Capacity Building for Regional Integration – Policy Development, Planning, M&E, Statistics and International Cooperation

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REVIEW OF
THE WINDHOEK DECLARATION ON A NEW PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AND
THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATING PARTNERS

FINAL DRAFT REPORT

June 2012
This report has been prepared at the request of SADC with the financial support of the European Commission by Mrs. Gwen Corre, with the contribution of Mr. Marc Kwai Pun and Mrs. Fatima Keko on behalf of Landell Mills Ltd of the United Kingdom.

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<th>Abbr.</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfDB</td>
<td>African Development Bank</td>
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<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Consultative Conference</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBRI</td>
<td>Capacity Building for Regional Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CG</td>
<td>Core Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES - FA</td>
<td>Deputy Executive Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DES - RI</td>
<td>Deputy Executive Secretary – Regional Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPs</td>
<td>International Cooperating Partners</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member States</td>
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<td>MTEF</td>
<td>Medium Term Expenditure Framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTS</td>
<td>Mid-Term Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODA</td>
<td>Official Development Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGAN</td>
<td>Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Project Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPRM</td>
<td>Policy Planning and Resource Mobilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RISDP</td>
<td>Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNC</td>
<td>SADC National Committees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPO</td>
<td>Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPME</td>
<td>Strategy development, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TG</td>
<td>Thematic Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>WD</td>
<td>Windhoek Declaration</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The “Windhoek Declaration on a new Partnership between the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the International Cooperating Partners (ICPs)” was adopted in 2006. The Windhoek Declaration (WD) was meant to become a common aid effectiveness framework to facilitate the delivery of ICP support to the SADC region. The foundation of WD was to a large extent influenced by the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. It was intended that the Windhoek Declaration would prepare the ground for increased information-sharing and policy dialogue and lead to improved coordination and more effective cooperation between SADC and its partners. It would also strengthen the SADC regional integration agenda through appropriate technical and financial support.

SADC and the EU, as lead ICP, started to prepare the ground work to carry out the review of the Windhoek Declaration in the second half of 2011 to assess the level of implementation and the effectiveness of the WD dialogue structure. In January 2012, a proposal was made to the SADC/ICP Core Group meeting, which took the decision to carry out the review. That was the first time since its adoption that a review of WD had been initiated.

The objective of the review is “to improve the effectiveness of the SADC-ICP partnership, with a view to facilitating an enhanced and more strategic dialogue, while adhering to the priorities and interests of SADC and the ICPs”. The specific objectives of the review are to:

- Assess the implementation of each Windhoek Declaration partnership commitment (Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Managing for results, Mutual accountability);
- Make relevant recommendations to be considered by the parties on measures to facilitate regular monitoring and evaluation of the Windhoek Declaration.

The review was based on information collected through three main sources namely a documentary analysis, an assessment survey though a questionnaire and a semi-structured interview. The survey sample comprised Officials from SADC, including SADC Member States and the SADC Secretariat, and ICPs. The individuals who were selected in the sample constituted a fair representation of the different functions and positions involved in the dialogue structure from the SADC side as well as the ICPs side. The size of the sample was quite significant as 38 questionnaires were responded to and 32 interviews were conducted.

The scope of the survey comprised a stock-taking of progress achieved with regard to the application of the five principles of the partnership (Ownership, Alignment, Harmonisation, Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability), and an analysis of the WD dialogue structure. It was expected that recommendations to enhance the effectiveness of the WD would be formulated on that basis.

The survey found that the progress achieved in the implementation of the partnership commitments had been quite modest overall. The exercise of full Ownership has been constrained by structural limitations such as the wide disparity of countries on many aspects and multiple memberships of SADC Member States in other Regional Economic Communities. Other factors such as the lack of prioritisation of SADC interventions and insufficient delegation of decision-making powers of the Secretariat and within the Secretariat itself are also issues which restrain the sense of initiative and leadership. Despite some efforts by a few ICPs to adhere to the principle of Alignment, progress in this area appears to have been uneven. However, the encouraging results registered by SADC in raising some of its management systems to
international standards constitute an important landmark which would enable more alignment of ICP interventions to SADC systems.

Some notable outcomes have been registered on Harmonisation in certain sectors, namely the Water sector and the HIV&AIDS sector. However progress on the issue limited by the heterogeneity of ICP policies. ICP interventions are governed by general policies and procedures which are not exclusive to SADC and hence cannot be easily adjusted within the framework of the WD only. The issue of harmonisation at SADC regional level is not as acute as in some Member States where much more ICPs are involved. However, it is necessary to place more emphasis on harmonisation between regional and national interventions of ICPs.

Considerable efforts have been made during the last few years towards the SADC Secretariat’s capacity development. The encouraging results achieved so far can contribute to make better impact in Managing for Results and Mutual Accountability. SADC will have to be more proactive in engaging ICPs on the application of some of the new instruments such as the Strategy Development, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Policy and the Financial Regulations which would promote accountability and results based management. It would also be important for SADC and ICPs to consider intervention aimed at capacity development in SADC Member States focused on the coordination and monitoring of SADC policy implementation and programmes at national level.

The study has noted that the WD dialogue structures have not managed to improve the aid effectiveness as expected. At present, even though partnership mechanisms exist, they are characterised by insufficient coordination and limited impact. Meetings have been irregular and there has been a lack of focus on the core objectives. Dialogue at the operational level has had more significant results than at the political/policy levels. But results obtained have been sporadic and unequal across the different sectors. Coordination between the political and policy levels with the technical levels of dialogue has been insufficiently addressed. Communication between the partners has also been lacking and expectations on the scope of the dialogue by the parties were at times not in tune. There is a general sentiment among stakeholders that the synergy that Windhoek Declaration was supposed to build has in fact never quite materialised largely due to the ineffectiveness of the dialogue structure.

Even if the overall track record of the Windhoek Declaration so far is quite modest, there is a shared acceptance that the WD partnership framework remains valid to support SADC regional development. The question is about how to rebuild the framework, especially to design dialogue structures that add value to SADC-ICP cooperation.

The analysis of the issues that have impeded progress in implementing the WD led to the identification of three main factors that may have been overlooked in the initial design of the WD partnership framework. Those are:

- The added-value of the WD partnership framework, taking into consideration the existence of other SADC-ICP bi-lateral cooperation dialogue frameworks as well as other Global and Continental frameworks adhered to by SADC and ICPs;
- Institutional capacity requirements: there may been an oversight on capacity requirements to support the dialogue structure, which has led to an underestimation of resources allocated to attend to the tasks related to the proper functioning of WD dialogue structure;
- The wide disparity of ICPs policies and decision making processes was not taken into account sufficiently. Engaging collectively in the implementation of the WD commitments also require
efforts from ICPs. However, although the concept of shared responsibility is agreed, there are challenges that go beyond the WD framework.

In light of the fundamental factors at the core of the challenges faced by the implementation of the WD partnership framework, it is suggested that SADC and ICPs should take profound measures to rebuild the WD partnership framework on new foundations rather than just trying to mend issues which are likely to have been caused by design oversights. The foundations of the framework would be established through three pillars.

The first pillar is a SADC-ICP partnership strategy to give a new boost to the WD partnership framework. The strategy should build on the core objectives of the WD and the fundamental principles underpinning the partnership. The strategy should also re-position the partnership framework, articulating it with other SADC-ICP dialogue frameworks such as bi-lateral frameworks and Global and Continental frameworks. Consideration should be given on focusing on the added-value of the framework. The strategy will also articulate the prioritisation mechanisms of interventions for the SADC-ICP cooperation, in light of the tools that SADC is developing such as the SADC Medium Term Strategy and Five Year Corporate Plans, and define the dialogue structure and establish a Monitoring and Evaluation framework for managing the partnership strategy.

The second pillar is an effective and efficient dialogue structure as the nerve centre of the partnership framework. On the basis of a combination of two critical factors – scope of dialogue/ representativeness and cost effectiveness/levels of dialogue– the study provides an objective approach to assess the relevance and feasibility/sustainability of options for WD dialogue structure. Two basic options are considered in a first step of the analysis: (i) Maintain the dialogue structure as originally designed, and (ii) Streamline the dialogue structure of the framework to two levels: the Core Group and the Thematic Groups.

The analysis of the two basic options suggest that the first option would enable the involvement of all Member States in the dialogue process and that the wide scope of dialogue would place SADC and ICPs on a broad base of cooperation on key emerging issues pertaining to the region. However, the institutional implications in terms of SADC-ICPs joint-responsibility in organising the Consultative Conferences and capacity demand of such an ambitious scope of dialogue are major issues which put into question the feasibility and sustainability of the structure.

The second option of streamlining the dialogue structure to two levels while focusing on the core issues of the WD partnership framework would definitely be more manageable for SADC and ICPs. SADC keeps the possibility of re-establishing Consultative Conferences on the basis of its past experiences prior to the WD. The main disadvantage of that option is that it does not offer the opportunity for Member States to participate directly and regularly in the dialogue.

In order to provide the opportunity for greater ownership of the partnership a third option is recommended. This should include the measures proposed under Option 2 and the addition of a regional cooperation forum with the participation of SADC Member States, civil society representatives of the region and ICPs. The purpose of the forum is for SADC and ICPs gather the views of a wider basis of stakeholders to identify cooperation priorities. The forum would also allow stakeholders to take note of progress and undertake reviews of the partnership framework every two to three years. Hence the dialogue structure will have the following features:
### Option 2+: A dialogue structure at two levels to address the core functions of the partnership framework (Core Group, and Thematic Groups) + a Regional Cooperation Forum

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main features</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- SADC continues to organise Consultative Conferences (CCs) and engage ICPs in the same way as during the pre-WD period.</td>
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<td>- SADC has the full responsibility of organising CCs, which can also focus on key thematic areas such as the CC organised for the Water Sector in 2010.</td>
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<td>- The function of the JTF is merged into a single level (Core Group).</td>
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<td>- The composition of the Core Group is expanded to include SADC Double Troika representatives at Senior Officials level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The deliberations of the Core Group will take into consideration the recommendations of the regional cooperation forum (when the latter is convened).</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The conclusions reached at the Core Group shall be implemented by the party concerned except where actions require policy decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The dialogue structure will focus on the core functions of the partnership framework (i.e. Aid Effectiveness and other commitments that SADC and ICPs may want to integrate in the framework, for instance the commitments made at Global and Continental levels).</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The Core Group may also engage political dialogue issues to clarify positions on core aid effectiveness matters and make recommendations to the relevant structures for decision (It should be observed that the current dialogue structure also foresees that deliberations of political dialogue be transmitted to decision making structures, hence there would be no change in that regard).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The regional cooperation forum will be a platform to provide stakeholders of SADC programmes to contribute to the cooperation priorities and make recommendations to the Core Group on the implementation of the SADC-ICP partnership strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The establishment of the above structure will need to be accompanied by a consolidation of the Thematic Groups, namely through a more systematic use of SADC medium term strategies and corporate plans into pursue cooperation objectives.</td>
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The third pillar of the new foundation is an **enhanced institutional capacity**. The review process of the WD framework needs to give due consideration to feasibility and sustainability of the intents on the basis of the means that can be realistically provided. It would be pointless to develop an ambitious agenda which does not commensurate with the capacity of the institutions which are supposed to implement the partnership framework. Capacity needs to be developed mainly at the level of the Secretariat and also at the level of SADC National Committees in Member States. In order to complement the capacity development programmes currently in place or being deployed which are targeted at Secretariat, consideration should be given to address the gaps in terms staffing in order to increase absorption capacity and ensure the sustainability of SADC management systems.

Based on the lessons learnt from SADC-ICPs cooperation as well as on the findings of the WD review and the three pillars developed above, it is recommended to re-affirm a SADC/ICP Partnership based on fundamental principles of good governance, democracy, and respect for the rule of law and human rights, gender equality, peace, stability and security as enriched in the SADC Treaty and RISDP and SIPO plans.

The Windhoek Declaration partnership framework remains an important platform for improved cooperation between SADC and ICPs although it has to be re-built on new foundations.

Four main challenges are singled out as being particularly important in making the partnership commitments an effective vehicle to development effectiveness. One is to ensure that SADC has
ownership and leadership of donor-funded initiatives, and that ICPs better align their interventions to SADC medium term strategies and corporate plans. Secondly, there is a strong need for better linkages between regional and Member States strategies of development, and better alignment between national and regional efforts to address the priorities (this also applies to ICPs in their cooperation with SADC Secretariat and SADC Member States). Thirdly, the quality and the sustainability of the dialogue structures may not be reached if the capacities of the SADC Secretariat are not strengthened. Fourthly, it is important that SADC-ICPs partnership strategy integrates other SADC-ICPs dialogue frameworks based on bi-lateral engagement and Global and Continental consensus and position.

Finally, the review recommends embarking on the third option and formulating a clear action plan and roadmap incorporating adequate monitoring and evaluation framework that enables the stakeholders to take stock of progress achieved together.
1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Context

The ‘High Level Forum on Harmonization’ (Rome, 2003), the first high level forum of its kind, lead the way for a number of international conferences stressing the importance of aid effectiveness. The primary concern that had been expressed by development stakeholders for some time was that development assistance had not managed to bring about the expected levels of growth and socio-economic development. At the same time, donor practices and approaches were not always compatible with the development priorities and processes of recipient countries, nor with their planning cycles and financial management systems. In addition, the structural adjustment to comply with a range of donor procedures carried a high cost, especially for the poorest and the most aid-dependent countries. Hence the conclusions and recommendations for proceeding towards a more effective way to deliver aid focused on the need to increase mutual accountability, country-led development strategies and donor alignment.

The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan High Level Forum on Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011) have all contributed to laying the foundations for a more flexible development assistance strategy, taking into account the development needs and objectives of the recipient countries. The key principles of this strategy, now adhered to by over 100 countries as the blueprint for maximising the impact of aid, are: Ownership; Alignment; Harmonisation; Managing for results; and Mutual accountability.

In light of the Paris Declaration, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and its International Cooperating Partners (ICPs) adopted the “Windhoek Declaration on a new Partnership between the Southern African Development Community and the International Cooperating Partners”1 during the Consultative Conference of 2006. This Declaration was intended to become a common aid effectiveness framework, facilitating the delivery of ICP support in the SADC region. It highlights five partnership commitments (i.e. the Paris Declaration principles) and introduces a mechanism for dialogue to guide coordination. It further spells out the mechanisms and approaches necessary to ensure that ICP support to regional economic integration is fully coordinated, harmonised and coherent with the SADC Common Agenda. It was intended that the Windhoek Declaration would prepare the ground for improved coordination, increased information-sharing and a strategic policy dialogue. It would also strengthen the SADC regional integration agenda through appropriate technical and financial support.

1.2 Objectives of the review

The objective of the review is “to improve the effectiveness of the SADC-ICP partnership, with a view to facilitating an enhanced and more strategic dialogue, while adhering to the priorities and interests of SADC and the ICPs”.

1 Also referred to as the Windhoek Declaration.
The assignment:

- Assesses the implementation of each Windhoek Declaration partnership commitment (Ownership, Alignment, Harmonization, Managing for results, Mutual accountability);
- Makes relevant recommendations to be considered by the parties on measures to facilitate regular monitoring and evaluation of the Windhoek Declaration.

1.3 Structure of the report

The report is organised as per the structure of the questionnaire used for the review. After summarising the methodology and approach, it first looks at the implementation of the 5 partnership commitments under the Windhoek Declaration, with an analysis, lessons learned and a summary conclusion of the overall findings for each commitment.

Then the report focuses on the review of the structure for partnership dialogue. It looks at the state of play of the dialogue at each level (what was expected and what has really happened), reviews the relevance, constraints and issues at stake and includes a summary conclusion of the overall analysis.

Finally the report makes recommendations and conclusion on the way forward for further implementation of the Windhoek Declaration and enhanced cooperation between SADC and ICPs. The report does not provide a fully-fledged action plan, but paves the way for the formulation of a joint SADC-ICP roadmap on the future of their cooperation.

2 METHODOLOGY & APPROACH

For this exercise, hereinafter referred to as ‘the WD review’ a qualitative approach has been followed, which included the analysis of existing documents, semi-structured interviews with the SADC Secretariat and ICPs present in the region and questionnaires sent to the different stakeholders (SADC Secretariat, SADC Member States, ICPs and Co-Chairs of the Thematic Groups).

To keep the WD review “manageable” and within the agreed time-schedule, it was decided during the Core Group meeting of 27 January 2012 to establish an ad-hoc SADC/ICP Task Team, with representatives of the SADC Secretariat, EU Delegation, British Embassy and German Embassy, for the regular monitoring and quality control of the findings, analysis and progress of the review.

The Task Team brought significant improvement to the design of the questionnaires and monitored the review of the Windhoek Declaration on a regular basis. The task team’s comments throughout the study together with the results from the stakeholders’ meeting provided valuable input and were used by the consultant to gradually upgrade her work.

The assignment involved:

- Presenting a first draft of the WD review to the SADC/ICP Task Team, representing both the International cooperation partners (ICPs) and the SADC;
• Incorporating the comments from the SADC/ICP Task Team and communicating the new draft to all stakeholders;
• Discussing the draft report in a stakeholders’ meeting; and
• Drafting the final report incorporating the results and recommendations from the stakeholders’ meeting.

2.1 Sampling

The review took into account the complex institutional and coordination structures of the Windhoek Declaration and focused on the following groups of respondents:

• The Joint-Task Force Co-Chairs;
• The Core Group Co-Chairs;
• The Thematic Groups Co-Chairs;
• The SADC Secretariat (Executive Management, Directors, Heads of Units);
• The SADC Member States;
• The ICPs Ambassadors, Heads of Cooperation and Resident Representatives.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Questionnaires distributed</th>
<th>Questionnaires answered</th>
<th>Number of Interviews planned</th>
<th>Number of interviewees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Joint-Task Force Co-Chairs (*)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Core Group Co-Chairs</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thematic Groups Co-Chairs</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Secretariat</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC Member States (**)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICPs Ambassadors, Heads of Cooperation and Resident Representatives</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) The Head of the EU Delegation Co-Chair both the Core Group and the Joint Task Force. He participated in the survey (questionnaire & interview) but his contribution is only recorded under the Core Group.

(**) Interviews with respondents from the Member States were not foreseen as part of this review.

The interviews covered most of the areas addressed in the questionnaires distributed to SADC and ICPs (This included partnership commitments i.e. ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability and also structures for partnership). In instances where the respondents had replied “neutral” or “don’t know”, the consultant used the interviews to probe further with a view to clarifying the questions and eliciting other useful information. For interviewees that did not have the opportunity to fill in the questionnaire prior to the meeting, the discussion focused on obtaining responses to the questionnaire. All interviewees were also given the opportunity to add information and comment freely on any aspect of the study.
Given the relatively short time for respondents to complete the questionnaires (2 weeks\(^2\)), the total number of participants can be considered as satisfactory, with:

- 38 questionnaires filled, over 64 questionnaires sent (59% responses rate), and
- 32 interviews carried-out, over 50 interviews planned (64%).

The entire data set captured was analysed by the consultant, involving the processing of over 40 hours of interviews, processing and statistical analysis of more than 1,200 separate entries including the compilation around 400 qualitative responses.

Due to the time constraints of the assignment to which the consultant was required to adhere, it was not possible to collect a large sample. It would also have been preferable to conduct further interviews with some stakeholders, such as the members of the thematic groups and other potentially relevant respondents. For this reason, the sample used is not completely representative in the “strict statistical sense”.

Furthermore, the respondents from the 14 ICP organisations that participated in the review do not necessarily represent their organisation’s headquarter. Some cooperation mechanisms and channels are complex in terms of structure and type of support to the SADC region and all aspects cannot be adequately captured by one standardised questionnaire.

2.2 Data collection instruments and analysis

2.2.1 Data collection instruments

Data collection of the review included:

- Semi-structured interviews with the Joint-Task Force Co-Chairs, Core Group Co-Chairs, Thematic Groups Co-Chairs, SADC Secretariat (Executive Management, Directors, Heads of Units), ICP Ambassadors, Heads of Cooperation and Resident representatives and additional interviews with some SADC Secretariat officials and advisers;

- Questionnaires distributed to the stakeholders.

2.2.2 Method of analysis

The method of analysis consisted of the following steps:

- Mix of closed-ended questions and open-ended questions, using mostly the Likert scale\(^3\).
- Some responses to general questions were analysed through semi-structured interviews. The key statements captured were compiled and organised.

Certain interviews were conducted through ‘focus group discussions’ in which several interlocutors participated. Documents analysis also provided important input to the report.

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\(^2\) The original deadline was extended to allow for including all answers communicated. This flexibility resulted in less time allocated for data processing and analysis and to the writing of the draft report.

\(^3\) The Likert scale is commonly used to attain range, weight and consistency in one-dimensional responses in research studies, which employ questionnaires.
It should be noted that all stakeholders were approached in terms of their position within the overall structure of the Windhoek Declaration framework, and also with regard to their areas of competence and experience. This means that their views and recommendations do not necessarily represent the official position of the organisations they represent.

2.3 Limitations

The Windhoek Declaration, adopted on 27 April 2006, provides a clear framework for SADC-ICP cooperation and attempts to ‘regionalise’ the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness of 2005.

The Paris Declaration emerged on the international donor scene and has developed into a practical blueprint for donor agencies seeking to deliver aid in the spirit of mutual accountability and greater beneficiary ownership. It has set out to measure progress against specified indicators and targets and regularly monitor progress on the country level.

The commitments underlying the Windhoek Declaration are largely derived from the Paris Declaration, which was a commitment signed by individual states and mostly focused on ODA at country level, without appropriately considering the regional context. Since its signature, no baseline has been established for assessing progress against agreed indicators at the regional level, neither has there been a ‘regional definition’ of the core principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability.

These structural weaknesses inevitably bring methodological shortcomings to this first Windhoek Declaration review, taking place nearly six years after its adoption. In addition to reviewing the implementation of the WD, due to its nature, the study is also faced with assessing the options for tackling challenges of regional cooperation, structures of coordination and quality of dialogue.

Several limitations have already been mentioned such as the nature of the sample, data collection instruments, quality of the responses, lack of regular monitoring and dialogue, etc. These factors all run a risk of influencing the way the findings are interpreted and conclusions are drawn.

However, the lessons learned from the limitations and challenges encountered during the review can be used by the stakeholders to improve the implementation of the Windhoek Declaration and its subsequent progress assessment.
3 THE PARTNERSHIP COMMITMENTS

The content and thrust of the Windhoek Declaration is largely based on the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and its five guiding commitments, namely:

- Ownership
- Alignment
- Harmonisation
- Managing for results and
- Mutual Accountability.

This section summarises the findings of the study with regard to the five commitments. It also highlights a number of salient points such as when SADC and ICP perceptions were found to differ fundamentally, or when lessons learned are substantial enough to add value to the dialogue.

For each commitment, there are three levels of analysis:

Firstly, the results of the study are presented through an analysis based on the questionnaires and interviews. This overview provides a snapshot of the current situation as perceived by the respondents.

- The second section interprets the findings and deepens the analysis to identify trends and draw conclusions.
- Section three provides a summary table which can be used as a reference grid for each WD commitment. It includes results-based recommendations on the way forward.
3.1 Ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ownership</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- SADC exercises effective leadership in coordinating and implementing the SADC Common Agenda (RISDP and SIPO) at regional and national levels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SADC commits to:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Exercise leadership in developing, implementing and monitoring the regional development agenda as expressed through protocols and other regional agreements through broad, consultative processes (including the participation of civil society and private sector);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Translate the RISDP and SIPO into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes expressed in mid-term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets; and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Coordinate regional development assistance at all levels in conjunction with other development resources in dialogue with ICPs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- ICPs commit to: Respect SADC leadership and help strengthen SADC's capacity to exercise it at regional and national levels.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* See page 5 of the Declaration, point 8 to 10.

The Windhoek Declaration recognises that the achievement of the SADC Common Agenda is more likely to be successful if **SADC is able to exercise effective leadership** in coordinating and implementing the RISDP and SIPO. WD also commits ICPs to respect this leadership and help strengthening SADC’s capacity to exercise it at the regional and national level.

3.1.1 Analysis

RISDP and SIPO translate commitments made by SADC member states to the SADC Common Agenda. However, with regard to implementing the Common Agenda, there were found to be some serious challenges to the ownership of SADC policies and programmes.

The chart below shows that the overwhelming majority of respondents agree on the fact that coordinating and implementing the SADC Common Agenda at the regional and national level remains challenging. Both ICP and SADC respondents share this view. It is worth noting that SADC respondents all agree that there is a challenge with regard to the “Ownership” principle. This is the only question where there is such a consensus.

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4 The first question focused on challenges with coordinating and implementing the regional agenda, which is quite broad, rather than more specific on progress in terms of ownership. Respondents therefore shared their views on a number of generic issues, pertaining to the overall challenges and successes met at the level of SADC and its partnership with ICPs. (See question1, Annex II). The following section summarises the issues mentioned. The other four questions under ‘ownership’ are also considered, together with the interviews. This explains why the section on ownership captures more substance than the sections on the other commitments, for which questions and answers were more straightforward.
More than half of SADC respondents agree (or strongly agree) that RISDP and SIPO plans are translated into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes.

It is interesting to note that it was not so clear whether SADC overall regional strategies were being translated into programmes. Indeed over 40% of SADC participants either give a neutral answer (over 30%) or disagree (over 10%). These answers are evenly distributed between member states and the Secretariat ICPs were not asked to answer this specific question, but they commented on it as one of the main challenges for the implementation of the regional agenda (either in the questionnaires or during the interviews).

**Chart 2 : RISDP and SIPO plans are translated into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes (Q3)**

Nonetheless, it was generally expressed that the fact that 15 SADC Member States have managed to reach a common view and vision on the role of region and on how to remove the bottlenecks to further this goal through the RISDP and SIPO was an achievement in itself. This ownership is key to developing the SADC common agenda.

Moreover, the SADC planning framework which is based on consensual decision-making, with the involvement of the Member States, is a strong asset for SADC ownership. The SADC Treaty is translated into regional policies with a focus on eight key areas, by means of protocols, declarations and other legal instruments. The agenda is developed through a consultative process involving all Member States, and the decisions are based on
consensus. The modalities of cooperation are defined through protocols, memoranda of understanding or declarations..

However, the analysis also reveals the need for a better articulation between, on the one hand policies and strategies, which normally have a long-term perspective and on the other hand operational planning at medium and short term levels. The scope of the RISDP and SIPO remain too wide. The RISDP needs to be updated. Protocols provide an important reference point but their practical function is limited to designing new interventions or support measures. The evolution of the SADC Agenda with regard to certain areas - the free trade area, customs union, review of the RISDP and SIPO, the tripartite negotiations and review of the Tribunal - means that priorities are at times uncertain. The SADC Protocols and other regional agreements merely set the framework, by indicating the general direction in which the SADC region would like to proceed. The remaining challenge to achieving the regional development agenda is the formulation of detailed programmes and short to medium-term projections.

SADC has also developed annual work plans. However, it seems that the WD dialogue has not managed to create a forum where operational plans could be regularly presented to ICPs. Also, it appears that even if SADC operational plans are approved by Council, stakeholders at national level are not fully aware of those.

The survey results indicate that only a minority of ICP respondents believe that SADC has a leading role in ensuring that the Windhoek commitments are effectively adhered to (see chart below). This indicates that ICPs perceive a rather low degree of ‘ownership’ and leadership from SADC with regard to ensuring a conducive cooperation and effective implementation of the regional agenda at the national level.

**Chart 3: Leading role of SADC in ensuring that the commitments of cooperation with the ICPs under the Windhoek Declaration are effectively adhered to (Q5)**

The issue could partially be attributed to the limited monitoring and reporting on the implementation of protocols at SADC Member States level. A number of respondents, both ICPs and MS or Secretariat representatives, highlighted that the outcomes of policies and programmes are not visible and that protocol monitoring is insufficiently developed. Once protocols have been adopted, the challenge lies in implementing the agreed regional

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5 SIPO review has been recently done and the RISDP review is underway.
commitments at the Member States level. The ratification process of protocols at Member States level is generally protracted. Moreover, the implementation of some of the provisions may face further challenges to certain countries if they are not sufficiently aligned to the national agenda or requires revisions of the legal framework\(^6\). The answers from some individual member states also suggest that there are too few tangible results to allow for a strengthened ownership\(^7\). What comes out of the study indicates that there is a lack of ownership at the national level, resulting in a low level of implementation of protocols. SADC does not monitor in detail the implementation of legal documents at MS level. There seems to be an insufficient amount of resources allocated to this at the level of the Secretariat. It also believed that there is also a general lack of capacity regarding the skills required to deal with the more complex regional agenda. More resources need to be dedicated to the monitoring of performance and to enforce consequences of non-delivery (i.e. adapted sanction mechanisms).

The implementation deficit may also be caused by the significant disparities among SADC Member States in terms of income levels, resource distribution and infrastructure development. Implementing a common agenda becomes difficult as Member States find themselves at different stages of development and do not always have common interests. The pace of programme implementation at the national level thus differs from country to country. In addition, a number of Member States belong to other regional economic communities (REC). This dilutes their resources on other regional programmes and may even lead to conflicting commitments of different REC membership.

Insufficient capacity is frequently mentioned as a cross-cutting issue in the comments provided by respondents. This is linked to the issue of ownership: in particular, when limited capacity of the SADC Secretariat is caused by, a lack of dedicated staff and financial resources assigned to on-going programmes and projects. The lack of staff resources also partly explains, limited absorption capacity\(^8\).

### 3.1.2 Lessons learned

The results of the study show that ownership has so far been difficult to be exercised and that there are important challenges with implementing the RISDP and the SIPO. The following analysis highlights a number of trends at the strategic level.

SADC’s regional ambition is hampered by several constraints. Although the development of long term strategic plans with the consensus of all MS is a real milestone, implementation is limited by:

- Multiple membership of most SADC Member States to other regional communities
- Heterogeneity of members in terms of economic development, geography, etc leading to difficulties in aligning regional policies with national objectives;

\(^6\) An example given in the survey by one of the MS highlighted that, while joining the SADC FTA, this MS would have to adapt its tariffs, which would imply a need to revise recently agreed macroeconomic policies.

\(^7\) Seven Member States have expressed views with regard to insufficient ownership. The reasons range from limited interaction with the SADC Secretariat, limited extent to which Summit and Council decisions have been implemented, limited ratification of protocols at the national level to lack of commitment to programme implementation.

\(^8\) Low utilisation of ICP resources by the Secretariat is due to e.g. institutional capacity constraints and approval processes, the specific context of the project implementation, inappropriate project designs, issues related to procurement and tendering and administrative delays due to partner procedures.
• Lack of prioritisation;
• Unclear mandate of the Secretariat;
• No clear delegation of decision-making powers and absence of ‘representation’ (i.e. interaction with ICPs) within the Secretariat.

The lack of medium term priorities has diluted scarce resources on a wide spectrum of interventions contributing to the limited achievement of an overall ambitious strategy. That affects the capacity to coordinate with Member States on the implementation of regional policies. Besides, the relative share of MS contribution to the regional budget is decreasing in comparison with ICP funding as evidenced in the annual budgets during the last three years.

**Ownership is constrained** by the limited flow of information from the Secretariat to Member States (including national stakeholders) on regional programmes as well as the unavailability of information from Member States on the implementation of SADC protocols as well as on national programmes supporting the regional agenda.

Improved regional/national linkages and a clear division of tasks between the regional institutions and the Member States are needed. Ownership has not translated into clear roles and responsibilities. There are no frameworks to guide the translation of regional policies into national programmes. Reinforced mechanisms including the adoption of incentives/sanctions are necessary to ensure implementation and reconciliation of the national and regional agenda. The synergy between member states and the Secretariat should be better linked to the WD dialogue, at all levels.

There is a perception that the Secretariat’s authority to exercise its responsibility to coordinate the RISDP/SIPO is inadequate. The mandate of the Secretariat to take position with development partners even on operational issues sometimes appear to be too narrow to make progress in the dialogue. In order to ensure consistency and ownership at the regional level, SADC Secretariat needs to be authorised to speak on behalf of the region and to represent common interests, while respecting the principle of MS sovereignty.

These constraints should not overshadow the many achievements made with regard to the implementation of the SADC Agenda. Although at a slower pace than envisaged, these achievements span across the areas of infrastructure, trade, macro-economic convergence, defence and security cooperation, water etc. The broader participation of stakeholders in policy development, with an increased participation of civil society, is also worth noting. Civil society participation should preferably be consolidated, including at the level of the WD thematic groups, given that these stakeholders participate to ensure a strong ownership of the development agenda at the regional level.

In recent years, SADC has undergone **an institutional reform process**, aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness of support services, including policy and strategy development, planning, budgeting, finance management amongst other key areas. The reform is underpinned by new policies, procedures and system in several of the above key areas. One of the most immediate outcomes of the institutional reform is the acceptance of the EU to implement EU funded programmes using SADC’s own systems and procedures (Contribution Agreements). This indicates a stronger level of trust of SADC’s management
capacity by the EU. Furthermore the review of SIPO is now finalised and the review of the RISDP is underway.

Nevertheless, the proportion of technical advisors to permanent staff remains rather high, exacerbating the risk of capacity substitution rather than capacity building. Another concern is the fact that the SADC Secretariat’s capacity is stretched across a broad range of issues and activities, which also includes travel and frequent attendance of regional meetings.

Besides, the resources allocated by MS to the Secretariat for programme implementation are limited. The share of ICP resources in the overall SADC budget has increased. This situation obviously undermines ownership. The challenge is therefore not so much to know what to do, but rather to attain the capacity to do it.

The Windhoek Declaration has certainly contributed to renewing the dialogue between SADC and ICPs, placing the Secretariat in the driver’s seat, and prompting regional ownership. In parallel, bilateral dialogue takes place, but the WD dialogue allows for a combined discussion on several different topics in a single forum. This has also facilitated the sharing of experience among participants. The on-going dialogue illustrates the ability of the region to secure support from ICPs. It is essential to sustain and make more effective the dialogue taking place within the WD framework.

It is worth noting that the issue of a lack of ownership is not specific to SADC only: the monitoring of the implementation of the Paris Declaration and the Accra Agenda for Action shows that ownership is key to the implementation of other commitments, but that shifting mindset from ‘beneficiary’ to ‘leader’ for countries or regions and from ‘donor’ to ‘partner’ for ICPs cannot be improvised and takes time.

3.1.3 Summary table

The summary table below is a reference grid for the WD commitment to ownership. It provides results-based recommendations and facilitates a deeper analysis.
## OWNERSHIP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REVIEW FINDINGS</th>
<th>KEY ISSUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Lack of clarity on the translation of the regional strategies into operational frameworks. | • Availability of a coherent collaborative framework amongst SADC Member States, but lack of clear articulation between policies/strategies, and operational plans.  
• WD dialogue has not managed to offer a forum where operational plans could be systematically presented to ICPs. |
| 2. Perception that SADC has a limited leading role in ensuring that the Windhoek commitments are effectively adhered to. | • Lack of ownership at national level, resulting in a low domestication of protocols and regional commitments.  
• Significant disparities among many SADC Member States, which impact on the commitment to and ownership of SADC agenda.  
• Limited monitoring of and reporting on the implementation at SADC Member States level. |
| 3. Capacity issue | • Limited capacity of SADC Secretariat to act as a coordination body |

### LESSONS LEARNED

### SUGGESTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LESSONS LEARNED</th>
<th>SUGGESTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Adjust regional ambition with regional constraints & low domestication | • Improve regional/national linkages and a clear division of tasks between the regional institutions and the Member States.  
• Enhance the linkages & synergy between the SADC Secretariat and the Member States within the framework of the Windhoek dialogue structure. |
| 2. Limited capacity of the Secretariat in taking the leading role | • Clarify the mandate of the Secretariat to speak on behalf of the region, and to represent the interest of the region in order to ensure consistency and ownership at the regional level.  
• Better use of the WD to coordinate the ICPs effort in building the capacity of the Secretariat.  
• Empower the Secretariat. |
| 3. Acknowledge achievements in the implementation of the SADC agenda | • Better use of the dialogue structure to communicate on success stories and best practises.  
• Use the WD dialogue structures to better feedback the result on the restructuring process and the results of the Secretariat institutional assessment.  
• Broaden the participation of civil society in the WD dialogue. |
| 4. Renewed dialogue between ICPs and SADC | • Sustain and make more effective the dialogue taking place within WD framework. |
3.2 Alignment

Alignment
- For Alignment with SADC Strategies: ICPs base their overall support on the SADC Common Agenda as expressed through the SIPO and the RISDP.
- ICPs commit to:
  (a) Base their overall support on RISDP and SIPO and periodic reviews (monitoring and evaluation) of progress in implementing these; and
  (b) Link funding to a joint framework of conditions and/or a manageable set of indicators derived from RISDP and SIPO.

[Including]
- Alignment with SADC Institutions and Systems
- For SADC to Strengthen its Development Capacity with ICP Support
- For SADC to Strengthen its Financial Management Capacity
- To Strengthen SADC's Procurement System
- Towards Untying Aid and Getting Better Value for Money.

(*) See page 6-8 of the Declaration, point 11 to 25.

Alignment is an important commitment because of the impact it generally has on aid effectiveness. It is generally agreed that enhanced alignment leads to a reduction in transaction costs, a faster decision-making process and consolidated planning.

3.2.1 Analysis

The results of the survey shows that in spite of the fact that SADC and ICPs perceive that progress has been achieved in that area, the SADC ICP cooperation are still implemented through the project-based approach and relies much on the use ICPs systems. ICPs and SADC share the view that cooperation related to monitoring the progress of alignment is progressing well: more than 60% of respondents from both parties consider that there is cooperation on monitoring progress on alignment (see chart 4).

**Chart 4: Cooperation in monitoring progress of alignment with SADC institutions and systems over time (Q6)**

However, ICPs and SADC have a different perception of the reliability of SADC’s financial management system (see chart 5 below). While SADC respondents agree to a very large extent (more than 75% of the SADC respondents either agree or strongly agree), the views of ICPs are more mixed, or even opposing. Only 10% of ICP responses indicate that they agree (or strongly agree). Several disagree (or strongly disagree) with a majority of respondents providing a neutral answer (28%) or do not know (24%). The comments expressed by respondents indicate that this difference in views is largely based on the issue
of communication. The **majority of ICPs feel that transparency and information on financial management is insufficient.**

**Chart 5: SADC provides reliable assessment of its financial management systems (Q9 & Q13)**

On the other hand the study also suggests that there are also improvements to be made by ICPs in terms of the predictability of their funding, as only half of the respondents agree that their own cooperation provides financial commitments over a medium-term or long-term period (see chart 6). It is expected that enhanced financial predictability for SADC would facilitate financial management and monitoring by reducing the burden of fund-raising and by liberating capacity to monitor multi-annual financial frameworks.

**Chart 6: ICPs provide indicative commitments to SADC over a multi-year framework (Q16)**

It seems that there is also room for improvement for ICPs in adhering to the SADC programming cycle.

Only about 45% of respondents indicate that their organisation will utilise the SADC programming cycle. However, according to during the interviews it was gathered that this is seldom applied. Even when projects are funded through the Secretariat, SADC is often required to follow the budgeting, programming and monitoring processes of the ICPs rather than the actual SADC Secretariat planning and financial management systems.
Some ICP respondents indicated that they were not aware of the difference between SADC and ICP programming cycles. A number of ICPs actually do not disburse aid directly to SADC; instead they base their support to the region on bilateral agreements with Member States. **ICPs rarely communicate their multi-annual financial commitments to the SADC region.** This can result in limited scope for planning and prioritising the overall approach to the implementation of the regional agenda.

Some significant efforts towards alignment have nevertheless been registered. The African Development Bank has aligned its support to the SADC Secretariat procedures; Sweden/SIDA uses the SADC systems to channel funds on HIV & AIDS⁹. EU 10th EDF RIP clearly states that the contribution agreement modality will be the principal implementation modality, meaning that the procedures and rules of the beneficiary apply. The EU has in principle agreed to use the Contribution Agreement modality for the implementation of future programmes under the 10th EDF. This follows the conclusion of an Institutional Assessment carried out in 2011 which shows that SADC key management systems and procedures comply with internationally accepted standards.

### 3.2.2 Lessons learned

The non-alignment of ICPs to SADC systems and procedures has the following implications:

- **ICPs have different procedures (e.g. procurement, financial management project management, monitoring, etc.).** Different skills and knowledge are needed to manage the range of procedures and their technical requirements. This adds to training costs as well as the workload of SADC staff.
- Limited alignment with strategic priorities and the SADC programming cycle leads to fragmented planning and impacts negatively on ownership and leadership.
- Despite some efforts by a few ICPs to adhere to the principle of alignment, progress in this area appears to have been uneven. Effective application of that principle depends both on the recipient and the donor partner. The recipient needs to have the necessary capacity to exercise fiduciary responsibilities and ensure good governance practices. Donor partners need to adopt the necessary policies and possess the adequate

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⁹ Sweden/Sida has however requested the SADC Secretariat to procure externally the independent annual audits of the use of Swedish/Sida funding due to the fact that the SADC Secretariat audit does not fulfil the requirements as per the bilateral agreement.
instruments to operationalise alignment policies. Alignment is thus a process through which partners adjust their policies and systems.

**Stronger ownership needs to be expressed to enhance alignment** SADC’s leadership in engaging its partners on the basis of clear strategies and in operational plans in would facilitate the alignment of ICP support.

Better ICP awareness on capacity improvements will change perception on credibility and reliability of SADC systems. Many ICPs are not aware of the measures that SADC has undertaken to improve its management practices. Chart 8 reveals that only a minority of ICPs are aware that SADC is undertaking measures to strengthen its financial management capacity. It is therefore important to increase awareness on the extent to which the SADC Secretariat systems and processes have been improved.

**Chart 8: SADC undertakes measures to strengthen its financial management capacity (Q10 & Q14)**

Information and communication flows between the SADC Secretariat and ICPs impacts on the perception. During the interviews with some ICPs, a few weaknesses on communication and information flow were pointed out, for example limited access to information, difficulty in identifying contacts and channels of communication and slow feedback. Those can be a disincentive for ICPs to align their procedures with SADC systems.

Better communication within the Secretariat would also ensure that policies and priorities are adequately shared all along in the hierarchy lines, consistent information exchange with ICPs at various levels.

**ICPs and SADC also need to enhance transparency.** This is essential to improve information on financial flows (predictability of ICP funding, display of their commitments) and financial management (access to information on SADC accountability). Both parties must share information in a timely and transparent way. In this regard, it would be useful to consolidate and share an ICP matrix showing how the overall ICP community takes the priorities of the SADC common agenda into account. Better use could be made of the thematic groups for providing overviews of funding and interventions in a given thematic area or sector and to share their experience on coordination across all sectors.

Another important lesson learned from the study on alignment is the need to review aid modalities. SADC and ICPs need to engage on the use of aid modalities that enable better alignment such as basket funding, delegated management, contribution agreements, etc. Pooling of donor funding can also be a good option for ICPs with a limited cooperation programme. Some ICPs have already embarked on such initiatives to introduce such
modalities. Others need to be encouraged to join in. Reflection on the preferred options of aid modalities should occur more systematically in the frame of the dialogue structures set up by the Windhoek Declaration. It is therefore important that ICPs also take responsibility for modifying their procedures further in line with SADC systems to decrease the pressure on SADC staff.

The Secretariat needs to pursue its capacity development process and ICP support would be required. However the Secretariat needs to refrain from using external technical assistance as a substitute for permanent staff. SADC should also regularly train staff members on donor procedures (when SADC procedures are not used to implement projects) and strive to institutionalise this knowledge rather than relying on technical assistance.

► To conclude, what stands out from the review is that despite some good progress and a general positive perception of alignment, the current trends illustrate the need to stress further implementation of this commitment. Both SADC and ICPs have to take responsibility and provide incentives for the other counterpart to move towards a common position - with respect to aid modalities, transparency, financial reliability and predictability. For this purpose, the Windhoek Declaration dialogue structures are instrumental and should be used to their full potential.

3.2.3 Summary table

The summary table below is a reference grid for the WD commitment to alignment. It provides results-based recommendations and facilitates a deeper analysis.
# Alignment

## Review Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Issues</th>
<th>1. Real added value for SADC in enhanced Alignment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Non-alignment leads to further pressure on SADC limited capacity.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• ICPs share in SADC support is increasing and the multiplication of systems bears a high transaction costs and leads to fragmented programming.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Divergence between progress perceived and evolution of practice</td>
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<tr>
<td>• SADC financial management reliability is questioned by ICPs.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Predictability offered by ICPs remains limited.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Project-based approach prevents from aligning to SADC systems.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Use of bilateral and/or regional to channel ICPs support</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Project-based approach limits the possibilities to plan and prioritize the overall approach to the implementation of the regional agenda</td>
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## Lessons Learned

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Suggestions</th>
<th>1. Stronger ownership needs to be expressed to improve alignment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Strong SADC lead and efficient communication to engage ICP on their contribution in to achieve strategic priorities</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• ICPs have to translate more systematically their commitment to alignment in adapting their own policies and systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Negative impact of the perceived reliability of SADC financial management capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Increase visibility on the SADC Secretariat reform</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Develop the use of SADC systems while building its institutional capacities</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Challenging information &amp; communication acting as a disincentive</td>
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<tr>
<td>• ICP to improve communication on multiannual commitments to improve predictability</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• SADC to improve communication channels</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• SADC to consolidate and share an ICP matrix</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Make a better use of WD dialogue structures to provide overview of funding and interventions &amp; to share practices of coordination across all sectors</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Need to use more aid effective modalities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Gradually move away from a mostly project-oriented approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Develop joint management or donor-pooled funds</td>
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3.3 Harmonisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Harmonisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>For ICPs</strong> to implement common arrangements and simplify procedures, they will make the following commitments:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(a) Implement the ICP action plans that they have developed as part of the follow-up to the Rome High-Level Forum.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Implement, where feasible, common arrangements for planning, funding (e.g., joint financial arrangements), disbursement, monitoring, evaluating and reporting to SADC on ICP activities and aid flows. Increased use of programme-based aid modalities can contribute to this effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Work together through conducting joint missions and diagnostic work, sharing of analytical work and information; and undertaking joint training to share lessons learnt and build a community of practice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Including]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To Promote Complementarity in Development Assistance;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- To Strengthen Collaborative Behaviour.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(*) See page 8-9 of the Declaration, point 26 to 29.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Harmonisation usually relates to the responsibility of donors to agree on respective focal areas, according to the added value they can bring and their complementarity. This should enable a more effective and efficient coverage of the priority needs of the recipient.

Harmonisation also refers to the alignment of donor procedures which limits the number of different procedures and formats that the beneficiary has to deal with. Due to the relatively low number of ICPs working directly with the Secretariat, the problem of procedural harmonisation should in principle not be urgent at the level of the SADC Secretariat. Ideally, ICPs should align to SADC systems and make use of SADC procedures. This emphasises the synergy between the alignment and harmonisation commitments. However, harmonisation between regional and national support, including when originating from the same ICP, remains a major challenge.

3.3.1 Analysis

SADC and ICPs have opposing views on the availability of clear guidance to ensure that donor support to implementing the regional agenda is complementary.

Almost 75% of SADC respondents consider that such guidance does exist, while only a minority of ICP respondents agree (see chart 9). This translates into unnecessary tension and affects the scope for donor coordination and harmonisation.
**Chart 9**: SADC provides clear guidance to ensure that the ICPs provide complementary support to the regional agenda (Q21 & Q23)

However, a number of positive results should be highlighted, such as the development of common arrangements (either financial or procedural) between different ICPs (see chart 10 below). Despite initial cost constraints for coordination\(^\text{10}\), a number of positive initiatives were highlighted such as the establishment of a Joint Strategy for Water, a business plan on HIV & AIDS aiming at prompting basket-funding and other examples of pooled funding.

**Chart 10**: ICPs implement common arrangements with other ICPs (Q24)

Similarly, the majority of ICP respondents (about 50%) indicate that reporting requirements have been harmonised. However, further information obtained during interviews indicate that this does not apply to project funding which still represents an important share of the total cooperation. There are a few examples from the Water and HIV & AIDS sectors where there is ex ante agreement with SADC on the reporting and/or monitoring format.

\(^{10}\) The initial steps of harmonised coordination are likely to be time-consuming e.g. when a common position and procedures for joint or delegated management need to be agreed upon.
Chart 11: Monitoring and reporting requirements for regional programmes/projects are harmonised with SADC to the maximum extent possible (Q30)

The perception with regard to the simplification of donor procedures is more nuanced (see chart 12): only 20% of ICP respondents agree that procedures have become simplified, whereas 40% disagree and 25% of the responses are either neutral or indicate ‘do not know’. It appears that the procedures for cooperation with SADC have become simplified in some fields, for example on the implementation of the Finance and Investment Protocol and in the water sector. Other fields such as transport and energy have not yet been simplified. An additional constraint is that ICPs focus their cooperation on specific interventions with limited scope for harmonisation that do not call for common arrangements. Ultimately, simplification of procedures is linked to alignment with SADC systems, which further highlights the linkages and synergy between the different commitments of the WD.

Chart 12: Procedures for cooperation with SADC are simplified (Q25)

What the study does not cover in detail is the complementarity and harmonisation of ICP support at the national and regional level. There were no specific questions on this topic, but when addressed with interviewees, most of the answers indicated that no particular mechanism exists to ensure coherence between the support to MS at the national level and interventions aimed at SADC. Respondents also indicated that the thematic groups would be the right forum for the exchange of such information. For instance, during the last meeting of the TIFI TG, a comprehensive list of all projects in the region was presented to participants. Having a clear idea of who does what and where is helpful to coordinate interventions.

The specific issue of harmonisation with emerging partners, such as China, Brazil or India for instance, has not necessarily been covered by the study but perhaps some of the
conclusions from discussions at the Pan-African level or from other RECs could be of use to SADC.

3.3.2 Lessons learned

A number of areas in need of improvement were highlighted by the respondents concerning the commitment to harmonisation. They are to a large extent similar to those brought up in the discussions on alignment. They include:

- The need for operational plans clearly indicating areas where support is required;
- Clear modalities for engaging in common arrangements and manageable budget frameworks;
- Strengthened coordinating capacities at the level of the SADC Secretariat;
- Timely and transparent information sharing;
- A number of findings emerge from the analysis on harmonisation and some recurrent points have been highlighted to show how the commitments of alignment and harmonisation are interlinked.

The main lesson learned from the analysis on the alignment commitment is the need to take into account the issues that donors are facing. This is done at the thematic group level. Consideration needs to be given to the cost of coordination, especially for donors who are not represented in Gaborone and would need to travel to participate in meetings. In addition, ICPs engage in bilateral talks with SADC whilst sustaining bilateral cooperation with SADC member states. Bilateral talks are rarely designed to create synergy with the WD dialogue structure, which limits the positive impact that a collective approach to donor coordination might have.

There are good practices with regards to harmonisation despite some limitations. For instance, in the water sector, the design of the PMU for the RSAP III was based on the Secretariat’s needs with joint input from SADC, ICPs and MS. A Joint Assistance Strategy concept paper in the Water Strategy was developed in 2011 and appears on the agenda of the next Water Strategy Reference Group. The serious involvement of the ICP co-chair and the use of full time technical assistance dedicated to supporting this process is a key success factor. Although, questions have been raised as regards SADC leadership and sustainability of the results of the intervention, real progress has been made, making a difference both at the strategic and operational level. Another example of good practice is the core support provided by Sweden/Sida to the SADC HIV & AIDS Unit. This is a clear example of support that is driven by SADC HIV & AIDS annual operational plan. Hence priorities are set by SADC and procedures are aligned to SADC systems. Thus the support also strengthens the management and coordination capacity the SADC HIV & AIDS Unit.

The Windhoek Declaration dialogue structures, especially the thematic groups, can be key drivers for alignment. However and the management of that process requires dedicated staff. This is a major constraint as the SADC Secretariat has been facing serious resources constraints during the past few years and has not been able to match staffing requirements with that expansion of its activities.

The follow up on the WD dialogue thus adds to the list of other responsibilities without any clear prioritisation. This eventually impacts negatively on SADC’s ability to facilitate donor
coordination. To some extent, ICPs face the same issue as unless this task is outsourced, the capacity they have available for the implementation of the WD is limited.

To conclude, it is important to recall that SADC has been pursuing the harmonisation issue with a wide range of ICPs. Recognising that harmonised and coordinated donor funding is less onerous, SADC has supported common arrangements. ICPs have a key responsibility to contribute, through formalisation of common arrangements, to enhanced harmonisation.

3.3.3 Summary table

The summary table below is a reference grid for the WD commitment to harmonisation. It provides results-based recommendations and facilitates a deeper analysis.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REVIEW FINDINGS</th>
<th>KEY ISSUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Harmonisation is primarily a donor challenge | • Scope for further development of common arrangements with other ICPs  
• Limited harmonisation of procedures |
| 2. Challenge of harmonisation between ICPs regional and national support | • Scarcity of donor mechanisms to link their cooperation at national & regional level  
• Bilateral cooperation between ICPs and MS rarely designed to create synergy with the WD dialogue structures.  
• Limited positive impact of collective approach to donor coordination |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LESSONS LEARNED</th>
<th>SUGGESTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Harmonisation works in synergy with Alignment & Ownership commitments | • Alignment to SADC systems is linked to many aspects on harmonisation (procedures, reporting, monitoring)  
• ICPs expect clearer guidance to enhance complementarity |
| 2. Initiatives for harmonisation must be reinforced | • Harmonised donor funding is less onerous for SADC & ICPs should be encouraged to improve harmonisation  
• Dedicated staff is needed for enhanced harmonisation & donor coordination  
• WD dialogue structures, especially the thematic groups, should be better used as key driver for alignment, including to share good practices |
3.4 Managing for results

Managing for results

- SADC commits to:
  (a) Strengthen the linkages between, on the one hand, regional and national development strategies. On the other hand, strengthen the linkages between the above strategies and annual and multi-annual budget processes and the business plans derived from the RISDP and the SIPO, and
  (b) Establish results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks that monitor progress against key dimensions of the national, regional (spatial) and sector (cluster) level development strategies; and that these frameworks should track a manageable number of indicators for which data are cost-effectively available.

- ICPs commit to:
  (a) Link regional programming to bilateral country programming and resources to results and align them with effective SADC performance assessment frameworks, refraining from requesting the introduction of performance indicators that are not consistent with SADC’s development strategies;
  (b) Work with SADC to rely, as far as possible, on SADC results-oriented reporting and monitoring frameworks; and
  (c) Harmonise their monitoring and reporting requirements—until they can rely more extensively on SADC’s statistical, monitoring and evaluation systems — with SADC to the maximum extent possible on joint formats for periodic reporting.

- SADC and ICPs jointly commit to: Work together in a participatory approach to strengthen SADC capacities and demand for results based management.

(*) See page 9-10 of the Declaration, point 30 & 31.

3.4.1 Analysis

The views gathered on this commitment are rather mixed. SADC and ICPs cooperate on capacity building initiatives at the level of the Secretariat (e.g. EU, GIZ, DfID etc.) and in a number of sectors (water, good governance, energy, HIV & AIDS, etc.). Such support usually takes different forms: engaging international staff as political advisers or technical experts, capacity building programmes resulting from institutional assessments, etc. Some ICPs provide direct technical assistance to support the development of minimal standards and guidelines, while others increase the Secretariat’s capacity by financing positions charged with the implementation of specific programmes/activities. However, not all donors undertake capacity building activities, so the collective effort aimed at reinforcing SADC’s capacities is limited.

There were also mixed views of reporting tools, including within SADC itself. Chart 13 below shows that about half of SADC respondents actually do not agree, were not aware or did not answer the question relating to the existence of results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks.
The answers show mixed views of both member states and SADC respondents, indicating that there is no contradictory perception at country and regional levels. It is noticeable that established assessment frameworks, which are key in the institutional set up for regional development, are seldom known within SADC. This probably relates to lack of communication, since these mechanisms do exist at the programme level and also in the framework of the institutional assessments which lead to the development of the SADC internal monitoring framework. It is worth highlighting the risk that some answers suggest: without full awareness of the results-oriented frameworks, it will be difficult to engage in a dialogue with ICPs on mutual accountability.

The next survey question relates firstly to the ability of ICPs to link regional programming with country level programming and secondly result-oriented use of resources. The vast majority of ICPs responses are positive (i.e. about 70% of respondents either agree or strongly agree).

However, some of the interviews shed a different light on this that interpretation. A number of respondents indicated that generally speaking, all interventions are in line with either regional or national priorities but there are few actual mechanisms to ensure synergy between country and regional level. In other words, when programming or engaged in the bilateral dialogue, ICPs do not systematically ensure coherence between the two levels of support.

Concerning the link between resources and results, respondents usually refer to the type of aid modalities used, mostly project-oriented, which include a management for results approach in the identification stage, guaranteeing an efficient use of the aid transferred. Respondents did not go into detail on how they perceive of the results achieved under the specific interventions that they fund. This assessment did not allow for a deeper analysis of
the commitment ‘Managing for Results’ but it could be useful to further assess to what extent different aid modalities (i.e. project or programme approach, basket funding, budget support) makes effective use of resource and contribute to tangible results.

3.4.2 Lessons learned

Despite several efforts to build the capacity of SADC, a coordinated, common response to address SADC capacity needs seems to be lacking. In that regard, the WD dialogue structures have not yet succeeded in bringing out a coherent ICP response strategy. Several capacity-building support measures are the results of bilateral relations. They have not originated from a clear task division among ICPs based on a collective response to a demand-driven needs assessment. Besides, there is not direct linkage between the Human Resources Directorate of the SADC Secretariat in the WD dialogue structures: there is no specific mechanism to provide feedback on human resource constraints. This situation results in a lost opportunity to introduce an overall HR needs assessment in the dialogue.

The limited knowledge of SADC M&E frameworks and initiatives to enhance those frameworks, such as the development of the Policy on Strategic Development, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (SPME) affect the commitment on Managing for Results. Increased awareness of the existing frameworks is necessary to enhance progress on this commitment. SADC Member States and ICPs need improved access to this type of information.

The WD dialogue structures offer a forum for consulting and sharing regular results-oriented reporting that monitor progress against key dimensions of regional development strategies. The Thematic Groups is the right place for sector specific information sharing. These groups should establish common goals and a manageable number of indicators for monitoring. They should assess progress towards goals and indicators and ensure that communication takes place on a regular basis. Discussions between parties are often held on this subject but this dialogue has not lead to tangible results. To advance the dialogue, the functioning of the thematic groups must be improved. Their limited functionality, with the exception of the Water and HIV & AIDS thematic groups, is mainly explained by limited capacity to follow up on the implementation of the WD and the reluctance of sharing sensitive information between partners. Both ICP and SADC staff should be dedicated to coordinate such efforts and information sharing should be a condition for ICP co-chairing.

The survey analysis indicates that it is key to support the strengthening and development of SADCs monitoring and evaluation systems. Other findings show that it is equally important to follow up results at Member State level, including on making amendments as required the keep national legislation in line with the regional agenda. The SADC Secretariat regularly interacts with the SADC National Contact Points who rely on the SADC National Committees (SNC) for updates. However it appears that the mechanism has not been quite effective in all Member States so far. It is recommended to review the role and responsibilities of the SADC National Committees, assess their performance and adjust their capacity where needed. Ultimately, this would contribute to linking regional programming to national programming and supporting the SNCs in this respect. It also

[11] The methodology did not follow a strict evaluation approach, with detailed indicators that would have entered into the modalities details.
includes agreeing on a joint format for measuring progress and on intended outcomes as well as identifying the activities that may help to achieve the outcomes.

To conclude, progress on the managing for results commitment is needed and can be better achieved by:

- Enhancing the connection between the national and regional level;
- Linking resources systematically to results; and
- Aligning resources with effective SADC performance assessment frameworks, refraining from introducing performance indicators that are not consistent with SADC development strategies.

### 3.4.3 Summary table

The summary table below is a reference grid for the WD commitment to managing for results. It provides results-based recommendations and facilitates a deeper analysis.
MANAGING FOR RESULTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REVIEW FINDINGS</th>
<th>KEY ISSUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Various modalities exist to strengthen SADC capacities | • ICPs support includes direct technical assistance, funding of additional posts and inclusive capacity building programme.  
• No coordinated approach to support SADC institutional strengthening |
| 2. Limited knowledge of result-oriented reporting & assessment frameworks | • Established frameworks are not communicated to ICPs and Member States.  
• The situation can impact negatively on mutual accountability (synergy between several WD commitments) |
| 3. Misconceived perception on existing relation/connection between country and regional levels | • Strong feeling that ICPs do not link regional programming for SADC with country level programming.  
• Absence of systematic mechanisms to actually ensure coherence between these two levels. |
| 4. Limited information on link between results and resources | • Few detailed information provided on perceived linkages between aid flows and results ('value for money').  
• Incidence of the choice aid modalities on effective use of resources and tangible results. |

LESSONS LEARNED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUGGESTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Lack of coordinated, collective approach to cover SADC capacity needs. | • Better use the WD dialogue structures, especially Thematic Groups to organise a coherent response to capacity needs.  
• Enhance the visibility of ICP capacity building measures taken on the basis of bilateral cooperation within the WD framework.  
• Mainstream SADC Secretariat human resource needs assessment in the WD dialogue structures. |
| 2. Need to enhance the visibility on monitoring & assessment framework and the results they produce. | • Disseminate more widely existing reports on implementation, monitoring and evaluation, financial settlements, and adapt the format if needed for public display.  
• Continue support to strengthen SADC monitoring and assessment frameworks.  
• Further use the WD dialogue structure for sharing regular results-oriented reporting that monitor progress against key dimensions of regional development strategies.  
• Dedicate staff to coordinate the inputs in the Thematic Groups and condition co-chairing to the availability of doing so. |
| 3. Need to strengthen the link between national and regional level, especially for programming. | • Enhance the follow-up of results at Member State level, including on domestication and implementation of the Regional Agenda frameworks.  
• Review the role and responsibilities of the SADC National Committees and adjust their capacities |
3.5 Mutual Accountability

**Mutual accountability**

- **SADC and ICPs commit to:** Jointly assess through existing and increasingly objective mechanisms, mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including the New SADC/ICP Partnership.
- **ICPs commit to:** Provide timely, transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows so as to enable SADC Secretariat to present comprehensive budget reports to its Member States.

(*) See page 10 of the Declaration, point 32 & 33.

3.5.1 Analysis

It is important to note that relatively few comments were received regarding this specific commitment. The previous topics generated more elaborate answers from respondents. This may probably be explained by the fact that the monitoring of the Windhoek Declaration has only partially taken place so far and that participants mostly understood the question on mutual accountability in the light of its implementation.

The analysis of the study shows very mixed views of both ICP and SADC respondents with regard to the mutual accountability commitment. Only about half of the respondents (SADC & ICPs) agree that mutual accountability has been jointly assessed (see chart 15 below) but not in an overall manner.

**Chart 15: Mutual progress jointly assessed in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness (Q31)**

In fact, a majority of respondents indicated that the current review seems to be the first proper exercise carried out in this regard. This review of the Windhoek Declaration is believed to have influenced both SADC and ICPs to look back at whether mutual progress actually was achieved.

The actual operationalisation of the Windhoek declaration and the question of how its commitments are being implemented do not actually seem to be discussed at the level of the thematic groups. Commitments are important and are touched upon, such as the discussion of joint funding, but they are not systematically reviewed.

Another interesting element of the review can be found in the replies given by ICPs on their capacity to provide clear and timely information on aid flows (see chart 16 below). In fact,
not even half of the respondents agree that timely information is regularly provided, suggesting that the exchange of such information cannot be validated. These results are important because they illustrate that even though ICPs require SADC to ensure that information is transferred, they also acknowledge the fact that communication could be improved on their side.

*Chart 16*: ICPs provide transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows in a timely manner to enable SADC Secretariat to present comprehensive budget reports to SADC Member States (Q34)

In conclusion, the analysis of this section highlights the need to:

- Monitor and review regularly the Partnership between SADC and ICPs, both internally and externally;
- Ensure that full responsibility for successes and failures is taken on both sides;
- Reinforce the participatory approach when formulating and assessing progress in implementing SADC development strategies.

### 3.5.2 Lessons learned

**Need to establish regular monitoring of the Windhoek Declaration.** Respondents noted that the Windhoek Declaration has not been reviewed since inception and that no indicators have been developed for monitoring progress on the commitments. They call for a more regular monitoring (annual or every other year) based on a jointly agreed framework and adapted to the region. Respondents expect that such an approach will also serve as an incentive for straightforward and regular exchange of information, including on public disclosure of resource mobilisation and transparency of funds used. It is also expected that the active participation of non-state actors will increase and add value to the process.

### 3.5.3 Summary table

The summary table below is a reference grid for the WD commitment to mutual accountability. It provides results-based recommendations and facilitates a deeper analysis.
## MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REVIEW FINDINGS</th>
<th>KEY ISSUES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Narrow understanding of Mutual accountability principle</td>
<td>• Commitment seen in the light of the monitoring of the implementation of the WD rather than the actual regional development</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 2. Limited feedback on the implementation of the WD | • WD review is seen as the first official effort in reviewing the implementation of the WD Declaration  
• WD dialogue structures have not been used to discuss the progress in implementing the 5 commitments |
| 3. Limited transparency on aid flows | • Information on aid flows provided by ICPs to SADC is limited |

### LESSONS LEARNED

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUGGESTIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 4. Absence of regular monitoring of the Windhoek Declaration. | • Create a jointly agreed monitoring framework for the implementation of the WD on a regular basis  
• Use the WD dialogue structures to further incentive smooth and regular exchange of information  
• Increase disclosure on resource mobilization and transparency of funds  
• Include civil society organisations in the monitoring of the WD |
4  STRUCTURE FOR A PARTNERSHIP DIALOGUE

Since the adoption of the Windhoek Declaration there has been no joint assessment of the mechanisms of coordination.

This first sub-section section provides an overview of what was expected from the WD dialogue structures before describing the progress to date, based on the inputs gathered during the study.\(^{12}\) The subsequent section provides an in-depth analysis of the relevance and constraints of the dialogue process.

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**Structure for Dialogue under the New Partnership**

*SADC and ICPs commit to: A constructive, comprehensive, open and structured dialogue at political, policy and technical levels (...).’*

(*) See page 10 of the Declaration, point 35.

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4.1  Functioning of the dialogue structures: state of play

The Declaration ‘puts in place a New SADC/ICP Partnership for the implementation of the SADC Common Agenda as outlined in the RISDP and SIPO’ and outlines the structure for effective dialogue under the partnership. ‘In particular, the partnership aims at:

- Ensuring regular, institutionalised dialogue at the political, policy and technical levels for constructive engagement, information and experience exchange and the promotion of best practices on development cooperation;
- Improving coordination between ICPs and SADC in order to ensure more effective development cooperation mechanisms with a view to achieving maximum impact;
- Ensuring alignment, harmonisation and streamlining of operational procedures, rules and other practices in the delivery of development assistance to SADC, taking into account local conditions;
- Ensuring synergy and complementarity of assistance provided at the national and regional levels taking into account developments at the continental level.’

The agreed institutional and operational structures\(^{13}\) for dialogue set by the WD operate both at the political/policy and technical/operational levels. There are three levels:

- The Consultative Conference;
- The Joint Task Force (operationalised through the Core Group); and
- The Thematic Groups.

This section summarises the state of play of the dialogue by carefully looking at the expectations of the WD and the developments to date.

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\(^{12}\) This section was deemed useful to remind all stakeholders of the origin and development of the Windhoek Declaration process. Not all of them have an institutional memory of the implementation of the Declaration. A majority of stakeholders also see only one aspect of the dialogue, according to the meetings they attend and without getting an overview. This section gives a sense of the overall process and its evolution in a concise way.

\(^{13}\) See Windhoek Declaration “Structure for dialogue under the new partnership”, 2006.
As a general observation, the results of the study indicate that SADC and ICPs have different views with regard to the relevance of the dialogue structure. While the majority of SADC respondents consider that the dialogue structures function effectively, ICP views are mixed with a prevalent negative perception.

**Chart 17: SADC and ICPs strongly support the functioning of the different structures of coordination (Q35)**

![Chart showing support for the functioning of different structures of coordination](chart)

### 4.1.1 Level 1: Consultative Conference

**What was the original plan?**

The SADC Consultative Conference (CC) represents the highest level (Level 1)\(^{14}\) of the partnership dialogue. It aims at providing high-level guidance to the decision-making entities of SADC and the ICPs. It was designed to provide a platform for SADC and ICP representation at the Ministerial level. The mandate of the CC includes:

- Specifying the issues where, from time to time, political decisions about partnership may be required from SADC and the ICPs, and to transmit these issues, with the Group’s guiding comments, through to the relevant fora (the Council of Ministers and/or Summit for SADC, and individual governments, the DAC, and other bodies of the ICPs);
- Spelling out the implications of changing political ideas for the scope of partnership, and ensure that cooperation modalities remain in harmony with a shifting environment; and

Informing both the political authorities and the policy/technical level groups in SADC/ICPs of new policy approaches, and their possible implications for the subject areas/themes of development cooperation, and the forms of support (financial and otherwise) which might be available and consistent with new approaches.

Documentation and backup support for the work of the CC should be provided by the SADC Secretariat, development cooperation ministries (or their equivalents) in ICP countries, and international development agencies. This follows the principle of joint responsibility of ICPs and SADC for maintaining the dialogue. The CC should act as a powerful filter for political and policy information taking account of emerging changes in the SADC region. The CC is scheduled to be held every two years.

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\(^{14}\) See Windhoek Declaration “Structure for dialogue under the new partnership”, 2006.
What has happened?

Since the adoption of the Windhoek Declaration only two SADC Consultative Conferences have been held, one in 2006 and the other in 2008. Following the 2008 Conference, a third Consultative Conference was planned for 2010. However, the 2010 Conference has been postponed to 2012 and no precise date has yet been agreed for it to take place.

The level of participation at the Consultative Conference has been identified as an issue by SADC respondents. Representation from the SADC Region has been at Ministerial level, with more than one Minister participating from each of the SADC Member States. However, the level of participation from the International Cooperating Partners, in recent years, has only been at the level of officials. For SADC, this means that the status of the CC has declined. Hence, it was pointed out that the CC can no longer be considered as a platform for high-level political dialogue.

The issue was raised after the Mauritius Conference of 2008\textsuperscript{15}. This led to the decision of the SADC Council of Ministers in August 2008 to review the level of representation of SADC to that of Senior Officers.

It is also worth noting that the Consultative Conference of 2008 held in Mauritius in the margins of the Poverty Conference was not conclusive, participants did not manage to successfully agree on conclusions and neither on a Communiqué.

In 2011, the SADC Council of Ministers at its meeting in Windhoek, Namibia, directed the Secretariat to undertake an internal assessment of the role and functioning modalities of the Consultative Conference. The results were presented for consideration to the Double Troika-Senior Officials in July 2011 and subsequently to the SADC Council for approval in August 2011.

Based on the recommendations made by the Double Troika-Senior Officials, the SADC Council of Ministers (Angola, August 2011) recommended that\textsuperscript{16}:

- The Consultative Conference be maintained as a platform to discuss policy, coordination and accountability issues and continue to be held every two years;
- The level of participation for both sides should be at the level of Senior Officials;
- SADC-ICP meetings at Ministerial level be considered on a case-by-case basis through consultations between the two parties;
- CC be complemented by thematic investment fora, bringing together international partners, regional investors, private sector; and
- SADC Secretariat consults with the ICPs and resume preparations for the CC to be held in 2012.

This internal decision, made without having consulted ICP counterparts, was considered by ICPs to conflict with the spirit of “WD Partnership”.

The table below provides a detailed analysis of the CC achievements.

\textsuperscript{15} ICPs attending the meeting were represented by senior officials, while SADC MS were represented at ministerial level.

\textsuperscript{16} Extract from the Decision of Council.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commitments/Mandate</th>
<th>Achievements/Constraints/Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1. Dialogue occurs at Ministerial level for both SADC and ICPs | Not fulfilled  
- No consensus on the level of participation for the CC between SADC and ICPs as shown by the experience of the 2006 and 2008 CC  
- To-date only two CC held with limited outcome and one postponed (the 2010’s CC).  
- Political bottleneck in the dialogue between SADC and the ICPs as a result of constraints met. |
| 2. The CC will be held every two years | Partially fulfilled  
- Due of weak coordination mechanisms & meeting irregularity, limited impact on achievement of the overall objective of the implementation of RISDP and SIPO.  
- The CC process now widely considered to be compromised. |
| 3. The CC will specify the issues where political decisions about partnership may be required from SADC and the ICPs, and transmit these issues through the relevant fora. | Partially fulfilled  
- Despite the constraints and limits observed for the CC, the level of dialogue for political guidance, as defined in Windhoek Declaration still perceived by the stakeholders as relevant to address a constructive, comprehensive, open and structured dialogue at political and policy levels. |
| 4. The CC will spell out the implications of changing political ideas for the scope of partnership, and ensure that cooperation modalities remain in harmony with a shifting environment | Not fulfilled  
- The implementation of the WD and the functioning of its modalities have not been regularly monitored.  
- The shifting international environment on aid effectiveness has not been integrated in the WD implementation (Accra Agenda for Action, Busan Partnership Commitments17).  
- There is a need to be more consensual approach on the themes discussed. |
| 5. The CC will inform both the political authorities and the policy/technical level groups in SADC/ICPs of new policy approaches, and their possible implications for the subject areas/themes of development cooperation & the | Partially fulfilled  
- The Mixed result in terms of the quality of the dialogue but acknowledgment of progress in the CC’s history.  
- More attention and commitment from the stakeholders, and real dialogue at the strategic level is required, in the framework of the CC, or any other level |

17 For more information, see: http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3746,en_2649_3236398_46310975_1_1_1_1,00.html
forms of support which might be available and consistent with new approaches.

| 6. Documentation and backup support for the Group’s work would come through inputs from SADC Secretariat, development cooperation Ministries (or their equivalents) in ICP countries, and international agencies concerned with development. The Group would therefore act as a powerful filter of political and policy information, shaped in relation to emerging changes in the SADC region. | that would be empowered to offer political guidance at senior level. |

**Partially fulfilled**
- The quality of inputs for the CC has been a matter of tensions between SADC & ICPs, and lead to the postponing of the 2010 CC.
- Human resources constraints for both SADC & ICPs to engage in the WD implementation have lead to weaken the substance of inputs prepared for discussion.
- It resulted in a disincentive for mobilization at ministerial level.
- Limited capacity for prospective analysis of what the main trends are in the international environment and how it affects regional development in SADC.
- All these elements have contributed to diminish the connection between the CC agenda, its outcome and the impact on regional development (weak result chain).

**Overall outcome:** Higher quality dialogue between SADC and Development Partners

**Limited**
- Conclusions were not reached in the 2008 CC and the CC planned in 2010 has not taken place yet.
- There has not been any specific dialogue between SADC and ICP to reflect on the future of the CC.
- The limited outcome of CC did not prevent other aspect of the WD to be implemented (with the mixed success of operational coordination within thematic groups).
4.1.2 Level 2: Joint Task Force

What was the original plan?

The Joint Task Force (JTF)\(^{18}\) consists of a broader group of ICPs and SADC representatives\(^{19}\). It was established as a platform for linking top-level political decision makers with groups working on the ground in key thematic areas. It was also a direct response to the desire for a closer coordination between SADC and the ICPs during the implementation of the RISDP.

The Joint Task Force should play an advisory role and its main responsibility is to guide the work of the Core Group in the interest of facilitating and improving SADC-ICP coordination. This also includes facilitating dialogue. It seeks to improve coordination between ICPs and SADC to ensure that aid is delivered more effectively. It also seeks to achieve maximum impact of ICP assistance through the efficient and effective implementation of RISDP. It is chaired by the SADC Executive Secretary on behalf of SADC and co-chaired by the Head of the Delegation of the European Union on behalf of the ICPs. The Joint Task Force is to meet twice a year.

What has happened?

The meetings of the Joint Task Force have been less frequent over the years, and have tended to focus mainly on the preparations for Consultative Conferences. The last meeting was held in February 2010.

4.1.3 Level 3: Core Group

What was the original plan?

The Core Group\(^{20}\) was established to implement the decisions of the Joint Task Force. It is responsible for the technical day-to-day work and feedback to the Joint Task Force. It also follows up on the proposals of the Joint Task Force, and is responsible for commissioning studies, ensuring coordination including meeting preparation and information dissemination to the broader group of ICPs and SADC stakeholders.

The Core Group should play a crucial coordination and networking role for all key stakeholders. It, should, inter alia, facilitate inter-sector and inter-institutional dialogue and cooperation, and provide strategic advice to facilitate implementation of the RISDP. It is composed of ICPs represented in Gaborone and representatives of the SADC Secretariat and open for participation for all members of the JTF. The focal points for the Core Group are the SADC Secretariat and the EU Delegation to Botswana on behalf of the ICPs. The SADC Deputy Executive Secretary for Regional Integration and the EU Head of the Delegation both co-chair the Core Group. It was intended that the Core Group ‘meet frequently to manage and coordinate day-to-day operations.’\(^{21}\)

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\(^{18}\) See Windhoek Declaration "Structure for dialogue under the new partnership", 2006.
\(^{19}\) Secretariat with possible participation of the Troika and other SADC bodies and stakeholders such as SADC National Committees.
\(^{20}\) See Windhoek Declaration "Structure for dialogue under the new partnership", 2006.
\(^{21}\) See Windhoek Declaration, Annex A. The annex also refers to “the monthly meetings of the Core Group”.

What has happened?

The meeting format has been extended to include all ICPs and regional stakeholders that are interested to cooperate or already cooperating with SADC and the frequency of meetings has been reduced to twice a year.

The mandate of the Core Group in managing and coordinating the day-to-day operations of the JTF was not adequately performed, nor the coordination of the existing Thematic Groups. Its meetings have become increasingly infrequent. A Core group meeting was held in July 2010, and since no meeting has taken place between July 2010 and January 2012. As in the case of the Joint Task Force, the meetings of the Core Group were infrequent and the partner cooperation agenda has not been monitored.

4.1.4 Level 4: Thematic Groups

What was the original plan?

The Thematic Groups (TG) consist of representatives from SADC, ICPs and Non State Actors (e.g. civil society and business community/private sector, implementing agencies) working in specific thematic areas. They were established in line with the key areas of cooperation outlined in the Windhoek Declaration to offer the ICPs an opportunity to align their technical and financial support to thematic areas.

The TGs seek to improve coordination by identifying the ICP focal points and the roles they should play in specific thematic areas. This partnership also gives an opportunity for mobilising technical expertise, pooling resources and implementing specific programmes in common areas of interest.

Each thematic group identifies a lead ICP and a SADC focal point. The advantage of having thematic groups is that all parties are expected to have clear commitments and the issues that come up for discussion are often those that are appropriate for regional action. The meeting frequency varies from group to group but most are held on a quarterly or bi-annually basis.

What has happened?

The meeting schedule has not been adhered to. The first meetings of the Energy, HIV, Trade Facilitation, Transport and Water Thematic Groups for 2011 have been held as planned. TIFI met in March 2012, agreeing on an action plan and introducing for the first time a list of donor contributions prepared by the Secretariat for all projects channelled through the Secretariat.

It was expected that the Thematic Groups would ‘evolve in a flexible manner within the context of the JTF and would be an efficient route towards partnership and dialogue at the technical level’. In fact, the thematic coordination never fully provided a ‘platform to give attention to specific priority areas by SADC and ICPs interested in a particular area’ nor did it become ‘an opportunity for pooling resources together and implementing specific programmes in areas of common interest under the leadership of SADC’. Participation of the civil society has also been limited.
Nonetheless, a number of successes have been registered, for example in the water sector, in infrastructure to a lesser extent (energy and transport) and for HIV-AIDS\textsuperscript{22}. As mentioned above, TIFI TG is currently drafting a work plan and, an updated list of donor contributions prepared by Secretariat has been introduced for all projects channelled through the Secretariat (last meeting, 8 March 2012).

A number of issues relating to the \textbf{Thematic Groups} have also been noted in the analysis of the survey results. The chart below shows a wide consensus on the need to improve the TG functioning.

\textbf{Chart 18: Thematic Groups could improve their functioning and the interaction between the Thematic Groups’ members (Q45)}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart18.png}
\caption{Thematic Groups could improve their functioning and the interaction between the Thematic Groups’ members (Q45)}
\end{figure}

4.1.5 \textbf{Overall relevance of the dialogue structure}

Effective, high-quality and regular dialogue between the parties was foreseen as essential for a successful cooperation and partnership towards achieving the regional agenda as set out in RISDP and SIPO. The Windhoek Declaration created dialogue structures which have been evolving and functioning for more than five years with contrasting experiences at each level of coordination - either political or technical (Consultative Conference, Joint Task Force, Core Group and Thematic Groups).

The functioning of the different WD structures of coordination has demonstrated success in certain areas and slow progress in other. On the overall however, the survey analysis shows that ICPs are eager to support the region and both parties recognised the added value of the partnership (see Chart 19).

\footnotetext{22 In this latter case, offering a platform for dialogue and implementation of the Business plan, even though this plan is actually not fully articulated with RISDP (i.e. it emerges from ICP pulled resources, in line with the regional priorities, but not a direct translation of the RISDP).}
Chart 19: Windhoek Declaration adds value to the cooperation between SADC and the ICPs (Q37 & Q39)

The chart below (chart 20) shows that the majority of the respondents, either from ICPs or SADC, do not believe that it is necessary to opt for a new framework. In addition, the explanations given by the respondents who felt that a new framework was required (i.e. 40%), indicated that rather than asking for a completely new set up, they preferred to amend or streamline the partnership in a way that makes it more functional. Overall, the results illustrate that dialogue between ICPs and SADC is necessary at a joint level, but that this is not working as well as expected.

Chart 20: Coordination and dialogue with ICPs requires a new framework (Q38 & Q40)

In order to avoid the trap of Windhoek fatigue, it is suggested to consider this positive finding and re-assert that dialogue remains important and should be sustained and that WD is relevant for the SADC & ICP support to the implementation of the regional agenda.

Moreover, the coordination and dialogue are currently disconnected from the SADC decision-making process. It is suggested to strengthen the links between the WD dialogue and the SADC Council of Ministers and Summit and to the Ministerial Cluster Meetings for the Thematic Groups. The necessity to better link the national and regional level was also identified.

4.1.6 Impact of the WD dialogue on aid effectiveness

The impact of the WD dialogue on aid effectiveness at the regional level has so far been limited for a number of reasons. The irregularity and limited focus of meetings at all levels
have contributed this situation. The review also demonstrates that the performance review on the implementation of the five commitments of WD have not received enough consideration by the dialogue structures. There is a common opinion that the aid effectiveness agenda cannot be an end in itself and stakeholders should be careful to avoid that WD becomes the focus of attention. However, the WD commitments are meaningful for the achievement of the development goals set out. They seek to adjust a number of practices, ranging from harmonising programming at the national and regional level to more effective financial predictability, efficient communication and use of mixed aid modalities. Without having to go into detailed monitoring, it is necessary to use the WD forum to prompt SADC and ICPs to address these specific questions and use the different dialogue levels to reflect and act upon how the commitments can further regional development in a concrete sense.

For instance, regarding the ownership commitment, one of the key issues identified by the study is the low level of regional priorities introduced at the national level. It also highlights the fact that MS visibility is limited in the actual WD dialogue structures. Reflecting on the linkages between the national and regional level within the WD, for example on the participation of the national committees in the dialogue, could certainly contribute to enhance the region's ownership.

On the alignment commitment, the study shows that short-term priorities and outcome-oriented agendas are key factors for the successful functioning of the TG. Such focused agendas are not always available and this situation results in confusion on what the main support areas should be and what priorities ICPs can support on a short or medium term basis. The findings also emphasise the limited information available on SADC’s on-going strategic development, including limited communication at the level of the core group and thematic groups.

Another example of the limited impact of the WD on improving aid effectiveness at the regional level is illustrated by the harmonisation commitment. The definition of harmonisation at the regional level is different from that of the national level. Whereas the Paris Declaration principles were designed with the national level in mind, their transposition at the regional level, through the WD, does not have the same relevance. Harmonised donor procedures are key at the country level - especially if donors are numerous and aid dependence is high – however, at the regional level, where donor overlap is less significant, it does not appear significantly. The issue of harmonisation at the regional level is mainly relevant to improve the complementarity of programming at country and regional level. Yet, this is not addressed in the WD dialogue framework.

The WD dialogue structures should be used to improve the understanding of how the aid effectiveness commitments influence and interact with regional development and to follow more accurately the implementation of the five commitments. Furthermore, since the Windhoek Declaration was signed, the aid effectiveness agenda has moved forward at the global level (Accra Agenda for Action, Busan Partnership for Development) and also at the regional level (African Consensus and Position on Development Effectiveness). The WD has not been reviewed or adapted since its inception and its dialogue structures do not take these developments into account. It will be necessary to improve the capacity of the WD framework
to address these challenges, e.g. with the creation of a specific thematic group dedicated to aid effectiveness23.

► To conclude, the structures of SADC-ICP cooperation have not managed to improve the dialogue and aid effectiveness in the way it was believed they would. At present, even though partnership mechanisms exist, they are characterised by insufficient coordination and limited impact. Inadequate communication also sometimes contributes to lack of trust between donors and SADC. The result is both a disintegration of the broad Windhoek Declaration vision and difficulties in ensuring coherence, alignment and harmonisation across the donors’ interventions. The synergies between the different levels were not as good as expected and greater clarity on how they relate to each other is needed. For these reasons, the current dialogue structure should be adjusted. The dialogue levels retained need to meet regularly, their agenda has to be focused, and they should deliver results. There is a shared acceptance that the WD commitments and the SADC-ICP dialogue are extremely relevant in contributing to a more successful implementation of the regional agenda.

The table below provides an overview of the key observations, and their link with the evidence-based recommendations.

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23 See proposal under recommendation 2.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBSERVATIONS</th>
<th>SUGGESTIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Consultative Conference, Joint Task Force &amp; Core Group</strong></td>
<td><strong>Consultative Conference, Joint Task Force &amp; Core Group</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No consensus on the level of participation for the CC, and political bottleneck in the SADC-ICP dialogue.</td>
<td>Review the dialogue structure comprehensively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited impact of CC on achievement of the overall objective of the implementation of RISDP and SIPO.</td>
<td>Bring in flexibility with Ministerial level meetings, by giving back the CC responsibility to SADC, who can mobilise this level unilaterally, when relevant and needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relevance for one level of dialogue for political guidance still perceived by the stakeholders</td>
<td>Streamline the dialogue structures dealing with political and policy guidance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementation of the WD and the functioning of its modalities have not been regularly monitored, which resulted in the absence of adjustment and/or update in a changing environment.</td>
<td>Establish regular monitoring of the implementation and modalities of WD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed result in terms of the quality of the dialogue; more attention and commitment from the stakeholders is needed for sincere dialogue at the strategic level</td>
<td>Use the WD to reflect on the impact of the evolution of the aid effectiveness agenda on the cooperation ICPs with SADC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human resources constraints affect the preparation work for discussion; Quality of inputs for the CC has been a matter of tensions between SADC &amp; ICPs Limited capacity for prospective analysis Weaken connection between the CC agenda, its outcome and the impact on regional development (weak result chain).</td>
<td>Mainstream the organization of WD dialogue with one structure for policy guidance and coordination, and one level for operational &amp; technical matters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC limited outcome and catalyst for SADC ICPs tension CC limited outcome did not prevent other</td>
<td>Reinforce SADC capacity to prepare substantial inputs and analysis to nurture the reflection and decision-making of the WD dialogue.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Further mobilize SADC &amp; ICPs staff in the implementation of the WD by dedicating staff time to engage and follow-up on the process.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Extract the CC from the WD framework and streamline dialogue for overall policy guidance &amp; coordination in one structure.</td>
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</table>
| | Simplify of the dialogue architecture with a focus on one structure that would
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>aspect of the WD to be implemented</th>
<th>cover policy coordination, and ensure a representation of MS.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Limited outcome of the consultative conference level affected the nature and role of the Task Force and the Core Group</td>
<td>• Core group (more regular meetings, enlarged participation) acts as the dialogue structure to address policy orientation and coordination with the Thematic Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Focusing on one level for strategic/political guidance &amp; coordination could revive the dialogue process and refrain the risk of a Windhoek fatigue</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Groups</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Success factors include: sedulity of partners focused agenda, and results oriented approach</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Flexibility is needed for TG to move forward.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Challenge in maintaining sustained interest of all ICPs operating across sectors</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Inadequate resource jeopardizes the regularity of meetings and therefore the outcomes of TG</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other considerations on Dialogue</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Recognized added value of the partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relative disconnection of dialogue from SADC decision-making process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Acknowledgment of slow path to process approach</td>
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5 RECOMMENDATIONS

The findings of the study indicate that progress in implementing the WD has been quite slow. The track record in the application of the five principles by the partners is quite modest. Slight achievements have been noted in a few areas under some commitments, namely in the coordination of cooperation in the Water Sector, the enhancement of SADC systems and procedures to international standards and the alignment of support to SADC operational plans for HIV & Aid interventions. The dialogue structure has overall not produced the outcomes that were expected from the partnership process despite some isolated cases of success at the technical level. Experience gathered from similar processes indicates that developing a partnership is rarely a straightforward task that can be accomplished within a short period of time. The paths that are chosen to achieving the goals of the partnership are often hampered by bottlenecks arising from differences of approach. Variations in the expectations of stakeholders have the risk of contaminating the entire process and derail it from its founding goals. However, as long as there is political will, solutions can be found.

The consultations made during the survey indicate that there is a strong convergence of opinions with regard to the overall relevance of the Windhoek Declaration framework. In essence, the five principles remain valid to support regional development. The question is about how to rebuild the framework, especially to design dialogue structures that add value to SADC-ICP cooperation.

Given the trajectory taken by the process so far, the task lying ahead is huge. Almost everything remains to be done. The challenges are however not completely insurmountable. A major asset is that the issues encountered through the WD dialogue structure have not prevented SADC and ICPs to pursue their cooperation. Important strides have been made in some cases. This is a good indicator of the willingness of SADC and ICPs to cooperate. Furthermore, both SADC and ICPs are going to the new starting block with a bigger capital of knowledge gathered from past successes as well as mistakes. In particular, SADC should be in a position to draw from the capacity development programmes it has been implementing with the support of some ICPs. Not the least, this new start will be made in a context which should be more conducive to success. Notable progress in the core values underpinning the Global and Continental aid agenda has been made. Those frameworks clearly recognise the regional dimension of development aid, which provides Regional Economic Communities with an important role at the continental level. The experience gathered by SADC and the ICPs involved in the WD pioneering aid effectiveness at the regional level should provide them with an edge that could also be an additional motivation to succeed.

Given the magnitude of the task and the inter-linkages, it is important for SADC and ICPs to use a strategic approach in tackling the issues. In order to avoid future challenges it is important to first identify the key success factors that SADC and ICP need take into account. The analysis will inform the measures to be taken to revitalise the WD process.

5.1 Critical success factors for an effective dialogue

Based on the survey findings and the analysis of the situation, a number of key factors that need to be taken into consideration in the review of the WD dialogue structure have been
identified. Some of those factors may have been overlooked by the original design whereas others have emerged during the last few years.

5.1.1 A clearly articulated added value

A clear articulation of the added-value of the partnership framework is required to determine the edge which SADC and ICPs could use to have better leverage towards WD goals. The WD dialogue structure is not the exclusive channel for SADC and ICPs to engage on their common interests. Bilateral channels of dialogue are used by SADC and ICPs to pursue with their cooperation. SADC and ICPs are also active in other dialogue structures that have been established at the pan-African level (e.g. Africa-EU partnership and Africa-China partnership dialogue structures and the AU post-Busan process). The WD is silent on those channels. The added-value of using the WD dialogue structure to implement SADC-ICP cooperation goals needs to be considered in light of this important and evolving context.

Even though the WD dialogue structure has not been effective, SADC-ICP cooperation has been pursued quite effectively through bi-lateral channels. In fact the relative contribution of ICPs to SADC annual budgets has even increased substantially during the recent years. Furthermore, nothing prevents SADC and ICP to engage with one another to achieve aid effectiveness. For instance, the decision of EU to apply the Contribution Agreement modality to implement SADC-EU EDF programmes was after all not taken through the WD dialogue structure. Would those bi-lateral channels not be sufficient to achieve aid-effectiveness? Besides, the core values that guide aid effectiveness under SADC-ICP cooperation are inspired by the Global and Continental development aid effectiveness agenda. Since SADC and ICPs participate in those processes and adhere to the commitments, do the political commitments expressed through those fora not provide the necessary legitimacy for SADC and ICPs to apply them in their cooperation frameworks?

However, whilst there is no doubt that existing channels of dialogue between SADC and ICPs can be effective in improving aid-effectiveness the WD framework is unique in that it provides a transparent platform for SADC and ICPs to coordinate their efforts in translating political values agreed at Global and Continental levels in practice for the SADC region. Bilateral dialogue channels for SADC-ICP cooperation do exist and will continue to be pursued to advance SADC cooperation policy. But those channels cannot provide the political thrust required to harness the changes required to adequately implement aid-effectiveness commitments. The WD framework provides a transparent platform where aid-effectiveness stakeholders, including civil society actors, can contribute openly and effectively to address critical issues pertaining to aid-effectiveness focused on the SADC region. Even if those issues may be raised in Global and Continental platforms, there is a risk that specific issues of particular importance to the SADC region may be diluted in those fora. In addition the AU African Consensus and Position on Development Effectiveness (September 2011) has introduced the regional dimension of development effectiveness. This implies that Regional Economic Communities will have a more important role to play in the future to implement and monitor African priorities. The WD dialogue structure should provide a platform for SADC and ICPs to play a more proactive role in that process.

On the other hand, it is important to set the ambition of the WD framework to the current and foreseeable context of cooperation. WD dialogue may not substitute bi-lateral channels in addressing specific cooperation issues at the political, policy and technical levels. WD framework can be used by SADC and the concerned ICP to underscore and disseminate
lessons learnt from their specific cooperation process with the view to make progress in on the WD commitments. But WD cannot be used to resolve specific bi-lateral issues underpinning specific SADC-ICP cooperation programmes. For example, the undertaking of a multi-year programming exercise (such as the EDF Regional Indicative Programme) through a WD dialogue structure is hardly conceivable, at least in the near future, as most ICPs have specific guidelines that are determined outside the WD structure (e.g. in principle EDF guidelines depend on the EU-ACP Cotonou framework). Furthermore, WD framework should be coordinated with other frameworks to which SADC and ICPs adhere to, namely at the Global and Continental levels (i.e. African Consensus and Position on Development Effectiveness). In particular, SADC and ICPs need to focus on finding innovative arrangements to favour the implementation of regional policies at the national level.

### 5.1.2 Match ambition with adequate capacities

As observed in the findings of the survey, the implementation of the WD commitments depends on the capacity of the SADC Secretariat to fulfil the crucial roles that it was attributed with, especially in exercising ownership of the process, in leading the day-to-day coordination with ICPs and in developing the necessary frameworks for the alignment of ICP cooperation programmes with SADC priorities and SADC systems. The institutional reforms which were undertaken to develop the capacity of the Secretariat took more time than originally anticipated to produce the necessary outcomes. The Secretariat’s organisation restructuring process left a number of gaps in terms of filling in the different posts, including for core functions such as policy development, planning and ICP coordination. Although, the WD took cognisance of the capacity development requirements of the Secretariat, the actual needs to implement the commitments may have been underestimated.

In addition there may also have been an oversight on capacity requirements to support the dialogue structure. The design of the WD structure provides the Secretariat with a central role in building and maintaining the substance of the dialogue, while at the same time looking after the mechanics of the coordination, in order to make the different players of the mechanism work in tune with one another. The tasks required to fulfil such role demands constant dialogue with stakeholders to follow up on matters, identify issues of concern and conduct research on various subjects to deed discussion on policy matters. In particular, the organisation of the Consultative Conference in line with the outcomes that were expected of it and in the format that were originally planned entailed a heavy responsibility for the Secretariat.

The resources allocated to attend to the tasks related to the proper functioning of WD dialogue structure have been quite limited in the past, and may have been insufficient in creating the critical mass required to make the necessary leap for an effective dialogue through the WD framework. Furthermore, on top of the issue of resources, the capacity of an organisation also depends on its decision making process. An organisation which has access to adequate resources may still not be in a position to operate adequately when there are cumbersome procedures. Thus SADC Secretariat’s ability to sustain constant dialogue with ICPs on a day-to-day basis and to make the necessary adjustments in implementing SADC-ICP cooperation agenda also depends on the authority that it is granted with by its principals. This appears to be quite narrow at times.

There is a general recognition of the need to pursue with the institutional reform process at the Secretariat, especially to apply policies and systems developed under various capacity
development programmes. This is crucial to maintain the momentum of the reform process. But is also important for also provide the Secretariat with the necessary resources and power to fulfil its role in implementing the WD agenda.

From another perspective, the review process of the WD framework needs to give due consideration to feasibility and sustainability of the intents on the basis of the means that can be realistically provided. It would be pointless to develop an ambitious agenda which does not commensurate with SADC’s capacity. It would be better to start with a modest agenda that can bring results in the short-medium term and have a flexible expansion plan. In particular, the review should ensure a simple WD dialogue structure that does not drain too much on the resources of the Secretariat.

5.1.3 Shared responsibility

Engaging collectively in the implementation of the WD commitments will also require efforts from ICPs. The heterogeneity of ICPs and the wide disparities of their cooperation policies and practices and the underlying political values may be a factor which has not been given enough consideration in the original design of the WD dialogue structure. The complexity has even been compounded during the recent years with the strengthening of SADC links with emerging partners. Coordination at the ICP side is thus an important challenge and this inevitably impacts on the channels of dialogue that SADC will use. While the WD commitment on harmonisation and alignment aims at addressing that issue, there is recognition that those may not be realised within the short/medium term.

In addition to coordinating among themselves, ICPs need to also better coordinate their actions between the regional level and the national level. During the consultations with stakeholders some ICP representatives working on SADC issues acknowledged that they were not fully aware of the national programmes which their institutions were implementing in SADC Member States.

Furthermore the WD places SADC in the lead position to initiate and sustain that dialogue. However, there are still important challenges for SADC to perform this role adequately. But the main challenge is the move from beneficiary status to partner status as there is still a strong perception that aid remains at the core of the relationship which clouds out the concept of “partnership”. The conclusions of the various high-level discussions among development stakeholders in Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) indicate the gradual shift of political values towards more balanced relationship between partners. Yet, there are also clear indications that more efforts are still required to translate those values into practice.

5.2 Rebuilding the WD partnership framework on new foundations

It is recommended that SADC and ICPs need to take some profound measures to rebuild the WD partnership framework on new foundations rather than just trying to mend issues which are likely to have been caused by design oversights. The need for a fresh look at the WD partnership framework is required in light of findings of the study and the critical factors of success derived from the analysis. Consideration is given in particular to the fact that many critical elements such as the bi-lateral channels of dialogue for SADC-ICP cooperation and the linkages with Global and Continental dialogue frameworks were not sufficiently taken into consideration. SADC’s cooperation policy itself has evolved, as evidenced by the development of a SADC Resource Mobilisation Strategy. The cooperation framework is also
being reshaped through the development of other instruments that are meant to provide guidance to the Secretariat to coordinate SADC-ICP cooperation in a more proactive manner (e.g. the Strategy Development, Planning Monitoring Policy and the Resource Mobilisation Framework).

The foundations of the partnership framework would be established through the following pillars:

i) A SADC-ICP partnership strategy;

ii) An effective and efficient dialogue structure; and

iii) Institutional capacity.

By design, the three pillars of the framework will be interrelated and would need to be considered comprehensively. In fact the dialogue structure will be a key element of the partnership strategy and future success will depend strongly on continued commitment to the WD Principles and adequate capacity to maintain the momentum for change.

5.2.1 Development of a SADC-ICP partnership strategy

A SADC-ICP partnership strategy is required to give a new boost to the WD partnership framework. The strategy will address the following issues:

**Objectives of the WD framework**

In line with the general views emerging from the WD survey and stakeholders meeting, the objectives of the WD partnership framework will be maintained.

**Principles of the framework**

The partnership framework should reiterate the five aid-effectiveness principles. Further commitments based on the outcomes of the Busan High-Level Forum will be incorporated. Consideration will be made to include the African Consensus and Position on Development Effectiveness, especially with regard to the regional dimension of development effectiveness.

**Positioning of the WD partnership framework**

An analysis of the partnership framework will be done to position it in the current context and to take into account the political, geo-political and economic trends that are bound to influence SADC-ICP Cooperation in the foreseeable future. Specific consideration will be given to existing dialogue channels, including bilateral, Global and Continental channels. The analysis should provide a basis to determine the added-value of the framework. The articulation with other dialogue structures should be made.

A succinct analysis of the added-value of the WD framework was undertaken during the study (see previous section), a more elaborated analysis needs to be undertaken. This would be supported by consultations with stakeholders from ICPs and SADC Member States on that specific matter.

**Focus on added-value**

The scope of the dialogue structure will be informed by its added value as will be formulated by the positioning analysis. Based on the succinct analysis conducted during the current
study, the core value added of the WD framework is based on the added transparency which facilitates the harnessing of changes required to implement SADC commitments. However, the framework should also recognize its limitations. The cooperation policies of ICPs and the procedures that they practice generally has a wide scope are often not targeted exclusively at the SADC region. Thus, it may not be appropriate in trying to adapt those policies and procedure to the SADC region through the WD partnership framework. The WD dialogue framework will thus be useful mainly in monitoring the application of commitments adopted by SADC and ICPs in the context of the framework or larger frameworks such as the Global and Continent development aid dialogue frameworks.

**Priorities of cooperation**

The strategy will formulate the principles through which the SADC and ICP will identify cooperation priorities. Consideration will be given to the provisions of the SADC policy on Strategy Development, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation which foresees the SADC Medium Term Strategy (MTS) to define SADC priorities and the SADC Five-Year Corporate Plan to formulate programmes. The priorities of cooperation will be identified and formulated on the basis of the SADC MTS and Five-Year Corporate plan and will be appended to the partnership strategy document.

**Dialogue structure**

The strategy will comprise a clear definition of the dialogue structure. The section below provides a framework to make an assessment of options for reviewing the dialogue structure. Once SADC and ICPs reach agreement on the dialogue structure Terms of Reference of each structure will have to be developed and appended to the strategy.

**Monitoring and Evaluation**

The SADC-ICP partnership strategy will incorporate an adequate Monitoring and Evaluation framework that will enable the stakeholders to take stock of progress. The framework will comprise relevant indicators, baselines and targets.

**5.2.2 Designing an effective and efficient dialogue structure**

The dialogue structure of the partnership framework is the nerve centre of the process. An effective dialogue structure is important in order to implement the framework. The need for a review of the dialogue has been recognised generally by SADC and ICPs. The exact configuration of the structure is yet to be determined.

In reviewing the design of the dialogue structure there are two important considerations which need to be factored in:

- **Scope of the dialogue structure/representativeness**: A broad scope of dialogue will offer SADC and ICPs the opportunity to engage transparently on a wide number of issues and enable the resolution of cooperation issues. However, the broader the scope is the more issues get diluted. On the other hand, a narrow scope may not allow the partners to properly consider new issues affecting their cooperation. Similarly, a wide representation of stakeholders will favour favours ownership and is hence likely to be effective overall.

- **Cost effectiveness/Number of levels of dialogue structure**: Increasing the number of levels of the structure would enable stakeholders with different levels of responsibilities to participate at various levels and enable a more structured discussion. However, the
increase of levels also impact on the cost effectiveness, since more resources are required to coordinate the various levels.

The combination of the above factors can result in an infinite number of possibilities. For example there seems to be a general recognition the need to simplify the structure in order to make it more cost effective. However, the degree to which the structure may be streamlined needs to be balanced with the need to adequate representativeness. Consideration to the issue of the scope will lead to a similar situation. Ultimately, SADC and ICPs will have to jointly decide on the trade-off points which will provide a balanced outcome.

5.2.2.1 Options for consideration

In order to provide a framework to assist the decision, two basic options are proposed:

i) Option 1: Maintain the dialogue structure as originally designed (with the adjusted level of representation as decided by SADC Council);

ii) Option 2: Streamline the dialogue structure of the framework to two levels: the Core Group and the Thematic Groups.

Option 1 is a maximalist position as the current dialogue structure is all-encompassing in terms of scope of cooperation and stakeholder participation. Option 2 is minimalist position as it proposes the streamlined structure of two levels of dialogue and a scope of cooperation which focuses only on core issues of the framework (the partnership commitments). An assessment of the two options is provided in the tables below.

SADC and ICPs may decide on either of the two options or make some alterations to come up with a mid-way solution.

The presentations of the two options do not include the technical level. This is due to the fact that the functioning of the technical level is not tied to the functioning of the policy/coordination levels. A proposal on the review of the technical level is proposed separately below. Measures adopted at the technical level can be combined with any option without significantly impacting on the selected option.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option 1: Maintain the dialogue structure as originally designed</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Main features</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Task Force (JTF) and Core Group (CG) are maintained with the tasks of supporting the organisation of the CC and coordinating Thematic Groups (TGs). Consultative Conference (CC) is convened every two years to discuss issues that affect SADC-ICP cooperation as provided in the WD, SADC Member States are represented at Senior Officials level SADC and ICPs take joint responsibility of organising the Consultative Conference Additional political dialogue with ICP continue to take place through different channels (e.g. with China).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Advantages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC’s Consultative Conferences had organised a number of CCs prior to the WD which had been quite successful in creating awareness on specific areas of intervention and draw ICP’s interest in those areas; SADC Member States are provided with a platform to take more ownership on SADC programmes;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disadvantages</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By associating ICPs in the organisation of the CCs, ICPs are held “mutually accountable” to the outcomes of the events. This situation can be a dilemma as it implies that ICPs would have to be closely involved in the organisation of CCs,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

63
including in the selection of conference themes, discussion papers etc. However, such an arrangement would dilute SADCs leadership and ownership of the process. The strong emphasis on the discussion themes of the CC makes it become an event on its own and have the tendency to disconnect it from its core function of providing political impetus to the implementation of aid effectiveness commitments; The expectations in organising a CC every two years with an innovative theme is quite demanding for the Secretariat. Experience from similar processes suggests that discussion themes at political level require sustained dialogue at technical levels before they reach the necessary maturity to be endorsed at political level. If the CC is to adequately fulfil the role it has been attributed with, SADC and ICPs would need to invest in considerably more resources than is currently available on the preparation on political dialogue on trends that affect regional integration. The JTF and the CG have significant overlaps in terms of function as well as membership;

Option 2: Streamline the dialogue structure of the framework to two levels: the Core Group and the Thematic Groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main features</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Disadvantages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SADC continues to organise CCs and engage ICPs in the same way as during the pre-WD period. SADC has the full responsibility of organising CCs, which can also focus on key thematic areas such as the CC organised for the Water Sector in 2010;</td>
<td>SADC has full ownership of the CC and can decide on the level of representation and the frequency of events;</td>
<td>SADC Member States are not directly represented in the dialogue;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The function of the JTF is merged into a single level (CG). Its composition is expanded to include SADC Double Troika representatives at Senior Officials level</td>
<td>The streamlined structure relieves a lot of pressure on the Secretariat and ICPs, who can allocate more time improving the dialogue as there will be more opportunities for regular meetings</td>
<td>Political dialogue on key emerging issues is restrained by the level of representation;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The dialogue structure will focus on the core functions of the partnership framework (i.e. Aid Effectiveness and other commitments that SADC and ICPs may want to integrate in the framework, for instance the commitments made at Global and Continental levels);</td>
<td>The participation of the SADC Double Troika favours Member States ownership on the process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The CG may also engage on political issues to clarify positions on core aid effectiveness matters and make recommendations to the relevant structures for decision; It should be observed that the current dialogue structure also foresees that deliberations of political dialogue be transmitted to decision making structures, hence there would be no change in that regard</td>
<td>The dialogue can focus on core issues with regard to the implementation of commitments and ensure coordination with the technical level;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The streamlined structure is more cost effective that the original structure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.2.2.2 Operational and technical structures

The proposals made with regard to the technical structures may be combined with any of the two options, since the adjustments made will not have any major bearing on their effectiveness. In fact the technical level of the partnership seems to have moved faster than and independently of the political level.

Also some Thematic Groups (TGs) have progressed faster than others. Results obtained have been sporadic and unequal across the different sectors. The survey results indicate that TGs do not use the appropriate tools to discuss SADC priorities. This implies that there is a risk
that SADC-ICP cooperation drifts in a supply-driven mode which would contradict the WD commitments.

The added value of the TG is defined by the outcome of its meetings. An analysis of the success factors indicates that the following three elements are key to prompt results:

- The diligence and determination of partners (to meet regularly and dedicate adequate resources to the process) and the capacity of co-chairs;
- A focused agenda, backed up by the SADC Management; and
- A results-oriented approach with adequate planning tools.

Those factors will have to be taken into consideration to improve the efficiency of the Thematic Groups. However, it is also important to leave some degree of flexibility in the functioning of TGs to cater for specificities. For instance, some areas of cooperation have very few partners and thus the modality for coordination will not be the same as areas where there are many partners. Furthermore, ICPs do not necessarily use the same instruments for cooperation (in spite of the commitment on harmonisation). The difference in degree of predictability and flexibility of funding for different ICPs will definitely be an element that will need to be taken on a case-to-case basis.

Hence it is suggested to avoid developing a blueprint for the implementation of the TG agenda and activities. It would be more effective to start off from what has been learnt and what has worked and to secure quick wins such as information-sharing, in order to mobilise participation of stakeholders, then gradually move to jointly addressing major regional priorities at an appropriate scale. It was noted that there is a disconnect between the technical and the political dialogue to the extent that there is not enough dialogue on aid effectiveness itself (i.e., progress on implementing the commitments, reflection on the characteristics and impact of aid effectiveness at SADC level; linkages of global and continental progress on the development effectiveness dialogue; etc.)

The following measures need to be considered on the way forward:

i) Assessing whether all TGs are required and should be retained (on the basis of their results and added value);

ii) Offering greater flexibility when operating each TG

iii) Regularity of meetings;

iv) Work embedded into operational plan deriving from SADC medium term strategies;

v) Outcome orientation;

vi) Ability to enhance aid effectiveness;

vii) Revising the performance of TGs and deciding to keep/stop and/or create new ones;

viii) Matching the form and scope of ICP support to newly assessed TG;

ix) Intensify the dialogue on aid and development by creating a thematic group on Development Effectiveness\textsuperscript{24};

\textsuperscript{24} Further analysis is required to define the exact role and added value of this TG. Three main functions could be envisaged: (i) to work specifically on the implementation of the WD Principles at the regional level (for example, by
x) Increase flexibility at the operational level by allowing for the creation of an ad-hoc task force, dealing with specific issues within a specific timeframe.

5.2.2.3 Identifying the right combination

The main advantage of maintaining the current dialogue structure (Option 1) is that it includes all Member States. This is particularly important in that it provides a broader basis to facilitate ownership. Besides, it provides an additional opportunity to linking national and regional cooperation. The re-establishment of the Consultative Conference as in the period prior to the WD is also a potential advantage which needs to be considered. However, the institutional implications in terms of the joint-responsibility and capacity demand of such an ambitious scope of dialogue are major issues which put into question the feasibility and sustainability of the structure. Currently there are no indications whether those two major bottlenecks will be resolved. ICPs have already expressed reservations on the issue of joint-responsibility for organising the CC. The capacity requirements to provide the CC in its current scope, taking into consideration the time required for preparation of background documents and the necessity for maintaining constant dialogue at technical level on a wide array of issues in order to seek political endorsement, are much beyond SADC’s current resources.

The option of streamlining the dialogue structure to two levels while focusing on the core issues of the WD partnership framework (Option 2) would definitely be more manageable for SADC and ICPs. SADC keeps the possibility of re-establishing CCs on the basis of its past experiences prior to the WD. The main disadvantage of that option is that it does not offer the opportunity for Member States to participate directly in the process. The participation of the Double-Troika in the CG is important to monitor the implementation of the commitments. However, there are other issues which require the direct involvement of Member States representatives as well as civil society representatives. Those include the identification of medium-term priorities for cooperation (see proposal on the development of a SADC-ICP partnership strategy above) as well as the evaluation of the partnership which will need to be carried out every two to three years.

In order to provide the opportunity for greater ownership of the partnership it is proposed that SADC sets up a regional cooperation forum with the participation of SADC Member States, civil society representatives of the region and ICPs. The purpose of the forum is for SADC and ICPs to identify cooperation priorities based on SADC medium-term strategies and corporate plans as well as to take note of progress and undertake reviews every two to three years. It is also recommended that the SADC Secretariat takes the full leadership in organising the forum and make consultations with ICPs at the level of the Core Group with regard to the agenda as well as the exact timing. The matrix below illustrates the analysis made for the three options.

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analyzing the impact of new aid modalities such as blending for SADC); (ii) to monitor the implementation of the Windhoek Declaration; and (iii) to ensure the linkages with global developments and their impact at the regional level (e.g. analysis of the specificity of development effectiveness for SADC regional level; processing the progress made in the international agenda such as AAA, Busan Partnership, African Consensus, etc.).
The addition of the forum to the structure proposed under Option 2 would therefore constitute a third option (Option 2+).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option 2+: A dialogue structure at two levels to address the core functions of the partnership framework (Core Group, and Thematic Groups) + a Regional Cooperation Forum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main features</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- SADC continues to organise Consultative Conferences (CCs) and engage ICPs in the same way as during the pre-WD period.</td>
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<td>- SADC has the full responsibility of organising CCs, which can also focus on key thematic areas such as the CC organised for the Water Sector in 2010.</td>
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<td>- The function of the JTF is merged into a single level (Core Group).</td>
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<td>- The composition of the Core Group is expanded to include SADC Double Troika representatives at Senior Officials level.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- The deliberations of the Core Group will take into consideration the recommendations of the regional cooperation forum (when the latter is convened).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The conclusions reached at the Core Group shall be implemented by the party concerned except where actions require policy decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The dialogue structure will focus on the core functions of the partnership framework (i.e. Aid Effectiveness and other commitments that SADC and ICPs may want to integrate in the framework, for instance the commitments made at Global and Continental levels).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The Core Group may also engage political dialogue issues to clarify positions on core aid effectiveness matters and make recommendations to the relevant structures for decision (It should be observed that the current dialogue structure also foresees that deliberations of political dialogue be transmitted to decision making structures, hence there would be no change in that regard).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The regional cooperation forum will be a platform to provide stakeholders of SADC programmes to contribute to the cooperation priorities and make recommendations to the Core Group on the implementation of the SADC-ICP partnership strategy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The establishment of the above structure will need to be accompanied by a consolidation of the Thematic Groups, namely through a more systematic use of SADC medium term strategies and corporate plans into pursue cooperation objectives.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Advantages
- SADC has full ownership of the CC and can decide on the level of representation and the frequency of events.
- The streamlined structure relieves a lot of pressure on the Secretariat and ICPs, who can allocate more time improving the dialogue as there will be more opportunities for regular meetings. The streamlined structure is more cost effective that the original structure.
- The participation of the SADC Double Troika to the Core Group meetings favours Member States ownership on the process.
- SADC Member States as well as civil society representatives are directly represented in the dialogue within the regional cooperation forum.
- Political dialogue on key emerging issues is not restrained by the level of representation.
- The dialogue can focus on core issues with regard to the implementation of commitments and ensure coordination with the technical level.

### Disadvantage
- Political dialogue on key emerging issues is restrained by the level of representation; this would need to be addressed through alternative ways, including bi-lateral cooperation channels, Think-tank workshops, Consultative Conferences (adopting SADC past formats).

In light of the current analysis, Option 2+ as shown below would be the most conducive to making the necessary impact on the implementation of the partnership framework, and maximising the results of the cooperation. However, other factors may need to be taken into consideration after the SADC-ICP partnership strategy is developed. Those would need to be discussed at the appropriate dialogue structure (the Core Group to start with) and endorsed by the relevant Authorities.

#### 5.2.3 Addressing institutional capacity

The lack of capacity at the SADC Secretariat as well as SADC Member States is at the core of many of the challenges encountered in the implementation of the SADC regional programmes. The causal linkage between capacity gaps at the Secretariat and the implementation of the WD commitments (including the functioning of the dialogue structure) have been discussed in the previous section of the current study.

The capacity of Member States in ensuring adequate national monitoring of SADC policies and programmes implementation is an issue which has been highlighted by several studies. According to the SADC Treaty, the coordination of SADC programmes in Member States should be undertaken by SADC National Committees (SNCs). It appears however that many of the SNCs are in fact not functioning due to lack of capacity (Come, 2007). Since the coordination of national and regional programmes has been identified as a critical issue to be considered under the partnership framework, it is important to look at capacity issues at Member States as well as the SADC Secretariat.

SADC’s Capacity Development Framework developed in 2008 sets the basis to coordinate capacity development programmes for the Secretariat. SADC has already to implement projects in consistency with that framework in cooperation with some ICPs, especially the EU and GiZ. Those cooperation arrangements will be pursued during the next few years. Those programmes will focus much on the development of systems and skills required to support SADC capacity needs and will also partly address some human resources needs. However, there are still important gaps to address human resources needs at the Secretariat. This is all

the more important considering that the ICP support to address human resources constraints will be gradually phased out over a period of time.

The capacity of the Secretariat with regards to ICP cooperation in particular will have to be strengthened and sustained. The following areas: are especially important:

- Skills to undertake prospective analysis in order to better anticipate issues related to ICP cooperation;
- Coordination on developments in the Global and Continental frameworks for aid effectiveness and development effectiveness;
- Monitoring and evaluation of aid effectiveness commitments and coordination of the partnership framework including the coordination of thematic groups.

6 CONCLUSION

The findings of the review indicate that Windhoek Declaration partnership framework remains an important platform for improved cooperation between SADC and ICPs although progresses in implementing the five principles have been quite slow.

The dialogue structure has not really produced the outcomes that were expected from the partnership process. Experience gathered from similar processes, indicate that developing a partnership is rarely a straightforward task that can be accomplished within a short period of time. Variations in the expectations of stakeholders can also hamper the quality of the dialogue and derail it from its initial objectives. However, as long as the as there is political will, solutions can be found and challenges surmounted.

A major asset is that the issues encountered through the WD dialogue structure have not prevented SADC and ICPs to pursue their cooperation. Important strides have been made in some cases. This is a good indicator of the willingness of SADC and ICPs to cooperate.

Based on the findings of the WD review and the analysis of the major bottleneck, four main challenges were singled out as being particularly important in making the partnership commitments an effective vehicle to development effectiveness.

One is to ensure that SADC has ownership and leadership of donor-funded initiatives, and that ICPs better align their interventions to SADC medium term strategies and corporate plans. Secondly, there is a strong need for better linkages between regional and Member States strategies of development, and better alignment between national and regional efforts to address the priorities (this also applies to ICPs in their cooperation with SADC Secretariat and SADC Member States).

Thirdly, the quality and the sustainability of the dialogue structures may not be reached if the capacities of the SADC Secretariat are not strengthened. Fourthly, it is important that SADC-ICPs partnership strategy integrates other SADC-ICPs dialogue frameworks based on bilateral engagement and Global and Continental consensus and position.

Finally, this review recommends embarking on the third option which includes:
- The dialogue structure is streamlined to two levels: the Core Group and the Thematic Groups (the function of the Joint SADC-ICP Task Force is merged into a single level: Core Group);
- Those two structures will focus on the core functions of the SADC-ICP partnership framework;
- A regional cooperation forum is created. The Regional Cooperation Forum will be a platform to provide stakeholders of SADC programmes to contribute to the cooperation priorities and make recommendations to the Core Group on the implementation of the SADC-ICP partnership strategy, especially on national/regional coordination
- The composition of the Core Group is expanded to include SADC Double Troika representatives at Senior Officials level;
- The conclusions reached at the Core Group shall be implemented by the party concerned except where actions require policy decisions;
- The deliberations of the Core Group will take into consideration the recommendations of the Regional Cooperation Forum (when the latter is convened);
- SADC may continue to organise Consultative Conferences (CCs) and engage ICPs in the same way as during the pre-WD period.

These new foundations of the SADC-ICP cooperation architecture call for a partnership framework that aligns with SADC’s strategy of development and systems at national and regional levels. This should also form the basis for clear action plan and roadmap, and regular monitoring and evaluation of progress made on Aid and Development effectiveness as recommended in the Fourth High Level Form on Aid effectiveness held in Busan in November 2011.
7 ANNEXES
## ANNEX I: Summary of the activities of the study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>OBJECTIVES</th>
<th>ACTIVITIES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Windhoek Declaration Review</td>
<td>Launch of the 2011 WD review- Core Group meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Communicate the questionnaire to ICPs, Secretariat, Member States</td>
<td>All questionnaires sent to ICPs, Secretariat and Member States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Plan the interviews</td>
<td>Planned dates of interviews in Gaborone (ICPs + Secretariat) &amp; Pretoria (ICPs) are agreed with the stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>STE mobilization</td>
<td>Arrangements for the STE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Questionnaires completed by ICPs and SADC Secretariat</td>
<td>Check the questionnaires received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Questionnaires completed by SADC Member States</td>
<td>Check the questionnaires received</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kick off meeting with the STE</td>
<td>Preparatory meeting to outline the work schedule and work plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Interviews in Botswana</td>
<td>Meeting with SADC Secretariat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Interviews in Botswana</td>
<td>Meeting with ICPs in Gaborone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Interviews in South Africa</td>
<td>Meeting with ICPs in Pretoria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>First consolidation of information and data</td>
<td>Check the quality of the information &amp; data gathered; possible new meetings/interviews with the stakeholders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Data analysis and interpretation</td>
<td>-Analyze the information &amp; data gathered; possible new meetings/interviews with the stakeholders. -Meeting with the SADC-ICP Task Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>First draft report of the WD review</td>
<td>-draft report -Meeting with the SADC-ICP Task Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Stakeholders meeting</td>
<td>-review the draft report and recommendations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Second draft report of the WD review</td>
<td>-draft report revised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Core Group meeting</td>
<td>Discuss the findings and recommendations of the report, and way forward</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## ANNEX II: List of questions used for the review

### PART 1: PARTNERSHIP COMMITMENTS

#### PARTNERSHIP COMMITMENT 1 – OWNERSHIP

1.1. General Question for SADC and ICPs

**Question 1:** Based on your experience, what are the successes and challenges in developing, implementing and monitoring the SADC regional development agenda as expressed through protocols and other regional agreements?

1.2. Questions for SADC

**Question 2:** There are challenges in coordinating and implementing the SADC Common Agenda (RISDP and SIPO) at regional and national levels

**Question 3:** RISDP and SIPO plans are translated into prioritised results-oriented operational programmes expressed in medium term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets

1.3. Question for ICPs

**Question 4:** There are challenges in coordinating and implementing the SADC Common Agenda (RISDP and SIPO) at regional and national levels

**Question 5:** SADC plays a leading role in ensuring that the principles of cooperation with the ICPs under the Windhoek Declaration are effectively adhered to

#### PARTNERSHIP COMMITMENT 2 – ALIGNMENT

2.1. General Question for SADC and ICPs

**Question 6:** SADC and ICPs cooperate in monitoring progress of alignment with SADC institutions and systems over time

**Question 7:** Name three (3) priorities to enhance alignment:

2.2. Questions for SADC

**Question 8:** SADC carries out diagnostic reviews of its financial management systems and informs the ICPs

**Question 9:** SADC provides reliable assessment of its financial management systems

**Question 10:** SADC undertakes measures to strengthen its financial management capacity

**Question 11:** SADC makes efforts to mobilise more internal resources and creates an enabling environment for public and private investments

2.3. Questions for ICPs

**Question 12:** Reviews of progress (monitoring and evaluation) in implementing the regional support are periodically conducted with SADC

**Question 13:** SADC provides reliable assessment of its financial management systems

**Question 14:** SADC undertakes measures to strengthen its financial management capacity

**Question 15:** Our organisation disbursed aid to SADC in a timely and predictable fashion according to agreed schedules and indicative commitments

**Question 16:** Our organisation provides indicative commitments to SADC over a multi-year framework

**Question 17:** Our organisation will utilise SADC systems for procurement once SADC implements mutually agreed standards and processes

**Question 18:** Our organisation will utilise SADC programming cycle

#### PARTNERSHIP COMMITMENT 3 – HARMONISATION
1.1. General Question for SADC and ICPs

Question 19: Have you (SADC and ICPs together) strengthened incentives including for recruitment, appraisal and training for management and staff to work towards harmonisation, alignment and results? Give examples.

Question 20: Name three (3) priorities to enhance harmonisation

1.2. Question for SADC

Question 21: SADC provides clear guidance to ensure that the ICPs provide complementary support to the regional agenda

Question 22: When programming, SADC takes into account the comparative advantages of the ICPS in the areas of cooperation

1.3. Question for ICPs

Question 23: SADC provides clear guidance to ensure that our organisation provides complementary support to the regional agenda

Question 24: Our organisation implements common arrangements with other ICPs. Explain your answer.

Question 25: Procedures for cooperation with SADC are simplified. If so, please explain how.

PARTNERSHIP COMMITMENT 4 – MANAGING FOR RESULTS

4.1. General Question for SADC and ICPs

Question 26: Do SADC and ICPs work together in a participatory approach to strengthen SADC capacities? - Give examples.

Question 27: Name three (3) priorities to enhance managing for results

4.2. Question for SADC

Question 28: SADC has established results-oriented reporting and assessment frameworks that monitor progress against key dimensions of the regional development strategies

4.3. Questions for ICPs

Question 29: Our organisation links regional programming for SADC with country level programming, and links resources to results

Question 30: Monitoring and reporting requirements for regional programmes/projects are harmonised with SADC to the maximum extent possible

PARTNERSHIP COMMITMENT 5 – MUTUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

5.1. General Question for SADC and ICPs

Question 31: Have SADC and ICPs jointly assessed mutual progress in implementing agreed commitments on aid effectiveness, including in Windhoek Declaration on a “New SADC/ICP Partnership”? Explain your answer.

Question 32: Name three (3) priorities to mutual accountability

5.2. Question for SADC

Question 33: SADC and ICPs periodically assess their commitment to mutual accountability

5.3. Question for ICPs

Question 34: Our organisation provides transparent and comprehensive information on aid flows in a timely manner to enable SADC Secretariat to present comprehensive budget reports to SADC Member States

PART 2: STRUCTURE FOR PARTNERSHIP DIALOGUE
**General Questions for SADC and ICPs**

**Question 35:** SADC and ICPs strongly support the functioning of the different structures of coordination (Consultative Conference, Joint SADC-ICP Task Force, Core Group, Thematic Groups). Explain your answer.

**Question 36:** Linked to the Busan commitments for “effective development co-operation” (4th High Level Forum, December 2011), what are the recommendations for strengthening and facilitating the SADC/ICPs partnership dialogue (e.g. name 3 priorities)?

**Questions for SADC**

**Question 37:** The Windhoek Declaration adds value to the cooperation between SADC and the ICPs.

**Question 38:** Current coordination and dialogue with ICPs requires a new framework. Explain your answer.

**Question for ICPs**

**Question 39:** The Windhoek Declaration adds value to the cooperation between ICPs and SADC.

**Question 40:** Current coordination and dialogue with SADC requires a new framework. Explain your answer.

**Questions for Thematic Groups**

**Question 41:** My Thematic Group has clear TORs, which guide the work of the Group.

**Question 42:** My Thematic Group meets regularly. Explain your answer.

**Question 43:** My Thematic Group has success stories. Explain your answer.

**Question 44:** My Thematic Group has key lessons learned. Explain your answer.

**Question 45:** My Thematic Group could improve its functioning and the interaction between the Thematic Group’s members.

**Question 46:** What are the key messages/recommendations for SADC and ICPs to improve the efficiency of cooperation and the overall SADC-ICPs structure for dialogue?
## ANNEX III: List of the participants in the review

### ORGANISATIONS/INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SADC SECRETARIAT</th>
<th>NAME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Dr. Tomaz A. Salomão</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Eng. João Samuel Caholo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Executive Secretary</td>
<td>Ms Emilie Mushobekwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director Policy Planning and Resources Mobilization</td>
<td>Dr. Angelo Mondlane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director Budget and Finance</td>
<td>Mr. Clement Kanya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director Human Resources and Administration</td>
<td>Mr. Russell S. Mufaya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Head of Unit - Gender</td>
<td>Ms Magdalene Mathiba Madibela</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officer International Partners</td>
<td>Mrs. Tracy Zinanga</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co Chair/TIFI Thematic Group</td>
<td>Ms Boitumelo Gofhamodimo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Co Chair/ORGAN Thematic Group</td>
<td>Lt. Col Tanki J. Mothae</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### COOPERATING PARTNERS

| British High Commission – regional Affairs Officer - Task team | Mr. Thibaud Kurtz                     |
| GTZ Principal Adviser, SADC Institution Programme – Task Team | Mr. Gerhard Sippel                    |
| Head of EU Delegation                                        | Mrs. Gerard McGovern                   |
| Ambassador - Germany                                         | Mrs. Annett Günthe                     |
| High Commissioner – United Kingdom                           | Mrs. Jennifer Anderson                  |
| Attaché - Japan                                               | Mrs. Naoli Suwa                       |
| Resident Representative, JICA                                | Mr. Nobuhiro Kumagai                   |
| Ambassador - France                                          | Mrs. Genevieve Iancu                   |
| Deputy Chief of Mission - Brazil                             | Mrs. Maria Clara de Paula              |
| Head of Development Cooperation, Sweden                      | Marie Bergstrom                        |
| Southern Africa Mission Director, USAID                      | Mr. Jeffrey Borns                      |
| UNODC Representative                                         | Mr. Mandiyaye Niang                    |
| UNIDO Representative – Director Regional Office              | Francois d’Adesky                      |
| Southern Africa Trust/SAT – Head of Programmes              | Mr. Themba Mhlongo                     |
| Minister plenipotentiary – Deputy head of Mission - Netherlands | Mr. Wouter Jurgens                   |
| Ambassador, Finland                                          | Mrs. Tina Myllintausta                 |
| Deputy Head of Mission - Austria                            | Mr. Martin Gärtnert                    |
| Ambassador - Denmark                                         | Mr. Dan E. Frederiksen                 |
| ICP Co Chair/Energy Thematic Group                          | Mrs. Mari Sofie Furu                   |
| ICP Co Chair/Transport Thematic Group                       | Mr. Nick Amin                          |
| ICP Co Chair/Water Thematic Group                           | Mr. Horst Vogel                        |
| ICP Co Chair/TIFI Thematic Group                            | Mr. Theo Kaspers                       |
| ICP Co Chair/FANR Thematic Group                            | Ms. Helena McLeod                      |
| ICP Co Chair/ORGAN Thematic Group                           | Mr. Otto Ditz                          |
| ICP Co Chair/HIV & AIDS Th. Group                           | Ms. Cristina de Carvalho Eriksson      |
## ANNEX IV: List of the Thematic Groups & Co-chairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thematic Group</th>
<th>SADC directorates and persons</th>
<th>ICP institutions and persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI) | TIFI Directorate  
- Mrs Boitumelo Gofhamodimo (Director)  
  Bghofamodimo@sadc.int | EU  
Gaborone  
- Mr Theodorus Kaspers  
  theodorus.kaspers@ec.europa.eu |
| Transport | Infrastructure and Services (I&S) Directorate  
- Mr Remigious Makumbe (Director)  
  rmakumbe@sadc.int  
- Ms Mapolao Rosemary Mokoena  
  mmokoena@sadc.int | UK/DFID.  
Pretoria  
- Mr Nick Amin  
  N-Amin@dfid.gov.uk |
| Energy | I&S Directorate  
- Mr Remigious Makumbe (Director)  
  rmakumbe@sadc.int  
- Mr Freddie Mothlathledi  
  fmothlathledi@sadc.int | Norway  
Maputo  
- Mr Hans Terje Ylvisåker  
  hans.ylvisaker@gmail.com  
- Mari Sofie Furu  
  Mari.Sofie.Furu@mfa.no |
| Water | I&S Directorate  
- Mr Remigious Makumbe (Director)  
  rmakumbe@sadc.int  
- Mr Phera Ramoeli  
  pramoeli@sadc.int | Germany-GIZ.  
Pretoria  
- Mr Horst Vogel  
  Horst.Vogel@gtz.de |
| Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (FANR) | FANR Directorate  
- Mrs Margaret Nyirenda (Director)  
  mnyirenda@sadc.int  
- Mr. Simon Mwale  
  smwale@sadc.int  
- Mr. Nyambe Naymbe  
  nnyambe@sadc.int | FAO  
Harare  
- Mr Cary Joseph  
  cary.joseph@fao.org  
UK-DFID  
Pretoria  
- Mrs Helena McLeod  
  H-McLeod@dfid.gov.uk |
| Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) | OPDS  
- Mr Tanki Mothae (Director)  
  tmothae@sadc.int  
- Mr Sergio Baloi  
  sbaloi@sadc.int | Austria  
Pretoria  
- Ambassador Otto Ditz  
  Otto.DITZ@bmeia.gv.at |
| HIV/AIDS | Social and Human Development and Special Program Directorate  
- Mr Stephen Sianga (Director)  
  ssianga@sadc.int  
- Mrs Antonica Hembe  
  ahembe@sadc.int | Sweden.SIDA  
Lusaka  
- Mr Cristina de Carvalho  
  cristina.de-carvalho@foreign.ministry.se |
ANNEX V: List of existing documents used for reference

- BUSAN PARTNERSHIP FOR EFFECTIVE DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION, Fourth High Level Forum on aid effectiveness, Busan, Republic of Korea, 29 November-1 December 2011.


- Progress report on implementation of donor funded projects for 2011/12 financial year in the period: April-September 2011/12, SADC, November 2011.


(*) The list of existing documents is not exhaustive. Minutes of meetings that took place in the framework of the Windhoek Declaration review, when made available, including in their draft form, were also analyzed.