Castro Ruz, the Commander in Chief took the initiative on September 3, 1978, to set up this centre, under the leadership of Division General Senén Casas Regueiro, First Substitute of the FAR Minister and substitute member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba. The fundamental mission of the institution was to prepare military commanders, as requested, from Africa, Asia and Latin American countries. To carry out this mission, a group of officers was selected from among the élite of the Granma Military Education Centre, from the Juvenile Labour Army of the Military Region of the Isle of Youth and from the military reserve personnel of that Special Municipality.

The duration of the courses were between 3 months and 2 years, according to the request of each country or Liberation Movement. The specialties taught were: Motorized Infantry, Tanks, Ground Artillery, Antiaircraft Artillery, Rear Guard, Exploration, Communications, Chemical Defence, Technical Services, Weapons Services, Engineering, and General Troop Military Policy. The courses culminated in tactical manoeuvres, where all the knowledge and skills acquired in the different specialties were practiced.

It should be underscored that hundreds of young people from more than 14 countries (most of them from the southern African region) graduated from the above-mentioned institution and were prepared with care and dedication.¹⁰⁸

Fidel's Visits

On several occasions The Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro, visited the Isle of Youth, accompanied by guest personalities, who had interactions with the students. The following list is an illustration of the visits made with African leaders and two United Nations secretaries general:

- 12 October 1977, with Samora Moisés Machel, President of the People's Republic of Mozambique.
- January 7, 1979, with Kurt Waldheim, United Nations Secretary-General.
- January 25, 1979, with Agostinho Neto, President of Angola.
- March 19, 1980, with José Eduardo Dos Santos, President of Angola.
- May 27, 1982, with Samora Moisés Machel, President of Mozambique.
- May 29, 1985, with Javier Pérez de Cuellar, United Nations Secretary General.

¹⁰⁷ Most of these data were extracted from the work: *Estudiantes Extranjeros en la Isla de la Juventud (años 1977-1996)*, by the authors Juan Colina La Rosa, Ofelia Sandrino Rosemond, Jaime Valdivia Fernández, Noelvis Rodríguez Corría and Rodi Candido Irsula Figueredo. Year 2004. Archive of the regional Ministry of Education in Isla de la Juventud

¹⁰⁸ Inter-Weapons School Brigadier General Raúl Díaz Argüelles. Foldable 1988. Isle of Youth. Municipal Archive Education.

- October 1, 1985 with Julius Nyerere, President of the United Republic of Tanzania and of the Party of the Revolution, Chama Cha Mapinduzi.
- 8 October 1985, with Robert Mugabe, President of Zimbabwe and Zanu-FP.
- October 14, 1985, with Kenneth Kaunda. President of the Republic of Zambia and President of the National Independence Party.

President Julius Nyerere, in a speech to Namibian students at the Hendrick Witbooi School on October 1, 1985, said: "I have come to Cuba, to thank the Cuban people, to thank them for helping us in the struggle to liberate our continent. In 1975 after the fighters from Mozambique and Angola had contributed to freeing their countries from Portuguese fascism, South Africa, supported by the CIA, tried to prevent the MPLA from assuming government in Angola. They would have been successful had it not been for the support the MPLA received from Cuba. Since then, since 1975, Angola has been attacked all the time. Angola would have lost its independence, even after 1975.

«The commitment of our friends in Cuba saved Angola. With regard to the liberation of our continent, I have come here to say thank you to comrade Fidel, to your colleagues and to the people of Cuba, for the assistance you have provided us and for the help you are giving us. I'm also here to ask you to continue to give us that help. I am also here to express to Fidel Castro and to his colleagues, the shame we feel in Africa, because in Africa we are not doing all we could to help liberate our own continent."¹⁰⁹

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda, also on his part, said on October 14, 1985, at the school "Hendrick Witbooi": "Before we talk about Namibia, let me tell comrade Castro that this is a novel idea and with it we achieve novel results; to bring together so many young people from all over the world is in line with the spirit of internationalism in an effective manner. We are grateful comrade Fidel Castro Ruz.

"I want to tell you young comrades to learn from the experience of our comrades in Cuba, you are learning to develop your minds, your brains, to develop your hands, your skills; this is a very important approach with regard to education. I have no doubt that you are taking advantage of the opportunity you have been given and that you are learning to become citizens of your respective countries.

"Comrade Castro, what you are doing for our young people here is good, you are training them to become good fighters, against the two forces, the two evils of human society; the first line of evils is constituted by exploiting imperialism with the tentacles of imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, Zionism, fascism, racism and apartheid; on the other hand, there is poverty and hunger, ignorance, disease, crime, corruption and above all, the exploitation of man by man".

"Then let's fight together until we guarantee victory in Namibia, let's fight together until apartheid is eliminated, until the continent of Africa is liberated from East to West, from North to South."¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁹ Address by the President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, at the Hendrick Witbooi School. *Granma Newspaper*, October 3, 1985.

¹¹⁰ Speech by Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda at Hendrick Witbooi School. *Granma Newspaper*, October 16, 1985

South African Students

Under this section, it is important to describe the conditions of extreme oppression in which the South African people lived which made it impossible for them to send students to the Island, in addition to the presence of the Cuban internationalists in Angola. Thus, entailed making great efforts in order for the South African young people, who were in the neighbouring African country, to travel to Havana.

The first South African student arrived in Cuba in 1976, according to documents of the Ministry of Education, and a few others (23) arrived to study, up to 1986. The largest number of South Africans, 107 young people, came to the Island in 1988

During the visit Oliver Tambo, then president of the ANC, made to the island, between March 23 and 27, 1986, Cuba confirmed the interest of a large group of students coming to study on the Isle of Youth, for which they would enjoy a complete installation. During the visit, Oliver Tambo expressed, quote: I am deeply grateful for Cuba's gesture, because I know what that beautiful island means for Africa and for Cuba and also because I have realized perfectly well the need for South African students to be there, but unfortunately we do not have enough young people to accept full tuition.¹¹¹

Another recently declassified document indicated that Oliver Tambo reported, On August 22, 1987 that he was sending about 100 students to the Isle of Youth. He explained that they had been trying, for months, to convince several hundred young people in the ANC camps in Angola to return to their studies, but they refused because they were demanding military training to fight the regime inside the country.

Faced with these demands, "the Cuban side promised Oliver Tambo to find a way to satisfy the request for military training made by these young people, either during vacation periods, weekends or at the end of their courses. With this commitment, the ANC leadership managed to convince these 100 adolescents to go back to schools."¹¹²

During a farewell event in Havana, in August 2006, to honour 32 South African fifth-year students who were going back to their country to complete the final year of their degree, it was reported that hundreds of South African students had graduated, before 2004, in different specialties, in Cuba and that in that year, 300 young people were studying medicine in their country¹¹³.

Africa was not left on its own in hard times

It should be recalled here the cardinal principle of non-interference in internal affairs by the Cuban Government. When providing military assistance or sending troops for combat, Cuba is abiding by the request made by a legally established government or a Liberation Movement recognized by the OAU since its foundation in 1963.

Cuban contingents or advisors had been sent to defend those countries from

¹¹¹ Synthesis of the meeting between Jorge Risquet and Oliver Tambo, 24-3-1986. Party Central Committee Archives.

¹¹² Jorge Risquet's report on conversation with Oliver Tambo. 22-08-1987. Central Committee Archives.

¹¹³ Jorge Risquet's report on conversation with Oliver Tambo. 22-08-1987. Central Committee Archives

external aggressions; to respect their sovereignty; not to interfere in internal struggles or counterinsurgency missions. This also was an established foundation of Cuba's foreign policy. The internationalist troops would leave those territories, upon request by the receiving country, once the threats or aggressions were eliminated.

Within the framework of these missions, specialist doctors have also been sent. In addition to attending to the combatants, they provided services to hundreds of thousands of people in these regions. After the war in Angola and the return of Cuban troops to the island, along with the remains of their compatriots fallen in that struggle, extremely difficult times were approaching for the small Caribbean country. Once again, the humanist and internationalist policy of the Cuban government and people was manifested at the beginning of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, with which the island maintained 85 percent of its trade and from which it received the precious oil and considerable volume of foodstuffs.

To make the situation worse, the United States tightened their economic blockade against Cuba, which began in the early 1960s, in an attempt to defeat it through hunger. The blockade impeded the Island to get credits from international financial institutions and prohibited other nations from trading with the island under threat of economic retaliations.

The situation was exacerbated when the country's Gross Domestic Product fell by 35 per cent, imports by 75 per cent, and the retrograde and right-wing forces of the United States and Western countries predicted the irremediable fall of the revolutionary government. During that period, almost all factories closed, transport was reduced to a minimum and the population's food suffered a serious deterioration. No more foreign students could be received and many schools reduced their class schedules.

The country lived within this difficult context until the beginning of 1995, when the leadership of the Government, with adequate measures, managed to cross the Rubicon that for many was insurmountable.

«Contrary to what happened in Eastern Europe in the late 80's and early 90's of the last century, where all students had their scholarships cancelled and left without the slightest contemplation of hope, they were left to their own free will. This did not happen in Cuba. On the Isle of Youth and in other centres of study in the country, thousands of young Africans shared with Cubans the shortcomings and limitations until their graduation. In some cases, such as the Instituto Pedagógico Zimbabwe, the students were transferred to their country of origin and continued to be taught there by Cuban teachers, as cost effective solution."¹¹⁴

As for the greatest direct impact on the social programmes of the African nations receiving support, it was decided to give, in those hard years, priority to branches of international cooperation: health, education (literacy programmes), sport and agriculture. At the same time, they tried to look for other financing alternatives through donations from governments, charitable institutions and NGOs. Unfortunately, these efforts were only able to cover a small part of the aid provided by Cuba.

The Cuban authorities devoted the increasingly scarce resources to maintain the collaboration that was provided, until that time, to 14 African nations, always with

¹¹⁴ David González López. *Impacts of Africa on Cuba*. Amílcar Cabral Chair. University of Havana. p. 7.

the utmost respect for sovereignty and equality among nations and maintained scholarships, studies, housing and food to more than 20 000 Africans who were studying in their universities and schools. This policy allowed all those who resisted the Special Period together with Cuba to graduate with the required quality.

Schools for Women Leaders

It should be recalled that Cuba has not only helped to train young Africans in the most diverse civil and military specialties, but also adult women who, in most cases, have held important official positions in their countries, as well as in both national and international organizations.

In addition to the Cuban ministries that opened their doors for the training of African citizens, special mention should be made to other organizations, such as the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC) which also took the same direction as the ministries. Many women who are holding today important positions in their respective countries, such as Thenjiwe Mtintso, former South African ambassador to Cuba (since 2009 she has held the same position in Italy) who studied at the FMC school from September 1982 to July 1983.

At that period, Mtintso was in the ANC military and political clandestine structure in Lesotho and was selected by the SACP unit in Lesotho that was led at that time by Chris Hani (later assassinated). The FMC trained Cuban women and of the world on political, cultural and ideological areas. Each year, members of Liberation Movements or governments officials were invited to undergo training on the island. The duration of the courses was between six months and a year; the FMC covered all the expenses of the students: accommodation, transportation, food, medical care, stipend for additional expenses and a week's vacation in a province of the Island. The name of the school, "Fe del Valle," was to pay tribute to a Cuban revolutionary who died in a counterrevolutionary attack, in 1960. The school was inaugurated in February 1975. In 1976, almost 300 women from different countries of the world joined the school. Classes were given in English, French, Portuguese and Spanish, on philosophy, political economy, history of the women's movement, of the Cuban revolution, Cuban society, the basis of socialism. Visits were also organised to industrial and service centres so that the visitors could see by themselves, in practice, the work and performance of Cuban workers and leaders.

In 1976-1977, thirty Angolan women were the first to study, among them: Joana P. Fragoso, María Do Cruz and Rosario Ernesto Da Silva; Danaiel Ana Sossiana and Ahiatar Juvenalia of Mozambique (1979-1980); Rassaharinario Victorino and Raharimaudimky Lucie of Madagascar (1978-1979); Koli Paudeline, Angula Miriam and Spetuyenga Febronio of Namibia (1979-1980); Nomás Shange and Thademi Lucía, South Africa (1979-1980); Teodora Chamurnewa, Juliana R. Chirume and Constante Yararo, of Zimbabwe (1981-1982).

A group of 36 women from the Republic of the Congo studied in 1976, at the Fe del Valle School. After finishing the year of preparation, they had stayed another two years in Cuba to become Educators of Children's Circles.

A total of 520 women from 20 African countries studied, and of the SADC members: 93 Angolan; 12 from Madagascar; 2 Mozambican; 23 Namibian; 5 from Seychelles; 16 from South Africa; 14 Zambian; and 70 from Zimbabwe.¹¹⁵ "The

¹¹⁵ Author's interview with Generosa Maceo Alarcón, Principal of Fe del Valle School, FMC, May 5, 2009.

contribution that Cuba made against apartheid had an important meaning, because at that time the South African revolutionary movement had very few friends, we depended fundamentally on the socialist countries and others like Sweden and Norway that mostly offered material things. Cuban collaboration was aimed at how to help end apartheid and what to do next. Cuba prepared many cadres during the years of struggle and after independence; it gave us political and ideological tools to face that task; it prepared military cadres and helped us to be part ourselves of the international arena because we were strengthening relations with many leaders and representatives of movements that visited the Island.

"I have met many young people who studied in Cuba and in other countries, and those who studied on the island have another vision of the world, of life, of human values. Cuba played a very important role in the formation of revolutionary thought outside the Island, and above all that the women who went to school understood their role within the society. I learned a lot from them. We are direct beneficiaries of Cuba's internationalism in South Africa, Angola and Africa. We have weaknesses but we can say that Cuba planted the seed and can see the results¹¹⁶.

Nelson Mandela in Cuba

Aware of the enormous and difficult history of the struggle against the apartheid regime of the legendary leader of the ANC, Nelson Mandela, the Cuban people were eager to warmly welcome him on Cuban soil, after having spent 27 years in racist prisons. That moment was materialized when the Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro, invited Mandela to participate in the celebrations for the 38th Anniversary of the Assault of July 26, 1991, on the Moncada Barracks, in the province of Matanzas, 100 kilometres from Havana. Mandela was welcomed, on July 25, by Fidel, the top leadership of the Government and the Party, and by more than a million people who got a big cheer on the 20 kilometres journey from José Martí International Airport to the Protocol Building.

In a ceremony held at the Palace of the Revolution, Fidel Castro awarded Mandela José Martí Order, the highest distinction granted by the Cuban Council of State to international personalities. In his speech during the massive act in Matanzas, Mandela said: "The Cuban people occupy a special place in the heart of the peoples of Africa. The contribution of Cuban internationalists to independence, freedom and justice in Africa is unparalleled in its principled and disinterested nature. From its initial days the Cuban Revolution has been a source of inspiration for all freedom-loving peoples. We in Africa are used to being victims of other countries that want to tear our territory apart or subvert our sovereignty. In African history there is no other case of a people standing up in defence of one of our own. We also know that this was a mass action in Cuba. We are aware that those who fought and died in Angola constitute only a small part of those who volunteered. For the Cuban people, internationalism is not simply a word, but something that we have seen put to the test for the good of large sectors of humanity.

¹¹⁶ Author's interview with former South African ambassador to Cuba, Thenjiwe Mtintso, 6 December 2005.

... "Your presence on our side and the reinforcement sent for the battle of Cuito Cuanavale have a truly historic significance (...) The defeat of the racist army in Cuito Cuanavale made it possible for me to be here with you today. We come here with the feeling of a great debt that we have contracted with the people of Cuba. What other country has a history of greater altruism than that which Cuba manifested in its relations with Africa?"¹¹⁷

Collaborative Relationships

In 2009, the Republic of Cuba maintained diplomatic relations with 54 out of the 55 countries in Africa, with the sole exception of Morocco for its policy of colonization against the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. It has embassies in 30 nations of that continent and Havana hosts 22 African diplomatic representations. This clearly expresses the importance that both parties attach to their relations. In addition, 48 joint intergovernmental commissions were operating.

Cuba had diplomatic representations in 10 countries out of the 15 SADC countries, viz: (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, DR Congo, Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe), while five of those nations have representations in Cuba, namely: (Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe). The others have ambassadors in other countries of the region, with accreditation in Cuba. Cuban specialists from several economic and social sectors began to provide services in those countries as diplomatic relations were formalized. In 1975, 400 of the Island's collaborators provided technical assistance in eight countries on the continent; by 1979, the figure exceeded 8,700 in 16 countries, mainly Angola.

At the end of the 1980s, this outlook was affected by the worsening of the economic situation in Africa as its social budgets were reduced due to the structural adjustment policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), coupled later by the economic difficulties in Cuba. Indeed, the events that took place in the former Soviet Union and the European socialist camp had a negative impact on Cuban trade. It should be recalled that 85 per cent of trade disappeared overnight. Although Cuban cooperation was granted free of charge, the countries that are beneficiaries should be able to guarantee a minimum of conditions in order to achieve the expected results of this assistance.

However, alternatives were found to continue the collaboration. 76 771 was the number of Cuban specialists registered in 1999, who had worked in 33 African countries since 1963.

The distribution among SADC members was as follows:

Angola 43 247

Mozambique 3 473

South Africa 1 378

Zambia 1 218

Tanzania 990

Botswana 840

Namibia 594

¹¹⁷ Nelson Mandela, 26 July 1991, *Granma*, 27 July 1991, p.3.

Zimbabwe 332
 Seychelles 239
 Madagascar
 DR Congo 12¹¹⁸

Short cycles was another modality of collaboration put in place in the most mixed economic specialties in Cuba, that is to say, 6,015 students from 23 countries, mainly from Angola and Mozambique, graduated in this modality mainly due to the close existing relations and the linguistic similarity which facilitated this type of training.

Until 1999, Cuba registered 28,809 African students from 43 countries, who had graduated in the Island with full training and scholarships, out of which more than 30 per cent were at the higher level. Among the SADC countries with the highest number of graduates are Angola, 7 502; Mozambique, 3 506; Zimbabwe, 3 029; Namibia, 1269, in addition to Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zaire (DR Congo).¹¹⁹

According to reports published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Cuba (MINREX) and the Ministry of Foreign Investment and Collaboration (MINVEC), these figures increased in 2008. The total number of Africans graduated to that date, in Cuba was 31,031, out of which 17,906 were at the intermediate level and 13,135 at the higher level. From the SADC countries, they were: 8 129 from Angola; Botswana, 7; Lesotho, 73; Madagascar, 218; Malawi, 2; Mauritius, 3; Mozambique, 3 791; Namibia, 1 281; Seychelles, 70; South Africa, 436; Tanzania, 199; Zambia, 151; R.D.Congo. 19; Zimbabwe 3 043 and Swaziland 1.

Adam Kighoma Ali Malima, Vice Minister of Energy and Mines who studied in Cuba from 1983 to 1989 and graduated with a degree in Economics, said: "those were the best years of my student life because I have learnt about the Cuban Revolution, the true reality of the world, of imperialism. They were years of constant threat from the Ronald Reagan administration and the beginning of the collapse of the USSR. Despite these vicissitudes, Cuba was at all times the faithful friend. For the Cuban Government, Party and people, hypocrisy does not exist. They told us, what we have is what we have and we share it with everyone. In the Caribbean Island there is an important love for the African people."¹²⁰

In addition to the training of professionals on the island, according to official data, only in the SADC countries, 54163 Cubans provided their services as internationalists as evidence by the following details:

Angola	42 248
Botswana	1 751
Lesotho	207
Mozambique	3 149
Namibia	2 383
Seychelles	502

¹¹⁸ *Cuban Collaboration with other countries 1960-1999*. Ministry for Foreign Investment and Economic Collaboration. Havana. March 2000. p. 22.

¹¹⁹ *Cuban Collaboration to other countries*. Idem. P. 23

¹²⁰ Interview with Adam Kighoma Ali Malina by the author in Tanzania. 17 February 2009. Author's file.

South Africa	112
Swaziland	85
Tanzania	1 081
Zambia	691
Zimbabwe	1 954

12 555 were in the following countries as contractors who received stipends:

Angola	4 420
Botswana	93
DR Congo	1
Lesotho	12
Mozambique	2 396
Namibia	180
Seychelles	26
South Africa	4 642
Tanzania	19
Zambia	722
Zimbabwe	44

165 persons have worked for Regional organizations:

Angola	19
Mozambique	138
South Africa	6
Swaziland	2 ¹²¹

Cuba has developed extensive collaboration with SADC member countries through bilateral agreements signed with all SADC member States. As a result of the presence of Cuban collaboration in the Southern African region and considering the support provided to achieve political independence in that region, Cuba was invited in 1989 to participate, for the first time, in the SADC Annual Consultative Conference and since that date it has been present at all the conferences.

The former SADC Executive Secretary, Kaire Mbuende, visited Havana in February 1997, which was an important moment in relations and recognition of the collaboration offered by Cuba in Southern Africa. Likewise, in all the meetings and consultations, Cuban representatives have expressed the island's interest in collaborating in development projects in the areas of health, education, agriculture, biotechnology, selected industries, joint ventures, etc.

In recent years, Cuba has also made, to the best of its ability, donations to the sub-Saharan region and the most important were: free technical assistance that has included, in not a few cases, the payment of international airfare and scholarships. Other material and monetary donations among which: the construction of schools, farms, roads, factories and houses; in addition, equipment, school materials, medicines, feasibility studies, livestock, fertile eggs, food, seeds, means of transport, sports equipment, vaccines, etc.

In the construction sector, one should single out the training of qualified personnel on site, which Cuban technicians have developed in several countries as

¹²¹ Report on collaboration with Africa. MINREX-MINVEC. MINREX-MINVEC Archives, March 2009.

a complement to their construction work.

In the field of education, teachers of different specializations have been sent to primary, middle and higher levels, as well as in specialized education. In addition to direct teaching, Cuba has collaborated in the development of and advice to adult education and literacy programmes, in the preparation and revision of textbook programmes, as well as in the carrying out of diagnostic studies in education. The literacy program Yo Si Puedo, designed by Cuba, was implemented in five countries of the region where more than 73 000 people learned to read and write and another 8 000 were being taught. By simplifying learning, especially in the case of very complex languages, and reducing the time required to teach each individual to read and write, the method has the advantage of minimizing costs in facilitating the eradication of illiteracy, even in very poor and resource-poor countries. Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland and Tanzania were among the SADC countries where the latest adaptations for implementation were already in place or were being made

In the agriculture, specialists in poultry, tobacco, artificial insemination, livestock development, food grains, forestry, wood processing, and coffee were sent and more than 20 countries of the continent benefitted from this collaboration. In the fishing industry, specialists have been sent to more than 11 countries to undertake advisory work in the construction, repair and maintenance of vessels, network of refrigerators, improvement of fishing gear and capture techniques, crew training and the proper operation of fishing vessels, all of which together with joint fishing exploitation was the most outstanding in this sector. In the sugar agroindustry, Cuba was cooperating more than 10 countries of the continent to assist in the training of specialists, technicians and skilled workers and repair of sugar plants.

In addition, Cuba was helping in medical services that began in 1963, in Algeria. More than 40 African countries have received, in recent years, in one way or another, this kind of medical cooperation which has registered greater strength and diversity. This collaboration has been carried out in different forms by: sending doctors, stomatologists, technicians and nurses to carry out care and teaching activities; creating medical faculties; advising on the elaboration and development of health programmes; diagnostic study of health, education, sport, agriculture and others; participation in vaccination campaigns.

Twenty two sub-Saharan African countries (half of the number in this area), applied, since 1999, free of charge, the method designed in Cuba entitled: Comprehensive Health Programme (PIS). This medical presence has immediately modified infant and maternal mortality indicators. The PIS made it possible to extend health coverage to more than 48 million people. Among the SADC countries that have benefitted from the PIS were as follows: Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

Operation Miracle, the new Cuban system enabled also the treatment, free of charge, of thousands of citizens for cataracts, pterygium and other diseases. The success of these medical operations allowed many Africans to have their vision restored in the centres installed in Mali and Angola, with the participation and assistance of Cuban doctors and health personnel. These centres received citizens of several sub-Saharan countries to undergo surgery.

Latest Mixed Commissions Held With SADC Countries

Angola: 12th Session of the Intergovernmental Bilateral Commission 20 - 24 February 2006, Havana.

Botswana: 10th Session of the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration, , 13-14 October 2008, in Gaborone.

Lesotho: 5th Session of the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration, 24-27 September 2008 Havana.

Malawi: 3rd Session of the Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration, 23-26 April 2007, Havana, in conformity with Articles 10th and 11th of the Agreement for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration, signed between the two governments on 10 February 1999.

Mauritius: The 1st Intergovernmental Commission was not held despite the signing of the General Partnership Agreement.

Mozambique: 16th Session of the Intergovernmental Joint Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration between the two countries, for the period 2007-2009.

Namibia: 10th Session of the Cuba-Namibia Intergovernmental Commission, 8-11 June 2009, Havana.

Seychelles: 11th Session of the Intergovernmental Commission between the two countries, June 2009, Havana.

South Africa: 5th Session of the Intergovernmental Commission, 5-9 November 2007. The next one was scheduled for November 2009.

Swaziland: 2nd Session of the Intergovernmental Commission, 2005, Havana.

Tanzania: 15th Session of the Cuban-Tanzania Intergovernmental Commission for Economic and Scientific-Technical Collaboration, 15-19 September 2008, Havana.

Zambia: 10th Session of the Joint Commission, 18-20 April 2006, Havana.

Zimbabwe: 10th Session of the Intergovernmental Commission, 18-20 September 2007. Havana.

The extensive, fluid and beneficial relations between Cuba and the SADC member in all economic, political, social, sports and cultural areas, which were increasingly strengthened in the interests of the well-being of our peoples¹²², should be appreciated.

Outstanding Example

Despite a strong and strict economic blockade imposed by the United States for decades, Cuba, this small Caribbean country, has never made any mention of the monetary cost of its aid offered to African nations during five decades. The Cuban assistance never stopped even in the most difficult times.

The figures of the Cuban assistance could reach billions of dollars, if we consider in details the cost to carry troops, weapons of all kinds, supplies and the amount of the aid in cash given to different African liberation movements, the transit cost

¹²² Intergovernmental commissions with SADC countries. Archive MINVEC, 20 June 2009.

through Algeria, Syria, the two Congo, Guinea Bissau, Angola, Ethiopia, in addition of the tens of thousands of civilian workers who worked in Africa, and the tens of thousands of African students who studied in the Caribbean Island. Cuba has accomplished this entire feat with its own efforts and motivations driven always by the disinterested help of its entire people under the leadership of the main and most important internationalist person, the Cuban President: Fidel Castro Ruz.

This collaboration not only had an economic cost but also human. More than 2,000 Cuban citizens have perished in combats, accidents or illnesses, in missions in Africa. These persons gave their lives to help African peoples getting their independence as well as political, economic and social freedom. From Africa came many of their ancestors to Cuba. The Cuban Revolution and its people have always been characterized for their humility and altruism. Indeed, Cuba never divulged the efforts made in this area of assistance, nor asked for anything material in return, only the friendship and solidarity of the African brothers. This explains why it was difficult to find anywhere in the world, be it a people, State or Organization that can surpass the internationalist example offered by the small Caribbean island, which has always been recognized, unanimously, by African leaders and peoples.

Four Caribbean Pearls Fight for Africa

Four small Caribbean countries, one continental country (Guyana) and three island countries (Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados) provided examples to the world of what States could do, however tiny, in favour of the liberation of the African continent and against the shameful system of apartheid institutionalized in South Africa, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South West Africa (Namibia) occupied by Pretoria.

These Caribbean nations received on their territories large numbers of African citizens, taken as slaves by the former colonizing powers to work on agricultural plantations, and therefore their African descendants were very strong, maintained their cultures and above all never betrayed their ancestral roots.

During the last half of the twentieth century, small Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Barbados became, at the same time, great engines of international struggle by using their voices in all fora to raise global awareness on behalf of oppressed African peoples and especially those located in the southern part of the African continent that suffered, directly or indirectly, occupations, attacks and aggressions by the South African racist regime.

These nations of poor and dependent economies fought, with bravery and great courage, in the different world bodies for the independence interests of the African nations. The large population of African descent living in these four Caribbean countries has been their common feature of unity.

Interesting Facts

This section deals with some background information on the four nations mentioned above. The largest of these nations is the 214,969 square kilometre Cooperative Republic of Guyana, which obtained its independence in May 1966 and has more than 30 per cent of its population of African descent. It is located on the northern coast of South America and is bordered to the east by Suriname, to the south by Brazil, to the west by Venezuela and Brazil and to the north by the Atlantic Ocean. It has a population of 715 000 inhabitants.

Jamaica, located south of Cuba, is the third largest island in the Antilles with an

area of 10 991 square kilometres and a majority population of African descendants who were brought as slaves to the country between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. With a population of 2,800,000 inhabitants, it gained its independence after strong struggles of demands, on August 6, 1962.

The Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, located on the north-eastern coast of Venezuela is composed of two islands, one named Trinidad with 300 square kilometres and the second, Tobago with 4 828 square kilometres. Its population of 1,090,000 is made up of 43 per cent of African descendants and 40 per cent of Asian.. They became independent States within the Commonwealth on August 31, 1962.

Finally, Barbados is the easternmost island of the West Indies, east of St. Vincent, within the Lesser Antilles. It covers an area of only 330 square kilometres and has a population of 280,000, 90 per cent of whom are of African descent and got independence in November 1961.

In Guyana, leaders Cheddi Jagan, Forbes Burnham and Desmond Hoyte played a pivotal role in the fight against apartheid and in supporting the liberation of African countries. In Jamaica, Norman Manley, Michael Manley and Percival Patterson played that role; in Trinidad and Tobago, Eric Williams, George Chambers and Patrick Manning; and in Barbados, Errol Barrow and Erskine Sandiford.

Difficult International Political Outlook

Under this section, it is necessary to take into account the world political panorama in the middle of the twentieth century in which the cold war, prevailed, in all spheres, fought by the United States against the now defunct European socialist camp, and the specific situation in Latin America, where Washington carried out a powerful policy of force, threats and aggressions against any government daring, to the smallest extent, to challenge their hegemony in the region.

In the United States, these were known as the years of McCarthyism (the 1950s and 1960s). Their dire consequences were felt all over the world, with fear and terror being imposed against individuals who thought differently or against social and nationalist movements, naming and shaming them as communists. In the international organizations that emerged after the Second World War, the decisions made by the United States and the other Western powers prevailed, imposing their conditions through strong pressure and threats.

Both the United States and Great Britain vetoed or boycotted any measure that could set aside or condemn the South African racist regime that imposed on the black majority of the people a state of racial segregation similar to slavery. The media blackout on the atrocities committed by Pretoria against the people, the complicity of the majority which controlled the mass media and that of the Western powers allowed the white minority regime to maintain diplomatic and trade relations with many countries and to be member of various international bodies.

The Sharpeville massacre in March 1960, in Transvaal, was the trigger for the situation, when the racist police machine-gunned a demonstration protesting against apartheid, causing 69 deaths and 180 wounded. After this mass murder, the president of the African National Congress (ANC), Oliver Tambo, made an extensive tour of capitals around the world, to denounce the behaviour of the racist regime and to request support for the implementation of international sanctions against the

apartheid regime. Several independent nations and autonomous territories initiated, between 1960 and 1962, boycotts and trade sanctions against South Africa, including the Caribbean nations Jamaica, Guyana, Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and Antigua and Barbuda.

The First Boycotts

In 1957, several years earlier, Jamaica became the first country in the world to declare, in an unprecedented action, a trade embargo against South Africa and deny entry to its territory to anyone holding a South African passport, even while the island was still a colony of Britain and thus without responsibility for its external relations. It was Norman Manley, Michael Manley's father, the leader of the National People's Party, who made the proposal.

Enuga S. Reddy, principal secretary of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid (1967-75) and director of the United Nations Centre against Apartheid (1976-1984), in a paper published in 1986, stressed: "the significant role that Caribbean countries played in the anti-apartheid movement beyond their small populations and geographical extensions, and who continued to play a role with greater force in the coming period, before and after the victory over the regime"¹²³.

To illustrate his proposal, Reddy made reference to the boycott carried out by the workers of the port of Trinidad when they refused to unload, in April 1960, a ship with South African goods, a fact that happened before the country achieved its independence. He also highlighted the same attitude taken by the port workers of the tiny island of Antigua in 1978, when they learned that one of the largest arms and ammunition smuggling took place there, with the participation of the Canadian Space Research Corporation and the United States. This was one of the most notable boycotts against these smugglers that had been denounced by the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the United Nations.

"The Caribbean countries have made a great contribution to the United Nations, the Commonwealth and other organizations in assisting the African Liberation Movements. It is for that reason the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid awarded, in 1978, the Gold Medal to the then Prime Minister of Jamaica, Michael Manley (and six other world leaders) in recognition not only of his own contribution as a person but also of the Caribbean governments and their peoples in the struggle against apartheid."¹²⁴

Leslie Harriman, president of the Special Committee of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, acknowledged this effort in a message sent to the Conference of the World Movement for Peace, which took place in February 1978, in Mexico. In his message, Harriman called upon the Latin America and the Caribbean countries to maintain effective and continued participation in this declared International Year against Apartheid, "bearing in mind the traditional anti-racist and anti-colonial spirit of the Caribbean peoples who have pioneered Africanist concepts."¹²⁵

Harriman sent another message, the following month, in March 1978, this time to

¹²³ Enuga S. Reddy, Significance of African and India Joint Struggle. Sitio Web: www.anc.org.za/un/reddy/struggle3.

¹²⁴ Enuga S. Reddy. Idem

¹²⁵ Leslie O. Harriman. Message to the Conference of the Movement of Countries for Peace. February 1, 1978. www.anc.org.za/UN/pr/pr0201-78.html

Jamaica which created the National Committee for the International Anti-Apartheid Year. "I have noted with great satisfaction that the Jamaican National Committee has brought together representatives of government sections and public organizations to undertake a programme of wide-ranging activities during the year. The UN Special Committee is aware of the commitment and firm objective of the Jamaicans and their government, under the leadership of the Honourable Michael Manley, for the liberation of South Africa."¹²⁶

In his message, Harriman quoted an abstract written by the American antiracist, later naturalized Ghanaian, W.E.B. Dubois: When blacks in America, in the East Indies and in Africa once work and think together, the future of black man in the modern world will be saved. "This was a message, Harriman added, like that of many eminent leaders of the Pan-African Movement that originated in the Caribbean, and therefore, we have no doubt that the Caribbean governments and their peoples will work together with the Special Committee to free oppressed people in South Africa."¹²⁷

The Seminar on the elimination of apartheid and in support of the struggle for the liberation of Africa was held from May 24 to 28, 1976, in Havana, Cuba, where positions were taken and a proposal was made by the Jamaican Prime Minister, Michael Manley, to work out an International Convention to take measures that would prohibit sports collaboration with the apartheid regime.

The Havana Seminar adopted the programme of action and it was later submitted to the United Nations Special Committee, along with the proposal on the sports boycott that was unanimously approved by the delegates at the same Seminar. In August of the same year, it was sanctioned by those attending the Fifth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement held in September 1976 in Colombo, Sri Lanka, who adopted the programme of action. On its part, on 14 December 1977, the UN General Assembly adopted the International Declaration against Apartheid in Sports. Jamaica was a member of the UN Ad Hoc Committee charged with drafting an International Convention that was finally adopted in 1987.

The initiative promoted by Manley and adopted at the seminar in Havana bore fruit rapidly. Indeed, in June 1976 a New Zealand rugby team, whose government was very close to the racist regime of Pretoria, toured South Africa which caused numerous protests both in New Zealand and in many countries. In August of that year the African nations, Guyana and Iraq withdrew from the Olympic Games in Montreal in protest of New Zealand's participation. This action was a wake-up call for countries that were still reluctant to put an end to sports contacts with South Africa and, faced with the threat of a boycott of Commonwealth games in Canada at the end of 1977. In June 1977, Canada adopted the Gleneagles Agreement, calling on its members to avoid contacts or competition with South African sports organizations, teams or athletes.

Already years earlier, in 1972, Manley had challenged the International Courts to redefine the word terrorism, and emphasized that it should not apply to South

¹²⁶ Leslie O. Harrison. Apartheid Committee Chairman sends message to Jamaican Anti-Apartheid Group. 27 de marzo de 1978. www.anc.org.za/UN/pr/pr0213-78.html.

¹²⁷ Leslie O. Harrison. Idem

African freedom fighters, which prompted the 27th Session of the United Nations General Assembly to require universal moral reformulation in the conduct of these international affairs. He also became an unwavering defender of the African National Congress actions and the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela.

Huge Shearer, a Senator for the Labour Party, another Jamaican leader, draw attention as an anti-colonialist, anti-racist and anti-apartheid leader, and proposed in 1963 to the United Nations to declare an International Year for Human Rights. In 1967, Shearer won the Jamaican elections and was appointed prime minister. His initiative was adopted by the UN, by declaring 1968 as the International Year for Human Rights. The UN decision served to reinforce the measures and actions that the world agreed to reinforce the pressures against the Pretoria regime and for the liberation of the subjugated South African people. In all international fora, Shearer maintained an uncompromising attitude in opposition to apartheid, and within the Commonwealth, in the Caribbean and at the United Nations, he worked to seek the necessary support against the inhumane system of apartheid.¹²⁸

In international fora and in the Commonwealth, Caribbean countries carried out the struggle against apartheid on two main fronts: (a) weakening the structures and the intransigence of the racial segregation regime; and (b) persuading industrialized Western countries to impose economic and trade sanctions against South Africa, all of which played a major role alongside the actions of disobedience and emancipation carried out by the indigenous South African population.

In an article for the 50th Anniversary of the international organization, H. S. Walker, who served as Jamaica's permanent ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva, explained that Jamaica also made a contribution to the fall of the illegal white minority regime in Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe). In November 1965 that regime, headed by the racist Ian Smith made a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom, which was considered by the international community as illegal. The UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council adopted many resolutions to reject the action taken by the minority regime.

Supported by these sanctions and by the international community, Zimbabwe got independence in 1980. Jamaica played an important role in the negotiating process. Walker points out that Jamaica also collaborated with the last steps in the liberation of South-West Africa (now Namibia), a country that after the First World War the League of Nations had given a mandate to South Africa to administer.

In 1966, the UN General Assembly terminated that mandate on the grounds that South Africa had failed to fulfil its obligations to the territory and in 1968 the UN recognized its new name, Namibia.

South Africa, however, remained entrenched in the territory where it had imposed its apartheid laws. In 1988, after the debacle of the South African forces suffered in combat with Cuban-Angolan-Namibian troops, and after the international sanctions imposed against the racist regime, South Africa was forced to give in, and in 1989, under the direct supervision of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), general elections were held where for the first time the majority of

¹²⁸ Tribute of the Jamaican Parliament to the Honorable Huge [Shearer](http://www.jis.gov.jm/.../shearer/tribute.FROM.PM.html). www.jis.gov.jm/.../shearer/tribute.FROM.PM.html.

the black population had the right to vote. San Nujoma and the South West African People Organization (SWAPO) won a landslide victory. Among the UNTAG members were twenty-three policemen and women from Jamaica¹²⁹.

Manley's Support for Angola's Defence

Despite the pressure exerted by the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western countries, Manley supported, with enormous political courage, the Cuban government's decision to send troops to Angola to face the South African troops that had invaded the territory, as well as the troops of Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) of Jonas Savimbi, the Zairean Mobutu forces, mercenaries, and groups of American advisors who tried to take Luanda before November 11 to snatch the independence of the nation that would be proclaimed by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) led by Agostinho Neto. In explaining his decision, the Jamaican Prime Minister said that South Africa, in addition to oppressing the country's black majority, was also attacking the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa.

Following that position, the U.S. administration, then under the Republican administration of Gerald Ford, took drastic measures against Kingston to destroy its economy. But the coercive U.S. sanctions did not deter the Jamaican government, which also supported the offensive of Cuban-Angolan troops to the north to kick out from Angola the remnants of the FNLA, mercenaries and Zairian forces that had not yet left the Angolan territory.

Manley made, on the first days of January, a private visit to Santiago de Cuba where he met with Fidel Castro. During their meeting, the Cuban leader explained the situation in Angola, the offensive that Cubans and Angolans were deploying against the aggressors, and informed him about the seizure, on January 4, 1976 of the northern city of Carmona, near the border with Zaire. Fidel read to Manley a cable from the Cuban Military Mission in Angola with the important news that Jorge Risquet, Abelardo Colomé and Vecino Alegret¹³⁰ informed him from Carmona and its neighbouring military airport, Negage, that they were both in the hands of the liberating troops. Fidel explained to Manley the importance of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) extraordinary summit scheduled on January 12 and 13 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to analyse the situation in Angola, and to recognize the independence of that nation and the MPLA government as its representative.

In a courageous gesture of support for Cuba and Angola, Manley, upon his arrival in Kingston, sent one of his cabinet members, Minister Percival Patterson, to Ethiopia to lobby for Angola's recognition by the OAU. The South African Prime Minister, Balthazar J. Vorster, after the setbacks suffered by his troops and by the FNLA and UNITA gangs, had decided to withdraw his forces from Angola (which he was trying to keep as a secret with the consent of the silenced Western media) but had stopped

¹²⁹ H.S.Walker. *The struggle Jamaica against apartheid*. Published by Institute of Jamaica Publications Limited in Association with the National Preparatory Committee of the United Nations. Celebrating the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations. October 1995. www.un.int/jamaica/membership.html.

¹³⁰ Jorge Risquet, head of the Cuban civilian mission, Abelardo Colomé was head of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola and Vecino Alegret, one of the Cuban officers of the Mission.

the action until after the OAU Summit. The Summit did not recognize Angola at that time as the vote was even: 22 States in favour, 22 against and two abstentions. On that occasion several South African prisoners captured on Angolan soil were presented at a press conference where they reported on the details of the invasion by the racist Pretoria. Several days after the Summit, the OAU recognized the independence of Angola and the MPLA as its legitimate representative.

The efforts made by Jamaica in Ethiopia for the independence of the young African nation was a gesture of political courage and an example for many nations of the world which still did not condemn the shameful apartheid regime¹³¹.

Manley explained, in an article published in *Nueva Sociedad* magazine, that for several months he had held separate meetings with Cuban and U.S. leaders to try to mediate between the two countries and that he understood that events in Angola would affect his efforts. In order to find the truth about the crisis in Angola, he spoke with African presidents and Cuban, U.S. and Canadian leaders and discussed these sensitive issues in depth. "As a result of these discussions, we were convinced that South Africa was the aggressor in Angola, that South Africa had invaded Angola to install a puppet regime that would support racism and apartheid. And we were convinced that the Cuban presence in Angola was in response to an invitation from the MPLA and with the purpose of defeating the South African invaders. As a result, we recognized the MPLA and supported the Cuban presence in Angola. Unfortunately, as we had thought, there was nothing anyone could do at that time to prevent the worsening of attitudes between the United States and Cuba as a result of the Angolan crisis."¹³²

African Roots Strengthen Caribbean Positions

The Caribbean governments of Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Guyana, in regional and international forums, adopted positions in favor of Cuba's reincorporation into the concert of Latin American and Caribbean nations from which it had been expelled under pressure from the United States by passing an arbitrary resolution within the Organization of American States expelling the Island from the regional organization. Only Mexico and Canada did not break off relations with Cuba at that time.

In a historic decision, the above - mentioned four Caribbean governments announced, in October 1972, that they would establish relations with Cuba, which became a reality on December 8 of the same year. These nations looked with admiration at the policy followed by Cuba in favour of the Third World countries and especially in Africa, origin of their ancestors who arrived with great number to the Caribbean. The Prime Ministers of Guyana, Forbes Burnham, Trinidad and Tobago, Eric Williams and Jamaica, Michael Manley, visited Cuba between April and July 1975.

These three prominent personalities visited Cuba's historical and social centres of interest and were welcomed in mass events where they had an opportunity to interact with the people. Fidel Castro welcomed them in the three activities to thank

¹³¹ Interview by the author with Jorge Risquet Valdés. 16 July 2009.

¹³² Michael Manley, *New Society Magazine* No. 27. November-December 1976. pages 99-103. Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

them for their attitude vis-à-vis Cuba and to underline the similarity of their policies towards Africa. In one of those speeches, Fidel stated: "Establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba was a challenge to imperialism; and yet the English-speaking Caribbean countries overcame that challenge. The history of these Caribbean countries is very similar to ours: the discovery, the conquest, centuries of economic exploitation, the extermination of the aboriginal population and the establishment of the most ruthless slavery and the consequent poverty of the masses... both governments actively support the struggle of the African peoples against Portuguese colonialism, and we also maintain a similar attitude in the struggle against the racial politics of South Africa. There is a great coincidence in foreign policy..."¹³³

The Commonwealth and Shridath Ramphal

The Commonwealth was dominated, until the mid-1960s, by the Western rich white countries. But by the end of that decade, a Secretariat of the organization was created whose number had grown to 31 members. The Canadian Arnold Smith was elected as the first Secretary General for a period from 1965 to 1975. Smith was totally opposed to racial discrimination and helped the Commonwealth to find ways and means to carry forward the campaign for democratization in South Africa.

In addition to his merits against the racist regime, Smith came to light in this investigation, because his successor was an outstanding Caribbean personality, the Guyanese Shridath Ramphal who, during the period 1975-1985, promoted a greater integration of the Commonwealth to carry out greater measures against Pretoria and even that the organization supported all kinds of struggle to achieve the independence of this suffering people.

Ramphal worked closely with leaders within the Commonwealth who increased those actions, such as Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Michael Manley, Malcolm Fraser, Pierre Trudeau, Olusegun Obasanjo, Muhammad Mahathir, Indira and Rajiv Gandhi and Brian Mulroney. Ramphal's firm stance made him the target of many racist enemies within the UK government and the UK media who began attacking him.¹³⁴

The Times and the Telegraph were two of those newspapers, which published insidious news, such as Ramphal were crawling inside Buckingham Palace to give the Queen the address of the Commonwealth. The Prime Minister of Barbados, Errol Barrow, was not spared by the same campaign launched by newspapers, the host, who directed the Commonwealth conference in 1985, in Nassau. Ramphal had to face a very difficult period in his term of office, during the 1980s, when Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990), a fervent advocate of racism and the South African regime, came to power in the United Kingdom.

But Thatcher's virulent defense of apartheid energized relations between the Commonwealth, the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the African National Congress. Shridath Ramphal developed a close relationship with English Archbishop Trevor Huddleston, and South Africans Abdul Minty and Oliver Tambo, as well as anti-

¹³³ Fidel Castro, speech for the reception of the Guyanese Prime Minister Forbes Burnham, held in the city of Cienfuegos. April 9, 1975. Website: www.cuba.cu/gobierno/discursos/.../f090475e.html

¹³⁴ Patsy Robertson. A common purpose: the Commonwealth's support for the AAM. Sitiesweb:staff.lib.msu.edu/limb/a-z/az_a3.html, <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/aam/symposium.html>

apartheid militants Mike Terry and Bob Hughes who provided invaluable information and helped maintain the principles of the fight against the South African regime despite racist efforts to try to denigrate the work and initiatives undertaken by the Commonwealth Secretariat¹³⁵.

A Bahamian among the Group of Eminent Persons

The Nassau meeting created a Commonwealth group called Eminent Persons and it was decided to send a commission to South Africa, which visited that country the following year. This was the first international mission that was able to meet in prison with prominent anti-racist leader Nelson Mandela. The commission reached a consensus between the South African regime and the African National Congress, the first point of which was the release of Nelson Mandela, which only occurred in 1990.

Nita Barrow, a distinguished Bahamian, was among those on the Eminent Persons accompanying as secretary of the co-chairs, the Nigerian General Olusegun Obasanjo and the Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser.

The small group toured much of the country without requesting government security, met and interviewed many peoples and then proposed a five-point plan between the parties. The racist regime simply ignored it.

The Outstanding Guyanese Policy towards Africa

Guyana was one of the last Caribbean nations to obtain independence on 26 May 1966. The Republic was born while Venezuela and Suriname were claiming parts of its territory. As a result, up until 1970, its foreign policy was based on opposing the demands of both neighbours.

Faced with these threats, Guyana developed close relations with the United States and the Brazilian military to support it, and on the other hand, it strengthened relations with the Commonwealth, the United Nations, and consequently supported the Liberation Movements in Africa. The United States, which used the Atkinson airport as an air base, managed to get the new government, following independence, to grant it permission to use it for 17 years and to allow U.S. flights over its territory¹³⁶.

In November 1975, Cuba began sending troops to Angola to help preserve that nation's independence and its old British Bristol planes had to refuel to cross the Atlantic. The first 33 flights were refuelled in Barbados, which had an air service agreement with Cuba, but the United States, upon learning of the real reasons for the operation, exerted all their pressure against the government of that Caribbean island that was forced to suspend the transit of the Cuban planes on December 17, 1975.

Cuba requested permission from Trinidad to land, which was refused. A Cuban officer was sent to request permission from Burnham who agreed. The first flight took fuel on December 19, but when Washington learned of Burnham's transgression it tightened the screws. The President of Venezuela, Carlos Andres Perez, warned Guyana that the favourable treatment for oil sales his government

¹³⁵ Patsy Robertson. *Idem*

¹³⁶ Guyana News and Information. Aspects of Guyana's foreign policy from 1966-1970. 19 April 2005.

sought would be jeopardized if a drop of Venezuelan oil replenished a Cuban aircraft. Burnham had to give in and only two Cuban ships were able to make a stopover¹³⁷.

In his famous article Operation Carlota, the writer Gabriel García Márquez pointed out other arguments that confirm the enormous pressure exerted by the United States to stop the arrival of Cuban military aid in Angola: "Texaco, which was the oil exploiter in Guyana, refused to sell the fuel...while the U.S. ambassador himself threatened Burnham with bombing and destroying Georgetown airport."¹³⁸

Excellent Attitude of Solidarity with Africa

Guyana's initiative to donate \$50,000 annually to support movements fighting racism in South Africa was an excellent attitude of solidarity that served as an example for many countries. Such an act from a poor country, far away from the African continent, was politically effective for Guyana and for global solidarity with liberation movements throughout the African continent. This policy was also widely accepted by the Afro-Guyanese and catapulted Guyana as a champion in the Western Hemisphere in defense of African peoples. In May 1967, the UN General Assembly created the United Nations Council for South West Africa (Namibia), Guyana was elected unanimously as one of eleven members. The Guyana Mission to the UN had an outstanding participation in that Council and also in discussions with the African Group on political and economic matters that were raised at various forums of the United Nations.

As far as Angola's case is concerned, Guyana followed in the footsteps of Western countries by supporting the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) rather than the MPLA. In the early 1970s, Guyana joined the Non-Aligned Movement where, as in the United Nations, it carried out outstanding work in support of African countries and against the apartheid regime. In mid-1971, the government began to nationalize important Canadian and American properties, which irritated the United States. Economic sanctions were immediately imposed against the country by the US. Guyana also had relations with Cuba and with European socialist countries¹³⁹.

The Burnham government continued to strengthen its relations with Havana and broaden efforts for international support for the liberation of African nations, in particular with the people of South Africa.

Desmond Hoyte then Guyanese President made a visit to Cuba, in 1989, and participated with Fidel Castro at a rally at the Hendrick Witbooi school for Namibian students, located on the small Isle of Youth.¹⁴⁰ As the elections in Namibia were approaching and hundreds of these students in Cuba would interrupt their classes in order to participate in that event, Hoyte stated the following to the students: "I hope all of you will return to Namibia to exercise your right to vote and you will vote for

¹³⁷ Piero Gleijeses, *Missions in Conflict*. Ediciones Ciencias Sociales, 2004. Havana. Pages 572-574.

¹³⁸ Gabriel García Márquez: "Operación Carlota", *Tricontinental* magazine. No 53, November 1977.

¹³⁹ Guyana News and Information. El gobierno del CNP y el cambio de posiciones ideológicas en la década de 1970. 29 January 2007 www.guyana.org/features/.../post-independence.html

¹⁴⁰ Speech by Desmond Hoyte, President of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana at the Hendrick Witbooi School. *Granma* Newspaper, 30 January 1989.

independence...". All the Namibian students raised their hands.¹⁴¹

Both the ruling National People's Congress Party (NPC) and Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party (PPP) supported African countries' struggles for independence, which Guyana expressed in all international fora. Jagan won the elections in 1953, when Guyana was still under British domination, and was overthrown 133 days later by a military coup sponsored by Britain and the United States who accused him of admiring the government of the Soviet Union.

Jagan expanded his contacts, after 1957, with African leaders who were fighting for the liberation of that continent and with many who had been in exile. He maintained extensive communication with them through letters and regular visits to Africa. He developed close relations with Ghanaian Prime Minister Kwame Nkrumah and enlightened the Guyanese about confrontation with and solidarity against apartheid. Days after the Sharpeville massacre, in an extraordinary gesture of solidarity with the South African people, he joined a demonstration protesting in front of the British Parliament, in London, where he was arrested.¹⁴²

On 27 April 2005, Jagan was decorated, post mortem, for his broad stance in favour of the liberation of African countries and especially of South Africa, with the Supreme Order of Oliver Tambo's Companions in Gold, the highest distinction granted by the South African government, after the ANC won the general elections in 1994 and apartheid was defeated. On that occasion, President Thabo Mbeki noted that Jagan led the defense in the Caribbean and South America against apartheid in South Africa and became a close friend of O. R. Tambo and Yusuf Dadoo.¹⁴³

Three eminent Caribbean statesmen, the Prime Ministers of Trinidad and Tobago, Eric Williams, and of Jamaica, Michael Manley were decorated, post mortem with the Order, and in life the outstanding Guyanese leader, Shridath Ramphal.

When awarding the Order, it was stressed that: "Eric Williams, in tribute and recognition for his commitment to peace and inspiration to South African's for unity and harmony. Renowned Caribbean statesman, accomplished historian and head of government for a quarter of a century until his death in 1981, Dr. Williams was consistently passionate in denouncing and activism against apartheid."¹⁴⁴

"Shridath Ramphal: he was awarded the Order for his outstanding contribution to the struggle against racial oppression in South Africa, striving to create a new International Economic Order, more just and beautiful, and faithful defender for the cause of human rights in the international arena and outstanding militant of the South African people against apartheid".¹⁴⁵

"Michael Manley, for his consistent support for the elimination of apartheid

¹⁴¹ Speech by Desmond Hoyte, idem

¹⁴² Speech by Ambassador Odeen Ishmael. Cheddi Jagan Research Center. Georgetown. 14 March 2002.

¹⁴³ South Africa honours Cheddi [Jagan. Jamaicaobserver.com/news/html](http://Jagan.Jamaicaobserver.com/news/html). 10 May 2005.

¹⁴⁴ Supreme Order of the Companions of O.R. Tambo (Gold). http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/orders_list.asp?show=364

¹⁴⁵ Supreme Order. Idem.

during his long years as Prime Minister of Jamaica who, at all times, supported and contributed to the development of liberation movements in Africa."¹⁴⁶

Invariable Caribbean Position

The Western powers' policy of supporting the racist South African regime was once again exposed internationally (as opposed to that adopted by the countries of the Caribbean) during the United Nations General Assembly on 16 December 1980, which, at the proposal of the Special Committee against Apartheid, adopted Resolution 35/206 imposing an oil embargo against South Africa.

At the same time, it revealed the invariable position of the Caribbean nations, some fuel exporters such as Trinidad and Tobago, who agreed with the Resolution, adopted by 123 countries, with 7 against and 13 abstentions. The United States, the United Kingdom, the German Federal Republic, Canada, Belgium, France and Luxembourg appeared against, while Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Barbados, Guyana, Saint Lucia, Cuba, Haiti, Grenada, the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas were among those in favour, that is, almost all the Caribbean countries which, at that time, belonged to the United Nations Organization or had the right to vote.¹⁴⁷

Oliver Tambo's Visit

The ANC President Oliver Tambo during visits to Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica addressed their Parliaments on 1 and 4 July 1987, respectively. He explained the situation in his country and thanked the unconditional help these two Caribbean nations had offered to achieve victory over apartheid. Before the Trinidadian legislators, Oliver Tambo thanked the then Prime Minister Arthur Robinson for the courtesy of inviting him to address the MPs, something that "no African national has ever been able to do in the South African Parliament dominated by the white minority... In racist South Africa, Africans are only allowed to enter to clean or sweep the premises."¹⁴⁸

While thanking the Trinidadians for their warm welcome given to his delegation and their support they had given to the South African people for years, he urged them to close ranks within the Commonwealth so that it can take stronger sanctions against racists and prevent the British government from continuing to oppose and enter reservations in the official documents of that organization. He pointed out that his delegation travelled 5,000 miles to come to the island where he had met people with whom he shared common origins and objectives, but who had also managed to build a unified nation and a national culture, without differences of race and creed. We hope to learn from this experience in order to emulate it in the future in a free South African Parliament.¹⁴⁹

In his address to the Kingston Parliament which coincided with the celebration

¹⁴⁶ Supreme Order. Idem.

¹⁴⁷ Oil embargo against South Africa. 16 December [1980. www.anc.org.za/un/undocs.html](http://www.anc.org.za/un/undocs.html)

¹⁴⁸ Address to the joint session of Parliament of Trinidad and Tobago, Port of Spain. First July 1987. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/1980s/or87-14.html>

¹⁴⁹ Address to the joint session of Parliament or Trinidad. Idem.

of the national day for the constitution of the National People's Party, Oliver Tambo pointed out the *raison d'être* of his visit, which was that the Jamaican people and government were united and had always fought for the common cause of the South African people in their demand of a free, prosperous and peaceful future for the good of humanity. He highlighted the example of the majority Jamaican population of African origin that had been uprooted from their countries by European slave traders, and who, after gaining independence did not forget the pain their fellow countrymen in several African nations still suffer and especially those surviving under the laws of apartheid.

The president of the ANC exalted the figure of Jamaican leaders in that battle and especially that of men like Michael Manley who, at all times and under all circumstances, had been a bastion in support of African peoples.¹⁵⁰ Oliver Tambo's visits to Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica were a great honour for these two Caribbean countries that had maintained a policy consistent with the South African people.

Mandela in Jamaica

The legendary leader Nelson Mandela visited Jamaica on July 23, 1991, in a trip that included Cuba where he addressed the rally in honour of the 38th anniversary of the attack on the Moncada Barracks, on July 26, 1953. This was the culmination of the effort made over many years for the South African people to achieve full independence from apartheid, a few months after obtaining his freedom from 27 years of unjust imprisonment.

In Jamaica, the leader of the African National Congress was warmly greeted during an exciting reception, considered one of the greatest in the history of that Caribbean nation. Mandela spent almost 40 hours on Jamaican soil, which was an enormous emotional burden for him and for all the people of the island. In a solemn act, the authorities awarded him an Honorary Doctorate from the University of the West Indies. Mandela was accompanied by a delegation, including his former wife Winnie, Thomas Nboki, treasurer of the ANC and Raymond Suttener, of the ANC's political department.

Three years later, the ANC won South Africa's first free elections with the resounding defeat of apartheid and Mandela was elected first black president in South Africa's history. The legendary South African leader visited several Caribbean islands, including Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Grenada. In honour of the then South African president's visit, the Jamaican government named the capital's vast national park Nelson Mandela, which was used as a cultural recreation centre and for religious and political rallies.

In Trinidad and Tobago, the South African leader addressed more than 20,000 attendees who honoured him at the Queen's Oval Park in Port of Spain. "I come to thank Trinidad and Tobago for supporting us in overthrowing the apartheid system that my people suffered for three and a half centuries"¹⁵¹. On his first visit to the Caribbean nation, Mandela met with Prime Minister Patrick Manning and

¹⁵⁰ Speech at the People's National Party founder's Day Banquet, Kingston, Jamaica, July 4, 1987. <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/speeches/1980s/or87-13.html>

¹⁵¹ Mandela thanks Trinidad-Tobago for anti-apartheid help. Carriibbean Net News. May 1, 2004. www.caribbeanetnews.com/Trinidad/Trinidad-tobago2.htm

attended a luncheon at the Trinidad Hilton Hotel with many personalities from political and cultural life. He was accompanied on his visit by Archbishop Desmond Tutu who described Trinidad and Tobago as a rainbow in the fight against apartheid.

Caribbean Representation at UNOMSA

The weakening of the racist regime on all fronts led its authorities to be forced to agree to a general election for the first time in the history of that nation. The process began on September 14, 1991 with an agreement between the government, the ANC, the Inkatha Freedom Party and other organizations that signed the National Peace Agreement. A long process of negotiations was carried out with all the country's political forces, under the leadership of the United Nations. International institutions and bodies such as the OAU, the Commonwealth and the European Community sent groups of observers.

The Jamaican Angela King was appointed in September 1992, as head of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA). The experience, the delicate and the excellent work performed by Angela King during that long period until the general elections of April 27, 1994, was recognized by all peace-loving countries and organizations in the world. Her work was essential to the birth of a new South Africa free of racism and apartheid.

Likewise, leaders of several African countries and especially South Africa have travelled in the last three decades to the Caribbean countries, either to undertake official visits or international events. On all occasions, the gratitude of the African continent was always expressed, in the speeches and conversations, to thank the outstanding assistance that, for years, these small nations offered to help the Liberation Movements and to wipe from the face of the earth the abhorrent apartheid regime.

8.7

The German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa

By Hans-Georg Schleicher

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Introduction

When veteran Namibian freedom fighter Andimba Toivo ya Toivo inaugurated a joint Namibian and German research project on anti-colonial resistance and the national liberation struggle, he made this point: “As it is with all youngsters - in their quest for their very own roads of travelling to their future - important questions need to be answered: Who am I? Where do I come from? Where am I heading to? This precisely is the point where the importance of knowing and understanding our history becomes obvious for all who wish to see the Namibian nation develop on a solid base of common identity and values.” This is also true for the history of the liberation struggle in the whole of Southern Africa.

This struggle drew international support from all over the world. This international solidarity contributed to the success of the liberation struggle in the region. The effectiveness of international solidarity depended on actions by many governments and numerous solidarity groups. Among countries supporting the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was an active player in the theatre of international solidarity right from the early days of this struggle. The following contribution covers the different aspects of the role of the GDR in the liberation struggle of Southern Africa. Section 1 deals with the importance of solidarity in the GDR, where anti-imperialist solidarity was proclaimed a basic foreign policy principle. The East German state considered the national liberation struggle to be part of the “world revolutionary process”. Therefore, the East-West conflict influenced solidarity. Many ideological, political and economic interests had to be considered. In the GDR itself, there was a broad sense of solidarity among the people to draw on, but a critical assessment includes constraints imposed on initiatives from below through the centralistic and administrative way of organising solidarity, undoubtedly a weakness of GDR solidarity. The GDR Solidarity Committee was the major instrument for mobilising, organising and implementing solidarity, but other organisations relating directly to liberation organisations were also involved in the solidarity movement. Sizeable solidarity assistance was rendered by the Churches.

The role of Southern Africa in the GDR foreign policy is analysed in Section 2. Attention which has always been paid to South Africa, because of socio-economic developments and political considerations, was extended to the region as a whole. Southern Africa received priority status with the independence of Angola and Mozambique. The support for the national liberation movement as one of the “main currents of the revolutionary world movement” grew. The socialist countries, among them the GDR, expected an extension of their influence in Southern Africa.

Section 3 covers the forms, methods and instruments of GDR solidarity, which included political support in the United Nations and other international organizations and sanctions as well as campaigns against apartheid and colonialism. Solidarity encompassed support for political prisoners, research and information on colonialism and apartheid. One important aspect was raising funds and collecting

goods as well as the provision of material assistance to the liberation movements and support in their propaganda efforts. Education and training was a trade mark of the GDR solidarity as was providing humanitarian assistance to the victims of oppression and of the armed struggle. The GDR was one of the major contributors as far as support for the armed liberation struggle was concerned.

Section 4 deals with the development of relations and the cooperation between the GDR and individual liberation movements. The review covers the period from the early 1960s till the independence of various countries (Angola and Mozambique in 1975, Zimbabwe in 1980) and, where the South African and Namibian liberation movements are concerned, up to the collapse of GDR in 1989/90.

Striking the balance of GDR solidarity Section 5 identifies partnership relations, speed and efficiency as crucial factors for its impact, including the strong personal commitment of many East Germans, which partly had to compensate for limitations and constraints. It is no surprise that an East German heritage of GDR solidarity has reappeared and is prospering. In Southern Africa itself the perception of the GDR and its solidarity is alive.

1. Solidarity: A Pillar of GDR Foreign Policy

1.1 Foreign Policy Interests, Bloc Confrontation and Cold War

The GDR existed from 1949 until 1990. It was a time which was characterised by the East-West conflict and the Cold War following the end of World War II, but it was also a time where the national liberation struggle in Africa reached its peak and conclusion. The GDR pursued an enduring policy of supporting the end of all forms of colonial oppression and the self-determination of African peoples and found itself in agreement with the majority of African and Non-Aligned countries. Based on her workingclass traditions, the ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) proclaimed “solidarity with the national liberation struggle against colonialism, racism and neo-colonialism” as one of its basic foreign policy principles. The GDR presented itself in Africa as a partner on equal terms, deliberately avoiding a paternalistic attitude.

Anti-colonialism, anti-racism and solidarity with national liberation movements were principles guiding East Germany’s international policy. But these principles were not unaffected by concrete political and economic interests and requirements in the GDR. They might accord with national interests to form a conflict-free synthesis, when clearly stated anti-colonialism went hand in hand with efforts to enhance the country’s international standing, or the principles and the interests might clash. The latter was the case when desperate efforts to improve the domestic economic situation through international trade proved incompatible with a boycott of South Africa. Tensions and conflicts between different political decision-makers end normally in a compromise deviating from the initial lofty principles, and the GDR was no exception. The problems were constantly reinforced by the general Cold War postures and by the GDR’s particular weakness in the highly sensitive area of foreign trade and international relations, where the West wielded superior power.

Solidarity determined, although to varying degrees, the thinking and action of people in the political arena. Individual features of the East German policy included shared ideological and political values with national liberation movements, its objectives internationally and in Germany, and its status as a junior partner of the Soviet Union. The political players in the GDR agreed on the principle of solidarity, but had to manage conflicts of political and economic interests in the practical pursuit of policy. Basic factors determining the GDR foreign policy were:

1. the integration into the bloc of socialist countries led by the Soviet Union
2. the East-West conflict and the impact of the inter-German confrontation as a highly specific manifestation of that conflict
3. serious economic problems.

As far as the leeway within the Eastern bloc and vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was concerned, the foreign policy of the GDR was determined by its loyalty as a member of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and by Cold War confrontations. A close relationship with the Soviet Union was a matter of principle for the GDR leadership and was only too vital for the very existence of the East German state. As a junior partner of the Soviet Union, the GDR played an important role in shaping the relations of the socialist countries with the African liberation movements. Regarding that role in Africa, the former Foreign Minister of Zimbabwe, Nathan Shamuyarira, remarked: "The GDR was one of the major players in the Eastern Bloc. After the Soviet Union, the GDR was the second most important player."¹

Contrary to the assumption of Western analysts that the GDR was merely a Soviet proxy or surrogate in Africa, the East German role proves that it was a junior partner of the Soviet Union.² The GDR had considerable room to manoeuvre, and even influenced Soviet policies. In 1977, the GDR and Cuba convinced the Soviet Union that due to recent developments in Mozambique and Ethiopia there was a new quality of "revolutionary developments" in Africa with far-reaching implications. Africa offered the best opportunities to advance the "world revolutionary process". A visit of the Soviet head of state Nicolai Podgorny to Southern Africa in early 1977 did not mention such new developments at all, contrary to evaluations by the GDR officials.³ But the joint arguments of the GDR and Cuba were obviously convincing. A few months later, the Soviets, Cubans and East Germans started giving massive support to Ethiopia.⁴ For the GDR, this was the beginning of a substantial expansion of its involvement in Africa.

For a long time, the GDR did not question the leading role of the USSR in the Eastern bloc and avoided issues of conflict. East Germany tried to encourage closer coordination and cooperation in solidarity efforts among the member states of

(1) Interview with Nathan Shamuyarira, 4 November 1995.

(2) Refer to G.M Winrow, p.6-32.

(3) SAPMO-BArch: DY 30/J IV2/202-584.

(4) Interview with Friedel Trappen, 2 July 1996; SAPMO BArch: DY 30/JIV 2/201-1292.

the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), which led to more or less regular multilateral meetings of the solidarity committees – but without any spectacular results. The relationship between the GDR and the Soviet Union changed in the 1980s; bonds were dissolved when Gorbachev's 'new thinking' gave more freedom and room to manoeuvre to socialist countries and when GDR leader Honecker disassociated himself more and more from Moscow because of disagreement with Gorbachev's perestroika.

For many years, the close relationship between the GDR and the Soviet Union included the involvement in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The vehement dispute between Moscow and Beijing was about strategy and tactics in the struggle between socialist and capitalist systems, about the evolution of socialism, and about hegemony in the "world revolutionary movement". For the GDR and its ruling party SED this was a matter of ideological and political principle. The SED was concerned about the maintenance of peace, which it saw threatened by the Chinese policy of those days. After all, the GDR was situated on the divide between two hostile political systems, where any clash of the blocs would hit the Germans first. The Sino-Soviet conflict strongly influenced the development of relations with liberation movements for quite some time. As far as the GDR was concerned, support for the armed liberation struggle always had to be balanced with the policy of peaceful coexistence between the East and West.

The disapproval of peaceful co-existence by the Chinese had a direct bearing on East German security interests. The Soviet Union encouraged the GDR to bring its specific interests into the debate over the Chinese stance. The little GDR without any Big Power interests was better placed than the superpower USSR to argue convincingly with liberation movements. East Germany, situated as it was "at the forefront of the international class struggle," could hardly be accused of any "retreat in the face of imperialism", even though it subscribed to peaceful co-existence. Moreover, its effective solidarity with liberation movements had earned the GDR prestige, not least in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation AAPSO.

The Sino-Soviet conflict degenerated into a total row, entailing heavy consequences for the relationships of the GDR with liberation organisations like ZANU which maintained close links with China. In 1967, China broke ties with AAPSO, with negative repercussions on relations with liberation organisations believed to be "pro-Chinese". When AAPSO shifted its focus of attention to Southern Africa in the second half of the 1960s, organisations like ZANU, the PAC, SWANU and COREMO found themselves barred from cooperation, as was seen in the preparations for, and the proceedings of the international conference in support of the peoples of the Portuguese colonies, South Africa, South West Africa and Zimbabwe, held in Khartoum early 1969. The conference under the auspices of AAPSO and the World Peace Council recognised the six participating liberation organisations - the ANC, ZAPU, SWAPO, MPLA, FRELIMO and PAIGC - as the sole and authentic representatives of their

peoples.⁵ This decision meant a permanent exclusion of the other organisations and proved disastrous enough, not least for relations between the GDR and the excluded organisations, particularly ZANU.

In the context of the East-West conflict, the national liberation movements were considered to be an ally of the socialist states. The impact of the Cold War on Africa increased with the collapse of the Portuguese colonial dominions and the emergence of states with socialist leanings in Angola and Mozambique, followed by an upsurge of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. The socialist countries hoped that the balance of forces in that region could be upset, with strategic reverberations beyond. It was believed that the triumph of FRELIMO and the MPLA, achieved with assistance from socialist countries, could be repeated in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

In the context of the East-West conflict, the inter-German confrontation had a major impact on GDR foreign policy. In 1955 the West German government proclaimed the Hallstein doctrine⁶ to deter Third World states from diplomatically recognising the GDR, inter alia by threatening to withdraw economic aid and to break off diplomatic relations. For almost two decades this doctrine formed an inflexible frame of reference for West and East Germany's Africa policy. It had a substantial impact on the active involvement of the GDR in the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid and on the association with the liberation movements. The German-German conflict also affected solidarity. The frontline situation seemed obvious: West Germany was siding with the South African regime and Portuguese colonialism, and the GDR supported the liberation struggle. The GDR considered the exposure of West German economic interests in Southern Africa and connections with white minority regimes a contribution to its support for the liberation movements as well as serving its own international and inter-German policy interests. The emerging new states in Africa seemed to offer good chances for the GDR to break up the international blockade imposed by West Germany.

Africa became the battleground of inter-German rivalry. The GDR attacked West Germany because of its support for Portuguese and French colonial wars and launched campaigns to reveal Bonn's "military and nuclear collaboration" with South Africa.⁷ This helped the GDR to strengthen ties with the liberation movements. A credible dissociation from the insinuated collaboration of West Germany with the apartheid regime was also successful. East Germany would take advantage of the holes in the West German attitude towards South Africa to underline what it identified as common interests with the liberation movements in the face of a common enemy. Part of the GDR activities was a large-scale propaganda effort juxtaposing the positions of the

(5) Cf. *Sechaba* 3/1969, p.3.

(6) Named after the then permanent secretary in the West German Foreign Office, Walter Hallstein.

(7) Refer to Denkschrift; and Apartheid: Who is for it.

two German states on the South African issue in the early 1960s.⁸ The GDR solidarity campaign was accompanied by press reports about conditions in the apartheid state⁹ and ties between Bonn, Pretoria and Lisbon. The Freedom for the South African people appeal criticised West German ties with South Africa and compared them with the GDR's position: "Our struggle against Hitler's heirs in the Federal Republic and your struggle against Verwoerd and Vorster – that, our African brothers, is one and the same struggle. Therefore we stand unwaveringly at your side!"¹⁰

The South African liberation movement took note of the German-German confrontation and viewed anything that would help to isolate the apartheid regime internationally as welcome support for its struggle. The ANC always considered the frontline situation of the GDR in the East-West conflict: "... the legitimacy of the German Democratic Republic was always contested by the other German state. So it of course had to have in many respects a much more aggressive foreign policy ... On the diplomatic front of course, the GDR and the FRG were both admitted to the United Nations at the same time ... the role the two countries played of course was very contrasting, because on most issues we could expect the GDR to vote with the Afro-Asian bloc, the FRG had at best an erratic voting record on Southern Africa issues."¹¹

The GDR position on colonialism and racism and its support for liberation organisations was a major asset of the East German Africa policy. GDR solidarity campaigns were strongly influenced by the rhetoric of the Cold War and, in particular, of the inter-German confrontation. Hence, the campaigns tended to be used by the GDR leadership to gain international recognition for the GDR and to discredit its Western rival – who, however, provided ample material. The divergent lines of development of the two German states, including their differing stances regarding national liberation movements, influenced the campaigns and mirrored the GDR's attempt to gain a distinctive image as a progressive alternative in Germany. Former ANC Secretary-General Alfred Nzo remembered: "The German Democratic Republic was a subject of discrimination by the international community on the basis of what was then known as the Hallstein Doctrine. A big struggle at that time by all the friends of the GDR was to ascertain that the GDR takes her rightful place in the community of nations as an independent republic of the German people ... We were part of the forces then ... I was also participating very actively in trying to ensure that this injustice had better been corrected."¹²

Solidarity was largely determined by Cold War constellations and the confrontation between the two German states. Later, the impact of the inter-German quarrels

(8) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A2/20/986, guidelines for the press concerning the solidarity campaign in November/December, 18 November 1963.

(9) Refer to *Neues Deutschland*, 5 December 1963.

(10) *Neues Deutschland*, 1 December 1963.

(11) Interview with Pallo Jordan, 4 December 1995.

(12) Interview with Alfred Nzo, 7 December 1995.

on cooperation with the liberation movements lost its momentum owing to the improving relations between the two German republics.

Besides those international aspects, GDR foreign policy was very much determined by the domestic situation and by economic problems. In 1963/64 the first major solidarity campaign with South Africa fell into a difficult time for the GDR, two years after the Berlin Wall was built. The leaders in East Berlin were trying harder to instil into the minds of people in all walks of life that the GDR was a legitimate socialist German alternative. Demonstrations of international solidarity were believed to play an important role in legitimising the GDR as a historic alternative for Germany, which embraced peace, social progress and solidarity with the anti-colonial striving of peoples for freedom. Thus the solidarity campaign with South African patriots accused in the Rivonia trial was also supposed to have some internal impact. Despite its own substantial deficits in democracy and human rights, the GDR leadership tried to underline democratic and humanitarian principles in their solidarity efforts.

Another important aspect was the economic situation of the GDR which had always been a difficult one. In the early years, economic hardships were aggravated by Western embargo policies. It was always a problem to find ways of practising solidarity and material support without overstretching its economy. In contrast to its political ambitions and activities, the GDR was short of economic resources and had to try to compensate politically for the limited economic and financial means available. This was done by actively taking sides in African conflicts, by using centralised decision-making structures for speedy actions in support of liberation movements, and by relying on highly motivated people who tried to compensate for the lack of resources through personal engagement and improvisation. The firm political stand on national liberation to a certain extent was also compensating the rather limited economic and financial means available for an active Africa policy.

Despite economic limitations, the GDR made great efforts to stick to its commitment of maximum support for the liberation struggle. Hence in the 1980s, when the volume of material aid was reduced, even for top-priority countries such as Angola and Mozambique, there were no cuts in solidarity supplies for the ANC and SWAPO. Liberation movements received all the assistance they had been promised.

12 National Liberation Struggle as Part of the “World Revolutionary Process” The proclaimed “anti-imperialist solidarity” vis-à-vis the developing countries and the national liberation movements was enshrined in the GDR constitution.¹³ The GDR regarded the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid as part of the worldwide confrontation between imperialism and progressive forces, that is, socialist countries and the forces of national liberation. Hence support for that struggle was furthering the “world revolutionary process”.

(13) Constitution, article 6, para. 3.

The Southern African liberation struggle was always seen in the context of the very complex Cold War situation and the strong reflection the East-West conflict had in Africa. Many Western countries were reluctant to recognise the legitimacy of the liberation struggle, not to speak of providing support to liberation movements. The threat of communism dominated considerations on Southern Africa in some Western capitals, resulting in the typical Cold War perceptions of the liberation movements as being “communist controlled”. That played an important role as far as the activities of the GDR were concerned. The active role of the GDR in the “world revolutionary process” claimed by its leadership has been recognised even by critical observers, specifically as far as the support for the liberation struggle is concerned.

GDR Solidarity was based on working-class traditions and on internationalist principles of socialist ideology. The movement of national liberation was considered a natural ally of the socialist countries in their struggle for progressive changes in the world. The idea of solidarity is deeply entrenched in German history, particularly in the history of the labour movement. Relating back to the staunch opposition by Social Democrats against the colonial policy of the German Empire around 1900. This tradition continued to the solidarity among the anti-fascist forces in Germany resisting the Nazi dictatorship. Quite a number of the old generation of the political elite in the GDR had gained personal experience with solidarity when they were imprisoned or exiled during the Nazi rule. In the early 1960s, officials of African liberation organisations found GDR partners with personal experience of underground struggle and exile in the anti-fascist resistance movement.¹⁴

Often the struggle against apartheid was compared to the resistance against Nazi Germany. Indeed a number of South African protagonists of apartheid drew considerably on the ideology of Nazism or had maintained close personal links with top Nazi figures and even sided with Hitler’s Germany during World War II. Remembrance of those facts instilled another emotional component into the sense of affinity between the German anti-fascists in GDR leadership and their partners in the liberation movement. The understanding of many East German political activists was that after the defeat of fascism, the German people had a special responsibility towards the other peoples of the world to eradicate racism.

In the GDR solidarity was thus a popular idea. A South African who came there for military training described his impression: “We always felt it was like they [the East Germans] were trying to wipe away the nasty history which Germany went through during the war. And so they would go all out and try to accommodate people. You got the feeling that they were genuinely committed to solidarity.”¹⁵ Solidarity and anti-racism was part of general education. Children expressed themselves in drawings on the theme of solidarity, Young Pioneers organised solidarity bazaars. The idea of solidarity accompanied juveniles and adults throughout their life. GDR mass media

(14) This was true of the first chairman of the GDR Solidarity Committee, Horst Brasch, and also of his successor, Heinz H. Schmidt, as well as of Heinrich Eggebrecht, secretary of the Committee.

(15) Interview with Jeremiah Kingsley Mamabolo, 30 October 1995.

played an essential part and reported extensively about the anti-colonial and anti-racist struggle. Africa and especially Southern Africa was very much the focus of the media coverage of international events. It appears that solidarity as a principled position was widely accepted by East Germans and was part of the GDR society. The solidarity movement— despite flaws and restrictions – was a genuine and popular movement.

That was experienced by representatives of the liberation movements, through the support they received from the GDR government or the solidarity committee, but also from a number of organisations and institutions. The GDR could rely on a huge solidarity potential reflecting not only the government's foreign policy of support for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, but also the readiness of people to express solidarity. There was a broad sense of solidarity for citizens to draw on. Most citizens actively involved in practising solidarity spiritualised this feeling. But the centralistic and administrative way of organising solidarity limited initiatives from below and prevented a democratic grassroots movement. The relationship between the centralistic structures and grassroots solidarity initiatives in the GDR was not always an easy one. Furthermore, the undemocratic character of the state-socialist society in which the political rights of its people were curtailed, clashed with the official claim to champion the right to self-determination of colonially and racially oppressed people. This was undoubtedly the major weakness of GDR solidarity.

As solidarity was considered a mutual co-operation between comrades and partners, GDR leaders and officials as well as those involved in the support of and co-operation with the liberation organisations considered themselves to be participants of a common cause, comrades in arms. The attitude was one of equal partnership, although sometimes paternalistic tendencies could not be denied. African liberation movements found the biggest common ground with the GDR in the focus on decolonisation and anti-imperialism.

While solidarity rested on such general principles, it served as a vehicle for specific foreign policy interests of the GDR in its drive to achieve international recognition as an equal member of the community of nations. As a junior partner of the Soviet Union, the GDR played an important role in shaping the relations of the socialist bloc with the liberation movements. Such successful cooperation allowed the GDR some room to move. The relationship between the GDR and the liberation movements was furthered by similar or identical political ideologies, inspirations and political values. In addition, evaluations of international developments provided ample common ground to establish and maintain a stable mutual relationship. This, of course, did not exclude differences of opinion, for example on how to judge political adversaries or devise the strategy and tactics of the liberation struggle.

3 Foreign Policy Structures, Major GDR Actors in Solidarity

The centralistic system of the GDR was reflected in its foreign policy and structures. The governing party SED- politically most important - played a major role as far as

the support of the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid and solidarity is concerned. The Solidarity Committee was the main instrument of that foreign policy aspect of the GDR and the main East German contact for liberation movements from the 1960s well into the 1970s. The Solidarity Committee, which was founded on 22 July 1960, provided conditions for a nationwide solidarity movement.¹⁶ The committee coordinated solidarity activities of political parties (except the SED) as well as mass and other societal organisations. Its task was to mobilise, coordinate, organise and implement practical solidarity. In the 1960s, the Solidarity Committee cultivated contacts and relations with liberation movements on behalf of the GDR.

The SED took over as the number one partner for political cooperation as soon as it entered into direct official links with individual African liberation organisations in the 1970s. These relations were handled by the international relations department of the SED Central Committee. However, the Solidarity Committee remained responsible for organising both physical supplies to liberation movements and political solidarity campaigns.

On the international scene, the GDR Solidarity Committee cooperated closely with AAPSO, the World Peace Council and, from the 1970s onwards, with UN institutions, NGOs and solidarity organisations in Western countries. It was highly respected internationally. It was also represented in the International Committee against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa (ICSA). Its representatives participated in the International Commission of Inquiry into the Crimes of the South African Apartheid Regime. The GDR Solidarity Committee cooperated with partner organisations in other socialist countries, through consultations and practical cooperation.

Formally, the Solidarity Committee was not a state-controlled organisation, but it was integrated into the centralistic structure of GDR society, politically guided and supervised by the SED. Whenever foreign policy objectives were concerned, the Foreign Ministry brought influence to bear on the committee's operations. The Solidarity Committee was never a non-governmental organisation in the true sense of the word. The centralistic system in the GDR did not allow for the development of a vivid civil society and organisations of such a society. So the function of the committee was ambivalent: It expressed a widespread will to act in solidarity with the liberation movements by organising and co-ordinating material and political support. But at the same time it was part of centralistic decision-making structures. Its actions were based on principles like anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism and anti-racism. But as an instrument of the international policy of the ruling party it was also strongly influenced by Cold War constellations and ideology.

The Solidarity Committee coordinated activities of various organisations, collected and managed financial contributions. In addition to trade unions and the political

¹⁶ Originally the Committee for Solidarity with the peoples of Africa, it was renamed Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the GDR, in 1973 it became the Solidarity Committee of the GDR.

parties, societal or mass organisations were the pillars of active solidarity and stakeholders of the solidarity movement. There was the National Front, with political parties and other organisations under its umbrella, which contributed to spreading the idea of anti-imperialist solidarity in residential areas. Political parties, trade unions and other political organisations and professional associations contributed to the solidarity fund. Besides the SED, other political parties in the GDR – the Liberal Democratic Party of Germany (LDPD), the National Democratic Party of Germany (NDPD), the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany (DBD) – contributed through financial donations from their members. The armed forces in the GDR participated with substantial donations from their members. Some of the GDR organisations supporting the Solidarity Committee had direct partnership links with liberation movements. Besides the SED and the trade union confederation FDGB, these included the youth organisation FDJ, the women's organisation DFD and the journalists union VDJ.

The bulk of the funds flowing to the Solidarity Committee were contributed by members of the FDGB. By 1960, the FDGB's annual transfer was some 2 million Marks. It grew and steadied at 100 million Marks from 1976 to 1987, to decrease to 80 and 75 million Marks in 1988 and 1989 respectively. The share of solidarity contributions from other organisations, governmental agencies, churches, schools and other sources rose continually from 1980, exceeding 100 million Marks in 1987-

89.17 Sizeable solidarity assistance was rendered by the Churches, partly on their own and partly in cooperation with the Solidarity Committee. There were also church-related anti-apartheid groups outside the official solidarity movement. The role of the churches was significant. Widespread enthusiasm within the East German population for the support of the anti-colonial struggle in Africa was an important base for the committee to carry out meaningful work.

The Solidarity Committee raised roughly 220 million Marks annually (the largest amount was 300 million Marks in 1979) mostly through its affiliated organisations.¹⁸ It was through the activities of the Solidarity Committee that the GDR became famous throughout the Third World for its aid to liberation movements, training of cadres, treating of wounded cadres, etc. In a way, the Solidarity Committee was the best advertising the GDR had for its Third World policies.¹⁹

Direct assistance and supplies given by other organisations should also be mentioned. Beside the funds it transferred to the Solidarity Committee, the FDGB made its own contributions by financing courses for trade unionists at its own College and by providing material supplies as well. Being a major theme in the political work

of the FDGB, solidarity played a role in trade union elections and at preparations for congresses. The trade union newspaper *Tribuene* focused on the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. The Journalists Union VDJ financed advanced training for

(17) Cf. I. Schleicher, *Statistische Angaben zur Solidaritaet*, p.150, tab. 1.

(18) B. Schulz, *East German Relations*, p.69.

(19) B. Schulz, *Development Policy*, p.69.

journalists at its School of Solidarity from its own budget. The youth organisation FDJ (with more than two million members) trained youth affair officers of liberation movements at its Youth College. Another organisation that was actively involved was the Women's League DFD with two million members, which also gave regular contributions to the funds of the Solidarity Committee.²⁰

The German-African Society (DAFRIG) played a role in mobilising solidarity and supporting practical contacts with members of liberation movements. Many other organisations such as the professional associations of artisans and tradesmen, the Association of Mutual Farmer's Assistance (VdGB), the Sculptors and Painters Union, the Cultural Association as well as the Cooperative Society, actively participated in the solidarity movement. Especially remarkable were the efforts of the Anti-fascist Resistance Fighters of the GDR. Its district and county committees regularly donated to the solidarity fund.²¹ This was also true for the Association of Victims of the Nazi Regime.²² The Red Cross society and other organisations, too, contributed resources of their own to the nation-wide solidarity effort. Within the anti-racism programme of the World Council of Churches, the churches in the GDR provided assistance for liberation movements in humanitarian fields.

Most churches in the GDR raised contributions to help peoples in the Third World and supported their struggle against colonialism and racism. Members of the Protestant churches debated whether churches should support liberation movements. GDR churches supported the anti-racism programme of the Ecumenical Council of Churches, but wanted to preserve their independence and distinguish their solidarity as an expression of Christian charity from the ideologically motivated official solidarity. The churches used the good offices of the Solidarity Committee in specific cases.²³ Churches and other Christian institutions showed solidarity with prisoners and the accused in political trials in South Africa.²⁴ Bishops in the GDR even intervened with the South African Justice Minister, Vorster. But they did not want publicity at the time, presumably because of the tense relationship between the state and the churches in the GDR. The Solidarity Committee respected their wish.²⁵ The Federation of Protestant Churches donated a substantial sum every year. The congregations of other churches also contributed considerable funds. "Brot fuer die Welt" (bread for the world) was one of the relief organisations that cooperated closely with the Solidarity Committee. So did the Gossner Mission. It raised funds directly and made them available to the ANC, the PAC and other liberation movements in Southern Africa. This did not exclude support for the armed struggle, which was a

(20) For instance in 1977 DFD handed over 3 million Marks to the Solidarity Committee. See *Against Racism*, p.151.

(21) In 1977 alone, they gave more than 2,2 million Marks. See: *Against Racism*, p.151.

(22) They contributed more than 2 million Marks in 1978. See: *Against Racism*, p.232.

(23) J. Althausen, p.74 f.

(24) *German Democratic Republic demands Freedom*, p.9.

(25) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A2/20/985, information on the solidarity campaign from the Solidarity Committee to the SED CC international relations department, 15 August 1966.

problem for some of the churches. But Friederike Schulze, a long-time activist with Gossner Mission, mentions a “gentleman’s agreement” with the liberation movements that church money was not to be used for purchasing weapons.²⁶ The Gossner Mission also supported South African students in the GDR. In 1971, INKOTA, an ecumenical network of grassroots solidarity groups under the umbrella of the Federation of Protestant Churches, was founded. They looked for an alternative solidarity approach, independent of government policy.

There were also examples of individual solidarity actions. For 20 years a local church community in a village near Leipzig provided goods for South African refugees and local communities in Lesotho as well as for the ANC school in Morogoro, Tanzania, with a value of up to 100,000 Marks annually, mainly owing to the commitment and ingenuity of their pastor Gottfried Wolff.²⁷

These various organisations participated in solidarity campaigns in the GDR. It is quite interesting to look at the internal decision-making mechanisms and the ways and means of organising international solidarity and assistance under conditions of a centralistic system and limited economic capabilities. The early solidarity campaign in support of the South African patriots accused at the Rivonia trial in 1963/64 is a typical example. Solidarity activities were planned and organised in the GDR. The precondition for launching the Rivonia campaign was a formal decision by the SED Central Committee Secretariat. It included proposals for specific actions from the FDGB, the FDJ, DAFRIG and other organisations. Officials from the Foreign Ministry, SED, FDGB, FDJ and other organisations met to discuss the campaign details.²⁸ The call for solidarity in December 1963 was well received by a very great number of people in different walks of life.

Following the centralistic decision, individual organisations took the initiative. The trade union confederation FDGB played a major part in mobilising its members, who came together to manifest their solidarity at workplace meetings in a dozen of cities and towns. ²⁹ The youth organisation FDJ convened rallies, collected signatures for a protest resolution and organised student rallies at universities. DAFRIG organised a solidarity rally at the Technical University of Dresden. The GDR Peace Council met with students for a solidarity meeting in Leipzig. The Women’s League DFD called on all its regional executives to make use of branch meetings in neighbourhoods to adopt protest resolutions.³⁰ There were manifestations of solidarity by different social and professional groups in various regions of the GDR.³¹ This solidarity campaign was organised from above, with the participating organisations taking charge of the various activities. The mobilising effect reached remarkable results. Other campaigns

(26) Callinicos, p.513.

(27) G. Wolff, p.122 ff.

(28) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, minutes of the meeting on 14 November 1963.

(29) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/986, information by the FDGB National executive, 17 January 1964.

(30) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, 986, BArch; P DZ 8/7305-662, draft reports on the solidarity campaign, without dates.

(31) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, press release from the National Council, 8 January 1964.

later on followed a similar pattern, with different organisations or institutions taking the initiative.

The spirit of solidarity was spread among the GDR population to an extent that should not be underestimated. For instance, assistance for Namibian refugees in Angola met with wholehearted support from the GDR public, including children. When the children's magazine *Bummi* called upon children below school age to collect gifts for Angolan and Namibian children, the response was enthusiastic. Over 950,000 gifts, often children's favourite toys, were packed, transported, and finally handed over in Angola in July 1983.³²

2. The GDR and Southern Africa

2.1 Focus on Southern Africa

Southern Africa was a priority area for GDR solidarity. Originally this classification related to ideological considerations as far as the "revolutionary potential" of South Africa itself with its developed class structure was concerned, resulting in early relations with the South African liberation movement. Originally, the GDR Africa policy focussed on gaining international diplomatic recognition. This seemed most likely with the newly independent states in West, Central and East Africa. Despite such considerations, the liberation struggle in Southern Africa has always been in the focus. At an early stage, relations were established with liberation movements there, which received political and material support from the GDR.

Compared to other socialist states, the GDR was considered by African liberation movements to be mostly involved with Africa. "The GDR was omnipresent in Africa and gave a lot of support; mainly in the field of training ... The GDR was 'in charge of Africa'.³³ The East German involvement in Southern Africa was characterised by a policy of:

1. strict opposition to colonialism and apartheid
2. active diplomatic involvement on these issues in the United Nations
3. boycott of the South African apartheid regime
4. support for the frontline states against South African pressure
5. support for liberation movements.

Solidarity with the liberation struggle became a trademark of the GDR Africa policy and resulted in valuable international recognition and praise. It also generated legitimacy for the SED regime internally.

At an early stage, the GDR sought contact with the OAU and its Liberation Committee, referring to the common support for the national liberation struggle. The GDR was also looking for African support in the inter-German rivalry. When the

⁽³²⁾ Schleicher/ Schleicher (1997), p.183.

⁽³³⁾ Interview with Max Sisulu, 5 January 1996.

GDR decided on sanctions against South Africa in 1963, the Solidarity Committee informed the newly established OAU Liberation Committee and explained the diametrically opposed policies of the two German states vis-à-vis South Africa. It placed the GDR's support of the South African liberation movement in the context of the inter-German confrontation and, in this sense, stated that "consistent struggle against West German imperialism and militarism and its chauvinistic policy of revanchism and neo-colonialism" was the decisive merit of this support.³⁴

At the same time, the GDR was actively cooperating with AAPSO in their support of the liberation struggle. AAPSO had invited the GDR Solidarity Committee and other European socialist countries' committees to attend, as observers, its 3rd Conference in February 1963, held in Moshi, Tanganyika. In September 1964, the GDR Committee was the first from an Eastern European country (except the USSR) to open a liaison office at AAPSO's Permanent Secretariat in Cairo. In 1965, AAPSO decided to grant observer status to Eastern European Solidarity Committees. Finally, the GDR Solidarity Committee was admitted as an associate member of AAPSO in 1974.

Since 1973, on the occasion of Africa Freedom Day in May, the GDR Solidarity Committee had been supplying solidarity goods to the OAU Liberation Committee for distribution to liberation movements, annually. Details of this first consignment are given in a letter from Major Hashim Mbita, the Liberation Committee's Executive Secretary, to the GDR Ambassador in Dar es Salaam, dated 17 July 1973. The consignment consisted of uniform fabrics, medicine, medical dressing and foodstuff with a value of 178,000 Marks. It was distributed by the Liberation Committee to 8 liberation organisations, with FRELIMO and MPLA receiving a major part, followed by SWAPO, ZANU and ZAPU, with smaller consignments going to FNLA, ANC and PAC. The OAU training centre received some medicine.³⁵ In the following years until 1989, the GDR Solidarity Committee provided solidarity supplies to the Liberation Committee to be distributed to the various liberation movements. Since the GDR focussed her support in the various countries on one respective liberation organisation only, other organisations like ZANU, PAC and even FNLA indirectly received GDR supplies channelled through the OAU Liberation Committee.

In the following years, the GDR supplies to the Liberation Committee increased substantially to reach a value of 1 million Marks in 1980, but the annual average was about 350,000 Marks. Supplies included more sophisticated goods like medical equipment, radios, binoculars etc..³⁶ In 1973, the GDR had succeeded in gaining full

(34) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/A2/20/987, Brasch's letter to Telli, copy without date. Cf. also *Neues Deutschland*, 4 Sept. 1963: Brasch's message to African heads of state taking part in the founding conference of the OAU in Addis Ababa.

(35) Cf. BArch, P DZ/8 7327-662.

(36) BArch, P DZ 8/7327-662; SAPMO BArch: DY 30/JIV 2/3/A-3103; SAPMO BArch: DY 30/JIV 2/3/A-3412; BArch: DY 30/JIV 2/3/A-3568; BArch: DY 30/JIV 2/3/A-3745; BArch: DY 30/JIV 2/3/A-4036; BArch: DY 30/JIV 2/3/A-4183; BArch: DY 30/JIV 2/3/A-4337; BArch: DY 30/JIV 2/2/A-2972; DY 30/JIV 2/3/A-4652; DY 30/JIV 2/3/A-4767.

diplomatic recognition by the international community and admission to the United Nations. The GDR's foreign policy made use of the new and greater possibilities to support the Southern African liberation movements politically and diplomatically, primarily in UN bodies, with a view to promoting international acceptance of their role and aims. GDR officials spoke out for their right to employ such means of struggle against the colonialist and racist regimes as they deemed appropriate, including armed fighting.

This happened despite the trend towards detente in Europe and between the superpowers USA and USSR since the late 1960s/early 1970s, which revived the issue about whether politics of peaceful coexistence were compatible with support for the armed liberation struggle. There was suspicion in the Third World and in liberation movements that the rapprochement between the blocs might lead to a sell-out of their interests. The West regarded assistance for liberation movements, which it called "terrorists", as irreconcilable with detente and disarmament. The East, including the GDR, held the view that detente in Europe did not mean maintaining the social and political status quo throughout the world and, more importantly, that colonial and racial oppression as a source of conflict and war needed to be eliminated.³⁷

While the European process of detente was reaching a climax, the situation in Southern Africa changed dramatically when the Portuguese colonial empire collapsed in 1974/1975 and Angola and Mozambique gained independence. This also provided a major boost to liberation movements in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. It gave rise to hopes in the Eastern bloc that the balance of forces in the region could be upset, with strategic reverberations beyond. Towards the end of the 1970s, the Soviet Union and its allies thought a strategic defeat could be inflicted on the West in that region. Developments in Southern Africa prompted the Soviet Union and its allies to expand their support for states and liberation organisations in the region.

Liberation movements in Southern Africa became a priority target of the GDR's Africa policy. That included giving substantial military support to the MPLA during the critical situation in 1975/76 and helping the new FRELIMO government in Mozambique to stabilise. In Southern Africa, the GDR supported ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU. Three of four priorities of its Africa policy in the 1970s were concentrated in Southern Africa, namely Angola, Mozambique and the liberation movements of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. The increased African commitment of the GDR in the mid-1970s and the upsurge in the liberation struggle in Southern Africa was noted by liberation organisations. Pallo Jordan observed: "Beginning around 1974/75, with the collapse of the Caetano regime in Portugal and the independence of the four Portuguese colonies ... the German Democratic Republic was able to play a much more ... high profile role in Southern Africa. Mozambique and Angola were becoming independent and almost immediately the GDR was able to open embassies

(37) Such was the argument of Peter Florin, the GDR representative to the UN, in his first speech in the Security Council debate on South Africa. (DAP 1974, vol. XXII/2, (East) Berlin 1978, 642ff.)

in the two countries. GDR technical and other assistance was very important for both countries. And also in relation to the other liberation movements in Southern Africa the GDR was able to play a prominent role. Beginning 1975/76, again through the Solidarity Committee, agreements were struck between the liberation movements in Southern Africa, ZAPU, ANC, SWAPO and German Democratic Republic institutions on various forms of material assistance.”³⁸

Henceforth, Africa played a significant role in the GDR’s foreign policy. The GDR Africa policy reached its zenith with Honecker’s official trip to Southern Africa in 1979. During state visits, Honecker signed Treaties of Friendship and Cooperation with Angola and Mozambique: the first such treaties with developing countries outside of the socialist world. This GDR policy, determined by the international situation, by its principles and by its own political and economic interests, coincided with intensified efforts by the liberation movements and independent states in Southern Africa to bring down the minority regimes in Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

The GDR was in agreement with the front-line states and the Zimbabwe liberation movement in consistently rejecting all “internal settlement” variants for Zimbabwe. During his Africa visit in February 1979, Honecker expressly confirmed this to his partners in Angola, Zambia and Mozambique. The GDR supported ZAPU and unity among the Zimbabwean liberation organisations. In early 1980 in view of the forthcoming elections in Zimbabwe and recognising the important role of the Frontline States the GDR undertook a special political initiative. GDR ambassadors conveyed messages from Honecker to the presidents of Mozambique, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia and to the co-presidents of the Patriotic Front of ZANU and ZAPU, emphasising the need to maintain and strengthen the unity of the Patriotic Front of ZANU and ZAPU for progressive forces in Zimbabwe to succeed.³⁹

In the late 1970s, following developments in Angola and Mozambique, Western diplomatic efforts aimed at negotiated solutions for Zimbabwe and Namibia reached their peak with the Lancaster House negotiations for Zimbabwe and the UN Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) for Namibia. Suddenly, with increased political and military activities of liberation movements in Southern Africa, Western diplomatic initiatives were undertaken to prevent these movements from achieving an unconditional takeover. These activities naturally served Western economic, political and military interests in a strategic sense. Given the perception of the socialist states, in the second half of the 1970s, compromise settlements in Southern Africa did not fit in with the strategic interests of the Eastern bloc. Western initiatives on Namibia and Zimbabwe therefore encountered little goodwill on the part of the USSR and its allies. The GDR described them as neo-colonialist manoeuvres, designed to prevent the isolation of South Africa, to secure Western influence in Southern Africa, and to contain the gains of socialism in the region.

(38) Interview with Pallo Jordan, 4 December, 1995.

(39) Schleicher and Schleicher (1998), p.137.

Southern Africa was of some importance to the GDR, which had established bilateral relations with a number of countries and had to consider the interests of those countries. Its two main allies, Angola and Mozambique, were very much involved in supporting the liberation struggle. The GDR also developed close relations with Zambia and – after some irritations in the early 1980s – with Zimbabwe; less with Botswana and Lesotho, and more or less none with Swaziland. The GDR supported the regional organisation SADCC in its efforts to reduce economic dependence on South Africa. GDR observer delegations participated in SADCC meetings, and projects in SADCC countries were supported.

But in the 1980s, there was a general decline in the East German engagement in Africa. The reasons were manifold. The GDR commitments in Africa had grown out of proportion. The crisis-stricken East German economy could not afford the strain. Expectations of successful economic cooperation with African countries did not materialise. Political and economic developments in African states of “socialist orientation” were a sobering experience. At the same time, East German foreign policy became European-centred, focusing on international security and disarmament. The decline of the African commitment of the GDR was not abrupt and was not even felt at that time. But economic and other activities were reduced, bilateral relations became stagnant. GDR economic interests were prevailing, represented by influential SED officials with the Secretary for Economics Guenter Mittag. But the support for liberation organisations was not affected, mainly due to the commitment of Erich Honecker himself to the spirit of solidarity and the continued support of the struggle against racism and apartheid.

The 1980s also saw changes as far as the political approach of the GDR to the problems in Southern Africa was concerned. The new approach was consistent with the GDR’s policy of peace and dialogue in Europe, and put explicit emphasis on the need for peace in the region. Partly owing to new political and economic priorities in the GDR itself, but also to Southern Africa’s degeneration into an acute source of conflict, and taking note of international trends, the GDR developed a new, constructive stand in support of a political settlement in Southern Africa. The GDR rejected the policy of confrontation in Southern Africa and pleaded for a negotiated solution for Namibia’s independence. It supported ANC contacts with other political forces in South Africa, including the white political elite. The GDR took pains to avoid the impression that its commitment to the struggle against racism and apartheid would change. On the contrary, the unqualified support for the ANC and SWAPO continued and even increased.

A strategic GDR paper of 1984 supported initiatives “aimed at ensuring a peaceful evolution in the region, independence, territorial integrity and sovereign statehood, and a further reinforcement of collaboration with the national liberation movements” by the African states. The GDR should encourage coordinated action by OAU member states, in particular the frontline states and the liberation movements, among themselves and with the socialist states and other allies. Political, diplomatic

and material support for the ANC and SWAPO should be continued.⁴⁰ The paper differed from the mind-set of the mid 1970s in that it no longer envisaged any further change in the international balance of forces in favour of socialism, but a need to defend positions already gained in Southern Africa. The dominant concern was to prevent an escalation of the conflict and restore peace and security to the region as conditions for its future development.

This approach accorded with interests and aims of the frontline states, was considered by the GDR a very important factor in the region. In April 1987, foreign ministers of frontline states visited the GDR to outline problems in relation to the South African policy of aggression and destabilisation. They were received by Erich Honecker for an exchange of views on the situation in Southern Africa. The GDR approach took into account the liberation struggle as well as the complicated developments within those countries directly confronted with South Africa. Beyond that, it was becoming increasingly clear that the GDR's economic weakness (which left no scope for undertaking additional commitments in favour of Mozambique at that meeting⁴¹) did not permit a further-reaching strategy in Southern Africa in the context of "a continued world revolutionary process".

The South African destabilisation strategy confronted the Eastern bloc with a choice: Should priority go to stabilising Angola and Mozambique or supporting the armed struggle of SWAPO and ANC? Internal discussions in the GDR decided in favour of Angola and Mozambique, without cutting back assistance for the liberation movements. The GDR's commitment to a political settlement was not at odds with continued unrestricted solidarity for ANC and SWAPO. Neither of those movements ever doubted the GDR's stand. Essop Pahad confirmed: "The GDR would discuss with the leadership of the ANC and the party (SACP – HGS) before they made contacts with white South Africans who were not in the ANC or the party, never mind the regime. And by then we were encouraging these contacts ourselves ... We also knew that they were deeply committed to support only the ANC."⁴²

In the course of "new thinking" a strategic paper on developments in Africa to be expected until 2000 was drafted in the GDR Foreign Ministry in 1988/89. The confrontational approach with simplifying socio-economic models was dropped, and the need for East-West cooperation in solving regional problems as well as improving the international framework for the solution of developing problems was stressed.⁴³ In practical terms, the GDR supported the political settlement of the Namibian question and was actively involved in the implementation of the UN Security Council

(40) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/2.2.115/25, exposé, Zur gegenwaertigen Entwicklung in der Region des suedlichen Afrika und Schlussfolgerungen fuer die Aussenpolitik der DDR, 30 November 1984.

(41) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-3012, Politburo decision, 28 April 1987: Report on the visit (20-21 April 1987).

(42) Interview with Essop Pahad, 30 November 1995.

(43) SAPMO-BArch: DY 30/IV 2/2115/30: Vorlage fuer die APK: Die Bedeutung Afrikas in den internationalen Beziehungen am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts, 16 March, 1989.

resolution 435. New political thinking in the GDR fitted well into international efforts to overcome the Cold War.

2.2 Support of the Liberation Struggle - Historic Background and Early Contacts

The GDR, itself being a result of post-war developments, welcomed the developing process of decolonisation after World War II. Regarding colonial traditions of the former German empire, Walter Ulbricht as head of the East German state declared in 1960 before an audience of foreign diplomats that the GDR's awareness of this tradition meant a rupture with the policy of the German Reich and that its foreign policy differed fundamentally from that of West Germany. "The German Democratic Republic", he said, "follows a different tradition of the German people vis-à-vis countries and peoples which are languishing under colonial repression and waging a struggle for their national liberation - the tradition of the German working class and of German humanists, who always despised and fought against colonial oppression and exploitation; who always defended the sacred right for oppressed peoples to live in freedom and human dignity, the right for all peoples to live in happiness in independent nation-states."⁴⁴

Based on that position the GDR actively got involved in political activities interrelating with forces of national liberation. In April 1960, a GDR observer delegation attended the 2nd Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference organised by AAPSO in Conakry.⁴⁵ The GDR established relations with liberation movements in Southern Africa in the early 1960s or even before. Trade union contacts as well as relations of the SED with communist parties in South Africa, Britain and Portugal were used to establish relations with nationalist organisations.

The GDR supported MPLA in Angola since its inauguration in 1956.⁴⁶ Contacts with the Mozambican liberation organisations were developed immediately after they established themselves in exile. As far as South Africa was concerned, contacts between the SED and SACP as well as between the FDGB and SACTU were instrumental for developing official relations between the GDR Solidarity Committee and the ANC. The GDR established contacts with the Zimbabwe liberation movement in 1960. In the same year the Solidarity Committee approached the Namibian liberation movements SWAPO and SWANU.

In the early 1960s the GDR maintained an office of a representative of the GDR government in Cairo. It was instrumental for GDR contacts to African and Arab countries as well as with liberation movements. The Cairo office served as a direct communication channel with the Solidarity Committee. At this early stage of activities in Africa, observers consider the role of the Solidarity Committee crucial: "It was during this era that the Solidarity Committee was of enormous importance

(44) DAP 1960, vol. VIII, (East) Berlin 1961, 201.

(45) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(46) Post/Sandvoss, p.54.

in the execution of foreign policy, and the visit of a liberation movement leader was treated like an important state visit from a foreign dignitary. It was during this first phase then that the GDR established its international reputation in terms of aiding national liberation movements and acting in a radical anti-imperialist fashion.”⁴⁷ The GDR and the liberation movements in Southern Africa shared overall interests which were also conditioned by the East-West Cold War confrontation.

In March 1961, GDR Solidarity Committee chairman Horst Brasch had consultations with liberation movements’ representatives from South Africa, Northern and Southern Rhodesia, and Namibia at the 3rd All-African Peoples’ Conference in Cairo. In February 1963, the Solidarity Committee participated in the Solidarity Conference of AAPSO in Moshi, Tanganyika.⁴⁸ Brasch attended Kenya’s independence celebrations in December 1963 in Nairobi,⁴⁹ while Henry Eggebrecht represented the Solidarity Committee at the Zambian independence celebrations in 1964.⁵⁰ These invitations were of specific significance, since West Germany worked hard to prevent the GDR from any kind of recognition. Cairo continued to be an important pivot in GDR relations with the liberation movements, especially since 1964 with a liaison office of the Solidarity Committee there.⁵¹

Considering the domestic situation in the GDR in the years after the Berlin wall was built, it seemed that political leaders were trying harder to instil into the minds of people that the GDR was a legitimate socialist German alternative. Demonstrations of international solidarity were believed to play an important role in legitimising the GDR as a historic alternative for Germany, embracing peace, social progress and solidarity with the anti-colonial striving of peoples for freedom. Foreign policy efforts had to compensate for internal difficulties in East Germany. It was also a time when the GDR was trying hard to establish ties with African and Asian countries in order to breach the international blockade created by the West.

It was exactly the time when solidarity became crucial for the South African liberation movement. After the apartheid regime had crushed the structures of the ANC and other political organisations in South Africa, international solidarity became indispensable as a lifeline which gave the movement a chance to rebuild their strength. The GDR was among the first states to offer assistance to South Africa’s liberation movement. The massive solidarity campaign with the Rivonia Trialists in 1963/64 was followed by other similar activities. The GDR Solidarity Committee drew up proposals for supporting the World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners in April 1964 and beyond.⁵²

(47) B. Schulz, ‘East German Relations’, p.26.

(48) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(49) SAPMO BArch NY 4182/1326.

(50) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/989.

(51) Schleicher/ Schleicher (1997), p.243.

(52) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A2/20/985, Schmidt’s letter, 14 April 1964; memo from Florin to Honecker, 15 April 1964.

Since the early 1960s the GDR had used the diplomatic arena to unequivocally position itself as far as the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid was concerned. Official GDR statements denounced the apartheid regime in South Africa, the colonial policy of Portugal as well as the Rhodesian minority regime of Ian Smith. At the same time these comments, in the then habitual cold-war style, were used to “unmask” the ambivalent attitude which the West in general and West Germany in particular were taking towards these issues. Although the GDR was not yet a member of the United Nations, it addressed its statements to the UN as well as to the OAU and various other international organisations.

3. GDR Solidarity - Forms, Methods and Instruments

3.1 Political and Diplomatic Support

Solidarity with and support for the liberation struggle encompassed a wide range of areas and took different forms. As far as the GDR was concerned, one important aspect was political and diplomatic support for liberation organisations. Such support in international organisations and especially in the UN became a trade mark of GDR solidarity. It included the GDR’s involvement in respective activities and conferences of the international solidarity movement, as well as events, including scientific functions, some of them convened in the GDR.

In a statement of 2 March 1959, the Foreign Ministry emphasised the GDR’s position as that of a staunch supporter of the peoples of the African continent who are fighting for their freedom.⁵³ The UN was a major international stage of the struggle against racism and apartheid as well as of support for and cooperation with Southern African liberation movements. Owing to the international blockade organised by West Germany, the GDR became a member of the UN rather late in September 1973 (at the same time as West Germany). Before its accession to membership, the GDR used every possible occasion to participate in UN activities relating to decolonisation and the struggle against racism and apartheid. In August 1967, for instance, the Solidarity Committee chairman Heinz H. Schmidt attended a UN anti-apartheid seminar in Lusaka as an observer.

Since becoming a member of the UN in 1973, the GDR gave support to the international struggle of peoples for freedom, independence and self-determination through countless initiatives.⁵⁴ Liberation movements regarded political and diplomatic support as an important display of solidarity. GDR representatives voted for all resolutions of the UN that supported African positions on apartheid, colonialism, and the plundering by multilateral corporations, as well as military and nuclear collaboration with South Africa. It was the understanding and at the same

(53) DAP 1960, vol. VII, 56ff.

(54) See *Against Racism*, p.29.

time very much in the interest of the liberation movements that the GDR played a role of a kind of watchdog in the UN, in a political sense, as TheoBen Gurirab, long- time SWAPO representative in New York, described it.⁵⁵

The GDR was one of the first states to sign the UN Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crimes of Apartheid (2 May 1974). The convention came into force in the GDR with unrestricted effect.⁵⁶ Officials stated the firm positions of their country on the struggle against racism and apartheid, which included the demand for:

- the implementation of a strict arms embargo against the Pretoria regime
- an end to the collaboration between imperialist states and South Africa
- the continued international isolation of the apartheid regime
- an end to the racist rule of terror in South Africa
- the repeal of all racist laws
- the immediate and unconditional release of all political prisoners and detainees
- the tracking down of all those directly responsible for the crimes of apartheid in accordance with the convention.⁵⁷

The GDR advocated appropriate measures against South Africa in accordance with chapter VII of the UN Charter, including an arms embargo. East Germany unconditionally complied with sanctions. East German diplomats in New York participated regularly in debates in the Security Council, the General Assembly and its committees, and in specialised agencies on issues relevant to Southern Africa, giving support to the cause of the liberation movements. In 1975 the GDR became a member of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid. In 1974, that UN Special Committee had met in Berlin, which was an expression of the GDR support for the work of the committee as well as an appreciation of the active engagement of the host country. East Germany was actively contributing to the work of the UN Special Committee with activities like hosting committee meetings, organising weeks of Solidarity with African peoples fighting for national liberation, publications, exhibitions etc. The GDR offered to produce booklets in German for the UN Centre against Apartheid free of charge, and the first edition of such booklets was published in 1977.⁵⁸ Several times, the East German Solidarity Committee reported on its activities before the UN Special Committee.⁵⁹ The GDR also supported the African struggle as a member of various special organisations of the UN. At the UNESCO in Paris in 1974, the GDR co-sponsored a draft resolution condemning the policy of apartheid and recommending that UN member states review school textbooks and syllabi accordingly.

(55) Interview with Theo-Ben Gurirab, 8 February 1996.

(56) Gesetzblatt II, no. 26, 1974.

(57) *Against Racism*, p.103.

(58) *Against Racism*, p.123.

(59) *Sechaba*, June 1985, p.29.

The GDR was regularly involved in activities of the international solidarity movement and of the UN regarding Southern Africa. Some events were convened in the GDR, in cooperation with international organisations or in the context of international solidarity campaigns. In February 1979, the GDR hosted a special session of the World Peace Council to promote solidarity with the peoples of Southern Africa and to propagate the objectives of the International Anti-Apartheid Year.⁶⁰ In 1981, an International Seminar on Publicity and the Role of Mass Media in the International Mobilisation against Apartheid took place in Berlin. In July 1980 and February 1982, ICSA held sessions of its Secretariat in Potsdam and in Berlin. A preparatory session of the International Commission of Inquiry of Apartheid Crimes in Luanda was held in the GDR in January 1981. The GDR participated in many international anti-apartheid conferences.

The UN and GDR officials held high-level consultations concerning the struggle against racism and apartheid. UN assistant secretary-general James Jonah as well as the chairmen of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid Yusuf Maitana-Sule and Joseph N. Garba visited the GDR, as did the director of the UN Centre against Apartheid, Enuga S. Reddy. GDR Solidarity Committee president Kurt Seibt paid visits to New York from time to time and took the opportunity to address UN institutions to inform about and call for solidarity with the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. He had regular consultations with the Special Committee against Apartheid. According to Alfred Nzo “The GDR then became one of the forces that were very squarely behind the struggle of our people against Apartheid, for democracy, peace and development... In all the important international fora right up to the United Nations, the GDR held aloft the flag of struggle for peace, the flag of the struggle for justice ...”⁶¹

This also applies to the Namibian issue. The GDR protested when the International Court of Justice at The Hague in July 1966 failed to pass judgement on the substance of the case submitted by Liberia and Ethiopia on behalf of the African states, notably their charge that South Africa had been violating its Mandate obligations for the territory.⁶² Four years later, after the International Court’s advisory opinion of 21 June 1971, GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer expressed his satisfaction that the responsibility of the United Nations for Namibia had been reaffirmed.⁶³ After the GDR joined the UN in 1973, it had more room for political and diplomatic action to support the Namibian liberation movement. The GDR co-sponsored the UN General Assembly resolution recognising SWAPO as “the authentic representative of the Namibian people” of 13 December 1974.⁶⁴

(60) Against Racism, p.294.

(61) Interview with Alfred Nzo, 7 December 1995.

(62) DAP 1966, vol. XIV/2, 1066f. On the question of Namibia at the UN, see: Moleah, 127ff.

(63) DAP 1971, vol. XIX/2, 1008f.

(64) Resolution 3295 (XXIX) of the UN General Assembly, 13 December 1974, in: YBUN 1974, New York 1977, p.164 and 155.

Like a majority of UN member states, the GDR had supported Security Council resolution 385 of 1976, calling for free and fair elections under UN supervision and control in Namibia. But the GDR remained sceptical about whether or how the resolution could be implemented, and was clearly distrustful of subsequent attempts by US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. The GDR described Western diplomatic activities vis-à-vis South Africa and SWAPO as neo-colonialist manoeuvres, designed to give effect to resolution 385 while at the same time preventing the complete isolation of South Africa, securing Western influence on Southern Africa and containing the gains of the Eastern bloc in the region.⁶⁵ Many Third World countries shared this view.

In the light of developments in 1976/77, GDR UN Representative Peter Florin defined basic points of East Germany's position on the Namibian problem. He urged all states to:

- “recognise SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia and break off all relations with forces opposing the people of Namibia and SWAPO;
- reaffirm the right of the people of Namibia to wage their struggle for self-determination in any form and with every means until attaining complete independence, and give SWAPO the support necessary for this struggle;
- take stringent coercive measures against the apartheid regime which is holding Namibia under occupation in defiance of international law, to support a mandatory arms embargo and economic sanctions by the Security Council, and to contribute actively to a further isolation of South Africa;
- reject any preconditions for achieving independence or its restriction, in particular any presumptions concerning the stationing of South African troops, the maintaining of military bases and the conduct of nuclear tests in Namibia;
- ensure the attainment of genuine independence and true self-determination for the people of Namibia by eliminating the influence of opposed forces, in particular of South Africa's state apparatus and repressive machinery, of its propaganda instruments, and of neo-colonialist vested interests, which are operating in Namibia, in conjunction with the apartheid regime;
- defend Namibia's accession to independence with its territorial integrity strictly observed, by countering any attacks against these principles.”⁶⁶

Originally, the GDR had reservations about UN Security Council resolution 435 (1978) based on a plan of the Western Contact Group. It provided for free and fair elections under UN supervision and the establishment of UNTAG to support the UN secretary-

(65) A message by Honecker to the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, 21 March 1977, emphasised: “Intensified attempts have been made recently to counter the struggle of national liberation movements with neo-colonialist methods. But the peoples in Southern Africa have not only an uncontested right to national independence and freedom but also a legitimate claim to choose the socio-economic system under which they want to live, without outside interference.” in: DAP 1977 Vol. XXV/2, (East) Berlin 1982, p.1014.

(66) DAP 1977, vol. XXV/1, p.995 f.

general's special representative. Ambassador Florin doubted the effectiveness of the proposed measures: "It is hard to understand that, on the one hand, the continued presence of South African administration and South African armed forces is creating new, artificial obstacles on the path to Namibia's independence, while, on the other hand, a large contingent of UN forces and civil personnel is to be put in place to manage the concomitant dangers. Would not an unconditional and immediate withdrawal of all troops, the police and the administrative machinery of the racists from Namibia offer the best guarantee for the elections to proceed smoothly?"⁶⁷ These doubts were attributable to the obvious intransigence of the apartheid regime. The South African Government was successfully playing the "bulwark against communism" card vis-à-vis the West, and the West, anxious to safeguard its interests in the region, resisted only half-heartedly South African schemes to torpedo the independence plan for Namibia. Defying resolution 435, South Africa held elections in Namibia in December 1978, only three months after the motion had been adopted.

The GDR's solidarity with SWAPO and insistence on international sanctions against South Africa were based on its policy principles of anti-colonialism, anti-racism and anti-imperialism. At the same time, its policies were a reaction to Western diplomatic efforts to implement resolution 435, as well as a reflection of the heightened East-West rivalry in the south of Africa. Eastern bloc diplomacy had no negotiating concept of its own to be set against the West's initiatives, although the Soviet Union and its allies endorsed a peaceful settlement of the conflict on principle. They accepted resolution 435, but they thought any further-reaching compromise in South Africa's favour was an attempt at denying SWAPO the desired fruits of victory. Eastern states were consequently worried that this might block any chance for themselves to wield influence in a strategically vital region.

Theo-Ben Gurirab, at the time SWAPO's secretary for international relations, emphasised that SWAPO consulted with the GDR and other socialist countries on all important strategic and tactical questions connected with the negotiations with the West. SWAPO saw the role of the GDR and the other Eastern bloc countries not so much in direct participation in negotiations about a settlement of the conflict as in strengthening SWAPO's negotiating position.⁶⁸

Resolution 435 was blocked for 10 years due to the intransigence of South Africa, supported by the Reagan administration in the United States. Only the rapprochement between the superpowers and their willingness to cooperate on resolving regional conflicts, finally freed perspectives on South West Africa from cold war fetters. In addition, South Africa's destabilisation strategy had reached its limits and backfired. The increasing erosion of the apartheid system, a resistance movement in South Africa which could be contained only by a state of emergency, the effects of international sanctions on the South African economy and, not least, the military

(67) DAP 1978 vol. XXVI/2, p.1050, 1052.

(68) Interview with Gurirab, 8 February 1996.

stalemate in Angola after the battle at Cuito Cuanavale, made Pretoria more amenable to a Namibian settlement based on resolution 435. As the interests of all parties began to coincide, it became possible to end the confrontation in South West Africa and work towards a settlement which allowed everyone concerned to save face.⁶⁹ The GDR welcomed the agreement of 1988 to propose the implementation of resolution 435, and recorded its own readiness to assist in implementing the UN decisions on Namibia. It left no doubt that it would continue its solidarity with SWAPO.⁷⁰ The GDR went on to give diplomatic support to the UN independence process for Namibia.

Ten years before, in 1979/1980, GDR diplomacy also went into action during the final phase of the independence process in Zimbabwe. The aim was to minimise the disadvantaged position of the Patriotic Front (PF) of ZAPU and ZANU in the electoral preparations in Zimbabwe. In late January/early February 1980, shortly after being elected a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, the GDR became involved in preparations for a session of the Council which was demanded by African countries to consider the situation in Southern Rhodesia and to create the prerequisites for truly free and fair elections there. The continued deployment of South African troops, violence committed by Southern Rhodesian security forces and obstructions for the PF was seen as jeopardising the elections. The GDR representative Peter Florin demanded “unswerving compliance with agreements entered into; the neutralisation of the army and auxiliary forces of the former regime in Southern Rhodesia, the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of South African troops and all other foreign mercenaries; the elimination of the influence of the former machinery of power; the ending of the emergency and martial law situations; the liberation of all political detainees and the return of refugees.”⁷¹ A few weeks later, as president of the Security Council for the month of February, Florin threw his weight behind the demand by African states that a monitoring group of the UN secretary-general be sent to Southern Rhodesia. The sustained international pressure at the time ensured that the elections were finally held under acceptable conditions.

Another political issue was solidarity with the victims of the colonial and racist regimes, among others the detained leaders of liberation movements. Already in October 1963, the UN General Assembly called upon South Africa to abstain from the Rivonia Trial and to liberate all political prisoners unconditionally.⁷² On 20 November, the General Assembly adopted its Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination⁷³. The GDR supported the declaration and pleaded for a corresponding convention, basing its arguments on the bitter lessons of German

(69) H.-G. Schleicher, UNTAG, p.328f.

(70) Message from foreign minister Oskar Fischer, in: APK 35/1988, p.274.

(71) Quoted from *Against Racism*, p.351f.

(72) Resolution 1881 (XVIII), 11 Oct. 1963, in: YBUN 1963, 21. In subsequent years, 11 October was observed as Day of Solidarity with South African political prisoners.

(73) Resolution 1904 (XVIII), UN Declaration on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, in: YBUN 1963, p.344ff.

history, with the appalling effects of racial hatred practised during the fascist era.⁷⁴ East German activities to defend Nelson Mandela and the other leaders of the South African liberation movements started shortly before the Rivonia Trial with a well-organised solidarity campaign. This campaign became part of the international movement for solidarity with the Rivonia trialists, which disseminated petition lists in 30 countries. GDR organisations got involved in the circulation of the lists and the collection of signatures.⁷⁵ The FDGB ordered 1,000 petition forms from London and organised protest rallies in enterprises and institutions countrywide.⁷⁶ The GDR Solidarity Committee solicited the support of prominent figures in the GDR for the Rivonia trialists.⁷⁷

On 12 June 1964, Nelson Mandela and seven of his co-defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment. The principal aim of the international solidarity efforts, to save the lives of the accused, was achieved. After the conviction, the international solidarity movement continued to urge the release of political prisoners in South Africa. One case in that campaign which featured prominently in the GDR was that of Abram Fischer, leader of the SACP. In March 1966 he faced the threat of capital punishment. The trial triggered a wave of solidarity in the GDR. Such solidarity with South African activists was part of a worldwide movement crossing the divide between the socio-political systems of East and West, and involved people with different social, political and ideological backgrounds. It made a remarkable contribution to the movement's effectiveness.

In 1968 the Foreign Ministry, the Solidarity Committee, the Committee on the Protection of Human Rights, and lawyers in the GDR called on the government in Southern Rhodesia to treat captured ANC and ZAPU fighters as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention, and protested against the trial and execution of such prisoners. The Foreign Ministry was prompted by the execution of liberation fighters in April 1968 to urge that sanctions against Southern Rhodesia be upheld.⁷⁸ The GDR also responded positively to the appeal for solidarity with captured guerrillas, which was a joint initiative by IDAF and the London-based World Campaign for the Release of South African Political Prisoners. They hoped for international solidarity to support their call that the Southern Rhodesian authorities grant ZAPU and ANC fighters the status of prisoners of war or of political prisoners.⁷⁹

(74) DAP 1963, vol. XI, (East) Berlin 1965, 269f; DAP 1964, vol. XII, (East) Berlin 1966, 544ff. As long as the GDR, like the FRG, was not a member of the UN, it was not allowed to sign the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, adopted by the UN General Assembly on 21 Dec. 1965 (cf. YBUN 1965, New York 1967, p. 440f.), whereas the FRG was allowed to sign. Only after the international blockade was lifted could the GDR join the Convention by accession in March 1973.

(75) This commitment of DAFRIG is noted in the World Campaign's circular of 9 January 1964 (SAPMO BArch: DY 34/A 201.2505).

(76) SAPMO BArch: DY 34/A 201.2505, memo from the FDGB's international relations department to secretary for international relations, Wolfgang Beyreuther, 11 February 1964.

(77) SAPMO BArch: DY 34/A 201.2502, private notes, 22 April 1964. Enclosure, letter to Warnke.

(78) DAP 1968, vol. XVI/1, p.418f.

(79) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, circular to all UN member states, 16 August 1968.

When the conflict with the apartheid regime exacerbated in the second half of the 1960s and SWAPO of Namibia was in urgent need of greater international solidarity, assistance was forthcoming from the GDR Solidarity Committee. One event which caused a stir across the globe, including in East Germany, were court proceedings against Andimba Toivo ya Toivo, a co-founder of SWAPO, and another 34 Namibian patriots in Pretoria. The GDR Solidarity Committee protested to the Vorster Government against the trial and demanded the immediate release of the defendants.⁸⁰ While the trial was in progress, foreign minister Otto Winzer sent a telegram to the UN secretary-general to demand cessation of the proceedings and to reaffirm the GDR's readiness to support any measures designed to put an end to South African control over Namibia.⁸¹

Solidarity activities with South African political prisoners continued in the GDR. With solidarity meetings, protest letters from the Solidarity Committee, initiatives by diplomats at the UN, at OAU headquarters and the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid, the GDR joined in the international campaign against death sentences and prison terms passed on ANC members in South Africa. The Solidarity Committee called for the unconditional release of Nelson Mandela and his compatriots, accompanied by countless activities in support of that request.

Another aspect of support for the African liberation struggle was the application of sanctions against the racist regimes in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Sanctions against South Africa have been in the focus of the international support for the liberation struggle. The principle of solidarity was not unaffected by concrete interests and requirements of the GDR because persistent and desperate efforts to improve the domestic economic situation through international trade seemed to prove incompatible with a boycott of South Africa. The problem was reinforced by Cold War positions and by the GDR's particular weakness in the sensitive area of foreign trade and international relations, where the West wielded superior power. When in 1959 Western media reported that a GDR foreign trade delegation was visiting South Africa, the GDR Foreign Ministry reacted. There was too much at stake, because the GDR was anxious to break out of its diplomatic isolation, especially in Africa. "Sending a GDR trading delegation to South Africa," an internal memo of the Ministry stated, "is inconsistent with our repeatedly declared foreign policy principles in support of the African peoples' struggle for national liberation and against colonialism and racial terror. Sending a GDR trading delegation to South Africa is likely to have a politically adverse effect on our relations with African states (Guinea, Ghana, Sudan, UAR) and on our existing contacts with the national liberation movements of the African peoples."⁸² The Foreign Ministry forced the recall of the trading delegation.

(80) *Neues Deutschland*, 12 February 1968.

(81) DAP 1968, vol. XVI/1, (East) Berlin 1971, p.417f.

(82) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/411, Foreign Ministry notes, 18 September 1959, containing comments on items in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* of 17. September 1959: "Delegation der Zone in Suedafrika", and in *Sueddeutsche Zeitung* of 15 September 1959: "Pankow verhandelt mit Suedafrika".

Already in December 1958, the first All-African Peoples' Conference in Accra issued an appeal for a worldwide trading boycott against South Africa.⁸³ When the call for sanctions became more forceful at the conference of independent African states in Addis Ababa in June 1960, the hesitant policy of Eastern European countries vis-à-vis the boycott came under increasing criticism. Such criticism fuelled the internal debate on the sanctions issue in the GDR, which reflected the conflict between political and economic interests. Official GDR statistics on exports to Africa showed South Africa in second place until 1959, and also second on the list of African importers until 1957.⁸⁴ Despite an ongoing decline since 1958, GDR exports to South Africa remained at a relatively high level, whereas imports dropped rapidly after 1961.⁸⁵ South Africa was an attractive market, because the rate of foreign currency revenue was favourable. And it was a market for manufactures for which the GDR had export capacities and could obtain global market prices. Prices of imports from South Africa were well below the global market average. In 1963, the GDR imported around 30,000 tons of fishmeal. The precarious situation in the GDR's agriculture in the early 1960s underlined the necessity for buying such inexpensive feed.⁸⁶

The GDR's state-run shipping company, Deutsche Seereederei (DSR), faced difficulties in case of a boycott. The company operated a liner service to Eastern and Southern African ports from 1962. In 1963 the GDR Transport Ministry estimated that termination of calls at ports in South Africa would render the DSR's Eastern Africa Service uneconomical and hardly worth maintaining. Yet its continued operation was considered necessary to avoid losing future business in the Eastern African freight market.⁸⁷

In the GDR, discussions about sanctions were fuelled by Western press reports about GDR trading operations with South Africa, which exacerbated controversy about the issue of sanctions. Also, the ANC and the SACP raised this issue again and again with their East German comrades.⁸⁸ The international debate took a more compelling turn within the UN and the OAU, after its inception in May 1963. It was now that internal debate began in the GDR, with a view to taking an urgent decision. On 8 June 1963, deputy foreign minister Sepp Schwab wrote to the Foreign Trade

(83) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV 2/20/410, Memorandum: The Boycott of South African Trade, attached to a letter from the SACP Central Committee (CC) to the SED CC, 12 October 1960. The Memorandum outlined the evolution of the boycott movement.

(84) Statistisches Jahrbuch, p.574.

(85) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A/610/332, report: Stand des Handels mit der Suedafrikanischen Republik, annexure to a letter by the Ministry for Foreign and Inter-German Trade to the SED CC department of domestic trade, supplies and foreign trade, 17 June 1963.

(86) In view of the situation in agriculture, buying feed with a lower foreign currency input was crucial, as noted in the report on the state of trade with South Africa, 17 June 1963. (SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A/610/332, report: Stand des Handels mit der Suedafrikanischen Republik, annexure to a letter by the Ministry for Foreign and Inter-German Trade to the SED CC department of domestic trade, supplies and foreign trade, 17 June 1963.

(87) Relevant data are contained in a draft of a Ministry of Transport paper for the Politbureau, July 1963. The authors have so far been unable to trace the draft's subsequent fate. (Cf. MfAA/A 16048).

(88) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/987, letter from the SACP CC to the SED CC, 29 May 1963. Cf. MfAA/A 16048, Msimang's letter to Ulbricht, 4 June 1963.

Ministry: "The German Democratic Republic, too, has repeatedly issued statements . . . , saying it is a staunch supporter of the national interests of the peoples on the African continent who are fighting for their freedom and against the policy of apartheid in South Africa. Trading with South Africa and calls of our new East Africa shipping line at Portuguese and South African ports are damaging to the GDR's reputation and provide imperialists with an opportunity to vilify the GDR and to discredit our policy in Africa".⁸⁹ He proposed that exports and all missions to, and imports from, South Africa should be stopped, and urged a swift decision.

This decision was taken at a session of the SED Foreign Affairs Commission on 5 July 1963. A paper of the Foreign Ministry recommended among others:

1. the immediate cessation of imports from South Africa;
2. an expiry of exports to South Africa by the end of 1963; an absolute termination of all exports as of 1964;
3. a ban on ships from the GDR to call at South African ports and at ports in the Portuguese colonies.⁹⁰

On 8 July 1963, the Minister for Foreign Trade ordered subordinate agencies to cease trading with South Africa. Foreign Minister Dr Lothar Bolz informed Chairman Diallo Telli of the UN Special Committee on Apartheid about the decision. He described it as an expression of the GDR's will to support the South African people's struggle for liberation and rejected western reports about GDR arms deliveries to South Africa as calculated propaganda.⁹¹ Prime minister Otto Grotewohl sent a telegram to an African Foreign Ministers' Conference Against Apartheid in Dakar, informing of the GDR's position. He expressed his belief that "... freedom and self-determination for the people of South Africa will soon be achieved if all governments take similar steps." The attitudes on the matter would show "who is a true friend of the African peoples."⁹²

An unbiased judgement on the GDR's boycott decision of 1963 deserves critical comment. It has to take into account that the GDR, economically weak and affected by Western embargo policies, was subjected to additional economic hardships when official trade relations with South Africa were cut and important opportunities in that market lost. For the GDR, every single clearing mark it earned was worth its weight in gold. Therefore, despite some qualifications that have to be made, it is certainly fair to say that by terminating its trade with South Africa the GDR was extending solidarity to the South African liberation movement. Similar difficulties were to be posed by the sports boycott against South Africa.

(89) MfAA. A/16048, Schwab's letter to Balkow, 8 June 1963.

(90) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/987, Memorandum of the Foreign Ministry's 4th extra-European division (AEA) on the trade with South Africa, 3 July 1963.

(91) MfAA/A 16048, Bolz's telegram to Telli, 25 July 1963.

(92) MfAA/A 16048, Grotewohl's telegram, 25 July 1963.

Solidarity activities in the GDR were often centrally organised, but East Germans could identify with them. There was widespread readiness to practise solidarity as shown in events such as the annual solidarity bazaar on the Berliner Alexanderplatz which was organised by journalists. Similar events took place in other GDR cities. In 1986, when *Bummi*, a journal for children, printed a story about Nelson Mandela on his 68th birthday and invited children to make cards for Comrade Nelson in prison, over 87,000 greeting cards were received.⁹³ Two years later, 70,000 young people flocked to an international rock concert against apartheid. The money they donated was earmarked for an ANC kindergarten.⁹⁴ The personal engagement of elderly people was very impressive. Anti-fascist resistance fighters who had survived Nazi prisons and concentration camps were all too ready to assist their comrades in the liberation struggle with donations to the solidarity fund.

Another form of GDR political support for liberation organisations was the establishment of semi-diplomatic missions of ANC, ZAPU and SWAPO in East Berlin. Officially accredited to the President of the Solidarity Committee, the missions enjoyed diplomatic privileges and were financed by the Committee. Representatives of the liberation organisations and the GDR embassies all over the world maintained a close cooperation in the respective countries. James Stuart describes his experiences: “Political support we received from the GDR ...all over, we relied on the support from the GDR representatives, whether it was in Africa, in Europe, it didn’t matter where it was. We could always go to them and say: Look, I am so and so, I come from the ANC, would you be able to support us. We would like to have this or that position adopted or that position rejected. And usually without much problem we received the support of the GDR representatives.”⁹⁵ The assistance included material and financial support for political activities. Delegations of liberation organisations attending conferences and meetings could also count on financial help to cover their travel costs.

The level of cooperation between the GDR and national liberation movements was indicated by high-level political consultations and the protocol treatment afforded their leaders by the GDR. The high level of cooperation included official party relations with the SED, which were viewed as an indicator of the political status of the GDR relations with a liberation movement. They reflected the general trend towards direct and close contacts between SED and national liberation movements since the early 1970s.

Party agreements were concluded for a period of one or two years. They included invitations for study delegations and material assistance as well as visits by senior officials for medical treatment or vacations in the GDR. Consultations about international developments of common interest and one another’s policies, and a regular exchange of information, documentation and publications were particularly important. Education of liberation movement cadres at party schools of the SED was

(93) *Sechaba*, July 1987, p.25.

(94) Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(95) Interview with James Stuart, 22 November 1995.

another major purpose of such agreements. SWAPO students at SED party schools numbered about 310. 125 trainees came from the ANC. Zimbabwean students numbered altogether 330, from ZAPU (1977-80) as well as from ZANU (1982-90) MPLA sent over 60 and FRELIMO over 40.96

3.2 Material support and assistance, the propaganda weapon

GDR support for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa included substantial material assistance, which was primarily organised, coordinated and financed by the Solidarity Committee. It involved funding for:

- the procurement and transport of goods;
- training and education;
- medical treatment and rehabilitation;
- the production and dispatch of journals, the printing of books, pamphlets, posters and material for exhibition, and the production of badges, flags, etc.;
- air travel expenses for liberation movement officials;
- rents and running costs for the offices of liberation movements in Berlin.

In the narrower sense, material assistance meant supplies of solidarity goods but also of manufactures which liberation movements could sell to finance their activities, the latter being an important part of material assistance for the ANC and ZAPU. Supplies financed by the Solidarity Committee included paramilitary equipment. The Committee made the necessary arrangements for training and education for liberation movement members and medical treatment for the sick and wounded.

Even with the establishment of party relations between SED and liberation organisations, technical responsibility for procurement, transport and funding of solidarity supplies continued to lie with the Solidarity Committee. As far as training, education and medical treatment for the sick and wounded were concerned, arrangements were made in cooperation with the responsible governmental agencies. The Solidarity Committee was also responsible for the supply of medicines, surgical dressings, blankets, clothes and food for the liberation movement abroad, as well as providing beds and medical care in GDR medical establishments for wounded freedom fighters. Academic scholarships and vocational training courses were also offered. Another task was the supply of information and educational materials, and the printing and production of propaganda material.

During the 1970s and 1980s, there was a growing need for ANC and SWAPO to accommodate the rising numbers of refugees and to provide them with food, educational facilities and health services in the refugee camps in Tanzania, Angola and Zambia. Food, tents, blankets, medicine and clothing as well as other equipment for

(96) Annual reports of the SED CC propaganda department which are included in CC Secretariat's decisions, in: SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3333 (2 July 1979), p.3508 (23 July 1980), p.3675 (20 August 1981), p.3764 (15 March 1982), p.3900 (7 February 1983), p.4059 (21 March 1984), p.4214 (27 February 1985), p.4365 (3 March 1986), p.4520 (11 March 1987), p.4654 (19 February 1988), p.4797 (3 March 1989).

camp life were most valuable for the refugee centres. The liberation organisations also started agricultural production and the manufacturing of textiles and other goods. International solidarity was vital to fulfil these tasks. SWAPO's settlement in Cuanza Sul (Angola), or ANC's Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SMFC) in Mazimbu, are well-known examples for international support. Shipments of solidarity goods from the GDR were sent to the SMFC in Mazimbu and the ANC camp in Dakawa. In Cuanza Sul, members of a friendship brigade of Free German Youth (FDJ) helped in construction work and training. A Day Care Centre in Cuanza Sul, catering for 500 children, was built jointly by the Finnish Africa Committee and the GDR Solidarity Committee.⁹⁷ East German doctors and medical personnel provided health services in Cuanza Sul. Teachers also worked there, as well as in the ANC's SMFC in Tanzania from 1986 till 1989. A youth brigade of the FDJ provided support to the ANC camp in Mazimbu.⁹⁸

An IDAF delegation, examining the situation in camps for refugees from South Africa and Namibia in neighbouring countries in the late 1980s, gained positive impressions from their visit to SWAPO camps in Cuanza Sul. Besides Scandinavian humanitarian aid, East German supplies of equipment had been important in erecting these camps.⁹⁹

The Solidarity Committee provided the OAU Liberation Committee with consignments of textiles for combat dress, medicines, surgical dressings, and foodstuff, which were distributed to the liberation movements in Southern Africa, that is, including those organisations that the GDR did not support directly. From the mid 1970s, material support for the ANC and other liberation movements in Southern Africa increased substantially.¹⁰⁰

From 1977 onwards, Rhodesian military attacks against refugee camps in neighbouring countries increased. Special planes of the GDR airline Interflug started flights to Lusaka, seven in all in 1977.¹⁰¹ The freight they carried comprised, for example, food, detergents and sanitary articles, clothing and textiles, medicines, household utensils, radios, camp beds, blankets and airbeds. When a GDR delegation met top executives of ZAPU in Lusaka in June 1977, Dumiso Dabengwa, head of logistics and intelligence, told them that the solidarity supplies that had come in by then were of great help to ZAPU. The organisation had to cater for 14,000 refugees, including 2,000 children. The food supplies from the GDR, he said, helped to save many people from dying of starvation.¹⁰²

(97) *Solidaritaet*. 1985/2, p. 1.

(98) Reichardt, p.80.

(99) Interview with Rica Hodgson, 26 December 1995.

(100) In 1977 liberation organisations in Southern Africa received goods to the value of 40 million Marks from the GDR. See *Against Racism*, p.161. In 1978 and 1979 the ANC received major consignments of solidarity supplies. See Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(101) BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, letters from Solidarity Committee secretary-general Kurt Krueger to Nkomo, 4 April, 24 May, 10 October, November 1977.

(102) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2087, decision of the SED Politbureau on 21 June 1977: Report on the talks of the delegation with John L. Nkomo and other ZAPU officials in Lusaka on 24 June).

GDR was known for providing emergency aid. In the middle of 1981, when the influx of refugees from Namibia was increasing and South African forces were stepping up their military operations in southern Angola, Sam Nujoma contacted the GDR leadership, urgently requesting assistance to feed the refugees and SWAPO's fighters. 30,000 tons of flour and other food were needed.¹⁰³ Earlier that year, the GDR Solidarity Committee had already provided solidarity supplies for refugee camps in Cuanza Sul. However, supplying a bigger quantity of flour now posed a major problem. The GDR had the capacity to supply only limited quantities of food to SWAPO, an additional 7,000 tons of grain had to be taken from the national reserve stocks, to be replenished in 1982. The other foodstuffs could be provided by increasing production.¹⁰⁴ In addition to supplying that food, the GDR also sent an Africa Line freighter of Deutsche Seereederei to Mozambique to move 2,000 tons of foodstuffs over to Angola.¹⁰⁵ The GDR's big supply of food reached SWAPO in the first six months of 1982.

The GDR provided also material support by assisting production facilities run by SWAPO in Angola and Zambia. The Solidarity Committee supplied tractors, agricultural implements, and seeds for farms where cattle and chicken were kept and vegetables grown. SWAPO had built big tailoring workshops, employing 30 workers each, in Angola, at Lubango, Cuanza Sul and Luanda, as well as in Zambia. Apart from producing badly needed clothing for Namibian refugees, they gave many of these people jobs and an opportunity to acquire technical skills. Equipment for the workshops in Luanda and Lubango, which also tailored uniforms for PLAN soldiers, had almost exclusively been financed and supplied by the GDR.¹⁰⁶

Material support from the GDR to the liberation organisations in Southern Africa reached a substantial dimension. Between 1975 and 1980, ZAPU received supplies from the GDR Solidarity Committee with a value of 25.3 million Marks. Between 1975 and 1989, SWAPO and ANC received supplies worth 73.7 and 37.3 million Marks respectively.¹⁰⁷

The GDR also became famous for its support in the specific field of propaganda. Propaganda was an important weapon in the liberation struggle. Quite early, the printing of material for ANC and SACP was a novel line of cooperation and a speciality of GDR solidarity, which somewhat later came to benefit other movements such as ZAPU and SWAPO. A major propaganda weapon of the ANC was *Sechaba*, the ANC's first own journal, which presented itself in January 1967 as a "mouthpiece of the oppressed masses". Pallo Jordan recounts: "From 1967 the German Democratic Republic began assisting the ANC in publishing journals – *Sechaba*. All the responsibility ... financially and politically was borne by the Solidarity Committee

(103) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3692, decision of the SED CC Secretariat, 29 September 1981: Report on Nujoma's visit.

(104) SAPMO BArch DY/30 vorl. SED 16592, Schuerer's letter, 15 September 1981.

(105) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3692, decision of the SED CC Secretariat, 29 September 1981.

(106) Interview with Festus Naholo, 20 February 1996.

(107) Source: Records of SODI

... The GDR also undertook training of journalists for the African National Congress and assumed some degree of responsibility for a number of students, who studied in the GDR from that time on.”¹⁰⁸ The production of publications for SACP’s political work in exile and for clandestine distribution in South Africa, including the magazine *The African Communist*, was part of the cooperation between the SED and SACP.¹⁰⁹ The “propaganda weapon” and underground work inside South Africa were closely related. In November 1969, South African underground fighters had caused some sensation through actions in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth, Johannesburg, East London and Durban that could not be ignored by the South African press. Leaflets from the exiled ANC floated down on pedestrians, and workers going home from their shift heard hidden loudspeakers linked to tape recordings: “This is the African National Congress; this is the voice of freedom.”¹¹⁰ In the mid-1970s, this type of action was considerably expanded and involved a number of underground fighters who had been trained in the GDR.¹¹¹ Ronnie Kasrils remembers: “In the ’70s, as early as 69/70, when we were operating from London ... we were really concentrating on building the underground in the country. And I can remember, we were trying to develop a special propaganda device, a leaflet bomb. We had a scientific lecturer from a science faculty, a South African, whom we sent to the GDR. ... Through that visit, we developed the leaflet bomb in a much more practical way, so that it could easily be smuggled into the country in small parts and put together. It became a very important and effective weapon in terms of our propaganda.”¹¹²

After a request by ZAPU in 1968,¹¹³ the GDR started printing and dispatching ZAPU’s journal *Zimbabwe Review*, starting in early 1969. The output reached 10,000 copies in 1970. In 1974, cooperation in the field of propaganda was also extended to SWAPO. The GDR undertook to print SWAPO’s *Namibia Today*. The printing of propaganda material included pamphlets, books, calendars etc. besides the journals of the organisations. Brian Bunting remembered: “Journals, pamphlets and books of the ANC and SACP were printed in the GDR and dispatched at state expense all over the world. Illegal editions were printed for distribution inside South Africa.”¹¹⁴

The publication of political documentation about the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid in English by the GDR served its own propaganda purpose,

(108) Interview with Pallo Jordan, 4 December 1995.

(109) Other GDR publications were: A. Lerumo, *Fifty Fighting Years, The Communist Party of South Africa 1921-1971* (London: Inkululeko Publications, 1971); B. Bunting, *Moses Kotane* (London: Mayibuye Books, 1975); *The South African Communists Speak* (London: Inkululeko Publications, 1981). In 1986 a booklet of speeches by J. Slovo and A. Nzo was also printed for SACP.

(110) For detailed reports, refer to *The African Communist*, 40, 1970, 93f.; *Sechaba*, 1, 1970, 3. ANC underground propaganda inside South Africa was reported later: “*Voice of Freedom*”, *Sechaba*, 4, 1976, 38ff.; ‘How to Outwit the Enemy’, *Sechaba*, 1, 1977, 6ff.

(111) See for example evidence of Tim Jenkin, Oral History of Exile Project, Mayibuye Centre, UWC.

(112) Interview with Ronnie Kasrils, Pretoria 4 December 1995.

(113) BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, notes, 4 October 1968, on a conversation between Ndlovu and Eggebrecht on 30 September 1968.

(114) Bunting, GDR and the South African Liberation Movement.

but also provided valuable material to liberation movements.¹¹⁵ The Solidarity Committee published booklets and brochures to support the struggle in Southern Africa, some of them focusing on Western collaboration with the apartheid regime.¹¹⁶ A study denounced the disregard for the rights of women in South Africa. The GDR Committee on Human Rights dedicated booklets to the fight against racism and apartheid.¹¹⁷ This struggle also featured prominently in the programmes of Radio Berlin International (RBI), the international broadcasting station of the GDR. Propaganda was part of solidarity campaigning in the GDR itself. The mass media reported comprehensively on crimes committed by the racist regime, on the resistance and the struggle for liberation. The radio broadcasted a special series on “racism in the pillory”. The television network showed films. GDR academics, writers and journalists published books on the liberation struggle.¹¹⁸ Annually in September, GDR journalists donated a day’s wages to the solidarity fund.

The Solidarity Committee conducted joint propaganda activities with liberation organisations. In 1967, the committee’s memorandum “The Bonn-Pretoria Alliance” was presented to the public on South Africa Freedom Day. The GDR observed the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination in 1969 with activities coordinated by a special committee. A variety of solidarity events were organised during the International Anti-Apartheid Year in 1978. Regular solidarity weeks of action against colonialism and racism were used to mobilise solidarity.¹¹⁹ The same applies to commemorative days such as International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (21 March), the Day of Solidarity with the Struggling People of South Africa (16 June) etc. In 1982, during the UN-proclaimed International Year for the Mobilisation for Sanctions against South Africa, the GDR Committee for the Decade against Racism coordinated activities.¹²⁰ Another highlight was the International Seminar on the Activities and Role of the Mass Media in the International Mobilisation against Apartheid in Berlin in 1981, which adopted an appeal and a declaration calling upon the international public to redouble its actions against apartheid.¹²¹

(115) In 1976, for example, ‘Against Racism and Racial Discrimination – United Nations Decade for Action’, was published and in 1978, ‘Against Racism, Apartheid and Colonialism’.

(116) For example J. Mader, *The NATO Conspiracy with the South African Racists* (Berlin, 1978).

(117) See for example, GDR-Committee for Human Rights, “Contributions to the UN Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination”, *Bulletin*, 2, 1975; GDR-Committee for Human Rights, “International Anti-Apartheid Year: Freedom and Self-determination for the Oppressed Peoples in Southern Africa”, *Bulletin*, 2, 1978.

(118) Refer to, among others, Elisabeth Adler (ed.), *Apartheid als Herausforderung fuer Suedafrikas Christen und Kirchen. Wie lange noch?* (Berlin: Union Verlag, 1982); Alfred Babing and Hans-Dieter Braeuer, *Fanal am Kap* (Berlin: Verlag der Nation, 1982); Dieter Neffe, *Kaempfe im Sueden Afrikas 1652-1980* (Berlin: Militaerverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1987); Karin Retzlaff, *Feuer in der Wagenburg. Suedafrika – Furcht und Elend der Apartheid* (Berlin: Verlag Neues Leben, 1989).

(119) For a range of examples refer to I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(120) *Ibid*.

(121) *Against Racism*, p.43.

GDR journalists ventured with FRELIMO into liberated territories in Mozambique, like the radio journalist Peter Spacek in 1970 and a GDR TV team with Ulrich Makosch in 1973. Just at the time when ZAPU Vice-President Jason Moyo was assassinated by a letter bomb in January 1977, GDR journalists visited a training camp of ZIPRA for the first time and sent home detailed reports about the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe.¹²² Their pictures from ZAPU camps and their reports are said to have added to East German public interest in developments in Southern Africa and to have inspired greater solidarity donations for the liberation struggle in that region.

3.3 Education and Training, Humanitarian Assistance

Based on German traditions of education and academic training, GDR solidarity focussed on these areas as major pillars of support for liberation movements. It was here where the GDR could exert influence in areas of strategic importance. Solidarity was not confined to offering scholarships for vocational training, technical and university studies, but included support for basic education with teachers and textbooks, support for training institutions and material as well as infrastructural assistance. Particular forms of support included day-to-day care for Namibian youths and special training courses for future South African diplomats of the ANC.

As early as in the 1950s, African students were offered scholarships; the first arrived in the GDR in 1951. In 1962, the first five ANC students were enrolled at GDR academic institutions.¹²³ Also in 1962, 12 youths from Southern Rhodesia were invited for vocational training in the GDR, and ZAPU students were offered scholarships.¹²⁴ In the years to come, hundreds of members of Southern African liberation organisations were trained at universities, colleges, technical schools and vocational training centres in the GDR.

Usually, the Solidarity Committee was in charge of necessary arrangements. In the early 1960s, this support started modestly, to develop with a substantial increase per annum. The Solidarity Committee spent 25,000 Marks in 1961, 167,000 Marks in 1962 and 288,000 Marks in 1963 for that purpose. From 1960 until 1974, liberation organisations like MPLA, FRELIMO, SWAPO, ZAPU and ANC received about 316 scholarships for vocational training in the GDR. In 1989, education and training for SWAPO and ANC amounted to 7 million Marks.¹²⁵ In the mid 1980s, about 1,000 cadres from the ANC and SWAPO were trained in the GDR.¹²⁶ Education and training was by far the biggest component of the Solidarity Committee's annual expenditures, representing for instance an amount of 112.6 million Marks out of 213.8 million Marks in 1988.¹²⁷

(122) *Neue Berliner Illustrierte* 16/1977, 18/1977 and 21/1977.

(123) Schleicher/ Schleicher (1997), p.243.

(124) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV/2/20/415, Schlussfolgerungen, p.11.

(125) I. Schleicher, *Statistische Angaben*, p.154 f.

(126) *Sechaba*, June 1985, p.29.

(127) I. Schleicher, *Statistischer Anhang*, p.265.

Nahas Angula, formerly SWAPO's secretary for education and training, considers that the GDR was SWAPO's principal partner in vocational training.¹²⁸ Around 1,400 Namibians received vocational training there, 129 tailored specifically to the Namibians' needs. Regrettably, only few of them could make use of their skills and knowledge before Namibian independence. GDR trained Namibian mechanics serviced and repaired the W 50 military trucks supplied by the GDR. Some of the agricultural specialists organised small-scale food crop projects which were to contribute to the self-sufficiency of SWAPO camps.¹³⁰ In 1985 SWAPO cadres trained in the GDR were working in Zambia, Tanzania and other countries, partly without pay. SWAPO was hoping that UN programmes might be used to find employment for newly trained Namibians in African countries.¹³¹

In addition to the Solidarity Committee, other GDR organisations offered support in training and education, for instance at the college of the trade union federation FDGB. The FDJ Youth College counted Namibians among its first African students.¹³² Every year, youth officers of liberation movements were trained there in ten-month courses.¹³³ The International School of Journalism, run by the GDR Journalists Association, had a Zimbabwean participant in its first training course in 1961/62.¹³⁴ They also trained cadres from other liberation organisations. One-year courses at the SED's regional party schools were a major feature of inter-party relations. These political education courses included excursions and contacts with everyday life in the GDR, which gave participants food for thought in various directions.¹³⁵ The GDR offered the ANC training courses for diplomats at the Institute for International Relations at Potsdam-Babelsberg in 1989.

Another dimension of educational cooperation was the deployment of GDR teachers and trainers to camps of liberation movements. In 1967, a first GDR teacher worked at FRELIMO's secondary school in Dar es Salaam. Later, at Bagamoyo, another one carried on, and five GDR teachers were assigned to work with FRELIMO from 1972 to 1975.¹³⁶

A special place was Cuanza Sul in Angola. From 1980 onwards, GDR teachers went there to teach Namibian refugee children and help SWAPO educational officers to develop strategies for an education system in a free Namibia. Six teachers were

(128) Interview with Angula, 16 January 1996.

(129) Annual admissions 1978-1990:

1978: 106; 1979: 102; 1980: 92; 1981: 222; 1982: 272; 1983: 162; 1984: 157; 1985: 102; 1986-90: 209.

(Cf. BArch, P DQ 4/5336, survey on cooperation with SWAPO (1986-1990); BArch, P DQ 4/5388, statistics of the State Secretariat for Vocational Training on new admissions for vocational training, 1981-1985).

(130) Interview with Prof. Pilz, 10 October 1995.

(131) Cf. BArch, P DQ 4/5336, file notes, 19 February 1985.

(132) After Nujoma's visit, SWAPO sent the first student, Solomon Mifima, to the FDJ Youth College. Emil Appolus finished a journalism course in 1962. (Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7306-662, Nujoma's letter to the Solidarity Committee, 20 February 1962).

(133) *Ibid.*, 79 ff.

(134) MfAA/A 14190, state of relations report by the Foreign Ministry's 4th AEA, 21 May 1962.

(135) Interview with Johannes Pilz, 10 October 1995.

(136) For more details see: I. Schleicher, DDR-Solidarität, 39 ff.

assigned by 1980.¹³⁷ Together with their colleagues from other countries, these East Germans were often the stable factor in education at the SWAPO camps.¹³⁸ After classes the teachers would often spend their afternoon running leisure activities for young people in the camp. They rehearsed songs or poems with the girls and boys. “These afternoon activities”, stresses the SWAPO Youth League official Lempy Kalungu, “Were actually no part of the teachers’ regular work, they did them in their free time.”¹³⁹ With supplies and personnel, the GDR youth organisation assisted SWAPO in building its own Young Pioneer Organisation for children. Useful cooperation developed in Cuanza Sul between East German teachers and Namibian child care workers educated in the GDR. The assignment of GDR teachers was very much appreciated by their Namibian partners. Their dedication, like that of other GDR experts in the camps, largely determined the GDR’s image in SWAPO’s eyes, demonstrating that whites and blacks could very well live and work together as equals. From 1964 onwards, the GDR youth organisation FDJ dispatched so-called friendship brigades, consisting of young skilled workers, farmers, engineers and technicians, physicians and teachers, to assist in projects in developing countries. From 1983 till 1986, FDJ assigned two instructors to a work team for the International Union of Students, based at the SMFC in Mazimbu, Tanzania. Between 1986 and 1988, FDJ sent civil engineers to the ANC transit camps in Angola. From 1987 to 1989, a FDJ Friendship Brigade assisted the Dakawa Development Centre in Tanzania in assembling a GDR-made plant for producing small building slabs, constructing social facilities, and providing practical vocational training for ANC members.¹⁴⁰ The support for the Dakawa centre included the training of 12 ANC construction experts in the GDR.¹⁴¹

Education and training were supplemented by the provision of respective material. The GDR produced information materials, programmes and textbooks, such as a special mathematics textbook for Angolan and Mozambican students. The Solidarity Committee furnished equipment for schools like the FRELIMO School in Tanzania. The GDR teacher at the Mozambique Institute developed teaching materials.¹⁴²

The liberation struggle had its own conditions and rules, which made it necessary to develop new forms and methods of assistance. In 1978, South African troops had attacked a SWAPO camp at Cassinga in Angola, killing hundreds of refugees. Attacks on other SWAPO camps followed. SWAPO President Nujoma requested that the GDR grant asylum for a prolonged period to around 200 children, aged between four and six, as well as to 20 Namibian women. The children, orphaned by the attack on Cassinga or left alone while their parents were fighting in the field, had to be saved from constant bombardments by the South African air force. The women

(137) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/20/132, information paper for the SED Politbureau, 18 August 1980.

(138) Interview with Prof. Pilz, 10 October 1995.

(139) Interview with Lempy Kalungu, 22 January 1996.

(140) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(141) Reichardt, p.80.

(142) I. Schleicher, *DDR-Solidaritaet*, 39 ff.

accompanying them were to help the children in exile and could simultaneously train as childcare workers.

The GDR agreed to SWAPO's request. It believed that receiving the children and the women could provide effective help for SWAPO's struggle and its policy with regard to a prospective education and training system of their own.¹⁴³ A mansion in the small village of Bellin in the GDR was chosen as the place for a childcare centre. The first group of 80 children arrived in December 1979 accompanied by 15 Namibian women who, together with GDR colleagues, catered for their needs. At the same time, these women took a childcare worker training course. All costs were financed exclusively from solidarity contributions. The expenditure per child was over 1,200 Marks a month.¹⁴⁴

The Namibian children reaching school age went to the local school of a neighbouring village. Two Namibian teachers were employed to teach them their mother tongue and cultural traditions of their native country. The fifteen Namibian women received diplomas as qualified childcare workers. In September 1981, the next group of Namibian women arrived. By 1989, 64 had obtained their childcare worker's diploma.¹⁴⁵

At SWAPO's request, the home in Bellin took in another 25 Namibian children below school age in 1982. Additional numbers of children arrived in the following years.¹⁴⁶ The total number of young Namibians admitted to the GDR was 425.¹⁴⁷ The GDR agreed that the children should be looked after and educated in the GDR until they had completed grade 10, where compulsory education ended for East Germans.¹⁴⁸ Consequently, children in this age group were transferred to a boarding school in Stassfurt called the "School of Friendship", for education in grade 5 and upwards.¹⁴⁹ These Namibian children in the GDR made headlines in 1989 during the electoral campaign in Namibia and stories were spread about their "enforced exile" in the GDR. The stories were soon discredited and the propaganda campaign finally misfired. Compounding the turbulence in the German unification process, the campaign had the effect of producing a hasty return of the children to Namibia. The young people are still known in Namibia as the "GDR kids", and some of them play an active role in social life. Most of them unanimously praised the care and sense of belonging they enjoyed in their childhood. At school and at home, they had all been

(143) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3366, SED CC Secretariat decision, 12 September 1979.

(144) *Berliner Zeitung*, 4 April 1990.

(145) *Neues Deutschland*, 2 January 1990.

(146) On 26 July 1985, the SED CC Secretariat decided, e.g., to admit another 50 pre-school children (cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-4525). After reconstruction of the home in Bellin in 1987, it was envisaged to admit another 40 children (cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-4525, Secretariat decision, 23 March 1987).

(147) U. Sikora, 11.

(148) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2601, Politbureau decision, 18 October Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2601, Politbureau decision, 18 October

(149) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3/3820, Secretariat decision, 8 February 1984.

“like a big family”. “When I think back, I primarily associate a fine time, a very fine time with the GDR,” said a young woman who was part of the group.¹⁵⁰

Another special form of humanitarian assistance was the medical treatment and rehabilitation of sick and wounded people. As early as 1960, the FDGB invited sick South African trade unionists for medical treatment in GDR.¹⁵¹ This particular assistance for liberation organisations reached a new dimension in the 1970s. In addition to the supply of medicaments and medical apparatus, medical treatment for wounded soldiers and civilians became increasingly important from the mid-1970s onwards. In 1977, the Solidarity Committee president’s report to the UN Secretary-General on assistance for the peoples in Southern Africa specified that 250 Angolan army and SWAPO soldiers (PLAN) were treated in the GDR between early 1976 and May 1977. Another 40 PLAN fighters arrived by air in early 1978, followed in July by 40 victims of the South African attack on Cassinga.¹⁵² On 19 February 1979, the SED Central Committee decided on long-term assistance for ZAPU in the medical field, including the assignment of two doctors and two medical assistants to a ZAPU hospital in Zambia and the provision of equipment for a doctor’s workplace as well as further medical appliances.¹⁵³

At the request of SWAPO-President Nujoma, the GDR had decided in 1977 to continue medical treatment for wounded SWAPO personnel in the GDR and to deploy medical staff, doctors and nurses to SWAPO healthcare facilities in Angola. This was a new form of assistance and included equipment for two hospitals and medicinal drugs, medical appliances, first-aid kits and surgical cases.¹⁵⁴ SWAPO greatly appreciated the work of GDR doctors and medical staff in its hospitals, which also were not only to a significant extent furnished with East German equipment but also received medical supplies and dressings from the GDR. In 1989, an East German mobile X-ray unit was commissioned for SWAPO use in Angola.¹⁵⁵

Beyond medical treatment in those facilities, GDR doctors in the camps usually recommended further treatment in the GDR, where the required specialised procedures were available. In the 1980s, SWAPO was in need of medical care for increasing numbers of refugees injured in South African raids on camps in Angola and for PLAN fighters wounded in battle. In 1987, 47 PLAN personnel came to the GDR for medical treatment; in 1988 20 others came.¹⁵⁶ Altogether, several hundred Namibians received medical treatment and follow-up care in the GDR. According to a German physician, over 400 SWAPO fighters were treated in the 1978-1988

(150) Sikora, p.61.

(151) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(152) *Against Racism*, pp.138., 173.

(153) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3266, decision of the SED Politbureau, 19 February 1979.

(154) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2129, decision of the SED Politbureau, 24 January 1978: Report on the SWAPO delegation’s visit to the GDR from 16 to 20 December 1977.

(155) Interview with Prof. Dr Johannes Pilz, 10 October 1995.

(156) Private notes.

period in the hospital at Berlin-Buch alone.¹⁵⁷ The majority of the Namibian patients, most of them refugees, the rest PLAN soldiers, were admitted to ward 303 of the 2nd Geriatrics Hospital in Buch, a suburb of Berlin. The GDR received wounded and sick from other liberation organisations as well. Some were also taken to hospitals in various other places.

Berlin-Buch treated wounded personnel of SWAPO, the ANC, ZAPU and the PLO as well as nationals from 33 other countries. It acquired an international reputation. A special “solidarity ward” was set up there in summer 1978, after the South African raid on Cassinga. Following a request by nurses who had delved into Namibian history, the ward was given the name “Jacob Morenga” in 1988. After surgery, the wounded learned to lead an independent life again, with supervision by the doctors and help from physio and work therapists. In work therapy exercises, such as weaving or other handicrafts, they learnt to use their arms and legs again. For a fair number of them, vocational training subsequent to medical treatment proved to be a useful approach to social reintegration.

The public took a positive view of medical treatment for Namibians in the GDR. Special campaigns, such as “Solidarity action 303” in 1988 by the weekly *Wochenpost*, raised funds for maintaining the ward 303 in Berlin-Buch and catering for the wounded. Readers contributed 140,000 Marks in that campaign alone.¹⁵⁸ The Association of the Blind and Visually Handicapped as well as other organisations helped with social events or outings, and schools invited patients for get-togethers with pupils.

Solidarity assistance in the medical field included the treatment of officials of liberation movements in hospitals and in convalescent homes. This assistance was very much appreciated. Among them were such leaders as Sam Nujoma and Oliver Tambo.¹⁵⁹ A great number of officials of liberation organisations spent time at recreational places in East Germany as well. “The one support which many of our people will always appreciate was also this kind of what we used to call “rest and treatment”. And we had many people in the situation of stress, many of our leaders recuperated. Oliver Tambo himself was treated for a stroke ...”¹⁶⁰

Medical treatment, rehabilitation and care for the wounded and sick were important in terms of emotional support. It had a great moral and psychological effect on fighters and refugees who had been exposed to the traumatic experiences of South African or Rhodesian raids. It was encouraging for them to know that there was hope for recovery and rehabilitation even in critical cases. Medical assistance for hundreds of wounded freedom fighters as part of the GDR’s humanitarian help is well remembered. Hifikepunye Pohamba underlined the great moral and psychological effect this medical aid had among the Namibian refugees, who had

(157) *Wochenpost* 13/1990, p.12.

(158) *Wochenpost* 30/1989, p.9.

(159) Callinicos, 613 ff.

(160) Interview with Jeremiah Kingsley Mamabolo, 30 October 1995.

been exposed to the horrors of South African raids and had seen friends and relatives dying or suffering from the most serious injuries.¹⁶¹ While Scandinavian assistance in the medical field was confined to civilian refugees, the GDR also catered for PLAN fighters. From 1978/79 to 1989/90, the Solidarity Committee's total expenditure on medical treatment for Namibians alone is assumed to have reached 5 million Marks.¹⁶²

3.4 Support of the Armed Struggle

The armed liberation struggle in Southern Africa, started by most of the liberation movements in the 1960s, intensified substantially during the course of the 1970s, as did international support for that struggle. The GDR regarded anti-colonial liberation wars as just wars, a legitimate form of the struggle for liberation. In this understanding, support for national liberation movements, including military aid, had always been an element of pushing forward with the "world revolutionary process". But things became more difficult in the nuclear age. The USSR and its allies adjusted their strategy. The support for the armed struggle had to be carefully balanced with the policy of peaceful coexistence between East and West. The socialist states took a more or less ambivalent stand on the armed liberation struggle and on the expectations of liberation movements. Their policy vacillated between aiding armed liberation struggles and cooperating on peaceful settlements to the conflicts in Southern Africa. GDR support for the armed liberation struggle in Southern Africa dates back to the early 1960s. In 1961/1962 a small number of SACP-members had been trained in the GDR for undercover operations and MK sabotage actions. In those years, military cooperation between the GDR and African liberation movements was mostly confined to the supply of para-military goods. Military training for individuals was an exception. In 1962, the GDR Solidarity Committee turned down a request by a ZAPU representative for explosives and arms. The internal report noted: "In line with our political conception and because of our situation we explained to him patiently that the GDR and its institutions cannot grant such a request. In the end we had the impression that he understood the situation and the reasons for our refusal."¹⁶³

But similar requests came also from other organisations like MPLA and FRELIMO. In 1964, James Chikerema of ZAPU contacted the GDR ambassador in Zanzibar, expressing fears that a unilateral declaration of independence by the white minority in Southern Rhodesia was imminent. Therefore, he suggested, up to 5,000 ZAPU fighters should receive crash military training to foil that plan. The approach was met with reservations. The GDR Solidarity Committee was ready to supply ZAPU with equipment like tents, boats etc. As a matter of principle, the delivery of arms and ammunition was refused, however, because of the GDR's special situation and the

(161) Interview with Pohamba, 24 January 1996.

(162) *Wochenpost* 13/1990, p.12.

(163) BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, concluding report by the Foreign Ministry's 4th AEA, 5 December 1962. The value of this first major supply was planned to be 70,000 Marks (Cf. MfAA/A 15038. Report, 17 November 1962, on the review session at the National Council on 8 November 1962).

existence of two German states. The argument was that the GDR was not opposed to armed struggle, but could not supply arms on account of its specific situation.¹⁶⁴

The GDR authorities were open to an earlier request by ZAPU president Joshua Nkomo for the training of radio communication operators and the provision of respective equipment.¹⁶⁵ Another request for consultations with German veterans of the anti-fascist underground resistance on their experience in underground work was going to be considered. Consultations however should be confined to underground work, and not include preparations for armed struggle.¹⁶⁶ The visit of J.Z. Moyo (ZAPU) in April/May 1964 marked the beginning of paramilitary supplies for ZAPU and of broader mutual cooperation on military and security matters. In 1964, the GDR office in Cairo reported more inquiries from FRELIMO, MPLA, PAIGC, ZAPU and others as to whether the GDR could provide military equipment and train military cadres.¹⁶⁷ They were told that arms deliveries by the GDR were ruled out, but paramilitary items would continue to be supplied.

In 1965, Yusuf Dadoo of the SACP turned to the SED with a request for a programme of training for selected cadres in techniques on general underground activity, including items such as illegal printing, illegal documentation, the art of personal disguise, techniques of evading both visual and electronic surveillance etc.¹⁶⁸ The SED leadership was favourably disposed to the request, but reluctant.¹⁶⁹ Obviously, SACP and ANC had different views on this question,¹⁷⁰ and this, in turn, impacted on the final GDR decision.

At that time, the armed liberation struggle had already been spreading in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia; and was imminent in Zimbabwe. A general GDR decision about the supply of arms to African liberation movements appeared increasingly inevitable. At this juncture, the balancing act of the Soviet Union and its allies between peaceful co-existence and support for national liberation movements tilted towards the latter. At the same time, the focus of the East-West conflict was shifting to Third World countries, as the escalating war in Vietnam demonstrated. The Eastern bloc reacted to the global strategy of the West and also tried to thwart ambitions of the Chinese rival.

In 1967, the ANC journal *Sechaba* concluded in an article “The creeping war: The new trend in Southern Africa” the beginning of a phase of military struggle with hopes that the liberation movement could make its way back into South Africa by means

(164) MfAA/A 15038, Lessing’s letter to Fritsch, 2 April 1964.

(165) MfAA/A 15038, file notes, 13 May and 23 September 1963; letter from the 4th AEA to the Plenipotentiary’s Office, 3 October 1963.

(166) MfAA/A, unprocessed classified documents in VVS-Archiv IL 214, letter from the Plenipotentiary’s Office to the 4th AEA, 31 October 1963.

(167) BArch, P DZ 8/7412-660, Eggebrecht’s notes, November 1964.

(168) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A2/20/985, Dadoo’s letter to the SED CC, 7 August 1965.

(169) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A2/20/985, notes for talks with the SACP delegation, 15 March 1966.; Ibid., memo from Axen to Markowski, 15 April 1966.

(170) Interview with Ray Simons, 28 December 1995.

of the armed struggle.¹⁷¹ Armed operations were already an important instrument of MPLA and FRELIMO, and in 1965/66 armed attacks were launched by ZANU and ZAPU and by SWAPO. Finally, ANC and ZAPU started their combined Wankie operation in Southern Rhodesia from August 1967. The GDR had mixed feelings about this trial of military strength.

Finally on 10 January 1967, the SED Politbureau adopted its watershed decision about the “supply of non-civilian goods to national liberation movements in Africa”¹⁷² - the first time that the GDR had decided at highest level to supply arms to liberation movements. Obviously, the decision could not have been taken without clearance from the Soviet Union; probably the visit of a Cuban military delegation to the GDR at the end of 1966 was also instrumental.¹⁷³ The paper, prepared for the Politbureau’s decision, mentioned that it was a policy principle of the GDR to assist liberation movements, and that non-civilian assistance had occasionally been provided before. Such requests to the GDR had lately been increasing. Subsequently, a supply list which took into account foreign policy priorities, the situation in each liberation movement and the needs of the partners concerned, was drawn up. The list of recipients included FRELIMO, the MPLA and the PAIGC, as well as ZAPU. The supplies consisted of infantry weapons like carbines, machine guns, sharpshooters’ rifles, sub-machine guns and ammunition, along with anti-personnel mines, binoculars and blankets.¹⁷⁴ ANC and SACP preferred the GDR to specialise on cadre training. In their view, such GDR contribution was of a high standard and well adapted to conditions and requirements of the struggle. After 1969, the training of ANC cadres in the GDR for clandestine work was stepped up. Training became a major feature of the GDR support for the armed liberation struggle. The military, security and intelligence training in the GDR were arranged in absolute secrecy.

After the Soweto uprising in 1976, the ANC requested more assistance in military training from the GDR. Each year about 80 MK fighters went to the GDR for special military training. Those selected were MK soldiers who had already done basic training in Angola and proved their mettle.¹⁷⁵ The training base was a secret camp in a hilly stretch of landscape near Teterow in the North of GDR. Ronnie Kasrils of the MK leadership rated the training in the GDR as more creative and practical than the type he himself had received in the Soviet Union. He credited the East German instructors with high professionalism and political self-confidence.¹⁷⁶ Kasrils particularly valued the combat-type training in Teterow, guerrilla warfare

(171) *Sechaba*, 1, 1967, 2f.

(172) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/1093, decision by the SED Politbureau, 10 January 1967: Lieferung nichtzivilier Gueter an nationale Befreiungsbewegungen in Afrika.

(173) In the run-up to their visit, the Cubans had inquired whether the GDR was training guerrillas or supplying arms to liberation movements, which the SED leadership still denied before the delegation was received. See, Schleicher/ Schleicher (1994), 12f.

(174) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-1200, decision by the SED Politbureau, 10 January 1967: Foreign Ministry’s draft.

(175) Interview with Ronnie Kasrils, 4 December 1995.

(176) R. Kasrils, 125 ff.

with a strong focus on survival in the terrain, which made it unique. The Vietnamese style of digging bunkers underground was developed there and practised later in South Africa.¹⁷⁷ Military training in the GDR encompassed about 1,000 MK cadres. Furthermore, individual fighters were prepared for the underground struggle in South Africa. Such special training of solo MK fighters and small groups of up to three persons had begun in the late 1960s. The efficiency of this training was highly appreciated by those responsible for intelligence work in MK. According to James Stuart: “In the area of security training our people who trained in the GDR were and are some of our best in terms of the actual skills ... their training has been of the highest standards of quality.”¹⁷⁸ In the view of former military adversaries of the ANC the military training of MK cadres in the GDR was effective, with high technological and tactical standards, especially in military intelligence - a line of activity they had been directly confronted with.¹⁷⁹

Like other organisations, MPLA and FRELIMO had received paramilitary goods from the GDR. From 1967 onwards, with the above mentioned decision, the GDR supplied MPLA and FRELIMO with arms and ammunition. FRELIMO was on top of the list of recipients of the first respective consignment delivered early in 1967.¹⁸⁰ In 1974, when the Portuguese revolution opened the way for a speedy independence in Angola and Mozambique, GDR support for MPLA and FRELIMO increased substantially and close bilateral relations developed. Due to the critical situation in both countries, the strengthening of the armed forces of MPLA and FRELIMO played a major role. In the course of these developments military support by the GDR took a new dimension. In 1975, the GDR supply of arms, ammunition and military equipment, food, clothing, medicine and medical equipment, tents etc. by ships and special flights was of crucial importance for the victorious struggle of MPLA. Military supplies for FRELIMO had also increased substantially from 1973 onwards.¹⁸¹ In 1974 and 1975 these were further augmented. In both cases – Angola as well as Mozambique – the military support of the GDR for MPLA and FRELIMO dramatically increased before independence and in the course of the establishment of the new states. Afterwards it was based on respective bilateral agreements. The support for the armed liberation struggle in Angola and Mozambique was seamlessly transferred into a bilateral military cooperation (see 4.1 and 4.2).

With the successful independence of Angola and Mozambique, the liberation struggle (including the armed struggle) in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa accelerated. We have already looked at the ANC. In October 1977, during a visit to the GDR, ZAPU president Joshua Nkomo paid calls to ZAPU military cadres receiving “special training”. These were ZIPRA members training in military intelligence,

(177) Interview with Ronnie Kasrils, 4 December 1995.

(178) Interview with James Stuart, 22 November 1995.

(179) Interview with Chris Thirion, 5 December 1995.

(180) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-1200, decision by the SED Politbureau, 10 January 1967: Foreign Ministry's draft.

(181) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-2148.

a training which was to assume particular importance and efficiency.¹⁸² Against the background of the exacerbating conflict in Southern Rhodesia, ZAPU seemed to be a preferred partner of the GDR in this field, compared with other liberation organisations. ZIPRA commanders at the time felt that the training of such cadres, destined to infiltrate into Rhodesia, was a priority of GDR's assistance. In addition, previously trained ZIPRA commanders were sent to the GDR for specialised instruction in leading larger regular units like companies and battalions. Training in communications was another important area. From 1977-79, groups of ZIPRA cadres went regularly to the GDR for military and security instruction in courses which normally took six to twelve months. The number of trainees and the quality of the courses reached levels which greatly contributed to the combat capabilities of ZIPRA.¹⁸³ Even senior political executives of ZAPU were given special training in the GDR, for example, Simon K. Moyo, director of ZAPU, in president Nkomo's office.¹⁸⁴ In June 1979, Nkomo raised the issue of further GDR assistance in talks with GDR defence minister Heinz Hoffmann. He asked for a quick supply of weapons, vehicles, uniforms and anti-aircraft equipment. He also suggested that the GDR sent military advisers to ZIPRA in Zambia. Minister Hoffmann transmitted to Nkomo a prepared consignment of 1,000 submachine guns and 250,000 rounds of ammunition, and promised to examine more arms supplies. On the question of military advisors, he explained that the GDR could not do this for political reasons, but offered to train more Zimbabwean military cadres in the GDR.¹⁸⁵

The arrangement of an airlift for ZAPU from Luanda to Lusaka from March to May 1979 was an outstanding action. The 50 flights by special planes of the GDR airline Interflug were no doubt a highlight in the cooperation between the GDR and ZAPU. Those flights took place in a crucial phase of the struggle for independence for Zimbabwe, as ZAPU was stepping up its activities from hinterland bases in Zambia. The circumstances of those 50 flights were rather dramatic on more than one occasion. The airlift was maintained under complicated political conditions and with extraordinary safety precautions both in Angola and Zambia.

512 tons of "special" freight were transported from Luanda to Lusaka for ZAPU. These solidarity supplies had been stockpiled in Luanda since 1977, awaiting onward shipment to Lusaka. They included perishable foodstuffs as well as arms and ammunition for ZIPRA. In 1978, ZAPU had requested the GDR to help resolve the transport problem.¹⁸⁶ There was a positive response in principle, and Interflug was instructed to make the necessary preparations.¹⁸⁷ However, alarmed by the mounting

(182) Interviews with Dabengwa, 8 November 1995, Brickhill, 17 November 1995, and Simon K. Moyo, 13 November 1995.

(183) Interview with Dabengwa, 8 November 1995.

(184) Interview with Moyo, 13 November 1995.

(185) This follows from Hoffmann's memo to Honecker, 18. June 1979 (Cf. BArch MA AZN Strb. 32638).

(186) SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 19627, internal memo from the SED CC's international relations department to the transport and communications department, 25 May 1978.

(187) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3163, decision by the SED CC Secretariat, 27 June 1978.

attacks on Zambia by Southern Rhodesian commandos, the policy-makers in Berlin hesitated to give the green light for the airlift to take off. Early February 1979, just before his first journey to Southern Africa, GDR leader Erich Honecker gave his approval for starting the airlift.¹⁸⁸ An Ilyushin IL 18 plane with two crews and five technicians left for Luanda on 12 March.¹⁸⁹

The situation in Southern Africa was very tense. The South African Army was intensifying its attacks against Angola, and special units also entered Zambia. There were increasing ground and air attacks by Southern Rhodesian forces on ZAPU camps in Zambia in March and April, costing the lives of hundreds of people. The airlift was interrupted by a plane crash. On 26 March, the Interflug plane crashed during one of the starts at Luanda airport. The GDR crew and six ZAPU members on board were killed.¹⁹⁰ Joshua Nkomo expressed his deep distress about this tragedy and considered the deceased as “part of our liberation force because of their manifest warmth in the duty of serving the Zimbabwe struggle. ... Their contribution to our liberation struggle heralds the day of lasting mutual friendship now and in future.”¹⁹¹ Interflug very quickly replaced the lost aircraft. Assistance for ZAPU continued. Dumiso Dabengwa regards the airlift as crucial for ZAPU and of strategic importance especially in view of ongoing negotiation attempts on the Southern Rhodesian issue.¹⁹²

As with other liberation organisations, military and security cooperation played a particularly important part in relations between the GDR and SWAPO. It dated back to requests which SWAPO made after its armed action began in August 1966.¹⁹³ In May 1967 and in 1969 again, it asked the GDR to provide paramilitary equipment.¹⁹⁴ From mid-1960s onwards, the Solidarity Committee made such equipment available to SWAPO. The Committee continued to provide supplies for PLAN fighters throughout the first half of the 1970s. As Sam Nujoma assured the Committee in a letter of thanks in September 1972, medicines and medical equipment from the GDR were very helpful.¹⁹⁵ The importance of supplies for the camps became vital in

(188) SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 19627, memo, 5 February 1979, from Egon Winkelmann, head of the CC international relations department, to Honecker, informing him that verifications had confirmed the flights would be safe. Winkelmann proposed to start the airlift although a written accord about its financing by Libya was still outstanding, while oral commitments by Libyan authorities had been given. When the airlift ended, Libya had still not paid, and whether they ever did could not be verified.

(189) SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 19627, Henke's letter to Arndt, 2 March 1979.

(190) SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 19627, report about the accident, annexed to Henke's letter to the head of the CC transport and communications department, 6 April 1979: Bericht zur Katastrophe mit dem Luftfahrzeug der Interflug vom Typ IL 18, Reg. Nr. DM-STL am 26.3.1979.

(191) SAPMO BArch, DY 30/J IV J/5, letter Nkomo's to Honecker, 28 March 1979.

(192) Interview with Dabengwa, 8 November 1995.

(193) As early as March 1966, a SWAPO delegation with Peter Nanyemba and Solomon Mifima informed GDR contacts about intentions to organise resistance in Namibia with the aim of an armed uprising (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A200.7305, file notes of the international relations department of the FDGB National Executive, 18 March 1966).

(194) BArch, P DZ 8/7306-662, Nanyemba's letter to the Solidarity Committee, 5 May 1967. Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A4/20/115, Solidarity Committee list of liberation movements' requests, undated (1969).

(195) BArch, P DZ 8/7306-662, Nujoma's letter, 29 September 1972.

the second half of the 1970s, as thousands, of young Namibians joined SWAPO in Angola and Zambia. The question was how and where to educate and train them, first and foremost for military combat, but also for an occupation or trade.

Assistance for SWAPO's armed struggle began to increase after Nujoma's visit to the GDR in December 1977. Early in 1978, GDR defence minister Heinz Hoffmann saw the possibility to supply SWAPO with 850 sub-machine guns, 60 heavy machine guns plus ammunition and pistols and light machine guns. The cost of that 135-ton consignment was estimated at 1.15 million Marks;¹⁹⁶ delivery was concluded in May. At that time, the South African military attacked Cassinga, just when a high-level military delegation from the GDR visited Angola. The GDR officers were given first-hand information on the situation by senior SWAPO officials. They were also asked to take home "warmest thanks for the comprehensive solidarity" by the arms supply which had just arrived.¹⁹⁷ In February 1979, another consignment worth 1.4 million Marks for SWAPO's army included 2,000 AKM sub-machine guns with ammunition, 5,000 grenades, 2,000 infantry mines, 200 portable radio communication sets and 2,000 steel helmets.¹⁹⁸

This type of aid was also an item of Honecker's discussions with Nujoma in Luanda in February 1979. GDR would provide uniforms for 10,000 fighters and urgently needed vehicles. Honecker promised 50 lorries.¹⁹⁹ Lorries and heavy weapons were essential if SWAPO's military leadership was to carry out its new strategy, which Peter Nanyemba, SWAPO secretary for defence, expounded in the GDR in April 1979. SWAPO would gradually set up regular mechanised units in support of the guerrillas. GDR defence minister Hoffmann confirmed that the supply of uniforms and lorries, and promised that other requests were going to be examined. These included, among other items, 10 T-34 tanks, 67 armoured personnel carriers and 20 pieces of artillery. In addition, the SWAPO military requested one-year training courses for 20 commanders from battalion up to brigade level, as well as training for counter-intelligence officers and assistance with organising counter-intelligence, reconnaissance and bodyguards.²⁰⁰

Later that year, defence minister Hoffmann proposed the supply of arms and ammunition worth 3.5 million Marks, including anti-tank missiles, sub-machine guns, sharpshooter rifles and machine guns, with the required ammunition, as well as grenades, protective masks and demolition agents. Furthermore, he offered training for a total of 20 military cadres.²⁰¹ More supplies from the GDR reached PLAN in the

(196) BArch MA Strb AZN 32637, Hoffmann's letter to Honecker, 4 January 1978.

(197) SAPMO BArch DY/30 J IV 2/2 A-2155, SED Politbureau decision, 30 May 1978: Report of the military delegation's visit to Guinea, Angola and the Congo in May 1978.

(198) BArch MA Strb AZN 32657, Hoffmann's letter to Honecker, 31 October 1978.

(199) SAPMO-BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2.035-146, file notes on Honecker's talks with Nujoma in Luanda on 18 February 1979. Honecker's promises were endorsed by the Politbureau. (Cf. SAPMO-BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2214, Politbureau decision, 27 February 1979). Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV B2/12/55, memo from the SED CC's international relations department to the security affairs department, 7 February 1979.

(200) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV B2/12/55, memo from the security affairs department to Honecker, 3 May 1979.

(201) BArch MA Strb AZN 32639, Hoffmann's letter to Honecker, 8 October 1979.

years to follow. 1.6 million Marks were earmarked for this purpose in 1981, and 2.8 million in 1983/84.²⁰²

Since 1978, the GDR trained PLAN fighters in military intelligence, which the GDR had chosen as a priority area in assisting liberation movements in Southern Africa, but also in technological and other areas, for instance, service as bodyguards. Generals of the South African Defence Force had closely observed the GDR's aid to SWAPO. They considered the military training in the GDR effective. South African military commanders also believe that the increased combat power of the PLAN was the result of GDR training for SWAPO's military cadres.²⁰³ They associated this new quality of combat with a shift towards mobile guerrilla tactics in the early 1980s, and a capacity to conduct combat operations with larger units apparent from the mid- 1980s onwards.

According to former PLAN commanders, the GDR was among the principal suppliers of weapons, equipment and provisions for SWAPO's army in those days. The military experts particularly appreciated GDR-made communication technology. The East German area of expertise in establishing radio communication networks benefited other independent African countries. Namibian military executives have confirmed that GDR supplies of weapons and equipment greatly helped SWAPO to build up a significant military potential and a developed logistics network.²⁰⁴

4. Relations with and Support for Liberation Organisations

4.1 Angola

The Angolan liberation organisation MPLA had been supported by the GDR since its formation in 1956.²⁰⁵ The role and influence of Portuguese communists on the MPLA as envisaged by some analysts²⁰⁶ might have played a role as far as the GDR decisions were concerned, but such a decision would have been influenced mainly by the international constellation of the East-West conflict. The GDR used international forums to give political support to the cause of the Angolan liberation struggle. In February 1961, the MPLA organised an armed uprising in Luanda which was followed by a massacre of Angolans by the Portuguese police and settler vigilantes. News of those events were publicised widely in East Germany. The GDR Solidarity Committee, the trade union federation FDGB and the Foreign Ministry of the GDR addressed letters to the United Nations protesting against the Portuguese colonial repression in Angola. Public meetings and other functions were organised in the GDR

(202) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3585, SED CC Secretariat decision, 30 January 1981; SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2601, Politbureau decision, 18 October 1983.

(203) Interview with General George Meiring, 29 November 1995 and with Chris Thirion, 5 December 1995.

(204) Group interview in the Namibian Defence Ministry, 19 January 1996.

(205) Post/Sandvoss, p.54.

(206) Gibson, 211 f.

to mark a Week of Solidarity with the peoples of Angola and of the other Portuguese colonies, as had been suggested by AAPSO.²⁰⁷

Already in October 1960, Viriato da Cruz, at that time secretary-general of MPLA, had visited the GDR. He informed about the developing liberation struggle in Angola and explored possibilities for cooperation. In the same year 1960, the Angolan trade union federation UNTA had some of their executive members enrolled on a course for foreign students at the college of the East German trade union federation FDGB. More Angolan trade unionists attended such courses later on.²⁰⁸

In January/February 1961, Viriato da Cruz was again in the GDR for talks with officials of the Solidarity Committee and of FDGB. MPLA received an aid delivery from the Solidarity Committee. A second delivery for MPLA was shipped to Conakry in Guinea later in the year. Altogether, in 1961 the Angolan liberation movement received solidarity goods from the GDR valued at 104,000 Marks. At that time only Congo and Algeria received more GDR support in Africa.²⁰⁹ In December 1961, an UNTA delegation met FDGB and Solidarity Committee officials in Berlin to request assistance for Angolan refugees in the Congo (Leopoldville) and to discuss ways to develop cooperation.²¹⁰

The suppression of the Angolan people by Portugal was in the focus of international attention and stayed on the agenda. In January 1962, the GDR foreign minister Lothar Bolz protested against the Portuguese colonial administration's rule of terror in a letter addressed to the President of the UN General Assembly, Mongi Slim.²¹¹ GDR support for the Angolan liberation movement continued. In May 1962, a shipment of solidarity aid from FDGB for Angolan refugees reached UNTA in Leopoldville. It consisted mainly of textiles, tents and medical supplies. Late 1962, UNTA secretary-general Pascual Luvualo participated in an international trade union conference in the GDR.²¹²

The MPLA suffered from the Portuguese reprisals after the uprising of 1961, and in addition, from attacks by the rival People's Union of Angola (UPA), later National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). Looking for increasing international support, Agostinho Neto, president of MPLA, visited the GDR in May 1963. He exchanged information and views with Solidarity Committee officials on the liberation struggle in Angola and requested assistance with paramilitary equipment, medicine, medical instruments, blankets and tents. In addition, Neto examined possibilities for assistance to UNTA with FDGB officials. He also met officials of the Foreign Ministry.²¹³ As far as solidarity supplies were concerned, the trade union liaison became very active. The deputy secretary-general of UNTA, Bernhard Dombele, visited Berlin at the same

(207) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(208) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(209) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/55.

(210) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(211) See: *Gegen Rassismus*, 88 f.

(212) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(213) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/948.

time as Neto for discussions with the FDGB. In November 1963, Pascual Luvualo attended the 6th FDGB congress. FDGB again had assembled sizeable aid supplies for Angolan refugees in the Congo. Early 1964, FDGB despatched clothing and medicine to UNTA.²¹⁴

GDR was also in contact with other Angolan liberation organisations. On the fringes of the independence celebrations in Kenya in December 1963, chairman Horst Brasch of the GDR Solidarity Committee met with FNLA president Holden Roberto. And in April 1964, the foreign minister of the FNLA-led Angolan exile government, Jonas Savimbi, was in the GDR for an exchange of views and information with the Solidarity Committee.²¹⁵ But the GDR continued supporting the MPLA, as indicated by reports on the delivery of paramilitary equipment to MPLA via Brazzaville.²¹⁶ In September 1965, Agostinho Neto was back in Berlin and had talks with FDGB and solidarity committee officials. A few weeks later he was followed by Paulo Jorge, MPLA representative in Cairo. The same year, the GDR Solidarity Committee was represented at the 2nd meeting of CONCP, the umbrella organisation of PAIGC, MPLA and FRELIMO in Dar es Salaam. In 1966, a CONCP delegation visited the GDR for talks with the Solidarity Committee and FDGB. Later on in 1970, an International Conference for Solidarity with the Peoples of the Portuguese Colonies in Rome organised by CONCP was also attended by a GDR Solidarity Committee delegation.²¹⁷

On 23 March 1966, GDR foreign minister Otto Winzer addressed a letter to UN Secretary General U Thant concerning the situation in the territories under Portuguese rule. He emphasised that the GDR supported the right of self-determination of the peoples in the territories concerned as well as all respective UN decisions. The GDR was not delivering any arms or ammunition to Portugal and had even enforced economic sanctions against the Portuguese colonial territories.²¹⁸ Besides the GDR Solidarity Committee, the FDGB played a major role supplying MPLA with solidarity goods during the 1960s. In 1966/1967, the FDGB put together major aid consignments consisting of textiles and medicines for Angolan refugees. Moreover it provided machines and tools to equip tailoring and shoe-making workshops and a joinery.²¹⁹

In the early 1960s, the GDR received also requests for military support by MPLA, as underlined in confidential notes taken in 1964 by Henry Eggebrecht, head of the Solidarity Committee's liaison office to AAPSO in Cairo. He was in charge of relations with liberation movements and informed Berlin about inquiries from liberation movements as to whether the GDR could provide military equipment and

(214) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/948.

(215) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(216) BArch, P DZ 8/7412-660.

(217) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(218) See: Gegen Rassismus, 121 f.

(219) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

train military cadres.²²⁰ As with other liberation movements, Eggebrecht would tell his partners in MPLA that arms deliveries were ruled out, but paramilitary items like uniform textiles, blankets and water bottles would continue to be supplied. When finally in January 1967 the SED Politburo decided to supply arms to African liberation movements, MPLA was among the first organisations to receive military hardware from the GDR. This marked the beginning of a new stage of cooperation.²²¹ But even now, paramilitary supplies remained a major form of assistance. Requests by Neto included a portable wireless set as well as the delivery of a field hospital.²²²

Visits of high ranking MPLA delegations to the GDR continued during the course of the following years. That included a delegation led by Daniel Chipenda and another one with Lucio Lara, who attended an international scientific conference in Berlin for the liberation of Southern Africa. A delegation of the MPLA youth established relations with the GDR youth movement FDJ. In October 1968, Neto himself was back in Berlin, sharing views and information concerning the Angolan liberation struggle and discussing GDR support for MPLA in the rehabilitation of liberated regions in Angola. It was in that context that the issue of delivering a field hospital was raised.²²³

1971 was a crucial year as far as relations between the GDR and MPLA were concerned. In May a delegation of the GDR Solidarity Committee, led by its chairman Heinz H. Schmidt, visited Tanzania and Zambia. They transmitted mathematics textbooks in Portuguese to the MPLA. These had been drafted and produced in the GDR specifically for the liberation movements in Portuguese colonies. In Dar es Salaam, Schmidt met Neto and exchanged views and information. In June, an MPLA delegation attended the 8th party congress of the SED. And in November 1971, MPLA President Neto visited the GDR, invited by the Solidarity Committee. He was received by Hermann Axen, member of the SED Politbureau. It was at this point that direct party-to-party relations were established between SED and MPLA.²²⁴ MPLA was the first liberation organisation in Southern Africa to set up these official relations with the SED, which indicates the advanced level of bilateral relations. In 1971, 51 wounded Angolan guerrillas were sent to the GDR for medical treatment. This particular form of humanitarian support of the MPLA continued in the course of the following years to substantially increase after Angolan independence.²²⁵

Another meeting of GDR representatives with Agostinho Neto took place during the 5th AAPSOC conference in Cairo in January 1972, attended by a Solidarity Committee delegation. As a follow up, representatives of the Solidarity Committee handed over solidarity aid shipments to the MPLA in Dar es Salaam in April and in October 1972. MPLA and UNTA delegations visited Berlin. In October 1972, the

(220) BArch, P DZ 8/7412-660, Eggebrecht's notes, November 1964.

(221) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/JIV 2/2/1093.

(222) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/948.

(223) I. Schleicher *Chronicle*.

(224) BArch, P DZ 8/7301-662; see also: I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(225) I. Schleicher, *Solidarität mit dem Volk*, p.65.

Solidarity Committee, FDGB and other GDR organisations proclaimed a week of solidarity with the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau struggling for their liberation. Delegations of FRELIMO, PAIGC and MPLA and of the OAU Liberation Committee took part in events during the week.²²⁶

As relations between GDR and MPLA developed continuously, GDR solidarity supplies increased. Although respective figures are not completely available, the value of material annual assistance for MPLA had increased from about 100,000 to 200,000 Marks in the course of the 1960s. In 1971, the figure rose to 300,000 Marks, in 1972 to 841,000 Marks to be topped by 1 million Marks in 1973.²²⁷ This process was not even disturbed by the political turbulences within MPLA. The GDR didn't take sides in those infightings. Even at a time when the Soviet Union stopped its support for MPLA in 1973, the GDR continued and increased supplies. There was a time when the GDR and Yugoslavia were the only countries providing MPLA with a continuous flow of solidarity material.²²⁸ GDR support for MPLA included training. From 1960 to 1974, about 26 Angolans received vocational training in the GDR.²²⁹

Shortly after the revolution in Portugal, Neto visited the GDR at the invitation of the SED Central Committee in May 1974. He was accompanied by high ranking officials and members of the military command of the MPLA. They were received by Willi Stoph, chairman of the GDR State Council and other top officials of the SED. The two delegations signed a new agreement on cooperation between their parties for 1974 and 1975. The GDR promised to supply solidarity goods worth 1.5 million Marks.²³⁰ That amount would soon be overstepped substantially following the dramatic developments in Angola. The GDR assistance for MPLA included the offer of eight scholarships for vocational training, two scholarships for university studies and medical treatment for 20 wounded fighters.²³¹ GDR support was rather complex. 20 years later, Alexander Rodrigues (Kito) told a conference on the history of the liberation struggle in Pretoria, how crucial a spontaneous supply of fuel by the GDR embassy in Lusaka was at this critical time to secure the transport of supplies for MPLA to the Angolan border.²³² Neto himself had requested such help from the GDR embassy in Zambia.

Following Neto's visit to the GDR, a number of GDR ships putting in at the port of Dar es Salaam had transported goods for MPLA, including tents, shoes, foods, medicine and medical instruments.²³³ In November 1974, in reaction to an urgent request from Neto the SED Central Committee decided to speed up the material assistance for MPLA and even provided 10,000 US Dollars in cash – which was rather

(226) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(227) I. Schleicher, *Solidaritaet mit dem Volk*, p.66.

(228) Interview with A. Rodrigues, 6 December 1995.

(229) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-1873.

(230) BArch, P DZ 8/7301.

(231) BArch, P DZ 8/7301-662.

(232) Interview with A. Rodrigues, 6 December 1995.

(233) BArch, P DZ 8/7064.

unusual, considering GDR's lack of foreign currency. The GDR Solidarity Committee quickly dispatched the needed supplies.²³⁴ GDR solidarity goods for MPLA more than doubled in 1974 to reach a value of 2.25 million Marks.²³⁵

At the end of April 1975, a 122 ton solidarity contingent with a value of 5.2 million Marks was put together in GDR and shipped to Angola. In June, the GDR sea vessel MS "Elbe" arrived at the port of Luanda under dramatic circumstances. The political situation in the Angolan capital was unstable, due to the military presence and increasing tensions between MPLA, FNLA and UNITA. A GDR delegation was even briefly detained, but finally the goods - which included food, clothing, medicine and medical equipment with 15 ambulances, tents etc. - were handed over to MPLA.²³⁶ This was a clear indication that the GDR was going to increase its support for the MPLA drastically.

In August 1975, an MPLA delegation with Politbureau member Iko Carreira visited the GDR to share information and to exchange views about most recent developments in Angola and the preparations for the Angolan independence. Carreira urgently requested further GDR assistance, particularly in the military field. Agreement was reached on the provision of aid supplies and military equipment. The details were quite impressive – 10,000 submachine guns with 10 million ammunition, 10 artillery guns with 4,000 grenades, 10,000 hand grenades, 5,800 uniforms and 1,000 steel helmets.²³⁷

The situation in Angola was critical. South Africa intervened militarily, and Cuba sent troops to support MPLA. On 9 September 1975, the SED Politbureau decided on a number of measures to give additional support for MPLA in view of the forthcoming independence of Angola. These included diplomatic activities as well as solidarity supplies and military equipment worth six million Marks. The military goods were to be transported by ship to the port of Point Noire in the People's Republic of Congo.²³⁸ GDR diplomats particularly in African countries were to explain the GDR position and to request support for and recognition of the MPLA. Between October and December 1975, solidarity goods were delivered by four special flights of the GDR airline Interflug to Luanda.²³⁹ The GDR had continually increased its support and joined Cuba and the Soviet Union in their efforts to secure a political and military victory of the MPLA in the struggle for an independent Angola. In 1975/76, during the most critical developments in Angola, the GDR gave substantial military support to the MPLA. Supplies from the GDR Solidarity Committee for MPLA rose from 2.25 million Marks in 1974 to 9.2 million Marks in 1975 and 107.55 million Marks in 1976, thus reaching an unprecedented level not to be equalled for years to come.²⁴⁰

(234) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-2606.

(235) I. Schleicher, *Solidarität mit dem Volk*, p.67.

(236) I. Schleicher, *DDR-Solidarität*, 50 ff.

(237) SAPMO BArch DY B/2/12/55.

(238) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/1580.

(239) BArch, P DZ 8/7301. BArch, P DZ 8/7063.

(240) I. Schleicher, *Statistische Angaben*, pp.151 and 154.

On 11 November 1975, the GDR recognised the newly proclaimed People's Republic of Angola, and diplomatic relations between the two countries was established. In the months to come, the GDR provided even more aid to the MPLA to resist the South African military intervention. The GDR supported Angola politically and diplomatically against South Africa's military intervention in United Nations bodies.²⁴¹ With the struggle for Angola the East-West conflict took a Southern dimension, and the GDR was fully involved – reflecting its understanding of the active role they were committed to play in the “world revolutionary process”.

4.2 Mozambique

The first Mozambican liberation organisations were formed in exile in 1960 and 1961. Soon, the GDR established contact. In March 1962, a delegation of UDENAMO, one of the three organisations which constituted FRELIMO later in June, visited Berlin for talks with officials of the GDR Solidarity Committee. UDENAMO received propaganda material worth 1,500 Marks.²⁴² PAIGC leader Amilcar Cabral, who was held in high esteem by his German partners, encouraged the GDR to focus on FRELIMO as a partner organisation in Mozambique.²⁴³ Despite continuous problems within the Mozambican liberation movement and later on despite close links between FRELIMO and China, the GDR continued cooperation with FRELIMO.

For 1963, the GDR Solidarity Committee envisaged modest material support for FRELIMO amounting to a value of 20,000 Marks.²⁴⁴ Later that year, a first supply of material was provided to assist FRELIMO's propaganda campaign. In December 1963, FRELIMO vice-president Uriah T. Simango and international affairs secretary Marcelino dos Santos met Solidarity Committee officials in Berlin to discuss ways of developing cooperation. In October 1964, FRELIMO president Eduardo Mondlane visited the GDR. He attended the celebrations for the GDR's 15th anniversary and had talks at the Solidarity Committee.²⁴⁵ Obviously, these high ranking visits of FRELIMO officials were fruitful. In February 1965, the GDR sea vessel MS “Usedom” delivered a major consignment of solidarity goods for FRELIMO to Dar es Salaam, which included clothing, blankets, tents, uniforms, collapsible boats and other paramilitary equipment.²⁴⁶ In the years 1965 and 1966, FRELIMO figured with supplies of envisaged 200,000 Marks annually in the plans of the Solidarity Committee.²⁴⁷

When GDR Solidarity Committee observer, Henry Eggebrecht, attended the 2nd meeting of CONCP in Dar es Salaam in 1965 he had the opportunity to exchange views with FRELIMO leaders. In 1966 Jorge Rebelo, secretary for information, represented FRELIMO at the 6th Congress of the International Organisation of Journalists (IOJ),

(241) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(242) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/55.

(243) I. Schleicher, *Solidaritaet mit dem Volk*, p.59.

(244) BArch, P DZ 8/7414-660.

(245) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(246) BArch, P DZ 8/7414-660.

(247) I. Schleicher, *Solidaritaet mit dem Volk*, p.66.

in Berlin. At the end of November, a FRELIMO delegation under Mondlane came to Berlin for talks with Solidarity Committee officials.²⁴⁸

It was a crucial time as far as the GDR policy towards Southern Africa was concerned. Only a few months later, the GDR came out in favour of direct military support for the armed struggle of African liberation movements. When that decision was taken in January 1967, FRELIMO was one of the four organisations to receive first supplies of military hardware from the GDR and the biggest consignment with 280 machine guns, 5,000 submachine guns and carbines, about 1.5 million pieces of ammunition and 2,000 mines was delivered. The arguments supporting this decision give a clear indication of the East German assessment of FRELIMO. The organisation was considered to be the most important liberation movement in Mozambique, to be actively cooperating with the socialist states, and to be conducting a successful armed struggle. Furthermore it was noted that it had intended to move its headquarters from Dar es Salaam into liberated territories in Mozambique.²⁴⁹

Also in 1967, a first teacher from the GDR, Joachim Kindler, started to work at FRELIMO's secondary school in Dar es Salaam. The GDR Solidarity Committee furnished equipment for a physics and chemistry classroom at that school. During a temporary shutdown of the school after a students' revolt (June 1968), Kindler was busy at the Mozambique Institute in Tanzania devising teaching materials, including mathematics textbooks, for FRELIMO's education efforts. After the secondary school was re-opened at Bagamoyo, another GDR teacher carried on this line of cooperation with FRELIMO. From 1972 to 1975, five East German teachers were assigned to work with FRELIMO.²⁵⁰

In early 1969, FRELIMO president Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated in Dar es Salaam. The Solidarity Committee and the Peace Council of the GDR denounced this terrorist act and declared their solidarity with FRELIMO. But the ensuing crisis in FRELIMO affected the cooperation with the GDR and its solidarity support declined in 1969. Nevertheless, relations with FRELIMO as such continued, as well as different forms of practical cooperation. In June 1969, a FRELIMO delegation with Marcelino dos Santos and Uriah T. Simango attended a world meeting for peace organised by the World Peace Council in Berlin. Delegation members had talks with Solidarity Committee officials about future cooperation. The cooperation increased again when Samora Machel became president of FRELIMO.²⁵¹

During those difficult times, a very special project of support for FRELIMO's struggle was implemented. In March 1970, GDR radio journalist Peter Spacek accompanied FRELIMO guerrillas into liberated zones in Northern Mozambique. During this well-prepared trip he was in the company of Joaquim Chissano. Spacek reported about the state of the Mozambican liberation struggle in the press of the

(248) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(249) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-1200.

(250) For more details see: I. Schleicher, *DDR-Solidarität*, 39 ff.

(251) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

GDR, and his reports were also published or quoted in other countries like the Soviet Union, Tanzania, Sweden and India. The publications *Mozambique Revolution* (FRELIMO) and *Sechaba* (ANC) took up these reports.²⁵² This happened at a point, in 1970, when the Portuguese General Kaulza de Arriaga launched “*Gordic Knot*”, the largest military operation of the colonial war against the liberated zones of FRELIMO in Mozambique.

As a reaction to these military actions, the GDR addressed a number of statements and comments to the UN and to the OAU, protesting against Portugal’s intensified colonial repression and at the same time against the construction of the Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique. In April 1970, GDR Vice minister for Foreign Affairs Wolfgang Kiesewetter met with Marcelino dos Santos for talks in Dar es Salaam. Another meeting between a GDR Solidarity Committee delegation and FRELIMO officials took place at a CONCP Solidarity Conference in Rome, late June 1970.

In 1971, the exchange of delegations between GDR and FRELIMO increased substantially. Aurelio Manave and Armando Panguene visited Berlin and discussed further cooperation, especially in the fields of university education and medical assistance. Similarly to MPLA, in May FRELIMO was presented with mathematics textbooks from the GDR in Dar es Salaam by a Solidarity Committee delegation. They also presented other items as solidarity gifts to FRELIMO President Samora Machel. A FRELIMO youth league delegation attended the 9th Free German Youth (FDJ) parliament. This increase in the scope and amount of activities was highlighted by the visit of a FRELIMO delegation led by President Samora Machel which attended the 8th SED party congress in Berlin in June. They met with Hermann Axen, member of the SED Politbureau, and with officials of the Solidarity Committee. As a result of this visit, the GDR stepped up its cooperation with FRELIMO. In 1971 the supply of solidarity goods for FRELIMO reached a value of 681,000 Marks.²⁵³ As with other liberation organisations, training of Mozambicans was also part of the GDR support. Between 1960 and 1974 the GDR offered FRELIMO 47 scholarships for vocational training.²⁵⁴

Less than a year later, in April 1972, Samora Machel was again in Berlin. This visit showcased the new quality of relations. Invited by the SED Central Committee, the FRELIMO delegation which also included Joaquim Chissano, FRELIMO Central Committee secretary for security, Jorge Rebelo and others was received by Erich Honecker, the new party leader in the GDR, and had talks with an SED team led by Hermann Axen. The two sides signed the first agreement between their parties on mutual cooperation, therewith establishing direct party-to-party relations at FRELIMO’s request. 1972 saw an active exchange of delegations and meetings between GDR and FRELIMO. Three other FRELIMO delegations visited Berlin,

(252) See also: Spacek, 93 ff.

(253) I. Schleicher, *Solidarität mit dem Volk*, p.66.

(254) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-1873.

while one delegation of the SED, and two of the Solidarity Committee came to Dar es Salaam to have talks with FRELIMO, but also to hand over solidarity supplies.²⁵⁵

The GDR decided to supply FRELIMO with additional military supplies for the armed struggle as requested by Machel. These included submachine guns with ammunition, grenades, steel helmets and other military hardware. Preparations were made for an increase of such supplies by producing respective weapons and ammunitions for FRELIMO as from 1973 onwards.²⁵⁶ In 1974, the supply of military goods for FRELIMO reached an amount of 2.5 million Marks.²⁵⁷

From late 1972 onwards, the colonial repression of the Mozambican population escalated with Portuguese colonial troops burning down villages and killing people indiscriminately. In July 1973, a GDR TV team with renowned journalist Ulrich Makosch accompanied FRELIMO fighters into liberated zones in Mozambique. They documented evidence of the colonial repression. The GDR Foreign Ministry protested against atrocities perpetrated by Portuguese colonial forces.²⁵⁸ In public statements the Solidarity Committee and other GDR organisations condemned the Portuguese warfare. Documentary films made and screened by the East German Television were subsequently disseminated internationally. The liberation struggle in Mozambique was in the focus of attention during the 10th World Youth Festival in Berlin, held from 28 July to 5 August 1973. Around 100 members of FRELIMO participate in the festival. When the UN General Assembly decided to establish a committee to investigate massacres perpetrated by the Portuguese colonial army in Mozambique in December 1973, the GDR appointed representatives to the committee.²⁵⁹

In 1974, with the crumbling of the Portuguese colonial empire, the GDR attached even more importance to developments in Southern Africa, specifically in Angola and Mozambique. Increased solidarity with the liberation struggle included massive support for the independence process in both countries. The value of material supplies for FRELIMO had already passed the 1.3 million Marks mark in 1973 and jumped up to more than five million Marks in 1974.²⁶⁰ On 20 September 1974, the GDR Government welcomed the installation of the Transitional Government of Mozambique in Lourenco Marques and assured FRELIMO of its firm solidarity. Early December, a special flight of the GDR airline Interflug arrived in Dar es Salaam. Its cargo, solidarity supplies worth 500,000 Marks were delivered to FRELIMO.²⁶¹

At the same time, from 3 to 10 December 1974, a FRELIMO delegation with Samora Machel visited the GDR. Its composition gave an indication of the aims of the visit. The delegation included Jorge Rebelo, Xavier Baptista Sulila, member of the FRELIMO armed forces command, the minister for economic coordination and other members

(255) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(256) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/3 A-2148.

(257) SAPMO BArch DY 30/2/1533.

(258) *Gegen Rassismus*, 242 ff.

(259) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(260) I. Schleicher, *Solidaritaet mit dem Volk*, p.66.

(261) BArch, P DZ 8/7302-662.

of the Transitional Government, as well as executive officials of FRELIMO. They were received by Erich Honecker and had talks with Willi Stoph, chairman of the GDR State Council. Negotiations with an SED team led by Hermann Axen, focussed on the situation in Mozambique in the period of transition to independence. Both sides reached agreement on furthering the ties between SED and FRELIMO (a respective agreement for 1975 and 1976 was signed) and on establishing bilateral governmental relations in the fields of politics, economics, science and technology, culture, defence and security.²⁶²

Machel also asked for the military training of 2,500 FRELIMO cadres by GDR officers before independence. That included training as police officers, border guards, personal security, immigration and customs officers etc. Honecker agreed to that request. In April and May 1975, 250 cadres received training of various kinds in the GDR and returned to Mozambique to take up their posts before independence.²⁶³

During the following months, many GDR activities unfolded to support FRELIMO and help the Transitional Government in Mozambique to stabilise the situation there. At the end of January 1975, FRELIMO received another delivery of solidarity goods in Dar es Salaam. A week later, the first solidarity shipment from the GDR, consisting of medicines, food, and milk powder for children and school material, arrived with a special flight of Interflug in Lourenco Marques (Maputo) and was handed over to Prime Minister Joaquim Chissano of the Transitional Government. Similar aid supplies reached the Mozambican capital by charter flights on 13 February and in late March. The value of those supplies amounted to about 3.7 million Marks. These deliveries continued with special flights in August and December 1975 as well as with a ship consignment in December.²⁶⁴

In February and March 1975, a major GDR expert delegation arrived in Maputo to study the situation in Mozambique and to discuss with FRELIMO leaders how to organise a national government and the economic, educational and public health systems. The East German team headed by Herbert Graf included experts in law, finances, agriculture, education, health and foreign affairs.²⁶⁵ They also explored opportunities for future cooperation between the GDR and Mozambique.

In June 1975, a party and government delegation, headed by Bernhard Quandt, member of SED CC and the GDR State Council, attended the proclamation of the People's Republic of Mozambique (25 June). President Samora Machel received the delegation for talks. Mozambique and the GDR established diplomatic relations on 26 June 1975.²⁶⁶ The GDR had supported the independence celebrations itself with substantial supplies.

(262) Gegen Rassismus, 427 ff.

(263) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV B 2/12/55.

(264) BArch, P DZ 8/7302-662.

(265) Graf, 475 ff.

(266) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

At Mozambique's independence, GDR and FRELIMO looked back at a continuous development of relations since the early 1960s. The level of bilateral cooperation offered a sound foundation for close bilateral state relations between GDR and an independent Mozambique. GDR was considered a preferable partner by FRELIMO, since this rather small socialist country did not seem to have any big power ambitions. The GDR also did not interfere with FRELIMO's close relations with China. Samora Machel considered the GDR a stable ally even in difficult times. In his understanding, the GDR understood the problems of FRELIMO right from the beginning.

4.3 Zimbabwe

Initial contacts between the GDR and the Zimbabwe liberation movement date from 1960, when the president of the African National Congress (ANC) of Southern Rhodesia, Joshua Nkomo, enquired whether he could send a representative to the GDR.²⁶⁷ Relations with the ANC's successor organisation, the National Democratic Party (NDP), were subsequently established in Cairo where NDP had set up an office. NDP Secretary General George T. Silundika impressed GDR diplomats when he informed them in December 1960 on negotiations with the British Government and representatives of the Southern Rhodesian administration in London. His stand was not one of "blacks against whites" but rather in favour of a parliamentary representation of all segments of the population, based on equal rights, as well as a corresponding participation in national government.²⁶⁸

In March 1961, during the 3rd All-African Peoples' Conference, Horst Brasch, chairman of the GDR Solidarity Committee, met the NDP president, Joshua Nkomo in Cairo.²⁶⁹ In April 1961, NDP vice-president Moton Malianga attended an international scientific conference in Leipzig in the GDR. In the same year, the Solidarity Committee printed at its own expense 5,000 copies of a pamphlet for the NDP.²⁷⁰ A Zimbabwean took part in the first training course held at the school of the GDR Journalists Association in 1961/62.²⁷¹ GDR efforts to intensify these links with the NDP were not successful in 1962, however. The GDR and the Zimbabwe liberation movement only drew closer, after the conflict with the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia intensified, and assistance was forthcoming from the GDR Solidarity Committee.

In 1962, the Office of the GDR Plenipotentiary in Cairo examined in an analysis of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland the potential of future GDR's relations with local democratic organisations. The paper concluded that the African liberation movements were not sufficiently informed about contradictions between the Rhodesian settlers and the British Government, exploited these disagreements too

(267) MfAA/A 14353, State of relations report for July-September, 14 October 1960, by the Foreign Ministry's 4th extra-European division (AEA), dealing with African affairs.

(268) Cf. MfAA/A 14190, file notes, 15 December 1960 and 5 January 1961.

(269) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.401, draft report, 29 March 1961, on the proceedings of the conference.

(270) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/2/20/55, estimate/out-turn account by 31 December 1961.

(271) Cf. MfAA/A 14190, state of relations report by the Foreign Ministry's 4th AEA, 21 May 1962.

little, and were too fragmented in their struggle. The liberation movements should demand economic, political and social equality for the African population and use the instrument of mass mobilisation. Nonetheless, the GDR diplomats did not rule out armed conflict.²⁷²

As compared to UNIP in Northern Rhodesia which was already considered a well-organised and influential mass party, NDP's successor ZAPU was seen to have considerable organisational weaknesses and to lack clarity about the situation and the tasks and methods of struggle. The relations of these parties with the GDR and other socialist countries were assessed with caution: "They have not yet surmounted the influences of anti-communism. This is why, despite some promising beginnings, a deeply trustful relationship has not yet developed."²⁷³ Due to the political and economic importance of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the paper gave it top priority in the GDR's long-term foreign policy in Africa. Clinging to the theory of social classes and strata, a GDR foreign policy paper stated that intensified contacts with trade unions would be particularly important. Cooperation with UNIP and ZAPU should be pursued, but be more limited than relations with the trade unions.²⁷⁴ The paper recommended assistance for ZAPU and UNIP mainly through printing or furnishing material to help build their party structures. Invitations for delegations to visit the GDR were considered highly important, because this is where they could hold political consultations. In September 1962, 12 youths from Southern Rhodesia were invited for vocational training in the GDR, and ZAPU was offered scholarships for students.²⁷⁵ Thus, the GDR had set the stage for cooperation with the Zimbabwe liberation movement.

A significant step was the visit of the ZAPU representative in Cairo, Edward Ndlovu, to the GDR in 1962. Obviously the organisation had abandoned previous reservations vis-à-vis the socialist countries. A major reason for the shift was seen in the repressive policies of the white minority regime, which had banned the NDP in December 1961 and ZAPU in September 1962. Nkomo and other executive members were arrested. The Solidarity Committee promised to supply ZAPU with goods, but it turned down ZAPU's request for explosives and arms.²⁷⁶ ZAPU's external leadership greatly appreciated the results of Ndlovu's visit to the GDR.²⁷⁷

Relations with the trade union movement in Zimbabwe also gathered momentum. As far as the GDR was concerned, they developed as a relatively autonomous line of connection to the Zimbabwe liberation movement, quite in the sense of the

(272) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV/2/20/415.

(273) Cf. Foederation von Rhodesien und Njassaland, p.66.

(274) Cf. Schlussfolgerungen, 10. Cf. MfAA/A 17214, paper for submission to the SED CC Secretariat, 8 January 1961.

(275) Cf. *ibid.*, p. 11.

(276) BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, concluding report by the Foreign Ministry's 4th AEA, 5 December 1962. The value of this first major supply was planned to be 70,000 Marks (Cf. MfAA/A 15038. Report, 17 November 1962, on the review session at the National Council on 8 November 1962).

(277) BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, Ndlovu's letter to the Solidarity Committee, 28 December 1962.

aforementioned recommendations of 1962. The African Trade Union Congress of Southern Rhodesia (ATUC), which later became the Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions (ZACU), was close to ZAPU. The GDR trade union organisation FDGB offered material assistance and scholarships at its college in Bernau.²⁷⁸ Cooperation between the federations was later intensified, with additional scholarships at the college, and the provision of clothing, office material and equipment for trade union work.²⁷⁹

Brasch and Nkomo met again in December 1963 in Nairobi, during Kenya's independence celebrations. Their discussions about further cooperation included material solidarity and cadre training for ZAPU. First supplies for ZAPU from the Solidarity Committee in 1963 included blankets and medicines.²⁸⁰ By this time, the Solidarity Committee considered ZAPU one of its close partners in sub-Saharan Africa.²⁸¹ The Committee's work programme for Africa for 1964 listed Southern Rhodesia now fourth among priority countries, behind South Africa, Kenya and Northern Rhodesia.²⁸² Cooperation with ZAPU was assuming distinct contours.

In August 1963, when a group around Ndabaningi Sithole and Robert Mugabe left ZAPU to establish ZANU, the GDR perceived this split as a crucial setback in the struggle for liberation and blamed ZANU for it. GDR foreign affairs experts saw no reason to change their favourable attitude towards ZAPU. Most of their contacts, such as T.G. Silundika, Jason Z. Moyo and E. Ndlovu, remained in ZAPU, playing an important part in the organisation. There were reservations concerning Ndabaningi Sithole, ZANU's president. He was considered a stubborn nationalist and anti-communist. ZANU was more or less identified with Sithole. Leaders such as Mugabe were unknown in the GDR. An East German analysis of this time did not suggest closing the door to ZANU. It was recommended to continue studying the problem and to contact both sides. The "progressive forces" in ZAPU should be encouraged; restraint was advised concerning material aid for ZANU.²⁸³

This attitude was subsequently determined by international factors. UNIP, a major partner of the GDR Solidarity Committee, supported ZAPU; friendly movements like the South African ANC were also in support of ZAPU. ZAPU was already cooperating in international bodies like AAPSO, the World Peace Council and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), where the Soviet Union wielded considerable influence. Decisive for the GDR's stand towards ZANU became the constellation in the "world revolutionary movement", notably the conflict between

(278) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/989, report, 5 Feb. 1963, by the FDGB National Executive's international relations department on the delegation's visit.

(279) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304, file notes by the FDGB National Executive's international relations department, 26 January 1965.

(280) SAPMO BArch NY 4182/1326, report by the delegation, annex 4: notes about a conversation with Nkomo.

(281) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/112, appraisal of the Solidarity Committee's work and relations, 2 December 1963.

(282) Barch, P DZ/8 0767-660, plan of the Solidarity Committee for the work in 1964, undated.

(283) MfAA/A 15038, paper: Appraisal of the split in the liberation movement in Zimbabwe, 19 October 1963.

the USSR and China. The pro-Chinese label of ZANU restrained the GDR from building up relations. Internal problems in ZANU, the attitude of ZANU itself, and the influence of ZAPU also played a role in the reserved attitude of GDR toward ZANU.

The 1964 work programme of the Solidarity Committee expressly mentioned ZAPU as the main partner, but stipulated that contacts should be established with ZANU.²⁸⁴ However these were confined to sporadic exchanges of information. Such contacts continued in Cairo, London and in Dar es Salaam.²⁸⁵ In 1965, ZANU again approached the Solidarity Committee, requesting assistance, including aid for armed operations.²⁸⁶ In February 1966, Simpson V. Mtambanengwe, ZANU secretary for international affairs, travelled to Berlin to meet officials of the Solidarity Committee and the FDGB, who gained a good impression from the discussions.²⁸⁷ A review of the Solidarity Committee's activities in 1965/66 ultimately only mentioned information contacts with ZANU.²⁸⁸ Attempts to establish direct contacts with the South African Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) and ZANU caused angry reactions by the ANC insofar as the PAC was concerned. Despite that, the Solidarity Committee was committed to keep its doors open. But reservations were obvious, when Schmidt, noted: "The whole question of relations with these extremely nationalistic movements, which are mostly sustained by intellectuals and under both Chinese and American influences and which, like the PAC and ZANU, are not without influence in their countries, is at present under review."²⁸⁹ Evidently under the impact of the further deteriorating Soviet-Chinese rift, that review turned out unfavourably for ZANU, in spite of the promising beginnings of relations in early 1966.

The GDR came to place much greater confidence in ZAPU in the course of 1964. Relations had been brought to a new level by a longer visit of ZAPU's treasurer Jason Z. Moyo from April to June 1964 which centred on further assistance for ZAPU.²⁹⁰ At that time, the SED was even considering inter-party relations with ZAPU.²⁹¹ Consultations which Henry Eggebrecht of the Solidarity Committee held in October 1964 in Lusaka with ZAPU leaders marked an intensification of relations. ZAPU leaders presented wishes in terms of further assistance²⁹², which were based on the expectation that the struggle for a new constitution would increase, and

(284) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/0449-662, work plan of the Solidarity Committee for the year 1964.

(285) Cf. MfAA/A 15038, Wolfgang Schuessler's letter from the Plenipotentiary's Office in Cairo to the Foreign Ministry's 4th AEA, 26 Jan. 1964. Cf. MfAA/A 15038, paper, 25 November 1964. Cf. MfAA/A 15038, Mataure's letter to Eggebrecht, 28 Sept.

(286) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, Mtambanengwe's letter to the Solidarity Committee, 18 Nov. 1965.

(287) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304, file notes by the FDGB's international relations department, 24 March 1966. It is not known who invited Mtambanengwe.

(288) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/113.

(289) Ibid.

(290) BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, report on Moyo's visit.

(291) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/796, Notes by Schuessler, SED CC international relations department, 20 July 1964.

(292) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/989, report about Eggebrecht's talks with ZAPU executives in Lusaka on 27 Oct. 1964.

general elections in Southern Rhodesia would be enforced. Hence, ZAPU asked for motorbikes, bicycles, radiotelephones and similar equipment to enhance its operational mobility. To bolster up its propaganda effort, ZAPU hoped to obtain a mobile radio transmitter²⁹³ and various canvassing material, ranging from badges and flags to shirt tissue and ties from the GDR. ZAPU also requested the services of legal experts in drawing up constitutional proposals for the forthcoming negotiations in London. Furthermore, the organisation asked for university study and vocational training scholarships as well as for scholarships for trade union officials, youth affairs officers and journalists. Training for radio communication and telecommunication operators, printers, type-setters and mechanics would be appreciated as well.

In January 1965, Eggebrecht informed ZAPU in Cairo, that a group of GDR experts was ready to assist ZAPU with elaborating a constitutional proposal of its own. ZAPU leaders were advised to send Edward Ndlovu to Berlin as soon as possible to deliver ZAPU's draft and a copy of the current British proposal for the constitution.²⁹⁴ Ndlovu visited the GDR in February/March 1965. He was received by deputy foreign minister Georg Stibi, which underlined the importance of ZAPU in the GDR's strategy in Africa.²⁹⁵

After UDI in Southern Rhodesia, there was a substantial increase in practical solidarity from the GDR for ZAPU. In 1964/1965, the 87,000-mark²⁹⁶ target for aid supplies to ZAPU climbed to 175,000 Marks.²⁹⁷ The Solidarity Committee's plans of 1966 envisaged 175,000 Marks' worth of supplies for ZAPU and, interestingly, 25,000 Marks' worth of material aid for ZANU.²⁹⁸ UDI exacerbated the Zimbabwe liberation movement's confrontation with the white minority regime. In 1966, ZAPU started armed action in Southern Rhodesia with small groups of fighters infiltrating the country. ZANU guerrillas and Rhodesian police detachments were also engaged in armed clashes. In June 1966, T.G. Silundika informed the GDR Solidarity Committee in Berlin about recent developments and about ZAPU's strategy. The organisation intended to mobilise forces, hoping to disrupt public life in Southern Rhodesia and thus explode the myth of domestic stability of the Smith regime. Therefore, military action was deemed inevitable.²⁹⁹

Joint military operations of ZAPU with the ANC launched in August 1967, as well as political developments in the region, were causing ZAPU to reconsider not only its military but also its overall political strategy. In October 1969, Silundika told his

(293) Supplying a radio transmitter was a seriously debated question in 1965. Evidently, the idea did not materialise (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/989, file notes by Willi Zahlbaum, GDR Solidarity Committee, 1965).

(294) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/112, Eggebrecht's notes, 2 February 1965.

(295) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304, internal memo from the FDGB National Executive's international relations department to secretary Beyreuther, 23 Feb. 1965.

(296) This sum indicates the value of the goods. Transport costs were estimated at 13,000 Marks (Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/0449-662, explanatory notes for the 1964 budget).

(297) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7412-660, proposal for the appropriation of funds, without date.

(298) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7412-660, discussions on 9 December 1966 about further solidarity supplies.

(299) BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, file notes, 23 June 1966, on Silundika's talks with Eggebrecht and a GDR Foreign Ministry official on 20 June 1966.

partners in the GDR that the armed struggle had not produced significant results and liberation movements had to ask themselves fundamental questions and consider whether they are politically and theoretically capable of enforcing a military decision. Help by the socialist countries, especially material assistance through food and dress, continued to be of vital importance.³⁰⁰ The Solidarity Committee envisaged aid supplies for ZAPU worth 150,000 Marks in 1969, including uniforms and equipment for its soldiers.³⁰¹

But ZAPU fell into the grips of an internal crisis, with uncertainties and differing views on the movement's future strategy and tactics, overlaid by dissent over the style of leadership and charges of personal power ambitions. ZAPU's international relations, including those with the GDR, suffered a serious setback. The GDR remained extremely cautious about making any public comments on the strife within ZAPU. The Solidarity Committee drastically reduced its support for ZAPU in 1970 and in 1971, but hesitated to take sides in ZAPU's internal conflict. Ultimately it was decided to place greater confidence in the majority wing of the organisation's external leadership led by Moyo and Silundika.³⁰²

The visit of a ZAPU delegation with Edward Ndlovu to the GDR in July 1972 marked the resumption of cooperation. The Solidarity Committee judged the consolidation process within ZAPU to be positive, but had great difficulties with ZAPU's concept that political work inside the country should be subordinated to the needs of the military struggle. They felt that ZAPU overrated its own military capacities and based its strategy insufficiently on the situation inside Zimbabwe. And they had some doubts about the information that ZAPU had set up a joint military supreme command with ZANU.³⁰³ Material assistance for ZAPU was resumed, but only in 1973 on full scale. In 1974 the value of the goods delivered more than doubled to 373,000 Marks.³⁰⁴ In March 1974, J.Z. Moyo stated that ZAPU's international relations with socialist countries, but also with the OAU and other international organisations, were once again intact.³⁰⁵ At that time, the opening of a GDR embassy in Lusaka facilitated relations with ZAPU and direct liaison with its leadership in exile.

By contrast, ZANU was unsuccessful in its attempts to establish contact with the GDR via its embassy in Dar es Salaam in 1972/1973. GDR diplomats responded evasively, rejecting ZANU's contention that the GDR's support for ZAPU constituted interference in the liberation organisation's internal strife and arguing that ZAPU

(300) BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, file notes on a conversation with Silundika at the Solidarity Committee on 21 October 1969.

(301) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/115, plan of solidarity supplies 1969. Included were combat suits, shawls, 420 shirts, 500 pairs of gym shoes, 1,500 blankets, and loudspeakers, worth 107,000 Marks altogether (Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, list, 17 Oct. 1969, of supplies to ZAPU made in 1969).

(302) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7310-662, report, 4 June 1971, on Schmidt's journey to Tanzania and to Zambia (1-23 May 1971).

(303) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, appraisal, 31 August 1972, of the results of talks with ZAPU's delegation; report, 27 July 1972, on the second conversation with ZAPU's delegation.

(304) According to figures in SODI records.

(305) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, file notes, 13 March 1974.

rather than ZANU was recognised by AAPSO. But they considered further contacts with ZANU.³⁰⁶ ZANU expressed an interest for a visit of Herbert Chitepo to the GDR. GDR diplomats were again evasive. When in 1974 the Solidarity Committee refused to invite a ZANU delegation and referred to a planned conference on Zimbabwe in Mogadishu, the ZANU representative in Dar es Salaam angrily called that conference “a scheme by the Soviet-imperialistic AAPSO”.³⁰⁷ The sharp rejection of the conference, which in the end did not take place, nourished the GDR’s restraint towards ZANU. Nonetheless, ZANU did receive aid from the GDR, though on a small scale and indirectly via the OAU Liberation Committee. Such deliveries, which included uniform textiles, go back as far 1973.³⁰⁸ Some of ZANU’s weaponry is also said to have been of East German origin.³⁰⁹ It probably reached ZANU via FRELIMO, which cooperated militarily with ZANU.

The GDR continued to focus its assistance on ZAPU. One of the factors contributing to this focus was the state of affairs within ZANU. ZANU’s political programme in 1974 appeared confused. GDR experts specifically disapproved the description of the conflict between “blacks” and “whites” in Southern Rhodesia as part of a worldwide confrontation between races.³¹⁰ ZAPU’s programme itself, founded on an analysis of the social causes underlying the conflict in Zimbabwe, was closer to their own Marxist way of thinking.³¹¹ ZANU presented an image of utter disunity to the GDR. It must be noted, however, that the East Germans observed ZANU from the sidelines, having few direct contacts with the organisation itself. There was a crisis in ZANU with the ousting of Sithole as president, the clashes about unity, the Nhari revolt, the assassination of Herbert Chitepo and the rejection of the ZANU leadership by Zimbabwe People’s Army (ZIPA) commanders in 1976. All these events left a major blemish on ZANU’s image in the eyes of East German analysts.

A visit by a ZAPU delegation to the GDR in December 1976 was the first occasion where ZAPU executives held talks with top SED officials. The signing of an agreement on SED-ZAPU cooperation marked the beginning of direct relations at party level.³¹² Only a few days after the assassination of ZAPU Vice-president Jason Moyo by a letter bomb, an Interflug special flight with solidarity freight for ZAPU arrived at Lusaka airport.³¹³ In March 1977, ZAPU president Joshua Nkomo paid his first visit to the GDR and was received by Erich Honecker. The SED attached great importance to Nkomo’s visit and the strengthening of links with ZAPU. This was evident in the

(306) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, file notes, 24 November 1972, 15 February 1973.

(307) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, notes on the discussion, 19 September 1974.

(308) Cf. BArch, P DZ/8 7327-662.

(309) Cf. Engel, p.57.

(310) *Mwenje* No 2, p.6.

(311) Cf. Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), Ideological Concept, Lusaka (1971). This concept has been further discussed and replaced by *The Ideological Programme of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU)*, Lusaka, Nov 1978. (Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7336-662, *The Programme of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union*, manuscript).

(312) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7336-662, report on the delegation’s visit, 21 December 1976.

(313) *Neues Deutschland*, 26 January 1977.

protocol honours for the ZAPU president. Nkomo referred to this sojourn as his most impressive visit abroad so far.³¹⁴ Honecker and Nkomo developed a close personal rapport. The SED Politbureau decided to increase support for ZAPU by taking respective political action at diplomatic level and providing concrete aid in various forms, including printing of propaganda and information material and the expansion of the editorial office of Zimbabwe Review. More special flights by Interflug were to supply ZAPU continuously with solidarity goods. ZAPU experts were invited to study GDR expertise and practice in agriculture, manufacturing, infrastructure, trade and commerce, and government. Finally both sides agreed on military aid, the supply of “non-civilian goods” and the training of “special cadres”.³¹⁵

Cooperation was now rapidly expanding. In May 1977, when Nkomo visited the GDR again, he discussed the opening of a ZAPU office in Berlin, training opportunities for party cadres and economic experts, and more university scholarships and industrial traineeships.³¹⁶ In September 1977, a first batch of 30 ZAPU members enrolled at the SED’s regional party school in Dresden.³¹⁷ ZAPU was the first liberation movement for which SED regional party school courses were organised. The value of material assistance rose to over 8 million Marks in 1977, substantially more than what ANC and SWAPO (2.4 and 2.3 million Marks respectively) received together.³¹⁸

Solidarity supplies were mainly used to maintain ZAPU’s refugee camps in Zambia. Obviously, Zambia was no longer capable of shouldering the extra burden, Nkomo kept saying that Zambia was doing its utmost but was overtaxed.³¹⁹ Seven additional special flights by Interflug arrived in Lusaka in 1977,³²⁰ another six in 1978.³²¹ That year’s climax in the relationship was the inauguration of ZAPU’s office in Berlin in January, in the presence of Joshua Nkomo. Meetings between top GDR representatives and the ZAPU president also took place during the frequent travels of SED officials to Southern African countries. Honecker met Nkomo for lengthy talks in Lusaka on 21 February 1979, during his African tour, and handed over a solidarity cheque worth 5

(314) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2053, decision of the SED Politbureau, 15 March 1977: Report on the ZAPU delegation’s visit from 7 to 11 March 1977.

(315) Cf. *ibid.*: Conclusions.

(316) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7336-662, information paper, 30 May 1977, about Nkomo’s unofficial visit from 11 to 28 May 1977.

(317) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/vorl. SED 22620. The course lasted until June 1978. Nkomo and Joseph Msika visited these students, too. Similar courses were held in 1978/79 and 1979/80 for identical numbers of students. (Cf. SAPMO BArch DY/30 vorl. SED 22621. Internal memo from the CC’s international relations department to the propaganda department, 5 Oct. 1979). After Zimbabwe had gained independence, from 1982/83 up to 1989/90, these scholarships were taken over by ZANU.

(318) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3103, decision of the SED CC Secretariat, 22 February 1978. See also table 2.

(319) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, Stein’s letter to the Solidarity Committee, 25 April 1977.

(320) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, letters from Solidarity Committee secretary-general Kurt Krueger to Nkomo, 4 Apr., 24 May, 10 Oct., November 1977.

(321) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7336-662, letters from Solidarity Committee secretary-general Kurt Krueger to Nkomo, 5 February, 15 March, 5 August, 29 October, 21 November, 11 December 1978.

million Marks.³²² It also sparked off fresh initiatives in the relationship with ZAPU, including assistance for ZAPU in the medical field.³²³

One of the most stirring chapters in the annals of cooperation between the GDR and ZAPU was the big airlift for ZAPU from Luanda to Lusaka in 1979 with 50 special flights by Interflug planes. It was an extremely important venture by the GDR, undertaken to assist ZAPU in a critical phase of its struggle. The airlift was regarded crucial for ZAPU and of strategic importance, especially in view of ongoing negotiation attempts on the Southern Rhodesian issue.³²⁴ In the military field, too, cooperation continued. (see Section 3.4.) All in all, relations between the GDR and ZAPU had reached a level whose political significance could only be compared to relations with countries like Angola or Mozambique, which were high on the GDR's list of African priorities. In the perception of GDR politicians, ZAPU had indeed become a very important partner. The ZAPU leadership similarly rated the ties with GDR highly. Joseph Msika, Secretary-General of ZAPU in those days, paid tribute to the preferential treatment of ZAPU by the GDR, a treatment which the liberation movement did not experience in any other country. Msika recalls discussions with members of the GDR leadership on strategies for development in a future independent Zimbabwe.³²⁵ ZAPU used the good offices of the GDR to bring influence to bear on Moscow in favour of the liberation organisation's requests for training of Zimbabwean military specialists but also for the delivery of modern Soviet military hardware. Where the Soviets were initially reluctant to support ZAPU's new strategy of massive regular warfare attacks against the Rhodesian forces, GDR partners were more sympathetic and helped to convince Moscow.³²⁶

ZAPU was given priority treatment by the GDR in the decisive phase of the struggle for Zimbabwe's liberation, because it was held to be politically stable and credited with having an effective, single-minded leadership. The confidence placed in ZAPU mainly emerged from close cooperation with exiled leaders. Nkomo was held in esteem as a leader with integrity, whose influence was essential in maintaining the movement's unity, despite its heterogeneity.³²⁷ Nkomo's extensive diplomatic activities vis-à-vis Western countries were closely observed, not without scepticism, but primarily judged as reflecting the international acceptance of ZAPU as the dominant political force in the struggle for Zimbabwe's liberation.

1979 was a decisive year for the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. The attempt of an "internal settlement" was rejected by the GDR. In talks with Nkomo in June, Honecker agreed that a stabilisation of the Muzorewa puppet regime had to be prevented. According to their shared understanding, this would result in a neo-colonialist settlement in Zimbabwe and, together with it, facilitate imperialist plans

(322) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2216, decision of the SED Politbureau, 27 February 1979.

(323) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3266, decision of the SED Politbureau, 19 February 1979.

(324) Interview with Dabengwa on 8 November 1995.

(325) Interview with Msika on 3 November 1995.

(326) Interviews with Msika on 3 November 1995 and Dabengwa on 8 November 1995.

(327) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7307-662, assessment of the embassy in Lusaka, 27 January 1977.

in Namibia.³²⁸ Notwithstanding its support for the armed liberation struggle, the GDR thought a solution could only be found in a political settlement. The decisive prerequisite was to enhance the stature of the Patriotic Front as the authentic representative of the African majority in Zimbabwe. The socialist countries wanted the negotiations in Lancaster House in London to turn out as favourable as possible for the Patriotic Front. The ZAPU delegates received direct assistance from the GDR embassy in London. Ambassador Karl-Heinz Kern relayed to Nkomo hints and information about the actual proceedings of the conference received from Berlin. He also had cordial contacts with Mugabe.³²⁹ Former ZAPU politicians recall, that the GDR vowed to continue its full support no matter how the Lancaster House negotiations turned out. This was especially important as some of the front-line states, were bringing pressure to bear on the Zimbabwe liberation organisations to agree to a compromise at Lancaster House.³³⁰

The GDR considered unity of the Patriotic Front crucial and was disappointed that ZAPU and ZANU had registered separately for the elections.³³¹ The GDR's extensive assistance went almost entirely to ZAPU until 1980. Attempts by ZANU politicians to have this situation changed had failed. The negative highlight was a high level meeting during Honecker's Africa trip in February 1979. While Honecker met with Nujoma (SWAPO), Nkomo (ZAPU) and Tambo (ANC), it was decided that the SED CC secretary for international affairs, Axen, should talk with Mugabe in Maputo. The meeting took place under the shadow of the Chinese military aggression against Vietnam and thus was directly related to the crucial issue for Eastern bloc countries in their relation to ZANU: the attitude towards China.

Mugabe asked the GDR to review relations with ZANU, and requested military and non-military aid. He gave his view of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and of ZANU's international links. He mentioned the extensive assistance from China, but at the same time criticised the Chinese attack against Vietnam. As far as the relations with the GDR were concerned, there had been a series of misunderstandings for many years. But after all, the GDR and ZANU were struggling against a common enemy. Axen pleaded for unity among Zimbabwe's patriotic forces and stated that the GDR had rightly been cautious towards ZANU, which had split the liberation movement. It was supporting ZAPU as a solid liberation movement. Axen criticised ZANU for keeping officially silent about the Chinese aggression in Vietnam. He proposed a joint press release condemning the Chinese aggression in public. Mugabe replied that a session of ZANU's Central Committee on this matter was still outstanding,

(328) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/20/166, information paper for the Politbureau No. 99/1979.

(329) Interview with Kern on 11 April 1995.

(330) Interview with Moyo on 13 November 1995.

(331) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/20/125, information paper for the Politbureau, 28 January 1980: Zur Einschätzung der Ergebnisse der Londoner Konferenz zu Simbabwe und zu den Konsequenzen fuer das Wirken der Patriotischen Front (Appraisal of the results of the London conference on Zimbabwe, and of the consequences for the operation of the Patriotic Front).

and argued therefore against condemning China in public and by name. This was brusquely rejected by the GDR politician. Axen abruptly broke off the talks.³³²

This diplomatic faux pas had grave consequences. The negative effects of those talks lasted for a much longer period; even bilateral relations between the two governments were delayed and remained blighted. Nathan Shamuyarira, for many years Zimbabwe's foreign minister, spoke of the stigma of Maputo, which was not eradicated until 1983.³³³ The failure of Axen's meeting with Mugabe also produced widespread disappointment among GDR foreign-policy experts. Some officials in the GDR Foreign Ministry were contemplating a modified stand towards ZANU. A decisive obstacle for a more flexible approach towards ZANU was the Soviet Union's rigid stand. This became clear in consultations which Klaus Willerding, deputy foreign minister of the GDR, held in Moscow in June 1979. When he raised the question of developing relations with ZANU while continuing to treat ZAPU on a preferential basis, the reply of his Soviet colleague Ilyichev was an unusually harsh rebuke: Relations with a ZANU in Chinese bondage were out of the question.³³⁴

In 1980 Zimbabwe achieved independence. The GDR was not invited to the celebrations, despite the massive support given to the Zimbabwean liberation struggle. In the GDR, all this was experienced as a painful wound. Attempts by the GDR to enter into diplomatic relations with Zimbabwe were initially unsuccessful. Mozambique, which had long pleaded with Eastern bloc countries to assist ZANU, now advised Zimbabwe to establish fully fledged governmental relations with the GDR. During his visit to the GDR in September 1980, the Mozambican president offered a mediation initiative,³³⁵ and in October, foreign minister Chissano's personal intervention ensured its success. Finally, on 1 November 1980, the agreement on establishing diplomatic relations was signed.³³⁶

The real breakthrough occurred in 1983, when Robert Mugabe paid a state visit to the GDR. He called the GDR a reliable friend and ally and found words to break the spell which had long influenced relations. "The material assistance," he said to his hosts, "which you extended during the anti-colonialist struggle, no matter through which channels, was your sincere contribution to the struggle which the people of Zimbabwe fought for their liberation."³³⁷ This acknowledgement integrated the GDR's extensive aid for ZAPU during the liberation struggle with the newly established country-to-country relations.

(332) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2216, decision of the Politbureau, 27 February 1979, file notes on Axen's talks with Mugabe on 24 February 1979.

(333) Interview with Shamuyarira on 8 November 1995.

(334) The author participated in that meeting.

(335) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2-1859, decision of the Politbureau on 30 September 1980, report on Machel's visit 17-20 Sept. 1980.

(336) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2364, decision of the SED Politbureau, 25 November 1980, report about special envoy Neugebauer's negotiations.

(337) Cf. *Neues Deutschland*, 25 May 1983. The quotation is retranslated from the German as published.

4.4 Namibia

With regards to Namibia, the GDR always supported “the legitimate insistence of the national liberation movement in South West Africa on full independence and national self-determination for the people of the territory”, and regarded all “attempts of the apartheid regime in South Africa at annexation of the territory as aggressive acts which must be foiled with every means available”.³³⁸ The GDR supported the United Nations in its desire to discharge its special responsibility for decolonisation in South West Africa and end the illegal South African rule over the territory. A compelling reason for the GDR to act in this way was that the liberation movements and a growing number of independent African states expected the GDR to support them. And although nobody in the GDR ever avowed a special responsibility for Namibia because of Germany’s colonial role in old times, it seems justifiable to assume a latent influence of this historical factor on policy-makers in the GDR. The liberation movement, for its part, always attached particular importance to relations with the GDR because of German involvement in imperial days and the considerable influence which the German-speaking minority was still wielding in Namibia.³³⁹

In 1960, the GDR Solidarity Committee made contact with the Namibian liberation movements SWAPO and SWANU. Relations were initially more intensive with SWANU and its chairman, Jariretundu Kozonguizi, who visited the GDR several times. The president of SWAPO, Sam Nujoma, paid his first visit to the GDR in January 1962 to conduct talks with Solidarity Committee officials. Both organisations sent a limited number of members to the GDR for basic or advanced journalistic training. The Free German Youth (FDJ) College also counted Namibians among its first African students.³⁴⁰ A typewriter and copies of SWAPO’s programme printed in the GDR marked the modest beginning of material assistance for SWAPO.³⁴¹

As of 1963, the Solidarity Committee and other societal organisations in the GDR were scaling down relations with SWANU, and limited contacts to exchanges of information from the mid-1960s. Links with SWAPO, however, developed continuously, though not dramatically. In 1966 Nujoma visited the GDR for the second time. Other SWAPO officials also paid visits. A noticeable increase in the GDR’s cooperation with SWAPO began in 1974/75, after changes in Southern Africa in the wake of Portuguese withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique. The GDR stepped up its involvement in the region as a whole, and SWAPO, forging ahead with its struggle for liberation in a much more propitious environment, was interested in a more intensive collaboration with foreign partners, including the GDR. Following consultations in October 1974 with a SWAPO delegation, cooperation was initiated

(338) DAP 1966, vol. XIV/1, (East) Berlin 1970, p.679.

(339) Festus Naholo, SWAPO’s former chief of logistics, recalled this in an interview on 20 February 1996.

(340) After Nujoma’s visit, SWAPO sent the first student, Solomon Mifima, to the FDJ Youth College. Emil Appolus finished a journalism course in 1962. (Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/7306-662, Nujoma’s letter to the Solidarity Committee, 20 February 1962).

(341) Cf. BArch, P DZ 8/ 7306-662, notes, 17 Jan. 1962, on a conversation with Nujoma with the Solidarity Committee on 10 Jan. 1962.

in a field where the Solidarity Committee had sufficient experience. The GDR undertook to print SWAPO's journal *Namibia Today*. SWAPO's cooperation with the GDR developed steadily, without major ups and downs, until 1975.

At that time SWAPO was confronted with increased South African attempts to isolate the organisation. Part of this scheme were the Turnhalle Talks, which were to prepare the ground for an "internal settlement" of the Namibian question, without SWAPO's participation and with the obvious aim of perpetuating white minority rule in a modified form. In May 1975, SWAPO president Nujoma paid his third visit to the GDR. The East German Solidarity Committee rushed a supply of blankets and medicines to Dar es Salaam, to demonstrate support for the organisation.³⁴²

Relations were also impacted by international developments and initiatives, particularly after the UN Security Council adopted its resolution 385 on 30 January 1976. Against that background, the GDR as well as SWAPO were seeking to intensify their collaboration. Western countries were trying to work out a compromise solution for Namibia and thereby to forestall any further expansion of the Eastern bloc's influence in Southern Africa. The substance, volume and forms of the GDR's relations with SWAPO were now greatly determined by this constellation. The GDR maintained its support for SWAPO through all the developments over the Namibian issue, and by that found itself in conformity with the majority of the UN member states. In June 1977, Nujoma met SED Politbureau member Werner Lamberz in Luanda. He informed him of the diplomatic efforts of the Western contact group in the United Nations and the reservations which SWAPO was having, in particular about the contact group's ideas on the withdrawal of South African troops. It was feared the Western proposal would hollow out UN Security Council resolution 385. Nujoma asked for increased assistance for SWAPO by the GDR.³⁴³

GDR assistance included political and diplomatic support, notably in United Nations; solidarity supplies and the sending of experts to SWAPO camps; providing university scholarships and vocational training; offering education plus day-to-day care for Namibian boys and girls in the GDR; treating wounded and sick SWAPO members in GDR medical facilities. Another aspect of this support included assistance in military and security matters such as training cadres and supplying equipment. The decisive upswing in the mutual relationship came as a result of the visit paid by SWAPO president Sam Nujoma to the GDR in December 1977. Nujoma explained SWAPO's stand in the negotiations with the Western contact group, especially on the controversial issues of South African troop withdrawal and the status of Walvis Bay. In his view, SWAPO had gone to the limits of what it was able to concede when accepting the Western proposal. Currently, the negotiations had come to nought, but

(342) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY/30 J IV 2/3 A-2766, decision of the SED CC Secretariat, 2 December 1975. Substantiating its proposal for this supply, the Solidarity Committee had indicated to the SED leadership that SWAPO was in a difficult phase of its struggle against the racist regime in South Africa.

(343) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2087, decision of the SED Politbureau, 21 June 1977: Notes on the GDR delegation's conversation with Nujoma on 17 June 1977.

SWAPO remained willing to negotiate realistic and fair proposals. In view of the situation as it had emerged, SWAPO considered that armed struggle, which might have to be waged over a longer period of time, was the principal means of challenging South Africa. Nujoma added that SWAPO was increasingly combining this form of struggle with political work within Namibia.³⁴⁴

The GDR leadership recognised negotiations on a political settlement of the Namibian question as a reality which had to be accepted, even though it had definite reservations about the West's ambivalent posture. The GDR leaders respected SWAPO's participation in the negotiations and did not attempt to influence it to the contrary. Their shared view about the goals the West was pursuing in its diplomatic activities was recorded in a joint SED-SWAPO communiqué: "Both sides condemn the intrigues and manoeuvres engineered by international imperialism and its 'new strategy', all of which is designed to find neo-colonialist solutions to the problems of Southern Africa, deceive the peoples of Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia; and preserve the existing relationship of forces in the region, with power in the hands of a minority of white settlers."³⁴⁵ SED and SWAPO insisted on immediate and full implementation of all UN resolutions on Namibia by South Africa and all UN member states.

Nujoma's requests for assistance, communicated in earlier talks, received a positive response. Honecker gave Nujoma definitive promises in the course of their conversation.³⁴⁶ The details were as follows:

1. Installation of a SWAPO office, financed by the Solidarity Committee;
2. Cooperation in the field of training and education: admission of a total of 200 SWAPO members, 130 to take up industrial training and 70 to be enrolled for university studies. The SED was ready to send natural science teachers and social science teachers to SWAPO camps in Angola. The Solidarity Committee was to continue organising medical treatment for wounded SWAPO personnel in the GDR. A physician and an X-ray assistant should be assigned to SWAPO health facilities in Angola - a new form of assistance by the GDR. Honecker promised equipment for two planned hospitals in southern Angola and medicines, medical appliances, first-aid kits and surgical cases;
3. Material support for SWAPO should be continued, in particular by supplying foodstuffs, clothing, textiles and shoes.
4. As far as Nujoma's request for the supply of arms and ammunition was concerned, Honecker assured that it would be examined. He had instantly promised supplies of light arms.

⁽³⁴⁴⁾ Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2129, decision of the SED Politbureau, 24 January 1978: Report on the SWAPO delegation's visit to the GDR from 16 to 20 December 1977.

⁽³⁴⁵⁾ Joint communiqué on the visit to the GDR of a delegation of SWAPO, in: *Against Racism*, p.121.

⁽³⁴⁶⁾ Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2129, decision of the SED Politbureau, 24 January 1978: Report on the SWAPO delegation's visit to the GDR from 16 to 20 December 1977.

During his next visit to the GDR in October/November 1978, Nujoma attended the inauguration of the SWAPO Office in Berlin and was once again received for talks by Honecker. The UN Security Council had adopted resolution 435, but the Western contact group was still unsuccessful in gaining South Africa's agreement to the envisaged negotiations on a settlement. Nujoma and Honecker were rather sceptical. Nujoma said that the West was not willing to put decisive pressure on South Africa. SWAPO was ready to compromise but not to commit national suicide. Faced with this situation, SWAPO would continue its armed struggle, despite outside pressure. Nujoma requested that material assistance of the GDR, including arms deliveries, be doubled, further scholarships for industrial training and university study were to be provided, and GDR specialists and technicians be prepared to go to Namibia after independence.³⁴⁷

When Erich Honecker once again met Sam Nujoma, on 18 February 1979, during his African journey, the negotiating process on Namibia had entered a critical phase. South Africa had staged Namibian elections in December 1978, which the United Nations refused to recognise. SWAPO nevertheless maintained its consent to the UN plan for independence. At any rate, Nujoma did not rule out in his talks with Honecker that SWAPO would soon assemble its military forces in bases, as envisaged in the plan, and cooperate with the UN force. In order to convey the best possible impression, SWAPO soldiers needed to be well-equipped and well-dressed, Nujoma said, requesting assistance in this matter from the GDR. Honecker promised help, presented a 5 million Marks cheque and agreed to provide the urgently needed vehicles and also uniforms for 10,000 fighters.³⁴⁸

From then on, GDR support for SWAPO's military forces PLAN increased substantially. The cooperation in military, intelligence and security matters was regarded as important by both sides, in view of the situation and the historic implications of the struggle. The GDR granted material and training assistance, which SWAPO appreciated as a significant contribution towards achieving Namibia's independence. In August 1979, SWAPO's Central Committee rated the increasing material, political, diplomatic and moral support of the GDR very highly. Nujoma expressed the organisation's sincere thanks in a letter to Honecker and appealed for more help.³⁴⁹ Once top-level contacts between 1977 and 1979 had produced key decisions on greater GDR assistance for SWAPO, political cooperation, material supplies, training and education, medical treatment for the sick and wounded, and provision of weapons for the armed struggle became the pillars of this mutual relationship.

(347) SAPMO BArch DY 30/2/3 A-3237, decision of the SED CC Secretariat, 4 December 1978: Report on Sam Nujoma's visit to the GDR.

(348) SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2214, Politbureau decision, 27 February 1979: Notes on the meeting Honecker's with Nujoma on 18 February 1979 in Luanda. SAPMO-BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2.035-146, file notes on Honecker's talks with Nujoma in Luanda on 18 February 1979.

(349) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV J/5, Nujoma's letter, 23 August 1979.

The amount of material assistance, which had increased modestly to 74,100 Marks until 1973 jumped to 487,300 Marks in 1974 and 1 million Marks in 1975, rose substantially to 3.5 million Marks in 1978, nearly to be doubled in 1979 (6.13 million Marks). In the 1980s, the annual amount usually fluctuated between 3 and 6 million Marks with a peak of 10.5 million Marks in 1982, due to additional solidarity supplies in an acute emergency situation, which shall be described later. During the 1980s, there was a considerable up and down movement, but at a high level and never falling below the 1977 level. In 1989, the pre-independence year, when resolution 435 began to be implemented, material support for SWAPO reached 9.3 million Marks.³⁵⁰

According to the figures mentioned, the value of supplies and services provided by the GDR Solidarity Committee for SWAPO from 1968 to 1989 represents well over 120 million Marks. The actual sum must have been greater, for the available data on expenses on the medical treatment of sick and wounded Namibians relate only to the last few years. As with other liberation organisations, data on military supplies and training would have to be added, but these are not available. The same applies to data on SED assistance in particular in the field of political education, and data on assistance from churches and by other organisations.

GDR solidarity supplies were present in the Namibian refugees' daily environment and experience in their camps³⁵¹: tents; canned and other food helping over very critical situations and saving many lives; some of their clothing was also "made in GDR". The combat suits of the PLAN fighters had been delivered from GDR army stocks or made on site from GDR material, while IFA W 50 lorries transported not only supplies to the refugee camps, but also soldiers to the front. A good part of the equipment for nursery schools in SWAPO's camps in the Angolan Cuanza Sul province, and of the schoolbooks, other teaching aids and pupils' utensils were also of GDR origin. And last but not least: GDR teachers, doctors and nurses worked in the camps. Their skills, dedication and human qualities earned them respect and affection from many Namibians. Obed Emvula even went as far as saying: "In the camps, GDR became a teaching name; refugees sang the praises of it."³⁵²

Efforts to help the Namibian refugees also involved growing cooperation at a broader international level. In this regard, Festus Naholo, SWAPO's chief of logistics, recalls the construction of a big nursery school, a Finnish-East German "joint solidarity venture", in a refugee camp in Cuanza Sul, which was opened by SWAPO secretary-general Andimba Toivo ya Toivo in 1985.³⁵³

In 1977 SED and SWAPO also signed their first agreement on inter-party cooperation for the years 1978 and 1979. Material assistance became an item in their mutual agreements, as did. courses for SWAPO members at the SED regional

(350) Cf. Records of SODI: Material supplies/services and training/education; SAPMO BArch vorl. SED 40567: Material supplies/services 1979-88, training/education 1983-88, medical treatment and misc.

(351) Interview with Hifikepunye Pohamba, 24 January 1996.

(352) Interview with Obed Emvula, 18 January 1996.

(353) Interview with Festus Naholo, 20 February 1996. Cf. also: *Solidaritaet* 1985/2-3, p.1.

party school in Rostock. From then until 1989/90, about 30 SWAPO members were annually enrolled for such political education courses, some 310 women and men altogether.³⁵⁴ SED deployed an advisor to SWAPO, regarded as a major indicator of the mutual trust that had evolved in the overall relationship. Since summer 1986, Professor Johannes Pilz stayed at the GDR embassy in Luanda. His specific duties consisted in coordinating all matters which regarded SWAPO in Angola, except those concerning security and military aspects of the cooperation, and in maintaining permanent liaison with SWAPO's leadership.

“My task was to prepare the GDR's relations with Namibia for the times after the achievement of independence, so that the GDR would be politically present, on an equal footing with the Federal Republic of Germany, which had much influence in the country on account of the German minority,” said Prof. Pilz.³⁵⁵ Emphasis was on the word “equal”. Prof. Pilz had been instructed by not to spoon-feed SWAPO, and by no means to insinuate that the GDR should be the sole German representation to be recognised. He was supposed to follow this same line with regard to Namibia's domestic development. “My task was to lead an open discussion with SWAPO, to give food for thought rather than present ready-made concepts he said. His former partners have confirmed that he explicitly told them that SWAPO ought to develop its own ideas and should not blindly copy the GDR, since a socialist development for Namibia after independence was out of the question under the prevailing circumstances. What was visualised instead was a stable, democratic evolution in Namibia, following independence. SWAPO members who had dealings with Prof. Pilz remember fraternal cooperation and his cordial association with their organisation.³⁵⁶

Courses on economics and finance were organised in the GDR at SWAPO's request; for example a general course on economic policy from May to July in 1983, consultations about financial policy in 1984, and a further education course on financial administration a year later.³⁵⁷ Hifikepunye Pohamba, SWAPO's secretary for finance at the time, remembers that a small group of senior SWAPO officials took part in the above-mentioned two-month course in 1983. They attended lectures at scientific institutes in Berlin and held discussions in seminars. Visits to administrative authorities and financial institutions gave them an insight into the organisation and management of government agencies. The GDR partners involved saw to it that

(354) Cf. Annual reports of the SED CC propaganda department which are included in CC Secretariat's decisions, in: SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3333 (2 July 1979), p.3508 (23 July 1980), p.3675 (20 August 1981), p.3764 (15 March 1982), p.3900 (7 February 1983), p.4059 (21 March 1984), p.4214 (27 February 1985), p.4365 (3 March 1986), p.4520 (11 March 1987), p.4654 (19 Febr. 1988), p.4797 (3 March 1989).

(355) Interview with Prof. Pilz on 10 October 1995.

(356) Interviews with Pohamba (24 January 1996), Naholo (20 January 1996), O. Emvula (18 January 1996), Toivo ya Toivo (25 January 1996).

(357) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-3936, A-4085 and A-4218, SED CC Secretariat decisions, 12 May 1983, 14 May 1984 and 7 March 1985.

the course was tailored to correspond to prospective conditions in an independent Namibia.³⁵⁸

A paper compiled for SWAPO by GDR experts containing reflections on initial economic policies in an independent Namibia was handed over by Erich Honecker to Sam Nujoma in September 1983.³⁵⁹ The paper was a good basis for discussions which Prof. Pilz held with his SWAPO partners in Angola on future Namibian economic policies. These discussions took account of the negative experiences observed by the GDR since the mid-1970s, during its involvement in a forced policy of socialist development in Angola and Mozambique, which was evidently at odds with real conditions in these countries. Therefore, Prof. Pilz recalled, the paper did not recommend a socialist-oriented path of development for Namibia, but a cautious disengagement from its total economic dependence on South Africa. As far as the country's overall development was concerned, the scientists noted that all national forces of good will should be invited to join in the reconstruction effort, without any marginalisation on political grounds.

GDR support for preparing SWAPO for Namibia's independence was not a purely altruistic effort. The GDR considered an independent Namibia potentially important as a political and economic partner in Southern Africa. Initial concepts for political and economic cooperation with a free Namibia were developed in 1978. A Namibia paper approved by the SED CC Secretariat on 3 January 1979, revealed the new predominance of economic interests in the GDR's overall African policy and its relations with Namibia, after these relations had been of exclusively political significance in the sense of solidarity before. Closer economic ties with friendly African states were to invigorate the GDR's ailing economy.³⁶⁰

Despite its reservations about resolution 435, the GDR considered that involvement in the Namibian independence process would provide opportunities to exert influence through all of its stages. The GDR was looking for opportunities to move towards fully-fledged relations with an independent Namibia and to enhance its own positions within the United Nations, not to mention economic considerations. By participating in UNTAG's civil component the GDR could defray part of its mandatory financial contribution for UNTAG. And calculations were even drawn up about foreign currency which would boost national revenue if GDR citizens served in the UN contingent.³⁶¹ In early September 1988, preparations started for the GDR's participation in the civil component of UNTAG.³⁶² A contribution here, the Foreign Ministry noted, would reaffirm the GDR's advocacy of peaceful settlements to regional conflicts. Cooperation in UNTAG, it was believed, would also support Angola, Cuba and SWAPO, and was expected to enable the GDR to exert "concrete influence on

(358) Interview with Pohamba on 24 January 1996.

(359) Cf. SAPMO BArch J IV 2/2 A-2601, SED Politbureau decision, 18 October 1983.

(360) Schleicher and Schleicher (1998), p.180.

(361) Schleicher and Schleicher (1998), p.227.

(362) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/3 A-4735, SED CC Secretariat decision, 8 September 1988.

the correct organisation and conduct of the elections in Namibia pursuant to the UN mandate... and to counter attempts by imperialist quarters to gain influence through broad involvement of their nations in the military and civil components.”³⁶³

On 20 December 1988, the SED Politbureau addressed the Namibian question. It underlined that the GDR had gained political positions in Southern Africa from its long-standing, all-round cooperation with the independent states and national liberation movements in the region. It was emphasised that the GDR had a “fundamental interest in continued and deepened cooperation and in a sustainable peace for Southern Africa, specifically in a favourable external environment for all independent states in the region to develop peacefully,” and that it therefore supported the political settlement of the Namibian question. The elimination of tensions in Southern Africa by peaceful means would produce “objectively improved opportunities for the states in the region to join the struggle for peace, disarmament and development and to build economic relations with the GDR.” Diplomatic relations and a GDR embassy in Windhoek should be established immediately after independence, and ties with SWAPO should be preserved. Of immediate relevance to the period of transition was the decision to send two Foreign Ministry officials to Namibia to represent the GDR during the independence process.³⁶⁴ The GDR was clearly committing itself to the implementation phase of resolution 435.

The GDR maintained close contact with SWAPO to coordinate its attitude towards the independence process, and it increased its assistance for SWAPO as that process went on. For example, a large group of PLAN personnel was given specific security training, notably as bodyguards, in the GDR in 1987/88, as part of concrete preparations for SWAPO’s return to Namibia. Many of those trained security officers arrived back in Windhoek with the first major group of SWAPO officials, in June 1989. In a situation where the South African administration was still exercising control in Namibia, the task assigned to those officers consisted of verifying whether the bulk of SWAPO’s executive, and President Sam Nujoma himself, could safely return, and in taking precautions to ensure their permanent safety in their own country. The phased return of SWAPO’s leaders and senior officials from exile is now known to have been discussed, carefully planned and coordinated with GDR partners, with due attention given to the political implications and the publicity and vital security aspects.³⁶⁵ SWAPO also consulted the GDR when preparing for the electoral campaign and formulating its election manifesto; and the GDR sent an expert to Lusaka to assist SWAPO with the production of the respective videos. Before his return to Namibia, Sam Nujoma paid a longer visit to the GDR from August to early September 1989.

(363) Cf. *ibid.*: Annex 1.

(364) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-3183, SED Politbureau decision, 20 December 1988: *Massnahmen zur Entwicklung der politischen und oekonomischen Zusammenarbeit mit Namibia* (measures for the development of the economic and political cooperation with Namibia).

(365) Interviews with Theo-Ben Gurirab, 8 February 1996 and Hidipo Hamutenya, 10 February 1996.

He met officials for detailed talks, which resulted in arrangements for continued cooperation between SWAPO and the GDR.

Unlike other states which reduced their support for SWAPO on the grounds of neutrality when the UN process towards independence commenced, the GDR continued and actually increased its assistance. The posting of a GDR Diplomatic Observer Mission to Namibia was regarded as political and moral support for SWAPO. In accordance with its mandate to observe the electoral preparations and the ballot itself, the Mission itself was not involved in direct support for SWAPO. But its presence, like that of other friendly countries, was an important confidence-building factor for the liberation organisation. The GDR's commitment to a settlement in Southern Africa which would reflect the interests of all the parties involved, including those of Pretoria and the West, was not at odds with continued, unrestricted solidarity for SWAPO.³⁶⁶ Neither SWAPO nor the ANC ever doubted the GDR's stand towards them, whereas they were at times confused about the Soviet policy of new thinking as far as its consequences for the liberation organisations in Southern Africa were concerned.

The GDR Diplomatic Observer Mission to Namibia was not uncontested. South Africa continued to exercise authority in Namibia during the independence process, so that opening a Mission in Namibia could be interpreted as de facto recognition of South Africa's illegal occupation. The Soviets insistently advised against such action. But the GDR knew the OAU and SWAPO were supporting such missions. More serious difficulties arose with the South Africans, who refused to permit entry for an East German Mission. The UN Secretary-General had to intervene to change Pretoria's mind.

The head of the GDR Mission assured Martti Ahtisaari, special representative of the UN Secretary-General, of the GDR's support for implementation of the UN's independence plan, which had run into serious danger because of armed fighting in northern Namibia earlier that month. In that critical phase, the GDR expressed strong commitment for a political settlement, respecting South Africa's role as a player in the independence process. Since accurate knowledge of the situation and problems in the country was indispensable for the Mission to work effectively, its diplomats fairly quickly established contact with all relevant political forces and familiarised themselves with the situation. They also developed close cooperation with UN representatives and other foreign observers, including those from Western countries. The support of the GDR head of mission during UNTAG's difficult times in Windhoek was highly appreciated by UNTAG's chief of staff Cedric Thornberry.³⁶⁷ The GDR also contributed to the implementation of the UN plan for Namibia in practical terms. The Solidarity Committee organised the repatriation of Namibians from the GDR with two special planes. The GDR spent a total of 1.2 million Marks on

(366) On the eve of the elections, the head of the GDR Mission issued a press statement reaffirming this support and the importance of the political settlement for the entire region (*Neues Deutschland*, 4/5 November 1989).

(367) Thornberry, p.361.

the repatriation of Namibian exiles.³⁶⁸ At the request of the UN secretary-general, the GDR assigned 30 police monitors to UNTAG's civil police force CIVPOL.³⁶⁹ Shortly before the election day, another group of 25 East German civil monitors arrived in Namibia, at UN request, to assist with the supervision of elections in rural districts. In addition, the Evangelical Churches of the GDR sent election observers to Namibia on behalf of the World Council of Churches.

It stands to reason that there were plans to continue cooperation with SWAPO in the field of education and training. In the last few months of its existence, the GDR granted 15 new scholarships for 1990. A supply of 200 literacy kits, each for use by 40 children, was handed over in Namibia at the beginning of 1990, and a collection of books went to Windhoek University in early April. About the same time, Nahas Angula, Namibian minister for education, culture and sport, inaugurated an exhibition of art reproductions from the GDR.³⁷⁰

Continued cooperation between the GDR and SWAPO and ties at governmental level were consistent with the long tradition of GDR solidarity with the Namibian liberation struggle. Sam Nujoma paid tribute to this long association when he received the GDR delegation attending the Namibian independence celebrations on the day of his accession to the Namibian presidency. The two governments established diplomatic relations, and the GDR opened its embassy in Windhoek - the last one worldwide opened by the GDR. Three days before Namibian independence, the GDR had had its first free and democratic elections, and in less than seven months'time the GDR ceased to exist as an independent state.

With remarkable consistency over three decades, the GDR supported SWAPO, which became the governing party in independent Namibia. This GDR cooperation with SWAPO has left traces, which are easy to find in Namibia. Human relations developed between many Namibians and East Germans, which have survived the sands of time. The experience of these people is probably the most valuable inheritance from the past, and it deserves to be taken up and accepted for a prospering German-Namibian relationship today and in the future.

4.5 South Africa

The political leadership of the GDR had always considered the South African national liberation movement particularly important. South Africa was perceived as the country with the greatest "revolutionary potential" in sub-Saharan Africa, partly because of its developed class structure. The ongoing process of social differentiation, in particular the emergence of a comparatively strong industrial proletariat, was seen to provide conditions for a national-democratic revolution. Similar or identical ideologies, inspirations and evaluations of international developments provided

⁽³⁶⁸⁾ Cf. *Neues Deutschland*, 19 and 25 July 1989.

⁽³⁶⁹⁾ The SED Politbureau took the relevant decision on 12 September 1989. (Cf. SAPMO BAArch DY 30/J IV 2/2/2345).

⁽³⁷⁰⁾ Cf. *Allgemeine Zeitung*, 19 January 1990; *Namibia Today*, 4 April 1990; *Times of Namibia*, 5 April 1990.

ample common ground for the ANC and its partners in the GDR to establish and maintain a stable mutual relationship.

The ANC, the oldest African nationalist organisation, in alliance with the SACP was the backbone of the struggle against racism and apartheid in South Africa. The clear social commitment from the outset, explain why GDR's relations with the South African liberation movement developed relatively early and with particular intensity, and why they remained relatively stable through all the ups and downs of the battle against apartheid. The strongest link in these relations was the rapport between the SACP and the SED in the GDR. They shared a common ideology and the vision of building a socialist society and were looking back at a tradition of cooperation and joint struggle. German and South African communists had first met in the Communist International.

After the Second World War, the SED was helped by the Communist Party of Great Britain in restoring and maintaining contacts with South Africa's communists. It was as early as in 1955, that Moses Kotane, the future SACP secretary-general, paid his first visit to the GDR.³⁷¹ The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), which was close to the ANC, entered into regular correspondence with the GDR trade union federation FDGB in the 1950s. Contacts between the SED and SACP, between the FDGB and SACTU, and finally, after its inception in 1960, between the GDR's Solidarity Committee and the ANC, were rapidly developing from the early 1960s onwards.

1960 was a crucial year for the South African liberation struggle. Already at that time, the GDR took a clear stand on South African developments. Reacting to the Sharpeville massacre, the GDR Foreign Ministry and the National Council of the National Front condemned the rule of terror in South Africa. The FDGB, which early in the year had called on its members to display solidarity with South African miners after a gold mine disaster, protested to the South African Prime Minister, Verwoerd. A month for solidarity with the liberation struggle in Africa was organised in many enterprises and institutions in the GDR.

SACP and SACTU sent representatives to the GDR. In August 1960, Yusuf Dadoo, president of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) and leadership member of SACP, visited Berlin and informed SED officials about the situation in South Africa. A SACTU delegation with Vice-president Moses Mabhida called on FDGB chairman Herbert Warnke to discuss SACTU-FDGB cooperation.³⁷² In July 1961, the FDGB was a co-founder of the WFTU-organised International Trade Union Committee for Solidarity with the Workers and Peoples of Africa in Accra. The FDGB offered

(371) See B. Bunting, *Moses Kotane*, 199ff. Documents about Kotane's visit to the GDR in December 1963 - Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, report on the visit of the General Secretary of the SACP and other leading comrades, undated.

(372) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

South African trade unionists medical treatment in GDR sanatoriums and granted scholarships for vocational training and study at the trade union college.³⁷³

While relations existed already with SACP and SACTU, direct contacts with the ANC were established in 1961. Mzwai Piliso (ANC), in charge of the Cairo office of the United Front of South Africa, which represented several liberation movements, visited the GDR. He held talks with the Solidarity Committee, the FDGB, the German- African Society, and the Committee for German Unity. A delegation of the Solidarity Committee met with Piliso again in Cairo later that year.³⁷⁴ From then on, officials of the ANC, SACTU and SACP visited the GDR frequently to discuss cooperation and assistance as well as developments in South Africa. In September 1962 a first batch of five ANC students was enrolled at GDR higher education institutions. Their studies were financed by the Solidarity Committee. Before, SACP was the only partner to send South Africans to the GDR to study. Later on, the Solidarity Committee also provided places for vocational training.³⁷⁵

In 1963, the Solidarity Committee organised activities to mark South Africa Freedom Day (26 June) for the first time. The first major ANC delegation with Duma Nokwe, acting ANC secretary-general, and Moses Kotane, ANC treasurer and SACP general secretary, visited the GDR to solicit material assistance for the ANC. They held talks with top officials of the SED, the FDGB, the National Council of the National Front, and the Foreign Ministry, and they encountered great willingness to help. The ANC delegation received a pledge to supply goods worth 100,000 Marks. Solidarity Committee chairman Horst Brasch suggested supplying goods instead of money because of the shortage of foreign currency. The ANC could sell these goods in Dar es Salaam to finance its operations. In 1963/64, the first group of South African journalists were trained at the school of the Journalists Union in the GDR. ³⁷⁶

After the apartheid regime had crushed the structures of the ANC and SACP in South Africa by the mid-1960s, international solidarity became indispensable for South Africa's liberation movement, a lifeline which provided the chance to rethink and to rebuild strength. South African refugees who were in the GDR for medical care and/or vocational training were granted political asylum. In the field of trade union relations, FDGB regularly organised solidarity meetings and fund-raising campaigns in enterprises and institutions to support South African workers. Solidarity rallies commemorated South Africa Freedom Day and South African Heroes Day. FDGB provided SACTU with manual duplicators, medicine, clothing, blankets and tents, among others. Top SACTU officials attended FDGB congresses and SACTU delegations visited the GDR regularly for discussions with their counterparts.³⁷⁷

(373) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(374) Schleicher/Schleicher (1997), p.243.

(375) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(376) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A2/20/985, report on the visit of the general secretary of the SACP and other leading comrades, undated.

(377) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

According to Alfred Nzo, long-serving ANC Secretary General, “The GDR then became one of the forces that were very squarely behind the struggle of our people against apartheid, for democracy, peace and development ... it remained a very loyal friend of the suppressed people of South Africa. In this participation of the general peace movement in the world, it occupied a very prominent place alongside the then Soviet Union. So this interaction between these peace forces, in which the African National Congress also was involved, increased our intercourse with the GDR and of course the African National Congress recognised the GDR as one of its loyal partners in the struggle.”³⁷⁸

The 1960s were a crucial period for relations between the GDR and the ANC and SACP. During this period, the question for the South African liberation movement was how to survive; and the GDR had to prove its legitimacy and surmount the international blockade. The groundwork was laid by the GDR’s decision to join the trade boycott against South Africa. Material aid for the South African liberation movement, solidarity with its imprisoned leaders, and assistance for the reorganisation of the ANC and SACP after severe setbacks deepened these relations. Jeremy Cronin assesses: “The most reliable response, the most coherent response, the ‘no question asking’ response came from the GDR and from the Soviet Union in particular. I think that left a very strong mark. And on general perceptions ... for millions of ordinary South Africans the fact that out there was a powerful bloc of countries that unquestionably supported our struggle was of great fundamental importance.”³⁷⁹

Indeed, relations between the GDR and the South African liberation movement had seen a remarkable development since the early 1960s. Dr Yusuf Dadoo acknowledged this relationship of solidarity in October 1969 with the words: “... the German Democratic Republic ... has proven itself to be a constant and powerful friend of the cause of the South African liberation movement. The spokesmen of the GDR ... have protested vigorously against the savage repression and murders of those within our country that fight for freedom and human rights. The people of the GDR ... have rendered invaluable practical aid to our cause, including our brave guerrillas of the people’s army, Umkhonto we Sizwe; aid which shall never be forgotten.”³⁸⁰

This relationship included a vivid exchange of opinions and views. Consultations and discussions between GDR representatives and their partners from the ANC and SACP began at an early stage and were not a one-sided affair. In May 1969, the Solidarity Committee was briefed on the results of the ANC’s conference in Morogoro. Only a few months later, Solidarity Committee chairman Heinz H. Schmidt had talks with Oliver Tambo in Lusaka. In May 1971, he met ANC secretary-general Alfred

⁽³⁷⁸⁾ Interview with Alfred Nzo, 7 December 1995

⁽³⁷⁹⁾ Interview with Jeremy Cronin, 24 November 1995.

⁽³⁸⁰⁾ SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV 2/20/140, Congratulatory message from the SACP CC, signed by Dadoo, 3 October 1969.

Nzo in Lusaka for consultations. Later that year, an ANC delegation visited Berlin to exchange views on Southern Africa.³⁸¹

As already mentioned, the close relations between SED and SACP played an important role for contacts between the SED and the ANC. There were joint delegations of SACP and ANC such as the one in 1963 with Moses Kotane and Duma Nokwe. When in October 1966 M. P. Naicker and ANC vice-president Alfred Kgokong came to Berlin for a congress of the International Organisation of Journalists, they had discussions with the SED International Relations Department. In June 1971, Josiah Jele, ANC representative in Dar es Salaam, became the first ANC official to attend a SED party congress. From then on, the ANC was represented at all SED congresses.

Official party relations between SED and ANC were established in 1972, when Oliver Tambo and Alfred Nzo visited the GDR for the first time, at the invitation of the SED. They had formal talks about international issues, political developments in South Africa, the ANC's struggle and ANC-SED cooperation. SED and ANC signed an agreement on cooperation, thus establishing direct party-to-party relations. From then onwards, regular meetings between high-ranking officials of the GDR and the ANC were held in Berlin, in African countries or at international conferences elsewhere. They included consultations on cooperation in international affairs.³⁸²

The publication of a Joint Communiqué resulting from a visit by an ANC delegation to the GDR in May 1978 raised international attention. This paper outlined shared positions on international political developments.³⁸³ The ANC was accorded political and protocol treatment at the highest level, comparable with ruling parties of friendly states. Later that year, Oliver Tambo opened an official ANC mission in Berlin, which was widely publicised in the GDR and considered an important event in the history of the ANC.³⁸⁴ This mission coordinated relations of the ANC with most of the other East European socialist countries. Political and diplomatic consultations with the ANC constituted a special form of GDR solidarity. They took place not only during visits, but also at international conferences and visits of GDR delegations abroad.

In all the discussions about South Africa, it seemed that the GDR officials shared or accepted views and assessments of the South African delegation of what was required in the strategic direction, etc. Later, in the 1980s, in discussions with people in charge of the training of ANC cadres in the GDR, Pallo Jordan recalls that some of the partners thought that the ANC military leadership was a bit overcautious in the way it conducted armed struggle. Jordan thinks there were differences, but those

(381) For detail on activities see Schleicher/Schleicher (1997), 246 ff.

(382) In 1977, GDR officials met with ANC leaders in Lusaka. In 1979, Erich Honecker met Oliver Tambo in Maputo; in 1984 and 1986 Gerd Koenig met ANC officials in Maputo and Lusaka respectively. In 1984, an ANC delegation and GDR Foreign Ministry officials held discussions on further mutual cooperation at the UN and in Berlin.

(383) "Joint communiqué on the visit paid by a delegation of the African National Congress of South Africa to the German Democratic Republic", 23 May 1978; see *Against Racism*, 157 f.

(384) *Sechaba*, January 1979, p.24.

were about tactics rather than principles.³⁸⁵ It was typical for GDR officials to be rather cautious in expressing views on internal issues of the liberation movements, carefully avoiding the impression of any interference. That was different when it came to working relations at lower or grassroots level.

There was usually a close relationship between ANC representatives and GDR diplomats in African states and elsewhere. Anthony Mongalo, ANC chief representative in the GDR (1978–84), remembers: “Then of course there were questions also where discussions would be like if we are going to have some big conferences like the World Peace Council or the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, how to prepare for those things, we would sit and discuss how we get on into that. When it comes to United Nations, if there were going to be some specific resolutions which they felt would come up dealing with South Africa.”³⁸⁶ Max Sisulu experienced similarly: “I had such discussions at different levels and on different issues: like in WFDY and IUS³⁸⁷ with FDJ representatives ... There was a lot of interaction and discussions on many issues. There were also discussions on economic developments, for instance in connection with ECOSOC³⁸⁸ in Geneva, again the GDR was ‘in charge of Africa.’”³⁸⁹

As mentioned before, at an early stage of the struggle, the GDR organised a massive solidarity campaign on the occasion of the Rivonia trial in South Africa. It began with a mass rally organised by the National Council of the National Front in Berlin. FDGB organised meetings to encourage solidarity with the working people of South Africa, adopting protest resolutions against the strangling of trade union rights and the persecution of apartheid opponents, as well as for the liberation of political prisoners.³⁹⁰ Other GDR organisations called rallies, organised solidarity meetings and adopted protest resolutions.³⁹¹ The call for solidarity in December 1963 was well received by a great number of people (see Section 3).³⁹² A highlight was the above mentioned visit of a first major ANC delegation to the GDR. The Solidarity Committee solicited support of prominent figures in the GDR.³⁹³ FDGB chairman Warnke sent a letter of protest to the South African government on behalf of six

(385) Interview with Pallo Jordan, 4 December 1995.

(386) Interview with Anthony Mongalo, 28 November 1995.

(387) World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) was based in Budapest; International Union of Students (IUS) was founded 1946 in Prague.

(388) Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

(389) Interview with Max Sisulu, 5 January 1996.

(390) SAPMO BArch: DY 34/A 201.4176, proposal by the FDGB international relations department to save Walter Sisulu’s life, 5 November 1963. *Tribune* reported extensively on the persecution of apartheid opponents in South African. See *Tribune*, 5, 9, 23, and 30 November 1963.

(391) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A2/20/985, 986; and BArch: P DZ 8/7305-662, draft reports on the solidarity campaign, undated.

(392) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, press release from the National Council, 8 January 1964, noting lists of signatures from students and/or staff in many institutions.

(393) SAPMO BArch: DY 34/A 201.2502, private notes, 22 April 1964. Enclosure, letter to Warnke.

million trade unionists.³⁹⁴ Popular artists and many intellectuals and professionals pleaded for the men around Nelson Mandela.³⁹⁵

The mobilising effect of these efforts was remarkable. Later solidarity campaigns followed a similar pattern. There were protest meetings against particularly violent acts of the apartheid regime as well as signature-collecting campaigns. Workers in some factories worked extra shifts to produce and dispatch solidarity goods. South African political prisoners continued to be at the centre of solidarity activities in the GDR. The Solidarity Committee and the GDR Committee for the UN Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination protested against the many death sentences imposed on South African freedom fighters. In 1982 and 1983, the GDR foreign minister joined calls of the UN Security Council for the repeal of death sentences in South Africa. In 1988, the Solidarity Committee and GDR mass media joined the international campaign to save the lives of the Sharpeville Six.³⁹⁶

The GDR campaign for the release of political prisoners in South Africa focused on Nelson Mandela. In 1983, Mandela's 65th birthday was the climax of a solidarity campaign which the UN Centre against Apartheid and ANC had organised to have political prisoners released from prison. The GDR awarded Mandela the "Star of International Friendship" in gold.³⁹⁷ GDR citizens sent postcards to the Botha government, demanding that political prisoners be set free. Children and teenagers sent 25,000 birthday cards to Mandela in Pollsmoor prison. A secondary school was given the name "Nelson Mandela".³⁹⁸ In 1985, ANC representative Anthony Mongalo received a petition with 1.8 million signatures of young East Germans demanding Mandela's release from prison.³⁹⁹

Close cooperation between representatives of the ANC and the GDR all over the world included material and financial support for political activities of the ANC. In addition to supplying the ANC and SACP with funds for their delegations to attend conferences and meetings, the GDR hosted special conferences or seminars for them, such as the ANC summer school for South African students in Europe in 1967 and 1971.⁴⁰⁰ Academic conferences were organised to support the struggle.⁴⁰¹

In March 1975, the GDR was elected member of the UN Special Committee against Apartheid. Even before, the GDR had used the UN to actively support the right of the South African liberation movement to take up arms in the fight against racist oppression and apartheid. The GDR representative Peter Florin declared in the Security Council: "An oppressed people are entitled to wage a liberation

(394) Ibid., copy of the letter undated.

(395) *Neues Deutschland*, 29 April, 1 May 1964.

(396) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(397) *Sechaba*, December 1984, 19 f.

(398) *Sechaba*, September 1983, p.10.

(399) *Sechaba*, January 1986, p.18.

(400) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

(401) For instance a conference on "The Imperialist Nature of Racism in Southern Africa" in June 1976 in Berlin and a symposium on "Apartheid – Massive Violation Of Human Rights" in November 1978 in Leipzig.

struggle by all means, including the use of arms, against the armed champions of a terrorist regime.”⁴⁰² When the GDR became a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council (1980–1981) Ambassador Florin denounced the so-called reforms proclaimed by the apartheid regime in South Africa and demanded far-reaching steps by the Security Council in accordance with the UN charter. He also demanded the immediate release of Nelson Mandela and all other political prisoners.⁴⁰³ As a council member, the GDR actively contributed to the deliberations of the Security Council Committee established by Resolution 421 (1977) to make the arms embargo against South Africa more effective and pleaded in favour of tightening it. In addition, the GDR advocated effective economic sanctions, notably an oil embargo.

As with other liberation organisations, the supply of solidarity goods and manufactures constituted a major component of the GDR support for the South African liberation struggle. Goods for sale became an important part of material assistance for the ANC, in addition to ordinary aid supplies earmarked for refugees.⁴⁰⁴ Food, tents, blankets, medicine and clothing as well as other equipment for camp life were most valuable for the ANC and its refugee centres. Periodic shipments of such goods were sent to the Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College (SMFC) in Mazimbu and the ANC camp in Dakawa, both in Tanzania. From 1987 onwards, the Solidarity Committee’s support for Dakawa included the training of 12 construction experts in the GDR.⁴⁰⁵ A youth brigade of the FDJ worked in Morogoro to support the ANC camp. GDR educationalists worked as teachers and advisors at SMFC from 1986 till 1989. Rica Hodgson remembered: “And also in Mazimbu we had some volunteer helpers, teachers from the GDR. They were wonderful, absolutely marvellous, we loved them. They were also dedicated and good.”⁴⁰⁶

Luli Callinicos mentions in her Tambo biography: “The ANC relied on shipments from the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic (and later from Sweden), for tinned and dried food, as well as bales of basic clothing.”⁴⁰⁷ The printing of material for the ANC and the SACP was an important part of cooperation and a speciality of GDR solidarity. It included the production and dispatch of journals (Sechaba and others), printing of books, pamphlets, posters and material for exhibition, and the production of badges, flags, etc. The ANC received also medical treatment and rehabilitation for sick and wounded people.

Overall, GDR assistance to the ANC over the years amounted to 37.3 million Marks. Again, data on military supplies and training, on SED assistance, on assistance from churches and the various mass organisations are not available. They would have to be added. Despite economic difficulties in the GDR, support for the ANC even

(402) Against Racism, p.70.

(403) *Ibid.*, p.364.

(404) For details see BArch: P DZ 8/7304-662, list of solidarity supplies to the ANC 1961-1967, 2 November 1967.

(405) Reichardt, p.80.

(406) Interview with Rica Hodgson, 26 December 1995.

(407) Callinicos, p.311.

increased between 1986 and 1989.⁴⁰⁸ Regarding the costs for the ANC mission in Berlin, Indres Naidoo, deputy chief representative, recalls: “The Solidarity Committee paid our rent at the office ... They paid for the flats, they furnished the flats and they gave us three cars and petrol. For the first time in over two decades, I was getting a salary.”⁴⁰⁹

Already at an early stage, education and training was an essential element of the GDR support to the ANC. It included scholarships for academic and vocational training and was later on expanded into military and intelligence areas. Anthony Mongalo recalls: “When I got to the GDR in 1978, I think we had about 38-40 students in different fields of study, vocational training and then also in the universities. By the time I left [1984], I think we had reached almost 150–200 in different fields ... Many of them after completion went to fill in positions in the ANC structures where they had the qualifications for those positions. Some of them are cabinet ministers like Jeff Radebe, who was in Leipzig, and Zola Skweyiya. They are ministers today. So it was help for ANC in exile, and today it is help for the ANC in the government.”⁴¹⁰

In 1990, the South African student community in the GDR numbered well over 100 students.⁴¹¹ Academic and technical training programmes had expanded widely in the 1980s. In 1989 ANC members attended a training course for diplomats at the Institute for International Relations at Potsdam-Babelsberg. Such special courses for diplomats had previously been offered only to countries with which the GDR had very close relations. In the 1980s, the amount of money provided for education and training of South Africans increased substantially from 240,200 (1981) through 867,200 (1983) up to 1.07 million Marks (1987) and remained stable with 982,000 (1988) and 825,800 Marks (1989). Altogether the amount spent on education and training reached 7.25 million Marks for the 1980s alone.⁴¹² In addition, mass organisations of the GDR provided scholarships for the ANC, sometimes at their own training institutions.

An area of particular significance for the South African liberation struggle was the underground and the armed struggle. The GDR was involved in supporting this struggle as well. As early as in 1961/1962, a small number of SACP members were trained in the GDR for undercover operations and for sabotage actions of Umkhonto we Sizwe. Mac Maharaj was one of the first South Africans to undergo a sabotage training course in the GDR in 1962. He was involved in building up illegal structures of resistance within South Africa.⁴¹³ The SACP had repeatedly requested arms from

(408) Refer to Records of SODI – Archives of Solidaritaetsdienst-international e.V. (SODI), Berlin.

(409) Interview with Indres Naidoo, 12 December 1995.

(410) Interview with Anthony Mongalo, 28 November 1995.

(411) Interview with Pallo Jordan, 4 December 1995.

(412) Working sheets of SODI; data for Angola: 1983-88 SAPMO BArch: vorl. SED 40567 vol. 1.2. Data for 1989 refer to DDR- DDR-Entwicklungspolitik zwischen Ab- und Aufbruch, in: *epd-Entwicklungspolitik*, Frankfurt/ Main, V/1990, p.53.

(413) UWC, Mayibuye Centre Oral History: Hilda Bernstein Collection, interview with Mac Maharaj. See also SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV 2/20/57, letter from Industriedruck Bischofswerda to Zentrag, 21 February 1962.

the SED.⁴¹⁴ A memorandum of 1964 indicates that the ANC was particularly seeking assistance in military training.⁴¹⁵

A SACP delegation with Marks and Kotane held talks with SED officials in November 1967 to exchange views and information on international developments and the strategy and tactics of each party. In their expos, the SACP representatives gave due priority to the military actions started in August that year with the so-called Wankie operation jointly with ZAPU in Zimbabwe.⁴¹⁶ For the first time, the SACP and SED issued a communiqué about the meeting. It contained no direct reference to this issue, but the SED expressed ‘its admiration and its unlimited solidarity for the heroic struggle of the democratic forces of South Africa.’⁴¹⁷ The restraint of both parties in their communiqué might partly have been because of the doubts of the GDR about the Wankie operation, and partly the SACP’s concern at the time to make no particular mention of military activities in a communiqué with a governing communist party of the Eastern bloc. But Marks and Kotane were highly pleased with their talks.⁴¹⁸ Obviously, this visit was decisive in setting the stage for the intensive support the SED was going to provide for illegal work in South Africa. Earlier in January 1967, when the SED Politburo decided on the delivery of arms to African liberation movements,⁴¹⁹ the ANC was missing on the list of recipients. The former chief of military intelligence of MK, Ronnie Kasrils, stressed that the ANC needed no arms from the GDR. Instead, MK received a lot of foodstuffs and clothing.⁴²⁰ MK training camps in Angola were especially supplied with food regularly. Further assistance consisted of clothing and uniforms.⁴²¹

After the Morogoro conference in 1969, GDR increased its training of ANC cadres for clandestine work. As Ronnie Kasrils recalls, training for solo fighters and small groups was arranged to take place in the GDR, which had specialised in this kind of assistance. Numerous cadres that the ANC prepared in London for underground work in South Africa were sent to the GDR for training. In view of the ANC and SACP, the GDR’s contribution was of a high standard and well adapted to conditions and requirements of the struggle in South Africa. It was an extremely important part of the GDR’s overall support for the struggle. In the 1970s, cooperation on security and military matters intensified. When thousands of young South Africans left their country after the Soweto uprising in 1976 and joined the ANC, providing shelter and training became a critical problem. The ANC turned to the GDR, among others, for

(414) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A2/20/985, confidential notes on a talk with Yusuf Dadoo, 29 January 1963. At the 6th SED congress Dadoo announced that a delegation with Kotane would arrive in early in 1963 to discuss arms deliveries to the ANC. The visit did not take place until December.

(415) BArch: P DZ 8/7412-660, confidential information by the Solidarity Committee, undated (November 1964).

(416) SAPMO BArch DY 30/IV A2/20/985, draft report on the SACP delegation’s visit (Marks and Kotane), 15-20 November 1967; report on the SACP delegation’s visit, 15-23 November 1967, 8 December 1967.

(417) *The African Communist*, London, 32, 1968, 74f.

(418) SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV A2/20/985, report, 8 December 1967

(419) See SAPMO BArch: DY 30/IV 2/2/1093

(420) Interview with Ronnie Kasrils, 4 December 1995.

(421) Interview with Pallo Jordan, 4 December 1995.

help. Special flights were arranged from 1976/77 onwards to fly young MK recruits in groups of about forty from their camps in Angola to the GDR.⁴²²

From 1976 until the late 1980s, about 1,000 MK fighters were trained in the GDR. Military drill, general security concerns, intelligence and counter-intelligence, information and propaganda activities were the centrepiece of the courses, which lasted six months. Ronnie Kasrils of MK rated that particular training very high.⁴²³ MK cadres did not only come for military training; some were sent with other ANC members to the 10-month political courses at the SED party school in Magdeburg.⁴²⁴ Among the MK cadres trained in the GDR were a number who have now taken high- ranking positions in the military and security structures of the new South Africa.

Altogether, the range of support and assistance for the ANC was impressive. The brand of GDR solidarity recognised by many liberation movements, including the ANC, was that of partnership on equal terms and speedy and efficient solidarity support. There is another point underlined by Luli Callinicos in her Tambo biography, when she speaks specifically of “the ANC’s warm relations with the GDR”.⁴²⁵

5. Solidarity – Striking the Balance

5.1 Partnership, Speed and Efficiency

Solidarity as a basic principle of GDR foreign policy has been explained in detail - it was a major aspect of the East German engagement in Africa. Liberation movements in Southern Africa had become a main focus on this engagement. With the deepening of the economic crisis in the GDR in the 1980s, the limits of solidarity in terms of material help became more and more obvious. Despite this situation and a decline of the GDR’s Africa policy generally, its support for the liberation movements was not reduced. The unstinting solidarity with ANC and SWAPO continued. “New thinking” in the GDR Africa policy with the development of a new, constructive stand in support of a political settlement in Southern Africa did not negatively affect the support for liberation movements. Indeed, liberation movements like ANC and SWAPO did not notice any serious problems in the GDR or changes in the GDR engagement in Africa. Jeremiah Mamabolo of the ANC qualifies the support of the GDR: “At the level of government, there was no doubt that GDR was in the forefront of support for the liberation movements in terms of material support, political, moral support, material and so forth. ... The GDR government was in the frontline.”⁴²⁶

Altogether, the GDR took second place – after the Soviet Union - among the socialist countries of Eastern Europe as far as solidarity with the liberation struggle in Southern Africa was concerned. There were some aspects specific to GDR solidarity. One was the attitude of partnership among equals as far as the relations with the

(422) Interview with Ronnie Kasrils, 4 December 1995.

(423) Kasrils, 125 ff.

(424) Interview with Ronnie Kasrils, 4 December 1995

(425) Callinicos, p.513 .

(426) Interview with Jeremiah Kingsley Mamabolo, 30 October 1995 .

national liberation organisations were concerned. Leaders of the ANC, FRELIMO, MPLA, SWAPO and ZAPU were treated in a very respectful way by the GDR leadership, who afforded them a protocol equal to that of other official guests. That was of particular significance in the early years, when most of them could not expect a similar treatment in too many places. In the early 1970s, besides meeting officials of the GDR Solidarity Committee, leaders of these organisations met with Hermann Axen, the ranking foreign affairs official in the SED. In 1972 the new leader of the SED Erich Honecker received FRELIMO president Samora Machel; the GDR head of state Willi Stoph met Agostinho Neto of MPLA in 1974. From 1977/78 onwards, it became usual practise that Honecker would receive the visiting leaders of ZAPU, SWAPO and ANC personally. It was a well-calculated political gesture that the GDR leader officially met with Sam Nujoma, Joshua Nkomo and Oliver Tambo during his first state visit to Africa in 1979. Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela were awarded some of the highest official state decorations in the GDR.⁴²⁷ Honecker developed quite a close personal relationship with leaders like Samora Machel, Joshua Nkomo and Sam Nujoma.

It was not just a matter of protocol - the accessibility of GDR leaders for their partners from African liberation movements was exceptional. ANC chief representative Anthony Mongalo remembers: "The first thing that struck me was that they (the GDR leadership - HGS) were very accessible, maybe even more accessible than in other countries where I had been. Sometimes you would be surprised how you would be able within a short time to get hold of a leader and sit and discuss. The nature of discussions ... for them it was to get information about our struggle, information about developments inside South Africa. And then from there, on the basis of that we would then say: well we can see this is what is needed here and there, what is the most urgent need."⁴²⁸

Another aspect of the efficiency of GDR solidarity was its swift aid in acute emergency situations. The Solidarity Committee was able to organise, even at short notice, rallies of support when needed. Political decisions within 24 hours to the top of the state, up to Erich Honecker, were the guarantee for a speedy implementation of emergency aid. When in autumn 1968 the deteriorating situation in camps in Tanzania and Zambia forced the ANC to submit an urgent request for help, an emergency shipment of clothing for South Africans in ANC camps was prepared in December that year.⁴²⁹ In 1969 Aaron Ndlovu of ZAPU expressed thanks of his organisation: "We are very much short of words to express our inner and deep feelings in appreciation of your help. There is a saying in one of our languages which says 'Umgange weqiniso ngu mgane ngezenzo' which means 'a friend in need is a friend indeed'. Otherwise, without your help we would hardly maintain hundreds of men we

(427) Mandela and Tambo both received the Grand Star of International Friendship.

(428) Interview with Anthony Mongalo, 28 November 1995.

(429) I. Schleicher, *Chronicle*.

have in our army.”⁴³⁰ It was about the same time, when the ANC experienced serious problems: “When African states – one after the other – expelled us in connection with the ‘detente’ exercise after the Lusaka Declaration (Lusaka Manifesto in 1969 – HGS) we could retreat to the GDR, also to the Soviet Union.”⁴³¹

Swift aid in emergency cases - a specific strength of GDR support - was partly possible because of a lack of democracy. There were no “bottlenecks” of too many democratic institutions and regulations in the decision-making process in East Germany, very often decisions were taken single-handed by Honecker himself. Existing interest conflicts in East Germany were often covered by hierarchic structures with a dominating party and the omnipotence of its leader. Erich Honecker considered solidarity a very important value, relating back to his personal experience in the underground struggle and during his imprisonment. GDR officials in charge of relations with liberation organisations knew how to exploit Honecker’s personal affinity to the liberation struggle by channelling aid requests straight to him, thus avoiding interference and resistance by other SED leaders. Guenter Mittag, the influential secretary in charge of economic affairs in the SED, was particularly problematic, focussing exclusively on East Germany’s economic interests.

In 1975, the swift and coordinated action to give massive support to MPLA at a crucial time, when the successful conclusion of the Angolan liberation struggle was at stake is an example of the strength of GDR solidarity and its ability to react in acute emergency situations. About a year later, it was South Africa after Soweto, when thousands of young refugees flocked to the ANC in the African frontline states. It was no coincidence that in the same year the GDR more than doubled its assistance to the ANC, compared to 1975.⁴³² Scholarships and facilities for military training were part of it with a major project of military training for MK in the GDR. MK cadres considered the GDR a special place for military and security training with a greater survival capacity because of its proximity to the West, and because of the GDR-West Germany situation. “We felt that because of the effectiveness (of the GDR

– HGS) ... of infiltrating certain levels of the West German government, some of that skill could have been used to be able to have access to South Africa.”⁴³³ The training was tailored to the needs of the struggle. Pallo Jordan believes that the quality of the training was influenced very strongly by the GDR’s existential situation, especially in the early years in a very hostile environment, having been forced to develop relevant techniques. That obviously had a certain value to it.⁴³⁴ But one has also to question whether deficits in the GDR’s own security concept, where a “securocracy” reduced problems too often monocausally to activities of “outer” or “inner counter-revolution” and underrated indigenous causes, had also some negative impact.

(430) SAPMO BArch DY 34/A 200.7304, Ndlovu’s letter to the FDGB, 15 Sept. 1969.

(431) Interview with Max Sisulu, 5 January 1996.

(432) Refer to Records of SODI.

(433) Interview with Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, 1 December 1995.

(434) Interview with Pallo Jordan, 4 December 1995. .

In the late 1970s, with massive Rhodesian attacks on Zimbabwean camps in Zambia, ZAPU officials considered the GDR's capacity for quick help in emergency situations a very positive factor. When there was acute danger of catastrophic famine in the refugee camps in Zambia, special planes from the GDR with food and medicine on board landed in Lusaka. According to Jeremy Brickhill, it was the proverbial help in need.⁴³⁵ When Honecker met Nkomo in Lusaka on 21 February 1979, Nkomo said that the assistance granted by the GDR was the biggest compared with other international aid.⁴³⁶

This was to be surpassed by the GDR airlift for ZAPU goods in 1979. Dumiso Dabengwa holds the view that this airlift was important for ZAPU's Turning Point Strategy at the end of the 1970s when the organisation planned a massive attack using regular armed forces. To his knowledge, Rhodesians and Western intelligence services obtained information about ZAPU's plans, and he thinks that the magnitude of the GDR's assistance through the airlift must have made them realise that ZAPU's strategy was serious and genuine negotiations were necessary. Considering this, he even sees a direct connection between the airlift and the move to go ahead with the Lancaster House negotiations.⁴³⁷ Jeremy Brickhill also assumed that the GDR's airlift raised fears in the West that this evidently new quality of assistance for the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe might have unpredictable effects on developments in the entire Southern African region. He supports the thesis that the operation directly influenced the convening of the Lancaster House conference.⁴³⁸

The perception of observers in South Africa itself would nourish such an idea. There, the GDR was known to be one of the main allies and a staunch supporter of the liberation struggle. Allister Sparks remembers: "I think there were more ANC people in East Germany than in any other East European country [except] in the Soviet Union. It was a primary kind of base ... with all the military training was being given there. I think East Germany and Moscow itself were seen as the two knots of support for the ANC.⁴³⁹ South African generals considered the military training of cadres in the GDR effective, with high technological and tactical standards, especially in military intelligence: a line of activity they had been directly confronted with.⁴⁴⁰ Brigadier Snowball of the former South Africa Defence Force recalled: "Our perception was that East Germany was the leading force of the East Bloc countries against the white government in South Africa. As such they were giving assistance to all the liberation movements, also anti-Portuguese, also anti-South African of course

... They were one of the main instigators behind the onslaught against us."⁴⁴¹ The

(435) Interview with Jeremy Brickhill, 17 November 1995.

(436) Cf. SAPMO BArch DY 30/J IV 2/2 A-2216, decision of the SED Politbureau, 27 February 1979.

(437) Interview with Dabengwa on 8 November 1995. For the Turning Point Strategy, see Brickhill, 48ff.

(438) Interview with Brickhill on 17 November 1995.

(439) Interview with Alistair Sparks, 5 December 1995.

(440) Interview with Chris Thirion, 5 December 1995.

(441) Interview with K. Snowball, 30 November 1995.

operational capabilities of the liberation movements in Southern Africa improved greatly as a direct result of GDR support.

Liberation organisations got the impression of an altruistic East German policy. The GDR already gave help at a time when any success of the liberation struggle seemed far away. Max Sisulu recalls that the GDR helped when freedom for South Africa was a very distant vision – at that early stage it was a friend in need and therefore a friend indeed. And he added: “We were accepted without conditions; no strings attached. Much later and up to today a lot of support is being offered to the ANC. But that makes quite a difference ... We had the feeling: the GDR was our home away from home.”⁴⁴² But there were of course good reasons for the East German engagement

– ideologically and politically; with the East-West conflict and the German-German competition, economic interests for future cooperation like in Angola and Mozambique, was planned for Namibia. Partners in the liberation organisations valued the GDR because of the intensity and seriousness of cooperation, the swift and unbureaucratic reaction to requests for help, but also because of backup measures, such as food supplies or medical care in hospitals and sanatoriums of the GDR. All this created an emotional predisposition in favour of the GDR. In a message on the 30th anniversary of the GDR, the NEC of the ANC spoke of the GDR as “a symbol of international friendship and militant solidarity against imperialism and reaction”.⁴⁴³ This image of the GDR was determined by the East German policy, which could rely on strong solidarity feelings at grassroots level, on people’s goodwill and commitment. Besides a number of other factors already mentioned, the efficiency of the support for, and the close relations of the GDR with the liberation movements, resulted from the sincere personal commitment of many East Germans. It was easy for many of them to identify with the official policy of solidarity towards the struggle against colonialism, racism and apartheid. But there were also obvious contradictions within the GDR, for example deficits in democracy and economic deficits. The country’s economic problems, bureaucratic hurdles, the over-centralisation of structures, the lack of free initiative and the curtailing of grassroots activities limited the mobilisation efforts and the efficiency in implementing solidarity. Taking these into account, the tireless efforts of those engaged in solidarity work have to be valued. With comparatively limited financial and personnel resources relatively large effects were achieved in many respects and a considerable contribution made to the GDR Africa policy as a whole.

The cautious and often non-judgemental political attitude of East German leaders discussing the situation in the liberation organisations themselves with their partners contributed to this perception. Internal problems and contradictions within the liberation organisations were usually not touched by the GDR officials, if they were not raised by the African partners themselves. Reports on human rights violations

(442) Interview with Max Sisulu, 5 January 1996.

(443) *Sechaba*, December 1979, 21.

in camps of liberation organisations in Angola were obviously not discussed. At the same time most officials of liberation movements did not see and experience existing serious internal problems and deficits in the GDR, they only saw the solidarity and seemingly successful GDR Africa policy.

But the East German policy was impaired by systemic characteristics like the neglect of system-independent development problems, the failure of the socialist model of development and East Germany's own inadequate economic resources. Increasing problems of the GDR experienced in the bilateral cooperation with African partner states did not apply to such an extent to cooperation with the liberation movements, where the sustainability of GDR support was at its strongest. The GDR looked much more stable than indeed it was. It is only in the aftermath, that Essop Pahad points to some of the problems: "Our own students studying in the GDR obviously saw many things that those of us who were coming as guests of the party couldn't see, but as I say I think the leadership was too isolated ... isolated from their own people ... This lack of a culture of democratic discussion in the party structures as a whole."⁴⁴⁴ But at that time, an uncritical picture of the GDR dominated; it was shaped by solidarity experiences. Referring to the so-called GDR kids of Namibian origin (see Section 3.3) Festus Naholo expressed SWAPO's relationship with the GDR with the great trust put in the GDR: "Somebody to whom you entrust your future, your children, that somebody is really a friend of yours."⁴⁴⁵ And the South African veteran Brian Bunting stated: "The GDR placed the resources of the country at the disposal of the South African liberation movement to the fullest extent possible. Hundreds of MK members were trained in the GDR, the ANC representative given the status of ambassador. Journals, pamphlets and books of the ANC and SACP were printed in the GDR and dispatched all over the world at state expense. Illegal editions were printed for distribution inside South Africa. Cadres of both organisations were treated in GDR hospitals free of charge. Material aid was provided to the movement in Zambia and Angola. Students were enrolled at GDR universities and colleges ... Because of the warmth of support so readily offered, members of the liberation movement developed a special respect and love for the GDR."⁴⁴⁶

Alfred Nzo as ANC Secretary General was in a position to evaluate the importance of the support his organisation received: "It was therefore easy for us to place our case whenever the ANC was in any form of trouble ... And we knew the GDR was going to respond accordingly ... I remember, sometimes our camps in Angola would run short of food. It was dangerously low. The first country we [asked] was GDR, because we knew the GDR would respond almost immediately including airlifting supplies ... This relationship had developed to that extent."⁴⁴⁷ Hifikepune Pohamba of SWAPO,

(444) Interview with Essop Pahad, 30 November 1995.

(445) Interview with Naholo, 20 January 1996.

(446) Bunting, GDR and the South African Liberation Movement.

(447) Interview with Alfred Nzo, 7 December 1995.

referring to the medical treatment for freedom fighters remembers that wounded victims of attacks on the camps were usually flown to the GDR within a week.⁴⁴⁸

The former ANC chief representative in Berlin, Anthony Mongalo, compared: “From the GDR, the assistance that the ANC got was far better coordinated. The GDR was more responsive, even at short notice, to requests that used to come ... we were able to arrange with the GDR that at this time we have this amount of food that has come, but we will need at this time or at that time ... I would get a call, look there is a planeload of new recruits, uniforms, clothing, all these things. ... If that type of assistance had not come, the moral of our people in those bushes, in those camps would have gone so low. ... It was mainly the question of when it comes to urgency; the GDR was always ready at short notice. With the Soviet Union you would have had to wait for certain times to be slotted in.”⁴⁴⁹ Another aspect, considered to be important, was the militant solidarity and the frontline situation of the GDR in international politics.⁴⁵⁰ That was why the expression “anti-imperialist solidarity” was used by the GDR policy and propaganda. The common struggle was against colonialism, racism, apartheid and – imperialism. Thus the national liberation struggle was brought into the world-wide East-West confrontation. Of course, the image of GDR solidarity also benefited from the proverbial German virtues and their high regard in Africa as well as from the fact that the GDR, as opposed to the USSR, did not behave like a big power.

5.2 The Heritage

Liberation struggle and decolonisation have been the main features of international developments in the second half of the 20th century. Southern Africa was a main theatre in this liberation struggle. Worldwide international solidarity with the people fighting against colonialism, racism and apartheid played a crucial role and has been one important interrelating aspect. Solidarity survived the national liberation struggle.

The GDR as a state went into disarray from late 1989 onwards; it lost not only its socio-economic system, but also its identity as a state, and finally ceased to exist in October 1990. The whole world changed from 1989 onwards. The Cold War was finally ended, and the bloc of socialist states, among them the GDR, disintegrated. In the post-cold war unified Germany, there were quite a number of people in the former GDR who considered a constructive and critical analysis of their own past important. Neither prejudice nor nostalgia was helpful when analysing facts or circumstances of the implosion of the GDR, but it was important to draw necessary lessons and conclusions from it. This process is still continuing. Immediately after the collapse of the GDR and the unification of Germany, a wave of sweeping negative statements

(448) Interview with Pohamba, 24 January 1996.

(449) Interview with Anthony Mongalo, 28 November 1995.

(450) Interview with Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, 1 December 1995.

entered the debate over the history of the GDR and its international relations. The discussion was only too often hijacked by the expediencies of day-to-day politics.

In the course of the unification of Germany, many East German structures were simply dissolved. The ideological legacy of the GDR's Africa policy was rejected as well. But there were many activists, including a number of academics, who felt it was necessary to preserve such positive elements as international solidarity and striving for social justice and equality in international relations. A critical and factual scrutiny of the cooperation with liberation movements facilitates access to the heritage which East Germans can, with pride, contribute to the united Germany. Subsequently, a more sober assessment developed. East Germans have established their place in the unified Germany, and part of that process is identification with their past. In order to substantiate efforts to preserve the heritage, research and publications were of particular importance. Publications focussing on solidarity and the role of the GDR in Africa give proof of that. Most of them take a critical and realistic view of the past. This exercise is a vital reaction to the radical social change that has been experienced. Coming to terms with all their past experiences, positive and negative, is indispensable, for it enables people to clear their minds and regain energy and initiative.

When the GDR collapsed in 1989/90, it was an unpleasant surprise for many of its African partners. For them, especially those from the liberation movements, the GDR had always looked quite attractive. Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi thinks that the GDR had become a kind of example, not to use the word "model", of a seemingly successful socialist society.⁴⁵¹ For Max Sisulu "there were a number of factors for our appreciation of GDR: the stability, the welfare of the people, and the warmth among the people. We felt very depressed when the GDR collapsed."⁴⁵² And a SWAPO leader commented on the collapse of the GDR: "If this would have happened earlier we wouldn't be here [in Namibia] now."

Solidarity is a common value with a long historic tradition. More than ever, solidarity is partnership and requires global solidarity to face the challenges of this 21st century - it needs a globalisation bottom-up. International solidarity is part of the struggle for a new humanistic world order. That also goes for Southern Africa. Remembering the glorious past of an active and finally successful liberation struggle is one thing. Facing the new challenges of the post-liberation developments in a changed world is something else. There is the ambivalence of a historically based strong solidarity feeling and the difficulty to understand the changes and the new challenges in the region.

The importance of international solidarity during the liberation struggle is remembered vividly. In Africa, GDR solidarity was not forgotten. The issue of *Sechaba* in December 1990, a few months after the GDR had disappeared, had a cover showing

(451) Interview with Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi, 1 December 1995.

(452) Interview with Max Sisulu, 5 January 1996.

the opening of the ANC mission in East Berlin in 1978 by Oliver Tambo. It commented in an editorial “A Friend to Sechaba” on the loss that the liberation movement had suffered with the disappearance of the GDR and mentioned “the unstinting services that the GDR people willingly and selflessly rendered to the South African people”.⁴⁵³ In February 1993, an international conference in Johannesburg on solidarity was opened by Oliver Tambo. Among the invited guests, foreign representatives of governments and organisations were solidarity activists from the former GDR. Tambo had invited them in order “to thank their countries and organisations for their valuable contribution to the freeing of the South African people from the bondage of apartheid”.⁴⁵⁴ In the GDR, links with national liberation movements were particularly close in Southern Africa, where they have left many traces.

Preserving the heritage of solidarity was not easy due to particular developments during the unification of Germany. It has been mentioned that many East German structures were dissolved. Semi-societal organisations of the former GDR which had dealt with Africa experienced major financial problems. Some vanished; others re-grouped. Very few of the projects the GDR had maintained in Africa survived. Few of many East German experts involved in cooperation with Africa had the chance to continue. The ideological legacy of the GDR’s Africa policy was totally rejected. Unfortunately, this affected long-term and intense contacts with a number of governments and liberation movements.⁴⁵⁵

The collapse of the GDR and (nearly) all its structures in 1989/90 generally interrupted solidarity relations in the Eastern part of Germany. It took some time to preserve valuable traditions and restore the relations of solidarity. The GDR had its strongest pillars of the solidarity movement with the trade unions and the other mass organisations. These vanished, and only a limited number of structures survived. A new organisation, Solidaritaetsdienst International (Solidarity Services International - SODI), emerged as a legal successor organisation to the GDR Solidarity Committee, to save the substantial solidarity funds of the GDR and make them available for development assistance. At the same time, support for a number of ongoing projects and scholarships had to be continued. SODI is a grassroots-based organisation, not affiliated to any political party. It regards itself as functioning in the tradition of the GDR Solidarity Committee, while critically analysing and avoiding the deficits of that committee, especially those concerning the democratic base and independence of the organisation.

SODI focuses its work on traditional partners of the former GDR Solidarity Committee, including projects in Southern Africa. SODI has become a major NGO concerned with development cooperation in East Germany. Other organisations which were active in solidarity work, such as Gossner Mission, INKOTA and DAFRIG continue their involvement. The School of Solidarity of the former Journalists Union

(453) *Sechaba*, December 1990, p.1.

(454) See Callinicos, p.626.

(455) Schleicher and Engel (1997).

became the International Institute of Journalism Berlin-Brandenburg. A number of new small NGOs have emerged, some of them continuing East German solidarity engagement. Most of these organisations rely on the continuing commitment of East Germans to supporting the struggle: formerly against colonialism, racism and apartheid; today against neo-liberalism and the negative effects of globalisation, for the development and democracy. For many people, solidarity is an important part of their own identity, as far as their political life is concerned.

At the international solidarity conference in Johannesburg in 1993, the East German representatives included young people from the formerly independent church-related solidarity groups as well as solidarity activists from the former GDR establishment. These activists from different generations, with their different social and political backgrounds, were now cooperating in projects inherited from the GDR solidarity.

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Acronyms

AAPSO	Afro-Asian People's Solidarity
Organisation ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
ANC	African National Congress (Zimbabwe)
APK	Aussenpolitische Kommission beim Politbuero des ZK der
SED ATUC	African Trade Union Congress of Southern Rhodesia
CDU	Christlich-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union)
CIVPOL	Civilian Police (of UNTAG)
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
COREMO	Comité Revolucionario de Moçambique
CONCP	Confêrencia das Organizações Nacionalistas das Colônias Portugueses
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DAFRIG	Deutsch-Afrikanische Gesellschaft (German-African Friendship Association)
DBD	Demokratische Bauernpartei Deutschlands (Democratic Farmers' Party of Germany)
DFD	Demokratischer Frauenbund Deutschlands (Women's Democratic League of Germany)
DSR	Deutsche Seereederei
DTA	Democratic Turnhalle Alliance
DTSB	Deutscher Turn- und Sportbund
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
FDGB	Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Free German Trade Union Federation)
FDJ	Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth)
FNLA	National Liberation Front of Angola
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique
ICSA	International Committee against Apartheid, Racism and Colonialism in Southern Africa
IDAF	International Defence and Aid Fund
INKOTA	Information, KOordination, TAGungen zu Themen des Nord- Sued-Konflikts und der Konziliaren Bewegung
IOJ	International Organisation of Journalists
ISW	Institut fuer Sozialistische Wirtschaftsfuehrung beim ZK der SED
IUS	International Union of Students
IV	Internationale Verbindungen (Department for International Relations of the Central Committee of SED)
JMC	Joint Military Command

KPdSU	Kommunistische Partei der Sowjetunion (Communist Party of the Soviet Union - CPSU)
LDPD	Liberal-Demokratische Partei Deutschlands (Liberal Democratic Party of Germany)
MfAA	Ministerium fuer Auswaertige Angelegenheiten der DDR
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
NDP	National Democratic Party
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NDPD	Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany)
NUNW	National Union of Namibian Workers
OAU	Organization of African Unity
PAC	Pan Africanist Congress (of Azania)
PF	Patriotic Front
PLAN	People's Liberation Army of Namibia
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional de Moçambique
SACP	South African Communist Party
SACTU	South African Congress of Trade Unions
SAIC	South African Indian Congress
SED	Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands
SMFC	Solomon Mahlangu Freedom College
SODI	Solidaritaetsdienst-International (Solidarity Services International)
SPD	Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands
SWANU	South West African National Union
SWAPO	South West African People's Organisation
UDENAMO	União Democrática Nacional de Moçambique
UDF	United Democratic Front
UDI	Unilateral Declaration of Independence
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNITA	União para a Independência Total de Angola
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNTA	União Nacional dos Trabalhadores
UNTAG	United Nation's Transition Assistance Group
UPA	União das Populações de Angola (People's Union of Angola)
Vdgb	Verband der gegenseitigen Bauernhilfe (Association of Mutual
	Farmer's Assistance)
VDJ	Verband Deutscher Journalisten (Union of German Journalists)

WFDY	World Federation of Democratic Youth
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions
ZACU	Zimbabwe African Congress of Unions
ZANU	Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU	Zimbabwe African People's Union
ZENTRAAL	Zentraler Rat fuer Asien, Afrika- und Lateinamerikawissenschaften
ZIPA	Zimbabwe People's Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZK	Zentralkomitee (Central Committee)

